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Truss: Aviation Safety Regulation Review

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Truss: Aviation Safety Regulation Review

Old 31st Dec 2013, 06:15
  #161 (permalink)  
 
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Cool Food for thought and a blast from the past for 2014??

Kharon:
Now you have become a tendentious blogger, does this act qualify you as a fully fledged member of the Ills of Society? Could the blog could end up an extension of PPRuNe?; discussing matters such the Pel Air response, (or lack thereof); the CAO 48 rumble, the CASR bun-fight or even a repository for the IOS comments on the Truss wet lettuce leaf 'review' of aviation safety regulation.
Perhaps Senator X could do a blog piece on the TASRR ToRs, I'm sure he would get plenty of comments on that contentious subject matter...

What a year it has been and let's hope that in the coming year a few more DIPs develop at least half the testicular fortitude of Senator Nick and take on the current malaise within the embuggered aviation safety bureaucracy....

Reflections '13: For reflections on the year, that has been, we only need revisit the following PPRuNe threads (links are 2013 year specific):

Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011 & current version Merged: Senate Inquiry

The Regulatory Reform Program will drift along forever & current version Merged: CASA Regulatory Reform

And for this thread and where we now end the year you can't go past Kharon's post at #181

Revelations '13: We've all known for way too many years that Fort Fumble is morally bankrupt and that the RRP will 'drift along forever', so personally my disturbing revelation for '13 is just how rooted our once highly respected and credible aviation accident investigative agency has become, especially in the last five years under Beaker's beyond all reason reign. Besides the PelAir report (AAI Inquiry Report) this fall, to a spiral dive of oblivion, is perhaps best highlighted in the following GA threads: ATSB reports & ATSB to be reviewed by Canadian TSB

In looking to the future (i.e. 2014) we quite often look to the past first, so let's flashback to 2004 and reflect on the words of an IOS founding member on the subject of the ATSB:
KEEP A LITTLE SALT HANDY THIS WEEK, PLEASE …
IN CASE ANOTHER ATSB REPORT COMES OUT


I urge members of the Press Corps to keep a grain or two of salt handy this week. It may be needed when ATSB publishes its report into the Aviation Incident which occurred near Launceston on Christmas Eve.

The Report will probably be released this week, and it may contain the kind of inaccuracy for which the ATSB is rapidly developing a reputation. Before you go to camera, microphone or print on it, please contact us by phone or e-mail so we can – if necessary - tell you what ATSB may have chosen not to reveal.

The Aviation Incident is being beaten up for industrial reasons. Changes were made to Australia’s management of airspace. These changes take us part of the way out of the “quill pen and green eye-shade” era in which our airspace management has been for the past 50 years. Our airspace is now managed like that of the USA, which has an outstanding safety record – and there is far more flying in the USA than in any other country.

Those changes, sadly, are apparently seen by the leaders of the Air Traffic Controllers’ Union as a threat to their members’ jobs rather than the opportunity for professional development that they are,

The relationship between ATSB and the Air Traffic Controllers is a close one – so close that ATSB appointed a former Air Traffic Controller to investigate this incident.

ATSB has been widely criticised for its conduct of investigations. For example –

Mr. Wayne Chivell - Coroner, South Australia, July 2003

"Mr. Fearon was made available by the ATSB to answer as many questions as he could arising from Mr. Cavenagh's evidence.

"The difficulty I have with Mr. Fearon's evidence on this topic is that he is happy to seize upon data, such as that produced by Mr. Braly, as supporting his theory, but when contradictory data was put to him he reverted to rather facile positions.

"......Mr Fearon's evidence became unhelpfully speculative.

"I find the ATSB's theory, namely................., as to be so unlikely as to be almost fanciful.

"In my opinion, the evidence is overwhelmingly against the ATSB theory...........

"As each of these technical issues were put to (The ATSB's) Mr. Cavenagh and Mr. Fearon their explanations and arguments became more abstruse and less credible. I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved.

Ms Lyn McDade - Deputy Northern Territory Coroner, March 2003.

"ATSB apparently acting on the advice of others determined that they would not attend the accident site because it appeared to be an accident involving pilot error only. The basis for that determination could not be explored... ...because Mr. Heitman the ATSB representative who made that determination was not able to give evidence because he could not be located. This has deprived the family of the opportunity to test Mr. Heitman and ascertain why he formed the view about the accident he clearly did, without attending the scene or conducting any other enquiries other than telephone contacts with, it appears, Senior Sergeant B and nobody else."

Mr. Alistair Hope - Coroner, Western Australia, September 2002

"I should stress at the outset that any comments in relation to the performance of the ATSB are made in the context where eight people have unnecessarily lost their lives, such a tragic event in my view requires careful analysis of available evidence and where answers are not forthcoming because of a lack of evidence, an examination should take place as to the way in which evidence has been obtained and possible deficiencies in obtaining evidence identified, which should be corrected in future cases if such tragedies are not to be repeated on a continuing basis."

Mr. Kurt Mackiewicz - Father of deceased pilot, on the ABC in July 2003

"The protracted investigation was attributable to the ATSB's questionable culture and also their arrogant and obstructionist conduct at the inquiry."

Mr. Peter Scollard – Pilot involved at Launceston, in the Hobart Mercury on December 29th. 2003

"I was fully aware of the Virgin Blue plane's presence at all times, I was monitoring it on two radio frequencies and I was maintaining separation. It is quite simple for me to diverge one or two degrees. At no stage was there ever going to be a collision or even a near-collision."

Peter has good reason for concern. ATSB has not given him a copy of the transcript of the radio transmissions at the time of the incident, even though he took part in the transmissions. If all ATSB was doing was carrying out a “no blame” investigation, why on earth would they not give him a copy so that he could, for example, point out any transcription errors? To make matters worse it seems that a copy of that transcript, or a tape of the transmissions, has been made available to others!

If you were investigating with the intention of finding out what had happened, once you has made a transcript of a recording wouldn’t you send it to ALL those whose voices were on the tape asking them to verify the transcription? But if you were seeking “an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached” (to quote Coroner Chivell) then you might well be selective about who got the transcript and who did not.

So keep that salt handy and be sure to give us a call on 08 8276 4600 if you feel an urge to report on whatever character assassination it is that ATSB has in store for Peter.

