Ampan said

" The oral presentation at the briefing said that the track went direct to McMurdo Station. The co-ordinates on the handout said otherwise. So there was a contradiction"

and

"But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station."

I take it then Ampan that you were personally present at the oral briefing since you "know" this , after all an oral briefing leaves no permanent record - or are you relaying what others who were present have said happened , I believe in a court of law this is known as 'hearsay'?

We cannot ask the flightcrew what was said at the oral briefing , so who else was present whose recollection you are relying on ?

27/09,
This is what I posted on another thread on this subject,"Erebus 25 years on" that was running some months ago,

"He admittedly came up with some new methods of ascertaining deep seated causes of mishaps, which was a breath of fresh air after years of all accidents being put down to pilot error, but in this particular case he ignored much really relevant evidence, and with no aviation background how could he ascertain what was relevant and what was not. He made very little use of the aviation expertise that was available to him in the form of a qualified consultant."

So I am in agreement with Bushys post on that point,

The word garbage was used as I believe it was an attack on anybody who disagrees with Mahons findings. as I obviously, and many others do. And one does not have to be a "dinosaur" to do that.

Prospector

Me thinks your brain is in a "WHITEOUT"You cant see the woods for the mountain..Do you Fly or are you a driver in a snow storm..I spose you will keep rattling on for some obscure reason

Ampan (#30)

Quote:

---

But, and there can be no argument about this, the crew, at the briefing were told that their nav track was direct to McMurdo Station.

They might not have been told that this track went over the summit of Mt Erebus, but they were, definitely, told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station.

---

To use your own words
Complete f*cking bullsh*t.

The evidence showed the following briefing documents
In the Antarctic pack
In the passenger packThen the slidesAll of the maps at the briefing showed tracks down McMurdo Sound. Not one showed a track over Mt Erebus or to the NDB.
All the briefing slides appeared to be taken from over McMurdo Sound or flat terrain.

Then there is the evidence given by the pilots on the previous flights as to the position of the final waypoint given at their own briefing.
And we have

• Captain Simpson’s testimony: “I certainly did not get the impression from the audio-visual that our approach would be over Ross Island or Mt Erebus.” (M.p236) and about the McMurdo waypoint on the flight plan “I did not record this position but only noted it mentally. It seemed to be a logical position in that it was at the head of the sound clear of high terrain and a good position to start sightseeing….” (M.p237)

• Captain Gabriel’s testimony: “ …. noting the heading of the aircraft was to the right of the high ground depicted in the slide. I consequently expected the aircraft to approach the McMurdo area on a track which would take the aircraft to the west of Mt Erebus. Nothing that I saw or heard during the audio visual presentation gave me the impression that the aircraft would overfly Mt Erebus during its approach to the McMurdo area.”

• F/O Irvine’s testimony: “I am certain that at no stage during the briefing conducted by Captain Wilson was anything said to the effect that our flight plan track would go over Ross Island or Mt Erebus".

Even the AirNZ board knew that Collin’s track went down the middle of McMurdo sound.
Board meeting minutes 5 December 1979
Quote;
“Strictly confid. Not to be used.”
Wreckage was “off track (considerably)...Aeroplane ...was left of centre.”

I think that Captain Collins and F/O Cassin demonstrated pretty conclusively that they did not believe the track was direct to McMurdo Station (or the now out of service NDB) when they engaged NAV and flew straight into Mt Erebus. I'll write that again: they engaged NAV and flew straight into Mt Erebus!

To argue that the briefing told them that the track was direct McMurdo Station is to ignore all the evidence above. It would also mean that each one of the flight crew had individually forgotten the briefing (or they were all suicidal).
I don't buy that.

1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area."

If the 4 requirements were met when they descended they would have seen the Mountain, that's why the 4 requirements were there in the first place. If they hadn't descended in the first place, they wouldn't have hit anything.

So who elected to descend the aircraft below MSA? Air NZ management? Flight planning? Mc Murdo station? Wasn't it the case of a crew who thought they knew better than the company SOPs. Gordon Vette added a huge amount to what we have learned but can anyone of you out there slagging Chippendale honestly say that that aircraft wasn't taken VFR to a place that a widebody jet shouldn't have gone.

The accident has more similarities with a PPL in a 185 pushing his luck in dodgy weather somewhere near Mount Cook than any widebody accident I can think of.

