So what are the outstanding mysteries that 30 years on would require a deathbed confession.

what happend to the pages in Collins notebook?
why didn't the US Navy ATC personnel want to testify? were their tapes erased acidentally or on purpose?
if their was an 'orchestrated litany of lies', who was the puppetmaster. Morrie Davis, or was he the fall guy for Des Dalgety?
if the CVR was analyzed today, would new technology decipher it better?
were all the passengers camera films examined? were there any shots that showed the view to the south as they orbited that were disregarded because they were perceived not to show anything?
Was a passenger filming on a movie camera at point of impact?
if you put some cameras on a UAV and got it to fly the circuit over and over throughout the summer, would you get some footage of conditions as they were that day?

and having watched Erebus: The Aftermath on tv1 last 2 days and what was a whos-who of NZ Actors twenty years ago, Was that a youthful Jim Hickey playing one of the pilots with a 1 line speaking role?

I remember watching "Erebus : The Aftermath" as a kid when I was home sick from school in about 1989/90, and being fascinated by the subject. For years and years I did a lot of reading on the subject and had a nostalgic trip down memory lane when I found the YouTube upload and the NZALPA website.

While the fundamental argument that a pilot should be aware of where he is at all times is fair, the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound.

Several things in the story proposed at the time by ANZ simply don't make sense, and Mahon was quite justified in believing it likely that someone was trying to pull the wool over his eyes. The only thing he was censured for was stating this belief as plainly as he did - his investigation and conclusions regarding the accident were never in doubt, though the full force of the New Zealand Government and Air New Zealand's PR operations did their best to claim that the censure for the former invalidated the latter - quite successfully it would seem, given some of the posts on this thread.

The meat of what Mahon was saying was that there was a fundamental organisational failure at ANZ, and in Civil Aviation, in the time leading up to the crash - to whit:

1. For whatever reason, the 1977 and 1978 requirement that any captain taking an Antarctic flight should first take a familiarisation flight down there was rescinded for 1979. By all accounts, ANZ simply said they weren't going to require it anymore, and Civil Aviation acquiesced.

2. While the initial, manually navigated flights did indeed have their final waypoint a route that took them over Mt. Erebus, in all cases the weather and visibility were good enough for the crew to take them off that track and fly the McMurdo Sound route. It should be noted that Mahon was of the opinion that the initial waypoint and route directly over Erebus could not be justified under any circumstances for a sightseeing flight and should never have been approved in the first place.

3. Chief Navigator Brian Hewitt of Navigation Section made a gross error when he miskeyed the waypoint - he simply did not perform the final re-check as required by the standards set by the company, and for 14 months the computerised track took every single ANZ Antarctic flight down McMurdo Sound, and because that route was very close to the military McMurdo Sound route that the line pilots had been flying visually prior to computerisation anyway - to the line pilots it seemed like a perfectly logical waypoint.

3. In any case, the only department of ANZ that continued to believe that the route went over Erebus was the Navigation Section themselves. Every single line pilot that flew the route testified to the fact that the route took them down McMurdo Sound, and at least some, if not most of the briefing materials given Captain Collins indicated that route, and not the route over Erebus. Now, here's where things get tricky - because all the hard copies of the briefing materials other than the few provided by Captain Gemmell (which could be argued supported ANZ's claims) were either lost on the mountain, lost in transit, or possibly destroyed (see the story about Captain Collins' ring binder, recovered at the site intact, yet reappearing at the commission with the pages missing). All briefing materials bar one indicated the McMurdo Sound route, or an approximation of that route - and upon cross-examination Chief Navigator Hewitt was "very surprised" that these documents indicating the McMurdo Sound route constituted part (in fact a majority) of the briefing materials.

4. Regardless of the reason - Navigation Section updated the computer track only hours before Captain Collins and his crew took TE901 off the ground and failed to tell them. Collins may have plotted the route on the maps at home using the numbers he had - but they were the old (incorrect) numbers. Now it could be argued here that he should have cross-checked the new numbers with the old - and logically this was an oversight. But the prevailing culture at ANZ at the time, as testified to by the line pilots, allowed pilots to safely assume that the co-ordinates given at the briefing would be the same ones they'd be flying. This right here is a major systems failure, and, Mahon (IMO rightly) considered, the fundamental cause of the accident.

