How did Britain loose the lead in aviation ?
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The last chapter of test pilot Bill Waterton's book "The Quick and the Dead" is devoted entirely to the ills of British aviation, and written in 1955. David Beaty in "The Story of Transatlantic Flight" relates Lord Thomas's (Chairman BOAC 1949 - 56) view when trying to organise production of a British aircraft to compete with the Americans,
"Buggin's Turn. This practice, which is bred out of Civil Service fairness and the Treasury view that employment and the nation's economy as a whole should always be considered before commercial interests and technical specification, continued throughout the history of British aviation, reaching its crowning achievement in the late 1950s, when three small orders for three V-bombers of similar performance were given to three different aircraft manufacturers.... manufacturers were regarded rather like ironmongers. Between them and the users of their wares, the airlines, was the screen of the Civil Service. Since the British government was almost the sole buyer of their products, for too long a time the manufacturers were forced into the role of men knocking at the door of the tradesman's entrance, pencil in hand, waiting M'Lady's pleasure. They could not argue - the customer is always right especially if she is almost your only customer. No one would wish to criticise. In return for such obeisance, they all got a share of the orders and no one is left out in the cold. At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn
It may seem to be a problem of the Westminster style of government. Australia had problems with GAF Nomad aircraft, the production of which was controlled by the civil service. They would not buy material for production until a buyer had signed up, and I presume paid a non refundable deposit.
"Buggin's Turn. This practice, which is bred out of Civil Service fairness and the Treasury view that employment and the nation's economy as a whole should always be considered before commercial interests and technical specification, continued throughout the history of British aviation, reaching its crowning achievement in the late 1950s, when three small orders for three V-bombers of similar performance were given to three different aircraft manufacturers.... manufacturers were regarded rather like ironmongers. Between them and the users of their wares, the airlines, was the screen of the Civil Service. Since the British government was almost the sole buyer of their products, for too long a time the manufacturers were forced into the role of men knocking at the door of the tradesman's entrance, pencil in hand, waiting M'Lady's pleasure. They could not argue - the customer is always right especially if she is almost your only customer. No one would wish to criticise. In return for such obeisance, they all got a share of the orders and no one is left out in the cold. At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn
It may seem to be a problem of the Westminster style of government. Australia had problems with GAF Nomad aircraft, the production of which was controlled by the civil service. They would not buy material for production until a buyer had signed up, and I presume paid a non refundable deposit.
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At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn
But no one every stopped them chasing after foreign orders, maybe they couldn't be bothered, because they didn't need to?
Maybe they didn't know how and they needed a customer to write a set or requirements for them?
Maybe they always expected to be baled out by the UK taxpayer?
The small size of the home market argument never stopped the Japanese car/bike industry - oops somebody remind me now, did Britain once compete in that area too? - any lessons to be learned from that?
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"Buggin's Turn. This practice, which is bred out of Civil Service fairness and the Treasury view that employment and the nation's economy as a whole should always be considered before commercial interests and technical specification, continued throughout the history of British aviation, reaching its crowning achievement in the late 1950s, when three small orders for three V-bombers of similar performance were given to three different aircraft manufacturers.... manufacturers were regarded rather like ironmongers. Between them and the users of their wares, the airlines, was the screen of the Civil Service. Since the British government was almost the sole buyer of their products, for too long a time the manufacturers were forced into the role of men knocking at the door of the tradesman's entrance, pencil in hand, waiting M'Lady's pleasure. They could not argue - the customer is always right especially if she is almost your only customer. No one would wish to criticise. In return for such obeisance, they all got a share of the orders and no one is left out in the cold. At the same time, no one is allowed to get too many orders. That wouldn't be fair to the next man. It should be Buggin's Turn
And all that Autoland research investment, at least Bae and Airbus picked up some of the pieces, and some of that design team.
Ah! de Havilland - what a loss...
