Mt Erebus accident.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: Kerikeri New Zealand
Age: 89
Posts: 126
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Mt Erebus accident.
The local news media is again full of "expert opinions" as to who, what, why, and how did this terrible accident occur.
I was in the air in another DC10 at the time of the accident, and by a quirk of fate was not on board NZP, even though I had involved with both Lucas and Cassin on roster swaps prior to the accident.
The enquiry and accident reports on this prang are all full of lies deception, holier than thou statements that are so much a distortion of the truth, it is as hard as picking fly dirt out of pepper to get a complete truthful and accurate story of events prior to and indeed after the accident.
Blame has been afforded on the CEO of ANZ at the time, how he is to blame is still a mistry to me.
Capt Collins was the victim of a series of tragic mistakes and mis information.
Some of the previous captains( not all) flew in VMC conditions and flew low level up to Mc Murdo sounds.
Most of these Captains deny this but photgraphs from previous flight passengers show this to be a fact.
MSA was and still is 16000 ft, but it was allowed to be ignored if the Met conditions were OK for VFR type flying at a lower level.
Collins took this loop hole in the accepted practices.
Unfortunately Collins did not know that previous to his flight the computer generated flight plan had moved the Position of Mc Murdo by some 26 miles.
Collins had, prior to the flight used a flight plan printout that was issued by the Route briefing unit which DID NOT SHOW the new revised turning point at McMurdo.
Collins would have been confident that he had a clear VFR route to Mc Murdo,but ANZ administration had seen that he was short of current info.
Admittedly one of the crew, Casin and or Lucas would have cross checked that the printed format was the same as the format in the CDU, but I and most other pilots of the time did tend to skip along tracks a bit quickly because of time constraints.
To Deviate to Illustrate the point I was on a AKL HNL flight one night and the aircraft did a 180 degree turn at the transition of the date line. which took several minutes to clear.
I had enterered a longtitude with an East instead of a West at the date line transition.(This was not picked up in the xcheck of the CDU/Flightplan)
Capt Jim Collins was not to blame, for the accident even though some of the bottom lines state Pilot error.
Should it be able to get the whole truth out in the open a lot of egotistical short arsed pilots would have a little more than egg on their faces.
I add as a Post script ,I flew with every member of the crew on that flight in the previous six weeks, Collins was a good pilot to fly with, Casin was good But not tough enough to challenge a captain, Lucas was tough enough but he was back in the cabin at the time.
I did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording.
The real bottom line is a case of money.
Should the airline be in error the compensation claims are limitless, should the pilot be in error the claims are limited to US$40,000.00.
We are back to the big boys cheating again! and the small players paying as usual.
Little cog in big wheel.
I was in the air in another DC10 at the time of the accident, and by a quirk of fate was not on board NZP, even though I had involved with both Lucas and Cassin on roster swaps prior to the accident.
The enquiry and accident reports on this prang are all full of lies deception, holier than thou statements that are so much a distortion of the truth, it is as hard as picking fly dirt out of pepper to get a complete truthful and accurate story of events prior to and indeed after the accident.
Blame has been afforded on the CEO of ANZ at the time, how he is to blame is still a mistry to me.
Capt Collins was the victim of a series of tragic mistakes and mis information.
Some of the previous captains( not all) flew in VMC conditions and flew low level up to Mc Murdo sounds.
Most of these Captains deny this but photgraphs from previous flight passengers show this to be a fact.
MSA was and still is 16000 ft, but it was allowed to be ignored if the Met conditions were OK for VFR type flying at a lower level.
Collins took this loop hole in the accepted practices.
Unfortunately Collins did not know that previous to his flight the computer generated flight plan had moved the Position of Mc Murdo by some 26 miles.
Collins had, prior to the flight used a flight plan printout that was issued by the Route briefing unit which DID NOT SHOW the new revised turning point at McMurdo.
Collins would have been confident that he had a clear VFR route to Mc Murdo,but ANZ administration had seen that he was short of current info.
Admittedly one of the crew, Casin and or Lucas would have cross checked that the printed format was the same as the format in the CDU, but I and most other pilots of the time did tend to skip along tracks a bit quickly because of time constraints.
To Deviate to Illustrate the point I was on a AKL HNL flight one night and the aircraft did a 180 degree turn at the transition of the date line. which took several minutes to clear.
I had enterered a longtitude with an East instead of a West at the date line transition.(This was not picked up in the xcheck of the CDU/Flightplan)
Capt Jim Collins was not to blame, for the accident even though some of the bottom lines state Pilot error.
Should it be able to get the whole truth out in the open a lot of egotistical short arsed pilots would have a little more than egg on their faces.
I add as a Post script ,I flew with every member of the crew on that flight in the previous six weeks, Collins was a good pilot to fly with, Casin was good But not tough enough to challenge a captain, Lucas was tough enough but he was back in the cabin at the time.
I did see a hand written transcript of the voice recorder that commenced with "You are wrong, stick it up your arse." Bang door slammed( ostensibly from Lucas). thence the rest of the 30 minutes of tape recording.
The real bottom line is a case of money.