Boyd Munro
AIR SAFETY AUSTRALIA
And for a more general reflection let's take it back a century to 1914 care of Adam Gopnik's article: Two Ships

Hmm..contemplating '14 with much more to follow but approaching TOPD for next year, enjoy NYE and catch ya next year....cheers and many beers Sarcs

Last edited by Sarcs; 31st Dec 2013 at 07:00.
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Old 31st Dec 2013, 12:01
  #162 (permalink)  
 
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Do we - Look Left; or, look back?

So, Looky loo, Blackhand, Trolls and Casa-philes in general – 30 minutes of the old year left. Would you perhaps care to make a statement?; rebutting any or all of the Sarcs post above? – No ! - why am I not surprised?? I should of course, in concise, elegant terms, define exactly why not. However: as a gentle-man; and, what with it being new years eve and all, I decline this one time, to publicly do so.

I will await, with some faith, the parliamentary verdict on the aviation "safety" department performance. I have some patience with even the weak kneed Truss effort. But do be aware that even though the 2013 'performance' passed muster, (just) the parliamentary credibility test barrier; and, even reasonable doubt (parliamentary style) served you well: 2014 will be the year of veritas. Cash, and no bullshit. The houseboat thrives on forward bookings.

Here endeth my 2014 resolution. Selah.
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Old 31st Dec 2013, 23:01
  #163 (permalink)  
 
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Fair go Kharon, they are on a 17.5 % leave loaded 'free' holiday somewhere. Safety doesn't appear to be suffering because of their absence. They would serve us all by extending that stay.
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Old 1st Jan 2014, 21:10
  #164 (permalink)  
 
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Geoff Edwards – 2009

UITA – the Geoff Edwards – 2009 article linked to post #189 (above) is a full on 26 page reading event. For those contemplating making a submission to the Truss review it is worth taking the time to read at least the first 15 or 20 pages; there is some very good research and 'interesting' facts tucked away in the missive. You may not agree with some (or all) of the conclusions drawn, it is 'academic'. But if you are stuck for a phrase, or an idea to help frame a submission, you may just find some inspiration.

The thing that troubles is despite the many millions of dollars spent, thousands of pages published, numerous reviews, inquiries, commissions etc. etc. nothing seems to have changed much. It's a little like watching the desert, the ever shifting surface sands move to present an altered landscape, the core remains as ever, unchanged.

Heigh Ho - FWIW – I cherry picked some appetisers:-

P5 It is widely agreed that by the mid-1980s the Australian regulations had become too complex and anachronistic. But that does not give any hint as to whether the remedy lay in more government action or less: Yeend claimed that by 1985 there was a first class team within the regulator “already tackling a major up-date” (1994:402) but pilots’ lobby group AOPA claimed that the rules were a product of empire building petty bureaucrats: “...voluminous and disorganised sets of orders, rules, regulations, standards and sundry publications... [drafted by] twenty odd legal buffoons” (2000).
P6-“At its core, safety isn’t cost-effective” said Schiavo, former US Inspector-General of Transportation (1997:48). The marginal cost of preventing fatalities in aviation is very high. In Nader & Smith’s words (1994:317) “Safety always extracts a cost, whether in money, time, convenience or all of these.” That society places a limit on safety expenditure or, more bluntly, that human life has a price, is manifest in the fact that the budgets for road improvements are always contestable and always limited. One has only to visit a public hospital to learn that life is not sacrosanct, that there is a continual trade-off with financial expense. To Ramsden (1976:76), the fact that no airlines offer all rear-facing seats or full-body webbing restraints was evidence that safety can take second place to convenience or profit.
P6-Broderick (2001) found a remarkable correlation between accident rates and effective
governmental implementation of ICAO’s standards. He credited part of the global improvement to ICAO’s move in the mid-1990s to mandatory audits. “...good government aviation safety oversight results in airlines having good safety records. It’s that simple!” If it really is that simple, the converse conclusion also follows: if things go wrong, the government can be blamed.
P7-The James Reason model of safety preparedness portrays accidents simply as occupying the apex of a pyramid of causation that fails at several levels. Reason’s model is now internationally mainstream within aviation circles, though Young & Faulkner (2005) have argued that the pendulum has swung too far toward blaming management for latent systems weaknesses. There is still such a thing as human error.
P9- Australian Transport Safety Bureau

The Bureau proudly proclaims itself as `independent’ because it is institutionally separate within the transport portfolio from the regulator, the service deliverer and the policy office. The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 provides that the Executive Director is “not subject to directions from the Minister or the Secretary” in exercising their powers under this Act (s.15). However, the depth of independence is contestable. Some claim that the body cannot be independent unless it is situated within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and so not accountable to the same minister as CASA; or even directly funded by the parliament so that it is `independent’ of all ministerial departments. On funding, an insider wrote anonymously: “The [US] NTSB gets its funding by a direct allocation by Congress. We do not. Our budget is determined by the Secretary of the Dept and is being steadily tightened.”

Seven years later, the 2009 amendments seem to address this long-standing issue. When ICAO in its February 2008 “Safety Oversight Audit” (AIG/01, 1-6-01) gently chided Australia because the performance indicators had been based on the budget allotted to ATSB, whereas ideally, the typical number of accidents and incidents should be used as a basis of determining the budget, this was one of the only 3 out of 48 findings that Australia declined to accept at least in part – because it was “impractical…within resources available.” Budget was driving safety, still.
P9- Civil Aviation Safety Authority

Before the reforms of 1988 and later, the staff had apparently been proud of their record: “...there was, over a period of 40 years [1948-1988], a complete body of safety regulations established... It was not perfect, but it was the foundation of the best safety record in the history of aviation” (Yeend, 1994a:2,5,6). Yet “Despite our record and experience, the industry clamoured for a new civil aviation authority, loudly supported by the aviation press in the late 1980s. I am one of those who was in that process labelled as part of the dead hand and the cement-headed bureaucracy of the 1980s” (1994:6). Yeend deplored the self-serving capture of the Authority in the early reforms by “some industry operators and adventurers” and the destruction of corporate expertise.

Either his was a rose-coloured perspective or relationships deteriorated rapidly in the wake of the restructure. By 1989 more than 61% of staff in a survey said they would not recommend CAA as an employer (John Walker, 1989). Worse was to come. According to witnesses Foley and Haines, within CASA there was instituted a “culture of fear, fiat and favouritism” (TQS, 1994) commencing in early 1991, when under Dick Smith the Authority was reviewed and
restructured.
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Old 2nd Jan 2014, 04:38
  #165 (permalink)  
 
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Devil More of Edwards and a bit of Sandilands..??

