With both Tenerife and Erebus it’s sad that the pilots didn't give more credence to the doubts of the Flight Engineers.

KLM.
17.06:12 Captain. ‘We go …… check thrust’.
17.06:32 F/E. ‘Is he not clear then?’.
17.06:34 Captain. ‘What did you say?’
17.06:35 F/E. ‘Is he not clear … that Pan American’.
17.06:36 Captain. ‘Oh, yes.’
17.06:49 Impact.

ANZ.
12.49.08, Mulgrew. (Observer, Pax commentator.) ‘That looks like the edge of Ross Island there’.
12.49:24 F/E Brooks: ‘I don’t like this.’
12.49:25 Capt Collins: ‘Have you got anything from him?’ (McMurdo)
F/O Cassin: ‘No.’
12.49:30 Capt Collins: ‘We’re 26 miles north. We’ll have to climb out of it’.
12.49:35 Mulgrew: ‘You can see Ross Island? Fine.’
12.49:38 F/O Cassin: ‘You’re clear to turn right. There’s no high ground if you do a one eighty.’
(Collins was happier turning left.)
Capt Collins: ‘No.. . negative.’
GPWS.
12.49:48 F/E Brooks. ‘Five hundred feet’. (RadAlt)
GPWS.
F/E Brooks. ‘Four hundred feet’.
Capt Collins: ‘Go around power please’.
Impact.

Forget:
you make a good point, but I don't think your interpretation of the Erebus flight engineer's comment is valid.
Can I ask you to read Garry Parata's article at
Gary Parata's Article Page 1
where you will find (page 4)
Same words, but a completely different meaning.

Desert Dingo, I take your point, and we’ll never know one way or the other.

However, I do think that any ‘pilot in the street’ would question the ‘likely’ conclusion below on the FE’s ‘I don’t like this’.

I can’t accept that lack of comms, alone, prompted the FE’s remark. Why would it? Is it not more likely to have been the trigger - the last straw - in the FE’s increasing discomfort.

As I say, we’ll never know one way or the other. But with 20/20 hindsight, and it’s reasonable to say that the FE wasn’t the only one feeling uneasy, all it would have taken was another crew member to agree, ‘I don’t like it either - lets go’.

Erebus, like the Kennedy assassination, leaves you in no doubt where you were when you heard about it.

wasnt one of the crews houses broken into after the crash, and items removed from a planning folder?

When the Flight Engineers comment is aligned with the fact that they had no DME lockon, no radar contact, and no VHF contact, the scenario that forget suggests is a much more likely to be the correct one.

"I can’t accept that lack of comms, alone, prompted the FE’s remark."

After all, he only had 24 seconds from the I don't like it to calling 500ft of the RadAlt. Not a lot to suggest any different plan of action.

Desert Dingo #120: “I thought the track went down the middle of McMurdo Sound” is not necessarily inconsistent with “I thought the track went direct to McMurdo Station”. The statements would be inconsistent if the witness knows that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Ross Island (ie, does not go down the middle of McMurdo Sound). In order to know that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station goes over Ross Island, you need a map showing Cape Hallett, McMurdo Station and Ross Island.

The Radio Navigation Chart (McFarlane p81) is of small scale, does not identify Ross Island by name and, in any event, is what it says it is: a map for radio navigation purposes.

NZMS135 (McFarlane pp 90,91) is a topographical map showing all three positions, and containing an inset map of the area around McMurdo Station. But this map was not available at the briefing. The map used at the briefing was a photocopy of the inset (McFarlane p37). The inset does not show Cape Hallett, so the map can’t be used to picture the track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station in relation to Ross Island.

The point is that it was possible for a pilot attending the briefing to leave with the impression that the track was direct to McMurdo Station, and that this track would take the aircraft down the middle of McMurdo Sound, with Ross Island to the left.

I don't see the relevance of the "I don't like this" comment, because within 6 seconds of it being made, the captain had decided to climb out - via a left turn.

Perusing the Gary Parata article I find this quite suprising.