I don't see how the crew can be utterly blameless, if the weather had met the requirements then it would have been obvious that the track had been changed. Isn't making correct decisions what we are paid for?

StillAlb...you need to read the evidence more closely...or if you have a couple of hours spare, what the dramatisation on the website (4 part TVNZ docu-drama). Sure it's pretty cheezy but it follows the main points of the evidence and both enquiries without having to read!

Kiwiandrew #41: How do I know what was said at the briefing?

(1) It was an audiovisual briefing, using photographs and a tape-recorded commentary – and I have a copy of the script used to make the commentary (as you would if NZALPA had done a half-decent job). It contains the following: “A standard route definition will be used employing the From-Via-To format. Enter NZAA then 78S/176E, this being the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station.”

(2) The person who conducted the briefing was adamant that the pilots were told that their nav track from Cape Hallett was direct to McMurdo Station.

(3) Numerous pilots were called by the union to give evidence about their briefing. Not a single one of them said that that they were told that the nav track went to somewhere other than McMurdo Station.

(4) And if you still have doubts, Mahon himself accepted that the pilots were told that the nav track went direct from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station (p60, para 164(b)).


The conflict in the evidence was about the track in relation to Erebus, not where the track went.

But it is entirely possible to fly into the side of a massive 13000' snow covered mountain with the first two of those four criteria met. :ugh:

Was there any mention of surface definition in the descent criteria? As recently as last January, a transport cat aircraft had a CFIT in Antarctica in level flight in VMC.... Luckily everyone survived.

I do not think that there is a single poster on here that believe the crew to be entirely blameless. On the contrary, the crew did make a mistake (or misjudgment - call it what you will). But the company culture, expectation and operations of the time let them make that mistake - with the tragic consequences. It should shoulder some of the blame too.

Oh what a difference 25 years of technology makes...
http://i663.photobucket.com/albums/u...n/Picture6.jpg

Slackie, I read most of what has been published. In fact I reread the CVR transcript again today. They were repeatedly told the wx was worse than their company SOPs so having 2 of the 4 requirements still isn't enough when 4 of the 4 were required.

Corporate culture? The aircrew were all a part of that. Much was made by Mahon of the company wanting the aircraft to descend or the punters weren't getting their money's worth, but would any good skipper override SOPs and safety to do that? If over the course of this and the next dozen trips the weather was never good enough to safely descend then the flights would have been axed because the public wouldn't have wanted to travel on them.

As said before, you basically had a 190 ton aircraft poking about in dodgy VFR. Who put it there? What about the 6 seconds the GPWS went off for before anyone did anything? Is that managements fault?

Nothing wrong with Chippendales report, the crew put the aircraft somewhere it shouldn't have been. The buck stops there.

All that Mahon and Vette did was show what the crew were dealing with after they descended. They shouldn't have.

compressor stall,

"I do not think that there is a single poster on here that believe the crew to be entirely blameless."

Hard to reconcile that with some of the previous posts, that is what the debate is about.

" Care to read that again slowly ?
The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged. "

ampan (#47)
So what? That by itself doesn’t define the final waypoint. It is “the approximate co-ordinates of McMurdo Station” It is also the approximate co-ordinates of the McMurdo waypoint at the head of McMurdo sound which was on all the briefing charts. “Enter NZAA then 78S/176E” I would take as a computer entry that specifies a general area to pull up the briefing material for that area. It is in no way defining waypoints for the flight.
As the call-girl said during the Profumo affair “He would say that –wouldn’t he”.
The evidence given by Captain Wilson and by Captain Johnson as to the verbal content of the RCU briefing was not accepted by the majority of the pilots who attended the briefings. Indeed there was one pilot who said that upon listening to the evidence given before the Commision in relation to the briefing which he had attended, he was led to wonder if he had been at the same briefing’.

Quote:

---

(3) Numerous pilots were called by the union to give evidence about their briefing. Not a single one of them said that that they were told that the nav track went to somewhere other than McMurdo Station.

---

So you don’t count who all testified that their briefing was for a track down McMurdo Sound.
(OK. I’ve included the flight engineers here as well, but you get the idea.To suggest that nobody was told the track was anywhere else but to McMurdo Station is plainly ludicrous).

Quote:

---

(4) And if you still have doubts, Mahon himself accepted that the pilots were told that the nav track went direct from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station (p60, para 164(b)).

