Sir Arthur 'Bomber' Harris - Butch or Butcher?
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Usual nonsense posted on this thread regarding Harris, Dresden and area bombing.
By 1945, WW2 was total war. No-one in 2009 can even begin to understand the thought processes of those involved.
No-one knows how many people died in Dresden, the place was packed with refugees, a fire storm does not leave much in the way of evidence.
The primary purpose of the Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki raids was to show the Soviets the effectiveness of the Allied bombing machine.
Harris was doing his job, nothing more. He was rather good at it.
Hamburg x 6 could have finished the Germans in late 1943, although the end result would still have been the Red Army rolling into Berlin.
Harris could have flattened Berlin in 1944 if he had sufficient resource, although the end result would still have been the Red Army rolling into Berlin.
The hand ringers can ring their hands in 2009, but that's because Harris and his ilk did the job they were told to do 1939 - 1945.
I recognise that Harris' greatest strength was also his greatest weakness, he was inflexible. A few raids on the dams after 617 had visited would have delayed reconstruction, a few raids on the U-boat pens during construction would have severely hampered the effectiveness of the U-boats.
Europe was generally at peace from 1945 to the 1990s as a direct result of the threat of enhanced area bombing.
By 1945, WW2 was total war. No-one in 2009 can even begin to understand the thought processes of those involved.
No-one knows how many people died in Dresden, the place was packed with refugees, a fire storm does not leave much in the way of evidence.
The primary purpose of the Dresden, Hiroshima and Nagasaki raids was to show the Soviets the effectiveness of the Allied bombing machine.
Harris was doing his job, nothing more. He was rather good at it.
Hamburg x 6 could have finished the Germans in late 1943, although the end result would still have been the Red Army rolling into Berlin.
Harris could have flattened Berlin in 1944 if he had sufficient resource, although the end result would still have been the Red Army rolling into Berlin.
The hand ringers can ring their hands in 2009, but that's because Harris and his ilk did the job they were told to do 1939 - 1945.
I recognise that Harris' greatest strength was also his greatest weakness, he was inflexible. A few raids on the dams after 617 had visited would have delayed reconstruction, a few raids on the U-boat pens during construction would have severely hampered the effectiveness of the U-boats.
Europe was generally at peace from 1945 to the 1990s as a direct result of the threat of enhanced area bombing.
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I am afraid this thread is once again following the path of previous arguments. In other words it is now repetitious with one opinion against several others and gets nowhere. The same 'ol stuff and almost everyone has right or wrong point of view.
Trying to impress with your own opinion is never a good idea. It tends to raise a few hackles at best - but always leaving a bad after taste.
Even historians can't agree, but Max Hastings probably holds the best view of Bomber Command I have ever seen.
Trying to impress with your own opinion is never a good idea. It tends to raise a few hackles at best - but always leaving a bad after taste.
Even historians can't agree, but Max Hastings probably holds the best view of Bomber Command I have ever seen.
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Can I try a bit of nuance?
It seems generally agreed that the democracies believed deliberate bombing of civilians was unethical, and the British Cabinet knew they might be accounted war criminals under victor's justice (though that would have been the least of their problems). Against Britain (though not Poland), Luftwaffe bombing policy at first stuck to military targets (including Coventry, where the civilian slaughter was collateral damage from attacks on war industry, and the Luftwaffe did have the means for precision attacks). The British adopted area bombing because they couldn't do anything else, and it was decided that it was crucially important to keep some sort of offensive activity going, whilst the USSR was taking such appalling losses. Given the nature of the German regime, it seems a reasonable decision, though taken with much difficulty, and subject to ongoing criticism within Britain during the war. Thank God, no-one then was irresponsible enough to assume that all means were legitimate in war. Harris was appointed after the decision was taken; it was not his policy.
It does seem that Harris subscribed to the belief that strategic bombing was the decisive war-winning strategy. In a sense, that was right, but the technical means were not available until 1945. People sneer at politicians for believing that 'The bomber will always get through,' but they always did. Until nuclear weapons, though, one bomber was not enough, and the loss rates were critical.