Should the airline be in error the compensation claims are limitless, should the pilot be in error the claims are limited to US$40,000.00.
We are back to the big boys cheating again! and the small players paying as usual.
Little cog in big wheel.
Last edited by gulfairs; 11th Sep 2011 at 04:00.
Join Date: Oct 2000
Location: Berkshire, UK
Age: 79
Posts: 8,268
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My family and I were within a hair's breadth of being on that flight and hearing the sad news that evening on a TV in Tauranga shook us to the core.
The arguments will continue, but in my book the crew were in error. If they were in true "visual" conditions they should have seen the dangers; it's no good arguing about waypoints being moved. They were ultimately responsible for the safety of the aeroplane and it went pear-shaped. Sorry if that upsets anyone... 30+ years later I still get the shivers thinking about it.
The arguments will continue, but in my book the crew were in error. If they were in true "visual" conditions they should have seen the dangers; it's no good arguing about waypoints being moved. They were ultimately responsible for the safety of the aeroplane and it went pear-shaped. Sorry if that upsets anyone... 30+ years later I still get the shivers thinking about it.
Per Ardua ad Astraeus
Join Date: Mar 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 18,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If they were in true "visual" conditions they should have seen the dangers;
The NZALPA website www.erebus.co.nz is essential reading for anyone with an interest in this accident.
Here can be found the original Chippindale and Mahon reports in full. They are lengthy documents, scanned and presented as a series of PDFs which makes them not the easiest of reading. Time and perseverance are essential.
One would have hoped that the words of reconciliation by Rob Fyfe (Air New Zealand CEO) at the thirtieth anniversary might have healed the wounds caused in no small part by previous ANZ management. Evidently not - it appears there will always be differing views on where responsibility and blame begin and end, and passions are too strong.
If there can be a simple summary of a complex situation, I would endorse BOAC's post #3: -
An excellent 'Swiss Cheese' example with failures at all levels.
Here can be found the original Chippindale and Mahon reports in full. They are lengthy documents, scanned and presented as a series of PDFs which makes them not the easiest of reading. Time and perseverance are essential.
One would have hoped that the words of reconciliation by Rob Fyfe (Air New Zealand CEO) at the thirtieth anniversary might have healed the wounds caused in no small part by previous ANZ management. Evidently not - it appears there will always be differing views on where responsibility and blame begin and end, and passions are too strong.
If there can be a simple summary of a complex situation, I would endorse BOAC's post #3: -
An excellent 'Swiss Cheese' example with failures at all levels.
it's no good arguing about waypoints being moved.
I don't often disagree with you, HD, but I do this time.
Because the crew were not told the waypoint had been moved they thought they were somewhere else. They did not expect to see a mountain directly in front of them - and, because of the whiteout conditions, they didn't! This gave them the impression they were flying in VMC - because they saw what they expected to see based on the flightpath they had previously plotted on their charts!
Join Date: May 2002
Location: Permanently lost
Posts: 1,785
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Isn't the real issue that the crew descended below LSALT without a positive identification of their position?
They descended because they thought they were over McMurdo Sound based on the aforementioned navigational change and a misidentification of some coastline. However, in the virtual whiteout conditions that prevailed that was a dangerous assumption.
IIRC the SOP prevailing for the flights was that they were not to descend below the LSALT unless they were in visual conditions and had positively identified their position.
They descended because they thought they were over McMurdo Sound based on the aforementioned navigational change and a misidentification of some coastline. However, in the virtual whiteout conditions that prevailed that was a dangerous assumption.
IIRC the SOP prevailing for the flights was that they were not to descend below the LSALT unless they were in visual conditions and had positively identified their position.
The causes of this accident are far more complex than what a cursory look at the evidence would at first produce in the way of assumptions. The material pertinent to the first investigation, the Mahon enquiry, the input of experts such as Gordon Vette, all must be reviewed closely, before holding forth with an opinion.
In which regard, it becomes manifestly clear, on consideration in particular of the testimony of the captains who had crewed earlier flights of identical character, (except that they returned of course in one piece), in addition to the erroneous INS data that the company gave Captain Collins, that he did not stuff up due to any lack of airmanship. The primary fault lay in the carelessness of the company. Further to that the training section was found negligent in the conduct of their briefing sessions, which, though designed to cover every conceivable aspect of these special flights into potentially hazardous conditions, did not in fact for a first timer such as Jim Collins, give him adequate preliminary exposure.
History is too full of cases of commanders held culpable on false or unsafe grounds, then hounded, even to the grave, later to be exonerated by those who'd smelled a rat and would not rest till they'd uncovered the truth of the matter.
In which regard, it becomes manifestly clear, on consideration in particular of the testimony of the captains who had crewed earlier flights of identical character, (except that they returned of course in one piece), in addition to the erroneous INS data that the company gave Captain Collins, that he did not stuff up due to any lack of airmanship. The primary fault lay in the carelessness of the company. Further to that the training section was found negligent in the conduct of their briefing sessions, which, though designed to cover every conceivable aspect of these special flights into potentially hazardous conditions, did not in fact for a first timer such as Jim Collins, give him adequate preliminary exposure.
