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Tids – agreed.
To sort out the 'Mildura' issues is going to be a big job. Clearly there are major corporate, crew, meteorological and on the fringes, legislative issues. Although I feel the 'regs' are blameless this time – the Australian fuel policy is useful, flexible and with a little common sense tweaking works fine, for grown ups capable of taking responsibility and allowed to make decisions, although it does expect that the crews can look at the presented forecast, make an informed decision and order an extra few, discretionary drops of fuel – (to be sure, to be sure). Or to bugger off somewhere else before things get too 'tight'.
Once again, there are deep issues involved, BoM practice, methodology and policy. Corporate pressures, operational policy, pilot training, human factors; etc. in fact, all the parts of a crash puzzle except without body parts melded with aircraft parts, for the third time now. (Fuel x 3 + Weather x 3). Mildura is a serious, but subtle event. Now, can our compromised ATSB sort it out before centuries end?. Will the report have any value?. Is the political will, savvy and interest required to make the recommendations stick there?. Or will we just end up with the 'company has amended their policy' etc; or, two crews re sitting their ATPL Met exams a' la the Chambers system. Or perhaps, McComic will just blame the whole shemozzle on the ills of society, con yet another minister and leave the spin to those who know how best to do it. One thing the Senate has achieved though, there will no disgustingly obvious cover up; not this time. I don't know which concerns me the most: but close to the top of the list must be that two, not one, but two separate airlines finished up, operationally compromised, landing in less than ideal conditions, at Mildura. A foggy day should end with multiple complaints to management due to delays, missed connections, changes to crew rosters and a higher fuel bill; not with a full on declared fuel emergency and Brace, brace, brace. Winter fog in Australia is not 'unusual', there are a few options available; delay, divert, hold and divert. All corporately unpalatable and operationally problematic; but, rock solid safe. A skipper has all of those options available, fully supported by law. The 'company' policy does not signify. One concern, worthy of some consideration is 'crew attitude' and whether the ATSB has the balls to tackle the subliminal pressures to 'be on schedule', minimise fuel uplift and yet manage to not compromise or embarrass the company. Why did both crews not throw on 'gas for Mum'?. The little alarm bells of experienced crew, going south, early morning, in winter with the ambient weather conditions should ring, and a discreet, prudent 30 or even a big fat 60 minutes could be 'smuggled' inboard without adverse operational comment. Did two, not one, well fed, rested crews not 'see' the possibility of fog and take appropriate measures, I doubt it.. "One is unfortunate, two begins to look like carelessness". I believe we are allowed to ask why, just in case the nanny state or corporate dogma has managed to brainwash or bully a more politically correct generation of pilots, without denigrating the crews involved. Three incidents, no bodies. Lucky country ? you bet. Brace, brace, brace. Where's me old tin hat. |
Wow!
A post from K that is a) understandable and b) on the spot. Well said |
I'd suggest they did put on extra fuel. Didn't they do 2 approaches before declaring and landing on third? If Mildura was the alternate (not sure here) then that is almost 60 mins more fuel at 1t per approach.
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One concern, worthy of some consideration is 'crew attitude' and whether the ATSB has the balls to tackle the subliminal pressures to 'be on schedule', minimise fuel uplift and yet manage to not compromise or embarrass the company. Why did both crews not throw on 'gas for Mum'?. The constant subtle ( or not so) reminders combined with the extra tasks given to pilots to complete between sign on and push back, combined with a reduction in the perceived authority of the pilots by most people surrounding the operation does have an effect and needs to be looked at. Little things, the pilots car park being 15 minutes walk from the briefing room while security and management staff get the closer parks, although not a problem in itself, is indicative of the attitude towards the work that pilots need to complete in that hour between sign on and pushback. Don't get me wrong, I don't give a rats about walking to the briefing room or who is closer, what I am saying is that there has been a slow degradation in the perception of the importance of the work being carried out to the point where people freely interrupt flight planning without excusing themselves and the pilots have barely enough time to sign on, brief, get through security, prepare the aircraft before ground staff are interrupting that process (just as important) with requests to board. Each time a new task is added to the pre flight phase it gets a fraction tighter, yet this isn't mitigated in any way. Most crews understand this and won't be rushed too much but if you get the wrong combination of Captain and F/O holes start opening up. Most of the time this doesn't combine with poor forecasts, every now and again it will. To be clear, I'm not commenting on the crews involved at all as I know little of what they did and didn't do that morning,I'm commenting on a broader industry level. |
Why no mayday call then? Landing with less than ffr= mayday
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Great job Kharon!