Harris promised that he could destroy Berlin, and other cities, but he didn't, and he couldn't reasonably have asked for more resources. He opposed alternative uses of air power; apparently, he was reluctant to use Bomber Command for the interdiction strategy before the Invasion of Europe, and that is recorded as one of the great successes of bombing. Harris was undoubtedly right in opposing 'panacea' targets when Bomber Command was having difficulty getting bombs within three miles of the target, but once improved techniques were developed, it is arguable that it would have been more effective in shortening the war to switch to oil targets. That would still have meant huge German civilian losses, of course. It is, by the way, totally wrong to suggest that they deserved it. The major area of destruction in Hamburg was working class housing in the most anti-Hitler (and Anglophile) region of Germany.
One can see that the British authorities were uneasy about the area bombing policy, because they talked in terms of de-housing and attacks on morale. Thank God they still had a moral sense, even though the case for what they did was a reasonable one at the time.
It is of course absurd to hold individual members of Bomber Command personally responsible, even if one does believe that the later part of the area bombing campaign was morally wrong.
Blaming Harris looks like a convenient way of finding a scapegoat for a policy that was controversial at the time, and after the War and eventual allied victory, came to look more regrettable.
The real case against Harris seems to me that, like Leigh-Mallory, he had a grand theory of the use of airpower which he refused to change in the light of experience. War is about the use of violence; the case that could be made is that Harris did not use violence in the most directed way possible, thus shortening the war and minimising the total suffering. Which is a much more complicated business than just sloganeering and calling him "Butcher."
Oh yes, I was exposed to bombs and doodlebugs, though I was too young to have any memory of it.
It seems generally agreed that the democracies believed deliberate bombing of civilians was unethical, and the British Cabinet knew they might be accounted war criminals under victor's justice (though that would have been the least of their problems). Against Britain (though not Poland), Luftwaffe bombing policy at first stuck to military targets (including Coventry, where the civilian slaughter was collateral damage from attacks on war industry, and the Luftwaffe did have the means for precision attacks). The British adopted area bombing because they couldn't do anything else, and it was decided that it was crucially important to keep some sort of offensive activity going, whilst the USSR was taking such appalling losses. Given the nature of the German regime, it seems a reasonable decision, though taken with much difficulty, and subject to ongoing criticism within Britain during the war. Thank God, no-one then was irresponsible enough to assume that all means were legitimate in war. Harris was appointed after the decision was taken; it was not his policy.
It does seem that Harris subscribed to the belief that strategic bombing was the decisive war-winning strategy. In a sense, that was right, but the technical means were not available until 1945. People sneer at politicians for believing that 'The bomber will always get through,' but they always did. Until nuclear weapons, though, one bomber was not enough, and the loss rates were critical.
Harris promised that he could destroy Berlin, and other cities, but he didn't, and he couldn't reasonably have asked for more resources. He opposed alternative uses of air power; apparently, he was reluctant to use Bomber Command for the interdiction strategy before the Invasion of Europe, and that is recorded as one of the great successes of bombing. Harris was undoubtedly right in opposing 'panacea' targets when Bomber Command was having difficulty getting bombs within three miles of the target, but once improved techniques were developed, it is arguable that it would have been more effective in shortening the war to switch to oil targets. That would still have meant huge German civilian losses, of course. It is, by the way, totally wrong to suggest that they deserved it. The major area of destruction in Hamburg was working class housing in the most anti-Hitler (and Anglophile) region of Germany.
One can see that the British authorities were uneasy about the area bombing policy, because they talked in terms of de-housing and attacks on morale. Thank God they still had a moral sense, even though the case for what they did was a reasonable one at the time.
It is of course absurd to hold individual members of Bomber Command personally responsible, even if one does believe that the later part of the area bombing campaign was morally wrong.
Blaming Harris looks like a convenient way of finding a scapegoat for a policy that was controversial at the time, and after the War and eventual allied victory, came to look more regrettable.
The real case against Harris seems to me that, like Leigh-Mallory, he had a grand theory of the use of airpower which he refused to change in the light of experience. War is about the use of violence; the case that could be made is that Harris did not use violence in the most directed way possible, thus shortening the war and minimising the total suffering. Which is a much more complicated business than just sloganeering and calling him "Butcher."
