Terrorist plot thwarted?
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See the attached news report, look closely you will see the carriers logo.
No Cookies | Daily Telegraph
No Cookies | Daily Telegraph
Everyone knows a pilot can easily kamikaze an aircraft, including CASA.
If pilots could waltz through security and get airside without being scanned, that is a very obvious hole in the system that could easily be exploited. Either the pilot carries the weapon knowingly through security before passing it on an accomplice who was scanned already and came up clean (thus allowing an atrocity to take place without having to kill oneself), or some enterprising terrorists sneak the necessary pieces into the flight bag etc and get them out again once airside - distract and switch with a similar roller bag, whatever.
I mean it's far fetched but not that far fetched.
If pilots could waltz through security and get airside without being scanned, that is a very obvious hole in the system that could easily be exploited. Either the pilot carries the weapon knowingly through security before passing it on an accomplice who was scanned already and came up clean (thus allowing an atrocity to take place without having to kill oneself), or some enterprising terrorists sneak the necessary pieces into the flight bag etc and get them out again once airside - distract and switch with a similar roller bag, whatever.
I mean it's far fetched but not that far fetched.
The issue of screening all or none (baggage handlers, engineers etc) is no doubt a cost one. One that would be resolved overnight if an attack happened via these means. It's a totally reactive system and the politicians do what they need to do to avoid spending where they can. For them it's purely about staying in power nothing more nothing less.
I've always said "you screen everyone or you screen no one."
Here's the kicker: what if the current intelligence forces don't pick up 100% of the threats? All you need is 1% to get through and it's all over red rover. In the face of this, the encrypted software needs to go.
A National ID card and DNA register would solve a lot of problems and crimes but also create a lot of problems and be a massive loss of privacy.
I don't have a problem with it as I've got nothing to hide. Having said that, I can see very much how it could become a problem (the point sunfish makes).
Pilot A has been in the industry for 15 years with an unblemished record but is related to someone who is being watched by the authorities. Now what? Ultimately being related doesn't mean you are connected (quite the opposite in some families!). There are people at the airport today that are in this very situation.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
Spare a thought for the guys at security most of which are just doing a job. It would have to be the worst job, next to parking inspector, that I I could think of.
If we want maximum protection then we have to give into the screening and the loss civil liberties. In ways you have to wonder if it's really worth it as its being pointed out that there is no 100% fool proof system.
I've always said "you screen everyone or you screen no one."
Here's the kicker: what if the current intelligence forces don't pick up 100% of the threats? All you need is 1% to get through and it's all over red rover. In the face of this, the encrypted software needs to go.
A National ID card and DNA register would solve a lot of problems and crimes but also create a lot of problems and be a massive loss of privacy.
I don't have a problem with it as I've got nothing to hide. Having said that, I can see very much how it could become a problem (the point sunfish makes).
Pilot A has been in the industry for 15 years with an unblemished record but is related to someone who is being watched by the authorities. Now what? Ultimately being related doesn't mean you are connected (quite the opposite in some families!). There are people at the airport today that are in this very situation.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
Spare a thought for the guys at security most of which are just doing a job. It would have to be the worst job, next to parking inspector, that I I could think of.
If we want maximum protection then we have to give into the screening and the loss civil liberties. In ways you have to wonder if it's really worth it as its being pointed out that there is no 100% fool proof system.
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Either I misinterpreted the sense of the comment/s prior, or the user changed their tune. If the former, I apologise. My sense of the comment was that the user was being petulant because he has to get screened and the ground-staff don't. This seems to be apparent also in AIPA's submission/s, from my perspective, in the 104 page report. It is my view that crew are public facing, and if the public are expected to be put through the ringer, then the public might want to see the crew put through the ringer too - else, the public may ask questions and start forming the opinion that if crew do not need to be screened entering sterile areas, why should they?
On the matter of screening ground-staff outside of the sterile areas -
without breaking into intrinsic detail, screening isn't going to help at all. Not unless the screening occurs at entry points to every aircraft, up top AND down below. A metal detector and X-ray check at the door MAY mitigate a tiny fraction of infringements. But that check then gets blown out of the water (rendered useless) once we're on the other side.
Based on historical occurrences and present threat levels, I just think money would be better spend on the dog & handler solution and giving increased jurisdiction for them that extends to airplanes, up and down, if it doesn't already. This to me would better meet requirements and act as an adequate deterrent for those harbouring ill intent.
Some dirty big German Shepherds and a few Beagles should do the trick.