" Consider this exchange:
Time 0039:49 Having a bit of radio trouble at the moment
Have you got the squelch off?
Clearance to go down.
Say again?
Have you got the squelch off on that?
Time 0039:58 Yes, on both.
This exchange showed that the crew were actively troubleshooting the reasons why short-range VHF communications from “Ice Tower” 8 were not being received. The crew were utilising their wealth of knowledge and experience to resolve the anomaly. The words are clear and unambiguous, and were signed off unanimously by the CVR Group as having definitely been spoken."

Wealth of knowledge to ask if the squelch was off???

One would have thought that the wealth of knowledge would be trying to ascertain why there was no radar contact, no DME lock on, no VHF contact from a station that was, if they were where they thought they were, no more than, how many miles away???, over flat ice.

Forget about that stuff, prospector. It will be put down to "Monday Morning Quarterbacking".

It seems obvious - in hindsight.

Beg to differ there ampan, this new website was presumably constructed for the education of the layman. The passage I have quoted, to me, is pure spin. To any knowledgable, experienced person it may seem obvious, so why was it put on this website the way it is??. to influence people into agreeing with one interpretation of the facts perhaps???

This is like being at a tennis match: ampan, prospector, ampan, prospector ...:ugh:

ampanNot so. That idea is flatly contradicted by the discussions about having to make a left turn from the waypoint in McMurdo Sound, then estimating the track and distance required to get to McMurdo Station.
The briefed track was not direct to McMurdo Station, regardless of how much you or the airline wish it were so.

So all on here would have done the same and descended based on the company SOPs and the weather at the time. Apart from about 3 of us. Or are you all saying Collins and crew weren't at fault but nor would you have descended? I am confused.

I am still confused as to why you would all descend based on an INS that could have already been 10 or 20 miles out but still have been "in tolerance".

stillalbatross: Because you're in Brian Abraham's "VMC bubble": You'll see the high ground well before getting dangerously close to it.

Dingo: I'm not aware of any evidence about a left turn at the Byrd Reporting Point (or somewhere thereabouts).

PS: Here's the current version of the chart.

http://ortho.linz.govt.nz/antarctic/RossSeaRegions.jpg


If you look at both the main chart and the inset, it is clear that a track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station crosses Ross Island. But what if you only have the inset?

I wonder whether the recent Air France A330 disaster would have been averted by having that "3rd pair of eyes" on the Flight Deck?? (And many other incidents over the years) Progress?? Technological Redundancy?? Not always a positive step forward in Aviation.........
I did hear said that when Airbus were introducing their A320 (2 crew) concept that they were prepared to wear the "occasional" disaster on the type as an unfortunate "Statistic" when relating incidents precluded by having only 2 crew flight decks.
That 3rd pair of eyes is "Cheap Insurance" (had been calculated at $2 extra per pax ticket based on a 130 pax aircraft over a 4 hour sector.) The general public wouldn't bat an eyelid over paying that, knowing the asset it provided to a flight crew overall....

Not necessarily, due to the limitations of the Mk. 1 Mod 0, electromagnetic detector in the 790–400 terahertz range. In my one and only flight over the ice the limitation was made plain when at 18,000 in VMC conditions we could have flown into the proverbial brick wall without seeing it. The military practice the art of camouflage - seeing without seeing, if you get the drift. I don't know why you are so unwilling to accept evidence provided by very experienced ice people such as compressor stall and P-B. All detectors, whether they be radar, sonar or the human eyeball, have limitations and can be spoofed one way or the other. Training in the detectors limitations can surmount many of the problems, but not all - eg specialist photo interpreters searching for camouflaged equipment.

ampan Well you would be if you looked at the evidence about what was shown at the briefings.

And why would you have only that chart or the inset?
Yep. That is a lovely chart, and you keep referring to it, and it does not have a track on it, which makes it hard to relate to the flight planned track.

