Benalla six dead and $5,000 VOR reward
 

It is now over 2 years and 7 months since the terrible Benalla accident where six people died because the professional pilot was about 11 miles off course. See the ATSB report here.

At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.

I mistakenly thought that after this terrible accident that there would be a quick move to utilise the radar properly in this area – i.e. introduce new procedures or Class E airspace. Of course, this has not happened.

The prime reason for the Government’s decision to go ahead with NAS was so the use of radar could be maximised to save peoples’ lives.

I wonder if there is going to be more needless loss of life – say at places like Proserpine, where there are high mountains nearby but the radar is not used effectively.

It occurs to me that we need an air traffic control expert to push for the introduction of either new procedures or more Class E airspace.

Everyone at the time raved about how fantastic Voices of Reason (VOR) was, when many postings were being made in relation to airspace. Even Gaunty appeared to think that VOR was fantastic.

VOR placed the following post (see below) on 21 April 2004. This is of course the person we need to get involved in airspace reform. I’m prepared to make a $5,000 donation to the Royal Flying Doctor Service (Broken Hill Branch) if the VOR who wrote the below mentioned piece will identify himself or herself and assist with airspace reform.

I can understand why some people would be loathe to give their real names on PPRuNe, however I cannot understand when professional pilots are dying, along with their passengers, that there wouldn’t be at least one air traffic control expert who would not be prepared to push for the greater use of controlled airspace and radar - under their own name.

So VOR, how about becoming up front and identifying yourself so you can be effective and see if you can get involved in the necessary reform.

I point out that at one stage I thought I knew who VOR was – I believe it was a previous head of air traffic control in Australia. No, not the one who recently passed away. This person has denied being VOR, so VOR must still be out there.

Read the following post and realise just how valuable a person with this experience and knowledge would be. For surely no one wants to die after making a simple human error and not maximising the use of our $350 million radar system.

Dick - for once I agree with you.
Let me highlight the bit where YOU yourself admit that you are NOT the man for the job...
.

Hi Dick,

This really isn't meant to be a silly response but surely with the new OAM being a part of CASA from 01JUL07, and not AA, the representation and future SHOULD provide somewhat greater balance to the airspace debate with the new GM of OAM (whoever that is) driving/guiding new Australian airspace managment strategies.

Am I being naive (again)?

FTDK

Dear Mr FTDK

you need to see a specialist IMHFO, as it seems you have an identity crisis:} :}

Cheers
FTDK:cool: :E :ok: :sad: :8 :hmm:

Yairrsss

and with the skilful withdrawal of posts this now becomes an inside joke; with SOMEONE's slip now protected inthe noise....

Heh Heh Heh!

FTDK no charge!

This is just an attempt at unmasking a person's identity on Pprune. A bannable offence. With the reward money as well. Disgusting.

Dick

I have no disagreement with the thrust of this post, but you would have to agree that it only addresses a breakdown in the "safety net".

As someone who oftens flies GPS/RNAV approaches (including Lockhart River and Proserpine), I find this accident deeply disturbing as the primary cause remains unexplained. How can someone proporting to fly a GPS/RNAV Appr be so far off track and apparently not know it?

For these reasons I always fly with at least 2 GPS's operating (even though one is a top of the range VFR only) and a moving map display. In addition I now have terrain avoidance on my GNS430. I figure the GPS satellite system would have to have a major malfunction for me to come unstuck in this way. It would seem to me that the only alternative to check one's position would be to fly over the NDB or VOR prior to commencing the GPS/RNAV Appr - which really goes against the ease and convenience of the GPS Appr in the first place.

At the time I was surprised by the failure of ATC to advise the pilot that he was diverging from the expected track. I have been queried on a number of occassions by ATC in similar circumstances. The last time it happened took me a bit to figure out what they were on about cause everything in the aeroplane said I was on track. It eventually dawned on me that my departure clearance was ammended to put me via a waypoint that was not on my plan, and that detail had not been passed down the line. I was where I was supposed to be and headed to the right place - just not where that controller thought I should have been headed.