Author and historian Max Hastings recently summed up some of the underlying and relevant issues:
The British and Americans perceived commercial aviation as a vital field of competition. Each anticipated a boom, and set about chasing markets. Britain had designed and produced some of the most notable planes of World War II -- the Spitfire, Lancaster, and Mosquito. Its aircraft manufacturers employed 1.7 million people, including subcontractors. Above all, the nation led the world in jet engine technology, with the Meteor and Vampire combat jet aircraft in service, and the Comet airliner on the drawing board. In this industry, the US lagged. The British saw a great opportunity. Other circumstances, however, were vastly more favourable to the Americans. Before the war, the British pursued what proved to be a design blind alley, adopting flying boats for the long-haul civil aviation market. In 1939, the American-built Douglas DC-3 carried a staggering 93 percent of the world's passengers. When the US entered the war, the British recognized that they possessed no transport aircraft of comparable quality to those built in America. A transatlantic deal was struck, whereby the British continued to focus production on fighters and bombers and relied upon the US for transports. Late in 1944, as the British government contemplated the post-war implications of this arrangement, it begged the Americans at least to agree that Britain should start building some transport planes of its own as soon as the German war was won, and before Japan was defeated. This request was rejected. The US government envisaged Britain using the American funding on which its ally was totally dependent to gain a competitive edge against it in the commercial market. The Air Ministry in London reported gloomily: "It is out of the question for Great Britain to compete in civil aviation for at least five years after the war."
With peace came worse - much worse, for the British - the new reality of the cold war. The US was implacably hostile to supplying high technology of any description to the East Bloc. In 1946, an Anglo-American dispute developed, which persisted through the decades that followed. Broke Britain was desperate to sell almost anything it had to anyone who would buy it. Rich America was determined to prevent such sales..…
With peace came worse - much worse, for the British - the new reality of the cold war. The US was implacably hostile to supplying high technology of any description to the East Bloc. In 1946, an Anglo-American dispute developed, which persisted through the decades that followed. Broke Britain was desperate to sell almost anything it had to anyone who would buy it. Rich America was determined to prevent such sales..…
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I've not met the A.M "5 years" quote, but that would be a fair lead-time for UK's pressurised and/or turbine-powered projects underway by 1944. 3/41 Lend/Lease Act - "for the Defense of the US" - constrained recipients from competing with US - say by putting gift ALCOA aluminium sheet into export civil products, or by lifting design data. (Fair, yes?) Priorities for supply of all strategic materials were co-ordinated, US/UK, for the duration. Blessed with this, and shoals of C-47s, UK Chiefs+PM agreed 2/5/1942 "it would be unsound to initiate plans for the production of transport aircraft in GB at this stage" (TNA file AIR 2/7882). That, alone, gave rise to the myth of US thwart. But whatever our sailors could bring through U-boat packs was needed for Heavy Bombers NOW! In February,1943, Stalingrad and elAlamein 2 safe, UK Cabinet moved on, funding Bristol T.167 Brabazon I on 11/3/1943.
By April,1944 more design/prototype ITPs were out; Avro York C.I, HP Halifax C.VIII and Short Stirling C.V in volume production. In November 1944 at the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference US presented ideas of "Open Skies" that infuriated UK/Canada/Oz/S.A, so we accelerated more projects.
On 17/5/45 (NB: European Theatre, Mission Accomplished) US War Production Board authorised civil aircraft production "as long as this will not interfere with production to higher-rated orders" (i.e Pacific Theatre). On 4/7/45, as virtually the last act of Govt. before the General Election, UK did the same. (TNA files AVIA 15/2138 and 2139). In 1946 Westland negotiated access to B-29 pressurisation (the NormalAir-Garrett licence); Bristol explored an L-749 licence. There was no Aero-centric Truman policy of Protection: there was a general US wish to trade "fairly", which they interpreted (then as now) in an odd way. But who, really, believes that DC-6, L-749 entering service in 1947 feared competition from Tudor, Hermes...As for our follow-on turbine schemes, US was happy with its impending giants (C-74, C-97, C-99) to spawn civil variants to swamp limey (and French) weirdos.
This perpetual whingeing that our Brabazon suite (funded into urgent R&D by late-1944, prototypes' materials diverted when no Lend/Lease Administrator was looking) was dished by Uncle Sam is just not so. Avro (Tudors, to Brabazon Type III), Bristol (T.167, Type I), DH (Comet 1, Type IV), (DH/)Airspeed (Ambassador, Type II), HP (Hermes, Type III), Miles (Marathon, Type V), Vickers-Armstrong (Windsor variants, to Type III) did it all on their ownsomes.
By April,1944 more design/prototype ITPs were out; Avro York C.I, HP Halifax C.VIII and Short Stirling C.V in volume production. In November 1944 at the Chicago Civil Aviation Conference US presented ideas of "Open Skies" that infuriated UK/Canada/Oz/S.A, so we accelerated more projects.
