Airservices Australia climbs down on red-tape hurdle
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Airservices Australia climbs down on red-tape hurdle
Nocookies | The Australian
The Australian12:00AM December 29, 2017
The Australian12:00AM December 29, 2017
Airservices Australia climbs down on red-tape hurdle
The nation’s air traffic regulator has been forced into an embarrassing backdown after it announced more than 2000 airstrips and helipads nationwide — including those connected to more than 140 hospitals — would be wiped from the map if they did not clear a looming red-tape hurdle.
Airservices Australia in September announced the “operator” of every airport, airstrip and helipad nationwide must nominate an “aeronautical data originator”, or ADO, a person that would provide it with regular updates of the location and contact details of each facility.
The regulator said if operators failed to comply by January 4, it would move to “remove any reference to any remaining (airstrips and helipads) without a registered ADO” from all aeronautical information products.
Airservices Australia said it had undertaken “best efforts” to “identify ADOs” for more than 2000 airstrips and helipads but had “now exhausted all reasonable avenues of inquiry in relation to the identification of the remaining ADOs”.
This was despite the list of 2000-plus facilities including the Sydney Children’s Hospital, the Royal Perth Hospital, the Sea World theme park on the Gold Coast and facilities owned and operated by the Royal Australian Navy and Queensland Police.
Airservices Australia declined to comment when asked why it had announced the 2000-plus locations would be wiped from the map, why operators were required to regularly update the location of airstrips and airports when by nature they don’t move, and why it had been unable to contact major hospitals, the Navy or Queensland Police.
In a statement yesterday, the government body said the September “aeronautical information circular” had been removed as it “required improvement, and further context was required to explain (its) intent”.
Airservices Australia issued a replacement circular on December 19 reversing its dictum that all non-compliant facilities would be wiped from the map following an industry outcry.
Airservices Australia operates under chief executive Jason Harfield and answers to federal Transport Minister Barnaby Joyce, who replaced Darren Chester in a ministerial reshuffle this month.
Veteran pilot Bill Hamilton, who lobbied against the removal of airstrips and helipads from pilot resources, said the case was a classic example of the aviation regulator prioritising “box ticking” and bureaucracy over common sense and, ultimately, safety.
“It takes a particular brand of brain-dead bureaucrat to decide the best way to improve safety is to get rid of the (location details) of almost every aeronautical approach in the country,” Mr Hamilton said yesterday. “And to say they couldn’t contact the Royal Australian Navy — I know it’s not all that big, but nevertheless it’s not all that small that it’s invisible.”
Aviation Australia and the Civil Aviation and Safety Authority are facing criticism for over-regulating the sector to the point where civil aviation is in decline and many flight schools have been forced to close their doors.
In its updated circular, Airservices Australia said the September announcement had been aimed at “improving the integrity of the data*base” of airstrip and helipad operators. It made no reference to any facilities being removed from the map, or to its failed efforts to contact the operators.
The nation’s air traffic regulator has been forced into an embarrassing backdown after it announced more than 2000 airstrips and helipads nationwide — including those connected to more than 140 hospitals — would be wiped from the map if they did not clear a looming red-tape hurdle.
Airservices Australia in September announced the “operator” of every airport, airstrip and helipad nationwide must nominate an “aeronautical data originator”, or ADO, a person that would provide it with regular updates of the location and contact details of each facility.
The regulator said if operators failed to comply by January 4, it would move to “remove any reference to any remaining (airstrips and helipads) without a registered ADO” from all aeronautical information products.
Airservices Australia said it had undertaken “best efforts” to “identify ADOs” for more than 2000 airstrips and helipads but had “now exhausted all reasonable avenues of inquiry in relation to the identification of the remaining ADOs”.
This was despite the list of 2000-plus facilities including the Sydney Children’s Hospital, the Royal Perth Hospital, the Sea World theme park on the Gold Coast and facilities owned and operated by the Royal Australian Navy and Queensland Police.
Airservices Australia declined to comment when asked why it had announced the 2000-plus locations would be wiped from the map, why operators were required to regularly update the location of airstrips and airports when by nature they don’t move, and why it had been unable to contact major hospitals, the Navy or Queensland Police.
In a statement yesterday, the government body said the September “aeronautical information circular” had been removed as it “required improvement, and further context was required to explain (its) intent”.
Airservices Australia issued a replacement circular on December 19 reversing its dictum that all non-compliant facilities would be wiped from the map following an industry outcry.
Airservices Australia operates under chief executive Jason Harfield and answers to federal Transport Minister Barnaby Joyce, who replaced Darren Chester in a ministerial reshuffle this month.