---

No he did not accept that at all.
Taken in context he is talking about the inadequacy of the briefing where all the maps showing the track down McMurdo Sound would take precedence over a verbal statement that the track was to McMurdo Station.

In fact, he came to the conclusion that Wilson may have been telling some fibs in his evidence about his briefing, and this led to the famous “organised litany of lies” statement that caused so much trouble.

Is there a prize for the most errors in a single post? :E

Prospector,

I missed that post on page 1 so my generalisation was in error. I had felt the thread was not so much about the blamelessness of the crew - rather the blameless of the company as championed by the likes of StillAlbatross.

The comments of StillAlbatross that, Show a complete lack of understanding of any sort of modern corporate safety management and accountability. Although those terms were probably not coined yet, the principles still existed - because there would be little other reason that the company went to so much documented trouble to cover up various issues.

Hopefully this (and the other threads) will be of education to others, here's a pic - better res that I have seen elsewhere. Impact was pretty much on the slopes under the saddle, and MuMurdo Sound to the right of shot.

http://i663.photobucket.com/albums/u...ebuspano-2.jpg

With wx like that a VMC descent, after being identified on radar, would certainly be a possibility. Certainly shows Beaufort Island clearly, and its relative position to the impact point.

Mahon Report, page 60, para 164(b):

"The pictorial representations showed the observers that the flight path was down McMurdo Sound and these displays would, not unnaturally, take precedence over the spoken words indicating a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station and indicating the NDB co-ordinates as the destination waypoint."

Desert Dingo -Toss the following thought around in your head: The pilots left the briefing thinking that they would fly down McMurdo Sound direct to McMurdo Station.

Erebus is depicted as a material region, the lower half of Hades, the underworld. It was where the dead had to pass immediately after dying Charon ferried the souls of the dead across the river Styx, upon which they entered the land of the dead, where they remained for the rest of time. Erebus is synonymous for Hades, the Greek god of the underworld. Erebus has also been compared to darkness in general without personification.

Let it Lie.

"Not Chaos, not
The darkest pit of lowest Erebus,
Nor aught of blinder vacancy, scooped out
By help of dreams—can breed such fear and awe
As fall upon us often when we look
Into our Minds, into the Mind of Man—
My Haunt, and the main region of my song."

They could have thought down McMurdo Sound was direct to McMurdo Station?

Rubbish.

Go and review all the testimony about pilots at the briefing estimating how far to the West of McMurdo station the track down McMurdo Sound was going to take them. For more than a year the briefed flight plan had the destination waypoint in McMurdo Sound then returning back to Cape Hallet. The pilots were trying to work out the track and distance for the left turn and visual leg for sightseeing over McMurdo Station.
This was a fundamental factor in the accident. This waypoint was changed and the crew were not told.

What is so hard to understand about this statement, it matters not what who said what to who, who remembers what from when. It is concise, to the point, it is indisputable that the crew were aware of the requirements of this order, it was the latest directive, it was in the cockpit with them.

"Delete all reference in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let-down procedure available is VMC below FL160(16000ft) to 6000ft as follows:

D. Dingo -You mean this sort of evidence? (from Capt. Gabriel, transcript p1712 - and not to be found in McFarlane's book):


“In relation to the McMurdo waypoint for your own flight down there did you have any briefing as to where that was geographically prior to the flight?

Roughly I had a look at the topo map we were given at the briefing. The inset Exh. 4 I just roughly established where we were going. I thought it would be near enough to the 50 miles east of McMurdo Station.

Did you do that by roughly plotting the co-ordinates on that topo map?

Really just by roughly establishing in my own mind where the position was. I can’t say that I actually recorded the co-ordinates from the flight plan because we had to give the copy back at the end of the briefing, but looking at the map and from what I remember of the co-ordinates and looking at the topo map I thought in a rough sort of way we were going to about that position there so it wasn’t specifically plotted.

Are you speaking now of what you did and thought at the time of the briefing on 9 November?

No. It was after the briefing.

How long after?

I first started looking at the map when I got home that night and it was about a day before I went down we actually looked at the map and thought we were going to that position. 4 or 5 days after.”

ampan: quoting Gabriels esoteric excercise in obstrification hardly bolsters your argument; infact I'm at a loss to figure out what you're trying to substantiate actually.