I don't think the airspace issue can be blamed for Benalla, but agree that a change in procedures (among a number of things) may have averted a disaster.

Dr:cool:

It occurrs to me that we need a Driving Expert to push for the introduction of a special driving lane for me to use on the way to work...

Smart arse? Well, yes, I'm guilty.

However, if I don't agree with the laws, it's up to me to push to have them changed. I can't expect some expert to jump to, for my cause ... unless, of course, I have first convinced him that I'm right and that it's in his best interests too.

Alright then, I admit, I am VOR. Now give the five gorillas to Uncle Bob at BH and lets be done with it.:E

Dick, I don't know how many times you have to be told.

The radar coverage at Benalla is CRAP.

I....WORK....THAT....SECTOR....AND....THE....RADAR....COVERA GE....IS....CRAP.

Give me a procedural approach rating and I will monitor and separate every aircraft into Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector. Better still put an ADS-B transmitter or radar head at Benalla and every other aerodrome in the sector and I will talk you all the way down.

You will need to double or triple the ATC staff to do it though.

Step 1: Upgrade the facilities if you want the service.

Step 2: Staff the sectors correctly.

Step 3: Train the staff appropriately.

Step 4: There's about 20 more steps

How incredible is it that on the day the coroner makes a decision to hold an inquest, DS rakes the coles again. :hmm:

I am Spartacus!.....eer I mean VOR.

.........I dearly wish that the real reason behind the BLA accident could be indentified once & for all as I knew the PIC of the PA42 for many years, to me it seems almost impossible ( I said almost, we are afterall only human) to think that the (PIC I won't mention his name out of respect)) did anything wittingly wrong but as always with these 'event's it's a chain of events, sadly the chain wasn't broken in time to save 6 lives. Radar coverage will always be a bone of contention through out Aus whether it kept that 'chain' linked or not simply for what I believe to be two reasons.

One being we don't have the traffic (compared to OS) for our geographic size hence a somewhat 'limited' service & secondly we simply can't afford it under the "user pays" system...sad I know but that's the bare facts & there's little we can do about it in the short term.
Aviation will always be a risk, calculated mostly but never the less risky.

Next time vote wisely although there ain't enough pilots of all denominations to have any real long term effect at voting time unfortunetly.

RIP K...., ( & the 5 others) I still think of our quite times at BLA


Capt Wally

......apologies yes it was a PA 31T, I used to fly the PA 42 so that's where the mix up was from, old age gets ya aventually !!......obviously people read with a very alert mind.

Capt Wally

Dick,
I sincerely hope you are NOT using the deaths of these people to further peddle your E airspace agenda. You know very well that TAAATS could be used to provide all the safety functions now: it couldn't give a rats about what airspace the aircraft was in.

By all means push to get ATC to use the TAAATS alarms. Just don't bother pushing that 1950's rubbish of E.

Tarts cost $600m BTW.

Dick, Cancelling a RAM without telling a pilot is not negligence. I do it most days somewhere between 20-80 times.

Cancelling a RAM "Route Adherance Monitor" Alert is not the same thing as 'the aircraft was off track' (even if it was 3 times). The flight plan that the system had, didn't match the the cleared route (=RAM). Tracking DCT to GPS RNAV waypoints can cause this for almost all GPS RNAV tracking points that are "not defined" within the TAAATS data set. Was this the case?

Everytime we vector or have WX diversions, guess what the System route doesn't match the clearance = RAM alert; do I tell the pilot, no way, it's not unexpected, I know why I'm getting the ALERT.

If an aircraft is tracking to a point not defined in TAAATS the obvious happens the RAM goes off. We put the point the aircraft is tracking to in the LABEL so there is no need to inform the pilot they are off track the RAM is not, repeat, not unexpected thus it's cancelled.

What are we supposed to do:
RAM ALERT
Controller: "You're indicating off track for direct BLA"
Pilot: "We're not tracking DCT BLA we are tracking for BLAED as cleared"
Controller "Oh yes that's right, sorry about that"

Obviously ATC are not in the habit of telling pilots they are complying with their clearance in CTA, that's the point. In class G we have no ability to dictate a particular path to fly; if we get a RAM that is unexpected then we would tell the pilot.

