SQ286 return to AKL with tail strike damage.
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I never said Erebus was a crew stuff-up. It was however one of those accidents that held lessons for all of us. That is what I meant by a signature accident.
Tenerife told us, inter alia, that we needed to rigidly enforce SOP's and employ the, as then unknown, CRM.
Fort Worth was the first time microbursts and their effects really became known. That wasn't a crew stuff-up then either... although any crew doing what they did now would certainly have some explaining to do. (If they survived).
I take your point Kaptin that this SQ error was probably due to some form of distraction on the flight deck. That doesn't excuse them though. Managing the inevitable distractions that occur during a pre-flight is one of the other things we get paid for.
Tenerife told us, inter alia, that we needed to rigidly enforce SOP's and employ the, as then unknown, CRM.
Fort Worth was the first time microbursts and their effects really became known. That wasn't a crew stuff-up then either... although any crew doing what they did now would certainly have some explaining to do. (If they survived).
I take your point Kaptin that this SQ error was probably due to some form of distraction on the flight deck. That doesn't excuse them though. Managing the inevitable distractions that occur during a pre-flight is one of the other things we get paid for.
Moderate, Modest & Mild.
Thank you, TCoB. You come across (rightly or wrongly) on this forum, as one who does not tolerate any leeway with the crew (and yourself, I presume), with statements such as, "although any crew doing what they did now would certainly have some explaining to do." and, "That doesn't excuse them though.".
I wonder if this is how junior crew members would also see you, and whether it would affect their readiness to speak up, IF you were ever "guilty" of making a mistake? I`m sure your reply would be that you would EXPECT them to, and that you would chastise them if YOU subsequently discovered it yourself.
And so once again, we head down the CRM path.]
Personally I am not as interested in knowing WHAT mistake(s) was made, but WHY, and why it wasn`t caught in the airline`s Safety Net, because if it`s capable of happening once, it can recur countless times.
Just saying that ALL 3 crew members missed it, and that they should be hung high, is not - for me - any sort of answer.
I wonder if this is how junior crew members would also see you, and whether it would affect their readiness to speak up, IF you were ever "guilty" of making a mistake? I`m sure your reply would be that you would EXPECT them to, and that you would chastise them if YOU subsequently discovered it yourself.
And so once again, we head down the CRM path.]
Personally I am not as interested in knowing WHAT mistake(s) was made, but WHY, and why it wasn`t caught in the airline`s Safety Net, because if it`s capable of happening once, it can recur countless times.
Just saying that ALL 3 crew members missed it, and that they should be hung high, is not - for me - any sort of answer.
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Well maybe I do come across as someone intolerant of error. I don't believe that I am.
Way back in my neophyte days I read something that someone wrote about this job that made an impression on me then and still resonates. The quote when something along the lines of, "Those pilots unwilling to take responsibility for their actions, should aggressively seek other employment."
Now I take this to mean that, yes mistakes do occur. But, when it comes down to it my basic responsibility is to get a large aeroplane from point A to point B as safely as possible. Emphasis on MY.
I may be tired, that does not excuse me from that responsibility. If I am tired I need to take extra care.
I may be 11 hours out of my time zone, that does not excuse me.
I may be distracted, that too does not excuse me.
We all miss things when we are tired, but the knowledge of the weight of your aircraft in all stages of flight is paramount. Therefore it requires careful checking and crosschecking, no matter how tired, distracted, horny or circadian challenged you may be.
I don't jump on crew members for making mistakes however, and when they pick up one of mine I thank them for their attention.
What concerns me these days is that I am starting to see a trend where pilots in particular see the holistic approach to accident investigation as mitigating their responsibilities and absolving them of blame when circumstances are not ideal.
So therefore I am critical of any attempt to find an excuse for a basic error such as this one, particularly one that could have easily been prevented by adherence to SOP's.
If that characterises me a hard man these days, so be it.
Way back in my neophyte days I read something that someone wrote about this job that made an impression on me then and still resonates. The quote when something along the lines of, "Those pilots unwilling to take responsibility for their actions, should aggressively seek other employment."
Now I take this to mean that, yes mistakes do occur. But, when it comes down to it my basic responsibility is to get a large aeroplane from point A to point B as safely as possible. Emphasis on MY.