History is too full of cases of commanders held culpable on false or unsafe grounds, then hounded, even to the grave, later to be exonerated by those who'd smelled a rat and would not rest till they'd uncovered the truth of the matter.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Fantome ,
" In which regard, it becomes manifestly clear,"
I would agree with that statement but for entirely different reasons. Here is the first one.
The requirements for descent were very clearly laid out, very explicit, and for the reason that the lack of Antarctic experience of the Air New Zealand crews was well known. The required conditions were as follows.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows:
1.. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid My Erebus by operating in an arc from 120'Grid through 360'Grid to 270'grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29
4. Descent to be Co ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
The reported weather at McMurdo base was well below that required for the approved descent procedure. That is why they invented their own.
Not one of the required mandatory requirements for descent was met. They did talk to the radar operator, but they were never identified on the radar.
At no time did they have a DME lockon to TACAN channel 29.
At no time were they in the required arc from TACAN Ch 29 for the approved descent.
The argument that the waypoint had been changed would have had no such serious repercussions if these mandatory requirements had been complied with.
But, even if the aircraft was where the crew thought it was, in the weather conditions that they considered were good enough for a VMC descent, why was it that nobody twigged that they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island, a very distinctive Island that was visible, it showed in photo's recovered from the wreckage.
If they were so certain of their position during this descent why was it that Mulgrew, the tour guide, and supposed expert on things local for this trip told the passengers less than 4 minutes from impact
" I still can't see very much at the moment, keep you informed soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are"
Even if they were where they thought they were,they were within 25 miles of a 13,000 odd ft mountain and they had never sighted it even once.
And the simplest confirmation of the lot, they had a lat/long readout from the INS that was exceedingly accurate, but at no time was this readout put on a chart before descent was commenced.
Previous flight had descended below the altitudes laid down, but they had all been identified, and position confirmed by McMurdo radar, and in the conditions they had Mt Erebus could be see from 100 miles or more.
This from Bob Thomson who had been down to Antarctica some 75 times, and some 50 times on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North. He was the usual commentator on Air New Zealand flights to the ice.
Taken from John Kings New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.
"The captain didn't give any attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he had gone in by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay.
Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the the cloud. If a pilot is unsure of his position he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot of flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it."
And that sums it up, as to the cause of the accident.
PS "the input of experts such as Gordon Vette," How many trips to the ice does it require to be termed an expert??? How many trips to the ice had Gordon Vette carried out??
" In which regard, it becomes manifestly clear,"
I would agree with that statement but for entirely different reasons. Here is the first one.
The requirements for descent were very clearly laid out, very explicit, and for the reason that the lack of Antarctic experience of the Air New Zealand crews was well known. The required conditions were as follows.
Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160 to 6,000ft as follows:
1.. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid My Erebus by operating in an arc from 120'Grid through 360'Grid to 270'grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29
4. Descent to be Co ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
The reported weather at McMurdo base was well below that required for the approved descent procedure. That is why they invented their own.
Not one of the required mandatory requirements for descent was met. They did talk to the radar operator, but they were never identified on the radar.
At no time did they have a DME lockon to TACAN channel 29.
At no time were they in the required arc from TACAN Ch 29 for the approved descent.
The argument that the waypoint had been changed would have had no such serious repercussions if these mandatory requirements had been complied with.
But, even if the aircraft was where the crew thought it was, in the weather conditions that they considered were good enough for a VMC descent, why was it that nobody twigged that they were on the wrong side of Beaufort Island, a very distinctive Island that was visible, it showed in photo's recovered from the wreckage.
If they were so certain of their position during this descent why was it that Mulgrew, the tour guide, and supposed expert on things local for this trip told the passengers less than 4 minutes from impact
" I still can't see very much at the moment, keep you informed soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are"
Even if they were where they thought they were,they were within 25 miles of a 13,000 odd ft mountain and they had never sighted it even once.
And the simplest confirmation of the lot, they had a lat/long readout from the INS that was exceedingly accurate, but at no time was this readout put on a chart before descent was commenced.
Previous flight had descended below the altitudes laid down, but they had all been identified, and position confirmed by McMurdo radar, and in the conditions they had Mt Erebus could be see from 100 miles or more.
This from Bob Thomson who had been down to Antarctica some 75 times, and some 50 times on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North. He was the usual commentator on Air New Zealand flights to the ice.
Taken from John Kings New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.
"The captain didn't give any attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he had gone in by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay.
Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the the cloud. If a pilot is unsure of his position he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot of flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it."
And that sums it up, as to the cause of the accident.
PS "the input of experts such as Gordon Vette," How many trips to the ice does it require to be termed an expert??? How many trips to the ice had Gordon Vette carried out??
Last edited by prospector; 13th Sep 2011 at 05:27.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Nov 2001
Location: Kerikeri New Zealand
Age: 89
Posts: 126
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
" I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it."
In those days we were overawed in the accuracy of the triplex INS compared to the nearly correct doppler that was still used on the DC8.