The problem for the ATCs in this case is the 'black and white' docs that 'require' this and that action; but the reality is most ATCs would have done the exact same thing; and would still do so today. Reasonable actions of a reasonable man; there but for the grace of god go I.

The biggest issue here is ATCs are not required to monitor appraoches in Class G and in this circumstance the radar coverage is not sufficient to enable anything near effective monitoring anyway. If we were the sectorisation would change massively and you'd need to more than double the low level sectors and controller numbers. RISK vs COST, CBA. Dick is always on about costs; six lives this time, nothing to be laughed at, but what safety benefit would all that cost actually provide. Would have Class E to 1200 AGL saved this flight?

Would enabled MSAW data helped? Probably not as this was removed due to inaccuracy and relevance in Class G; ie MSAW ALERT on a landing aircraft = Issue alert to pilot; terrain alert, oh yes it's the 2 miles of black tar called a RWY.

If this accident happened at YSDU or YBHI or YMIA would it be the 'fault' of the airspace and/or controllers? Even if they cancelled the RAM 80NM before the aerodrome, there would be no subsequent RAMs due to lack of RADAR (just like in this accident).

While I'm here, rumours I've heard is an American (ex ATC) is being hunted to head the new AIRSPACE OFFICE within DOTARS. Here we go again.

NAS is firmly back on the agenda people.

Apache, any success I have ever gained has been by surrounding myself with competent people. I do not see myself as an air traffic control expert. I have, however, spent a lot of time studying airspace systems around the world and asking advice from those who have expertise in airspace.

For example, I can see the advantages of upgrading Class G airspace to Class E – especially where we have radar. This will undoubtedly improve safety.

Tobzalp, no I am not trying to forcibly unmask a person’s identity, but why is it that no ATC expert working for Airservices will post under their own name on this website or even make a public statement to the aviation industry about Class E airspace? It makes you wonder doesn’t it?

ForkTailedDrKiller, the accident could have been caused by either an equipment failure or human error. I’m sure you will agree that as humans we can make just about any mistake that is possible – look at the Tenerife accident where the Dutch 747 Captain took off without a clearance.

You are surprised by the ATC failure to advise the pilot of the track divergence. You obviously know that in Class G airspace (where the aircraft was heading) there is not even a requirement to report when visual – i.e. the air traffic controller has no idea whether you are still in cloud or visual.

In Class E airspace it is totally different. There is quite a different responsibility for the air traffic controller. That is why Class E airspace in this location – which has quite good radar coverage to the initial approach fix – would have very likely prevented the accident from happening.

En-Rooter, you say that the radar coverage is no good at Benalla, however look at the ATSB report. You will find that there was adequate radar coverage to allow a properly trained controller, using properly introduced procedures, to advise the pilot that he was many miles off track.

I agree that proper training is required. My suggestion is that you look at the Cabinet approved NAS document here, especially Note 12 which states:

Canary51, I had no idea until you made your posting that the Coroner had decided to hold an inquest. However what has that got to do with anything? Are you suggesting that because the Coroner believes it is serious enough to conduct an inquest, that I should not continue to push for the proper use of radar in the area?

Do you accept that there could be another accident before the Coroner makes his finding? I would imagine his finding will most likely support proper procedures being introduced, and the use of radar to minimise the chance of similar accidents happening in the future.

Capn Bloggs, you have obviously made up your mind that Class E airspace is “1950’s rubbish”. However it is obvious from the posting of VOR above, that he or she does not agree with you. There must be many pilots and controllers who accept that in radar covered airspace, Class E is better than Class G.

If TAAATS cost $600 million, it is all the more reason to use it properly.
SM4 Pirate, you make the very point of why Class E airspace is safer. You state:

Of course, in Class E – until the pilot cancels IFR – you do have that ability, and that is what makes it safer.

By the way, I don’t believe that NAS was ever off the agenda. I think that you will find it has always been Government policy (see here), and now that people are looking at these six deaths, they are more focused on why we are not using the radar correctly.

