WA: Push on or Pull Out?
I don't see any major issue with the decisions of the crew in this instance. Given the chosen cruise level and speed was achieved without the use of MCT. and there are two better suitables enroute, almost certain to have been mid point to the first suitable, please explain the rationale of turning back.
I don't see any major issue with the decisions of the crew in this instance. Given the chosen cruise level and speed was achieved without the use of MCT. and there are two better suitables enroute, almost certain to have been mid point to the first suitable, please explain the rationale of turning back.
Sure, but nobody manages an emergency or an abnormal perfectly. There will always be a peer review criticism, which is a wonderful thing when there's no pressure and all the time in the world to consider all the options. It was a short sector, with options, other than IAS command and steer in the general direction of a suitable whilst dealing with the issue, which they did, I can't put my hand on my heart and say I would have done anything all that different. There's 15 minutes of checklists, relight procedure, consider options and approach brief in there. I think it's spitting hairs whether to go on or go back, certainly Perth would have been my first choice.
Saying that they'd be over half way by the time they'd secured the engine is clutching at straws and defending the indefensible. A half decent crew would have the engine secure and an approach brief done in 15 minutes not the 40 that it would take to get to the CP at reduced engine out speeds. You can try and polish a turd all you like...........
I did not say that they would be 'over' half way to anywhere, merely that if they did get a relight and it subsequently ran down again and they had to go through the whole securing drill again, they could POSSIBLY be so near to half way that it would not matter on such a short sector.
Taking this particular flight: Engine failure is fully recognised roughly 30 nm south of GET. Allowing another 20 nm to complete the shutdown and follow-up actions puts a realistic CP about 10 minutes away at OEI speed - which is surely within a reasonable risk boundary when all the other factors favouring PER are considered. If the most suitable runway back at GET was RWY 21 there goes 5 minutes of that 10 anyway.
From the luxury of my armchair, about all that I may have done differently if not feeling rushed would have been to take the track-shortening.
As for the ATSB now suggesting that we must always be within gliding distance once an engine quits (if that is the implication of the report), we may as well ground all twins right now.
Last edited by Mach E Avelli; 10th Feb 2021 at 01:04.
Sure, but nobody manages an emergency or an abnormal perfectly. There will always be a peer review criticism, which is a wonderful thing when there's no pressure and all the time in the world to consider all the options. It was a short sector, with options, other than IAS command and steer in the general direction of a suitable whilst dealing with the issue, which they did, I can't put my hand on my heart and say I would have done anything all that different. There's 15 minutes of checklists, relight procedure, consider options and approach brief in there. I think it's spitting hairs whether to go on or go back, certainly Perth would have been my first choice.
Agreed entirely with the last two posts, except that in the case of track shortening, it must be meaningful, I doubt there would be more than 5 miles in it and in any case there would be changes in order to put them in a position for the approach, which is more work and radio calls. Staying with the plan in this case probably wasn't a detriment.
The whole gliding distance thing, what a crock.
The whole gliding distance thing, what a crock.
The whole gliding distance thing, what a crock.
We are multi engined, guaranteed performance aircraft, not gliders and there's been plenty of outfield landings in those. Where do they get these people from and how do they get to publish such things.
Just be WELL prepared when you enter the office of the CP or Training Department to discuss your decision making.
Just remember they probably won’t side with you. I can’t say I’ve seen many in my time enter and exit those discussions, any better off.
Just remember they probably won’t side with you. I can’t say I’ve seen many in my time enter and exit those discussions, any better off.
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A bloody good job by the crew I’d say.
A piss poor, amateurish report from the ATSB.
In over 25 years of Jet Flying I’ve never heard a discussion over glide range..... seriously?
By the time they turned back to GET, secured engine etc. (whilst holding OCTA) it would be lineball with the option they took to continue on to Perth.
However, from a workload, weather, runway and services perspective, PER was the far better option.
The report is at best amateurish and poor form for the ATSB, worst it is possibly misleading and dangerous.
A piss poor, amateurish report from the ATSB.
In over 25 years of Jet Flying I’ve never heard a discussion over glide range..... seriously?
By the time they turned back to GET, secured engine etc. (whilst holding OCTA) it would be lineball with the option they took to continue on to Perth.
However, from a workload, weather, runway and services perspective, PER was the far better option.
The report is at best amateurish and poor form for the ATSB, worst it is possibly misleading and dangerous.