However, the evidence shows that the other charts presented at the briefing were:

Strip Chart (annex 1) Topographic chart showing military tracks, including the two down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint and left turn to McMurdo Station.
http://www.members.optusnet.com.au/d...1%20detail.jpg

and
(DOD Strip chart Exhibit 165) Shows military route down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint then left turn to McMurdo Station. Similar to Strip Chart (annex 1) but without topographic detail.
http://www.members.optusnet.com.au/d...5%20detail.jpg

and RNC4 Radionavigation chart showing (among others) direct track from New Zealand down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint where the track ends. McMurdo Station is off to the left of ith inbound track
http://www.members.optusnet.com.au/d.dingo/RNC4-A.jpg


and Exhibit 164. An ANZ Nav department chart with no topographic detail but showing the two military tracks down McMurdo Sound to Byrd waypoint ending at a common waypoint with the track from New Zealand via Cape Hallet.
http://www.members.optusnet.com.au/d...4%20detail.jpg

Even the map for the passengers showed a track down McMurdo Sound and a left turn.
http://www.members.optusnet.com.au/d...map_detail.jpg

For you to be convinced that the briefed track was direct to McMurdo Station is contrary to the evidence. For you to believe that any crew member, after being shown these charts, would leave the briefing thinking the track was direct to McMurdo Station defies logic.

Please don’t try to refer us to the Annex J chart which does show a track direct to McMurdo Station and over Erebus. That is the obsolete chart the airline fed to Mr. Chippindale in their initially successful attempt to make it all look like pilot error.
I'll try to make the point once more.
THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION.

Desert Dingo #137: Thanks D. Dingo. Great post. (I wish I could figure out how to do that.)

Starting with the passenger map, I accept that this was available at the briefing, but doubt that it was given any attention. It was obviously not intended to represent the nav track down McMurdo Sound from Cape Hallett and back, because the nav track going back was the same as the nav track going down.

As for the other four maps, they all show a route that turns left at the Byrd Reporting Point. But as you note, that’s the military route, for aircraft landing at McMurdo Station. Obviously, none of the AirNZ flights intended landing at McMurdo Station – which is why none of the flights made any left turn at Byrd. They usually went to the right of track to get a closer view of the coast of Victoria Land, and then turned left towards McMurdo Station, passing the general Byrd location on the way.

But the real point is that the pilots at the briefing were expressly told that they would not be flying the military route. Even Capt. Gabriel accepted that this was said.

Another point: Although the strip chart is obviously a topographical map, it was not available at the briefing. Rather, it was one of the maps provided on the morning of the flight.

As for Ex. 164, I don’t understand the controversy. AirNZ said it was a working document prepared by the nav section and that it made yet another error by including it in the briefing materials for the 1978 flights. Is that explanation not plausible? All anyone needs to do is look at the document. Would anyone draw any conclusions about the nav track from a “chart” like that?

When you refer, in red capitals, to the “briefed track”, what do you mean? Do you mean the track shown on a couple of handouts? So does a briefing consist of the receipt of handouts? So why not simply mail the handouts to the pilots and let that constitute the briefing? You have to consider the whole briefing exercise: Slides with accompanying audio, plus the verbal information from Capt. Wilson, plus the subsequent simulator session conducted by Capt. Johnson.

For the sake of argument, let it be assumed that Capts. Wilson and Johnson are the liars that they are alleged to be, and that both were prepared to risk several months in prison (for … and I’m struggling here … in Wilson’s case, to keep his post-retirement briefing job at half the salary that he received before? As for Johnson, to keep on getting that extra 4k per annum, minus lost expenses, that he got for being an executive pilot?) So let’s ignore any evidence from Capts. Wilson and Johnson. Let’s only use the union’s evidence.

Start with Exhibit 12, which was the script that Wilson used to make the audio commentary. This is what the script says, and this is what the audio said:

“A standard route definition will be used employing the From-Via-To format. Enter NZAA then 78S/167E this being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.”