On 17/5/45 (NB: European Theatre, Mission Accomplished) US War Production Board authorised civil aircraft production "as long as this will not interfere with production to higher-rated orders" (i.e Pacific Theatre). On 4/7/45, as virtually the last act of Govt. before the General Election, UK did the same. (TNA files AVIA 15/2138 and 2139). In 1946 Westland negotiated access to B-29 pressurisation (the NormalAir-Garrett licence); Bristol explored an L-749 licence. There was no Aero-centric Truman policy of Protection: there was a general US wish to trade "fairly", which they interpreted (then as now) in an odd way. But who, really, believes that DC-6, L-749 entering service in 1947 feared competition from Tudor, Hermes...As for our follow-on turbine schemes, US was happy with its impending giants (C-74, C-97, C-99) to spawn civil variants to swamp limey (and French) weirdos.
This perpetual whingeing that our Brabazon suite (funded into urgent R&D by late-1944, prototypes' materials diverted when no Lend/Lease Administrator was looking) was dished by Uncle Sam is just not so. Avro (Tudors, to Brabazon Type III), Bristol (T.167, Type I), DH (Comet 1, Type IV), (DH/)Airspeed (Ambassador, Type II), HP (Hermes, Type III), Miles (Marathon, Type V), Vickers-Armstrong (Windsor variants, to Type III) did it all on their ownsomes.
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In defence of Duncan Sandys
The 1957 Duncan Sandys Defence White paper, in which the upcoming demise of the manned military aircraft was predicted, is often cited as being the beginning of the end of Britain’s aviation lead.
Sandys, was the Minister of Defence for the MacMillan Conservative government, and perhaps had every right to suppose that military aircraft where a thing of the past. During the war years, he’d been, - assigned by Churchill, his father in law- the chair of the committee for the defence against flying bombs and rockets.
He’d seen that the V2s were invulnerable to all but a pre-launch strike. Even today, post Regan’s Star Wars, this is the case.
Wartime Bomber Command had consumed enormous manufacturing and manpower resources and had, arguably done little to diminish Germany’s ability to continue the war. But post war, the RAF was reluctant to give up its strategic role.
Now Roy Dommett’s, paper:
www.brohp.org.uk/downloads/prospero2_article.pdf
provides a fascinating look at some little known aspects of post war defence thinking.
Blue Streak, like TSR2, was another famous cancellation. Blue Streak was to have been a British built, RAF operated, land based ICBM, with a British made nuclear warhead.
Rolls Royce made the engines for Blue Streak, but the design was from North American Aviation, the engine having been used in the Redstone missile - courtesy of von Braun’s migration to the USA and was, Dommett says, a direct descendant of the V2 engine. DH built the Blue Streak airframe.
The American built Thor missile was deployed in Eastern England, between 1958 and 63, so for a few years the RAF were ICBM operators. Thor was based above ground and was vulnerable to a first strike attacks. Blue Streak would have been similar in size to Thor but deployed in underground silos, the silos were supposed to withstand a one megaton strike 1000 yards away.
The silo technology, Dommett says, was devised in Britain, and subsequently copied by the USA, but it was not sufficient to prevent cancellation. RAF thinking, eventually, was that first strike collateral damage would have been huge and that the UK had no effective means of maintaining command and control, post first strike.
For a while the RAF continued to flirt with the ICBM, in the form of Skybolt. But eventually, control of the strategic nuclear deterrent was given to the Navy, when solid fuel submarine launched missiles and missile-carrying submarines became possible. To this day, although enourmously expensive, it remains credible.
The RAF fought long and hard to maintain its strategic role despite, historically, not being effective in it.
Sandys, was the Minister of Defence for the MacMillan Conservative government, and perhaps had every right to suppose that military aircraft where a thing of the past. During the war years, he’d been, - assigned by Churchill, his father in law- the chair of the committee for the defence against flying bombs and rockets.
He’d seen that the V2s were invulnerable to all but a pre-launch strike. Even today, post Regan’s Star Wars, this is the case.
Wartime Bomber Command had consumed enormous manufacturing and manpower resources and had, arguably done little to diminish Germany’s ability to continue the war. But post war, the RAF was reluctant to give up its strategic role.
Now Roy Dommett’s, paper:
www.brohp.org.uk/downloads/prospero2_article.pdf
provides a fascinating look at some little known aspects of post war defence thinking.