These threads are really healthy because they show how some people have made up their mind that the present system is adequate and that accidents like the one at Benalla cannot be prevented by proper procedures and a better use of the radar.

Lastly SM4 Pirate, you say:

I have never stated or implied such a thing. I have made it very clear in everything I have written that as far as I know, the controller was complying with the rules and training material that existed at the time - but six people did die.

Ahhh I really would have liked the RFDS to recieve the $5,000 BUT cherry picking doesn't cut it around here
Below is the last post from the real VORs from that particular thread.
Some of you may recall it.
27th April 2004, 07:37 #61
Voices of Reason
Join Date: Jan 2004
Location: New York
Posts: 132
Clarifications
First, we wish to apologize for some of the recent content (quoted above )under our nom-de-plume – the offending party has been removed from the roster of participants.

Second, as to credentials, suffice it to say our resumes would stand more than favorably against any offered by participants to this forum.

Now, in relation to this thread, perhaps we could go to first principles and try to clarify our original post.

As we have stated before, the entire basis for airspace service levels should be set around equitable risk management – that is, no single party should be exposed to a higher level of risk than another, unless that risk is accepted voluntarily.

By that, we mean that those that have sole responsibility for the risk to which they expose themselves – VFR pilots, glider pilots, military fighter pilots etc – may choose to operate to higher risk levels than those who have little or no control over risk – i.e., the fare paying passenger.

Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels.

So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.

Prior to the ICAO alphabet airspace classification system, there were as few as two classifications available in most parts of the world – controlled and uncontrolled airspace – with some States offering mid-range services such as Visual Exempt, or Instrument Visual airspace. The ICAO alphabet airspace system when finally codified offers seven layers of airspace service, and seven layers of risk management.

As we have previously stated, the system was developed by a panel whose primary responsibility was the accommodation of VFR flights in an increasingly complex environment of IFR flights – and an increasingly complex set of IFR flight parameters.

Now, for an airspace designer starting with a clean sheet of paper, it would be relatively simple to codify Australian airspace, so that the levels of risk are set to appropriate levels, and no single section of the community is subject to abnormally high levels of risk – except, as we stated before, where they choose to accept that risk. Some service leveling would be required to ensure that the model was not overly complex – so naturally there would be apparent over-servicing in certain areas. This occurs in all States.

We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.

So far, this is a lesson in theory.
The practicality of your debate in Australia is the superimposition of a model which may, or may not, set appropriate risk levels, over a system that has been in place for quite some time, and has therefore established a defacto risk standard.

Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc. It is also true to say that if you have been providing a higher level of service for some time, the reduction from, say, Class C to Class E may appear either cost neutral or cost negative – i.e., a reduction for no cost benefit.

In fact, by our research into the airspace reforms conducted over the last 15 years in Australia, we have seen enormous overall cost benefit associated with the change in service levels – without any provable or demonstrable change in risk.

We understand that you have transitioned from over 2500 air traffic and flight information staff to around 1100. We accept that a large part of that was due to a technology change – nevertheless, traffic levels have increased, so the cost effectiveness has increased.

We expect that your responses will be along the lines of “we can provide the service, so why don’t we?”. This goes to one respondent’s quotation from Justice Gibbs. We have seen this, and other similar statements – particularly those associated with the United Kingdom and European Occupational Health and Safety directorates. The statements, on there own, are misleading, and need to be linked to the benefit side of the equation. Effectively, it is the passengers who will determine risk tolerability versus cost, a fact that Broome has tested. So, if a passenger can fly from Broome to Perth for $100.00, they may tolerate a “safety tax” of $5.00, but would baulk at $50.00. So the fact that a service can be provided is not necessarily an indicator that it should be provided, particularly when it can be demonstrated that risk is within an acceptable bound.

We suspect that some years ago, talk of controllers simultaneously providing traffic information in Class G airspace and separation services in Class C airspace would have been anathema. We understand it is done routinely now.

