To return to the fatal accident can anybody help me with a few questions in the final report ?(
https://assets.publishing.service.go...973_G-ARPI.pdf)
Firstly who a few people who are named in the public enquiry were?
Captain Evans and two unnamed FO who demonstrated three take off and landings in December 1972?
Captain J W Jessop , named as one of the assessors.
Page Four mentions a switch in the P1 azimuth window. It states it was found in the starboard position after the crash but that it may have been moved due to the footprints found in the area and that it should have been in the port position. It all sounds very circumstantial to me and I doubt a modern enquiry would have believed this explanation. What exactly did it do?
Would the aircraft clock have any input to the FDR?
When the autopilot was engaged what lateral and vertical modes would have been engaged? What was the vertical mode targeting? A vertical speed or based upon a speed reference?
At the bottom of page four is a note about the delay on starting the take off roll may have been due to a low pressure warning light in the stall recovery system, how did the enquiry come to this conclusion?
Was it normal practice for the PF also to do the RT?
At the first stall warning the autopilot disengages. On a more modern aircraft there is a hierarchy for how the aircraft produces warnings. I take it that the autopliot disengaging would have produced an aural warning but would the stall warning have suppressed it?
In a modern aircraft with a speed trend arrow I encourage my colleagues not to reduce power or try and clean up unless there was a positive acceleration trend to avoid wallowing around in a low energy environment where the only get outs are reducing height or adding power but this seems to have been standard practice and resulted in many cases of speed loss in Trident operation. This seems to be utterly criminal and trying to avoid a noise complaint rather than preserving the safe operation of the aircraft seems like the tail is wagging the dog.