After loading a flight plan into the computer, if it wasn't aleady loaded as a route as a 'from via to format', one rarely if ever cross checked the CDU waypoints with the printed edition at hand.
It wasn't until we operated the steam driven, cable operted switch, B747-200 was the stage by stage cross checked; and that was because the 747 INS was almost clockwork, as well we had all had our arses kicked after the horse got out( so to speak)
A.G Vette's redition of mind set, visual accurity ,seeing what you expected even it it did not quite fit theses, is probably closer to the truth than most pilots would or will admit.
It certainly was not Morry Davis's fault that the accident took place, but the brains in Flight route planning/flight planning do really have to look at them selves and try and be honest about the pre 901 events.
Jim Collins and crew were victims of a system that was run by a bunch of men who did suffer from alto ego, particularly if one challenged them over any point in navigation ,operation and performance.
Air New Zealand broke more rules in performance operation because of cost in useable dollars than most people would ever believe.
Another incident was discovered by a very poor take off performance at Hong Kong one evening, due to a power plant change in allowable limits, the aircraft then increased in mauw for take off but the new limits on the engines were not applied because it woudl shorten the hot section overhaule life.
I succeeded in getting 5(five) consecutive route checks because I challenged aircrew management over this issue and we were technically taking off over weight.
Such was the thinking in those days.
In fact I retired 5 years early over a disputed take of performance in a steam driven aircraft out of LGW again because it would increase operating costs if we did it according to the manufacturer's specifications.
I could write on but Have diverted a little from Poor old Jim Collins case.
He was not at fault---Air New Zealand flight management was.
I flew on after leaving Air NZ, working in Europe, Ireland NZ and self employed,.
I make the unreserved statement that.
In all my working life, Air New Zealand LTd stand head and shoulders above the rest as being the WORST employer I ever worked for.
Now go back and look again at the Mahone report, Impact Erebus, and other publications on that accident and the route cause is obvious.
GR
In those days we were overawed in the accuracy of the triplex INS compared to the nearly correct doppler that was still used on the DC8.
After loading a flight plan into the computer, if it wasn't aleady loaded as a route as a 'from via to format', one rarely if ever cross checked the CDU waypoints with the printed edition at hand.
It wasn't until we operated the steam driven, cable operted switch, B747-200 was the stage by stage cross checked; and that was because the 747 INS was almost clockwork, as well we had all had our arses kicked after the horse got out( so to speak)
A.G Vette's redition of mind set, visual accurity ,seeing what you expected even it it did not quite fit theses, is probably closer to the truth than most pilots would or will admit.
It certainly was not Morry Davis's fault that the accident took place, but the brains in Flight route planning/flight planning do really have to look at them selves and try and be honest about the pre 901 events.
Jim Collins and crew were victims of a system that was run by a bunch of men who did suffer from alto ego, particularly if one challenged them over any point in navigation ,operation and performance.
Air New Zealand broke more rules in performance operation because of cost in useable dollars than most people would ever believe.
Another incident was discovered by a very poor take off performance at Hong Kong one evening, due to a power plant change in allowable limits, the aircraft then increased in mauw for take off but the new limits on the engines were not applied because it woudl shorten the hot section overhaule life.
I succeeded in getting 5(five) consecutive route checks because I challenged aircrew management over this issue and we were technically taking off over weight.
Such was the thinking in those days.
In fact I retired 5 years early over a disputed take of performance in a steam driven aircraft out of LGW again because it would increase operating costs if we did it according to the manufacturer's specifications.
I could write on but Have diverted a little from Poor old Jim Collins case.
He was not at fault---Air New Zealand flight management was.
I flew on after leaving Air NZ, working in Europe, Ireland NZ and self employed,.
I make the unreserved statement that.
In all my working life, Air New Zealand LTd stand head and shoulders above the rest as being the WORST employer I ever worked for.
Now go back and look again at the Mahone report, Impact Erebus, and other publications on that accident and the route cause is obvious.
GR
Last edited by gulfairs; 13th Sep 2011 at 06:22.
Guest
Posts: n/a
" Now go back and look again at the Mahone report, Impact Erebus, and other publications on that accident and the route cause is obvious."
Yes, the cause certainly is obvious.
Mahons publication,containing what one would expect it to contain, is actually titled "Verdict on Erebus".
Gordon Vettes publication is entitled "Impact Erebus"
There are many other publications and reports on this accident, many by Pilots with many years of experience in airline flying, and very few of them agree with Mahons findings, which is not suprising as he had absolutely no aviation experience or expertise.
His findings were admittedly of value in the aftermath of the accident, the political sheenanigans, the shortcomings of some of Air New Zealand's operational staff, but his knowledge of cockpit behaviour in large, or for that matter, any aircraft, as he accused the Chief Accident inspector of, was non existant.
All this happened after the accident, if the mandatory descent requirements were adhered to, even one of them, then the accident would not have happened.
Yes, the cause certainly is obvious.
Mahons publication,containing what one would expect it to contain, is actually titled "Verdict on Erebus".