5. Prior to this you had a situation whereby the national carrier and the Civil Aviation authority of New Zealand had a relationship that some would say was too cosy. And you also had Prime Minister Muldoon as the majority shareholder in the national carrier, and a personal friend of ANZ's then-CEO to boot. Had this not been the case, I suspect the reaction to Mahon's findings would have been very different.

In any case, it transpired that the minority decision by the Court Of Appeal censuring Mahon (for his language regarding the "litany of lies" remember - not his findings), was taken by two judges who had children working for ANZ at the time. After the report was published, ANZ also released the minutes of meetings taken directly after the accident which revealed that the board and senior pilots were well aware of the discrepancy in the nav track, and yet denied this publicly and to Mahon himself - proof they were indeed lying. But because this evidence was not entered in the original Commission (ANZ took the request for documents to include those up to the time of the accident - again pretty convenient), this could not be produced either during the Appeal, or to the Privy Council.

Finally, Chippindale himself said in 1989 that Civil Aviation was actively trying to avoid a large insurance payout, and while he stood by his report, it was relevant.

So Dozywannabe, with the TACAN out on the day, can you find me another airline that descends below MSA based solely on what the IRS is telling them? Another airline, anywhere in the world? Can you find me a navigation systems maker who made a prelaser gyro system and claimed it never required updating?
On the day, with the correct co-ordinates, that aircraft still could have hit terrain if the IRS had wandered and there was no Tacan to do a position update.
Yes, the company panicked and did some stupid things subsequent to the disaster but it was very poor airmanship that put the aircraft at an altitude where CFIT could take place.
If an engine caught fire due to incorrect assembly, as a crew do we put the fire out and land somewhere safe or do we crash and say the engine shouldn't have been on fire?
Descending below MSA, under radar, does basic airmanship still dictate we check our position?

If you're VMC why not?

What burty said - don't forget that ATC cleared them for descent under VMC, and they were not in bad weather at the time - as was proven by the photos and film taken in right up to the second the aircraft hit. Chippindale got that dead wrong.

In answer to your question, probably not nowadays. But the 1970s were a whole different kettle of fish, as you should well know.

"Chippindale got that dead wrong."

That statement is dead wrong. Before you make statements like that, get hold of the known, undisputable facts.

This is what the Company orders were for that flight, there is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was found in the cockpit after the crash.

" Delete all reference in Briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY let-down procedure available in VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.

1. Vis 20 km plus

2. No snow showers in area.

3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120degrees Grid through 360G to 270G, from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.

4 Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.


You will note that this is the ONLY let down available.

Which of these requirements was complied with??

You should also be aware that the requirements as stated was to cover the fact that this crew were completely inexperienced in AntArctic operations, in fact the only one to have been down to the ice was one of the Flight Engineers.

You no doubt know, that all other operators required a minimum time as First Officer, observer etc before going down there in command.

The weather at McMurdo was below requirements for the only approved let down procedure. To go and invent your own let down procedure, especially when at no time Mt Erebus was ever sighted, is surely the hight of folly, and the end results were exactly what the approved descent procedure was designed to avoid.

Map?
 

I heard or read at one time that they didn't have a chart in the cockpit even as good as a National Geographic map of Antarctica. Not so?

GB

No, the company said that's what was found in the cockpit after the crash. Certainly some things that were found in the cockpit after the crash disappeared or were destroyed, while the company was running every document that didn't support their position through the shredders.

The whole thing stunk like a boathouse at low tide and the company execs were trying to save their own skins at the expense of good men.

Graybeard - Captain Collins took an atlas with him with his intended route marked on it (having marked it out on a large-scale table map the previous evening) - his wife and daughters testified to this. The atlas was never found, or was disappeared because it would have been devastating to ANZ's case.

DozyWannabe,

I suppose Elvis told you all this, while you were on your way to take possession of the Sydney Harbour Bridge that you have just purchased for an unbelievably low sum.