Desert Dingo suggests that the above co-ordinates are also the approximate co-ordinates of a point 20nm to the west of McMurdo Station, by the Dailey Islands. Really? The actual co-ordinates of the final waypoint for TE901 were “7752.7S/1665.80E”. If you round those ordinates off to the nearest degree, the result is 78S/167E. The co-ordinates for the Dailey Islands waypoint were “7753.0S/16448.0E”. If you round those co-ordinates off to the nearest degree the result is 78S/165E.

Further, I have the whole of the script in front of me, and there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the waypoint was anywhere other than at McMurdo Station.

Moving on to the pilots who attending briefings in 1978 and 1979, not a single solitary one of them said that “Wilson told us that the nav track went to a point by the Dailey Islands”. The only evidence they gave was either in the negative: “”He didn’t say the track went over Erebus” or it was “We did some rough eyeballing etc.” Not a single one gave any evidence about what Wilson said about the location of the final waypoint. Desert Dingo has done the search, and has come up with nothing. There is no evidence from any pilot to the effect that “Wilson said that the nav track went to a point by the Dailey Islands [or somewhere similar].”

About this "briefed track":

Nobody seems to be addressing the fact that there were two, fundamentally different tracks in play.

One track was the track that ANZ wanted the crew, for optimum sightseeing, to follow. This track was the "sightseeing track". It was only around Antarctica and would be flown visually (with the AINS disengaged).

The other track was the one that would be programmed into the AINS. This track was the "AINS track" and was purely to get the aircraft from New Zealand to a position from where the sightseeing track could commence.

It would be folly to assume that these two tracks were intended to be one and the same. Mahon seems to have made that assumption and you, Desert Dingo, seem to be doing the same - or have I just misread your posts?

All the discussion I see in this thread about "the briefed track" fails to differentiate between the two.

Of course the passenger handout will show the sightseeing track. Of course the briefing will include detail as to where the sightseeing track should go.

The briefing should also have included some detail on the AINS track - given how fundamentally and conceptually different it was/is to the sightseeing track. Whether the briefing did or did not include this information seems to be in hot dispute.

I find it difficult to believe that the briefing would not have made references to the AINS track. The transition from the AINS track to the sightseeing phase - thence back to the AINS track was surely a significant aspect of how the flight would be conducted.

If I had been at the briefing and been told that the AINS track terminated at a point 27 miles west of McMurdo Station, I would have been asking "why does it terminate there? That makes no sense. It should terminate at the McMurdo Station TACAN".

Collins seems to have realised that the two tracks may have been different - hence his plotting the AINS track for himself the night before the flight.

But they would need to make the left turn in order to carry out the NDB approach should the weather dictate. What each crew actually did was make a judgement that they were in VMC and descended accordingly, just as the fateful flight.

"But they would need to make the left turn in order to carry out the NDB approach should the weather dictate."

But!!!! the WX was below minimums for the only instrument approach approved, basically a cloud break approach to 6,000ft, and the NDB had passed its use by date, not to be used for Apps. It was on but not being monitored.

"just as the fateful flight"

I think you will find that all prior flights had been identified by radar before these VMC descents were commenced.

Brian Abraham: The NDB cloud-break procedure was ‘out and back’, starting from a position overhead the NDB at FL200. It wasn’t a straight-line descent.


FGD135: I agree. Something must have been said by the briefing officers about the nav track. If what was said was inconsistent with the charts or the slides, and if any of the pilots had noted the inconsistency during the briefing, then something would have been said. The fact that nothing was said indicates that that no inconsistency was noted - during the briefing.

The material used during the briefing was inconsistent. The audio commentary indicated that the final waypoint was at McMurdo Station, as did the positioning of the simulator overhead the NDB. On the other hand, some of the slides suggested that Erebus would be to the left of track, and a couple of the charts showed the military track, with Erebus to the left of it.

Why didn’t any of the pilots note the inconsistency? My explanation is that there is no inconsistency unless you know that a track to McMurdo Station goes over Erebus. If you don’t know that fact, then you leave the briefing under the assumption that the track goes direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus will be well to the left of track. It should also be noted that this is not, actually, my own explanation. I only got the idea after reading the evidence of Capt. Ruffell (McFarlane pp 203-206). Of all the pilots who gave evidence about the briefing, his made the most sense and was consistent in all respects (despite McFarlane’s stupid criticisms of it.)