Veteran pilot Bill Hamilton, who lobbied against the removal of airstrips and helipads from pilot resources, said the case was a classic example of the aviation regulator prioritising “box ticking” and bureaucracy over common sense and, ultimately, safety.
“It takes a particular brand of brain-dead bureaucrat to decide the best way to improve safety is to get rid of the (location details) of almost every aeronautical approach in the country,” Mr Hamilton said yesterday. “And to say they couldn’t contact the Royal Australian Navy — I know it’s not all that big, but nevertheless it’s not all that small that it’s invisible.”
Aviation Australia and the Civil Aviation and Safety Authority are facing criticism for over-regulating the sector to the point where civil aviation is in decline and many flight schools have been forced to close their doors.
In its updated circular, Airservices Australia said the September announcement had been aimed at “improving the integrity of the data*base” of airstrip and helipad operators. It made no reference to any facilities being removed from the map, or to its failed efforts to contact the operators.
I wonder when the required exemptions from Part 175 were/will be issued. Remember, the dilemma for Airservices was created by this:
Remember also that Part 175 still has these effects, absent exemptions:
An aerodrome operator must appoint a single senior manager within its organisation as the AIP responsible person for the organisation. If it does not, it commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
If the person the organisation appoints does not have knowledge and competence to carry out the responsibilities of an AIP responsible person, the organisation commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
Equivalent requirements and offences apply to the organisation’s NOTAM authorised person, if it has one.
The organisation must provide Airservices with the name of the AIP responsible person (and the organisation’s NOTAM authorised person, if it has one) and notify Airservices of any changes. If the organisation does not do so, it commits a strict liability criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
The organisation commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units if it does not notify Airservices of the need to change aeronautical information, as soon as practicable after the organisation becomes aware of the need.
The data or information the organisation provides must be in accordance with specifications Airservices gives the organisation, or the organisation commits a strict liability criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
Here are some other examples of ‘safety’ rules in action:
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. 367 days later the organisation has yet to do a review of that information. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the organisation does a review of that information, but does not record the fact that the review happened, or its results. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the organisation does a review of that information, and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the review happened and its results. During the second year the organisation does a second review and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the second review happened and its results, but throws the record of the first review in the bin. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
Neither Airservices nor aerodrome data originators have any choice in this, absent exemptions from Part 175.
175.140 AIS providers—aerodromes not covered by Part 139—removal of references in AIP
(1) This regulation applies if an AIS provider becomes aware of an aeronautical data originator:
(a) who is responsible for aeronautical data or aeronautical information about an aerodrome that is not:
(i) a certified aerodrome; or
(ii) a registered aerodrome; or
(iii) an aerodrome to which Subpart 139.D applies; and
(b) who has not complied with Subpart 175.D in relation to the aerodrome.
(2) The provider must remove any references to the aerodrome that the provider has published in the AIP from the AIP when the AIP is next amended.
(1) This regulation applies if an AIS provider becomes aware of an aeronautical data originator:
(a) who is responsible for aeronautical data or aeronautical information about an aerodrome that is not:
(i) a certified aerodrome; or
(ii) a registered aerodrome; or
(iii) an aerodrome to which Subpart 139.D applies; and
(b) who has not complied with Subpart 175.D in relation to the aerodrome.
(2) The provider must remove any references to the aerodrome that the provider has published in the AIP from the AIP when the AIP is next amended.
An aerodrome operator must appoint a single senior manager within its organisation as the AIP responsible person for the organisation. If it does not, it commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
If the person the organisation appoints does not have knowledge and competence to carry out the responsibilities of an AIP responsible person, the organisation commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
Equivalent requirements and offences apply to the organisation’s NOTAM authorised person, if it has one.
The organisation must provide Airservices with the name of the AIP responsible person (and the organisation’s NOTAM authorised person, if it has one) and notify Airservices of any changes. If the organisation does not do so, it commits a strict liability criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
The organisation commits a criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units if it does not notify Airservices of the need to change aeronautical information, as soon as practicable after the organisation becomes aware of the need.
The data or information the organisation provides must be in accordance with specifications Airservices gives the organisation, or the organisation commits a strict liability criminal offence carrying a penalty of 50 penalty units.
Here are some other examples of ‘safety’ rules in action:
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. 367 days later the organisation has yet to do a review of that information. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the organisation does a review of that information, but does not record the fact that the review happened, or its results. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. During the following year the organisation does a review of that information, and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the review happened and its results. During the second year the organisation does a second review and makes and keeps a record of the fact that the second review happened and its results, but throws the record of the first review in the bin. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
Neither Airservices nor aerodrome data originators have any choice in this, absent exemptions from Part 175.
LB, spot on!