Anyone who has read all prospector's views and arguments on this subject knows that he has much detailed insight. But that does not make him a complete authority, and to be so sarcastic adds little to the standard of debate.

Fantome,

Perhaps you are correct in that the sarcasm was uncalled for BUT

"don't forget that ATC cleared them for descent under VMC,"

Did they?? when can a controller CLEAR anybody for descent below route MSA before they have been identified on radar??? the flight was never identified, and by definition requesting a VMC descent requires you, and tells the controller, you can maintain own separation from other traffic and TERRAIN.

"
"No, the company said that's what was found in the cockpit after the crash"

Really?? That is where Elvis comes in. Can he, or anyone, prove that this is only because the Company said it was?? It was in fact a Company memorandum to AntArctic crews dated 8 Nov 1979 OAA:14/13/28. and it was advising that the McMurdo NDB was not available, and it stated as has been posted in this thread many times, the ONLY let down procedure available.

The weather and belief as to position.
"
"the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound."

If the crew had of noticed, in this good weather, as it was at the time and place, photo's are available showing Beaufort Island quite clearly, but if they were on the track they thought they were on, they were on the wrong side of the island, hard to mistake that Island, it is the only one there.


"as was proven by the photos and film taken in right up to the second the aircraft hit. Chippindale got that dead wrong."

Really? Less than 4 minutes before impact, Mulgrew told the pax "I still cant see very much at the moment, keep you informed as soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are".

This was the positional awareness as the aircraft was in a descent at more than 265 kts, that descent going down to a little under 1500ft.


To be told that the Chief Aircraft Accident Inspector was "Dead wrong"
and that Mahon got it all correct I must admit makes me a little sarcastic.

The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged.

It continues on to explain why Mr Chippindale’s finding of pilot error was wrong:

The judge was able to displace Mr. Chippindale's attribution of the accident to pilot error, for two main reasons. The most important was that at the inquiry there was evidence from Captain Collins' widow and daughters, which had not been available to Mr. Chippindale at the time of his investigation and was previously unknown to the management of A.N.Z., that after the briefing of 9 November 1979 Captain Collins, who had made a note of the co-ordinates of the Western Waypoint that were on the flight plan used at that briefing, had, at his own home, plotted on an atlas and upon a larger topographical chart the track from the Cape Hallett waypoint to the Western Waypoint. There was evidence that he had taken this atlas and chart with him on the fatal flight and the inference was plain that in the course of piloting the aircraft he and First Officer Cassin had used the lines that he had plotted to show him where the aircraft was when he switched from nav track to heading select in order to make a descent to 2,000 feet while still to the north of Ross Island which he reported to ATC at McMurdo and to which he received ATC's consent. That on completing this descent he switched back to nav track is incapable of being reconciled with any other explanation than that he was relying upon the line he had himself plotted of the flight track on which he had been briefed. It was a combination of his own meticulous conscientiousness in taking the trouble to plot for himself on a topographical chart the flight track that had been referred to at his briefing, and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster.

The other principal reason why the judge felt able to displace Mr. Chippindale's ascription of the cause of the accident to pilot error was that certain remarks forming part of the conversations recorded in the CVR of the crashed aircraft and attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers had suggested to him that shortly before the crash they were expressing to the pilot and navigator uncertainty about the aircraft's position. The tape from the CVR which had been recovered from the site of the crash proved difficult to interpret. The judge, with the thoroughness that characterised him throughout his investigations, went to great pains to obtain the best possible expert assistance in the interpretation of the tape. The result was that he was able to conclude that the remarks attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers could not have been made by them, and that there was nothing recorded in the CVR that was capable of throwing any doubt upon the confident belief of all members of the crew that the nav track was taking the aircraft on the flight path as it had been plotted by Captain Collins on his atlas and chart, and thus down the middle of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus.