By the way, Mahons' report was not over turned, and the privy councils findings and the criminal charges that eventually dropped against various ANZ personel all hung on technicalities, evidentially and semantically, based on due process and not on the actualities as they applied to all aspects of the accident, particularly evidence which was not produced to the commission.

If the Chipindale report was rubber stamped by the Royal Commission, to this day the accepted wisdom would be 'they where lost in cloud, off track and it's pilot error' as opposed to waypoint being changed and the crew were not told.

The consequence of this and the spatial aspects have been covered - anyone seriously proposing that Collins or any of the other crew would have selected navtrk after the last orbit if they were actually fully cognisant of their position is presupposing that they deliberatly flew straight at mt erebus..clearly, this is where the argument falls down: no-one would do that, ipso facto.

Mahon and Vette paid a high price for having the integrity to back up what they fundimenatlly knew was right:something else trapped that flight, and it wasn't a simple question of VFR reqiremets, radar let downs, lost in clouds, or ANZ's SOP's. Vette knew from experience there was a more valid supposition and Mahon with a keen objective intellect,who had to sit through day of day of clearly preplanned and deliberate attempts - bordering on perjury to mislead the commission - smelt a king sized rat early on.

This is also part of the problem. Apologists for ANZ, Muldon, CAA et el tacitly condone the sidelining and contempt that ANZ/Govt had for the commision. Would Mahon have reached the same conclusion if the evidence had been produced in accordance with the requirements of fact and evidence? Unlikely.

Mahons' crime, if it can be called that, was to show by the commissions' report that Kiwis aren't some back slapping, bunch of good old blokes,beer swilling "she'll be right mate jokers", but infact, when cornered are just as devious, sneaky, self centered, willing to break any law that suits the purpose and willing to sell anyone down the line to cover their own arses as any people in any other country..and a dead crew can't argue their case..which is what Mahon and Vette did for them, and paid a high price for their courage.

Toshirozero: The point of the extract is to demonstrate that the “eyeballing” evidence relied on by D. Dingo was not convincing, to say the least.

As to the decision to lock the aircraft back onto the nav track, that doesn’t dispose of anything.

Assume that at the briefing on 9 Nov the pilots were told that the track was direct to McMurdo Station but were not told that this track went over Erebus (which is, basically, what Mahon found).

Assume that the Capt. Collins retained one of the flightplans, or else noted down the co-ordinates.

Three weeks later, the night before the flight, he gets out his charts. He would have noted that a direct track from Cape Hallett to McMurdo Station went over Erebus. On plotting the track using the co-ordinates, he would have noted that the track went down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island (including Erebus) to the left. Assuming that he remembered what was said at the briefing, he would have noted the contradiction re the track. He resolved the contradiction by assuming that the track shown by the co-ordinates would be the track that the aircraft would fly, without conducting any further check. That was an error, and a reasonably bad one. He had received contradictory information re the final waypoint, so he should have checked that waypoint as it was entered the following morning. Instead, he simply assumed that the final waypoint was the same as the one he had plotted the night before. It doesn’t mean he was suicidal or insane. It just means that he made an error.

After completing the descending orbits, he locked the aircraft back on the nav track, obviously, as you say, under the assumption that the track was down McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left.

Then F/E Brooks says “I don’t like this” and a few seconds later, the Captain decides to climb out. F/O Cassin, in the right-hand seat, says that its clear to the right for a 180 degree turn. The Captain says “No negative”, then pulls out the Heading Select knob and initiates a left-hand turn using the autopilot (refer page 99 in the Chippindale report). Then the impact.

Why did he decide to turn left? If he was certain that he was in McMurdo Sound, with the high ground of Ross Island to the left, then he would have turned right, as the F/O had recommended. One explanation is that he recalled what he was told about the track at the briefing and the pennies started to drop. The fact is that in his actual position (at 1500 feet in Lewis Bay with Erebus dead ahead and Cape Bird to the right and behind), the only way out was to the left.

Refer to the photo posted by compressor stall, note the position of Beaufort Island, if the VMC conditions were as good as some are trying to convince us, why was it that they did not click they were on the wrong side of the Island, if they were on the track they thought they were on. Beaufort Island is a very very conspicuous object, and not many of them down there to get confused with.

'they where lost in cloud, off track and it's pilot error'

That is not the case at all, to my way of thinking, the argument is that they commenced descent without meeting any of the requirements laid down by either CAA or the Company. As has been stated in this thread and others, all Mahon and Capt Vette were trying to justify is the sequence of events after the descent was commenced.

