Virgin Aircraft 'Emergency' Landing
Minutes between hero and zero!
Just released Spanish aircraft accident investigation board (CIAIC) ‘Final Report’ into Ryanair low fuel emergency into Valencia, Spain in May 2010 is well worth the read!
From ‘Aviation Safety Network’ (Flight Safety Foundation) article:
Here’s hoping the ATSB do a comparable job to the Spanish and perhaps also generate some equally good ‘safety recommendations’…although they may have to get rid of Beaker before that happens!
From ‘Aviation Safety Network’ (Flight Safety Foundation) article:
The Spanish aircraft accident investigation board CIAIAC published the final report of their investigation into a low fuel incident involving a Ryanair flight at Valencia, Spain in May 2010. Four similar low fuel emergencies in July 2012 were also considered in the investigation.
On 14 May 2010, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 flying from London-Stansted , UK to Alicante, Spain, was forced to make a go-around due to meteorological conditions (windshear). The crew then tried a new approach but the wind conditions were similar and the crew decided to divert to Valencia. They stated urgency (PAN-PAN) due to the fact that they were below the final fuel reserve and then, when they were in approach, they stated emergency (MAYDAY) and carried out an uneventful landing at Valencia. The fuel quantity was checked to be below final reserve fuel.
On 26th July 2012 thunderstorms occurred in the vicinity of Madrid Airport that forced ATC to divert twelve flights towards Valencia Airport. Four of these twelve flights declared emergency due to problems with fuel, when they were in approach to Valencia Airport. One was a LAN Chile flight, three were Ryanair flights. The LAN Chile and one Ryanair plane landed with a fuel amount below the final reserve.
Given the similarity with the 2010 incident, CIAIAC decided to incorporate them into the ongoing 2010 incident investigation.
CIAIAC concluded that:
“The incident was caused by the crew’s inadequate decision-making process in opting to make a second approach, in the choice of alternate airport and in the flight parameters used en route to that airport, which resulted in the fuel amount dropping below the required minimum reserve fuel and in the crew declaring an emergency (MAYDAY).
The company’s fuel savings policy, though it complies with the minimum legal requirements, tends to minimize the amount of fuel with which its airplanes operate and leaves none for contingencies below the legal minimums. This contributed to the amount of fuel used being improperly planned and to the amount of fuel onboard dropping below the required final fuel reserve.
Another contributing factor was the wind information provided by ATC to the crew when preparing the approach to runway 28. This information, though accurate, did not give the crew a clear picture of the changing wind conditions, which would have facilitated their making more suitable decisions.”
Six safety recommendations were issued:
On 14 May 2010, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800 flying from London-Stansted , UK to Alicante, Spain, was forced to make a go-around due to meteorological conditions (windshear). The crew then tried a new approach but the wind conditions were similar and the crew decided to divert to Valencia. They stated urgency (PAN-PAN) due to the fact that they were below the final fuel reserve and then, when they were in approach, they stated emergency (MAYDAY) and carried out an uneventful landing at Valencia. The fuel quantity was checked to be below final reserve fuel.
On 26th July 2012 thunderstorms occurred in the vicinity of Madrid Airport that forced ATC to divert twelve flights towards Valencia Airport. Four of these twelve flights declared emergency due to problems with fuel, when they were in approach to Valencia Airport. One was a LAN Chile flight, three were Ryanair flights. The LAN Chile and one Ryanair plane landed with a fuel amount below the final reserve.
Given the similarity with the 2010 incident, CIAIAC decided to incorporate them into the ongoing 2010 incident investigation.
CIAIAC concluded that:
“The incident was caused by the crew’s inadequate decision-making process in opting to make a second approach, in the choice of alternate airport and in the flight parameters used en route to that airport, which resulted in the fuel amount dropping below the required minimum reserve fuel and in the crew declaring an emergency (MAYDAY).
The company’s fuel savings policy, though it complies with the minimum legal requirements, tends to minimize the amount of fuel with which its airplanes operate and leaves none for contingencies below the legal minimums. This contributed to the amount of fuel used being improperly planned and to the amount of fuel onboard dropping below the required final fuel reserve.