Blue Streak, like TSR2, was another famous cancellation. Blue Streak was to have been a British built, RAF operated, land based ICBM, with a British made nuclear warhead.
Rolls Royce made the engines for Blue Streak, but the design was from North American Aviation, the engine having been used in the Redstone missile - courtesy of von Braun’s migration to the USA and was, Dommett says, a direct descendant of the V2 engine. DH built the Blue Streak airframe.
The American built Thor missile was deployed in Eastern England, between 1958 and 63, so for a few years the RAF were ICBM operators. Thor was based above ground and was vulnerable to a first strike attacks. Blue Streak would have been similar in size to Thor but deployed in underground silos, the silos were supposed to withstand a one megaton strike 1000 yards away.
The silo technology, Dommett says, was devised in Britain, and subsequently copied by the USA, but it was not sufficient to prevent cancellation. RAF thinking, eventually, was that first strike collateral damage would have been huge and that the UK had no effective means of maintaining command and control, post first strike.
For a while the RAF continued to flirt with the ICBM, in the form of Skybolt. But eventually, control of the strategic nuclear deterrent was given to the Navy, when solid fuel submarine launched missiles and missile-carrying submarines became possible. To this day, although enourmously expensive, it remains credible.
The RAF fought long and hard to maintain its strategic role despite, historically, not being effective in it.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 11th Mar 2008 at 06:12.
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In defence of Duncan Sandys-WHY?
Sandys, was the Minister of Defence for the MacMillan Conservative government, and perhaps had every right to suppose that military aircraft where a thing of the past. During the war years, he’d been, - assigned by Churchill, his father in law- the chair of the committee for the defence against flying bombs and rockets.
The Chiefs of Staff requested a single investigator to be appointed to call on such Scientific and Intelligence advisors as appropriate, and suggested the name of Mr. Duncan Sandys.
For a very considered view of the "Sandys" affair try Most Secret War- British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945/ R.V. Jones. Hamish Hamilton 1978 ISBN 0 241 89746 7.
Sandys had a bee in his bonnet about missiles, as a result of his amateurish attempts to frighten the government as to the likely huge civilian casualties which he said would be caused by the V-1 and V-2.
The 1957 Defence White Paper was flawed in its judgement of the technology available at the time, Sandys judgement of the threat from the V-1 and V-2 was similarly suspect.
He was not fit to hold high office in government, so I return to the question at the top of this post - " In defence of Duncan Sandys - WHY?
The Chiefs of Staff requested a single investigator to be appointed to call on such Scientific and Intelligence advisors as appropriate, and suggested the name of Mr. Duncan Sandys.
For a very considered view of the "Sandys" affair try Most Secret War- British Scientific Intelligence 1939-1945/ R.V. Jones. Hamish Hamilton 1978 ISBN 0 241 89746 7.
Sandys had a bee in his bonnet about missiles, as a result of his amateurish attempts to frighten the government as to the likely huge civilian casualties which he said would be caused by the V-1 and V-2.
The 1957 Defence White Paper was flawed in its judgement of the technology available at the time, Sandys judgement of the threat from the V-1 and V-2 was similarly suspect.
He was not fit to hold high office in government, so I return to the question at the top of this post - " In defence of Duncan Sandys - WHY?
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He was not fit to hold high office in government, so I return to the question at the top of this post - " In defence of Duncan Sandys - WHY?
That he forced the numerous aircraft companies to merge, correctly predicing a future composed only of aviation giants, even in the USA.
That he correctly predicted that aircraft would be vulnerable to missiles: As was proven in 1960 when Powers U2 was shot down.
He cancelled the high altitude rocket powered interceptors that would have been useless against ICBMs.
Perhaps he was paniced over the damage that was actually inflicted by the V2, but in the long run in he was right about the technology.
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It is sometimes stated that Sandy’s, Defence review of 1957, was too premature technically for the ‘no more manned aircraft’ position to have been feasible.
Anyone looking, immediatly after the end of WW2 - at German missile projects might have reasonably assumed that 10 years later the technology would be well mature.
Dr Carlo Kopp has produced a summary, of the genesis of the SAM
www.ausairpower.net/DT-MS-1006.pdf
The performance and technology of the missiles that were actually test flown by Germany clearly show that the demise of the high altitude bomber was on the cards.