Oh yes, I was exposed to bombs and doodlebugs, though I was too young to have any memory of it.
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Harris subscribed to the belief that strategic bombing was the decisive war-winning strategy
Today we have a fundamental belief that nuclear weapons are the decisive war winning strategy; now that the nuclear cat is out of the bag, so to speak, where might that belief lead us?
PS.
The major area of destruction in Hamburg was working class housing in the most anti-Hitler (and Anglophile) region of Germany.
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Luftwaffe bombing policy at first stuck to military targets (including Coventry, where the civilian slaughter was collateral damage from attacks on war industry, and the Luftwaffe did have the means for precision attacks).
That’s interesting, when compared with;
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/oct/09/coventry-blitz-hitler-revenge and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1892714.stm
and various other commentaries on the “Baedeker” raids. It’s hard to imagine now, but nearly every town in Britain used to have its factories and workshops (not sure about Torquay, though).
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@Blacksheep:
I said 'subscribed' to the belief in strategic bombing, precisely because Harris didn't make it up. Two organisations that didn't act on that belief were the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Air Force, so it wasn't quite a universal belief. It works out that it needs nuclear weapons to make strategic bombing really decisive. It works out that the theorists of strategic bombing got the calculations wrong because extrapolation from the results of Imperial German bombing of civilians in WW I wasn't a reliable guide; not a moral failing, but a technical miscalculation, which also, by the way and not irrelevantly, had the effect of making a very good case for promoting a large, totally independent strategic air force, in both Britain and the US.
At Hamburg, I am sure that the crews were told that the aiming point was the docks, and in a sense it was, but the planners knew that bombing would not be accurate enough to make this a precise strike on the docks, in the way that Luftwaffe raids on the London docks were, in a sense, precise. From what I have read, the bomb loads were designed to be effective for destroying housing, not attacking industrial installations. Policy was publicly described as 'de-housing,' wasn't it, not 'precision strikes with unfortunate collateral damage'. The docks were at an easily identifiable point in the middle of an easily locatable target.
@GBZ
I was careful to say (I hope) that the Luftwaffe raids were on more or less 'legitimate' targets AT FIRST. Of course the later raids were deliberately aimed at civilian targets of cultural, but no military, significance. The evil tyrant justified them as retaliation for attacks on the medieval centres of German towns. It seems to have been hard for everyone to realise how inaccurate bombing, and especially the early bombing of the RAF, was. It took the Butt report to get the British authorities to realise it, but there was probably a genuine belief by many under the British bombs that if a hospital, church or cultural monument was hit, it was the object of deliberate targeting (which, of course, was not the case, except for a general preference for targets that would burn well).
I'm not at all wishing to demonize Harris, nor to suggest any kind of moral equivalence between the British authorities and the Hitler regime. But area bombing was a subject of doubt and anguish on the part of the British authorities (which is one reason why there is not moral equivalence), and was rejected for a long while by the USAAF.
Even those of us who were alive during WW II (even if not especially conscious, like me) are surely far enough away from it that we can consider issues with a bit of detachment, and can acknowledge the qualities of people like Harris and Churchill without pretending that everything they did was perfect.
It kind of matters, because war isn't going to go away, and the question of morality in war-making is therefore really important (and very, very difficult).
I am, by the way, sure that if I had been old enough (which, God knows, was not very old), and had had the courage and skill to be in Bomber Command (and I know I would NOT have had either of them), I would not have been engaged in earnest moral enquiry. But we can now see more clearly, without pretending to be morally superior.
I said 'subscribed' to the belief in strategic bombing, precisely because Harris didn't make it up. Two organisations that didn't act on that belief were the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Air Force, so it wasn't quite a universal belief. It works out that it needs nuclear weapons to make strategic bombing really decisive. It works out that the theorists of strategic bombing got the calculations wrong because extrapolation from the results of Imperial German bombing of civilians in WW I wasn't a reliable guide; not a moral failing, but a technical miscalculation, which also, by the way and not irrelevantly, had the effect of making a very good case for promoting a large, totally independent strategic air force, in both Britain and the US.
