WW 2 Bombing Accuracy (or not)
Innovate and WanderOO....
Thanks for the heads up on that. I'm sure the info I read was in regard to the whole war.
The Butt Report was dated 08/1941 hence the figures were even worse as one would expect as Bomber Command were still getting their act together.
Shall nevertheless digest it more fully as time permits.
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Thanks for the heads up on that. I'm sure the info I read was in regard to the whole war.
The Butt Report was dated 08/1941 hence the figures were even worse as one would expect as Bomber Command were still getting their act together.
Shall nevertheless digest it more fully as time permits.
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Think I once referred to this on "Pilot's Brevet" as a city being: "the smallest thing a navigator could find that was too big for the bomb-aimer to miss".
Really, it was a miracle that the heroes of Bomber Command (and I use the word advisedly, having never been one) could even find a city, after 3-4 hours over a blacked-out continent with little but DR to help them, while dodging flak and being hunted by night fighters.
Remember Johnson: "Sir, the wonder is not that the bear dances well, but that he dances at all".
Before the advent of modern, laser-guided weapons, "Precision Bombing" was a myth; the nearest thing to it was a dive-bomber (advt). Look up "Midway", where three big Japanese fleet carriers (out of a battle group of four) were left blazing - in a matter of minutes!
Danny42C.
Really, it was a miracle that the heroes of Bomber Command (and I use the word advisedly, having never been one) could even find a city, after 3-4 hours over a blacked-out continent with little but DR to help them, while dodging flak and being hunted by night fighters.
Remember Johnson: "Sir, the wonder is not that the bear dances well, but that he dances at all".
Before the advent of modern, laser-guided weapons, "Precision Bombing" was a myth; the nearest thing to it was a dive-bomber (advt). Look up "Midway", where three big Japanese fleet carriers (out of a battle group of four) were left blazing - in a matter of minutes!
Danny42C.
Accuracy after the Pathfinders entered the scene.
RAF Wyton - The Pathfinder Force
By the start of 1944 the bulk of Bomber Command was now bombing within 3 miles of the PFF indicators
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Accuracy was possible early in WW II, but mostly at too high a cost.
It seems that in the 1930s, everyone overestimated the effectiveness of bombing, and underestimated the vulnerability of bombers in daylight. The two factors compounded, so that a loss-rate that would be acceptable for a "knock-out blow" was disastrous for a long campaign. Baldwin is always scorned for saying that "the bomber will always get through," but two things need to be said. First, he was relying on the advice of his professional advisers in the RAF, which is what a politician is supposed to do; second, he (and they) were right, some bombers always did get through, but the losses were unacceptable. I think Bomber Command regarded 3% losses as tolerable, but 10% was a defeat.
It is notable that the Germans, who discarded the notion of strategic bombing (that is, counter-city actions), were the only force that early in the war had the means to undertake it, with a doctrine of fighter defence of bomber forces (though the practice was flawed, under the stress of losses), and adequate guidance systems for accurate bombing at night.
Precision bombing always involved heavy losses. Once the Ju 87 met serious fighter opposition, it became very expensive to operate, and dive-bombers always seem to have been vulnerable: it is claimed that even at Midway, the greatest success of precision dive bombing, the sacrificial diversion of the torpedo bombers was crucial in getting the dive bombers through in sufficient numbers to score the very small number of hits that decided the battle.
As for the original question, the Germans clearly had better accuracy early in the war, with dive bombing for tactical warfare, and guidance systems for night bombing which enabled strategic attacks to be effective. The USA had dive bombers also in its Navy, and a strategic bombing force that could be accurate in clear skies in daylight, but which could not defend itself as expected, and which had problems with clouds. Even late in the war, when British accuracy had improved greatly, it took a lot of sorties to disable Tirpitz.
The vision or nightmare of the 1930s only really came to reality with the development of nuclear weapons, which made accuracy less important (though even then, apparently, Nagasaki was spared some destruction because of an error in aiming).
It seems that in the 1930s, everyone overestimated the effectiveness of bombing, and underestimated the vulnerability of bombers in daylight. The two factors compounded, so that a loss-rate that would be acceptable for a "knock-out blow" was disastrous for a long campaign. Baldwin is always scorned for saying that "the bomber will always get through," but two things need to be said. First, he was relying on the advice of his professional advisers in the RAF, which is what a politician is supposed to do; second, he (and they) were right, some bombers always did get through, but the losses were unacceptable. I think Bomber Command regarded 3% losses as tolerable, but 10% was a defeat.
It is notable that the Germans, who discarded the notion of strategic bombing (that is, counter-city actions), were the only force that early in the war had the means to undertake it, with a doctrine of fighter defence of bomber forces (though the practice was flawed, under the stress of losses), and adequate guidance systems for accurate bombing at night.
Precision bombing always involved heavy losses. Once the Ju 87 met serious fighter opposition, it became very expensive to operate, and dive-bombers always seem to have been vulnerable: it is claimed that even at Midway, the greatest success of precision dive bombing, the sacrificial diversion of the torpedo bombers was crucial in getting the dive bombers through in sufficient numbers to score the very small number of hits that decided the battle.