If it is assumed that Capt. Collins left the briefing under the assumption that the track was direct to McMurdo Station and that Erebus would be well to the left of that track, then things fall into place. The night before the flight, he got out his charts and would have noted within a couple of minutes that Erebus was on the track to McMurdo Station. But when he plotted the track using the ‘Dailey Islands’ flightplan he would have noted that this track had Erebus well to the left – which was consistent with some of the material used at the briefing. So he made an understandable error: He assumed that the indications at the briefing of a track to McMurdo Station were wrong, which caused him to not check the McMurdo waypoint before going below MSA.

The other matter to consider is what happened just before the impact, when Capt. Collins decided to turn left. This decision, to me, is not that of a pilot who is certain that he is in the middle of McMurdo Sound. It is much more consistent with that of a pilot who has been given contradictory information.

Although I’m not a member of the Vette fanclub, his work on sector whiteout can’t be argued with. When TE901 levelled out at 2000, then 1500, feet, they must have seen what they expected to see. But that initial impression would have soon given way to a different impression. For example, the false horizon produced by the sector whiteout would not be behaving like a normal horizon. And once the black reference points on either side were out of sight, the false horizon would disappear (which might explain why F/E Brooks was the first to raise the alarm, given his seat position).

Within a few seconds of F/E Brooks expressing concern, Capt. Collins decided to climb out. Some have asked why he decided to turn if he was certain that he was in the middle of McMurdo Sound: Why not just continue straight ahead on the nav track back up to MSA? My answer would be that both Collins and Cassin knew the standard ‘get out’ drill, which is to go back up through the same airspace in which you came down, because you know that the route will be clear of terrain. In other words, a 180 degree turn, once made, gets you back to where you were.


But why did Capt. Collins decide to turn left?

http://www.erebus.co.nz/Background/TheFlightPathControversy.asp

That makes no sense at all. Was he VFR below with a single mountain, Erebus, to worry about or was he flying around the Antartic Alps when he found himself flying up a Fjord in his C180 and thought I better nip it around in a 180 and get out of here?

You make it sound like he was completely out of his elements in that environment which is why AirNZ made such strict requirements for descent which is why his decision to descend was the wrong one.

That simple. If you handed this accident to someone not familiar with it and substituted DC10 with C180 it would make a lot more sense. How much mountain/alps C180/DC10 flying did he have?

His decision to press on in poor VFR conditions and the CFIT that resulted isn't any different from dozens of accidents that inexperienced pilots find themselves in. As Vette showed he was inexperienced for the conditions he took the aircraft into.

(1) He was out of his elements: Although Capt. Collins obviously knew about sector whiteout ("bit hard to tell the difference between the cloud and the ice") he had no proper training.

(2) The "strict requirements" argument can't succeed, in my opinion. This is where I disagree with Prospector, based on the evidence from the Royal Commission.

(3) There are several matters that fall into the "could have done better" category. But Capt. Collins made a bad error the night before, when he assumed that his nav track would not go to McMurdo Station, after receiving information at the briefing that it did. Part of his job was to be the 'last line of defence' re briefing cock-ups. I accept that he did not have to check everything, but he had to check that McMurdo waypoint, given that the issue had been been raised. Alternatively, he could have stayed at MSA.

ampan,

What would be your belief as to how the flight would have been conducted if the Airline Inspector was onboard??? This bearing in mind that the strict requirements to be met for any descent below 16,000ft, and the requirement for no descent below 6,000ft, were arrived at in consultation between ANZ and CAA. The following from John King's New Zealand Tragedies: Aviation.

"This was referred to in a company memorandum to AntArctic crews, OAA:14/13/28 dated 8 November 1979. Headed MCMURDO NDB NOT AVAILABLE, it was succinct and unambiguous:

Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note the only let-down procedure available " and the remainder as has been printed on this thread many times.