So in your post you essentially accuse these crew of : Being irresponsible for rellying on BOM TAF and METAR information in deciding their fuel uplift. You accuse them of not using common sense and uplifting more gas for mum as you put it. You insinuate that that was a careless shortcoming of both crew. You offer up your wisdom and outline their options without being there. As far as i can tell they both had fuel to divert their aircraft which is what they did. Hell who needs the ATSB This guy has answered all the questions. |
Please pardon my friend tenretni.
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Just because Virgin diverted before QF doesn't necessarily mean they arrived at Mildura before QF.
Maybe QF were closer when they diverted, or flew faster, and arrived at Mildura before Virgin? |
They probably did not give a Mayday call because the pilot in command did not believe that they were in "grave and imminent danger" so how about we leave that alone, yelling from the sidelines is so easy.
Landing with less than FR, mmm, MOST fuel policies only say how much one must PLAN to land with. Therefore if you land with less than FR it is quite possibly not an offence, merely a cause for reporting and explanation. Before you jump down my throat about this sacred cow, please post a reference to where it says the aircraft MUST land with FR intact. I think this thread has run it's course in the absence of any new information. |
Did the QF crew request to land first due their impending low fuel state?
What is more interesting is the QF side of this story. Did they break minimums when they landed? Did they have less than their FR when they did land? If they did, did they declare a fuel emergency? If they didn't, why did they break minimums (if they in fact did)? No accusations here, just questions, that to date have all been leveled at the VA crew. I'm sure there is more to follow. |
VOZ 1384 departed 17/2035 flight planned arrival YPAD 17/2247 Flight history
QFA 735 departed 17/2109 flight planned arrival YPAD 17/2300 Flight history sunrise approx 17/2152 (0722 CST source SA Gov ) ************************************************************ ** Weather Chrological order Times UTC TAF in BLUE from 17/0000 SPECI in RED, METAR in BLACK from 17/1700 ************************************************************ ********* 17/06/2013 05:16-> TAF YPAD 170516Z 1706/1812 22008KT 9999 -SHRA SCT030 FM171100 VRB05KT 9999 SCT030 FM180000 14006KT 9999 FEW030 RMK 17/06/2013 11:04-> TAF YPAD 171104Z 1712/1818 VRB05KT 9999 SCT030 17/06/2013 17:03-> TAF YPAD 171703Z 1718/1824 VRB05KT 9999 17/06/2013 17:30-> METAR YPAD 171730Z 03006KT 9999 FEW022 06/05 Q1018 NOSIG 17/06/2013 18:00-> METAR YPAD 171800Z 06005KT 9999 FEW022 05/05 Q1018 NOSIG 17/06/2013 18:30-> METAR YPAD 171830Z 09005KT 9999 FEW022 05/05 Q1018 NOSIG 17/06/2013 19:00-> METAR YPAD 171900Z 07004KT 9999 FEW022 05/04 Q1018 NOSIG 17/06/2013 19:30-> METAR YPAD 171930Z 04005KT 9999 FEW022 06/05 Q1019 NOSIG ************************************************************ ** PRE-FLIGHT BRIEFING ************************************************************ ** 17/06/2013 20:00-> METAR YPAD 172000Z 06004KT 9999 FEW022 05/04 Q1019 NOSIG 17/06/2013 20:30-> METAR YPAD 172030Z 08005KT 9999 FEW022 05/05 Q1019 NOSIG ************************************************************ ** VOZ 1387 AIRBOURNE 17/2035 ************************************************************ ** 17/06/2013 21:00-> TAF AMD YPAD 172100Z 1721/1824 05005KT 9999 FEW025 FM180000 VRB05KT 9999 FEW030 SCT045 FM181000 VRB05KT CAVOK PROB30 1721/1724 0500 FG RMK 17/06/2013 21:00-> METAR YPAD 172100Z 05004KT 9999 FEW022 05/05 Q1019 NOSIG ************************************************************ ** QFA 735 AIRBOURNE 17/2109 ************************************************************ ** 17/06/2013 21:11-> SPECI YPAD 172111Z 06005KT 9999 MIFG FEW022 SCT058 05/05 Q1020 NOSIG 17/06/2013 21:30-> METAR YPAD 172130Z 06004KT 9999 MIFG FEW022 05/04 Q1020 NOSIG 17/06/2013 21:30-> SPECI YPAD 172130Z 06004KT 9999 MIFG FEW022 05/04 Q1020 NOSIG 17/06/2013 22:00-> SPECI YPAD 172200Z 01006KT 9999 1000NW PRFG MIFG FEW022 05/05 Q1020 FM2200 01005KT 0500 FG FM2300 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 22:05-> SPECI YPAD 172205Z 01006KT 2000 0500N FG FEW022 05/04 Q1020 FM2205 01005KT 0500 FG FM2300 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 22:15-> SPECI YPAD 172215Z 02006KT 0500 0250N FG OVC001 05/04 Q1020 FM2300 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 22:30-> SPECI YPAD 172230Z 04005KT 0150 FG OVC001 06/05 Q1020 FM2300 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 22:30-> METAR YPAD 172230Z 04005KT 0150 FG OVC001 06/05 Q1020 FM2300 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 23:00-> SPECI YPAD 172300Z 04006KT 0150 FG OVC000 06/06 Q1021 FM2330 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 23:00-> TAF AMD YPAD 180122Z 1801/1906 01005KT 0800 FG FM180200 VRB05KT 9999 FEW030 SCT045 FM181000 VRB05KT CAVOK FM190000 04008KT CAVOK 17/06/2013 23:00-> METAR YPAD 172300Z 04006KT 0150 FG OVC000 06/06 Q1021 FM2330 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 23:02-> TAF YPAD 172302Z 1800/1906 VRB05KT 9999 FEW030 SCT045 FM181000 VRB05KT CAVOK FM190000 04008KT CAVOK 17/06/2013 23:30-> SPECI YPAD 172330Z 04005KT 0150 FG OVC000 07/07 Q1021 FM2400 05005KT 9999 FEW025 17/06/2013 23:53-> TAF AMD YPAD 172353Z 1800/1906 02004KT 0500 FG FM180100 VRB05KT 9999 FEW030 SCT045 FM181000 VRB05KT CAVOK FM190000 04008KT CAVOK RMK |
Thats pretty thorough FYSTI.
From your info it appears that Virgin diverted at 2306Z and QF diverted at 2315Z. Do you have the METARS for Mildura at that time? Would be interesting to see.:ok: |
Wait and see
Algie & Bloggs :D :D :D
tenretni @ #293, well you could take that perspective :O, but I merely took it as the outline of an investigation - look at all of the likely issues and the worst case interactions, then eliminate each possibility with the evidence :ok: our real problem is that even if the investigator in charge lifts up the rocks and chases all the mice that scuttle away, will the Beakercrats let any of it see the light of day? We already know that they have taken "death by deferral" to new heights and that the fate of each crew will depend on how the Skull thinks it should have gone down, no one else! Framer, the work that pilots need to complete in that hour between sign on and pushback And just to show that the great god ICAO doesn't always get it right, have a look at the advance copy of Doc 9976 Flight Planning and Fuel Management Manual and see if and how it would have helped :sad: :sad: :sad: |
Bloggs & Algie..,,,,:D.. ..http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ies/thumbs.gif. It is always easier to be clear with a defined subject. I know; (I know) - some stuff is 'cryptic', it just has to be, to avoid the slings and arrows etc.; but on this subject, I thought plain speaking would suffice. There are some questions here which are deep, subtle, prompted by a rarely seen set of circumstances; but, they do need answers – if we are to avoid a repetition. Someone (Framer ?) mentioned that it's rare for all the holes to line up; bit like one of those one armed bandits (poker machine things), rare to get 4 or 5 of a kind, but it does happen, from time to time. Except in this game, four lemons is not a jackpot, more like winning lotto – only in reverse. So, I meant no offence, indeed I'll lead the charge (or hold the jackets) if this gets whipped, spun, parlayed, bullied or coerced into being a strictly pilot error, one horse race.
