The way we were - Ansett, TAA, Qantas
one day back then when I was working at Essendon an RAAF VIP Viscount was there and the Commander (or whatever he was called) was worried about a prop leak, I was sent over to check it. I could not see any problem but the Commander wanted assurance it was safe to fly back to Canberra
He always was a bit twitchy about oil leaks from props. Methinks he read too many scary flight safety magazines
The RAAF VIP Squadron had two Viscount 832's. The furnishings were beautiful - sheer luxury. Many times after dropping off the VIP we would return empty to Canberra and I would let the co-pilot fly from the left seat all by himself up front, while I relaxed in the Prime Minister's chair and read the newspapers down the back in luxury interrupted only by the pretty RAAF stewardess bringing me the coffee, cake and sticky buns left over from the VIP meal. In those days, rank had its privileges with I a Flight Lieutenant and the co-pilot a mere Pilot Officer.. Hence I had first choice of the cakes.
RAAF pilots underwent the Ansett ground engineering course at Essendon. The Dart engine lecturer (I forget his name) was a superb lecturer with such a keen sense of humour. On the other hand, three days on the autopilot was too much for me. Back at Canberra, Squadron Leader John Radford did my endorsement on the RAAF Viscount. Lots of circuits and landings including touch and go's. During one of the circuits John wanted to show me how much drag was caused by the props at idle.
We turned base for 35 and he told me to close all four throttles when I was sure of getting in - just like we did on Tiger Moths. I waited on level base leg until I reckon I could make it then closed the throttles. Had to dive to maintain the required threshold speed and it was soon obvious I had badly underestimated the effect of drag with throttles closed. Good lesson learned.
After the Winton crash where a fire in blower system burned through the wing as Ken May (?) the captain tried to reach Winton, I was determined the safest thing was to get into an emergency descent asap if we ever struck a similar problem. It might mean a forced landing or even a ditching if over water but the danger of a fire burning through a wing was scary. That glide approach into Canberra was a good example how quickly you could descend.
The Viscount Ansett performance course at Essendon run by Roger Gabriel the Ansett senior performance engineer in 1965, was top class and it was from listening to his lectures on take off performance that generated my career long interest in aircraft performance. Later in 1969 I attended the TAA F27 performance course at Essendon run by Peter Turner - another fine performance engineer. On one of his lectures he demonstrated the low gradient of climb of the DC9 on one engine after lift off with engine failure at V1. He did this by using a roll of toilet paper with the net flight path superimposed on it with the Brisbane Storey Bridge at one end and Eagle Farm airport on the other. Now a roll of toilet paper goes a long way and so did the DC9 flight path.
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Hey that could have been Centaurus! He always was a bit twitchy about oil leaks from props. Methinks he read too many scary flight safety magazines
The ONLY time I ever worked at Canberra Airport was way back then, went up there from Essendon one night to change a generator on a Viscount, I did not know before I went that Ansett had no hangar there, at the time anyway, one of the coldest nights of my Life.
Centaurus.
Captain of the ill fated Viscount Was Capt. Ken Cooper.
The F/O was John Gillam.
I joined Ansett -ANA in Jan 64 and John was on the same DC3 course but was employed by Ansett-MAL ( New Guinea ) , he did not have enough experience to join Ansett-ANA. He worked in New Guniea for a while to get enough experience and was then able to join Ansett_ANA . He was delighted to be on the Viscount and he used to say how nice the V832 was . What a tragedy it ended for him the way it did. He worked so hard to come back to OZ.
Life can deal some cruel cards at times.
The F/O was John Gillam.
I joined Ansett -ANA in Jan 64 and John was on the same DC3 course but was employed by Ansett-MAL ( New Guinea ) , he did not have enough experience to join Ansett-ANA. He worked in New Guniea for a while to get enough experience and was then able to join Ansett_ANA . He was delighted to be on the Viscount and he used to say how nice the V832 was . What a tragedy it ended for him the way it did. He worked so hard to come back to OZ.
Life can deal some cruel cards at times.
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As I said earlier on this thread, one of the saddest days in my Life when we heard about VH-RMI. 
I was working in the Ansett Aircraft Overhaul Hangar at Essendon at the time, we were doing a complete overhaul on one of its sister Viscounts, after the loss of RMI so many people (experts) from all over came to investigate the Viscount we had in pieces.