Beaufort Island
 

Prospector: See page 154 of the Mahon Report, which contains two photographs of Beaufort Island taken by the passengers. It was, as you say, very conspicuous.

Mahon gives at least three explanations, two of which contradict eachother. Vette comes up with an elaborate theory to explain why Peter Mulgrew said "There's land ahead" right when Beaufort Island was dead ahead, suggesting that he was referring to other land.

The most likely explanation is that on the three occasions they flew past Beaufort Island, they assumed that they were in the middle of McMurdo Sound and simply disregarded the island (even though there is no such island in the middle of McMurdo Sound).

ampan
How can you possibly persist in assuming that the track was from Cape Hallet to McMurdo Station when all the evidence shows that it was not?
How can you ignore:

• All the documentary evidence showing the track was down McMurdo Sound.
• For more than a year the flight plan was to the McMurdo waypoint at 7753.0S16448.0E and this was the example shown at the briefings.
• The testimony of at least 12 people saying that they were briefed that the track was down McMurdo Sound.
• The testimony of the pilots about a left turn to get to McMurdo Station.

(By the way, contrary to what you wrote, Captan Gabriel’s testimony is in McFarlane’s book – on page 351).
The point being made is that if pilots are discussing making a left turn and estimating a distance to McMurdo Station, then they cannot possibly be coming from a final waypoint at McMurdo Station. If that doesn’t convince you that the final waypoint was not McMurdo Station, then you have a serious comprehension problem.
Bullsh!t – for all the above reasons.
That is quite possible
The coordinates obtained from the flight plan shown at the briefing - yes. Highly likely given the testimony about him plotting the track on his atlas.
No. Here your argument is based on the premise that he was briefed that the track was direct to McMurdo Station. There is overwhelming evidence that this did not happen. Mahon came reluctantly to the conclusion that this was part of the “organised litany of lies” he was fed from the company.
These are invalid conclusions based on the incorrect premise above.
Seems pretty logical to me. If you are flying from the left seat it is the natural way to turn. You can better see what you are turning into in a left turn. Also his last two turns had been left.
How many times does it need repeating? THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION.

ampan,
Perhaps this from Bob Thomson explains that situation, Bob Thomson has made over 50 flights to the AntArctic, most of them on the flight deck, he had in fact been the guide on prior ANZ flights.

"The captain didn't give attention to problems that he might have around there. These people were taking a Sunday drive. When I heard the transcript of the CVR I fell out of my chair. Most of the times Mulgrew had been there he'd gone by sea, and all his travel from Scott Base was to the South. Hardly anybody ever went into Lewis Bay.

Had they orbited Ross Island they would have seen the cloud. If a pilot is unsure he always goes up, never down. The co-pilot on Flight 901 never opened his flight bag to look up the co-ordinates. I always had a chart in the cockpit and checked the latitude and longtitude readout, but the crew of the fatal flight never referred to it.''


"How many times does it need repeating? THE BRIEFED TRACK WAS NOT DIRECT TO McMURDO STATION."

So what? if the descent requirements had been complied with it is of no relevance.

OK, Dingo: Let’s go through it bit by bit – again.

“All the documentary evidence showing that the track was down McMurdo Sound”

“All”? There is only one document showing a track from Cape Hallett to a point in the middle of McMurdo Sound (ie the Byrd Reporting Point): Exhibit 164 (McFarlane p102). But the topography is barely discernable.

The RNC4 chart (McFarlane p81 ) shows a track from the west of Cape Hallett to the Byrd Reporting Point. Why would any navigator rely on that, given that you are coming from Cape Hallett, not from the west of it?

Ditto the strip chart (McFarlane p101).



“The testimony of at least 12 people … ”

All they said was that they did not know that the track went over Erebus. Not a single solitary one of them said that Capt. Wilson told them that the final waypoint was anywhere other than McMurdo Station.

If you disgagree, post the evidence. You won’t find any.



“The testimony of the pilots about a left turn.”

Where’s that bit?



"Capt. Gabriel’s testimony"

No, it’s not all in McFarlane’s book. The bit that is missing is the bit where he admits that he didn’t, actually, do any “eyeballing” at the briefing. He did it, he said, after – relying on what he remembered of the co-ordinates. Mr McFarlane decided to leave out that bit, because it didn’t suit his cause.