These requirements are not subject to any misinterpretation, and there is no doubt the crew were aware of them, which part of the evidence overides these requirements, in your opinion???

Prospector: I can't see anything in the two memos expressly prohibiting going below FL160 before getting to the "let-down" area (ie, behind Erebus). You will say that it's implicit, and it probably is - but what about the previous flights and Capt. Wilson's concession? It's just not clear enough, I reckon, to make it a simple 'breach of a rule' case of pilot error.

ampan,
We will have to differ on that point. I cannot see anything implicit about "Note the only let down procedure available" , reads very much like a definitive order expressly prohibiting any descent below FL160 unless the stipulated requirements were met.

And the transcript of the audio is exactly as you suggest, Prospector.

"We are almost 77 degrees south proceeding from Cape Hallett towards Ross Island at FL330. Mount Erebus almost 13,000 feet ahead. McMurdo Station and Scott Base lie 20 miles beyond the mountain in the direction of grid north.

[new slide]

Now approaching Erebus at 16,000 feet, the minimum sector altitude. In VMC a descent to this minimum altitude up to 50 miles before McMurdo will be found advantageous for viewing."

Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash

(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.

The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.



In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".

Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.



The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.

At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.



The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.

The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.



By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.

The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.



A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.

However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.



Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.

However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..



Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.

In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."

Air NZ Apologises for Erebus
 

Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash

(Reuters/Airbus) Thirty years after an Air New Zealand plane crashed into Mt Erebus in Antarctica during a sightseeing flight killing all 257 on board, the airline will finally apologise to the victims' families.
The apology will be the first to relatives of the victims since the Erebus disaster devastated New Zealand on November 28, 1979. Chief Executive Rob Fyfe is to use the 30th anniversary of the tragedy next Friday to apologise for the way the families were treated after the accident. But he will not apologise for the accident itself or the controversial subsequent investigations, which at first attempted to blame pilot error for the crash.

In a statement released this week, the airline said Mr Fyfe would "speak directly about the lessons learned from the Erebus tragedy and the way in which the airline interacted with the families in the aftermath of the accident".
Jackie Nankervis, who was 15 when she lost her father and uncle in the accident, said an apology would be "a step in the right direction". She said the only gesture from Air New Zealand to her family at the time was a bunch of flowers. All other contact was with the police.

The Erebus disaster, which also killed six Britons, was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy. Sightseeing flights from Auckland to Antarctica were popular day trips at the time, with DC-10s taking passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound before returning to New Zealand.
At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, when Flight 901 left Auckland Airport there was nothing to suggest this would be anything other than yet another uneventful flight. The two pilots, Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not made the trip before but both were competent pilots and the flight was considered straightforward.

The men entered a series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer but unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning. When these were entered into the computer the changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east which put the plane on a collision course with Mt Erebus.
The navigational error combined with a white out that made it impossible for the pilots to see the 3,794m-high active volcano, Mount Erebus looming in front of them to create the setting for a tragedy it would be impossible to escape.

By the time the plane's altitude device began blaring out a warning the pilots had just six seconds to collision.
[FONT='Arial','sans-serif']The plane hit Erebus with such force it disintegrated, leaving a 600m trail of wreckage.

A one-day Royal Commission of Inquiry placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
However public opinion has remained divided over who was to blame for the crash. Experts said the new flight path would still have been safe if Captain Collins had not descended to 450m, although he had been authorised to drop to this height.

Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $NZ150,000 (£70,000). The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
However the counselling systems that swing into place in the aftermath of disasters today did not exist at the time, and the victims' families were offered no help to cope with their personal grief..

Mr Fyfe has been widely praised for his handling of the Airbus A320 crash off the French coast last November when all seven on board died after the plane plunged into the Mediterranean during a test flight.
In a recent letter to the Erebus families, Mr Fyfe wrote: "It was the experience of that accident ... that caused me to reflect on many of the gaps and failings that occurred in the days, months and years after November 28, 1979."