Gordon Vettes publication is entitled "Impact Erebus"
There are many other publications and reports on this accident, many by Pilots with many years of experience in airline flying, and very few of them agree with Mahons findings, which is not suprising as he had absolutely no aviation experience or expertise.
His findings were admittedly of value in the aftermath of the accident, the political sheenanigans, the shortcomings of some of Air New Zealand's operational staff, but his knowledge of cockpit behaviour in large, or for that matter, any aircraft, as he accused the Chief Accident inspector of, was non existant.
All this happened after the accident, if the mandatory descent requirements were adhered to, even one of them, then the accident would not have happened.
There you have it . . . . same again for the second course. . . . two diametrically opposed opinions . . . one from seemingly a lounge chair expert, (apologies, if this is insulting to an expert witness), and one from a former Air NZ skipper, possibly jaundiced by clashes with management. Over and over, there have been a steam of often predictable, unreconcilable opinions, bruited back and forth, a great many of them resistant to substantiation.
The precise origins of the campaign to maintain and never let up on the vilification of Jim Collins are not particularly obvious. My suspicion is that the Ron Chippendale camp would not in a million years be able, or want to be able, to take a broad and reasoned view, subjecting every scintilla of evidence to dispassionate review. Those who claim this has been done and that such would be an exercise in futility are wrong. . . . more than wrong . . . they are as deluded as the world's most benighted ostrich.
The precise origins of the campaign to maintain and never let up on the vilification of Jim Collins are not particularly obvious. My suspicion is that the Ron Chippendale camp would not in a million years be able, or want to be able, to take a broad and reasoned view, subjecting every scintilla of evidence to dispassionate review. Those who claim this has been done and that such would be an exercise in futility are wrong. . . . more than wrong . . . they are as deluded as the world's most benighted ostrich.
Guest
Posts: n/a
"The precise origins of the campaign to maintain and never let up on the vilification of Jim Collins are not particularly obvious."
Come now, lets try and stick to fact. Nobody started the ball rolling (again) on this subject to vilify Jim Collins, Paul Holmes started it to vilify Ron Chippendale.
If you wish to refer to "lounge chair experts", how about starting with that person??
Come now, lets try and stick to fact. Nobody started the ball rolling (again) on this subject to vilify Jim Collins, Paul Holmes started it to vilify Ron Chippendale.
If you wish to refer to "lounge chair experts", how about starting with that person??
Last edited by prospector; 13th Sep 2011 at 21:26.
Join Date: Nov 2011
Location: Boston
Age: 60
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A key question for me has not been resolved to my complete satisfaction. I'm hoping someone here can answer it, as I am not a pilot. I believe absolute key to Vette's position is his view that INS is as reliable as ground based aides. Is (or was) this justified, given the conditions at the time? I know some have answered "yes," and others "no." If the answer is "no," then why not? My common sense speculation has been that INS is less reliable for precisely the kind of mistake that was actually made in the last minute change of coordinates.
Thanks
[edit: changed "unreliable" to "less reliable"]
Thanks
[edit: changed "unreliable" to "less reliable"]
chris
An INS is telling you where it "thinks" you are because it knows where you started off ( that's if you aligned it properly) and has integrated every single acceleration you've made since brake release.
Any error in the above processes, (e.g. in measuring the accelerations) will result in a mismatch between where the INS "thinks" you are and where you really are in the world.
It was not unknown, in the days of flying around with a single 1960s build INS to see mismatches of tens of miles between the calculated position and your real position...the modern kit is much better, a good ADIRU or IRS position might only be adrift by a couple of miles after a long flight. Even so if you let down on raw INS alone (highly unusual these days of GPS but....) you are letting down on a "theoretical" position. FWIW some companies (most?all?) forbid letting down on the basis of a raw INS position, so I guess you can draw your own conclusion..
ALL IMHO as an end user, not as a INS techie.
An INS is telling you where it "thinks" you are because it knows where you started off ( that's if you aligned it properly) and has integrated every single acceleration you've made since brake release.
Any error in the above processes, (e.g. in measuring the accelerations) will result in a mismatch between where the INS "thinks" you are and where you really are in the world.
It was not unknown, in the days of flying around with a single 1960s build INS to see mismatches of tens of miles between the calculated position and your real position...the modern kit is much better, a good ADIRU or IRS position might only be adrift by a couple of miles after a long flight. Even so if you let down on raw INS alone (highly unusual these days of GPS but....) you are letting down on a "theoretical" position. FWIW some companies (most?all?) forbid letting down on the basis of a raw INS position, so I guess you can draw your own conclusion..
ALL IMHO as an end user, not as a INS techie.
Last edited by wiggy; 28th Nov 2011 at 17:16.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having been hooked on the subject since I saw the TVNZ docudrama on the BBC when I was off sick from school in 1990 (and in fact managed to stretch out my infirmity by an extra day so I could see the final part), as an outside observer there were several forces at play in the aftermath of the accident.