Then they confirm that Justice Mahon was correct in castigating the airline

The judge's report contains numerous examples and criticisms of A.N.Z.'s slipshod system of administration and absence of liaison both between sections and between individual members of sections in the branch of management that was concerned with flight operations. Grave deficiencies are exposed in the briefing for Antarctic flights; and the explanation advanced by witnesses for the airline as to how it came about that Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin were briefed on a flight path that took the aircraft over the ice-covered waters of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus but were issued, for use in the aircraft's computer, as the nav track a flight path which went directly over Mt. Erebus itself, without the aircrew being told of the change, involved admissions of a whole succession of inexcusable blunders by individual members of the executive staff. None of this was challenged before their Lordships. No attempt was made on behalf of A.N.Z. to advance excuses for it.

Mods

This continually goes around and around over the same old ground proving little to any, satisfying nil.

Plus more than a little out of date; surely more than time for the Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum???

DK

Cannot agree. There are still aspects of the flight/crash/investigation
that have not been thoroughly examined. Such as the anomalies between
the FDR and CVR that on circling and descent have unaligned time references. Also passenger photos and videos not as yet subjected to thorough forensic analysis. Some there are, largely working quietly on their own, striving to put together sufficient evidence to warrant a full reappraisal. Never close a case if there is any possibility of revealing hitherto unconsidered evidence.

Not so.

There have been the investigations and inquires, the evidence has been re-examined there and here many, many times where some remain unconvinced and probably will forever.

The investigations, the inquires have been done, recommendations made and implemented to prevent further or similar accidents in the future. That is the nature of aviation and it is time to move on better using our energies and resources preventing other incidents in the future, not wasting them futilely rehashing, rehashing the past.

It becomes like roadside memorials; attempts to pass the grief and guilt to others whilst, within days, the flowers rot and putrefy leaving a blight on the landscape: continued spurious searching for `answers' achives little except extending the grief of those involved.

Time to let them rest in peace.

Move On!

DK

Mods; the lock or Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum?

It's not about unresolved grief. It's not about rotting flowers or 'moving on'.
It's about questions based on the long and searching review of all published material that is still being undertaken by individuals who have no axes to grind, but can see with a forensic clarity not available to all who were involved in the official process. What transpires for this thread is neither here nor there.

Dark Knight
Some were saying that after the Chippendale investigation.
But subsequent information and events have proven that further investigation was indeed appropriate.

It was a long time ago and none of us were there but:

Failed to mark the waypoints off on the chart. (They MUST have had some sort of chart)

Didn't do a track check out of the last waypoint (Mt Hallet?)

Sent the spare pilot back and kept the spare engineer in the cockpit for the lo-level bit. (Big mistake. Gotta be.)

Relied on the INS which they knew at that stage could have been 15 miles out.

What was the weather radar picture?

Didn't ping on the no VHF, no radar contact, and where is this mountain which is supposed to be fifteen miles away on our left??

Feel free to pick me up on any of that if you feel like it, anyone. !!!!!!!!!!!

Erebus and SilkAir MI 185
 

There is similar current debate on the South Asia and the Far East Forum on continuing to try and resolve the SilkAir MI 185 tragedy as more detail gradually comes into circulation. There are similarities in the two cases, or more correctly of their investigation, and until they are finally resolved then the full lessons are not learned and the circumstances not guarded against in future.

Jafa:It's been a long, long time since I looked at this. Isn't Hallet some 200 miles back? A 10 mile or whatever difference in next wpt would be on the order of 3 degrees. Is that enough to trigger concern? There might be that much error reading the HSI.

The AINS-70 did triple inertial mix before the term was invented by Litton in their later LTN-72. From the 5 hours or so since last AINS position update near Christchurch, the position error was about 1.5 miles. ANZ and other KSSU configuration DC-10 operators had always seen that kind of accuracy. The crew had little reason to question the Nav system, and they obviously never checked the lat/long in their flight release against a good chart. In fact, it was the over-reliance on the AINS by the pilots and the company that resulted in complacency.

Whose responsibility was it for the pilots to have good charts appropriate for the route? The QF 747s flying Antarctica at that time didn't have AINS-70, just triple INS. What charts did they have as backup?

