Staines, UK 1972, June 18th.
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I think it was roughly here...
If my memory is correct Mandatory Occurrence Reporting came as a result of this accident inquiry and recommendations. I believe BEA had a similar near miss when the LE droop was retracted below min speed and it was reported internally but no action had been taken. This aspect was covered in the accident report.
N4790P
It was 'PT which had its tail torn off by the Ambassador and was scrapped. 'PI was repaired and returned to service. Both were parked at Hatton Cross for a while. In summer '68 my student vac job was at Air Canada Commissary, located next to the Eagle hangars. The engineers at HC were happy for us to take a look around during lunch breaks. One of the Tridents (can't remember which) had a series of gashes along the trailing edge of one of the wings. The BEA chaps told us it was where one of the Ambassador's spinning props hit the Trident. Sobering experience.
Edit - DUK already answered
I saw the ill fated BKS Lizie on approach while on a bus from Richmond to Hounslow-it flew over us. Not long after a big pall of black smoke from the general direction of 'The Airport'. I ahve followed Blind pews commentary over a few eyars because a school friend of mine was at Hamble with ST and was very cut up about it. He went on to BOAC and the back to short haul in the merger
PB
PB
I was training for my Aerodrome Control rating in Glasgow Tower that day when Scottish Centre told us the terrible news.
As I was in my first year, we hadn't yet done the BEA Course at Viking House but we found out all the different things that had to be done on the Trident two years later when we did the course on the Trident Systems Trainer; we didn't do the 'all moving' sim as this was booked H24.
As I was in my first year, we hadn't yet done the BEA Course at Viking House but we found out all the different things that had to be done on the Trident two years later when we did the course on the Trident Systems Trainer; we didn't do the 'all moving' sim as this was booked H24.
Once back in service the tail was wrecked again when it was in the hangar, a Comet on an engine test outside overrode its chocks, lunged forward, and brought the hangar doors down on it. A further major repair.
At the PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.
To return to the fatal accident can anybody help me with a few questions in the final report ?(https://assets.publishing.service.go...973_G-ARPI.pdf)
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
At the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
At the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.
" On a more modern aircraft "
regretfully many of the features we take for granted on modern aircraft were bought at the cost of lives lost in accidents like the Staines one
regretfully many of the features we take for granted on modern aircraft were bought at the cost of lives lost in accidents like the Staines one
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The damage to Papa India in the Ambassador accident looked sufficient to have written the aircraft off in most situations, repairs must have cost much of the value of the aircraft.
Once back in service the tail was wrecked again when it was in the hangar, a Comet on an engine test outside overrode its chocks, lunged forward, and brought the hangar doors down on it. A further major repair.
At the PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.
Once back in service the tail was wrecked again when it was in the hangar, a Comet on an engine test outside overrode its chocks, lunged forward, and brought the hangar doors down on it. A further major repair.
At the PI accident there was apparently considerable searching of engineering repair documents to see if anything arising from those could have contributed to the stall. A very unlucky aircraft.
Iirc
To return to the fatal accident can anybody help me with a few questions in the final report ?(https://assets.publishing.service.go...973_G-ARPI.pdf)
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Maybe to select which sides nav instruments were followed..but not sure
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
We had wind up clocks each side
Initially pitch hold? You then pulled speed lock?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Guess.. pete Chapman and Dennis woods were either side ..Dennis accepted an interception take off in a viscount..pete went after PI in a trident..both said at the trident museum knees up that they made written submissions but were not presented along with many others
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
no
the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?no..they would have a lot of flashing lights both red and amber
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Maybe to select which sides nav instruments were followed..but not sure
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
We had wind up clocks each side
Initially pitch hold? You then pulled speed lock?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Guess.. pete Chapman and Dennis woods were either side ..Dennis accepted an interception take off in a viscount..pete went after PI in a trident..both said at the trident museum knees up that they made written submissions but were not presented along with many others
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
no
the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?no..they would have a lot of flashing lights both red and amber
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.
PS they didn't understand perceived noise limits so we routed over relatively open countryside north bound between Slough and maidenhead ..I lived at Taplow roughly where a heavy T1 would increae to climb power.. literally you would get waves in a glass of wine..
we also had odd guys in both sense of the word including a manager or two, who would do their own thing like leaving take off power on and bringing in the flaps themselves whilst hand flying..looking out of the window for the measuring point..yanking the throttles back..then opening up again..
can't throw too many stones as once whilst RHS I got to VNE by 3 grand in a dc9'51..minimum noise exposure for those with beach villas ..Happy days
Last edited by blind pew; 20th Jun 2022 at 10:35. Reason: Post script
N4790P
Fifty odd years ago many repairs were carried out that would seem ridiculous today. Think of the TWA 707 that had its nose destroyed by a bomb in the cockpit at Damascus. Boeing built a new nose section and shipped it to Syria, where the aircraft was repaired and put back into service.Today, the cost of labour results in a write off even if the damage is technically repairable. This applies to cars as well as aircraft.
BOAC did indeed repair a 707 where the wing virtually fell off as a result of a ground fire. A schoolfriends father was one of the project engineers.
I imagine that this kind of engineering was more feasible back then due to less complex materials and production methods and certainly wouldnt be possible on 'plastic aeroplanes'. . I wonder how far an ace car mechanic of the 60s would get with even a fairly humble 2020 family car
I imagine that this kind of engineering was more feasible back then due to less complex materials and production methods and certainly wouldnt be possible on 'plastic aeroplanes'. . I wonder how far an ace car mechanic of the 60s would get with even a fairly humble 2020 family car