Truss: Aviation Safety Regulation Review
The new "Price is (not yet) right" and the real elephant in the (TASRR) room!"
Kharon:
Creamy:
Okay so we all agree the TASRR fix is firmly in place 
and the Government response to PelAir recommendations will go begging 
unless the non-aligned Senators (including the Greens..Creamy!
) create an alliance to force the Government to appropriately address the PelAir report recommendations.
IMO it is also crucial to aviation safety in this country that the current executive culture within the ATsB is fixed and that respective governments of either colour pay respect and action, not lipservice, their common rhetorical mantra of "aviation safety is...(our)... number one priority".
To follow on from the Kharon post and on the subject of fatigue...
Over the last decade, in aviation safety circles, the buzzword has been human factors. As a consequence we saw the rise of HF experts with scientific based research exploring the human element causal to accidents/incidents; i.e. why do pilots, engineers, controllers etc continue to make, sometimes fatal, critical errors??
We then saw government agencies/authorities employing these HF experts to further promote/foster this new proactive safety age of trying to address the human error element in transport accidents.
In Australia Fort Fumble and the ATsB followed suit, employing their own HF experts. However after the previous 2 Senate Inquiries (especially PelAir) it became obvious that these HF experts were only ever meant to be 'seen not heard'.
They weren't meant to be making waves by producing potentially revealing, embarassing audits of the supposedly compliant, bigend of town Operator/Airline Safety Management and Fatigue Risk Management systems (ala Ben Cook's audits of a certain airline's YPDN base Flight & Duty practices and his Special Audit report on the PelAir FRMS).
The following article, from one of those bothersome "HF experts", highlights that the HF FRMS conundrum is not just isolated to Australia
Until governments, bureaucrats and airlines alike, realise that properly implemented FRMS/SMS are safety risk mitigators that are now essential to good, safe business practice then the bureau and Fort Fumble, 'beyond all sensible reason', will continue to operate in a vacuum, without scrutiny, without oversight and where aviation safety is in fact their very last priority....
TICK..TOCK indeed!
Addendum:
Recieved a PM from an IOS member suggesting I copy across some of my recent GA thread posts as they are somewhat relevant to this thread but I now see Kharon has linked them.
In case you missed the links:
TSBC in-flight breakup report a benchmark for ATsB??
Senator X questions veracity of the TSBC review?? & research report comparison.
Much depends on independent Nick Xenophon being supported by the other 'bi-partisan' Senate committee members. In terms of the 'regulatory deformation' process, NX has made a start, upsetting the CAO 48/ FRMS apple cart. There is much empirical evidence and scientific study which makes a nonsense of the CASA non science of flight crew fatigue. NX nailed this down during the inquiry into 'pilot training', ran with it through the Pel Air inquiry and, put his money where his mouth was, blocking the shambles known as CAO 48. The bi-partisan committee, although quiet must at least tacitly support his cause. For example; despite fatigue being blithely ruled as an irrelevance in the Norfolk ditching; fatigue was clearly a factor.
The next time the government asks The Greens for its ‘wish-list’ in return for support for some government legislation (as has already happened with the ‘debt ceiling’), what is the risk to The Greens and how hard would it be for them to add to the list: “Finalisation of substantive actions to address the recommendations of the Senate Inquiry into Aviation Accident Investigations”? You might find this a revelation, but members of The Greens may have the smarts to work out that it’s in the public interest for those recommendations to be properly addressed.
and the Government response to PelAir recommendations will go begging unless the non-aligned Senators (including the Greens..Creamy!) create an alliance to force the Government to appropriately address the PelAir report recommendations. IMO it is also crucial to aviation safety in this country that the current executive culture within the ATsB is fixed and that respective governments of either colour pay respect and action, not lipservice, their common rhetorical mantra of "aviation safety is...(our)... number one priority".
To follow on from the Kharon post and on the subject of fatigue...
Over the last decade, in aviation safety circles, the buzzword has been human factors. As a consequence we saw the rise of HF experts with scientific based research exploring the human element causal to accidents/incidents; i.e. why do pilots, engineers, controllers etc continue to make, sometimes fatal, critical errors??
We then saw government agencies/authorities employing these HF experts to further promote/foster this new proactive safety age of trying to address the human error element in transport accidents.
In Australia Fort Fumble and the ATsB followed suit, employing their own HF experts. However after the previous 2 Senate Inquiries (especially PelAir) it became obvious that these HF experts were only ever meant to be 'seen not heard'.