The RDR-1F Wx radar in the ANZ DC-10 fleet would paint only a thin line when presented with a steep mountain from 1500 feet altitude. It would have been useful before they descended, however.

GB

Thanks Graybeard.

I actually looked it up. Cape Hallet to McMurdo is 337 n.miles, a track check 15 minutes into that leg would have shown a cross track error of 4 or 5 miles or thereabouts - enough to get your attention, I would've thought.

Tks for the heads-up on the INS - I was going on the Carousel figures, dimly remembered. Allowable drift three miles per hour plus three, I think it was.

Chz.,

Jafa.

Me again.

The radar should have shown a shadow of the mountain??

Radar returns from sea ice in my experience are generally excellent.

Jafa.

I don't remember the procedure at Hallett? Did they turn to a new track? At any rate, their flight plan gave the track direct to McMurdo Station, and not the reporting point over the Ross ice shelf. The track angle difference is only 1.7 degrees. What document did they have to compare the new, wrong track to the prior, correct track?

Radio altimeters are C band, and cannot reliably track the surface of the ice, so I'm told. Some of the 1979 generation of Wx radars were C band, also. ANZ had X band in their DC-10, which should detect ice better. In fact, they use two different frequency radars to measure the depth of ice.

I don't remember there being any evidence the WXR on this flight was even energized, nor any comments recorded on the CVR.

There are so many ways this accident could have been avoided, yet I believe this one is the first that could be at least partly attributed to "Stick to the automatics, son; hand flying is for the birds." I referenced this thread in that one.

I further believe the blind reliance on automation was largely overlooked in both investigations.

GB

Still don't see how anyone can claim that descent down to 1500ft in an area that has a substantially higher MSA and doing it solely based on what the INS is telling you is normal practise.

Like to hear someone telling me about how they switch off the GPS updating and delete the VORs and fly non precision approaches on a regular basis.

A reliance on the aircraft's nav system that is unbelievable.

Thirty degree track change at Hallet. Document? The chart. I would've thought they would mark the position on the chart 10 or 15 minutes past Hallet as per normal ops for random track operation. To check for cross track error. However they clearly hadn't checked the flight plan waypoints against the chart to begin with, as you said. Big Error number One.

You are in front of me re the radar technicals. But I would most certainly have had it on. Amongst other things to check for the mountain. Situational awareness back-up.

Couldn't agree with you more re the automatics.

Chz., Jafa.

Some personal recollections which adds nothing to who was right or wrong in this tragedy and makes no judgements either way.

I had just finished my first marathon and was at the after race function when the provosts turned up and ordered us all down to a hangar. A couple of C130's were backed up to the doors and piles of survival gear and body bags on the hangar floor. We were told to size ourselves up for a survival suit and standby but not told why. News came through that an ANZ DC-10 was overdue in Antartica and we were going down on a SAR flight leaving within an hour (which I was not looking forward to, I could hardly walk after the marathon and sitting in a C130 para seat would not have been an optimal recovery).

About 2 hours later word came through the DC-10 had been found and no survivors and that NZ Police SAR would take over. I had a friend who had recently joined the Police and he ended up down there doing the recovery (and which he suffered for years afterwards from).

30 years on and it remains as vivid now as it was then. I seem to recall that ANZ had not had a fatality up until this accident (although NAC was not so lucky) and that they had commissioned an advertisement with Allan Wicker stating this fact which aired a few weeks beforehand. The look on Morrie Davis face when the journalist asked him how felt in that evenings news bulleting remains etched in my memory as does his response.

It is right to discuss these matters as it honours the memories of those who perished and the families left behind. May they rest in peace.

For a regular flight of course not - and probably not for sightseeing flights now, as a result of lessons learned. But every pilot that flew that route prior did just that, and they were allowed to as long as the visibility was good - which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was.

Regarding the weather radar, I believe Mahon went to visit Bendix, where he discovered from the manufacturers concerned that the atmosphere in the region is too dry, weather radar being reliant on atmospheric moisture, to make it useful as a warning for terrain at that altitude. The radar return would, unfortunately, only have confirmed what they believed they were seeing - a flat expanse of sea ice to the horizon.