Yes, the change from Class C to Class E does increase risk – but is it an unacceptable level of risk – probably not. Are the incidents in Class E airspace indicative of a safety deficiency – yes. Is it a deficiency in airspace design – probably not. It is more likely to be a misapplication of the procedures associated with Class E airspace. Despite the protestations from some that Australia is somehow “different” to the rest of the world, evidence in other States with Class E airspace would seem to indicate that the design of Class E itself is not deficient.

Now to the question of transponders in Class E airspace.
Our research – and we would challenge any participants in this thread to look back through airspace change documentation to validate this information – indicates that the transponder carriage and activation proposal was mooted as part of a reform initiative called Airspace 2000, and was offered as a trade-off by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association as a safety enhancement mitigators, in return for reduction or elimination of airspace charges.

The regulations giving effect to the transponder carriage and activation in Class E airspace were put in place immediately before Class E airspace was implemented on your east coast, several years ago. We understand that it had originally been planned to implement Class E airspace along your entire east coast, from the north of Queensland to South Australia, at 8500 feet and above, and that charts had been printed and distributed. We understand that a Richard Harold Smith ordered the charts withdrawn and the implementation stopped, in favor of a much smaller implementation in New South Wales, two months later. We understand that charts were re-printed and issued – but on instruction from the director of your regulator, apparently at the specific behest of the same Richard Harold Smith, the effective date was deferred for two weeks whilst a debate raged around the need for mandatory transponders. We understand the carriage and activation of transponders was opposed by the same Richard Harold Smith.

As we have stated previously, the carriage and activation of transponders is NOT a prerequisite for Class E airspace. Yes, it does enhance its application – but it is not a requirement. As we have also stated, the carriage and operation of transponders should only be seen as a means by which the traffic alerting characteristic of Class E airspace is better enabled – and NOT as a way to alert TCAS carrying aircraft to the presence of VFR flights.

We trust this provides clarification.

:= :D

Dick,
Name "some people" please. Prune names will be fine.

But at what cost? There is an implication that it is more cost effective than G, that doesn't mean less expensive.:ugh:
Who are "they" and why do "they" say it's been used incorrectly?

Quote:

---

I have never stated or implied such a thing.

---

I'm sorry but what other implications can otherwise be drawn from comments such as

Quote:

---

At the time the Airservices controllers turned off the route monitoring alarm three times rather than inform the pilot.

---

in this very thread. Who says this location has good radar coverage? I can tell you it is rubbish; don't mistake what the radar head observed (ie a radar plot) with what was available on an ATC console; they are not the same thing. If the RFP (radar front processor) says paint not accurate (or strong) enough there is no displayed paint on the 'synthetic' TAAATS console; please come and look for real at the data we actually get in this area, often below FL110 is non-radar; some days A075 works fine; but I can't recall seeing lower than that in this area, ever. Would you really want E to AGL 1200 with radar paints dropping out somewhere near 5000+ feet higher than the base of E; all on inference that final approached will have better monitoring. That's right you don't need radar to do E:ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh: :ugh:

This is getting better! Now we are to believe that there are different VORs – the “real” ones and the (no doubt) “fake” ones. How are we to know the difference? Well it appears that any VORs that are against NAS are “real” and any VORs which explain how NAS works so well in the United States and could work well here, are “fake.”

Now of course it isn’t quite explained how the “fake” VORs (i.e. the ones that support NAS) have somehow got hold of the password to post, and how we are to know the difference.

By the way, any claims about me preventing Class E airspace implementation are rubbish – I have been a consistent supporter for more Class E.

If the people who make these claims don’t have the self-confidence to phone me and ask the facts, what can we do?

I say again, to answer this nightmare and for the reasonable people who are reading, why is it that Airservices has so frightened its staff and its knowledgeable people that they cannot say anything publicly about airspace?

I too have heard that staff have been threatened if they put anything on PPRuNe or say anything publicly about their professional opinions in relation to airspace. Can you imagine working for such an organisation?

This is not an issue of national security, it is an issue of aviation safety – where there should be no secrets. To intimidate your staff and management so they are not game to say their true beliefs in relation to safety is a damning reflection on this organisation.