They weren't meant to be making waves by producing potentially revealing, embarassing audits of the supposedly compliant, bigend of town Operator/Airline Safety Management and Fatigue Risk Management systems (ala Ben Cook's audits of a certain airline's YPDN base Flight & Duty practices and his Special Audit report on the PelAir FRMS).The following article, from one of those bothersome "HF experts", highlights that the HF FRMS conundrum is not just isolated to Australia
Opinion: The Price of Reducing Pilot Fatigue
By Ashley Nunes
In 2009, Colgan Air 3407 crashed while landing at Buffalo, N.Y., killing all 49 people on board. An investigation determined that leading up to the crash, pilot performance was likely impaired by fatigue: a finding that came as no surprise to safety advocates who had long recognized its dangers.
In the 1980s, NASA dedicated an entire research program to understanding fatigue. The effort was groundbreaking for its time, as researchers examined the influence of sleep loss and interruption on brain function, muscle activity and alertness. Those measures were used to paint a snapshot of fatigue, based on when pilots flew, how long they flew and how much rest they had obtained before the flight. The program laid the critical groundwork for the development of the fatigue management standards used today.
However, these standards have faced stiff resistance from air carriers. For example, when the FAA recently announced limits on night flying, cargo carriers successfully lobbied for exclusion because of the “unreasonable” $550 million price tag. That decision appalled many. Robert Travis, president of the Independent Pilots Association, notes that it was not the government's intent to address the important issue of pilot fatigue “only if the price is right.” Perhaps not, but costs are precisely why fatigue management standards are opposed; they reduce profit margins by limiting how much productivity can be squeezed out of workers. And in a climate of fierce economic competition, airlines hesitate to pass on any additional costs to customers.
Unsurprisingly, safety advocates lauded the FAA rule. Nico Voorbach, president of the European Cockpit Association, says that unlike European governments, the U.S. has taken a decisive step toward what a wide body of scientific medical research recommends to be safe. But does science really support the assertion that fatigue reduces safety? And more important, does the public value efforts to manage fatigue?
Justification of fatigue management standards is based on more than three decades of scientific research. Yet although these studies have examined the impact of fatigue on everything from oxygen levels in the brain to short-term memory, a mere handful have examined how fatigue affects a pilot's flying ability. This is surprising because today's technology allows monitoring of every facet of the job. Was too little engine power used during takeoff? Was too much brake pressure applied during landing? If so, the system has a record of it. And if a fatigued pilot is doing something dangerous, we should know about it.
Anecdotes tell of sleepy captains forgetting to extend flaps before takeoff to overworked first officers nodding off at the controls while in command. In one recent case, a fatigued Air Canada pilot sent an airliner into a 400-ft. dive over the North Atlantic after mistaking the planet Venus for another aircraft on a collision course. Sixteen passengers were seriously injured. However, standards must be based on methodologically sound research, not anecdotes, and as yet, the relevant research is lacking.
Whether the public values such efforts is a difficult question. A recent public opinion survey found that 82% of passengers rank fatigue as their most important air travel concern. But are their concerns reflected by their behavior? In 2006, a British television station used secret film to substantiate allegations that Ryanair forced its pilots to work excessively fatiguing schedules, flying multiple consecutive flights a day through congested airspace with few opportunities for rest.
How did customers respond? By helping Ryanair grow from a tiny, impoverished Irish carrier to Europe's largest airline, and a very profitable one at a time when some of its competitors are facing loses and insolvency. The secret to Ryanair's success is simple: cheap fares. Clearly, public concerns over fatigue are tempered by the prospect of flying from Brussels to Barcelona for €14.99 ($21).
Ryanair is hardly unique among its peers when it comes to reports of fatigue. But its remarkable growth despite such reports forces us to face a harsh reality: If passengers want air travel to be safe, they must be willing to pay for it.
By Ashley Nunes
In 2009, Colgan Air 3407 crashed while landing at Buffalo, N.Y., killing all 49 people on board. An investigation determined that leading up to the crash, pilot performance was likely impaired by fatigue: a finding that came as no surprise to safety advocates who had long recognized its dangers.
In the 1980s, NASA dedicated an entire research program to understanding fatigue. The effort was groundbreaking for its time, as researchers examined the influence of sleep loss and interruption on brain function, muscle activity and alertness. Those measures were used to paint a snapshot of fatigue, based on when pilots flew, how long they flew and how much rest they had obtained before the flight. The program laid the critical groundwork for the development of the fatigue management standards used today.