Yes the Edwards article is still very relevant, five years may have passed but we as a modern supposedly 1st world aviation safety administrator have not progressedinstead....


So Edwards three fundamental observations stand the test of time so far..:
First, some of the internal problems have not yet been resolved. The 2008 Issues Paper and Green Paper and public submissions indicate that a coordinated and forward-looking air traffic policy is missing; tensions characterise the relationship between CASA and ATSB; and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete. Was CASA’s skills base eroded too much in the 1990s or is the whole notion of non-prescriptive regulation misconceived anyway?

Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.

Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.
Meanwhile Ben has published his wishlist/expectations/predictions for 2014 and lo' and behold guess what it is at the top of the list??:
Air safety administration

A Senate committee will ask very detailed questions as to precisely how the Federal Police investigated the earlier concerns of the committee which considered the ATSB Pel-Air crash report, and referred possible breaches of the law by CASA to the AFP. The Federal Police will be asked if certain lines of inquiry were discontinued or disregarded.

My expectation is that a massive whitewash will be attempted, and … it won’t wash. I’m happy to say on a reasonable reading of all of the evidence that the ATSB and CASA probably conspired to suppress incompetence on the part of CASA, that the Transport Safety Investigation Act was offended, and that they set out to frame the pilot of the flight in a manner severely prejudicial to all tests of procedural fairness and failed to produce a report which meets internationally accepted standards of an air accident investigation by a first world country.

I expect that the treatment by various parties of the injuries and personal damage suffered by one of the survivors of that crash will shame all concerned, and that includes in the Opposition as well as Government.

I am concerned that this Government will try suppress disclosures about the ATSB and CASA that reflect very poorly on their current administration on the basis that our country should go to sleep and not be disturbed by such matters.

However I am especially concerned that this will lead to Australia being sanctioned by the US administration on the issue of governance and performance in air safety administration and that it will do to this country what it did to Israel, another very important ally, and bust us down to second tier status, causing the cancellation of the US code shares vital to Qantas and Virgin Australia as well as other negative consequences.

I expect that the Minister has, or will, ask why nothing material has been done change the ludicrously stupid regulations that apply to the refuelling of oceanic flights by Australian run air ambulance services in the more than four years since the Pel-Air crash occurred.

It is not unreasonable to expect the Minister to ask tough questions about CASA’s chronic inability to protect the public from operations it knew to be dangerous in advance such as those involving the late Barry Hempel and Transair, the operator that slaughtered 15 people in the Lockhart River crash of 2005.

I expect the Minister to come under pressure from both sides of the house to bring aviation accident investigations in this country into line with the open hearing practices of ICAC in NSW re the criminality of the previous NSW State Government and the Pink Batts Royal Commission and the various open inquiries into priests fiddling with our children and being protected by churches and organisations acting with evil and loathsome intent to deny justice to the victims and their families.

(The writer has expectations that go way beyond air transport.)

But these are only expectations, and they may not be fulfilled.
Subsequently Ben's IOS 2014 annual membership has been accepted as paid in full...

Addendum:

My 2 bob's worth..
Coroner Chivell's quote.."I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved."...perfectly sums up the standard modus operandi
for both the ATSBeaker & Fort Fumble and should be the IOS catchcry for '14...

Last edited by Sarcs; 2nd Jan 2014 at 05:23.
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Old 2nd Jan 2014, 10:59
  #166 (permalink)  
 
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2014 - Year of the wet lettuce leaf

My 2014 prediction is that we will see the increased use of the wet lettuce leaf. Nothing has happened over the past 24 years to give me any confidence that a positive 12 degree bank to the left has started. Australia is still caught up in a phugoid motion, and more nose down than anything.
Unfortunately Clarise the lambs are still crying.

Nothing definitive will take place because nobody in power cares. Things weren't much better in New Zealand in the 70's until the Erebus accident. It then took a long time for things to start to change for the better but it did happen, although things are still not perfect. Several accidents in Canada in the 90's were a catalyst that saw their hands twisted by those in high places, and again positive changes were made by TC, and as a result safety standards improved.

Australia is in an aviation safety slumber ........... ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ .......... The standard of the CASA and what is now the ATSB is proof that mental illness truly is an underestimated illness with far reaching tentacles. What other excuse could there be? An FAA downgrade or smouldering hull appear to be the only two unpalatable options at this point in time that could trigger change.

Tendentious bloggers like Xenophon, and succinct reporters like Sandilands are certainly a breath of fresh air, but they are two very small pawns in the giant CASA ocean. Until Australian aviators hand power to the Independent politicians the only way change will occur will be by way of something I have sadly experienced before, and you really really don't want to go there my friends.
No, 2014 will see more government obsfucation, the occasional bitch slap with a wet lettuce leaf by the Minister, lots of tough talk with no action, and lots of clever little decoys designed to fool the masses into believing our skies are actually safe.
So grab the beer and popcorn, plant some fresh lettuce seeds, stock up on the turd polish and raise your eyes skywards because 2014 will absolutely be the year of the wet lettuce leaf!

I believe this is now customary? TICK TOCK

Last edited by Paragraph377; 2nd Jan 2014 at 11:14.
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Old 2nd Jan 2014, 14:11
  #167 (permalink)  
 
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patience, dear

Dancing Dog,

I guess we are all just ignoring it because the report is already drafted and we are now just going through the motions of appearing to consult with the great unwashed out there

Try a couple of lines down the list for something containing clues like Truss and Aviation Safety Regulation Review

Looks a bit like:

http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-...on-review.html
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Old 2nd Jan 2014, 18:57
  #168 (permalink)  
 
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Nuts or a cigar?

Coroner Chapel's quote.."I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved."..
In one way it's a very good thing that we don't have many coroners reports to work with, mostly due to industry efforts. Conversely, the one's we do have seem marred by double tragedy; there is the easily discernable human side, in those left behind from Lockhart, Hempell etc. Less obvious is the effect of subtle, but premeditated systematic abuse, the lack of accountability, the dismissive attitude to recommendation and the manipulation of a system to ensure that under no circumstances can the status quo be upset. The well practiced process is clearly visible in the AAT, it's not even subtle there. Which brings us to the parliamentary system of inquiry.

