Another disaster averted
I think the title was intended to be sarcastic (but I assume the thread starter will correct me if I'm wrong).
Describing a disaster as having been "averted" implies some sort of timely and competent - even heroic - intervention that resulted in the disaster not happening. In this case the assessment of experienced and qualified professionals appears to me to be that a lack of timely and competent intervention increased the risks of a disaster, and that luck played a large part in the outcome.
Describing a disaster as having been "averted" implies some sort of timely and competent - even heroic - intervention that resulted in the disaster not happening. In this case the assessment of experienced and qualified professionals appears to me to be that a lack of timely and competent intervention increased the risks of a disaster, and that luck played a large part in the outcome.
I think the title was intended to be sarcastic (but I assume the thread starter will correct me if I'm wrong).
Describing a disaster as having been "averted" implies some sort of timely and competent - even heroic - intervention that resulted in the disaster not happening. In this case the assessment of experienced and qualified professionals appears to me to be that a lack of timely and competent intervention increased the risks of a disaster, and that luck played a large part in the outcome.
Describing a disaster as having been "averted" implies some sort of timely and competent - even heroic - intervention that resulted in the disaster not happening. In this case the assessment of experienced and qualified professionals appears to me to be that a lack of timely and competent intervention increased the risks of a disaster, and that luck played a large part in the outcome.
Maybe SQ had a policy of pinning up in their crew room a graph showing fuel consumption for each month, with the captains name alongside it? I know JQ did because my name was on it. SE Asia again, but those monthly pin-ups in the crew room sure did get attention. It then became a competition to see who could get the lowest reading. Check captains included. It was a subliminal farce to post those statistics and most of us ignored it.
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Maybe SQ had a policy of pinning up in their crew room a graph showing fuel consumption for each month, with the captains name alongside it? I know JQ did because my name was on it. SE Asia again, but those monthly pin-ups in the crew room sure did get attention. It then became a competition to see who could get the lowest reading. Check captains included. It was a subliminal farce to post those statistics and most of us ignored it.
Maybe SQ had a policy of pinning up in their crew room a graph showing fuel consumption for each month, with the captains name alongside it? I know JQ did because my name was on it. SE Asia again, but those monthly pin-ups in the crew room sure did get attention. It then became a competition to see who could get the lowest reading. Check captains included. It was a subliminal farce to post those statistics and most of us ignored it.
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Whether you have fuel to taxi is a moot point, once you are cutting into final/fixed reserve prior to completing the landing you have busted the law and in emergency territory. If the engines stop due to fuel exhaustion just after vacating the runway it's obvious that you did not have 30 minutes airborne, or any sort of reserves remaining.
30’ at the end of the landing roll is the rule, but what if you can’t?
I think you missed the point, once you have cut into your required fixed reserve prior to completing the landing you have busted 'the not enough fuel for flight' rule and can be charged as such. If you ran out of fuel and the engines stopped just after vacating the runway, it would make it very easy to prove you did not have the required fuel on board at touch down. Once you are cutting into that fixed reserve and it's reported, you then have to then justify why you were in that position and have a suitable excuse or you can be charged/fined as such. My point was that anyone who lands with the regulatory required fuel at touchdown will have ample fuel to taxi to the gate, so it's not really a consideration.
https://knkt.go.id/Repo/Files/Lapora...l%20Report.pdf
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If I read that right, that's like saying they encourage overuse of automation, develop a lack of skill from doing this, mess up: Then authorities push for more automation. If it didn't have the potential to cause a lot of problems, it would almost be funny (of course it's not).
I find it amusing seeing some posters desperately trying to sling mud at QF with misplaced equivalencies to this incident. God knows why, as the SQ incident has nothing at all to do with QF.
One poster, drawing on a decade old incident in Munich, stated there was ‘un-forecast fog’.
Another mentions Mildura, where once again there was un-forecast fog.
In the incident at hand the report clearly states, right at the start:
So there were TEMPO thunder storms forecast for their arrival. It wasn’t a surprise. But they chose not to take 60 mins holding fuel. I don’t care what your fuel policy says is legal, that’s just stupid.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
This is a pretty disturbing incident and people trying to deflect attention onto historical QF incidents clearly have either severe anti-QF issues or simply don’t understand what a dangerous situation these SQ passengers were in.
One poster, drawing on a decade old incident in Munich, stated there was ‘un-forecast fog’.
Another mentions Mildura, where once again there was un-forecast fog.
In the incident at hand the report clearly states, right at the start:
Prior to departure, the flight crew reviewed the documents provided by the flight dispatcher. The Terminal Aerodrome Forecast2 (TAF) for Changi Airport indicated that there could be temporary light to moderate thunderstorms with rain in the vicinity of Changi Airport for periods of 30 minutes or more but less than 60 minutes.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
This is a pretty disturbing incident and people trying to deflect attention onto historical QF incidents clearly have either severe anti-QF issues or simply don’t understand what a dangerous situation these SQ passengers were in.