As for the original question, the Germans clearly had better accuracy early in the war, with dive bombing for tactical warfare, and guidance systems for night bombing which enabled strategic attacks to be effective. The USA had dive bombers also in its Navy, and a strategic bombing force that could be accurate in clear skies in daylight, but which could not defend itself as expected, and which had problems with clouds. Even late in the war, when British accuracy had improved greatly, it took a lot of sorties to disable Tirpitz.
The vision or nightmare of the 1930s only really came to reality with the development of nuclear weapons, which made accuracy less important (though even then, apparently, Nagasaki was spared some destruction because of an error in aiming).
Nagasaki was spared some destruction because of an error in aiming
Edit to add: From Rhodes, "Making of the Atomic Bomb", I paraphrase: Original AP covered in cloud, radar bombing considered. On run in for a radar drop hole on undercast allowed sighting/drop on a known feature (a stadium) "several miles upriver from the original aiming point".
FWIW Rhodes does indeed comment that destruction was reduced due to terrain surrounding the eventual ground zero, but in the context of this thread I'm not sure that can be claimed as down to an "aiming error".
(Apologies if I'm being overly picky).
Last edited by wiggy; 19th Aug 2016 at 08:48.
Accuracy after the Pathfinders entered the scene.RAF Wyton - The Pathfinder Force
Didn't the introduction of the SABS bombsight make things more accurate?
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Wiggy
I don't think you're being over-picky, and I'm not wanting to quibble for the sake of quibbling. Evidently they hit more or less what they were aiming at; but in the overall picture of accuracy in strategic bombing, it also counts that they did not hit the intended aiming point. Even with the advantage of complete command of the day-time air, still the same kind of problem, though to a much lesser extent, of earlier bombing in Europe, namely of getting over the right location in the first place.
It is interesting that they did not rely on radar; do you have any information on why not? I've read somewhere the judgement that USAAF bombing on radar through cloud in Europe amounted, pretty much, to adopting area bombing, and so was a step towards the wholesale counter-city bombing of the Japanese campaign.
I'm at a loss whether modern accuracy makes things better or worse for the poor souls beneath it.
I don't think you're being over-picky, and I'm not wanting to quibble for the sake of quibbling. Evidently they hit more or less what they were aiming at; but in the overall picture of accuracy in strategic bombing, it also counts that they did not hit the intended aiming point. Even with the advantage of complete command of the day-time air, still the same kind of problem, though to a much lesser extent, of earlier bombing in Europe, namely of getting over the right location in the first place.
It is interesting that they did not rely on radar; do you have any information on why not? I've read somewhere the judgement that USAAF bombing on radar through cloud in Europe amounted, pretty much, to adopting area bombing, and so was a step towards the wholesale counter-city bombing of the Japanese campaign.
I'm at a loss whether modern accuracy makes things better or worse for the poor souls beneath it.
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It is interesting that they did not rely on radar; do you have any information on why not?
This has always been a shortcoming with any airborne primary radar system.
The secondary radars such as Oboe and Gee did not suffer from this problem, but they did have the shortcoming of needing ground transmitters within range of the intended target.
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Are we talking about accuracy or effectiveness? Accuracy is irrelevant if you can't find the aiming point and the woeful results early in WW2 are surely down to the inability to find the target town, never mind the aiming point. Someone out there should be able to quote the sort of CEPs being achieved on the range at the time, but in 1946 IX(B) with its new Lincolns was proud to record an average error (not CEP) of 32 yards for 8 bombs from 20000 feet - step forward F/O Myatt and crew! I suspect 300 yards was nearer the mark in real life.
Navigation without radio aids is/was not easy and AFAIR in the 50s a requirement for classification as a Select Canberra crew was to keep within 50nm of track on astro.
Navigation without radio aids is/was not easy and AFAIR in the 50s a requirement for classification as a Select Canberra crew was to keep within 50nm of track on astro.
For live bombing Research Branch observed that there was a tendency for crews to drop bombs early on the markers with subsequent aircraft dropping early on prior bomb bursts.
With the PFF the 35 Sqn 540 stated accuracy of marking as 400 yards.
Later ResBat calculated that combat degradation was in the order of 75% over training attacks.
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In one of the raids in the Summer of 1943 RAF Bomber Command was tasked with destroying the Krupp armaments factory in Essen.
RAF Pathfinding Mosquitoes utilizing the Oboe blind bombing device laying flares to indicate the factory which was totally destroyed, so accurate was the attack that the Nazis looked for the traitors (Communists, of course) who had lit up the factory target for the RAF as they couldn't comprehend such accuracy.
The high flying Mosquitoes which would routinely fly at 30,000ft could use the blind bombing aid codenamed Oboe based on two transmitter sites in Kent and Suffolk and which was limited due to the curvature of the earth hence the use of Mosquitoes which would increase the target range.
The Peenemunde Raid of 1943 used a visual timed run-in from the island of Rugen with the deliberate task of killing the German scientists who were developing the V1 and V2 rockets, the most famous casualty was Ing Dr Thiel who was a propulsion specialist.