I also think there are strict liability provisions in Part175 that make it a criminal offence for Airservices to publish the data without having a responsible person nominated??
I also think there are strict liability provisions in Part175 that make it a criminal offence for Airservices to publish the data without having a responsible person nominated??
Gives a whole new meaning to regulatory overkill.
The list of crimes an ADO can commit is quite impressive.
It is/was probably not surprising there was no response to 80 pages worth of latitudes and longitudes.
Tootle pip!!
The list of crimes an ADO can commit is quite impressive.
It is/was probably not surprising there was no response to 80 pages worth of latitudes and longitudes.
Tootle pip!!
From Lead Balloon:
This is so "Yes Minister" that it belies belief.
A pox on all of you miserable public service pen jockies that can't even spell the word aviation let alone imagine the concept.
Actually, it is more likely to be the dim-witted CASA Directors that don't have a clue to be able to envisage what is required by the real World of aviation.
The sooner we adopt USA FAA Regulations or even EASA, the sooner we start the healing process.
Our piss-ant CASA operation can't even make a dent in coping with the quantity of aviation engineering, maintenance, airworthiness and operational procedural changes that are being pushed out by competent manufacturers and other authorities worldwide.
Trying to re-invent the regulatory process of the FAA or EASA regulations by issuing independent Australian aviation regulations is incredulous in the face of the incredible complexity and plethora of 21st Century Aviation and the advances that are happening.
You would need a workforce of 20,000 or more qualified and experienced employees to replicate that sort of talent!
Australian Commercial aviation somehow just plows on with the job in spite of CASA and poor old GA just flounders and struggles (smothered?) along in the wake somehow.
You might disagree..?
An organisation provides information and the information is published in the AIP. 367 days later the organisation has yet to do a review of that information. The organisation is a criminal, even if the published information remains complete and accurate in fact.
A pox on all of you miserable public service pen jockies that can't even spell the word aviation let alone imagine the concept.
Actually, it is more likely to be the dim-witted CASA Directors that don't have a clue to be able to envisage what is required by the real World of aviation.
The sooner we adopt USA FAA Regulations or even EASA, the sooner we start the healing process.
Our piss-ant CASA operation can't even make a dent in coping with the quantity of aviation engineering, maintenance, airworthiness and operational procedural changes that are being pushed out by competent manufacturers and other authorities worldwide.
Trying to re-invent the regulatory process of the FAA or EASA regulations by issuing independent Australian aviation regulations is incredulous in the face of the incredible complexity and plethora of 21st Century Aviation and the advances that are happening.
You would need a workforce of 20,000 or more qualified and experienced employees to replicate that sort of talent!
Australian Commercial aviation somehow just plows on with the job in spite of CASA and poor old GA just flounders and struggles (smothered?) along in the wake somehow.
You might disagree..?
Maybe that’s the plan all along! I haven’t even bothered to renew my Australian flying quals since I left Australia 2 years ago, it’s just not worth the effort anymore.
First, the obligation is not merely to nominate a POC. The ‘AIP responsible person’ must be a ‘senior manager’ within the ADO’s organisation. Do you reckon there’s a senior manager in Westmead Hospital whose job it is to confirm that the lat and long of the helipad hasn’t changed?
Secondly, failure to comply with each of the obligations is a criminal offence.
Thirdly, some of the offences are committed even if the information provided by the ADO remains accurate.
Presumably you’ll be happy to be prosecuted for failure to keep a record of your review from three years ago, even if the most recent information you provided about your aerodrome continues to be accurate?
Secondly, failure to comply with each of the obligations is a criminal offence.
Thirdly, some of the offences are committed even if the information provided by the ADO remains accurate.
Presumably you’ll be happy to be prosecuted for failure to keep a record of your review from three years ago, even if the most recent information you provided about your aerodrome continues to be accurate?
First, the obligation is not merely to nominate a POC. The ‘AIP responsible person’ must be a ‘senior manager’ within the ADO’s organisation. Do you reckon there’s a senior manager in Westmead Hospital whose job it is to confirm that the lat and long of the helipad hasn’t changed?
Secondly, failure to comply with each of the obligations is a criminal offence.
Thirdly, some of the offences are committed even if the information provided by the ADO remains accurate.
Presumably you’ll be happy to be prosecuted for failure to keep a record of your review from three years ago, even if the most recent information you provided about your aerodrome continues to be accurate?
Secondly, failure to comply with each of the obligations is a criminal offence.
Thirdly, some of the offences are committed even if the information provided by the ADO remains accurate.
Presumably you’ll be happy to be prosecuted for failure to keep a record of your review from three years ago, even if the most recent information you provided about your aerodrome continues to be accurate?