Chippindale was an old-school "by-the-book" pilot of military extraction and post-WWII vintage, and everything he said indicates it was inconceivable to him that anyone other than the Captain should take responsibility for a crash that was caused by anything other than mechanical failure or extreme weather. By all accounts a great pilot and a good man, even if you disagree with his conclusions he should not be vilified for them. His occasionally slightly exotic interpretations of what was said on the CVR are not so easy to defend, but I suspect he genuinely believed that he was right. I wonder if the "handwritten" transcript that bbg's original post refers to might have been his - I distinctly remember that the controversial phrase "Bit thick here, eh Bert?"* was handwritten over the top of the NTSB's "indecipherable" marks at that particular timestamp. The problem with Chippindale's approach is that he was not a line pilot at the time, and he had no reason to believe that ANZ's corporate culture was any less stringent than the military culture he knew well. While later in life he acknowledged that the rules governing the sightseeing flights had not been followed in the past, he seemed to consider those incidents at the discretion of the pilots involved, and looking deeper into it was not warranted.
From what I've read and conversations I've had, in the cut-throat world of aviation in the '70s the truth was that rules were being bent, if not outright ignored, almost routinely. Most of the Kiwis I've spoken to over the years have advanced the opinion that Muldoon was running the country like his own personal fiefdom even as it increased in stature over the years, and as far as he was concerned his mate Morrie [Davis, then-CEO of ANZ] was still the man to run the national flag carrier, having seen it grow from a small operation in the Tasman days to the multi-million dollar operation it had become by the late '70s. A lot of ANZ's pioneer spirit was admirable on the surface, and indeed they followed through on the Antarctic flights to start with - rules were put in place, including the one Chippindale referred to regarding minimum altitudes, and no-one was allowed to command an Antarctic sightseeing flight until they had first been down there for familiarisation. These rules stayed in place for some time, but something went awry between that time and the Collins flight, and an "all mates together" attitude from the top down was not sufficient to stop it happening.
To begin with, the requirement for any commander of an Antarctic flight to first be taken on a familiarisation trip was dropped, whether because of the human tendency to grow complacent as new ventures become routine or more controversially, commercial pressure (ANZ pioneered Antarctic flights, but the larger Australian airlines were beginning to offer similar packages) we can only speculate. The fact remains that even by the '70s, Antarctica was still a risky proposition in aviation terms - sector whiteout was known about, but something rarely experienced on the line and the haste with which aviation in Antarctica went from being something that involved small aircraft loaded with survival gear to fully-laden widebodies with full onboard service and passengers in mufti definitely began to look foolhardy with 20/20 hindsight.
The breakdown in communication between ANZ's Navigation section and flight operations was also something that should not have been tolerated. A culture that allowed the Chief Navigator to make a mistake when programming the navigation computer because he did not perform the third "re-check" of his data is bad enough, but to compound that mistake by correcting it the night before the next flight was due to leave and *not informing operations that he had done so* quite rightly beggars belief, and Mahon was absolutely right to censure both the Chief Navigator and the company that allowed him to do so.
The fallout following the Mahon report is legendary, and the subsequent finding that he had overstepped his bounds - not by explicitly stating his belief that he had been lied to, but by saying that the lies were orchestrated from the top down - was later spun by Muldoon as an exoneration of ANZ and Morrie Davis (which it clearly wasn't). The tragedy there was that the careers of both Mahon and Davis - both pioneers in their field and very capable men - never recovered from these events.
Whether one subscribes to Chippindale's or Mahon's interpretation of the accident (or indeed weigh up the pros and cons of both), the fact remains that ANZ's corporate culture (and aviation safety knowledge globally) received a much-needed overhaul because of the information that Mahon brought to light, and for that the man deserves to be applauded.
* - When Mahon went to Washington with the CVR tapes, an equally credible alternative was "This is Cape Bird", which would completely reverse the conclusions Chippindale drew - but ultimately the equipment was not able at that time to make it any more clear. I wonder what modern audio technology would make of it?
Chippindale was an old-school "by-the-book" pilot of military extraction and post-WWII vintage, and everything he said indicates it was inconceivable to him that anyone other than the Captain should take responsibility for a crash that was caused by anything other than mechanical failure or extreme weather. By all accounts a great pilot and a good man, even if you disagree with his conclusions he should not be vilified for them. His occasionally slightly exotic interpretations of what was said on the CVR are not so easy to defend, but I suspect he genuinely believed that he was right. I wonder if the "handwritten" transcript that bbg's original post refers to might have been his - I distinctly remember that the controversial phrase "Bit thick here, eh Bert?"* was handwritten over the top of the NTSB's "indecipherable" marks at that particular timestamp. The problem with Chippindale's approach is that he was not a line pilot at the time, and he had no reason to believe that ANZ's corporate culture was any less stringent than the military culture he knew well. While later in life he acknowledged that the rules governing the sightseeing flights had not been followed in the past, he seemed to consider those incidents at the discretion of the pilots involved, and looking deeper into it was not warranted.