He said the most important immediate response to the France crash was to support the families of the victims and learn from the flight safety lessons rather than laying blame.
Air New Zealand to apologise for tragic Antarctica crash - Times Online

Mis-understanding somewhere. It should read "one-man Royal Commission".

Fyfe is an oily cock who hasn't even bothered doing any research. All he cares about is short-term PR and how his CV will look when he applies for his next position. As for his performance re the Airbus incident, it made me puke.

This is bound to wind a few people up:

Erebus milestone stirs up emotions - National - NZ Herald News

I think this quote was extremely misleading: So does retired airline captain Ian Gemmell who this month described Mahon as "an idiot".
Gemmell isn't just a 'retired airline pilot' for crying out loud, he was the Air NZ DC10 Chief Pilot at the time of the Erebus accident and directly implicated in the 'cover up' by Mahon.

Quite correct. Ian Gemmell was Air New Zealand's chief pilot at the time and he was directly implicated in the alleged cover-up, in that Mahon implied that Gemmell had recovered documents from the ice which then vanished.

If Gemmell recently said that Mahon was an idiot, I would tend to agree. It's also very good to note that "Marshal von Manstein" is still alive and still kicking bucketloads of **** out of lawyers:

"The answers which he gave were unhesitating and positive. When possible, his answers were monosyllabic and he seemed to treat the various counsel with thinly veiled contempt. His lean figure, standing upright with an almost military stance, reminded me of someone: but I could not for the moment remember who it was. I looked at his bronzed, immobile aquiline features, and his close-cut grey hair, and I surveyed his uncompromising demeanour. Then I remembered who it was that the Captain reminded me of. In his general appearance, he was very similar to photographs I had seen of the celebrated Field Marshshall von Manstein, probably the most brilliant commander of the present century. And as the hearing went on, I came to see that his similarity to the Field Marshall was not exclusively visual." ('Verdict On Erebus', p84)


[Here's one for the conspiracy theorists: Mahon fancied Gemmell and requested a "date". Gemmell told Mahon to **** off. Mahon responded with his famous report.]

When I started this thread...
 

When I started this thread it was to let people know the Erebus site built by NZALPA was up. The debate here has been largely circular for some time now and people will believe what they want to believe.

If there is substantial material missing from the site by all means contact NZALPA and let them know. They were keen to have the information publicly available so that people could reflect on what happened, and make sure that lessons learnt were not forgotten. I don't think anyone can debate the importance of this accident and the subsequent investigations in shaping a vast range of standard operating, disaster recovery and investigation procedures.

The site will never be comprehensive in the true terms of the word but it does represent what is arguably the single best repository of available information available to Joe Public. Read it, draw your conclusions and move on.

DNC

Navigation
 

Out of interest anyone know who maintains aeronautical charts for Antarctica?

That depends where you fly.

USAP produces its own approach charts for McMurdo and Pole. These are not publicly available. AirServices Australia publish publicly the Casey / Wilkins GPS/NPA. I'm not sure of the current status of the approaches and aids at Marambio on the peninsula. There is a NDB at Rothera too.

There are a number of published VFR only approaches for some bases in Antarctica (eg Troll).

And that's about it for approach charts. As for large scale maps:

6 GNCs cover the continent - order here NACO Product Catalog - Antarctica (note the recent chart dates :p).

Additionally each national sector (may) publish its own maps in WAC format or similar. These vary significantly in age and in many cases have either never been published or once only back in the 60s...

There is recent highly accurate satellite digital elevation data around but this has not found its way into any published maps yet.