Are we to expect more of the same with the present whimsical Truss effort?

A Senate committee will ask very detailed questions as to precisely how the Federal Police investigated the earlier concerns of the committee which considered the ATSB Pel-Air crash report, and referred possible breaches of the law by CASA to the AFP. The Federal Police will be asked if certain lines of inquiry were discontinued or disregarded.
The - Ben Sandilands – offering carefully highlights issues which will not be dealt with by the Truss review panel; indeed it is verboten. If the Murky Machiavellian department don't like your submission, it will be placed in pile 'D' for dump. You may have to wait a long wait before these answers are carefully eased quietly out into the real world. By then, those who are aware will have died of boredom, broken heart or booze and riotous living.

My expectation is that a massive whitewash will be attempted, and … it won’t wash. I’m happy to say on a reasonable reading of all of the evidence that the ATSB and CASA probably conspired to suppress incompetence on the part of CASA, that the Transport Safety Investigation Act was offended, and that they set out to frame the pilot of the flight in a manner severely prejudicial to all tests of procedural fairness and failed to produce a report which meets internationally accepted standards of an air accident investigation by a first world country.
Not to worry Ben, time will cure this problem, slowly but with surety the little problems will slip away into the night while the Smoke and Mirrors department waft away the stench over the next couple of years.

I expect that the Minister has, or will, ask why nothing material has been done change the ludicrously stupid regulations that apply to the refuelling of oceanic flights by Australian run air ambulance services in the more than four years since the Pel-Air crash occurred.
Sorry mate, the minor issues of fuel rules is a newcomer to regulatory reform; some of the rules have been patiently queued up for 25 years awaiting the attention of the reformers. A non fatal swimming exhibition where the flaws in the BoM, CASA, ATSB and ASA systems are exposed does not get priority: no! (little foot stamp) there is a protocol and process in place to deal with these minor irritations.

The serenity of Sleepy Hollow and all who graze in the lush, Elysian fields must not be disturbed, least of all by those miscreant elements who had the temerity to survive. And anyway, there is a welcome party for four newcomers to prepare, overseas guests are always especially welcome.

Now Sir, will you have nuts or a cigar?
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Old 3rd Jan 2014, 01:11
  #169 (permalink)  
 
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the AFP referral

Has anyone seen any evidence of the RRAT Committee actually referring the alleged breaches of the TSIA 03?


Is there a public document that establishes a timeline for any subsequent examination of the AFP's actions?
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Old 3rd Jan 2014, 01:58
  #170 (permalink)  
 
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----and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete.
Folks,
The above, of course, from the Edwards paper quoted in previous posts.
But, of course, you all realised, didn't you, how out of date is the reference to "performance based" regulation, with the present regime at CASA completely abandoning performance based regulation, with a return to complex and ultra-prescriptive regulation, based on a very narrow and literal interpretation of S.9A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
Tootle pip!!

PS: IN my personal view, the Edwards paper is interesting, but the selection of quotes from a selection of sources is a very personal one. I, for one, would not agree with many of the "conclusions", which you are expected to make.
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Old 3rd Jan 2014, 06:43
  #171 (permalink)  
 
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Feds run a protection racket for the bureaucrats??

PNM:
Has anyone seen any evidence of the RRAT Committee actually referring the alleged breaches of the TSIA 03?
How about this Prince Nick....from Hansard of CASA - RRAT, 18/11/2013, Estimates:
Senator XENOPHON: But, Minister, with respect, the Senate unanimously handed down its findings, and they were scathing findings by any objective measure. It was a damning report of CASA and the ATSB—absolutely damning. No-one can criticise the methodology of the committee and the forensic work that the committee put into this.

Insofar as there are a number of recommendations made based on what the committee found to be very serious failures in respect of the Pel-Air investigation, then surely that is relevant in looking at systemic failures on the part of CASA and the ATSB.

Senator SINODINOS: I do not think we are talking at cross-purposes. I am just saying that this is not a forum to replay the whole of that investigation.

Senator XENOPHON: Yes, but insofar as the Senate made a number of recommendations that were scathing of the ATSB and CASA—

Senator SINODINOS: All of which is on the public record.

Senator XENOPHON: from my point of view we do not want it swept under the carpet. There is a genuine concern by all members of this committee about airline safety in this country.

CHAIR: There was some dramatic downgrade of the incident.

Senator XENOPHON: That is right.

CHAIR: What was it from?

Senator XENOPHON: It went from being a safety issue identified as critical to being downgraded significantly. That is something that Senator Fawcett asked many questions about. There were issues about whether CASA and the ATSB colluded or not. That was raised. Can I remind the minister that the committee took such a serious view of this that it referred the evidence to the Federal Police for investigation into whether there was a breach of the TIA legislation.

Senator SINODINOS: I think we are in furious agreement.

Senator XENOPHON: I still do not know how the panel is going to do its job if it does not give privilege to people.

Senator SINODINOS: Having listened to all of this, we will go away and get advice on how we can handle this in a way that means that—

Senator XENOPHON: If you can.
However given that the former PM KRUDD couldn't get the AFP to properly investigate the PMC bureaucrats (see here)...

Access was sought to a copy of the referral letter sent by the Hon. Kevin Rudd MP to the AFP seeking an investigation into the unauthorised release of a video onto YouTube.

"Dear Commissioner Negus

Re: Investigation of offenses associated with the theft and illegal transmission of a video recording

I write following my referral of possible criminal activities to you on 14 March 2012, my meeting with your senior officers on 29 October and your written response to my referral provided to me at that meeting. Copies of relevant records are attached.

In the first instance I wish to reemphasise to you that as an ordinary Australian citizen I take these offenses seriously. Also as the immediate past prime minister and foreign minister of Australia, I take these offenses seriously. They do not constitute a trivial matter.

As I noted in my referral of 14 March 2012, the stolen video recording in question was downloaded without legal authorisation, edited without my consent prior to being uploaded to YouTube, then released through a YouTube account for the explicit purpose of damaging my reputation nationally and internationally; and that notification of the existence of this YouTube video to the Australian media was first through an anonymous phone call."

...what chance have we got that the Feds will do a proper job of the Senate referral for investigation of the trough dwellers (bureaucrats) at Fort Fumble??