To quote Kopp, achieved performance varies with sources, however the Wasserfall W-5 is usually credited with a top speed of over 1700mph, ceiling 60000ft, range about 14 nm. Not too shabby, considering that, at the time, the main force of RAF Bomber Command was struggling to get above 25000ft. Such technology makes the heavy bombers with their absurd and ineffectual hydraulic gun turrets look (correctly) like a hang over from a bygone age.
Missile guidance was also highly advanced, with a fully automatic ‘beam-riding’ version, being the most prescient. Infrared guidance, active radar homing and TV guidance were all well advanced.
People seem to take it, that because the British aircraft industry didn’t do anything to develop these possibilities, that they were too advanced for the time. But the British aircraft industry can rarely bring itself to do anything without a firm government order in the bag, (and ideally at Cost Plus).
Their chief customer, the RAF, always wants to go flying. So the more expensive, but less technically advanced manned aircraft were favoured- hence the rocket powered interceptors. And the Lightning, a latter day manifestation of an Me 163, albeit with extended duration.
Sandys, with his enforced mergers of the aircraft industry, and his view of missile technology, - correctly predicted the pre-eminence of the ICBM. He was right more times than he was wrong. He may even have been correctly cautious regarding the threat of the V2. During the Gulf War we were asked to believe that Hussein’s developed SCUDs could be flown with chemical weapons, it’s rather naïve to imagine that WW2 Germany could not have managed the same threat.
Anyone looking, immediatly after the end of WW2 - at German missile projects might have reasonably assumed that 10 years later the technology would be well mature.
Dr Carlo Kopp has produced a summary, of the genesis of the SAM
www.ausairpower.net/DT-MS-1006.pdf
The performance and technology of the missiles that were actually test flown by Germany clearly show that the demise of the high altitude bomber was on the cards.
To quote Kopp, achieved performance varies with sources, however the Wasserfall W-5 is usually credited with a top speed of over 1700mph, ceiling 60000ft, range about 14 nm. Not too shabby, considering that, at the time, the main force of RAF Bomber Command was struggling to get above 25000ft. Such technology makes the heavy bombers with their absurd and ineffectual hydraulic gun turrets look (correctly) like a hang over from a bygone age.
Missile guidance was also highly advanced, with a fully automatic ‘beam-riding’ version, being the most prescient. Infrared guidance, active radar homing and TV guidance were all well advanced.
People seem to take it, that because the British aircraft industry didn’t do anything to develop these possibilities, that they were too advanced for the time. But the British aircraft industry can rarely bring itself to do anything without a firm government order in the bag, (and ideally at Cost Plus).
Their chief customer, the RAF, always wants to go flying. So the more expensive, but less technically advanced manned aircraft were favoured- hence the rocket powered interceptors. And the Lightning, a latter day manifestation of an Me 163, albeit with extended duration.
Sandys, with his enforced mergers of the aircraft industry, and his view of missile technology, - correctly predicted the pre-eminence of the ICBM. He was right more times than he was wrong. He may even have been correctly cautious regarding the threat of the V2. During the Gulf War we were asked to believe that Hussein’s developed SCUDs could be flown with chemical weapons, it’s rather naïve to imagine that WW2 Germany could not have managed the same threat.
Duncan Sandy’s problem was that he put all his eggs in one basket, I.e. war between the Communist Bloc and the West. At the time the UK was having minor punch-ups in the Far and Middle East, as were the French. By emasculating the Royal Air Force in the conventional role he removed all possibilities that come the crunch, nuclear war was avoidable. History has shown, nearly seventy years later, that he was wrong. I believe that should WW III nave broken out that if both sides had had strong conventional forces the result would have been a form of stalemate with neither side daring to use their nuclear arsenal because of the inevitable consequences.
That, of course, can never be proven, but it is still a vague but possible threat. Very unlikely though, as the new economies of both Russia and China are not going to be sacrificed by their leaders. The same for India, Pakistan and possibly Iran.
Way back in 1962 as young Pilot Officer on my first squadron I was grandly informed by a Technical Command Air Commodore that I was wasting my time as a pilot because the RAF would be all missiles in ten years time.
Obviously a Duncan Sandys fan, and just as wrong.
That, of course, can never be proven, but it is still a vague but possible threat. Very unlikely though, as the new economies of both Russia and China are not going to be sacrificed by their leaders. The same for India, Pakistan and possibly Iran.