Prince Nick – one can only hope the ATSBeaker troops are in open rebellion and insisting on being allowed to do the job. Looks like a job well done on the QF32 report; I expect it won't please everyone but, it's a great improvement over some of the previous efforts. Perhaps because there was no requirement or need to allow the report to be Wodgered. Right, off to the pub then.....http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ies/thumbs.gif |
casa and cao 48.1
This is the document that has been challenged in the Senate, as many others should have been challenged as well.
If they were challenged, we may not have the mess as now occurs. |
Not sure if its been posted here but the Sun has an article about the Virgin jet committing to the approach, as they only had 800kg of fuel on board and could not do a go around. DF. |
Well it is the first Maggot in the world that is capable of dumping fuel!!:ugh:
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It's true, the Flight Engineer told me.
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Beat me to it!
I'm sure there'd be a picture somewhere in the media of a 737 dumping fuel though. A special 4 engined one too probably. |
Originally Posted by Iccy2001
They probably did not give a Mayday call because the pilot in command did not believe that they were in "grave and imminent danger" so how about we leave that alone
Do you have the METARS for Mildura at that time? |
Minutes between hero and zero!
Just released Spanish aircraft accident investigation board (CIAIC) ‘Final Report’ into Ryanair low fuel emergency into Valencia, Spain in May 2010 is well worth the read!
From ‘Aviation Safety Network’ (Flight Safety Foundation) article: The Spanish aircraft accident investigation board CIAIAC published the final report of their investigation into a low fuel incident involving a Ryanair flight at Valencia, Spain in May 2010. Four similar low fuel emergencies in July 2012 were also considered in the investigation. On 14 May 2010, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 flying from London-Stansted , UK to Alicante, Spain, was forced to make a go-around due to meteorological conditions (windshear). The crew then tried a new approach but the wind conditions were similar and the crew decided to divert to Valencia. They stated urgency (PAN-PAN) due to the fact that they were below the final fuel reserve and then, when they were in approach, they stated emergency (MAYDAY) and carried out an uneventful landing at Valencia. The fuel quantity was checked to be below final reserve fuel. On 26th July 2012 thunderstorms occurred in the vicinity of Madrid Airport that forced ATC to divert twelve flights towards Valencia Airport. Four of these twelve flights declared emergency due to problems with fuel, when they were in approach to Valencia Airport. One was a LAN Chile flight, three were Ryanair flights. The LAN Chile and one Ryanair plane landed with a fuel amount below the final reserve. Given the similarity with the 2010 incident, CIAIAC decided to incorporate them into the ongoing 2010 incident investigation. CIAIAC concluded that: “The incident was caused by the crew’s inadequate decision-making process in opting to make a second approach, in the choice of alternate airport and in the flight parameters used en route to that airport, which resulted in the fuel amount dropping below the required minimum reserve fuel and in the crew declaring an emergency (MAYDAY). The company’s fuel savings policy, though it complies with the minimum legal requirements, tends to minimize the amount of fuel with which its airplanes operate and leaves none for contingencies below the legal minimums. This contributed to the amount of fuel used being improperly planned and to the amount of fuel onboard dropping below the required final fuel reserve. Another contributing factor was the wind information provided by ATC to the crew when preparing the approach to runway 28. This information, though accurate, did not give the crew a clear picture of the changing wind conditions, which would have facilitated their making more suitable decisions.” Six safety recommendations were issued:
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Herald Sun said RNAV is a kind of computer. 10/10 fact checking
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Originally Posted by fl610
Well it is the first Maggot in the world that is capable of dumping fuel!!
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Herald Sun said RNAV is a kind of computer. |
Virgin should take action for deformation - "Landing with low fuel" is just something the uneducated journalists always throw around with aviation.
