New book profiling RAF Bomber Command in WW2
Good morning.. I'm an ex-FT columnist and reporter - I've been commissioned to write a new, detailed, impartial analysis of the effectiveness of RAF Bomber Command (BC) in all its many activities. May I send out a request for your expert, independent opinions and views, especially those which may be original and insufficiently expressed, which may help answer the following:
- Overall, how effective/decisive was BC during WW2, especially after 1943?
- What more could have been done/modified in any respect, to have made it more effective in destroying Germany's ability to wage war?
- Were the right targets selected, and if not, which other targets would have been more damaging?
- It now seems likely many German factories fraudulently overstated production - any examples you may know, or suspect, of this? We know Philips in Eindhoven did this, obviously deliberately, and got away with it.
- Did the Air Ministry's intelligence section fail to give BC the right information and, if so, provide details?
- Should a large force of bomber Mosquitos have been formed much earlier in the war?
- BC's performance during 1942 is considered 'weak' by many analysts, but it triggered the V-weapons programme. Can you list any other destructive consequences achieved during 1942?
And all responses included in the book will be credited to the contributor. Feel free to send this request to anyone you think might have a contribution to make.. In advance, thank you very much indeed..
Kind regards,
Marcus Gibson