Just as with the Wheat Board, it will all come out one day and be exposed - you wait and see.

SM4 Pirate, it was obvious that the pilot was well off course when above FL110 – in very good radar coverage. That is when the pilot could have been told that he was heading well away from the GPS approach, and that is when there is a chance that the accident could have been prevented – it is as simple as that.

Dick

On further reflection, you are indeed correct. When queried on my tracking by ATC, I have been in Class E airspace not Class G.

Dr:cool:

To who? In hindsight, yes, agreed, after plotting it out; but at the time what were the controllers (the three sectors involved (WOL, BLA and HUM) = three alerts) using to assess this "obvious" deviation from track? This has nothing to do with using the radar "correctly".

As far as I know the GPS RNAV/GNSS points were not in the data set at the time, so rerouting it to accurately describe the RAM corridor wasn't an option; thus the only reference point was the navaid/aerodrome; where the aircraft was not going; probably hence no advice to the PIC.

This probably has everything to do with a pilot being below the MSA still in a white/grey/black puffy lump of clag; yes the BLA GPS RNAV can get you lower than the MSA of 3500 within 10NM; but we all know you have to be on the damn thing.

From my untrained eye and from memory the aircraft appears to have gone to EE not ED; but flown the approach as if going to/from ED; sorry I have this all wrong. :ouch:

Dr, You will get advice from ATCs , about being in RAM in G too, in radar coverage, IFR, when you aren't on the CTAF, and your diversion from track is unexpected; the same RAM rules apply to all classes of airspace; ie there are only one set of rules.

Dick.......Dood,

You are looking for an expert in airspace design, I'm the first to admit that I'm not that.

I have however been working this sector for a number of years. AND I AM TELLING YOU THAT THE RADAR COVERAGE IN THIS AREA IS CRAP! Why can you not accept my word on this? Do you think I am lieing?

Saabs are routinely lost (momentarily) at levels up to F120 out of YMAY to YMML.

I do have reservations about working E airspace, but only in areas where radar coverage is crap. Give me the radar coverage, the staffing (we have been understaffed on this group for at least 5 or 6 years) and the appropriate training and I will do it without complaint!

You also need to educate VFR acft on the implications of their transponder limitations and for christ sake stop them from navigating on IFR tracks.

Regards,

ROOTER.

well I guess if you want to take that argument to its logical extension ipso facto you should not quote the VOR in any form to support your agenda of the day.

I doubt that there is anyone in Australia, or the world for that matter, watching or paticipating in the VOR NAS debate who wasn't able to work out what was and wasn't "fake".

And allegations of intimidation of staff by Airservices :rolleyes: coming from you is really cute don't you think:}

There are some very sound and very well proven reasons why many PPRuNers choose to remain anonymous, notwithstanding the accuracy and rationality of their posts and it has very little to do with the likely actions of their employers.

Dick,
I agree with the fact that if the pilot had been advised of his track error the accident could have been avoided. I say could not would. Obviously some very bad errors were made or equipment failures caused this accident.

In the end though you just can not fly below your msa without being absolutely sure of where you are and you can't be sure unless you have multiple sources of information. If ATC have radar that is one possible source, so is a DME, VOR, NDB, IRS etc.
I have flown too many Radar controlled airports around the world where I still don't descend below the MSA until I am sure of where I am, and not simply by the controllers advice. It is the only way to stay alive in this job.

I feel that to connect the need for more class E airspace to this accident is a bit of a stretch. There are a lot more things that can be done to prevent a repeat of this kind of accident that would be of more benefit before calling for more E airspace.

We can't positively control the whole of Australia by radar so the focus for this accident and for other remote areas needs to be on procedures, training and equipment required on board IFR aircraft.

Will class E airspce help? I don't know, but I do belive that it probably isn't the best way of preventing the above type of accidents.
Cheers.

Sound advice. The Radar Terrain Clearance charts that RAAF AIS provide should be available to all. I've been on one flight when we were vectored below the alt displayed on chart. After questioning the controller we were promptly cleared to the correct alt.