Another contributing factor was the wind information provided by ATC to the crew when preparing the approach to runway 28. This information, though accurate, did not give the crew a clear picture of the changing wind conditions, which would have facilitated their making more suitable decisions.”
Six safety recommendations were issued:
- It is recommended that AENA Air Navigation establish the necessary measures and procedures to facilitate the crews, by means of ATIS, the relevant and significant information that may be associated to sudden changes reported by aircraft, or those not important enough to have originated an SPECI O TREND, this way helping them to prepare their approaches and to take their decisions in the most appropriate way.
- It is recommended that Ryanair modify its Operational Flight Plan to show the real time and fuel data calculated for any alternate, regardless of its proximity, and the optimum parameters used in said calculations, so that these data may be referenced by its crews.
- It is recommended that Ryanair revise its Operations Manual to clarify the situations in which to declare urgency and emergency.
- It is recommended that Ryanair introduce as part of its practices and procedures that, at least when operating outside domestic airspace, and especially in emergency situations, its crews speak English adapted to the so-called “operational level”, using standard phraseology as much as possible and speaking slowly and clearly enough so that they may be easily understood by all of the parties involved.
- It is recommended that the ICAO clarify and standardize the use of the PAN PAN and MAYDAY terminology in urgency and emergency declarations in Annex 2 (Rules of the Air), Annex 6 (Aircraft Operations) and Annex 10 (Aeronautical Telecommunications) so that the entire aviation community can use common criteria.
- It is recommended that the ICAO reconsider the text in Section 4.3,7 of Annex 6 resulting from Amendment 36 in terms of both adapting the fuel-related emergency declarations to the generic emergency declarations listed in Annex 2 (Rules of the air) and Annex 10 (aeronautical Telecommunications), and of avoiding having the improper use of the “Minimum Fuel” status become a routine declaration in an effort to obtain better information or preferential treatment from ATC.
Originally Posted by fl610
Well it is the first Maggot in the world that is capable of dumping fuel!!
Why did both crews not throw on 'gas for Mum'?
Virgin hold until Qantas lands and clears the runway and then start their approach.
In the meantime the fog gets thicker and so carrying "gas for mum" has painted them into a corner.
And here we are, with 20/20 hindsight, trying to second guess what two crew did based on information presented to them.
As a matter of interest, how many times in OZ have RPT jet aircraft been forced to land in weather conditions that have been below the minimums or non normal conditions (night, etc) after having used all the flight fuel and their variable fuel.
Before this, I can think of at least 4.
Last edited by 601; 29th Jun 2013 at 06:49.
Addendum post #309
From post #309:
Here’s hoping the ATSB do a comparable job to the Spanish and perhaps also generate some equally good ‘safety recommendations’…although they may have to get rid of Beaker before that happens!
This was in order to get rid of the ambiguity on when to declare a PAN (urgency) or MAYDAY (distress) in the case of in-flight fuel emergencies. {Page 69 of the CIAIAC Incident Report IN-010/2010}
Which from certain parts of this thread appears to have been somewhat of an issue in the VA incident at YMIA. Irony or different interpretation?
Either way the issue has morphed half way round the world! It is also highlights the value of ICAO compliant aircraft accident investigation bodies adhering to the principles of promulgating safety recommendations (unlike the Beakerised methodology) when serious safety issues are noted while conducting incident/accident investigations!
Irony or different interpretation? Either way the issue has morphed half way round the world!
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BOM Forecasting Accuracy
One of the problems with BOM and Ozzie Govt spending cutbacks is that there are less local experienced people doing the forecasting.
A lot of present day forecasting is done relying only on historic data modelling and statistics. So, they _will_ get it right more often than not - that's how statistics work!
But when some conditions "outside-the-box" are looming, they will get it wrong as they need LOCAL experience and a window to look out-of to make reasoned forecasts.
Another factor is that the local BOM may not be "local". For Adelaide, they could be outsourced to Sydney, Canberra or Melbourne (or Mumbai). Now that cannot help.
One of the problems with BOM and Ozzie Govt spending cutbacks is that there are less local experienced people doing the forecasting.
A lot of present day forecasting is done relying only on historic data modelling and statistics. So, they _will_ get it right more often than not - that's how statistics work!