At Hamburg, I am sure that the crews were told that the aiming point was the docks, and in a sense it was, but the planners knew that bombing would not be accurate enough to make this a precise strike on the docks, in the way that Luftwaffe raids on the London docks were, in a sense, precise. From what I have read, the bomb loads were designed to be effective for destroying housing, not attacking industrial installations. Policy was publicly described as 'de-housing,' wasn't it, not 'precision strikes with unfortunate collateral damage'. The docks were at an easily identifiable point in the middle of an easily locatable target.
@GBZ
I was careful to say (I hope) that the Luftwaffe raids were on more or less 'legitimate' targets AT FIRST. Of course the later raids were deliberately aimed at civilian targets of cultural, but no military, significance. The evil tyrant justified them as retaliation for attacks on the medieval centres of German towns. It seems to have been hard for everyone to realise how inaccurate bombing, and especially the early bombing of the RAF, was. It took the Butt report to get the British authorities to realise it, but there was probably a genuine belief by many under the British bombs that if a hospital, church or cultural monument was hit, it was the object of deliberate targeting (which, of course, was not the case, except for a general preference for targets that would burn well).
I'm not at all wishing to demonize Harris, nor to suggest any kind of moral equivalence between the British authorities and the Hitler regime. But area bombing was a subject of doubt and anguish on the part of the British authorities (which is one reason why there is not moral equivalence), and was rejected for a long while by the USAAF.
Even those of us who were alive during WW II (even if not especially conscious, like me) are surely far enough away from it that we can consider issues with a bit of detachment, and can acknowledge the qualities of people like Harris and Churchill without pretending that everything they did was perfect.
It kind of matters, because war isn't going to go away, and the question of morality in war-making is therefore really important (and very, very difficult).
I am, by the way, sure that if I had been old enough (which, God knows, was not very old), and had had the courage and skill to be in Bomber Command (and I know I would NOT have had either of them), I would not have been engaged in earnest moral enquiry. But we can now see more clearly, without pretending to be morally superior.
Last edited by FlightlessParrot; 10th Dec 2009 at 04:44. Reason: Punctuation
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Policy was publicly described as 'de-housing,' wasn't it, not 'precision strikes with unfortunate collateral damage'
Nothing changes the fact that Harris was in command of "Bomber Command" and the job of Bomber Command was the destruction of the enemy's capability to wage war. Harris did the job he was given and he did it very well. He was far more concerned with reducing his own loss rates than worrying about German civilian losses. I suppose that in his opinion, reducing civilian casualties was the business of the German government. It is certainly mine.
OK - let's just take the names out of the equation and simplify things a bit.
Were the Allies butchers for prosecuting the war against the Axis powers to the full extent that they did or not?
If the answer is yes - what degree of 'butchery' would YOU be prepared to allow if it was your call at that time?
Were the Allies butchers for prosecuting the war against the Axis powers to the full extent that they did or not?
If the answer is yes - what degree of 'butchery' would YOU be prepared to allow if it was your call at that time?
Two organisations that didn't act on that belief were the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Air Force, so it wasn't quite a universal belief.
In fact when the Red Army crossed into Germany they were fighting a country whose industrial capability and air power had been all but devasted thanks entirely to the efforts and sacrifices of RAF Bomber Command and the US Eight Army Air Force, something that the Soviets were always unwilling to acknowledge. Certainly many thousands of civilians had lost their lives in this process, but as Blacksheep points out, a high proportion of those civilians were part of that industrial capability.
Just how effective was the Allied Bombing campaign?
Data exists that shows the Germans produced approximately 17,000 fighter aircraft annually during years '43 and '44 and 4,000 in the first quarter of '45. That does not suggest a very good success rate in my book.
The Air Force (American for sure) have always claimed the ability to utterly destroy the enemy by means of Strategic Bombing....but never have.
If one leaves Nuclear Weapons out of the equation....I hold that shall always be the case.
Data exists that shows the Germans produced approximately 17,000 fighter aircraft annually during years '43 and '44 and 4,000 in the first quarter of '45. That does not suggest a very good success rate in my book.
The Air Force (American for sure) have always claimed the ability to utterly destroy the enemy by means of Strategic Bombing....but never have.