Quote slightly adjusted for the Feds:
"I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate AFP investigation of the factors involved."
That said it would be interesting for the RRAT committee to request a copy of the AFP PROMIS file & case notes to scrutinise the thoroughness of the Feds investigation...

Last edited by Sarcs; 3rd Jan 2014 at 06:54.
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Old 3rd Jan 2014, 19:36
  #172 (permalink)  
 
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Conundrum.

PNM # 195-Is there a public document that establishes a timeline for any subsequent examination of the AFP's actions?
Sarcs # 197 -That said it would be interesting for the RRAT committee to request a copy of the AFP PROMIS file & case notes to scrutinise the thoroughness of the Feds investigation.
Do you see one of the interesting omissions in the Truss WLR; the submission system aided and abetted by the narrow terms deny the 'review panel' the sort of forensic investigation needed. The 'hand off' approach isolates the Nick X request and leaves it begging Senate committee attention. Apart from estimates, the Pel Air committee don't have a platform to work from and Fawcett is hobbled by party lines. That leaves NX independent to carry on the work. As Sarcs points out, even a PM had trouble getting answers, this combined with the unpardonable delay from the miniscule in responding to the Pel Air recommendations, despite some serious questions being asked of Mrdak and McComic does not auger well. Transparency, truth and resolution are already running at diminishing rate of return on the industry investment.

While it's a very interesting exercise to review the Parliamentary Library List on aviation reviews, inquiry, and commissions for the past 20 years; it is an almost surreal experience to follow the post review results. The pattern is 'crystal' clear; the choreography elegant and the execution immaculate (plenty of practice-methinks). Basically there are five steps in this dance. Pel Air is passing effortlessly through step three onto step four; the Truss WLR has by-passed step one, has almost completed two and is lining up the transition to steps three and four; in short order. At step five it's all over, the music stops and the band goes home until next time.

Aye, it's a conundrum, about to become more complicated by the WA Senate elections. So even for our erstwhile, bi-partisan Senate inquiry, the clock is ticking. IMO the only show stopper is the amount of anger fuelled determination the Pel Air inquiry committee has remaining to break the never ending cycle; crash, review to nothing changed, at great expense.

Last edited by Kharon; 3rd Jan 2014 at 19:43. Reason: Second coffee review - works like a charm.
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Old 4th Jan 2014, 03:41
  #173 (permalink)  
 
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Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1)

Direct link, here you go;

Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1)

I had started a thread on this document as I did not realise it had since been repealed/ceased. I then removed the thread as I thought it no longer relevant. Sorry.

I for one would like too see more on this, how/why can an amendment be Made 19 Dec 2013, Registered 24 Dec 2013 and then repealed 26 Dec 2013.
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Old 4th Jan 2014, 10:00
  #174 (permalink)  
 
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automatic repeal

Junior brother,

it goes like this:

48A Automatic repeal of amending and repealing instruments

(1) This section repeals a legislative instrument that is made on or after the commencement of this section and whose only legal effect is to amend or repeal one or more other legislative instruments (without making any application, saving or transitional provisions relating to the amendment or repeal).

Time of repeal

(2) The repeal of the instrument by this section happens on the day after the last occurrence of one of the following events:

(a) the commencement of the instrument or of the last of its provisions to commence;

(b) the registration of the instrument.

Effect of repeal

(3) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not affect any amendment or repeal made by the instrument. This does not limit the effect of section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 as it applies in relation to the repeal of the instrument by this section because of section 13 of this Act.

(4) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not prevent section 38 or 42 from applying to the instrument after the repeal. That application does not delay the repeal of the instrument by this section.
procedural only...

Stay Alive,
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Old 5th Jan 2014, 19:56
  #175 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
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As a matter of interest??

While we're waiting for the debate....
PNM post #1686:
1 - if the motion lapses without debate then the Instrument is disallowed and ceases to have the force of law;

2 - if the motion is debated and voted in, then the Instrument is disallowed and ceases to have the force of law; or

3 - if the motion is debated and voted out, then the Instrument continues to have the force of law.
....Kharon brings up an interesting point, post #1687...
notice that the FAA, who can legitimately claim safety sovereignty, have shown the way (again) with their revised fatigue rules which have apparently managed to reach a most satisfactory conclusion. They probably have not satisfied everyone's wishes, but the interested parties have, in a democratic fashion, achieved a greatly improved regulation based on modern thinking. So Bravo the FAA. Meanwhile here at home – "round and around the garden" – seems an apt description and 25 years in not really a long wait in the life of a glacier; is it ?
As of two days ago the US are now operating to an amended FAR 117: "PART 117 - Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements"

And as "K" mentions besides one or two points of difference, the new rules have been generally well accepted, here's an example from ALPA:
ALPA Supports Same Flight And Duty Rules For All Airline Pilots

“ALPA applauds the FAA and DOT for their continued efforts to ensure that the U.S. airline industry remains the safest in the world. The new science-based flight- and duty-time rules are a significant victory for safety and the traveling public here in the United States because they represent a long-overdue overhaul of decades-old flight and duty regulations.

“Unfortunately, the regulations have one critical shortfall because they exclude cargo airline pilots. ALPA was fully engaged in the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee regarding pilot fatigue, and has long maintained that the new flight- and duty-time limits and minimum rest requirements must cover all airline pilots. It is clear from the science that all airline pilots experience fatigue in the same ways, regardless of whether they are transporting passengers or cargo. Cargo airline pilots fly the same aircraft types over the same routes, into and out of the same airports, as passenger airline pilots. This is why ALPA supports H.R. 182/S. 1692—the Safe Skies Act, which would require that cargo pilots be included in these regulations in order to increase safety for the public. We urge every U.S. senator and representative to support this important aviation safety legislation for all who rely on air transportation.”
Here in Oz Fort Fumble in their usual bombastic way rammed through into law Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) despite criticisms from similar industry groups to the US ALPA...

AIPA: Safety risked by flawed aviation rules that would result in fatigued pilots landing planes after 20 hours at the controls

“AIPA believes that a scientific review of the proposed limits is necessary, ensuring efficiency is balanced with flight safety through principles developed by thorough scientific analysis, not lobbying. The motion to disallow CAO 48.1 will allow all industry stakeholders to go back to the table with CASA and produce legislation that is more aligned to international best practice, which will provide an outcome that is significantly better for public safety.”