On the matter of screening ground-staff outside of the sterile areas -
without breaking into intrinsic detail, screening isn't going to help at all. Not unless the screening occurs at entry points to every aircraft, up top AND down below. A metal detector and X-ray check at the door MAY mitigate a tiny fraction of infringements. But that check then gets blown out of the water (rendered useless) once we're on the other side.
Based on historical occurrences and present threat levels, I just think money would be better spend on the dog & handler solution and giving increased jurisdiction for them that extends to airplanes, up and down, if it doesn't already. This to me would better meet requirements and act as an adequate deterrent for those harbouring ill intent.
Some dirty big German Shepherds and a few Beagles should do the trick.
my point is that everyone who goes airside has to get an ASIC, but that the screening process for a lot of these people leaves a lot to be desired, as shown by the stats quoted by others here that eg. lots of baggage handlers have convictions for drug trafficking. To me it beggars belief that anyone can have a conviction for drug trafficking offences and still get an ASIC to work as a baggage handler. I don't think expressing that view is being pretentious or petulant. I think most members of the public, who endure security screening and see flight crew doing the same, would assume that all airside workers have to go thru the same screening and would be amazed that this isn't so.
my point is that everyone who goes airside has to get an ASIC,
Good point. How many countries have no equivalent to the ASIC?
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I don't disagree with the reasoning at all - it is valid. It was more the tone of the expression but I don't want to digress, so I'll leave it there.
Suffice to say - we've been bleating on for years about questionable characters being dragged in off the street and brought into the aviation domain. It is too bad we're in a public forum, because I'm sure you and I can beat a story or two about ASIC's. I know I can, and I can give examples that reflect a broken system.
I reiterate one of my initial posts in that company recruiting and ASIC issuance standards should be brought into question and if the government are hell bent on spending money then they can come up with something better than the ineffective would-be strategy of screening ground staff at the doors.
Suffice to say - we've been bleating on for years about questionable characters being dragged in off the street and brought into the aviation domain. It is too bad we're in a public forum, because I'm sure you and I can beat a story or two about ASIC's. I know I can, and I can give examples that reflect a broken system.
I reiterate one of my initial posts in that company recruiting and ASIC issuance standards should be brought into question and if the government are hell bent on spending money then they can come up with something better than the ineffective would-be strategy of screening ground staff at the doors.
Berealgetreal:
My dear Sir, I think you are just a tad naive.
"ultimately being related doesn't mean connected". I'm afraid it does in the eyes of the law. If you have a criminal acquaintance, and you have a clearance of some sort, any communication of any type with them must be reported.
What happens next can be "sorry son, we are removing you from operations, nothing personal against you but we cannot take the chance, etc." It is important to understand that such a decision is not arguable, appealable or subject to review because its 'operational". Your career is now in tatters. This threat has already been made to a relative.
Under such a scheme there will be no moslem pilots in Australia and no pilots with moslem friends or relations.
To put that another way; can't you just see the newspapers screaming: "Pilot of crashed aircraft knew Imam!".
As for encryption breaking - also a waste of time because you assume that 100% of communications will be scanned, which they won't and effectiveness isn't going to be 100% either.
What you don't understand as well is that the authorities are incapable of differentiating between a business related comment: "I'd like to put a bomb under Qantas" - meaning the speaker doesn't like their business model or customer service received but has no intention of violence, and someone with real terrorist intent. Furthermore the authorities are quite likely to confuse the two different intents when it suits them.
Pilot A has been in the industry for 15 years with an unblemished record but is related to someone who is being watched by the authorities. Now what? Ultimately being related doesn't mean you are connected (quite the opposite in some families!). There are people at the airport today that are in this very situation.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
"ultimately being related doesn't mean connected". I'm afraid it does in the eyes of the law. If you have a criminal acquaintance, and you have a clearance of some sort, any communication of any type with them must be reported.
What happens next can be "sorry son, we are removing you from operations, nothing personal against you but we cannot take the chance, etc." It is important to understand that such a decision is not arguable, appealable or subject to review because its 'operational". Your career is now in tatters. This threat has already been made to a relative.
Under such a scheme there will be no moslem pilots in Australia and no pilots with moslem friends or relations.
To put that another way; can't you just see the newspapers screaming: "Pilot of crashed aircraft knew Imam!".
As for encryption breaking - also a waste of time because you assume that 100% of communications will be scanned, which they won't and effectiveness isn't going to be 100% either.