You can say that again, Sunshine. And you had better have a padded bottom, 'cause it's gunna be whacked hard.

PS: Answer the question.

Prior to this crash not all RNAV approach points were available to ATC to insert into flight plans, so if a flight was cleared direct to such a point in E airspace or a pilot advised he was doing so in G airspace we would just expect him to be up to 15 NM away from his planned route. Now the points have been defined and it has been indicated to ATC that we must monitor tracking and advise discrepancies, regardless of the class of airspace. Of course, you have got it wrong again.:ugh:

The ATSB report makes it quite clear the controller WAS monitoring the track of the aircraft, he was just confused about which point the flight was heading for. Despite the points not being defined the discrepancy WAS noted, but the when the ATC weighed the probabilities of he or the GPS being wrong he decided he must have got it wrong. We all know better now.

My name is in my profile if anybody cares, don't see how it is relevant though, I have no ambitions to become a media tart.

Really? Could it have been prevented if the radio altimeter, which was fitted to this aircraft, had not been disabled by the pilot?

Whilst ATC monitoring of IFR tracks forms part of the system's defences, surely the final defence layer in the prevention of a CFIT should lie in the use of airborne technologies. In this case those technologies were knowingly disabled and so this final defence was breeched and the accident was allowed to occur. To pin-point the ATC's role in this accident as the 'make or break' point is misleading and is in direct conflict with the systemic approach to accident causation.

So in summary, the pilot flew the wrong way and hit a hill. ATC did not tell him and it is ATC's fault? The pilot made no error? User plays, user pays.

I know one of the ATC guys on duty at the time. And any implied suggestion that he and others were smoking the odd cigarette, feet up on the console, oblivious to all but the heavy metal at FL 350 is cruel, wrong and just nasty.

And Dick.....most airlines, including mine...as part of our CRM training in the classroom, the simulator and on the line....tell pilots, Captains (yes this poor guy flying up near Benalla was a PIC) to listen to "that sick feeling that something is wrong". he was flying without GPWS, not even a Radio Alt (I think) in IMC relying solely on his version of a GPS plotted track. I know he didn't mean to get into this place but ultimately HE was PIC, not ATC whatever may or may not have fleetingly appeared on their screen.

While a comment from ATC to alert the pilot to the track error may have prevented this accident, ATC can not possibly be blamed for this tragedy. If the approach had been into somewhere remote like Coen, this debate would not be relevant. Equally a cross check on the position with a VFR portable GPS might have alterted the pilot to a problem.

IMHO the buck stops squarely with the PIC. Like most aviation accidents, the plugging of any one of a number of "holes in the cheese" would have prevented it.

I did my GPS/RNAV Appr rating with a Trimble GPS, and found it much more difficult to work with than the GNS430 that I now use.

I have gotten into the habit of navigating soley by reference to GPS, but as a result of this accident, I now try wherever possible to cross-reference my GPS position with a ground station or radar position at some point in the flight prior to flying a GPS/RNAV Appr.

The pilot's habit of pulling the circuit breaker on the radio altimeter is curious. I wish I had one, and if I did I would ensure that I used it appropriately where ever possible.

Although apparently not diectly relevant in this case, the fact that the GPS database was not current is also interesting.

Dr:cool:

And with reference to "stand-alone" GPS approaches. Just to put them in perspective. At the airline level, my company which has operated 777s for 10 years has JUST received approval, with a number of caveats even then, for "stand alone" GPS approaches. We need that for ETOPS alternates like Midway.
And we have the mother of all nav systems to back up the two GPS systems. The ADIRU with its many IRS and fiber-optic standby back up IRUs would by itself be more accurate than almost all non-ILS approaches. And we have 2 active FMCs and all manner of cross-checks. On IRS alone we can navigate for 12 hours without any other updating.
And yes, I am old enough to remember the "old" days when we didn't have all that gear and you have to have positive ADF station passage, or passing over a VAR Marker (remember MONEA up near Mangalore and the "Z" marker at HBA? etc).
There's just no substitute for knowing where you are, as PIC, before you let down. If I ever have to go into Wake or Adak with one engine out, ATC will be the people I call on SATCOM after I land, not someone I expect ANY help from on the approach.