VIPA: New Regulations

"CASA has previously stated that the current CAO 48 is devoid of sound scientific principles to define the prescribed Flight and Duty limits cites this inadequacy to advocate for its new rule set. The new CAO 48 is supposed to be based on currently recognised and credible fatigue science. Sadly the new CAO 48.1 does not come close to satisfying the scientific principles. For example the scientific studies that ICAO relied upon to develop the SARP for FDP limits recognise that flight duty should not exceed 8 to 9 hours at the controls. The new rules routinely allow for this, which is no different to what we currently do.."

This FF total disconnect with industry concern was further highlighted by a speech made by the DAS at Clive's dinosaur park :Reforming civil aviation regulations - enhancing safety standards through new flight crew fatigue management rules
The recent claims made by some sections of the industry appear to compare the standby requirements specified in the new CAO 48.1 with foreign regulators’ airport standby arrangements. However, these are two very different concepts, and comparing them is tendentious and misleading.
Hmm...so while we wait and ponder the next political moves, on yet another reg debacle, it would appear the rest of the world has addressed the problem and are getting on with it......TICK TOCK indeed!
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Old 6th Jan 2014, 20:09
  #176 (permalink)  
 
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DO or DI?

While we are discussing CAO 48, disallowable instruments, motions and the like, I wonder if the WLR panel will have the nouse to look at other Disallowable Instruments (DI) which are or, have been 'rubber stamped' and passed through the system, unscathed.

There are 120 DI on the list at the moment; ranging from 'means of providing surface wind' to the 'number of cabin attendants', all manner of issues presented to the rubber stamp factory. Couple of troubling things;

That there is a need for so many exemptions must be one of the clearest signposts to a regulatory suite which has not kept pace with, or is incapable of supporting 'modern' operations. Prescriptive, complex and ruthlessly micro managed rule sets create the need for operational 'exemption'. Heaven only knows what the 'real' cost of this system is. A company wishing to stay 'legally safe' but operationally efficient needs to draft a proposal, this in all probability will involve operational and legal advice, time and money. Then the 'thing' has to go to the administrator and be processed through reception, recording, evaluation, drafting, legal and a final approval system, all fully documented. Then the 'thing' is off to parliament, through yet another expensive process, before the rubber stamp is used and the operator eventually receives a piece of very expensive paper granting an exemption against the 'rules', as writ.

No doubt the system is above board and the exemptions 'made' legal; but I wonder, when was the last external, independent audit of not only the system but some of the decisions. Some of the 'justification' for approval is mind bending, convoluted and abstruse, to say the least.

I've no objection to 'operations' having exemptions, or instruments, but would question the need for so many. Perhaps a WLR panel member could question why there is a need for so many and the real costs. When you start to add up the costs involved to produce a request for 'instrument', the cost of submission, the cost of process to get the 'thing' to parliament, the cost of parliamentary rubber stamping, all paid for by the travelling public (one way the other); you end up with some very scary numbers. Add this annual cost to the cost of regulatory reform, whichever way you look at it; the numbers are truly concerning especially when weighed against the progress made thus far.

Perhaps the WLR panel cost added to the cost of all previous parliamentary costs for inquiry should be tacked on at the end of a long column of figures which could then be used to define the absolute and abject failure of the great Australian regulatory reform program.

FAR or NZ CAR; pick one and lets be done with it. We could save a packet and send the visiting firemen home; for a rest, after their strenuous labour down-under, in the land of the long week end.

Selah -and/or Tick tock

Last edited by Kharon; 6th Jan 2014 at 20:19.
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Old 6th Jan 2014, 22:11
  #177 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
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WLR: Disallowable instruments...audit please??

In case you were wondering what in the world Kharon is talking about....here is a link for the lists of disallowable instruments currently before the 44th Parliament: Disallowable List - Parliament

And if I extract just one sitting day that instruments, related to the CAA 1988, have been introduced..here is what it looks like {Note: Have linked some of them to the COMLAW site, the one in red I find somewhat amusing..}
Presented to the Senate on 12 November 2013
5 sitting days remaining for notice to disallow