What you don't understand as well is that the authorities are incapable of differentiating between a business related comment: "I'd like to put a bomb under Qantas" - meaning the speaker doesn't like their business model or customer service received but has no intention of violence, and someone with real terrorist intent. Furthermore the authorities are quite likely to confuse the two different intents when it suits them.
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The issue of screening all or none (baggage handlers, engineers etc) is no doubt a cost one. One that would be resolved overnight if an attack happened via these means. It's a totally reactive system and the politicians do what they need to do to avoid spending where they can. For them it's purely about staying in power nothing more nothing less.
I've always said "you screen everyone or you screen no one."
Here's the kicker: what if the current intelligence forces don't pick up 100% of the threats? All you need is 1% to get through and it's all over red rover. In the face of this, the encrypted software needs to go.
A National ID card and DNA register would solve a lot of problems and crimes but also create a lot of problems and be a massive loss of privacy.
I don't have a problem with it as I've got nothing to hide. Having said that, I can see very much how it could become a problem (the point sunfish makes).
Pilot A has been in the industry for 15 years with an unblemished record but is related to someone who is being watched by the authorities. Now what? Ultimately being related doesn't mean you are connected (quite the opposite in some families!). There are people at the airport today that are in this very situation.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
Spare a thought for the guys at security most of which are just doing a job. It would have to be the worst job, next to parking inspector, that I I could think of.
If we want maximum protection then we have to give into the screening and the loss civil liberties. In ways you have to wonder if it's really worth it as its being pointed out that there is no 100% fool proof system.
I've always said "you screen everyone or you screen no one."
Here's the kicker: what if the current intelligence forces don't pick up 100% of the threats? All you need is 1% to get through and it's all over red rover. In the face of this, the encrypted software needs to go.
A National ID card and DNA register would solve a lot of problems and crimes but also create a lot of problems and be a massive loss of privacy.
I don't have a problem with it as I've got nothing to hide. Having said that, I can see very much how it could become a problem (the point sunfish makes).
Pilot A has been in the industry for 15 years with an unblemished record but is related to someone who is being watched by the authorities. Now what? Ultimately being related doesn't mean you are connected (quite the opposite in some families!). There are people at the airport today that are in this very situation.
I think the encryption issue is probably the quickest least expensive way to trap most of the problems and the government to its credit is trying on this front.
Spare a thought for the guys at security most of which are just doing a job. It would have to be the worst job, next to parking inspector, that I I could think of.
If we want maximum protection then we have to give into the screening and the loss civil liberties. In ways you have to wonder if it's really worth it as its being pointed out that there is no 100% fool proof system.
Yes, it's possible we could all be safer with cameras in every room of the house and no encryption. After all, what have the good guys to hide?
But Benjamin Franklin's famous quote resounds quite clearly in the current climate:
Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.
If we want maximum protection then...
And from what? How many aircraft are exploding in the skies?
And at what cost?
A threat has just been thwarted, the system appears to be working.
If terrorism wasn't so dramatic that it constantly occupies front page news, we might be able to get on with dealing with the real threats to our society, such as suicide, domestic violence, crystal meth and the road toll.
I still feel safer in my cockpit than driving to work.
With regards to the encryption argument, if we let the good guys monitor our communication, then we let the bad guys do it too. That would backfire on us big time.
Bad Guy: "Hey, Fred, thanks to the Governments encryption back-door, I have hacked your teenage daughter's phone and I found a photo of her masturbating naked. It'll go on the internet tomorrow, unless of course I can borrow your ASIC for a couple of days..."
Fred: "Here's my ASIC..."
We all have something to hide.
Terrorist plot solved by the labor party. We can get back to other programming now...
"...Labor's Sandra Nelson, the Northern Territory Assistant Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence, sneers that the arrest of four Sydney men over an alleged plot to bring down an airplane could be a political stunt: “Polling for LNP not good. Therefore we now have a ‘terrorist attack’. How convenient..."
No Cookies | Herald Sun
.
"...Labor's Sandra Nelson, the Northern Territory Assistant Minister for the Prevention of Family Violence, sneers that the arrest of four Sydney men over an alleged plot to bring down an airplane could be a political stunt: “Polling for LNP not good. Therefore we now have a ‘terrorist attack’. How convenient..."
No Cookies | Herald Sun
.
I don't disagree with the reasoning at all - it is valid. It was more the tone of the expression but I don't want to digress, so I'll leave it there.
Suffice to say - we've been bleating on for years about questionable characters being dragged in off the street and brought into the aviation domain. It is too bad we're in a public forum, because I'm sure you and I can beat a story or two about ASIC's. I know I can, and I can give examples that reflect a broken system.