Way back in 1962 as young Pilot Officer on my first squadron I was grandly informed by a Technical Command Air Commodore that I was wasting my time as a pilot because the RAF would be all missiles in ten years time.
Obviously a Duncan Sandys fan, and just as wrong.
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Not quite sure what you are driving at fareast, if you are saying Sandys' was obviously wrong because you were a pilot longer than predicted - with that point one can only agree.
The threat that Sandys chose to address was the major one, towards which Britain bought, eventually, and at great expense, a sub launched nuclear deterent to counter the Soviet threat. He thought that Britain had no chance of matching the Soviet Union in terms of conventional forces.
India, Pakistan (Iran?) have bought into the nuclear club, but would never use their nukes. - you believe because their leaders would not want to suffer the economic consequences of using them? It's a similar argument for them for buying into nuclear as it was for the UK, it's a cheaper way of standing up to intimidation than spending massivly on conventional forces.
For years the RAF kept itself busy chasing after Bear D's, it still does - so what? Russia has enough ICBM assets to turn the UK to dust if it should chose to face the consequences of retaliation from sub launched nuclear ICBM.
Sandys was trying to take a sensible course, to satisfy the anounced policy of the day - withdrawal from East of Suez etc - and to focus on what was perceived as a highly critical ongoing threat from the Eastern Bloc.
The threat that Sandys chose to address was the major one, towards which Britain bought, eventually, and at great expense, a sub launched nuclear deterent to counter the Soviet threat. He thought that Britain had no chance of matching the Soviet Union in terms of conventional forces.
India, Pakistan (Iran?) have bought into the nuclear club, but would never use their nukes. - you believe because their leaders would not want to suffer the economic consequences of using them? It's a similar argument for them for buying into nuclear as it was for the UK, it's a cheaper way of standing up to intimidation than spending massivly on conventional forces.
For years the RAF kept itself busy chasing after Bear D's, it still does - so what? Russia has enough ICBM assets to turn the UK to dust if it should chose to face the consequences of retaliation from sub launched nuclear ICBM.
Sandys was trying to take a sensible course, to satisfy the anounced policy of the day - withdrawal from East of Suez etc - and to focus on what was perceived as a highly critical ongoing threat from the Eastern Bloc.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 12th Mar 2008 at 15:03.
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TSR2
The BBC did an excellent series of interviews of Manufacturers Test Pilots,which was reshown on Sky.Roly Beamont gave a very interesting view of the lack of interest in furthering the Lightning program,and was apoplectic regarding the demise of the TSR2.Sandys had even told him as far back as 1944,when on a visit to 609 at Manston,that Rockets were the way to go,not manned fighters.The possible collapse in Civilian morale from impossible to stop V2,was his reasoning.When his Sandystorm finally hit the Brit Aviation Industry in 58,and destroyed the Reserve Squadrons as well,the Lightning was to be the last piloted fighter.Derek Wood wrote a book "Phoenix from the Ashes",I think it was called.This was a description of the cancelling of TSR2,ending up with all sorts of conspiracy theories ,regarding LBJ and the American Military Defense Industry paying off the then Labour Leaders to finish off TSR2 in its entirity,leaving nothing from which it could be resurrected.However in 78,Red Flag and Maple Flag Buccaneer failures meant 66% of the airframes were scrapped,leaving a gap in Low level Maritime strike capability.An OR was written for a replacement.The Chief of HS(George Edwards),was said to have told Callaghan that a fully singing and dancing TSR2,with Tornado Avionics,could be produced at Warton.There was said to be a 13th Airframe(Indeed photos were around showing the assembly of not 12 but 13 airframes,including the 3 completed(2 Nearly)-this was said to have been kept at various HS establisments.Also at that time,a Senior Staff member at the RAF Museum stated that they had just acquired a 320R Olympus,but that it had been part of a Rolls Bristol private developement,nothing to do with the Concorde project.This engine had been labelled"Finger Tight",and had come from an establishment no one had heard of-Seven Hats.The assumption being that some one had instigated the continuance of the 320R Olympus developement.There were a deal of coming and going of HS staff and RAF/Navy Buc Officers between Dunsfold,Warton,Honnington.Unfortunately the revised project was permenantly curtailed by the Conservatives after the mar 79 election,but this made excellent conversation at the time.I wonder if the Excellent John Farley can put any light on this time of struggles between the Aviation Industry and the Government of the time?