I had doubts then as did many others working there that it was the cabin blower that caused the loss of RMI, just they could not find anything else. Very poor design really, there was no fire protection in that area at all.
Nothing really changed after that either, just to make sure the drain plug on the blowers was in the correct place.
I was working in the Ansett Aircraft Overhaul Hangar at Essendon at the time, we were doing a complete overhaul on one of its sister Viscounts, after the loss of RMI so many people (experts) from all over came to investigate the Viscount we had in pieces.
I had doubts then as did many others working there that it was the cabin blower that caused the loss of RMI, just they could not find anything else. Very poor design really, there was no fire protection in that area at all.
Nothing really changed after that either, just to make sure the drain plug on the blowers was in the correct place.
Nothing really changed after that either,
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Well it did - sort of
Okay you got a pretty light but there was still NO way of putting out a fire in that area.
I can't agree with you that NOTHING changed after the RMI accident - subsequently there was a very real awareness amongst Ansett crews (at the very least) that if the cabin blower overheat light came on you only had a very limited amount of time to get on the ground.
Again, I can't quite agree. From my admittedly highly fallible memory of the report into the Winton accident (I'd be happy to be corrected here), the crew initiated an emergency descent on the basis of a visible fire and that then they were unable to feather the engine (control runs had burnt through). If they ever had an engine fire warning it came much later (the fire started behind the area of the fire detecting loops), and because they didn't have what you damningly call the "pretty light" by the time they were aware they had a problem they were (very sadly) probably already doomed.
When I said nothing really changed I meant that would have prevented the loss of RMI. 
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Well sorry, but I was there for the whole investigation, not at the crash site, but with the teams that went over our identical Viscount in Overhaul for weeks and weeks.
Even if you believe that a leak from a plug being installed in the wrong place on the blower started the fire, the main problem, and it was a design problem THAT WAS NEVER FIXED was that there was NO way of putting out a fire in that area.
I would prefer NOT to argue over such a sad and tragic loss of life, thank you.
Even if you believe that a leak from a plug being installed in the wrong place on the blower started the fire, the main problem, and it was a design problem THAT WAS NEVER FIXED was that there was NO way of putting out a fire in that area.
I would prefer NOT to argue over such a sad and tragic loss of life, thank you.
Not exactly arguing . . . more like an informed discussion between two with
specialist knowledge of the time and the circumstances. A difference of opinion might be resolved by referring to the accident report and other relevant files. That is exactly what Mac Job has made his long suit for years. Across a broad canvas. To the great benefit of those who want to know as factually and accurately as possible what went wrong.
"I would prefer NOT to argue over such a sad and tragic loss of life, thank you."
Nobody is arguing over that. The personal tragedies attending the loss of life is not the issue at all.
Just harking back a little A.S. , when you say that you had
"doubts then as did many others working there that it was the cabin blower that caused the loss of RMI, just they could not find anything else. Very poor design really, there was no fire protection in that area at all", then of course if the fire did not originate in the Rootes blower, you would have to go on to conclude that the absence of fire warning or a fire bottle to activate in that section would be immaterial, in terms of a thorough investigation. That much should be patently obvious. The matter of design inadequacies is another subject, even if co-related.
specialist knowledge of the time and the circumstances. A difference of opinion might be resolved by referring to the accident report and other relevant files. That is exactly what Mac Job has made his long suit for years. Across a broad canvas. To the great benefit of those who want to know as factually and accurately as possible what went wrong.
"I would prefer NOT to argue over such a sad and tragic loss of life, thank you."
Nobody is arguing over that. The personal tragedies attending the loss of life is not the issue at all.
Just harking back a little A.S. , when you say that you had
"doubts then as did many others working there that it was the cabin blower that caused the loss of RMI, just they could not find anything else. Very poor design really, there was no fire protection in that area at all", then of course if the fire did not originate in the Rootes blower, you would have to go on to conclude that the absence of fire warning or a fire bottle to activate in that section would be immaterial, in terms of a thorough investigation. That much should be patently obvious. The matter of design inadequacies is another subject, even if co-related.
Last edited by Fantome; 9th Feb 2014 at 08:26.
arsupport:
Despite your tendency to take over this thread and turn it into a "look at me" thread (I've really enjoyed the photos though), please don't start condescendingly lecturing me on what can/can't be discussed here.