I reiterate one of my initial posts in that company recruiting and ASIC issuance standards should be brought into question and if the government are hell bent on spending money then they can come up with something better than the ineffective would-be strategy of screening ground staff at the doors.
Suffice to say - we've been bleating on for years about questionable characters being dragged in off the street and brought into the aviation domain. It is too bad we're in a public forum, because I'm sure you and I can beat a story or two about ASIC's. I know I can, and I can give examples that reflect a broken system.
I reiterate one of my initial posts in that company recruiting and ASIC issuance standards should be brought into question and if the government are hell bent on spending money then they can come up with something better than the ineffective would-be strategy of screening ground staff at the doors.
my point is that everyone who goes airside has to get an ASIC, but that the screening process for a lot of these people leaves a lot to be desired, as shown by the stats quoted by others here that eg. lots of baggage handlers have convictions for drug trafficking. To me it beggars belief that anyone can have a conviction for drug trafficking offences and still get an ASIC to work as a baggage handler. I don't think expressing that view is being pretentious or petulant. I think most members of the public, who endure security screening and see flight crew doing the same, would assume that all airside workers have to go thru the same screening and would be amazed that this isn't so.
However, I've always been of the opinion and always will be that there should be a threshold level of record over which you NEVER get employed in the industry or get an ASIC.
People can bleat all they like about civil rights (of which I am a strong proponent) but this industry is just too sensitive and open to causing mass casualty that if you do something criminal in your life, you cancel your 'ticket' so to speak as regards getting a job in the industry or anything connected directly to it.
I don't know if it still happens but the system used to take SO long to get an ASIC that people were working sensitive areas for months before they were found to be ineligible. Using Visitor Passes and Temp IDs is a joke because you're expecting a person who is 'escorting' them to take on a massive responsibility.
I'm surprised one of the newspapers hasn't exposed security for what it is by smuggling a reporter airside in a catering truck or something similar. Happened in the UK and security was tightened overnight.
As someone who is potentially at risk if one of these nutters succeeds, i feel that I am at least entitled to express an opinion.
If we took a step back and looked at the bigger, broader picture, which is what is killing our friends, loved ones etc, the answer isnt religious based terrorism, it isnt driving half a km/hr over the speed limit, it isnt a whole bunch of things that we regularly throw money at.
It is cancer, it is heart disease, it is suicide and mental health issues, negative health outcomes caused by the medical profession just to name a few.
I reckon we would get more value for money trying to save more people rather than spending on airport security theatre, "every k kills" bull**** ad campaigns amd other such populist nonsense.
By all means have an effective security apparatus at the airport, an effective surveillance and intelligence capability to stop nutters from doing stuff, but lets focus our efforts where we can really save lives.
After all this all ramped up after 9/11, a tragic event that needlessly took the lives of 3-4000 people (sorry cant remember the correct number) but taking a broader, less emotional view, only 3-4000 people, compared to the millions killed by the other causes.
If we invest in cancer research, in research into heart disease, in research into mental health and suicide prevention, we will save far more people than we have by throwing dollar after dollar into the pocket of people whose only incentive is trade on our fear, and the fear of our politicians, when they recommend tighter and stricter security measures at airports etc.
On a per head saved basis, the investment in aviation security in particular, would not pass the pub test if it were relabelled and presented to the general public for review.
If we took a step back and looked at the bigger, broader picture, which is what is killing our friends, loved ones etc, the answer isnt religious based terrorism, it isnt driving half a km/hr over the speed limit, it isnt a whole bunch of things that we regularly throw money at.
It is cancer, it is heart disease, it is suicide and mental health issues, negative health outcomes caused by the medical profession just to name a few.
I reckon we would get more value for money trying to save more people rather than spending on airport security theatre, "every k kills" bull**** ad campaigns amd other such populist nonsense.
By all means have an effective security apparatus at the airport, an effective surveillance and intelligence capability to stop nutters from doing stuff, but lets focus our efforts where we can really save lives.
After all this all ramped up after 9/11, a tragic event that needlessly took the lives of 3-4000 people (sorry cant remember the correct number) but taking a broader, less emotional view, only 3-4000 people, compared to the millions killed by the other causes.
If we invest in cancer research, in research into heart disease, in research into mental health and suicide prevention, we will save far more people than we have by throwing dollar after dollar into the pocket of people whose only incentive is trade on our fear, and the fear of our politicians, when they recommend tighter and stricter security measures at airports etc.