And as has been stated before many times, the captain did indeed check the waypoints against charts the night before - in fact he showed his daughters where he was going on the family atlas. Those waypoints were changed in the early hours of the morning they took off and the flight crew were not notified of the change.

Regardless of one's opinion of the responsibilities of an airline captain once the aircraft has left the ground, it is important to also bear in mind the responsibilities of the employer to allow their employees to operate safely, and while I'm sure ANZ in the late '70s was not alone in this, there was a staggering degree of corporate complacency going on. Firstly, the rescinding of the rule that every Antarctic flight should have at least one crew member on the flight deck who had been down there before. Secondly, the laissez-faire attitude to the enforcement of MSA on Antarctic sightseeing flights. Thirdly, the failure of the Nav Section to perform a re-check on the co-ordinates fed into the computer, which remained incorrect for over a year - giving line pilots the impression that the intended route was down McMurdo Sound and not over Erebus.

Given sector whiteout conditions, the only clue that the crew would have that something had changed would be the different co-ordinates for the McMurdo waypoint on the printout they were given at pre-flight compared to the materials they'd been given at the briefing - how many pilots check that on a regular basis?

The last I knew, Erebus was an active volcano. It wasn't just a mountain of ice.

The investigator was misguided by traveling to Bendix to learn if Erebus showed up on the Wx radar, where he would get only theoreticals and hedging. He would have had only to interview ANZ and QF pilots who had been there using that exact same radar.

GB

"But every pilot that flew that route prior did just that, and they were allowed to as long as the visibility was good - which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."

From John King's publication New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation, which has the luxury of hindsight.

From 1987 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the Military Pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former may have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred its DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic. In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.

The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziell's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallet. Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when condition were marginal and, according to company instructions, well below minima for the area."

So, we see that not all flights prior did not "do that", and we are also told that the accident crew were well aware that the weather conditions were below that allowed by the company for descent in that area.

- "which as far as the accident crew was concerned, it was."

That statement is quite obviously incorrect.

If this is true it may well be the only time ever that an airline boasted of such a thing. Also seems a swag of bad karma followed Morrie Davis around.

Wasn't aware of any bad karma following Morrie Davis around, care to elaborate? I don't think you were meaning Muldoon.

The Alan Wicker commercial might have been pulled before airing in NZ but I am 100% sure it was made. I recall Alan Wicker stating in a news article that this was the first time in his career where he had endorsed an airline (not that he did it for free of course). I saw the advert when in LA.

Really? As I understood it, QF took a different route entirely and from the computerisation of the route to the flight before the accident - which would have been for more than a year, remember - all ANZ flights would have followed the incorrect INS track down McMurdo Sound. How would a QF or ANZ pilot have been able to tell him what Erebus looked like on the weather radar when none of them had approached Erebus from that angle?

And prospector, while I haven't read John King's book in its entirety, it would appear from the extracts I have read that it appears a somewhat one-sided account of events.

Also, we'll never know exactly what went on in the cockpit that day due to the limitations of the CVR technology installed at the time, but it would appear that they went below the cloud cover to provide visual confirmation of where they were. The photos and film taken from inside the jet show there were no problems with visibility at all for some time prior to impact, contrary to the theories put forward by ANZ and Chippindale, which suggested they were lost in cloud until the point of impact. As such, King's assertion that

is thoroughly speculative. And at any rate regardless of weather, the "hard floor" specified by ANZ was routinely flouted by previous flights, and prior to the accident the company was quite happy to distribute material that made that fact clear.

The Holy Grail loosely follows the legend of King Arthur.

Arthur along with his squire Patsy recruits his Knights of the Round Table, including Sir Bedevere the Wise, Sir Lancelot the Brave, Sir Robin the Not-Quite-So-Brave-As-Sir-Lancelot and Sir Galahad the Pure.

The group is instructed by God to seek out the Holy Grail.

They are led to a castle controlled by the French where they believe the Grail is being held. After being insulted in mangled Franglais and failing to invade the castle in a Trojan Rabbit, Arthur decides that they must go their separate ways to seek out the Grail.