However, these standards have faced stiff resistance from air carriers. For example, when the FAA recently announced limits on night flying, cargo carriers successfully lobbied for exclusion because of the “unreasonable” $550 million price tag. That decision appalled many. Robert Travis, president of the Independent Pilots Association, notes that it was not the government's intent to address the important issue of pilot fatigue “only if the price is right.” Perhaps not, but costs are precisely why fatigue management standards are opposed; they reduce profit margins by limiting how much productivity can be squeezed out of workers. And in a climate of fierce economic competition, airlines hesitate to pass on any additional costs to customers.
Unsurprisingly, safety advocates lauded the FAA rule. Nico Voorbach, president of the European Cockpit Association, says that unlike European governments, the U.S. has taken a decisive step toward what a wide body of scientific medical research recommends to be safe. But does science really support the assertion that fatigue reduces safety? And more important, does the public value efforts to manage fatigue?
Justification of fatigue management standards is based on more than three decades of scientific research. Yet although these studies have examined the impact of fatigue on everything from oxygen levels in the brain to short-term memory, a mere handful have examined how fatigue affects a pilot's flying ability. This is surprising because today's technology allows monitoring of every facet of the job. Was too little engine power used during takeoff? Was too much brake pressure applied during landing? If so, the system has a record of it. And if a fatigued pilot is doing something dangerous, we should know about it.
Anecdotes tell of sleepy captains forgetting to extend flaps before takeoff to overworked first officers nodding off at the controls while in command. In one recent case, a fatigued Air Canada pilot sent an airliner into a 400-ft. dive over the North Atlantic after mistaking the planet Venus for another aircraft on a collision course. Sixteen passengers were seriously injured. However, standards must be based on methodologically sound research, not anecdotes, and as yet, the relevant research is lacking.
Whether the public values such efforts is a difficult question. A recent public opinion survey found that 82% of passengers rank fatigue as their most important air travel concern. But are their concerns reflected by their behavior? In 2006, a British television station used secret film to substantiate allegations that Ryanair forced its pilots to work excessively fatiguing schedules, flying multiple consecutive flights a day through congested airspace with few opportunities for rest.
How did customers respond? By helping Ryanair grow from a tiny, impoverished Irish carrier to Europe's largest airline, and a very profitable one at a time when some of its competitors are facing loses and insolvency. The secret to Ryanair's success is simple: cheap fares. Clearly, public concerns over fatigue are tempered by the prospect of flying from Brussels to Barcelona for €14.99 ($21).
Ryanair is hardly unique among its peers when it comes to reports of fatigue. But its remarkable growth despite such reports forces us to face a harsh reality: If passengers want air travel to be safe, they must be willing to pay for it.
TICK..TOCK indeed!
Addendum:
Recieved a PM from an IOS member suggesting I copy across some of my recent GA thread posts as they are somewhat relevant to this thread but I now see Kharon has linked them.
In case you missed the links:
TSBC in-flight breakup report a benchmark for ATsB??
Senator X questions veracity of the TSBC review?? & research report comparison.
Last edited by Sarcs; 29th Dec 2013 at 05:16.
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Fort Fumble had the starting point of fatigue management sitting in the palm of its sweaty little hand but decided to throw it all away. Why? Well Colgan was a turning point in fatigue and human factors that even awoke the sleeping ICAO beast from its slumber! The NTSB did all the investigative groundwork, and all Fort Fumble had to do was follow the play script. Plus they the additional bonus of having Ben Cook onboard the team, but they let him walk out the door after he was sick of the non support and internal pony pooh.
But don't worry, an unintentional micro sleep or fatigue induced mistake causing a smoking hole will wake up Auatralia.
Tick Tock
But don't worry, an unintentional micro sleep or fatigue induced mistake causing a smoking hole will wake up Auatralia.
Tick Tock
Last edited by Cactusjack; 29th Dec 2013 at 12:29.
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Quote:
Not sure about the Canuck's CARs, they do seem to largely mirror the US FARs... : Canuck CARs
A third the size of Australia's Frankenstein. And it would be a sixth if they didn't have to duplicate the text in English and French.
Not sure about the Canuck's CARs, they do seem to largely mirror the US FARs... : Canuck CARs
A third the size of Australia's Frankenstein. And it would be a sixth if they didn't have to duplicate the text in English and French.
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Warning Nick Xenophon – Warning.
NX- blogs "I admit I’m pretty ‘useless’ – at least when it comes to putting out blogs. It’s been a long time between drinks and my New Year’s resolution is to blog more often."