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Virgin would take deformation action for a heavy landing, not low fuel. :E
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Why did both crews not throw on 'gas for Mum'? Virgin hold until Qantas lands and clears the runway and then start their approach. In the meantime the fog gets thicker and so carrying "gas for mum" has painted them into a corner. And here we are, with 20/20 hindsight, trying to second guess what two crew did based on information presented to them. As a matter of interest, how many times in OZ have RPT jet aircraft been forced to land in weather conditions that have been below the minimums or non normal conditions (night, etc) after having used all the flight fuel and their variable fuel. Before this, I can think of at least 4. |
Addendum post #309
From post #309: Here’s hoping the ATSB do a comparable job to the Spanish and perhaps also generate some equally good ‘safety recommendations’…although they may have to get rid of Beaker before that happens! This was in order to get rid of the ambiguity on when to declare a PAN (urgency) or MAYDAY (distress) in the case of in-flight fuel emergencies. {Page 69 of the CIAIAC Incident Report IN-010/2010} Which from certain parts of this thread appears to have been somewhat of an issue in the VA incident at YMIA. Irony or different interpretation?:confused: Either way the issue has morphed half way round the world! It is also highlights the value of ICAO compliant aircraft accident investigation bodies adhering to the principles of promulgating safety recommendations (unlike the Beakerised methodology) when serious safety issues are noted while conducting incident/accident investigations!:ok: |
Cream puff :D
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Irony or different interpretation? Either way the issue has morphed half way round the world! |
BOM Forecasting Accuracy One of the problems with BOM and Ozzie Govt spending cutbacks is that there are less local experienced people doing the forecasting. A lot of present day forecasting is done relying only on historic data modelling and statistics. So, they _will_ get it right more often than not - that's how statistics work! http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ilies/nerd.gif http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...ilies/nerd.gif But when some conditions "outside-the-box" are looming, they will get it wrong as they need LOCAL experience and a window to look out-of to make reasoned forecasts. Another factor is that the local BOM may not be "local". For Adelaide, they could be outsourced to Sydney, Canberra or Melbourne (or Mumbai). Now that cannot help. There is no substitute for local area knowledge and experience, the models aren't always right... |
Originally Posted by Iccy2001 They probably did not give a Mayday call because the pilot in command did not believe that they were in "grave and imminent danger" so how about we leave that alone Better have a re-read of AIP, Iccy, in particular ENR 1.1 60.6.1. The word "shall" being the operative one. Bloggs, have you even seen a good lawyer thrash out the legal meaning of "shall" versus "must" versus "will"? I can tell you that it is very entertaining and informative. |
maggot. :ok:
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A Mayday is not just for low fuel. If you are going to go below the minima on an approach then it is permitted if it is an emergency. If its an emergency then declaring a Mayday will leave no doubts that the situation is serious.
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How can a situation in which the Captain calls "BRACE BRACE BRACE" not be an emergency?
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Since when did it become a requirement to declare a mayday before deciding what to do with your aircraft in the interests of safety?
Isn't a mayday defined as grave and imminent danger? Does knowingly descending below an MDA presumably in the interests of safety,constitute grave and imminent danger? |
Lone Pine:ok:
Most of the previous calls for a Mayday should be Pan Pans.:zzz: |
ICAO
5.3.1.1 Distress and urgency traffic shall comprise all radiotelephony messages relative to the distress and urgency conditions respectively. Distress and urgency conditions are defined as:
a) Distress: a condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance. b) Urgency: a condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance. 5.3.1.2 The radiotelephony distress signal MAYDAY and the radiotelephony urgency signal PAN PAN shall be used at the commencement of the first distress and urgency communication respectively. IMHO, given the above, it's a line call either way but this is not the issue at hand. It's how two separate airlines end up landing at a regional airport on a runway ill equipped for the actual weather conditions. That it happened to two separate crews from separate airlines points to a bigger issue than the actions of either flight crew; that it is a systemic issue in the regulatory culture is the most obvious culprit. Debating the RT actions of either crew is pointless here. |
Yes, I see the error in my reasoning.
If the pilot was obliged to broadcast a MAYDAY, the obligation should only arise during the 2 or 3 seconds in which the crew realises that CAT III approaches have stringent standards for a reason, and Mildura doesn’t meet them. Works for me (unless I’m one of the PAX). :ok: |
at the end of the day, if an RPT jet call's either PAN or MAYDAY they will get an In-Flight Emergency Response from ATC (after all, that's the whole point of the call in the first place..) In a min-fuel situation, there's not all that much ATC can do other than 'Do you want local stand-by or full emergency?'.
Sadly the real answer to that question would lie in the quality of the landing (or lack thereof..) |
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