Wherever did I start showing disrespect towards the victims of this awful accident? Having seen, on the ground, the remains of RMQ a few days after that accident - I wish I never had, the sights and smells remain with me today - I don't appreciate being told I'm being insensitive or disrespectful or unaware of the horrible realities that lie behind these accidents.
You maintain that you know more than the investigators on the basis that "...I was there for the whole investigation" - as a 20 year-old I can well imagine you were at the forefront of this - and blindly follow the line that absolutely nothing changed. I concede that crews were never given the means of extinguishing a cabin blower fire (other than shutting down the engine), but the awareness factor, both in training and with the "pretty light" indication, assuredly did change things.
There is absolutely no intended criticism of the crew of RMI here, and it's easy to say with the benefit of hindsight, but had they have had the "pretty light" indication plus the awareness of the implications of this, then they could well have acted sooner and possibly never got into the uncontrollable fire scenario - every pilot's nightmare.
Despite your tendency to take over this thread and turn it into a "look at me" thread (I've really enjoyed the photos though), please don't start condescendingly lecturing me on what can/can't be discussed here.
Wherever did I start showing disrespect towards the victims of this awful accident? Having seen, on the ground, the remains of RMQ a few days after that accident - I wish I never had, the sights and smells remain with me today - I don't appreciate being told I'm being insensitive or disrespectful or unaware of the horrible realities that lie behind these accidents.
You maintain that you know more than the investigators on the basis that "...I was there for the whole investigation" - as a 20 year-old I can well imagine you were at the forefront of this - and blindly follow the line that absolutely nothing changed. I concede that crews were never given the means of extinguishing a cabin blower fire (other than shutting down the engine), but the awareness factor, both in training and with the "pretty light" indication, assuredly did change things.
There is absolutely no intended criticism of the crew of RMI here, and it's easy to say with the benefit of hindsight, but had they have had the "pretty light" indication plus the awareness of the implications of this, then they could well have acted sooner and possibly never got into the uncontrollable fire scenario - every pilot's nightmare.
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Loss of RMI - Cause of fire
I do not wish to add to any perceived criticism of any other poster, however I noted reference to a "plug being in the wrong place" on the Rootes Blower as being the cause of the fire. My reading of the event lead me to believe that the problem was identified as being deficient maintenance during overhaul of the blower. It was found, I understood, that a loss of oil caused by the loosening of retaining nuts due to them not being lock wired precipitated the problem.
Neither fire or overheat detection, as well as fire suppression, was available in the area. The report I read indicated that by the time the crew became aware of the fire it was of such magnitude that the top spar cap had already been weakened so much that the bottom spar cap would fail under overload, as it did.
Sadly, design is not always foolproof. This loss was similar to that of the Neptune which suffered a similar fate near Richmond in 1959 when an un-contained failure of a Power Recovery Turbine occurred.
Neither fire or overheat detection, as well as fire suppression, was available in the area. The report I read indicated that by the time the crew became aware of the fire it was of such magnitude that the top spar cap had already been weakened so much that the bottom spar cap would fail under overload, as it did.
Sadly, design is not always foolproof. This loss was similar to that of the Neptune which suffered a similar fate near Richmond in 1959 when an un-contained failure of a Power Recovery Turbine occurred.
Last edited by Old Fella; 10th Feb 2014 at 00:52.
The failure of the right wing of RMQ was found to be due to the use of incorrect and excessive force.