“Pilots discussing a left turn”?

What are you talking about? The briefing, or what happened on the Simpson / Gabriel flight?


The rest of it is just your opinion, with which I disagree.

I understand why the capitalised red type appears at the end - because you know it means an obvious case of pilot error (probably having attended several half-baked briefings in your time).

So without any ground based Navaids, using an Inertial Ref system that was only accurate to 1.99 NM per hour, there is absolutely nothing wrong with making up a descent based on that IRS accuracy? A descent that puts you IMC below MSA in the hope that you will get a good look at everything VMC when you get down there. And most aviators on here siding with the crew completely agree that from an airmanship point of view they would happily do the same?

There would never have been a single comment on the CVR regarding the weather conditions if they had remained within the company SOPs.

As far as they knew they were VMC (see Vette's sector whiteout material)...and had possibly confirmed their position visually (if mistakenly). And in order to confirm this they elected to re-establish on the briefed track up McMurdo Sound after each orbit. When they (possibly) became uneasy with the situation they elected to climb out, again straight up McMurdo Sound.

It appears to me that those that a few here have their minds irrevicably set on either side of the fence (for whatever reason)...and we could bang on here forever.

The stated purpose of the website is to be the definitive location for all information pertaining to the accident. If I had any further evidence that didn't appear on the site then I'd submit it to be included.

"I had any further evidence that didn't appear on the site then I'd submit it to be included."

It is the interpretation of the evidence, already presented, that is what is creating the animated discussion.

slackie: NZALPA could have easily included the evidence and the exhibits on the website. They chose not to - and I can understand why, because I've seen it all.

The fact is that the whole Erebus saga was a war between the union and the airline, which was started by union, and for which the airline was not prepared.

As for the allegedly "even-handed" presentation on the website, I do no more than point to the "Jim Collins Memorial Award". If NZALPA were going to be even-handed, it would be the "Gordon Brooks Memorial Award".

Disagree. As Vette showed you needed a cloud layer above you to get the whiteout conditions that lead them to believe that they didn't have terrain in front of them. They were uneasy before descent, in descent and for some time at the lower level. They shouldn't have commenced descent in the first place. There is no point in blaming the company, the crew elected to descend themselves. They were slow to react to a worsening situation and slow to react to the GPWS. Having blind faith in the INS, below MSA in a completely unfamiliar environment?

Vette further highlighted what a completely unfamiliar environment it was so what were they doing there? LA three times a month isn't going to give you preparation for VFR around Antartica.

Lets say the company didn't give them the changed co-ordinates but the INS developed a xtrack error instead, without tacan they still would have hit the mountain. Whose fault then? Chippendale would still have come to the same conclusion.

What would Mahon have said then?

'Lets say the company didn't give them the changed co-ordinates but the INS developed a xtrack error instead, without tacan they still would have hit the mountain. Whose fault then? Chippendale would still have come to the same conclusion'.

No, the outcome in all probability may have been the same, but the cause would have been different which would have changed the IIC's reasoning on how it ended up where it did; If the INS had gone pear shaped, it would have been a clue, and clues visual or otherwise were the problem.

What would Mahon have said then?

He would have said nothing, as the Chippendale report would have found the cause was a systems error, there wouldn't have been a public furore and no requirement for a subsequent Royal Commission - Mahon would have lived out his days in relative obscurity, Vette, retired a capt with ANZ and Chippendale would have got deserved praise for a complex investigation in difficult and trying circumstances; however, the 'malevolent trick of the polar light' put paid to that, ably assisted by the chicanery of the airline and govt

http://pixel.quantserve.com/pixel/p-...nAndEmployment One other thing I noticed, some of these comments are disingenuous at best, and at worse, deliberately misleading, for example:

" Across the world in the head office of ICAO at Montreal, the Royal Commissions report was closely studied by the Head of the Operations section, Duane Freer, who made this comment:
" What on earth is going on down there? It reads like something coming from a third world country"
http://pixel.quantserve.com/pixel/p-...nAndEmployment


But Freer wasn't referring to the content of the report,he wasn't referring to the commissions report at all, he was referring to the chaotic operating environment, lack of effective CAA oversight, poor flight planning and obvious conflicts of interest having a govt owned airline, under investigation by a govt dept...or as Sir Walter Scott put it - 'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'

Once again, a question of interpretation, who was trying to deceive who???