One thing I would like to clear up if I may, Continuation, Return or Diversion with one engine out is an emergency and should be declared as such in a Mayday, as opposed to a Pan Pan in the case of an Abnormal.
As for tea and bikkies with Management, I would expect my fellow Command Pilots to have the confidence of the Chief and vice versa If that is not the case then one or both should not hold that position.
As for tea and bikkies with Management, I would expect my fellow Command Pilots to have the confidence of the Chief and vice versa If that is not the case then one or both should not hold that position.
A good chief pilot would insist that the 'no blame culture' (written in every SMS in the industry) is upheld. Often this will require the CP to defend the crew's actions against the wrath of CASA and upper management.
Unfortunately, these days there is often a kneejerk response which has perfectly good pilots stood down after an incident pending 'remedial training'. I hate that ****, because everyone gets to know about it and invariably something ends up on the crew training files.
Often it's so much better to simply have a discussion (which may involve a gentle spanking in some areas) but ending in "well done".
Weak and sycophantic CPs won't do that; instead they eagerly apportion blame and then come up with some new SOP or crew instruction to show how good they are at fixing stuff.
One thing I would like to clear up if I may, Continuation, Return or Diversion with one engine out is an emergency and should be declared as such in a Mayday, as opposed to a Pan Pan in the case of an Abnormal.
As for tea and bikkies with Management, I would expect my fellow Command Pilots to have the confidence of the Chief and vice versa If that is not the case then one or both should not hold that position.
As for tea and bikkies with Management, I would expect my fellow Command Pilots to have the confidence of the Chief and vice versa If that is not the case then one or both should not hold that position.
It’s been a while since I’ve gone over it, but I believe somewhere in an Airbus manual, it gives guidance as to its definition of their “LAND ASAP” (red or amber) on the ECAM, and basically Red is Mayday, Amber is Pan. Not in those exact words, but that’s basically what they’re trying to get across.
A straight engine failure, is only considered abnormal.
well we can differ, an engine failure is in most twin engined types an emergency action, RED and therefore a mayday. We as crew don't know for sure what is going on in there and in any case unless you declare an emergency no-one else on the ground is at high alert. Should it become a full blown emergency you really want everyone prepared. An abnormal is in my opinion something like a cracked windscreen that requires a level change and a reduction of cabin pressure, should it fail completely then its an emergency.
well we can differ, an engine failure is in most twin engined types an emergency action, RED and therefore a mayday. We as crew don't know for sure what is going on in there and in any case unless you declare an emergency no-one else on the ground is at high alert. Should it become a full blown emergency you really want everyone prepared. An abnormal is in my opinion something like a cracked windscreen that requires a level change and a reduction of cabin pressure, should it fail completely then its an emergency.
There seems to be a reasonably even divide between those who would continue and those who would divert, with good reasons given for both choices.
Each case would be different and it would be a command decision at the end of the day and as always, the Captain carries the can and needs to be able to justify his decision.
It would be difficult to write the rules in absolute terms so some leeway is deliberately left in the regs. A bit more guidance would be useful to fall back on for those who end up in a similar situation in future.
Landing at the nearest suitable airport is a safe decision which won’t involve problems with the regulatory authority, continuing to destination could also be justified based on current thinking.
Previously, twins couldn’t operate across the North Atlantic, these days traffic is almost all twin because the rules changed.
Each case would be different and it would be a command decision at the end of the day and as always, the Captain carries the can and needs to be able to justify his decision.
It would be difficult to write the rules in absolute terms so some leeway is deliberately left in the regs. A bit more guidance would be useful to fall back on for those who end up in a similar situation in future.
Landing at the nearest suitable airport is a safe decision which won’t involve problems with the regulatory authority, continuing to destination could also be justified based on current thinking.
Previously, twins couldn’t operate across the North Atlantic, these days traffic is almost all twin because the rules changed.
Given the criticism of continuing to Perth as SLF I'm left wondering what might have been done differently had the take off Geraldton been made in the minimum permitted weather criteria, here I assume the landing minima at Geraldton is above the take off minima.
Continue to Perth would seem to be the only option in that case.
Gliding range? When did that ever become a consideration in twin RPT operations? Report written by amateurs looking to stick a knife where ever they can is what I take away, write the report with respect to the rules as written.
Continue to Perth would seem to be the only option in that case.
Gliding range? When did that ever become a consideration in twin RPT operations? Report written by amateurs looking to stick a knife where ever they can is what I take away, write the report with respect to the rules as written.