from wiki -
The investigation determined that some years before the accident, the bush at Station 143 had been pushed upwards so the chamfer and 0.055 inch (1.40 mm) of the parallel-sided portion protruded beyond the upper surface of the boom. The exposed end of the bush was then struck with a conical tool applied to the bore. This action slightly flared the exposed end and left the external diameter 0.0038 inch (0.097 mm) oversize.[14] The bush was then pushed upwards out of the hole and re-inserted from the lower surface. As the bush was being re-inserted its flared end broached the anodised material and a small amount of aluminium from the wall of the hole. This broaching action scored the wall of the hole and left its diameter slightly oversize so the bush was not an interference fit anywhere except at its flared end. Scoring of the wall of the hole and the absence of an interference fit left the inner lower boom vulnerable to developing fatigue cracks at Station 143.[15][16]
Despite exhaustive investigation it was not possible to determine when, why, or by whom, the bush at Station 143 had been flared with a conical tool, removed and then re-inserted in the bolt hole. Investigators could not imagine circumstances in which a responsible tradesman would take these actions.[7][17]
from wiki -
The investigation determined that some years before the accident, the bush at Station 143 had been pushed upwards so the chamfer and 0.055 inch (1.40 mm) of the parallel-sided portion protruded beyond the upper surface of the boom. The exposed end of the bush was then struck with a conical tool applied to the bore. This action slightly flared the exposed end and left the external diameter 0.0038 inch (0.097 mm) oversize.[14] The bush was then pushed upwards out of the hole and re-inserted from the lower surface. As the bush was being re-inserted its flared end broached the anodised material and a small amount of aluminium from the wall of the hole. This broaching action scored the wall of the hole and left its diameter slightly oversize so the bush was not an interference fit anywhere except at its flared end. Scoring of the wall of the hole and the absence of an interference fit left the inner lower boom vulnerable to developing fatigue cracks at Station 143.[15][16]
Despite exhaustive investigation it was not possible to determine when, why, or by whom, the bush at Station 143 had been flared with a conical tool, removed and then re-inserted in the bolt hole. Investigators could not imagine circumstances in which a responsible tradesman would take these actions.[7][17]
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Loss of VH-RMI
Fantome, if your post alluded to my previous we are looking at two different accidents. Below the "Copy and Paste" from the notes of Frank Yeend, one of the Accident Investigators into the loss of VH-RMI.
"In the latter stages of the flight, the fire and smoke on the port side of the aircraft became visible from the cabin, but by this time the softening of the wing spar would have progressed to the point where a catastrophic failure was imminent.
The attachment of the No. 2 blower oil metering unit was effected by 5 threaded studs in the body of the unit upon which five castellated nuts held secure a cover plate. In turn, these castellated nuts are secured by a copper locking, wire passing through each to prevent unwanted rotation of the nuts or the studs. In the wreckage examination only one stud remained and none of the nuts, but obviously there was a strong presumption that, although there was a severe vibration set up by the blower lobe failure, the loss of the studs and nuts probably occurred because the required locking wire had not been put in place during the last overhaul of the blower".
"In the latter stages of the flight, the fire and smoke on the port side of the aircraft became visible from the cabin, but by this time the softening of the wing spar would have progressed to the point where a catastrophic failure was imminent.
The attachment of the No. 2 blower oil metering unit was effected by 5 threaded studs in the body of the unit upon which five castellated nuts held secure a cover plate. In turn, these castellated nuts are secured by a copper locking, wire passing through each to prevent unwanted rotation of the nuts or the studs. In the wreckage examination only one stud remained and none of the nuts, but obviously there was a strong presumption that, although there was a severe vibration set up by the blower lobe failure, the loss of the studs and nuts probably occurred because the required locking wire had not been put in place during the last overhaul of the blower".
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Ah yes RMQ, another sad day for Viscounts.
I was on duty at Essendon the following day, it was a public holiday, new years day I think 1969.
I had one of the others, cannot remember if it was RMO or RMP, all ready to dispatch full of pax and DCA turned up and confiscated all the logs and paper work, they never flew again.
RMO was used for fire fighting practice, RMP was overhauled by Ansett for sale to an airline in Indonesia, all painted up in blue and white colours, then DCA refused to even let it be ferried, it ended up scrapped at Essendon too.
I was on duty at Essendon the following day, it was a public holiday, new years day I think 1969.
I had one of the others, cannot remember if it was RMO or RMP, all ready to dispatch full of pax and DCA turned up and confiscated all the logs and paper work, they never flew again.
RMO was used for fire fighting practice, RMP was overhauled by Ansett for sale to an airline in Indonesia, all painted up in blue and white colours, then DCA refused to even let it be ferried, it ended up scrapped at Essendon too.
dear OF . . .. . not mixing the two up really. Just thought that the RMQ trace was apposite, as both failures, while in no way common, except for the suspicion, in the case of RMI, of also a maintenance related cause, was worth a look back. In hindsight. (now I can be accused of tautology, as well as thread drift.
The Yeend screed mentions copper lockwire. That went out with the ark.
LAME s today pale when they see any still in service.
The Yeend screed mentions copper lockwire. That went out with the ark.
LAME s today pale when they see any still in service.