'Oh what a tangled web we weave,When first we practice to deceive'

What interpretation would you take from Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling stating " It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing he took sole responsibility for separating the airplane from other aircraft and terrain, and he was on his own".

He also stated "The operational crew of Flt TE901 acted unreasonably in several respects, including not plotting their actual position from the AINS and descending below 16,000ft contrary to both prudent airmanship and Air New Zealand policy, without first ascertaining what was there or following the other requirenments for such descent. The crew also missed the obvious landmark of Beaumont Island being on the wrong side of the flight path and pressed on in the face of deteriorating weather, with five or six extra [eople milling around the cockpit causing some distraction during the critical period."

Toshirozero,
Perhaps you would like to give us your take on how Justice Greene of the US District Court in Washington was influenced by either the NZ Government NZ CAA, or the fact that the Airline was Govt owned?

Who was it who took the case to the US court, and for what reason?
It was not the decision that was expected, This judge obviously agreed with the Chief Accident Inspector's findings, and the published beliefs of many past and present aircrew, totalling many hundreds of thousands of hours of air time, as against a judge who had none.

Your good at obscuring the point and it's evident you have little or no knowledge of how litigation works - the US Navy was implicated directly in the accident as part of the ATS system in the Antarctic.

Judge Harold H. Greene's ruling is pure legal jargon, implicit in removing the USN from any culpability.

'deteriorating weather?' the stated vis and photo evidence shows it was 8/8th clear, 40 nm plus.

'against a judge who had none'...For a judge with no aviation experience he did a good job of pin pointing why and how a fully experienced and capable crew flew a serviceable aeroplane into a mountain they did not see was there. That they weren't fully cognisant of their actual position is well documented- the question was why, that's been explained. It's an interesting fact about air accident investigation, that very experienced pilots crash servicable aeroplanes relatively regularly - experience isn't a guarantee of infallibility, and is therefore not a proof.

the 16000' ceiling argument has been thrashed out before. it was a fallacy disproved by Chippendale as well in subsequent arguments, and was a corner stone of ANZ's defence that it was a crew error - A point that you are more than ready to reinforce at every opportunity. The crew are not blameless, but more importantly, they are not culpable

De ton cotè mec, I'm getting bored

:zzz: So am I:zzz:

Toshirozero,
"the US Navy was implicated directly in the accident as part of the ATS system in the Antarctic."

Are you sure????

"The last of these came towards the end of 1987 when representatives of the families of the dead crew members sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901 that it was in danger. Relatives of the 237 passengers had received substantial compensation, but because the 20 crew members were working for a New Zealand company they were eligible for only the standard accident compensation, and proving negligence against an outside agency was their one opportunity to receive a higher payout".

fourholes,
Does your computer direct you to this thread? why not utilise one of those items in your nom de plume and dissappear into it.l

Pretty sure - the reason litigation is held in the US is that there is no statutory limit to maximum payouts - it's why all accident litigation is US based. It applies to pax, crew and every man and his dog.

Anyway, you answered your own question: '... sued the United States Government for alleged failure of the US Navy Air Traffic Controllers at McMurdo to warn Flt TE901'..it's legal jargonese but you get the point.

apportioning blame is part of the game or as Einstein said ' If the facts get in the way of a good theory, that's too bad for the facts'

That's me, I'm done with this pointless ping pong exchange, constantly recycling the same point isn't resolving the argument, a point substantiated by D Dingo et el

No, don't get the point. the crew members legal eagles alleged, the judge said CRAP. and agreed with Chippendales report.

Prospector: Who really cares about what Judge Greene thought? His opinions are about as relevant as those of McFarlane. In any event, Judge Greene was not called upon to determine who was to blame within AirNZ. He was called upon to determine whether the US Navy was partly to blame.

Toshirozero: The reason why a lot of accident cases are heard in the USA is because there are a lot of Boeing aircraft in service around the world. But there is no automatic right to sue in the American courts. For example, take the recent Airbus accident off Brazil. There would be no basis for a US court to hear litigation concerning that accident (unless, perhaps, one of the components was faulty and was manufactured by a US company.)

ampan,

I do, he was presented with the same scenario as other legal people and took a completely opposing view. I find this interesting because he was not directly involved with any of the people affected prior to making his decision.