If one leaves Nuclear Weapons out of the equation....I hold that shall always be the case.
Aye - did they have enough fuel or good pilots for them? No.
Were the guns and people they needed to defend their cities from attack (and the night fighters etc) missed from the 'frontline'? You bet.
Were the guns and people they needed to defend their cities from attack (and the night fighters etc) missed from the 'frontline'? You bet.
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I think that the post-war pontificating about the bombing campaign misses one very important point. All the senior politicians and commanders of the British armed forces had fought and been effected by their experiences in the trenches during the First World War. These memories must have been an important factor in deciding strategic thinking during the Second World War as none of them wanted a return to a murderous land campaign on the Western Front that they had experienced during the First World War.
I think very much so. Of course the governments of the day on the Allied side wanted to win the war with as few casualties to 'our' civilians and military and infrastructure. The Axis side were responsible for their people. So all options would be pursued to end the war as quickly and on the most favourable terms possible. Only after the war can you say 'Should have done a bit more of that, a little less of this...'. Can you imagine saying to your population in time of war 'Well just in case things look bad afterwards IF we win - we'll just have to accept more casualties and horror because we really want to go as lightly as possible on the opposition who were firmly believe by the way are a bunch of genocidal maniacs...'
Also the Germans really had planned and hoped for a short war that would not use strategic bombing - so they didn't have the equipment to carry it out. It wasn't that they didn't want to or hadn't indulged where they could. But it turned into total war. Ain't it a bugger when you reap what you sow?
Also the Germans really had planned and hoped for a short war that would not use strategic bombing - so they didn't have the equipment to carry it out. It wasn't that they didn't want to or hadn't indulged where they could. But it turned into total war. Ain't it a bugger when you reap what you sow?
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1917 Minister of Munitions WS Churchill, The Great War/III, Newnes,1933,P1605: Allied 1919 Offensive was to include “Poison gases of incredible malignity (which) would have stifled all resistance and paralysed all life on the hostile front (No) doubt the Germans too had their plans” - informing his 6/40 Finest Hour speech: “the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of perverted science”.
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Also the Germans really had planned and hoped for a short war that would not use strategic bombing - so they didn't have the equipment to carry it out.
Very true LT. Additionally, the Luftwaffe was subordinate to the Land forces. As we often observe, the Land commanders rarely see further than highly mobile and long range artillery; the aeroplane.
There are other things to remember. The whole idea of another brutal war in Europe was the last thing people wanted and politicians certainly had to look at any way to end the war without involving heavy losses. So yes we the allies did look at poison gas, setting fire to forests and crops, causing insurrection in Germany, getting Hitler assassinated by the military who might then look for a peaceful resolution etc.
Also the USA was basically cooperating with Britain and specifically due to Churchill producing long range bombers; the point is - that it was felt that bombing would bring home to civilians the horror of war (as many had experienced on the battlefields of The Great War) and thus hopefully result in the civilian population overthrowing the Nazi leaders. Somehow.
Harris was appointed to prosecute the war to the best of his and bomber commands ability with the equipment at his disposal.
You start talking about Dresden ass a specific case well I'm very sorry but - go away and read Human Smoke or such like.
Also the USA was basically cooperating with Britain and specifically due to Churchill producing long range bombers; the point is - that it was felt that bombing would bring home to civilians the horror of war (as many had experienced on the battlefields of The Great War) and thus hopefully result in the civilian population overthrowing the Nazi leaders. Somehow.
Harris was appointed to prosecute the war to the best of his and bomber commands ability with the equipment at his disposal.
You start talking about Dresden ass a specific case well I'm very sorry but - go away and read Human Smoke or such like.
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Could Harris have brought Germany to her knees in 1943, early 1944? If you believe Speer then yes. Harris never had a clear run at Berlin, winter 43/44 was unforgiving (although it can be argued that foul weather gives cover to the bomber offensive). As I recall, max British expenditure on Bomber Command was approx 25% of total British war effort at any one time, with the benefit of hindsight this should have been 70% in mid/late 1943, of which the majority should have been Mossies in various forms. German defences would have been saturated, Me 262 and He 219 night fighters not available in any numbers, collapse to follow? But who - at the time - would have gambled on such an approach with the limited knowledge available?