On a per head saved basis, the investment in aviation security in particular, would not pass the pub test if it were relabelled and presented to the general public for review.
"An effective ASIC system???????? Anyone remember the poor housewife who finally got an airline job, only to have her ASIC approval rejected because she stuffed up her welfare payment some time before and got prosecuted? Not having a million dollars to defend herself she had pleaded guilty.
Go and look at the AAT decisions database and search with"aviation security" look at the poor saps who lost their licence or were denied an ASIC anda job for no good reason.
Go and look at the AAT decisions database and search with"aviation security" look at the poor saps who lost their licence or were denied an ASIC anda job for no good reason.
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"An effective ASIC system???????? Anyone remember the poor housewife who finally got an airline job, only to have her ASIC approval rejected because she stuffed up her welfare payment some time before and got prosecuted? Not having a million dollars to defend herself she had pleaded guilty.
Go and look at the AAT decisions database and search with"aviation security" look at the poor saps who lost their licence or were denied an ASIC anda job for no good reason.
Go and look at the AAT decisions database and search with"aviation security" look at the poor saps who lost their licence or were denied an ASIC anda job for no good reason.
I get what you're saying Sunfish, but do want to risk guys like this around aircraft again?
IsDon:
Given that Khazal was on a watch list already, why would updated screening produce a better result?
I am concerned that many pilots are falling for the tabloid newspaper philosophy that generates hysteria in the general public and does not account either for the cost of security measures, their efficiency or their unintended consequences.
Examples:
A drunken New Years Eve kiss to a female police officer can get you branded as a registered sex offender for life.
A drunken brawl at a pub (your fault or not) and a conviction for assault means you are never getting an ASIC and can kiss an aviation career goodbye.
Then there was the aforementioned lass who found an aviation job, but a Centrelink overpayment turned into a crime of dishonesty, so no ASIC.
Now of course there is the entire "domestic violence" feminist push that could potentially see you convicted without even the possibility of cross examining the accuser and with the onus of proof reversed.
Ask yourself if you really want to trust your employment to faceless bureaucrats with arbitrary powers.
Oh! And Khazal is still appealing.....
[QUOTE]On 25 September 2009 the Supreme Court of New South Wales sentenced Bilal Khazal to 14 years in prison, with a non-parole period of 9 years, for producing a book whilst knowing it was connected with assisting a terrorist attack that would happen in Australia. In 2011 the conviction was overturned[1] and Khazal was granted bail by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Sydney on 7 June 2011, after spending nearly three years in jail. Mr Khazal's barrister, Charles Waterstreet, said that his jail conditions had been "just one step down from Guantánamo Bay".[citation needed] The Australian Commonwealth appealed to the High Court of Australia which in August 2012 unanimously overturned the earlier dismissal and Khazal's bail was revoked by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. That court is yet to hear an appeal against his original sentence./QUOTE]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bilal_Khazal
I get what you're saying Sunfish, but do want to risk guys like this around aircraft again?
I get what you're saying Sunfish, but do want to risk guys like this around aircraft again?
I am concerned that many pilots are falling for the tabloid newspaper philosophy that generates hysteria in the general public and does not account either for the cost of security measures, their efficiency or their unintended consequences.
Examples:
A drunken New Years Eve kiss to a female police officer can get you branded as a registered sex offender for life.
A drunken brawl at a pub (your fault or not) and a conviction for assault means you are never getting an ASIC and can kiss an aviation career goodbye.
Then there was the aforementioned lass who found an aviation job, but a Centrelink overpayment turned into a crime of dishonesty, so no ASIC.
Now of course there is the entire "domestic violence" feminist push that could potentially see you convicted without even the possibility of cross examining the accuser and with the onus of proof reversed.
Ask yourself if you really want to trust your employment to faceless bureaucrats with arbitrary powers.
Oh! And Khazal is still appealing.....
[QUOTE]On 25 September 2009 the Supreme Court of New South Wales sentenced Bilal Khazal to 14 years in prison, with a non-parole period of 9 years, for producing a book whilst knowing it was connected with assisting a terrorist attack that would happen in Australia. In 2011 the conviction was overturned[1] and Khazal was granted bail by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Sydney on 7 June 2011, after spending nearly three years in jail. Mr Khazal's barrister, Charles Waterstreet, said that his jail conditions had been "just one step down from Guantánamo Bay".[citation needed] The Australian Commonwealth appealed to the High Court of Australia which in August 2012 unanimously overturned the earlier dismissal and Khazal's bail was revoked by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. That court is yet to hear an appeal against his original sentence./QUOTE]
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[quote=Sunfish;9849493]IsDon:
Given that Khazal was on a watch list already, why would updated screening produce a better result?