Civil Aviation Act 1988—
Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment (Part 117) Regulation 2013—Select Legislative Instrument 2013 No. 222 [F2013L01539].
Civil Aviation Legislation Amendment (Subpart 21.J) Regulation 2013—Select Legislative Instrument 2013 No. 188 [F2013L01444].
Civil Aviation Order 82.6 (Night vision goggles – helicopters) 2007—Exemption — initial NVG pilot flight training prerequisites—CASA EX87/13 [F2013L01488].
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988—
Approval and directions — operations without an approved digital flight data recorder system—CASA 190/13 [F2013L01763].
Civil Aviation Order 40.3.0 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 2) [F2013L01712].
Civil Aviation Order 100.28 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01711].
Civil Aviation Order 100.5 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01330].
Civil Aviation Order 100.5 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 2) [F2013L01486].
Civil Aviation Order 104.0 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01746].
Civil Aviation Order 108.56 Repeal Instrument 2013 [F2013L01331].
Direction — number of cabin attendants for Airbus A320 and Fokker F100 aircraft (Virgin Australia Regional Airlines)—CASA 132/13 [F2013L01278].
Direction — number of cabin attendants for Fokker F70 and Fokker F100 aircraft—CASA 164/13 [F2013L01489].
Direction — number of cabin attendants in Boeing 737-800 series aircraft, Qantas Airways Limited—CASA 158/13 [F2013L01491].
Direction — number of cabin attendants (National Jet Systems)—CASA 170/13 [F2013L01501].
Direction — number of cabin attendants (Sunstate Airlines)—CASA 133/13 [F2013L01280].
Direction — number of cabin attendants (Tiger Airways)—CASA 121/13 [F2013L01274].
Direction — number of cabin attendants (Virgin Australia Airlines)—CASA 87/13 [F2013L01215].
Direction — number of cabin attendants (Virgin Australia International Airlines)—CASA 88/13 [F2013L01213].
Direction — parallel runway operations at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport—CASA 192/13 [F2013L01671].
Directions under subregulation 235(2) relating to landing weight and landing distance required—
CASA 116/13 [F2013L01276].
CASA 181/13 [F2013L01629].
CASA 205/13 [F2013L01757].
CASA 213/13 [F2013L01762].
Instructions — GNSS primary means navigation (A330 and B737NG aircraft)—CASA 186/13 [F2013L01627].
Instructions — GNSS primary means navigation (B737NG and B777-300ER aircraft)—CASA 187/13 [F2013L01626].
Instructions — GNSS primary means navigation (B787-8 aircraft)—CASA 220/13 [F2013L01797].
Civil Aviation Regulations 1988 and Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998—Exemption, permission and direction — helicopter search and rescue operations and training for such operations—CASA EX66/13 [F2013L01724].
Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998—
Airworthiness Limitations—AD/B767/145 Amdt 2 [F2013L01698].
Amendment of instrument CASA 125/09 — Drug and alcohol testing by CASA under Subpart 99.C of CASR 1998—CASA 165/13 [F2013L01616].
Approval – means of compliance with Airworthiness Directive for Grob G 109 and G 109 B aircraft—A&ESB 12/3050 [F2013L01704].
Auto-Speedbrake Control System—AD/B767/178 Amdt 1 [F2013L01313].
Automatic Flight Control System—AD/A320/3 Amdt 1 [F2013L01691].
Cabin Altitude Warning Takeoff Briefing—AD/B737/346 Amdt 1 [F2013L01751].
Darwin Inspection and Testing Service Ultrasonic Inspection—AD/GENERAL/86 [F2013L01490].
Elevator Flutter Damper Shear Pins—AD/CL-600/36 Amdt 1 [F2013L01332].
Escape Slide Release Cable—AD/B737/42 Amdt 1 [F2013L01750].
Exemption – carriage of flight data recorder – Pel-Air Aviation—CASA EX80/13 [F2013L01393].
Exemption — CASR Part 99 DAMP requirements for CAR 30 or Part 145 organisations overseas—CASA EX95/13 [F2013L01675].
Exemption — certificate of release to service – foreign approved maintenance organisations—CASA EX74/13 [F2013L01378].
Exemption — from having training and checking organisation—CASA EX81/13 [F2013L01493].
Exemption — from holding an air traffic control licence—CASA EX108/13 [F2013L01754].
Exemption – from standard landing minima – Boeing 737 fail-passive aircraft – Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd—
CASA EX73/13 [F2013L01400].
CASA EX86/13 [F2013L01496].
CASA EX114/13 [F2013L01882].
Exemption – from standard take-off and landing minima – Nippon Cargo Airlines Co. Ltd—CASA EX103/13 [F2013L01771].
Exemption – from standard take-off and landing minima – Virgin Australia International Airlines Pty Ltd—CASA EX115/13 [F2013L01883].
Exemption – from standard take-off and landing minima – Vietnam Airlines—CASA EX99/13 [F2013L01688].
Exemption — instrument rating flight tests in a synthetic flight training device—CASA EX116/13 [F2013L01869].
Exemption of DAMP organisations for collection and screening of specimens—CASA EX112/13 [F2013L01806].
Exemption — recency requirements for night flying (Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd)—CASA EX90/13 [F2013L01628].
Exemption – recency requirements for night flying – Virgin Australia International Airlines Pty Ltd— CASA EX118/13 [F2013L01871].
Exemption — requirement to wear seat belt and safety harness—CASA EX 106/13 [F2013L01805].
Exemption — Sydney Jabiru Flying School solo flight training at Bankstown aerodrome—CASA EX111/13 [F2013L01877].
Exemption — take-off with residual traces of frost and ice—CASA EX70/13 [F2013L01203].
Exemption — temporary relief from requirement to carry serviceable ADS-B transmitting equipment when operating in defined exempted airspace—CASA EX113/13 [F2013L01837].
Exemption — use of ADS-B in Aerolineas Argentinas aircraft LV-CSF—CASA EX96/13 [F2013L01662].
Exemption — Virgin Australia International Airlines from subregulation 217(2) of CAR 1988 and paragraph 3.3 of CAO 82.5 (cabin crew training)—CASA EX69/13 [F2013L01202].
Exemption — Virgin Australia International Airlines from subregulation 217(2) of CAR 1988 and paragraph 3.3 of CAO 82.5 (flight crew training)—CASA EX68/13 [F2013L01200].
Exhaust System Inspection – Heat Exchanger—AD/X-TS/1 Amdt 1 [F2013L01664].
Fatigue Critical Components – Retirement Lives—AD/TSA-600/38 Amdt 2 [F2013L01597].
Flightcrew Oxygen Masks—AD/B737/294 Amdt 2 [F2013L01697].
Fuel Injection Servo Plugs—AD/FSM/31 Amdt 3 [F2013L01792].
Fuel Probes—AD/A320/9 Amdt 1 [F2013L01690].
Fuel System Ventilation and Drainage Modification—AD/GA8/7 [F2013L01663].
Main Cabin Upper Door—AD/TSA-600/39 Amdt 3 [F2013L01791].
Main Rotor Mast and Trunnion – Retirement Index Number (RIN) Recount/Inspection—
AD/BELL 204/6 Amdt 13 [F2013L01470].
AD/BELL 205/1 Amdt 33 [F2013L01472].
Maintenance on warbird and historic and replica aircraft (WHR) — directions and licence condition—CASA 197/13 [F2013L01747].
Manual of Standards Part 139 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01756].
Nose Wheel Steering Control—
AD/A320/27 Amdt 1 [F2013L01692].
AD/A320/27 Amdt 2 [F2013L01835].
Oxygen System—AD/HS 125/161 Amdt 1 [F2013L01679].
Part 66 Manual of Standards Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01399].
Part 147 Manual of Standards Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) [F2013L01397].
Pitot Probe Hoses—AD/A320/24 Amdt 1 [F2013L01693].
Revocation of exemption — CASR Part 99 DAMP requirements for CAR 30 organisations overseas—CASA EX97/13 [F2013L01676].
Revocations of Airworthiness Directives—
CASA ADCX 012/13 [F2013L01333].
CASA ADCX 013/13 [F2013L01411].
CASA ADCX 014/13 [F2013L01494].
CASA ADCX 015/13 [F2013L01566].
CASA ADCX 016/13 [F2013L01596].
CASA ADCX 017/13 [F2013L01637].
CASA ADCX 018/13 [F2013L01700].
CASA ADCX 019/13 [F2013L01752].
CASA ADCX 020/13 [F2013L01828].
CASA ADCX 021/13 [F2013L01823].
CASA ADCX 022/13 [F2013L01902].
Take-Off Warning—AD/B737/18 Amdt 2 [F2013L01703].
{Note: If you are interested in some of the other individual instruments just copy and paste to search engine and click on the COMLAW link provided}

I know different political systems and all that.. but interestingly enough in the US recently the House Transportation Committee instigated an audit of the FAA:
Inspector General To Audit FAA Organizational Structure

House Transportation Committee Requested The Probe

The DOT Inspector General plans to begin an audit of the FAA's organization structure this month at the request of the chairs of the House Transportation Committee and Aviation Subcommittee.