From what I've read and conversations I've had, in the cut-throat world of aviation in the '70s the truth was that rules were being bent, if not outright ignored, almost routinely. Most of the Kiwis I've spoken to over the years have advanced the opinion that Muldoon was running the country like his own personal fiefdom even as it increased in stature over the years, and as far as he was concerned his mate Morrie [Davis, then-CEO of ANZ] was still the man to run the national flag carrier, having seen it grow from a small operation in the Tasman days to the multi-million dollar operation it had become by the late '70s. A lot of ANZ's pioneer spirit was admirable on the surface, and indeed they followed through on the Antarctic flights to start with - rules were put in place, including the one Chippindale referred to regarding minimum altitudes, and no-one was allowed to command an Antarctic sightseeing flight until they had first been down there for familiarisation. These rules stayed in place for some time, but something went awry between that time and the Collins flight, and an "all mates together" attitude from the top down was not sufficient to stop it happening.
To begin with, the requirement for any commander of an Antarctic flight to first be taken on a familiarisation trip was dropped, whether because of the human tendency to grow complacent as new ventures become routine or more controversially, commercial pressure (ANZ pioneered Antarctic flights, but the larger Australian airlines were beginning to offer similar packages) we can only speculate. The fact remains that even by the '70s, Antarctica was still a risky proposition in aviation terms - sector whiteout was known about, but something rarely experienced on the line and the haste with which aviation in Antarctica went from being something that involved small aircraft loaded with survival gear to fully-laden widebodies with full onboard service and passengers in mufti definitely began to look foolhardy with 20/20 hindsight.
The breakdown in communication between ANZ's Navigation section and flight operations was also something that should not have been tolerated. A culture that allowed the Chief Navigator to make a mistake when programming the navigation computer because he did not perform the third "re-check" of his data is bad enough, but to compound that mistake by correcting it the night before the next flight was due to leave and *not informing operations that he had done so* quite rightly beggars belief, and Mahon was absolutely right to censure both the Chief Navigator and the company that allowed him to do so.
The fallout following the Mahon report is legendary, and the subsequent finding that he had overstepped his bounds - not by explicitly stating his belief that he had been lied to, but by saying that the lies were orchestrated from the top down - was later spun by Muldoon as an exoneration of ANZ and Morrie Davis (which it clearly wasn't). The tragedy there was that the careers of both Mahon and Davis - both pioneers in their field and very capable men - never recovered from these events.
Whether one subscribes to Chippindale's or Mahon's interpretation of the accident (or indeed weigh up the pros and cons of both), the fact remains that ANZ's corporate culture (and aviation safety knowledge globally) received a much-needed overhaul because of the information that Mahon brought to light, and for that the man deserves to be applauded.
* - When Mahon went to Washington with the CVR tapes, an equally credible alternative was "This is Cape Bird", which would completely reverse the conclusions Chippindale drew - but ultimately the equipment was not able at that time to make it any more clear. I wonder what modern audio technology would make of it?
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 28th Nov 2011 at 21:29.
Join Date: Nov 2011
Location: Boston
Age: 60
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"This is Cape Bird" I assume was made after the aircraft had descended below 6,000 ft?
My question is, was it safe to rely on INS for this very descent? The view has been expressed that Collins and his crew should have positively identified the terrain before descending, or else wait for corroboration from ground instruments. That's the piece I'm trying to get a definitive answer on.
My question is, was it safe to rely on INS for this very descent? The view has been expressed that Collins and his crew should have positively identified the terrain before descending, or else wait for corroboration from ground instruments. That's the piece I'm trying to get a definitive answer on.
Join Date: Apr 2009
Location: `
Posts: 309
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by HEATHROW DIRECTOR
The arguments will continue, but in my book the crew were in error. If they were in true "visual" conditions they should have seen the dangers; it's no good arguing about waypoints being moved. They were ultimately responsible for the safety of the aeroplane and it went pear-shaped. Sorry if that upsets anyone... 30+ years later I still get the shivers thinking about it.
HD, I share your shivers. I was a PPL at that time waiting at NZCH for the DC10 to land and refuel before heading back to Auckland. It was a long cold night and it didn't take long before we worked out it had exceeded it's flight time and had run out of go-juice.
Collins has to share the majority of the blame but that doesn't say other may have been blameless. Again it is a case of the swiss cheese syndrome; take away one factor and it may never have happened. I remember a C130 flew the same route but 500 fet higher and it cleared the summit. How many seconds earlier if TOGA had been applied would we now not be discussing this issue. It was a sad day for the whole country. What followed was also no better.
I would also like to make it very clear that I in no way am trying to impeach the integrity of Captain Vette and his role in the subsequent Commission. I met him briefly (picked up the Tech Crew when I was driving taxis while saving for my C Cat) and from discussions with ANZ flight crew who knew him, he was a man of honour and intergrity. I believe he was protecting/defending his pilots from the ANZ management skulduggery that took place after the event. Captain Collins was responsible for checking the Flight Plan and using an old school atlas was really not the way to do that. That was not a professional at work on this ocassion and added to the swiss cheese slices.
Mahon uncovered the ANZ management involvement and the attempted coverup or at least the distortion of events and the political involvement. However he failed to take into account Reg 51 and the responsibility of the PinC in this Regulation.
This tragedy was a long time ago. Lessons were learned from this (like they are from every accident). I hope AF447 and other tragic incidents are not going to suffer the same repeated regurgitation that TE901 is being put through.