SM4 Pirate, you state:

I believe the Echo Delta waypoint was in the Airservices database. How else could the aircraft be cleared to track to Echo Delta, and how could the air traffic controller call the pilot and say that he was 65 miles from Echo Delta?

Gaunty, you falsely added words to the VOR posting of 27 April to give PPRuNers a completely different view. In the original post VOR did not add the words “quoted above.” VOR was referring to recent content, and if you go back and look at the history it is obvious that VOR was referring to posts other than the one that I have quoted.

Why ever would VOR be removed from the “roster of participants” for stating the facts about the US airspace system as I have quoted in the first post on this thread?

ShockWave, you state:

And then you state:

In fact, if you look at my initial posting I made it very clear (when I said the radar use should be maximised) that the only alternative was not just Class E airspace. I said:

Nothing could be clearer.

Just so everyone understands – in Class G airspace there is no regulatory responsibility for the controller in relation to LSA/MSA because the controller does not know if the pilot is visual. Under NAS the pilot must report visual or on the approach, and it is a very much more disciplined system where the responsibility is clearly shared between the controller and the pilot in a more definite way.

Spodman, you state:

If this is so, it is outrageous. You can buy a complete Jeppesen database for about $150. Are you suggesting that this had never been installed in the TAAATS system? However as stated above, in relation to this accident, the initial approach fix Echo Delta was in the TAAATS database.

Is that the best you can do ??:ugh: :ugh: :rolleyes:

I added “quoted above.” to, hopefully point to the post you quoted at the beginning of the thread, there was never any intent to to give PPRuNers a completely view, most of them are capable of distinguishing the proverbial := from shinola.

I'll back my record for rational and consistent argument around here against yours any day.

And for the lazy ones around here, here is the full thread, I recall it well and it seems pretty clear to me what's happened. But then what would I know.

http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...tates+Practice

In the meantime I'm back to doing something useful, like actually progressing the state of the GA industry instead of frightening the bejeesus out of the callow chattering class and gormless gapers.

Coral, it has nothing to do with grandstanding. It is all about preventing unnecessary deaths.

I do like to see that the available safety dollar is spent where it is most effective. I haven’t said that we have to have Class E airspace at Benalla. I have made it clear that if we introduce better procedures we can benefit from the use of radar.

If you question my real motivation possibly you are judging me on what you would do in similar circumstances – that is not sensible. I have one interest and that is having the highest possible safety and participation rates in aviation.

Point one regarding the clearance, in the same manner that you clear an aircraft for a holding pattern, an NDB let down, a weather diversion; you use your experience and knowledge to facilitate the arrival as requested; you don't need to know "exactly" where a point is to clear an aircraft to it. When separating you then "add on for mum". If ED was in CTA then you're probably right re the clearance, but it wasn't.

Point two, run the distance measuring tool from the aid to the aircraft and then subtract the distance from the aid to the tracking point. ie 80-15 = 65; or something like that. They got the chart info from the menu in AAARDS (which is a computer monitor adjacent to the dispaly; but not on the display, if it was available, where we have our RAPIC) or from opening the DAP East like everybody else.

I absolutely support the increase in safety participation; unfortunately to suggest it's simple and won't cost serious dollars, is outrageous; please don't quote whilloughby report figures; nobody with more than $3.50 in the bank can see the logic behind that one; unless it's millions more than $3.50.:}

Check facts!
 

It is the PIC who is asked for his TOD and replies with 65 NM to Echo Delta. The controllers subsequently use that report in coordination. Nowhere in the transcript do the controllers refer to a distance to run a waypoint, other than by reference to a pilot’s report. :ugh:

Dick,

Somewhere along the line we need to get back to better pilot training and cockpit disciplines before we start asking controllers to fly the aircraft for us.

We know that this discussion centres around improving the NAS, but you're going about it the wrong way mate!