Perhaps the effectiveness of conventional bombing by early 1945 can be measured by the raids on Tokyo in Feb/March 1945.
Various scenarios involving Bomber Command at a tactical level from June 6th 1944 onwards can be considered: close support at Omaha to assist US landings, the drive to Caen is achieved by day 4, Arnhem is winnable (617 and 5 Group to destroy Panzers concealed in wooded areas .... mind the bridge). All achievable ... with hindsight.
Perhaps the effectiveness of conventional bombing by early 1945 can be measured by the raids on Tokyo in Feb/March 1945.
Various scenarios involving Bomber Command at a tactical level from June 6th 1944 onwards can be considered: close support at Omaha to assist US landings, the drive to Caen is achieved by day 4, Arnhem is winnable (617 and 5 Group to destroy Panzers concealed in wooded areas .... mind the bridge). All achievable ... with hindsight.
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Harris did what he had to do. If some of you folks were getting bombed and machine-gunned in in the streets like we were then you probably would agree that anything that gave some pain back to the enemy was worthwhile.
Personally, having lived through it and being bombed out twice, I wish he had obliterated the whole evil bunch.
Personally, having lived through it and being bombed out twice, I wish he had obliterated the whole evil bunch.
"Bert Harris of Bomber Command came to see me this morning during the COS (Chiefs of Staff) meeting. According him the only reason why the Russians army has succeeded in advancing is due to the results of bomber offensive!!! According to him I am certain that we are all preventing him from winning the war. If Bomber Command was left to itself it would make much shorter work of it all!" Field Marshall Lord Alanbroke War Diary for 13 October 1943 then Chief of the Imperial General Staff
If you devoted 70% of the war effort to the bomber offensive then other activities would need to have been curtailed. Say no invasion of Sicily/Italy (with Italy remaining in the war?) or no attacks in the far east. As Germany disperses its war production so bombing cities is going to have a lesser effect. Also is a government that was prepared to exterminate millions going to be concerned about a few thousand deaths of its own people every night.
Where strategic bombing did have an effect it was on the petrol refining, storage facilities etc and transportation system - perhaps targets not suitable for night attack?
Perhaps the RAF should have considered returning to day attacks supported by its own P-51 squadrons?
If you devoted 70% of the war effort to the bomber offensive then other activities would need to have been curtailed. Say no invasion of Sicily/Italy (with Italy remaining in the war?) or no attacks in the far east. As Germany disperses its war production so bombing cities is going to have a lesser effect. Also is a government that was prepared to exterminate millions going to be concerned about a few thousand deaths of its own people every night.
Where strategic bombing did have an effect it was on the petrol refining, storage facilities etc and transportation system - perhaps targets not suitable for night attack?
Perhaps the RAF should have considered returning to day attacks supported by its own P-51 squadrons?
It seems to be quite fashionable to belittle Bomber Commands contribution to the overall picture.
It was a war of attrition,quite often the German aircraft manufacturing output is quoted as failure of the night bombing,but the quality of a/c being produced by slave labour in the various dispersed sites was abysmal by 1944.
Dresden keeps being wheeled out as a 'war crime' when in actual fact it contained factories producing high quality military optical equipment.
Sure Harris made some targetting errors,but how much of that was down to political interference ? or perhaps even his own staff ?and how many wartime leaders made no mistakes ?
Just the disruption to transport links etc must have been colossal,but I do agree that BC perhaps should have used more mosquitos as a way of reducing our own casualties.
It was a war of attrition,quite often the German aircraft manufacturing output is quoted as failure of the night bombing,but the quality of a/c being produced by slave labour in the various dispersed sites was abysmal by 1944.
Dresden keeps being wheeled out as a 'war crime' when in actual fact it contained factories producing high quality military optical equipment.
Sure Harris made some targetting errors,but how much of that was down to political interference ? or perhaps even his own staff ?and how many wartime leaders made no mistakes ?
Just the disruption to transport links etc must have been colossal,but I do agree that BC perhaps should have used more mosquitos as a way of reducing our own casualties.