The opening paragraph on the Infrastructure website under the heading of “Confidentiality and Personal Information” which advises:
Your submission, including any personal information supplied, will be provided by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (the Department) to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel and its specialist advisers (as required) for the purpose of undertaking the review and preparing their report.
Your submission, including any personal information supplied, will be provided by the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (the Department) to the Aviation Safety Regulation Review Panel and its specialist advisers (as required) for the purpose of undertaking the review and preparing their report.
Nick's Blog
Food for thought and a blast from the past for 2014??
Kharon:
Perhaps Senator X could do a blog piece on the TASRR ToRs, I'm sure he would get plenty of comments on that contentious subject matter...
What a year it has been and let's hope that in the coming year a few more DIPs develop at least half the testicular fortitude of Senator Nick and take on the current malaise within the embuggered aviation safety bureaucracy....
Reflections '13: For reflections on the year, that has been, we only need revisit the following pprune threads (links are 2013 year specific):
Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011 & current version Merged: Senate Inquiry
The Regulatory Reform Program will drift along forever & current version Merged: CASA Regulatory Reform
And for this thread and where we now end the year you can't go past Kharon's post at #181
Revelations '13: We've all known for way too many years that Fort Fumble is morally bankrupt and that the RRP will 'drift along forever', so personally my disturbing revelation for '13 is just how rooted our once highly respected and credible aviation accident investigative agency has become, especially in the last five years under Beaker's beyond all reason reign. Besides the PelAir report (AAI Inquiry Report) this fall, to a spiral dive of oblivion, is perhaps best highlighted in the following GA threads: ATSB reports & ATSB to be reviewed by Canadian TSB
In looking to the future (i.e. 2014) we quite often look to the past first, so let's flashback to 2004 and reflect on the words of an IOS founding member on the subject of the ATSB:
And for a more general reflection let's take it back a century to 1914 care of Adam Gopnik's article: Two Ships
Hmm..contemplating '14 with much more to follow but approaching TOPD for next year, enjoy NYE and catch ya next year....cheers and many beers Sarcs
:
Now you have become a tendentious blogger, does this act qualify you as a fully fledged member of the Ills of Society? Could the blog could end up an extension of PPRuNe?; discussing matters such the Pel Air response, (or lack thereof); the CAO 48 rumble, the CASR bun-fight or even a repository for the IOS comments on the Truss wet lettuce leaf 'review' of aviation safety regulation.
What a year it has been and let's hope that in the coming year a few more DIPs develop at least half the testicular fortitude of Senator Nick and take on the current malaise within the embuggered aviation safety bureaucracy....
Reflections '13: For reflections on the year, that has been, we only need revisit the following pprune threads (links are 2013 year specific):
Senate Inquiry, Hearing Program 4th Nov 2011 & current version Merged: Senate Inquiry
The Regulatory Reform Program will drift along forever & current version Merged: CASA Regulatory Reform
And for this thread and where we now end the year you can't go past Kharon's post at #181
Revelations '13: We've all known for way too many years that Fort Fumble is morally bankrupt and that the RRP will 'drift along forever', so personally my disturbing revelation for '13 is just how rooted our once highly respected and credible aviation accident investigative agency has become, especially in the last five years under Beaker's beyond all reason reign.
Besides the PelAir report (AAI Inquiry Report) this fall, to a spiral dive of oblivion, is perhaps best highlighted in the following GA threads: ATSB reports & ATSB to be reviewed by Canadian TSB In looking to the future (i.e. 2014) we quite often look to the past first, so let's flashback to 2004 and reflect on the words of an IOS founding member on the subject of the ATSB:
KEEP A LITTLE SALT HANDY THIS WEEK, PLEASE …
IN CASE ANOTHER ATSB REPORT COMES OUT
IN CASE ANOTHER ATSB REPORT COMES OUT
I urge members of the Press Corps to keep a grain or two of salt handy this week. It may be needed when ATSB publishes its report into the Aviation Incident which occurred near Launceston on Christmas Eve.
The Report will probably be released this week, and it may contain the kind of inaccuracy for which the ATSB is rapidly developing a reputation. Before you go to camera, microphone or print on it, please contact us by phone or e-mail so we can – if necessary - tell you what ATSB may have chosen not to reveal.
The Aviation Incident is being beaten up for industrial reasons. Changes were made to Australia’s management of airspace. These changes take us part of the way out of the “quill pen and green eye-shade” era in which our airspace management has been for the past 50 years. Our airspace is now managed like that of the USA, which has an outstanding safety record – and there is far more flying in the USA than in any other country.