By 1943 RAF Pathfinder Force employed a range of tactics to use subject to the weather with code names such a Newhaven, Parramatta (The birthplace of AVM Don Bennett) and Wanganui which is worth another chapter in itself!
RAF Pathfinding Mosquitoes utilizing the Oboe blind bombing device laying flares to indicate the factory which was totally destroyed, so accurate was the attack that the Nazis looked for the traitors (Communists, of course) who had lit up the factory target for the RAF as they couldn't comprehend such accuracy.
The high flying Mosquitoes which would routinely fly at 30,000ft could use the blind bombing aid codenamed Oboe based on two transmitter sites in Kent and Suffolk and which was limited due to the curvature of the earth hence the use of Mosquitoes which would increase the target range.
The Peenemunde Raid of 1943 used a visual timed run-in from the island of Rugen with the deliberate task of killing the German scientists who were developing the V1 and V2 rockets, the most famous casualty was Ing Dr Thiel who was a propulsion specialist.
By 1943 RAF Pathfinder Force employed a range of tactics to use subject to the weather with code names such a Newhaven, Parramatta (The birthplace of AVM Don Bennett) and Wanganui which is worth another chapter in itself!
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A word about high level bombing accuracy - wind.
There is an assumption that the bomb spends more time at height and stronger winds than at lower levels. Based on that the wind used on a computer is factored at about 2/3 that of the wind at height. This holds good where the air mass is homogeneous. If dropping through a frontal zone with wind sheer the bombs can fly practically anywhere.
There is an assumption that the bomb spends more time at height and stronger winds than at lower levels. Based on that the wind used on a computer is factored at about 2/3 that of the wind at height. This holds good where the air mass is homogeneous. If dropping through a frontal zone with wind sheer the bombs can fly practically anywhere.
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A word about high level bombing accuracy - wind.
There is an assumption that the bomb spends more time at height and stronger winds than at lower levels. Based on that the wind used on a computer is factored at about 2/3 that of the wind at height. This holds good where the air mass is homogeneous. If dropping through a frontal zone with wind sheer the bombs can fly practically anywhere.
There is an assumption that the bomb spends more time at height and stronger winds than at lower levels. Based on that the wind used on a computer is factored at about 2/3 that of the wind at height. This holds good where the air mass is homogeneous. If dropping through a frontal zone with wind sheer the bombs can fly practically anywhere.
I've not seen that pointed out so clearly before, and I have read a fair bit.
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Flightless Parrot,
It was not an estimate from the 30s but the actual civilian losses from the German bombing campaign in WWI that gave cause for alarm. The Gothas and R Planes actually inflicted higher casualty rates than in the later Blitz.
It was not an estimate from the 30s but the actual civilian losses from the German bombing campaign in WWI that gave cause for alarm. The Gothas and R Planes actually inflicted higher casualty rates than in the later Blitz.
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Thank you. Which means that, however good the navigation aids, however complete the command of the air, however accurate the bomb sights, there's an irreducible potential for inaccuracy in high-level bombing without in-flight guidance.
I've not seen that pointed out so clearly before, and I have read a fair bit.
I've not seen that pointed out so clearly before, and I have read a fair bit.
The error can be minimised by dropping parallel to the wind direction and dropping a stick of bombs. Ideally you would fly downwind to minimise tome over target. In training we would fly in to wind to maximise time for target identification and aiming.
As you can see, dumb bombing is a function of compromise and luck.
PS, even at 500 feet and TBF of 6 seconds there is plenty of scope for getting it wrong. That is level bombing of course, the TBF for dive bombing will be less.
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Yes indeed, but these were on a relatively small scale, and the element of estimation came in scaling them up for the future war. It would be interested to find out how much estimates of bombing casualties were influenced by intra-service competition (consciously or unconsciously).
By the time of Overlord the accuracy of Bomber Command was such that the Main Force bombers were used in a tactical role (much to Harris's disgust). My father was in the infantry and witnessed first hand both daylight and night time attacks by the main force on German positions at distances as short as 1000 yards. During Operation Totalize the PFF were even assisted in marking the target by the Divisional artillery firing flares and coloured tracer.
Father had no complaints about Bomber Command's accuracy, on the other hand he was on the receiving end of the USAAF in broad daylight on a couple of occasions when well behind the front line.
Father had no complaints about Bomber Command's accuracy, on the other hand he was on the receiving end of the USAAF in broad daylight on a couple of occasions when well behind the front line.
In connection with this discussion and well worth reading if you haven’t already done so is "The United States Strategic Bombing Survey" - available here:
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)
United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (European War)
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Yes indeed, but these were on a relatively small scale, and the element of estimation came in scaling them up for the future war. It would be interested to find out how much estimates of bombing casualties were influenced by intra-service competition (consciously or unconsciously).
I can't find my copy but a fairly extensive exposition of the projected casualties especially as they affected Civil Defence preparations is given in "The Blitz" by Constantine FitzGibbon. Funnily enough, this book is much earlier (1957) than those on the Blitz cited by Wiki. Incidentally Wiki states that the WW1 estimates were corroborated by the bombing casualties in the Spanish Civil War.