Last edited by Biggles78; 29th Nov 2011 at 06:36. Reason: Added a few more words.
Join Date: Jul 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 3,093
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My question is, was it safe to rely on INS for this very descent? The view has been expressed that Collins and his crew should have positively identified the terrain before descending, or else wait for corroboration from ground instruments. That's the piece I'm trying to get a definitive answer on.
The chart showing the route down McMurdo Sound, and the INS co-ordinates following that route had by this time been in the system for a year - all the line pilots flying to Antarctica believed that the route change was deliberate, and that henceforth they would be flying down McMurdo Sound. All the evidence indicates that Collins' briefing materials showed the same thing (although ANZ's later conduct made sure that it could never be proven conclusively). If Hewitt had spotted the magnitude of his error and informed ops, the crash wouldn't have happened - in fact the flight probably would have been postponed while they sorted the error out. Likewise, if Hewitt had waited until after the Collins flight to make the correction, the next briefings would have been done with the new material and it's possible no-one would have been the wiser.
As for the conditions at the time, a lot of myth has grown up around that over the years - Chippindale went to his grave believing they were in cloud at the time, even though the photos recovered show visibility of 40 miles plus right up until the point of impact. But as Captain Vette's research showed, there was more to it than that.
Collins was the Pilot in Command and the majority of the blame rests on his shoulders irrespective of the orchistrated litiney of lies by ANZ, it was HIS responsibility to check the waypoints that were input into the INS.
...
Captain Collins was responsible for checking the Flight Plan and using an old school atlas was really not the way to do that. That was not a professional at work on this ocassion and added to the swiss cheese slices.
...
Captain Collins was responsible for checking the Flight Plan and using an old school atlas was really not the way to do that. That was not a professional at work on this ocassion and added to the swiss cheese slices.
TVNZ's "Erebus : The Aftermath" docudrama has been removed from YouTube, which is a shame. However, NZALPA recently uploaded Captain Vette's "Impact Erebus" documentary in it's entirety - it goes even further than the Mahon report in places in terms of demonstrating the false visual perceptions, and mentions a couple of factors that the docudrama did not, which I consider very important - namely:
- The transponder indicator light on the flight deck indicated coding during the descent and approach to Erebus, giving the crew the impression that McMurdo were tracking them on radar and had them in the right position.
- The flight plan filed with McMurdo had the co-ordinates for the McMurdo waypoint removed and replaced with the term "MCMURDO" - the only time this had happened in the entire time ANZ had been flying down there.
It also says that the briefing on whiteout given to all ANZ crews was inappropriate for aviation, instead being based on the effects of what are commonly known as snowblindness - the dangers of a low overcast obscuring high ground and possibly (although Mahon was not convinced) presenting a false horizon were never covered - this was Mahon's "malevolent trick of the polar light".
Part one is here:
To answer the question chris_lz is asking regarding "positively identif[ying] terrain", a combination of the features of McMurdo Sound versus Lewis Bay shows that it would indeed be easy to mistake one for the other were Erebus to be obscured. Cape Tennyson is approximately the same distance and azimuth from the track over Erebus as Cape Bird is from the track down McMurdo Sound. The cliffs to the west of McMurdo Sound (Cape Bernacchi) are three times further from the McMurdo track than Cape Bird is from the Erebus track. However, in a coincidence that demonstrated just how much the crew had going against them that day, the Cape Bernacchi cliffs are approximately three times larger than those of Cape Bird, meaning that they would appear from the flight deck to be much the same - certainly Peter Mulgrew never seemed to notice, so what chance did Captain Collins have?
Much seems to be made of Captain Vette's motivation to clear his friend's name, but he himself says that was only a minor part of it - what bothered him was that as far as he was concerned Captain Collins was probably the most cautious and conscientious pilot he knew, and he reasoned that whatever had happened in Antarctica to allow Jim Collins to fly into a mountain, given the kind of pilot Collins was - Vette didn't think much of anyone's chances, including his own, if faced with that kind of situation.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 29th Nov 2011 at 15:35.
Join Date: Nov 2011
Location: Boston
Age: 60
Posts: 49
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
DozyWannabe :
But in a sense, isn't that precisely why INS is not as reliable as ground aides? They can be inadvertently misprogrammed. The crew themselves can mistakenly punch in a wrong coordinate. If you've never been to destination before, wouldn't it also be prudent to check the programmed coordinates you've just entered and make sure they match the actual coordinates for the McMurdo Sound route?
I'm aware the Lewis Bay track and the expected route down McMurdo Sound would have appeared similar. But before the letdown commenced, could the crew really be 100% certain of their position by visual means alone?
Thanks
Chris
It was safe as long as the aircraft was following Chief Navigator Hewitt's "erroneous" co-ordinates, which were actually safer than the original path he plotted to the TACAN south of Ross Island.
I'm aware the Lewis Bay track and the expected route down McMurdo Sound would have appeared similar. But before the letdown commenced, could the crew really be 100% certain of their position by visual means alone?
Thanks
Chris