Those changes, sadly, are apparently seen by the leaders of the Air Traffic Controllers’ Union as a threat to their members’ jobs rather than the opportunity for professional development that they are,
The relationship between ATSB and the Air Traffic Controllers is a close one – so close that ATSB appointed a former Air Traffic Controller to investigate this incident.
ATSB has been widely criticised for its conduct of investigations. For example –
Mr. Wayne Chivell - Coroner, South Australia, July 2003
"Mr. Fearon was made available by the ATSB to answer as many questions as he could arising from Mr. Cavenagh's evidence.
"The difficulty I have with Mr. Fearon's evidence on this topic is that he is happy to seize upon data, such as that produced by Mr. Braly, as supporting his theory, but when contradictory data was put to him he reverted to rather facile positions.
"......Mr Fearon's evidence became unhelpfully speculative.
"I find the ATSB's theory, namely................., as to be so unlikely as to be almost fanciful.
"In my opinion, the evidence is overwhelmingly against the ATSB theory...........
"As each of these technical issues were put to (The ATSB's) Mr. Cavenagh and Mr. Fearon their explanations and arguments became more abstruse and less credible. I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved.
Ms Lyn McDade - Deputy Northern Territory Coroner, March 2003.
"ATSB apparently acting on the advice of others determined that they would not attend the accident site because it appeared to be an accident involving pilot error only. The basis for that determination could not be explored... ...because Mr. Heitman the ATSB representative who made that determination was not able to give evidence because he could not be located. This has deprived the family of the opportunity to test Mr. Heitman and ascertain why he formed the view about the accident he clearly did, without attending the scene or conducting any other enquiries other than telephone contacts with, it appears, Senior Sergeant B and nobody else."
Mr. Alistair Hope - Coroner, Western Australia, September 2002
"I should stress at the outset that any comments in relation to the performance of the ATSB are made in the context where eight people have unnecessarily lost their lives, such a tragic event in my view requires careful analysis of available evidence and where answers are not forthcoming because of a lack of evidence, an examination should take place as to the way in which evidence has been obtained and possible deficiencies in obtaining evidence identified, which should be corrected in future cases if such tragedies are not to be repeated on a continuing basis."
Mr. Kurt Mackiewicz - Father of deceased pilot, on the ABC in July 2003
"The protracted investigation was attributable to the ATSB's questionable culture and also their arrogant and obstructionist conduct at the inquiry."
Mr. Peter Scollard – Pilot involved at Launceston, in the Hobart Mercury on December 29th. 2003
"I was fully aware of the Virgin Blue plane's presence at all times, I was monitoring it on two radio frequencies and I was maintaining separation. It is quite simple for me to diverge one or two degrees. At no stage was there ever going to be a collision or even a near-collision."
Peter has good reason for concern. ATSB has not given him a copy of the transcript of the radio transmissions at the time of the incident, even though he took part in the transmissions. If all ATSB was doing was carrying out a “no blame” investigation, why on earth would they not give him a copy so that he could, for example, point out any transcription errors? To make matters worse it seems that a copy of that transcript, or a tape of the transmissions, has been made available to others!
If you were investigating with the intention of finding out what had happened, once you has made a transcript of a recording wouldn’t you send it to ALL those whose voices were on the tape asking them to verify the transcription? But if you were seeking “an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached” (to quote Coroner Chivell) then you might well be selective about who got the transcript and who did not.
So keep that salt handy and be sure to give us a call on 08 8276 4600 if you feel an urge to report on whatever character assassination it is that ATSB has in store for Peter.
Boyd Munro
AIR SAFETY AUSTRALIA
AIR SAFETY AUSTRALIA
Hmm..contemplating '14 with much more to follow but approaching TOPD for next year, enjoy NYE and catch ya next year....cheers and many beers Sarcs
Last edited by Sarcs; 31st Dec 2013 at 07:00.
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Do we - Look Left; or, look back?
So, Looky loo, Blackhand, Trolls and Casa-philes in general – 30 minutes of the old year left. Would you perhaps care to make a statement?; rebutting any or all of the Sarcs post above? – No ! - why am I not surprised?? I should of course, in concise, elegant terms, define exactly why not. However: as a gentle-man; and, what with it being new years eve and all, I decline this one time, to publicly do so.
I will await, with some faith, the parliamentary verdict on the aviation "safety" department performance. I have some patience with even the weak kneed Truss effort. But do be aware that even though the 2013 'performance' passed muster, (just) the parliamentary credibility test barrier; and, even reasonable doubt (parliamentary style) served you well: 2014 will be the year of veritas. Cash, and no bull****. The houseboat thrives on forward bookings.