I am concerned that many pilots are falling for the tabloid newspaper philosophy that generates hysteria in the general public and does not account either for the cost of security measures, their efficiency or their unintended consequences.
Examples:
A drunken New Years Eve kiss to a female police officer can get you branded as a registered sex offender for life.
A drunken brawl at a pub (your fault or not) and a conviction for assault means you are never getting an ASIC and can kiss an aviation career goodbye.
Then there was the aforementioned lass who found an aviation job, but a Centrelink overpayment turned into a crime of dishonesty, so no ASIC.
Now of course there is the entire "domestic violence" feminist push that could potentially see you convicted without even the possibility of cross examining the accuser and with the onus of proof reversed.
Ask yourself if you really want to trust your employment to faceless bureaucrats with arbitrary powers.
Oh! And Khazal is still appealing.....
I really don't get your point. Are you saying there shouldn't be any background checks because these checks are of little practical value and they might exclude someone who is not a threat? Presumably then anyone can work airside?
Are you just taking the piss?
The theatre that is airport screening of passengers and crew is a bureaucratic joke I'll grant you that. Especially once you consider that a large proportion of airside workers can just walk through a turnstile with the most rudimentary of security checks, or none at all. If this is your point I agree with you completely.
Behind the scenes checks of all operational and airside working staff is still important however. I don't want the likes of Kahzal anywhere near my aeroplane. Loading it, fuelling it, catering it, being a passenger in it, sitting in a tinny off the extended centreline of 16R with an RPG or waving at it from his backyard in Lakemba. If ASICs are what is required then so be it.
The real heavy lifting keeping our skies free from terrorism is not done by the security numbskulls at our airports. It's done by the invisible agencies using intelligence gained locally, and in collaboration with our international equivalents that have the greatest impact. You want bang for your buck, then spend it here. Not on white elephant full body scanners.
Given that Khazal was on a watch list already, why would updated screening produce a better result?
I am concerned that many pilots are falling for the tabloid newspaper philosophy that generates hysteria in the general public and does not account either for the cost of security measures, their efficiency or their unintended consequences.
Examples:
A drunken New Years Eve kiss to a female police officer can get you branded as a registered sex offender for life.
A drunken brawl at a pub (your fault or not) and a conviction for assault means you are never getting an ASIC and can kiss an aviation career goodbye.
Then there was the aforementioned lass who found an aviation job, but a Centrelink overpayment turned into a crime of dishonesty, so no ASIC.
Now of course there is the entire "domestic violence" feminist push that could potentially see you convicted without even the possibility of cross examining the accuser and with the onus of proof reversed.
Ask yourself if you really want to trust your employment to faceless bureaucrats with arbitrary powers.
Oh! And Khazal is still appealing.....
On 25 September 2009 the Supreme Court of New South Wales sentenced Bilal Khazal to 14 years in prison, with a non-parole period of 9 years, for producing a book whilst knowing it was connected with assisting a terrorist attack that would happen in Australia. In 2011 the conviction was overturned[1] and Khazal was granted bail by the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Sydney on 7 June 2011, after spending nearly three years in jail. Mr Khazal's barrister, Charles Waterstreet, said that his jail conditions had been "just one step down from Guantánamo Bay".[citation needed] The Australian Commonwealth appealed to the High Court of Australia which in August 2012 unanimously overturned the earlier dismissal and Khazal's bail was revoked by the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. That court is yet to hear an appeal against his original sentence./QUOTE]
Are you just taking the piss?
The theatre that is airport screening of passengers and crew is a bureaucratic joke I'll grant you that. Especially once you consider that a large proportion of airside workers can just walk through a turnstile with the most rudimentary of security checks, or none at all. If this is your point I agree with you completely.
Behind the scenes checks of all operational and airside working staff is still important however. I don't want the likes of Kahzal anywhere near my aeroplane. Loading it, fuelling it, catering it, being a passenger in it, sitting in a tinny off the extended centreline of 16R with an RPG or waving at it from his backyard in Lakemba. If ASICs are what is required then so be it.
The real heavy lifting keeping our skies free from terrorism is not done by the security numbskulls at our airports. It's done by the invisible agencies using intelligence gained locally, and in collaboration with our international equivalents that have the greatest impact. You want bang for your buck, then spend it here. Not on white elephant full body scanners.