Short Notice TIBA for Scheduled Air Transport Operations
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Short Notice TIBA for Scheduled Air Transport Operations
What are CASA doing to address this issue from a safety management perspective, specifically with regards to training and checking requirements when crews get very little notice of the airspace changing to TIBA procedures?
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
The other night probably somewhere around Hay the controller told us "I'm going home in 10 minutes your airspace will revert to TIBA, I'll issue a hazard alert, you should be out of my airspace by this time but if you're not there is a published NOTAM".
JUST WOW
JUST WOW
Normalisation of deviance. Nothing the see here. /s
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My colleagues say all the time ‘They will do something when we have an accident’
I disagree. If (sorry probably more ‘when’) we have an accident. They still won’t do anything.
I disagree. If (sorry probably more ‘when’) we have an accident. They still won’t do anything.
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Why do we think they implement TIBA rather than simply closing the airspace? KPI's and because it'll be our fault when something happens. It won't be theirs, even if they didn't have the staff to cover the roster.
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Of course not. Because it'll be the pilots fault - like those two in Darwin the other month when they used the same, but reciprocal runways and went nose to nose... And remember - there's no separation standard in Class G, so everything's completely normal right up until you swap paint.
Why do we think they implement TIBA rather than simply closing the airspace? KPI's and because it'll be our fault when something happens. It won't be theirs, even if they didn't have the staff to cover the roster.
Why do we think they implement TIBA rather than simply closing the airspace? KPI's and because it'll be our fault when something happens. It won't be theirs, even if they didn't have the staff to cover the roster.
In the Darwin occurrence it was not Class G - it was Class C with an embedded TRA matching the dimensions of the Class C airspace with certain broadcast procedures specified. Not the same procedures as Class G but in reality not too different. If pilots want to use RRO that's their decision (subject to their company also allowing it?). Surely it is a company decision as to whether to permit their flights to operate in airspace of this classification, and not solely at pilot discretion?
As for TIBA vs closing airspace - there's some legal issues here and certainly the operating companies would question CASA's right to close Class A/C/E airspace when a control service is not available. Again, it is up to operating companies to determine whether they will permit their aircraft to fly in TIBA airspace. Some have been known to go a longer way around it.
And for context, a reminder that Airservices does not classify, nor change classification of airspace - that is a role of CASA. TRAs etc are created by CASA, not Airservices. Airservices simply provides (and on occasions does not provide) the services associated with the extant airspace classification.
Need to understand the context of this. One scenario is that the controller is about to run out of duty time and there is no replacement available.
What are CASA doing to address this issue from a safety management perspective, specifically with regards to training and checking requirements when crews get very little notice of the airspace changing to TIBA procedures?
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
Last edited by parishiltons; 7th May 2023 at 11:54.
What are CASA doing to address this issue from a safety management perspective, specifically with regards to training and checking requirements when crews get very little notice of the airspace changing to TIBA procedures?
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
Whilst it could be assumed that professional pilots are familiar with TIBA procedures, it certainly cannot be assumed that they can comfortably transition to the procedures unexpectedly at very short notice.
Recent short notice TIBA procedures at Cairns at night is an example and high risk in my opinion, due to the high terrain in the terminal area.
Last edited by parishiltons; 8th May 2023 at 12:08.
The short break procedures are only to be taken when air traffic activity is minimal and not requiring air traffic controller action for the separation of aircraft. As the relieving controller is required to reply with phrases, such as 'STAND BY' or 'WILL ADVISE' only, safety is likely to be maintained albeit at the expense of efficiency.
Yer, right, nope.
"centre xxxx requires 20nm right of route due weather"
"STANDBY"
At say 8nm/minute and statistically a minimum of 10 minutes for the brains trust
to have a dump and transit back to the work station (2mins) is say 100 track miles.
I call bulldust on "safety likely maintained".
"Likely"infers a probability and we should not control airspace on the same basis as a toss of a coin.
