New book profiling RAF Bomber Command in WW2

[MarktheMole]

Good morning.. I'm an ex-FT columnist and reporter - I've been commissioned to write a new, detailed, impartial analysis of the effectiveness of RAF Bomber Command (BC) in all its many activities. May I send out a request for your expert, independent opinions and views, especially those which may be original and insufficiently expressed, which may help answer the following:
- Overall, how effective/decisive was BC during WW2, especially after 1943?
- What more could have been done/modified in any respect, to have made it more effective in destroying Germany's ability to wage war?
- Were the right targets selected, and if not, which other targets would have been more damaging?
- It now seems likely many German factories fraudulently overstated production - any examples you may know, or suspect, of this? We know Philips in Eindhoven did this, obviously deliberately, and got away with it.
- Did the Air Ministry's intelligence section fail to give BC the right information and, if so, provide details?
- Should a large force of bomber Mosquitos have been formed much earlier in the war?
- BC's performance during 1942 is considered 'weak' by many analysts, but it triggered the V-weapons programme. Can you list any other destructive consequences achieved during 1942?
And all responses included in the book will be credited to the contributor. Feel free to send this request to anyone you think might have a contribution to make.. In advance, thank you very much indeed..
Kind regards,
Marcus Gibson

[Jhieminga]

Originally Posted by MarktheMole

- It now seems likely many German factories fraudulently overstated production - any examples you may know, or suspect, of this? We know Philips in Eindhoven did this, obviously deliberately, and got away with it.

Just a quick note to mention that the Philips factory in Eindhoven was in occupied The Netherlands, not in Germany as your question appears to imply. Philips' chairman spent five months in a concentration camp as the Germans felt that the repairs following Operation Oyster in 1942 took too long and he had failed to end a strike at the factory. So did they get away with it? It led to the raid on the factories...

It's quite a broad spectrum subject that you're taking on. Some of your questions could be a book in their own right, and I wonder how you are going to balance independent views obtained through a forum against all the factual evidence and other material already out there? If you want an impartial analysis, shouldn't that be based on the facts alone?

[Asturias56]

there must be thousands of books already written on this subject - check Amazon for those still in print ................. what , exactly, is the benefit of another one?

[Peter47]

Bomber Harris - Sir Arthur Harris' Despatch on War Operations 1942 - 1945 compiled by John Grehan & Martin Mace (Pen Sword Aviation 2014, ISBN 978 1 78303 298 3) is a useful read and contains a lot of interesting data. Obviously its one person's view and needs critical analysis - just the job for an ex FT journalist.

[FlightlessParrot]

Originally Posted by Asturias56

there must be thousands of books already written on this subject - check Amazon for those still in print ................. what , exactly, is the benefit of another one?

That's how history works. Old stories get retold because each (serious) book does new analysis and finds new data which needs reconsidering. And the audience changes, and stories are always told to a specific audience. And in this case, there's always the chance of new official records being released.

Just another popular book on a topic like this isn't needed (whatever needed means), but a new serious analysis, asking perhaps different questions, could well add to our knowledge.

There's also the case that the WW2 bombing campaign is a bit of a troublesome spot in British memory, and so is returned to in a way that might seem on the verge of the obsessional to others.

[Brewster Buffalo]

"...Should a large force of bomber Mosquitos have been formed much earlier in the war?"

Well you could say for every action there is a reaction so more Mosquitos could have lead to an earlier introduction of the Me 262 which might have been unhelpful to the USAAF!

Good luck with the book..

[DHfan]

Originally Posted by Brewster Buffalo

"...Should a large force of bomber Mosquitos have been formed much earlier in the war?"

A large force of Mosquitos couldn't have been formed that much earlier as the bombers didn't enter service until very late 1941 or early 1942. The bulged bomb bay doors to carry the 4000 lb bomb didn't arrive until well into 1943.

I thought I've had previously is that Arthur Harris was probably the right man at the right time when he was appointed, given there was said to be no other way of fighting back, but was he still the right man by early 1944?

[BEagle]

Training a suitable number of pilots to man a larger number of Mosquito squadrons would also have proved difficult?

[ancientaviator62]

I think that it must be remembered that Bomber Command did not in isolation dream up the 'area bombing' doctrine. All the major decisions come from the government and in this case Churchill. Harris merely carried it out in his own thorough way.. After all the early defeats in WW2 it was the only way we could strike back at the Axis powers. Had Churchill disagreed with this he could he changed the edict and removed Harris at any time. He was not backward in sacking senior officers for alleged shortcomings. That he left Harris in place suggests to me that he did not wish to alter anything in respect of Bomber Command. It was only later that he decided for political reasons to distance himself from the Bomber Campaign .Not his finest hour.

[DHfan]

Harris was appointed to carry out the government's or war cabinet's policy of area strategic bombing which he carried out with dogged determination, not only because he was ordered to do so but also because he wholeheartedly agreed with the policy.
However, in early 1944 when Bomber Command was needed to switch to tactical bombing in support of the forthcoming invasion, Harris disagreed with the policy so basically ignored it, still convinced that area bombing was all that was required.
IIRC, as mentioned in another thread recently, it took a direct order before Harris would start allocating resources to tactical bombing.

Dresden in particular certainly wasn't Churchill's finest hour, especially as Harris was specifically ordered to carry out the raid. I'm sure I've read somewhere that the raid was at the instigation of the Americans.