But when some conditions "outside-the-box" are looming, they will get it wrong as they need LOCAL experience and a window to look out-of to make reasoned forecasts.
Another factor is that the local BOM may not be "local". For Adelaide, they could be outsourced to Sydney, Canberra or Melbourne (or Mumbai). Now that cannot help.
There is no substitute for local area knowledge and experience, the models aren't always right...
Originally Posted by Iccy2001
They probably did not give a Mayday call because the pilot in command did not believe that they were in "grave and imminent danger" so how about we leave that alone
Better have a re-read of AIP, Iccy, in particular ENR 1.1 60.6.1. The word "shall" being the operative one.
They probably did not give a Mayday call because the pilot in command did not believe that they were in "grave and imminent danger" so how about we leave that alone
Better have a re-read of AIP, Iccy, in particular ENR 1.1 60.6.1. The word "shall" being the operative one.
Bloggs, have you even seen a good lawyer thrash out the legal meaning of "shall" versus "must" versus "will"? I can tell you that it is very entertaining and informative.
A Mayday is not just for low fuel. If you are going to go below the minima on an approach then it is permitted if it is an emergency. If its an emergency then declaring a Mayday will leave no doubts that the situation is serious.
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Since when did it become a requirement to declare a mayday before deciding what to do with your aircraft in the interests of safety?
Isn't a mayday defined as grave and imminent danger?
Does knowingly descending below an MDA presumably in the interests of safety,constitute grave and imminent danger?
Isn't a mayday defined as grave and imminent danger?
Does knowingly descending below an MDA presumably in the interests of safety,constitute grave and imminent danger?
ICAO
5.3.1.1 Distress and urgency traffic shall comprise all radiotelephony messages relative to the distress and urgency conditions respectively. Distress and urgency conditions are defined as:
a) Distress: a condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.
b) Urgency: a condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance.
5.3.1.2 The radiotelephony distress signal MAYDAY and the radiotelephony urgency signal PAN PAN shall be used at the commencement of the first distress and urgency communication respectively.
IMHO, given the above, it's a line call either way but this is not the issue at hand. It's how two separate airlines end up landing at a regional airport on a runway ill equipped for the actual weather conditions.
That it happened to two separate crews from separate airlines points to a bigger issue than the actions of either flight crew; that it is a systemic issue in the regulatory culture is the most obvious culprit. Debating the RT actions of either crew is pointless here.
a) Distress: a condition of being threatened by serious and/or imminent danger and of requiring immediate assistance.
b) Urgency: a condition concerning the safety of an aircraft or other vehicle, or of some person on board or within sight, but which does not require immediate assistance.
5.3.1.2 The radiotelephony distress signal MAYDAY and the radiotelephony urgency signal PAN PAN shall be used at the commencement of the first distress and urgency communication respectively.
IMHO, given the above, it's a line call either way but this is not the issue at hand. It's how two separate airlines end up landing at a regional airport on a runway ill equipped for the actual weather conditions.
That it happened to two separate crews from separate airlines points to a bigger issue than the actions of either flight crew; that it is a systemic issue in the regulatory culture is the most obvious culprit. Debating the RT actions of either crew is pointless here.
Last edited by compressor stall; 30th Jun 2013 at 10:28.
Yes, I see the error in my reasoning.
If the pilot was obliged to broadcast a MAYDAY, the obligation should only arise during the 2 or 3 seconds in which the crew realises that CAT III approaches have stringent standards for a reason, and Mildura doesn’t meet them.
Works for me (unless I’m one of the PAX).
If the pilot was obliged to broadcast a MAYDAY, the obligation should only arise during the 2 or 3 seconds in which the crew realises that CAT III approaches have stringent standards for a reason, and Mildura doesn’t meet them.
Works for me (unless I’m one of the PAX).
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at the end of the day, if an RPT jet call's either PAN or MAYDAY they will get an In-Flight Emergency Response from ATC (after all, that's the whole point of the call in the first place..) In a min-fuel situation, there's not all that much ATC can do other than 'Do you want local stand-by or full emergency?'.
Sadly the real answer to that question would lie in the quality of the landing (or lack thereof..)
Sadly the real answer to that question would lie in the quality of the landing (or lack thereof..)