Yer, right, nope.
"centre xxxx requires 20nm right of route due weather"
"STANDBY"
At say 8nm/minute and statistically a minimum of 10 minutes for the brains trust
to have a dump and transit back to the work station (2mins) is say 100 track miles.
I call bulldust on "safety likely maintained".
"Likely"infers a probability and we should not control airspace on the same basis as a toss of a coin.
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Lets start here:
CASR 172.110 Personnel
An ATS provider must have, at all times, enough suitably qualified and trained personnel to enable it to provide, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards and the standards set out or referred to in Annex 11, the air traffic services covered by its approval.
Then there is this:
CASR 172.150 Contingency plan
(1) An ATS provider must have a contingency plan, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards, of the procedures to be followed if, for any reason, an air traffic service being provided by it is interrupted.
(2) The plan must include:
(a) the actions to be taken by the members of the provider’s personnel responsible for providing the service; and
(b) possible alternative arrangements for providing the service; and
(c) the arrangements for resuming normal operations for the service.
The enactment of a contigancy plan, is a temporary measure, to prevent a temporoary breach of the regs (CASR172.110). However by planning to use TIBA as a day to day mitigator, effectively means that you are planning to breach the reg on a daily basis in advance and hiding behind your contingency plan to do it. If you are enacting your contingency plan daily, then I would have to argue it is no longer a contingency plan, its your normal daily plan. CASA even says it themselves in the response and are concerend about the implications on Aviation Safety. Im disgusted at the regulators response.
What is the new OAR manager doing about Airservices not providing the level of service that his office has directed Airservices to provide? Surely if the level of risk requires a certain level of service to provided as, directed by the OAR, and that service is not being provided, then the OAR also carries the risk.
Alpha
CASR 172.110 Personnel
An ATS provider must have, at all times, enough suitably qualified and trained personnel to enable it to provide, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards and the standards set out or referred to in Annex 11, the air traffic services covered by its approval.
Then there is this:
CASR 172.150 Contingency plan
(1) An ATS provider must have a contingency plan, in accordance with the standards set out in the Manual of Standards, of the procedures to be followed if, for any reason, an air traffic service being provided by it is interrupted.
(2) The plan must include:
(a) the actions to be taken by the members of the provider’s personnel responsible for providing the service; and
(b) possible alternative arrangements for providing the service; and
(c) the arrangements for resuming normal operations for the service.
The enactment of a contigancy plan, is a temporary measure, to prevent a temporoary breach of the regs (CASR172.110). However by planning to use TIBA as a day to day mitigator, effectively means that you are planning to breach the reg on a daily basis in advance and hiding behind your contingency plan to do it. If you are enacting your contingency plan daily, then I would have to argue it is no longer a contingency plan, its your normal daily plan. CASA even says it themselves in the response and are concerend about the implications on Aviation Safety. Im disgusted at the regulators response.
What is the new OAR manager doing about Airservices not providing the level of service that his office has directed Airservices to provide? Surely if the level of risk requires a certain level of service to provided as, directed by the OAR, and that service is not being provided, then the OAR also carries the risk.
Alpha
It's 'funny', at one level, watching the usual game of Pass-The-Risk-Parcel from CASA to Airservices to ATSB to Airservices to CASA to ATSB to...
Ghastly that the only thing at risk is the lives of pax and crew but not the paypackets of the officials in CASA and Airservices and ATSB.
Ghastly that the only thing at risk is the lives of pax and crew but not the paypackets of the officials in CASA and Airservices and ATSB.
Would be funny if when POTUS arrives in SY in May for Quad meetings, the Mil ADIZ areas are abutting TIBA/TRA un-manned airspace. Australia can chalk up another world aviation 1st.
Last edited by 10JQKA; 11th May 2023 at 13:59.
CASA is aware of the ongoing variations being reported and is attempting to manage
Airservices back to compliance as outlined.
Recalcitrant managers being performance managed.