Concurrent to these events, in a manner of breaking the fourth wall, a modern-day historian, while describing the Arthurian legend as for a television program, is killed by a knight on horseback, triggering a police investigation.

Each of the Knights encounter various perils on their quest.

Arthur and Bedevere attempt to satisfy the strange requests of the dreaded Knights who say Ni. Sir Robin narrowly, but bravely, avoids a fight with the Three-Headed Giant. Sir Lancelot accidentally assaults a wedding party at Swamp Castle believing them to be hiding the Grail. Galahad is led by a Grail-shaped beacon to Castle Anthrax, populated by only comely women who wish to perform sexual favours for him, but is "rescued" by Lancelot.

The Knights regroup and travel to see Tim the Enchanter, who points them to caves where the location of the Grail is written on the walls. To enter the caves, the group is forced to defeat the Rabbit of Caerbannog using the Holy Hand Grenade of Antioch.

With their final destination known, the group travels to its last peril, the Bridge of Death, where each Knight is forced to answer three questions by the bridgekeeper before they can cross; Sirs Robin and Galahad fail and are thrown into the chasm below the bridge, before Arthur tricks the bridgekeeper. Lancelot becomes separated from Arthur and Bedevere, later shown arrested by modern-day police for the murder of the historian. Arthur and Bedevere travel to the Grail's castle, which they find is already occupied by the French who send them away with their insults.

They amass a large army to prepare to storm the castle, but just as they are ready to start the charge, the police arrive and stop it, arresting Arthur and Bedevere, and putting an end to the film; the search is never resolved nor are further inquiries ever held.

(Apologies to Monty Python however, there are many, many similarities where I shall leave it to readers to apply places and posters names to characters from the film as appropriate to this everlasting tale)

DK

DozyWannabe,

There can be no mistaking what the weather at McMurdo base was at the relevant time, it was well below the minimums required for the approved cloud break procedure.

If you want to use the phrase "one sided" try this for one eyed and one sided.
"From the point of view of both organisations they could obtain, so they believed, absolution from their own numerous errors by merely ascribing the disaster to a failure by Capt Collins to observe the minimum flight level of 16,000ft. This was the principal basis for the case for Civil Aviation Division and, as will be seen from what I have already written, it was in my view a basis without any justification whatever".

Here we have the learned judge, stating, in his opinion, that not complying with the Minimum Safe Altitude, had nothing to do with the "accident".

Most people who have any knowledge of this occurence readily accept that many errors were made by a number of parties, both errors of omission and commission, but the prime cause was the decision to go below MSA, without meeting any of the requirements as laid down by both the CAA and the Company.

The statement by Justice Mahon that the decision to go below the route MSA had nothing to do with the accident shows to me anyway, the folly of appointing someone who had never sat in the drivers seat of any aircraft, to enquire into, and criticize the findings of a highly qualified Aircraft Accident Inspector.


Dark Knight,

You have made your opinions abundantly clear, why then does your brousing bring you back to the thread????

Different Route; Same Destination
 

Would you not grant that if Erebus were visible from 100 miles south, it would certainly be visible closer? I don't know what route QF took, but the book "Whiteout" reported QF SLF mooning the McMurdo residents, so they passed close enough to Erebus.

It matters not much from which angle Erebus is approached, it would be either visible under the ice on the radar, or not. Nothing but another transport aircraft with that radar, like ANZ and QF flights, would provide the answer. Still, I have seen or heard nothing suggesting they even had the radar energized.

GB

As an outside observer, and non-pilot, the Mahon report created an interesting perspective on the use of 'company culture' for the basis of determining the cause of the accident.

I've spent much of the day watching - and re-watching - numerous documentaries, research and interviews regarding the Erebus tragedy, as someone who wasn't born when it happened. I'm no expert - nor am I a pilot - so my comments aren't as informed as most on here. However, I have several questions I hope others can help me with:

Note: No judgement on anyone is cast in my post here!