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Revived TSR2
A government study into the feasibility of resurrecting the TSR-2 project was carried out during the early 1980s when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister.[citation needed] There was, briefly, some speculation that TSR-2 might yet see the light of day in an updated form.[citation needed] But after the study concluded that it would be far too expensive (the previous destruction requiring a complete start from scratch), and that the technology was no longer cutting edge, the TSR-2 was cancelled forever.
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This was a description of the cancelling of TSR2,ending up with all sorts of conspiracy theories ,regarding LBJ and the American Military Defense Industry paying off the then Labour Leaders to finish off TSR2 in its entirity,leaving nothing from which it could be resurrected.
Surely there must be someone who knows from whence it came, and why it was considered so important that it was actually carried out... (to all intents and purposes). Obviously the govt. owned the designs and aircraft, so it can only have come from them... but by whom and at what level was that decision made and passed down Ostensibly a secrecy/security issue to prevent it passing into other's hands?
NB. The French, having acquired the Fairey Delta's wing research data, went on to make a shedload of money out of Mirages over the years...
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The National Archives offer a plethera of papers on the subject, if anyone wants to go and trawl through 'em
My confinment, still, in Colditz Young Offenders Centre prevents a trip to Kew any time soon, to look at any of these, but the first one: DSIR 23/32791, (opened in 1995) could be worth a look.
Cancellation of TSR2 airplane:
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research: Aeronautical Research Council: Reports and Papers DSIR 23/32791
Cancellation of TSR2: letters . Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers') DEFE 13/285
Cancellation of TSR2 aircraft programme .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3073
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): measures to be taken to deal with discharged workers .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3079
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): possible study on the re-employment of labour .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3072
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): correspondence with regions .
Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-1970 PREM 13/433
Future of UK aircraft industry: manpower implications following cancellation of TSR2 project .
Treasury: Defence Policy and Materiel Division: Registered Files (DM and 2DM Series) T 225/3946
Claims arising from the cancellation of the TSR2 strike aircraft .
Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series) FV 2/271
Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled . Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series)Date range: 1964 - 1966.
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research: Aeronautical Research Council: Reports and Papers DSIR 23/32791
Cancellation of TSR2: letters . Ministry of Defence: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers') DEFE 13/285
Cancellation of TSR2 aircraft programme .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3073
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): measures to be taken to deal with discharged workers .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3079
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): possible study on the re-employment of labour .
Ministry of Labour and successors: Employment Policy, Registered Files (EM series and other series) LAB 8/3072
Aircraft industry redundancies (cancellation of P1154 and TSR2 projects): correspondence with regions .
Prime Minister's Office: Correspondence and Papers, 1964-1970 PREM 13/433
Future of UK aircraft industry: manpower implications following cancellation of TSR2 project .
Treasury: Defence Policy and Materiel Division: Registered Files (DM and 2DM Series) T 225/3946
Claims arising from the cancellation of the TSR2 strike aircraft .
Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series) FV 2/271
Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled . Effect on costs if TSR2 were to be cancelled Ministry of Aviation and successors: Air A Division and successors: Registered Files (TS Series)Date range: 1964 - 1966.
Last edited by Jetex Jim; 14th Mar 2008 at 01:46.
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In 1938 Fairey designed a 4 engine Airliner,which we lost to the US which became the Constellation.After the War ,having already given the US the Jet engine,the Atlee government gave away the Nene to the Russians.The Miles 52 was aborted,not before some designs off it were apparently used in the US X program.The French turned it into the Leduc.The French also used the Fairey Delta for their Mirage program,via South Africa.The TSR2 and the Canadian Arrow project were terminated to oblivion.Even top people concerned with the project,and the Low level Marine Bucc Outfit Bosses had odd things happen to them(Neil W and Pete S)Sir Neil Cameron,CIGS,became the only one to die in harness,and a TSR2 supporter.Quite later the Nimrod AWACS was cancelled,with the Brits the ONLY guys to have developed a Forward Seeking Radar,to identify Front End On Heat Signatures.Racal and GEC were doing this and had achieved a working stage of their program,when 11 pax were killed in a Navajo at Detling,on a low viz approach to Rochester(Home of GEC).I believe no one has managed to replicate this even now.The project was cancelled,and the Sentry was purchased.There was a terrible time in the early 80s ,when Dynamics were running tests with Racal at Hatfield.One by one,all the Aircraft involved,Hunters,Buccs,were withdrawn fromavailability,and 125s had to be used,against Airborne Radars mounted in a Twin Pin,and Wessex,which were hardly suitable.The noise for Welwyn Garden City must have been awful,but at least it was not done all day.Anyway,there was a survivor from the Racal Team,who was sick at the time,doing a Flying Course at Leavesden.He became Turboprop Chief Pilot at Air Uk and now I believe is Chief Pilot of GB Airways.All good conspiracy stuff,or plain coincidence.And I forgot to mention,thinking of John Farley again,we lost the Harrier to the US,without the 1154 even being built and the thin wing variant well and truly a US Aeroplane now.Not even a FAA Fighter anymore,for Fleet defense.What Effing fleet I hear you ask???????We only have the GR7and 9,used by Dark and Light Blue!!!!!!!!I feel a Book is in the offing!!!!!!