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AQIS:
Respectfully, there's something missing from your imagination. I've seen this situation - a thunderstorm covering all the Singapore airfields AND JB - on several occasions. Inevitably, Batam was clear, but my company wouldn't use it as an alternate.
I just can’t imagine that all three airports had crap weather.
I find it amusing seeing some posters desperately trying to sling mud at QF with misplaced equivalencies to this incident. God knows why, as the SQ incident has nothing at all to do with QF.
One poster, drawing on a decade old incident in Munich, stated there was ‘un-forecast fog’.
Another mentions Mildura, where once again there was un-forecast fog.
In the incident at hand the report clearly states, right at the start:
So there were TEMPO thunder storms forecast for their arrival. It wasn’t a surprise. But they chose not to take 60 mins holding fuel. I don’t care what your fuel policy says is legal, that’s just stupid.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
This is a pretty disturbing incident and people trying to deflect attention onto historical QF incidents clearly have either severe anti-QF issues or simply don’t understand what a dangerous situation these SQ passengers were in.
One poster, drawing on a decade old incident in Munich, stated there was ‘un-forecast fog’.
Another mentions Mildura, where once again there was un-forecast fog.
In the incident at hand the report clearly states, right at the start:
So there were TEMPO thunder storms forecast for their arrival. It wasn’t a surprise. But they chose not to take 60 mins holding fuel. I don’t care what your fuel policy says is legal, that’s just stupid.
Before you argue they had diversion fuel, so don’t need an alternate, recall that Batam is 15Nm away from SIN. It is your base turn. You can’t be surprised that storms in SIN also lead to storms in Batam.
This is a pretty disturbing incident and people trying to deflect attention onto historical QF incidents clearly have either severe anti-QF issues or simply don’t understand what a dangerous situation these SQ passengers were in.
No doubt its a disturbing incident. However the link to the Mildura incident was not whether the crew were caught out by weather, but more so that like what is being insinuated about SQ, QF apoears to have not complied fully with the investigation. The crew busted a minima when the fuel state probably did not require them to, they did not declare a mayday when intending to perform an emergency landing below minima, therefore no services were in attendence. After the landing the crew refueled and departed, which conveniantly deleted the cvr data, after such an event the crew should have been stood down. QF appears to have provided no FDR information or even actual fuel data. The ATSB used calculated data and fuel uplifts from third parties to work out roughly how much fuel the QF aircraft had. The crew knew about the TEMPO, claimed they had holding fuel for it, then landed immediately claiming they had 'low fuel'. That whole event is just as disturbing, and leaves you wondering how many other times are minimas busted by this company and nobody finds out.
Last edited by Chronic Snoozer; 6th Oct 2023 at 23:50.
I suggest you read the actual report, QF planned to land below minima, adjusted to a 'new minima' 200 ft below the actual, continued below that and became visual at less than 200 ft AGL then quoted cloud base of 150ft AGL to other aircraft. The VA aircraft used the 150ft guide for the first approach, did not get visual, went around, but did see the runway below them in the missed approach and then declared the fuel emergency as they were now fuel critical. I know people on the ground who witnessed the whole event, QF landed in very poor conditions, possibly much worse than if they had held for a while. The SPECI at the time the QF landed was cloud OVC at 100 ft and 900m vis, which matches what I've been told.
Last edited by 43Inches; 6th Oct 2023 at 23:53.
At 0946 the crew of Qantas 735 broadcast that they had landed at Mildura.
The first SPECI indicating the presence of fog was issued at 0948, showing visibility as 900 m in fog and cloud overcast at 100 ft.
Subsequent SPECIs show that the visibility at Mildura reached a low of 200 m in fog at 1011.
The first SPECI showing no fog, but with mist and overcast cloud at 100 ft being issued at 1048.
The first SPECI indicating the presence of fog was issued at 0948, showing visibility as 900 m in fog and cloud overcast at 100 ft.
Subsequent SPECIs show that the visibility at Mildura reached a low of 200 m in fog at 1011.
The first SPECI showing no fog, but with mist and overcast cloud at 100 ft being issued at 1048.
Again, there is no real equivalency to the SQ incident. After being confronted with unforcast fog in ADL both VA and QF were confronted with unforcast fog in MIA. The TEMPO was only for BKN 600’. So again the forecast was wrong and conditions much worse than advertised.
VA also made an approach below minima prior to declaring a mayday but you don’t criticise them, only Qantas. Rather than analyse this serious SQ incident you only seem interested in taking pot shots at QF over an unrelated historical incident.
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