PPRuNe Forums - ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979

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- - ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 34 years later. (https://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/527672-anz-erebus-crash-28-november-1979-34-years-later.html)

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Was it not ALPA that demanded that their senior pilots all have a "Turn" at these Antarctic flights? They must have known of the requirements of other operators

A familiarisation flight was a requirement initially. The airline asked the CAD to remove the requirement in light of the briefing given. Can't lay that at ALPAs door, unless you're saying ALPA runs the airline and CAD.

From Chippendales report.

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2. Area Qualification Requirements
Area qualification shall consist of the following:
a. A comprehensive pre-flight briefing which covers at least the following items:
(i) En-route and terminal routing
(ii) Terrain and minimum safe altitudes
(iii) The seasonal meteorological condition and statistics
(iv) Meteorological communication and ATC facilities,
services and procedures
(v) Navigation facilities
(vi) Prohibited and restricted areas
(vii) Search and Rescue facilities and procedures
AND within 30 days
b. A flight in the area under the supervision of a person authorised by the Flight Operations Director.

1.17.19 None of the pilots on this flight had previous Antarctic experience but on 24 October 1979 a signal message from Air New Zealand Limited to CAD asked:

“OPS 880 Flight Operations. Reference our telecon regarding the operation of company flights to Antarctica and return non-stop it is our understanding that because of the briefing programme carried out in our route training unit and the simulator detail covering exercises in grid navigation and the NDB could break at McMurdo that there is no requirement for flight under supervision. The briefing and simulator detail are completed within the week prior to operating the flight8. Would you please confirm that our understanding is correct”.

In a reply dated 24 October 1979 CAD stated:
“OPS 523 98/4/14. Your OPS 880 is confirmed correct and Ops Specs will be amended to reflect such detail”.

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unless you're saying ALPA runs the airline and CAD.

One could say with some justification that there is a grain of truth in that statement.
I will quote from Bob Thomson "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88.

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"Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their senior pilots and members were seen as professionals who knew it all and did not therefore need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF,USAF, USN or the Division.

Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a "special perk" for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members."

As I can see no other reason for the Company to change the crews for every flight, more expense for training etc, than this agreement with NZALPA then it is more than likely that this was why so many different crews were used on these flights.

Whilst Bob Thomson was not a qualified pilot, he had made75 trips to the ice, 50 being on the flight deck of aircraft approaching from the North. He was in fact scheduled to fly as the commentator on Flt 901. When asked if he ever felt uneasy that but for a twist of fate he may have died that day?
his reply was

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"Not at all. I always insisted on a complete circuit of Ross Island before letting down below 17,000ft. That way I could get an idea of the complete situation and what the weather was like, where any clouds were."

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Area qualification shall consist of the following:
a. A comprehensive pre-flight briefing which covers at least the following items:
(i) En-route and terminal routing

Interesting that a 'comprehensive pre-flight briefing' covering 'En-route ...... routing' was required.

Wasn't the official position that moving the final waypoint & therefore the track to fly directly over Erebus was not relevant to the outcome of the flight?

If they could move the route all over the map without telling anyone & still hold the belief that that was safe, why would a comprehensive pre-flight briefing on en-route routing be required by the regulator?

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Note - tonite ( Sunday) on TV 1, NZ time @ 2030, "Erebus, Operation Overdue."

"Tells the emotional and compelling true story of four police officers who went to Antarctica to recover the bodies of the victims of the 1979 Air New Zealand crash that killed all 257 passengers."

(Appears as tho the vexed question of the diary missing pages emerges again.)

Should be available within days on TV 1 Ondemand.

... got round to watching the documentary (thanks MySky).

The documentary had a link to a website, primarily about the documentary. What I found interesting was this link ... The Making of | Erebus Operation Overdue

... and the comment about Gemmells knowledge of what happend to the ringbinder contents ...

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...He admitted to knowing that Air New Zealand staff had removed pages of a ringbinder...

... I didn't think much of the excuse given.

and what about the sim run??

My cousin was a FA on that flight.

In response to Framers post # 169,Why we have not learned .
I have the answer to your question,You said it yourself.
"as it may make it difficult for them to achieve some commercial targets"

That's half of the problem, but not the whole problem ( IMHO of course) .

Humans fall into traps all the time. How do we avoid them? Words that spring to mind: knowledge, experience, being aware and careful, rules, routine.

What is a common trap for pilots? Not changing the plan as circumstances change: plan continuation bias. How do you recognise it? That is the problem.

November 28, 2014 - 35 years since we lost you all.

Only a few short weeks to go; ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 35 years later. On November 28 1979 Air New Zealand Flight TE901crashed into Mt Erebus killing 237 passengers and 20 crew. 35 years have passed but not forgotten.
R.I.P to all those souls.

Erebus anniversary - 35 years ago today

The last thread, as usual, was slyly made to disappear yesterday. That's a shame because 257 lives were lost 35 years ago today. Some people are willing to remember;

https://tvnz.co.nz/national-news/spe...erebus-6177838

R.I.P friends.

I've stumbled upon this thread when I searched data about Gordon Vette and found this interesting document:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyWvOI_MD-Q
I am rather surprised it has less than 5.000 views. I am not a pilot whatsoever but a management consultant and lecturer and I can only say that many executives can learn from aviation field thus I like to use such examples in my lessons.

It is interesting to observe the struggle to find out what and why happened.

Just one question - didn't DC-10 have some MFRD type of radar back in 1979?

http://www.erebus.co.nz/Portals/4/Do...ot%20error.pdf

The radar issue is dealt with at pages 120 to 127.

Whatever Mahon might have to say on the subject, and he says quite a lot, the radar had no relevance, because the captain descended into the danger zone on the basis that he was flying visually. The word "visually" does not refer to what one can see on the radar screen inside the cockpit. Instead, it refers to what one can see out the window, outside the cockpit.

As a matter of fact, the conditions were not suitable for a visual descent, because white cloud above would merge with the white ice below, making one indistinguishable from the other. Did the captain know that before he descended? Most definitely: He expressly said so 10 minutes before he did it.