Last edited by FAStoat; 14th Mar 2008 at 11:08.
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FASToat - I don’t know what you mean by:
But if you mean IRS&T, Infra Red Search and Track, that goes back years and, according to Dr Kopp over on Australian Aerospace, was first seen on USAF Voodoos and Delta Darts. - Its main benifit being the ability to track a target passively - not much of a advantage on an aircraft with two howling great radars blasting out RF in all directions.
The AEW Nimrod comes across as another defence budget funded job creation scheme for industry, why make your own AWACS when an American product is available cheaper? But much like the Spey Phantoms, the RAF were obliged to wait and wait while GEC faffed around, on Cost Plus for years.
According, again to Dr Kopp, one of AEW Nimrods many woes was a predilection for saturating its processing system, which was trying to track fast moving air targets overland, by detecting and tracking slow moving vehicles instead. This, if correct, represents an extraordinary system architecture – a clutter notch would normally eliminate ground and slow moving returns before they ever got into the tracking chain.
While this abortive development was going on, the RAF were forced to carry on flying, for AEW purposes, Shackletons with APS-20 Radar salvaged from ex-RN Gannetts, and that Radar was actually first used on Douglas Skyraiders.
However, unlike the Spey Phantoms, at the end GEC never managed to deliver the goods.
I don’t know about a book, but the IEEE has a case study on Nimrod AEW -
ECBS - Engineering of Computer-Based Systems
Forward Seeking Radar,to identify Front End On Heat Signatures
The AEW Nimrod comes across as another defence budget funded job creation scheme for industry, why make your own AWACS when an American product is available cheaper? But much like the Spey Phantoms, the RAF were obliged to wait and wait while GEC faffed around, on Cost Plus for years.
According, again to Dr Kopp, one of AEW Nimrods many woes was a predilection for saturating its processing system, which was trying to track fast moving air targets overland, by detecting and tracking slow moving vehicles instead. This, if correct, represents an extraordinary system architecture – a clutter notch would normally eliminate ground and slow moving returns before they ever got into the tracking chain.
While this abortive development was going on, the RAF were forced to carry on flying, for AEW purposes, Shackletons with APS-20 Radar salvaged from ex-RN Gannetts, and that Radar was actually first used on Douglas Skyraiders.
However, unlike the Spey Phantoms, at the end GEC never managed to deliver the goods.
I don’t know about a book, but the IEEE has a case study on Nimrod AEW -
The Nimrod AEW flies again; a procurement case study. by D. Dalcher Summary:… The Nimrod programme represents the largest development effort of its time. In the context of forensic ECBS, it represents a classical catalogue of failures.
ECBS - Engineering of Computer-Based Systems
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FAStoat, I'd quite forgotten about Fairey's civil efforts before the War. As a reminder, I looked at http://www.freewebs.com/faireyaviation/aviation.htm. It opened a whole new tract of personal ignorance for me! I never knew that Fairey's had designed and developed engines; and my Dad started his craft apprenticeship at Heaton Chapel.
Back directly to Thread and relating to the FD2:
Back directly to Thread and relating to the FD2:
As Marcel Dassault, the founder of the company, said in the book 'Mirage, Warplane of the World', "If it were not for the clumsy way in which you tackle things in Britain, you could have made the Mirage yourselves". The next series of overseas low-level research flights took place in Norway with observers from the United States in attendance. Remember the Convair Delta Dagger? The FD.2 was never allowed to be developed into a fighter. The Dassault Mirage went on to become the best-selling fighter aircraft range of all time.