1) While the Chippendale report certainly raised the fact that flying below MSA was the 'cause', it was Mahon's enlarged scope that brought the lack of checks and balances within Air NZ to the fore. It was raised in one of the documentaries (Flight 901 to Erebus) that there had been many documented instances in the media, and in Air NZ's own publicity material, where flights were conducted below MSA. Other pilots - prior to Erebus - had done this as well.

Is it not then feasible - given the circumstances - that 'company culture' played a role in shaping the actions of the crew, not just in the realm of this accident, but in prior Antarctic flights as well? Evidence and submissions showed many contradictions in terms of what expectations and rules crew were to follow.

2) The differences in scope of the investigation (Chippendale vs. Mahon's findings) - as have been noted on here - draw the distinction of a pilot vs. non-pilot making technical judgements in an aviation investigation. However, were it not for Mahon's findings, the many managerial and technical flaws that existed in Air NZ would never have come to light. Also, this breadth of investigation, from my own personal research, seems evident in other accident investigations around the world.

Pure conjecture, but it must be asked: If we relied on the findings of the Chippendale report, without questioning further, would we not be arguing instead about another accident occurring at Air NZ? Another incident involving a flightplan error - however, with the benefit of the lessons of Erebus - was caught on an AKL-RAR flight (termed the '4th December Incident' - had never heard of it before, in the sphere of the Erebus investigation).

I believe it occurred some 8-months after the RC ended?

3) Recently in this forum, much has been made of the Bendix weather radar, and its' ability to pick up ice, etc. The manual for the type of radar installed on the aircraft stated it should not be used for terrain avoidance. Aside from the GPWS (sadly), what other radar systems could the crew have used at the time? Just seems to be disagreement within the forum (not unusual, I know).

Put much better than I could.

And conversely, had things been left with the Chippindale/ANZ report that focused on the MSA breach to the exclusion of all else, a whole plethora of lessons about company culture would not have been learnt.

The point I was trying to get at, that Mr Seatback 2 has explained so eloquently, is that while a descent in what could have been marginal conditions while relying on INS was a contributing factor to the crash, it was not the first such descent made, and in fact ANZ had been quietly removing layers of safety for two years prior to the accident, and had also been very lax about enforcing the MSA - which in today's world would and should be considered major contributing factors to the accident. That the holes in the cheese created by ANZ lined up on flight it did had more to do with bad luck than especially poor judgement (compared to their peers in ANZ) on the part of the crew in charge that day.

Remember - the only part of Mahon's report that was censured was the language referring to a cover-up. ANZ and Muldoon claimed that the whole thing was vacated, when in fact the report was considered painstaking and a model of its kind in every respect other than that.

DozyWannabe,

"In any case it was largely acedemic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures."

You say,

"it was not the first such descent made, and in fact ANZ had been quietly removing layers of safety for two years prior to the accident"

Which is where I disagree. It was the first descent made in marginal weather conditions, we have a record of flights descending below the laid down minima, but they were all carried out in "brilliantly clear conditions".

If you want to break the rules you must make sure everything is going for you, that was possible in Brilliantly Clear Conditions.

The question there is where was King getting his information from? You're talking about a second-hand source with a hefty dollop of opinion thrown in for good measure. I'd be surprised if he personally interviewed every single pilot that went down there over the course of time that ANZ ran those flights - many of whom found ANZ and Chippindale's report hard to stomach, given what they knew was going on, and testified in support of Captain Collins at the inquiry.

If the book is the one I've seen, which is a 300-odd pager referring to all aviation mishaps in NZ over a time period, firstly one would need to look at the sources - was Chippindale himself one of them?

Dozy Wannabe,

This thread has been running for a long time. There have been many publications quoted from, from some very eminent people in the Aviation World, many have not agreed with the findings of Justice Mahon.
I would suggest you start from the beginning of the thread and absorb what has already been scribed.

The enquiry was as to the cause of the accident. All the other errors of omission and commission, of which there were many, would not have made one ioata of difference to the safety of the flight if it had remained above the required altitudes as laid down by the Company and CAA.

To state that it was a sight seeing flight therefor it was acceptable to bend the rules is ridiculous.