I may be tired, that does not excuse me from that responsibility. If I am tired I need to take extra care.
I may be 11 hours out of my time zone, that does not excuse me.
I may be distracted, that too does not excuse me.
We all miss things when we are tired, but the knowledge of the weight of your aircraft in all stages of flight is paramount. Therefore it requires careful checking and crosschecking, no matter how tired, distracted, horny or circadian challenged you may be.
I don't jump on crew members for making mistakes however, and when they pick up one of mine I thank them for their attention.
What concerns me these days is that I am starting to see a trend where pilots in particular see the holistic approach to accident investigation as mitigating their responsibilities and absolving them of blame when circumstances are not ideal.
So therefore I am critical of any attempt to find an excuse for a basic error such as this one, particularly one that could have easily been prevented by adherence to SOP's.
If that characterises me a hard man these days, so be it.
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This certainly is a warm and cuddly thread.
We have plausible explanations for what happened (finger trouble and transposition).
We have some explanations as to why it might have happened (lack of familiarity on type, rostering effects/circadian function, language and pronounciation).
What I simply cannot come to grips with is how three highly competent and qualified individuals could leave their commonsense checker back in the hotel.
In round figures the V numbers for the 400 and the 340 would be about the same for a 10 hour flight with a reasonable pax/cargo config.
When the a/c gave them 737 numbers back, they simply accepted them.
Surely this is comparable to believing a calculator when it tells you 2+2 equals 3. It is something that just doesn't happen.......
We have plausible explanations for what happened (finger trouble and transposition).
We have some explanations as to why it might have happened (lack of familiarity on type, rostering effects/circadian function, language and pronounciation).
What I simply cannot come to grips with is how three highly competent and qualified individuals could leave their commonsense checker back in the hotel.
In round figures the V numbers for the 400 and the 340 would be about the same for a 10 hour flight with a reasonable pax/cargo config.
When the a/c gave them 737 numbers back, they simply accepted them.
Surely this is comparable to believing a calculator when it tells you 2+2 equals 3. It is something that just doesn't happen.......
Join Date: Mar 2003
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I'm curious to know whether people blindly accept the FMC computed V speeds, or is there some kind of cross-check?
In my outfit the sequence of events goes like this (for both the B744 and B777):
An estimate of the zero fuel weight is used to calculate an estimated take-off weight, which is then used to calculate the take-off data using tabulated RTOW figures. This data is cross-checked by at least one other crew member. Nothing is entered in the FMC at this stage.
When the loadsheet arrives with the final figures, the actual zero fuel weight is entered in the FMC, and the FMC computed gross weight compared with the take-off weight shown on the loadsheet - ANY discrepancy must be investigated. The take-off weight shown on the loadsheet is also compared with that used to compute the take-off data, and if it is within certain limits, the calculated take-off data is then manually entered into the FMC. If the difference between the actual take-off weight and that used to calculate the take-off data is outside the limit, then the take-off data is recalculated from the tabulated RTOW figures and manually entered in the FMC.
What procedures do other airlines use?
In my outfit the sequence of events goes like this (for both the B744 and B777):
An estimate of the zero fuel weight is used to calculate an estimated take-off weight, which is then used to calculate the take-off data using tabulated RTOW figures. This data is cross-checked by at least one other crew member. Nothing is entered in the FMC at this stage.
When the loadsheet arrives with the final figures, the actual zero fuel weight is entered in the FMC, and the FMC computed gross weight compared with the take-off weight shown on the loadsheet - ANY discrepancy must be investigated. The take-off weight shown on the loadsheet is also compared with that used to compute the take-off data, and if it is within certain limits, the calculated take-off data is then manually entered into the FMC. If the difference between the actual take-off weight and that used to calculate the take-off data is outside the limit, then the take-off data is recalculated from the tabulated RTOW figures and manually entered in the FMC.
What procedures do other airlines use?
Last edited by Avago; 2nd Apr 2003 at 07:12.
Join Date: Apr 2003
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For the edification of all (who fly the 76&74 ). The lever lock makes a distinct sound as it releases.... when the main gear is tilted. You can use this during rotate, coupled with your knowledge of attitude and tail clearance to ensure that you never suffer a tail scrape, and the inevitable WKX01 pattern. Cheers.
spelling, D'ho !
spelling, D'ho !