In a document posted on the Federal Register, over the past two decades, FAA has undergone several reorganizations and structural changes in an effort to improve its operation of the National Airspace System, such as the establishment of the Air Traffic Organization in 2000. The IG says the audit objectives are to:
  • Determine whether FAA reforms implemented since 1995 have resulted in improved air traffic operations, reduced Agency costs, and expedited delivery of new technologies
  • Compare the processes used by different countries to deliver air traffic services and implement new technologies.
FAA reauthorization legislation is scheduled to be before the committee later this month. LoBiondo said at a hearing December 12 that one of his top priorities was the implementation of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act, and that organization changes at the agency may be necessary for that to be accomplished.
Question for those kosher with the Oz system: Would it not be possible for the WLB (Wet Lettuce Brigade) to enlist the help of the Senate RRAT committee to make a submission to the ANAO or OBPR (Office of Best Practice Regulation) to audit/review the CAA DIs??

The ANAO/OBPR in turn could enlist the expertise of the WLB, along with maybe some guidance from the PMC endorsed Best Bractice Regulation Handbook, pool their resources and before you knew it you'd be well on the way to a fully independent, transparent process of auditing the DI list...hmm food for thought perhaps??

ps All in the interest of the Governments Red Tape Reduction policy of course...

Last edited by Sarcs; 6th Jan 2014 at 22:43.
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Old 7th Jan 2014, 18:40
  #178 (permalink)  
 
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Now, what was I talking about?

Oh yes.

116/13 These directions apply to Airbus aircraft operated by Tiger Airways Australia Pty Limited (the operator). They apply a new system for determining the landing distance applicable to particular aircraft at a given weight, referred to as the in-flight landing distance determination. It is a system not dealt with in CAO 20.7.1B, in particular subsection 11 which deals with the calculation of landing distance required.

Airbus has changed the way failures affecting landing performance are taken into account. Instead of using the historical factoring method to increase a base figure, as is done in subsection 11, Airbus has produced an actual distance figure for all failure conditions affecting landing performance.
118/13 These directions apply to Airbus aircraft operated by Qantas Airways Limited (the operator). They apply a new system for determining the landing distance applicable to particular aircraft at a given weight, referred to as the in-flight landing distance determination. It is a system not dealt with in CAO 20.7.1B, in particular subsection 11 which deals with the calculation of landing distance required.

Airbus has changed the way failures affecting landing performance are taken into account. Instead of using the historical factoring method to increase a base figure, as is done in subsection 11, Airbus has produced an actual distance figure for all failure conditions affecting landing performance.
205/13 These directions apply to Boeing aircraft operated by Qantas Airways Limited (the operator). They apply a new system for determining the landing distance applicable to particular aircraft at a given weight, referred to as the En-route Landing Performance. It is a system not dealt with in CAO 20.7.1B, in particular subsection 11 which deals with the calculation of landing distance required.

Boeing has changed the way failures affecting landing performance are taken into account. Instead of using the historical factoring method to increase a base figure, as is done in subsection 11, Boeing has produced an actual distance figure for all failure conditions affecting landing performance.
213/13 These directions apply to Boeing 787-8 aircraft operated by Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (the operator). They apply a new system for determining the landing distance applicable to particular aircraft at a given weight, referred to as the En-route Landing Performance. It is a system not dealt with in CAO 20.7.1B, in particular subsection 11 which deals with the calculation of landing distance required.

Boeing has changed the way failures affecting landing performance are taken into account. Instead of using the historical factoring method to increase a base figure, as is done in subsection 11, Boeing has produced an actual distance figure for all failure conditions affecting landing performance.
I have only cherry picked the above from the Sarcs list because of their similarity and ease of reference. Here we have Tiger, Qantas and Jetstar all needing an 'instrument' approving operations, as writ. Now Airbus and Boeing did not wake up one morning and jointly decide to change the method of complying with the Australian CAO, make the changes by lunch time, work out the new data and have it published and distributed by afternoon tea, before retiring for the day to the pub, for a well earned pint or two. Did they now?

I'd risk a choccy frog and bet that the cast and crew at all the above air operators knew that changes were imminent and were all prepared, well in advance. Training, scheduling, TEM and etc. i.e. all facets analysed well in advance of change over day. I'd even hazard a further choccy frog that the CASA FOI were equally ahead of the game, being informed of and probably involved in the step by step process. Change was coming and everyone was prepared – except the regulator's rules.

The primary effect of this instrument is to allow use of a new method of determining that distance based on criteria provided by the aircraft manufacturer.
Why, oh why do we persist with this expensive, counterproductive approach when by simply accepting that the manufacturer and grown up regulators may just know a thing or two and adjust our regulation, once, in advance to accommodate the facts of life. Would that not save a world of time, effort, trouble and money?.

Perhaps the WLR panel, if they could manage it, over tea and cream buns, spare a second or two just to consider exactly how deep mud actually is. Yes minister, we may need a bit more than a teaspoon to dig our way out of the legislative mire.

Last edited by Kharon; 7th Jan 2014 at 18:54.
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Old 7th Jan 2014, 21:52
  #179 (permalink)  
 
Join Date: Apr 2007
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One thousand seven hundred reasons for adopting NZ regs!

Kharon:
Perhaps the WLR panel, if they could manage it, over tea and cream buns, spare a second or two just to consider exactly how deep mud actually is. Yes minister, we may need a bit more than a teaspoon to dig our way out of the legislative mire.
Surprise..surprise "K" for once the DAS and you actually agree on something...

He even gives the figure for exemption instruments as 1700, sheesh.... no wonder it is SOPs for the pollies to just rubber stamp these instruments straight through both chambers without a secondary glance..

See here from about 45 seconds...:

[YOUTUBE]
Warning: Bucket may be required on standby!
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Old 8th Jan 2014, 00:13
  #180 (permalink)  
 
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Well what he says makes sense to me
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