Erebus crash remains a mystery


4:00 AM Saturday Nov 28, 2009

One of the mysteries of the Erebus crash not understood by many is how Captain Jim Collins and his crew could fly into the side of the mountain in broad daylight with good visibility.
Paul Davison, QC who represented the Collins family and the Pilot's Association at the Royal Commission describes what happened: "He had been insidiously tricked into believing everything was safe by all of the systems he was using and all the resources he was using including
his eyes."
The phenomenon Collins came up against is known as sector whiteout - a situation, says Davison, where you maybe operating in clear air, but your eyes are not able to provide surface and distance definition because the diffuse light can create a convincing ocular illusion.
When the decision was made to descend Davison says Collins, like any pilot, was concerned to use his vision to maintain terrain avoidance and keep the aircraft in a safe location.
This would involve him looking to identify features of landscape and topography of the area.
"Believing that his aircraft was in the centre of McMurdo Sound he would expect to see an expanse of flat sea ice to South."
Which is what he saw, but even so, in making his descent he was ultra cautious by adhering to his Nav track and turning the aircraft first to the right before proceeding back to the north where he had just come from.

In making his decent he undertook a descent pattern which ensured he kept the aircraft in clear air over the flat sea ice and only then did he recapture the Nav track to proceed south.
"What he is doing is covering territory he knows it is safe to descend into." As Davison points out, for aviators, one's eyes are one's protection and insurance in these circumstances. "That is the great irony because here his eyes deceived him. The intersection of the overcast with the mountain and the gradation of shade would have given an illusion of an horizon many miles away when he was actually looking at the slopes of Mt Erebus which would have been only several miles away." At that point he went under the overcast cloud, but remained in clear air.
It didn't help either that Air New Zealand pilots hadn't been briefed on what whiteout conditions were. "Had he been briefed to understand the risks of proceeding under overcast he wouldn't take that risk without the appreciating the danger." The insidious nature of these deceptions lead him to believe his understanding of his location was accurate.
His navigation system told him he was on course. "He believed it was flying him down McMurdo Sound - and if adhered to his Nav track he could ensure the aircraft was in a safe location."
Collins also used his eyes and those of the people on the flight deck - in particular Peter Mulgrew who had been to the Antarctic on a number of previous occasions and knew McMurdo approach route well.
Land forms left and right were identified from the flight deck which appeared to confirm their location of flying down the centre of McMurdo Sound.
What they didn't realise was the landforms they were seeing were actually located either side of Lewis Bay on the northern side of Ross Island and they were on a collision course for Mt Erebus.
The crew has previously been talking to McMurdo Station by high frequency radio and had been offered a radar directed flight in the vicinity of McMurdo, but as the aircraft gets closer, Collins finds he is not receiving line of sight radio communications and lock on to a navigational beacon as expected.
Increasingly concerned at this failure to make radio contact, Collins decides to climb away. Despite the mountain's proximity, even then it could not be seen and tragically he was too late.

Chippendale Report, p99:

"Eight seconds prior to impact and 2 seconds before the GPWS warning started, the roll mode FMA changed from NAV track to Heading Select, as the Heading Select knob was pulled out. This would be done to turn the aircraft through the autopilot and followed a discussion by the pilots on which way to turn to get out of their present position. The co-pilot said "it's clear to turn to the right" but the Captain contradicted him. Immediately the Heading Select knob was pulled out the aircraft commenced to roll to the right. This right roll was also evidenced by the movement of the ailerons and spoilers which reached a maximum of 11 degrees bank 3.5 seconds before impact. The roll was then reversed, as the pilot attempted to commence a left turn. This reverse role which was the result of control surface movement, results in the aircraft striking the ground while rolling left through a wings level attitude. These rolling manouvres had no effect on the aircraft heading which was last recorded as 358.95 degrees grid."

If the captain throught he was in the middle of the sound with Erebus to the left, and with his co-pilot telling him that it was clear to turn right, then why did he turn left? None of the 'believers', Capt. Davison QC included, has been able to explain that one.

Explanation: Various pennies started to drop, which included a recollection of the statement made at the briefing that the track was to McMurdo Station. If you're on that track 27 miles out, the only way out is to go left.

So he got that bit right, but he should never have gone below MSA without first checking that final waypoint, especially given the contradictory information he had received about it. If that wasn't an error, then I don't know what is.

One disadvantage of being dead is that you can't defend yourself. But there is also another disadvantage: You can't put your hand up and admit that you made a bad mistake.