Here endeth my 2014 resolution. Selah.
I will await, with some faith, the parliamentary verdict on the aviation "safety" department performance. I have some patience with even the weak kneed Truss effort. But do be aware that even though the 2013 'performance' passed muster, (just) the parliamentary credibility test barrier; and, even reasonable doubt (parliamentary style) served you well: 2014 will be the year of veritas. Cash, and no bull****. The houseboat thrives on forward bookings.
Here endeth my 2014 resolution. Selah.
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Fair go Kharon, they are on a 17.5 % leave loaded 'free' holiday somewhere. Safety doesn't appear to be suffering because of their absence. They would serve us all by extending that stay.
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casa's on "hols"
Gives us all time to have a good browse of things we have forgotten about.
This is a little gem and shows that other people can see some of the problems facing aviation, which are structural as well as aviation related.
Move on ASRR to the new regs - NZ-CAA, FAA-regs now
and K -
"TICK TOCK" for sure, unless ASRR grabs a hold.
New Year - Out with the OLD
This is a little gem and shows that other people can see some of the problems facing aviation, which are structural as well as aviation related.
Move on ASRR to the new regs - NZ-CAA, FAA-regs now
and K -
"TICK TOCK" for sure, unless ASRR grabs a hold.
New Year - Out with the OLD
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Geoff Edwards – 2009
UITA – the Geoff Edwards – 2009 article linked to post #189 (above) is a full on 26 page reading event. For those contemplating making a submission to the Truss review it is worth taking the time to read at least the first 15 or 20 pages; there is some very good research and 'interesting' facts tucked away in the missive. You may not agree with some (or all) of the conclusions drawn, it is 'academic'. But if you are stuck for a phrase, or an idea to help frame a submission, you may just find some inspiration.
The thing that troubles is despite the many millions of dollars spent, thousands of pages published, numerous reviews, inquiries, commissions etc. etc. nothing seems to have changed much. It's a little like watching the desert, the ever shifting surface sands move to present an altered landscape, the core remains as ever, unchanged.
Heigh Ho - FWIW – I cherry picked some appetisers:-
The thing that troubles is despite the many millions of dollars spent, thousands of pages published, numerous reviews, inquiries, commissions etc. etc. nothing seems to have changed much. It's a little like watching the desert, the ever shifting surface sands move to present an altered landscape, the core remains as ever, unchanged.
Heigh Ho - FWIW – I cherry picked some appetisers:-
P5 It is widely agreed that by the mid-1980s the Australian regulations had become too complex and anachronistic. But that does not give any hint as to whether the remedy lay in more government action or less: Yeend claimed that by 1985 there was a first class team within the regulator “already tackling a major up-date” (1994:402) but pilots’ lobby group AOPA claimed that the rules were a product of empire building petty bureaucrats: “...voluminous and disorganised sets of orders, rules, regulations, standards and sundry publications... [drafted by] twenty odd legal buffoons” (2000).
P6-“At its core, safety isn’t cost-effective” said Schiavo, former US Inspector-General of Transportation (1997:48). The marginal cost of preventing fatalities in aviation is very high. In Nader & Smith’s words (1994:317) “Safety always extracts a cost, whether in money, time, convenience or all of these.” That society places a limit on safety expenditure or, more bluntly, that human life has a price, is manifest in the fact that the budgets for road improvements are always contestable and always limited. One has only to visit a public hospital to learn that life is not sacrosanct, that there is a continual trade-off with financial expense. To Ramsden (1976:76), the fact that no airlines offer all rear-facing seats or full-body webbing restraints was evidence that safety can take second place to convenience or profit.
P6-Broderick (2001) found a remarkable correlation between accident rates and effective
governmental implementation of ICAO’s standards. He credited part of the global improvement to ICAO’s move in the mid-1990s to mandatory audits. “...good government aviation safety oversight results in airlines having good safety records. It’s that simple!” If it really is that simple, the converse conclusion also follows: if things go wrong, the government can be blamed.
governmental implementation of ICAO’s standards. He credited part of the global improvement to ICAO’s move in the mid-1990s to mandatory audits. “...good government aviation safety oversight results in airlines having good safety records. It’s that simple!” If it really is that simple, the converse conclusion also follows: if things go wrong, the government can be blamed.
P7-The James Reason model of safety preparedness portrays accidents simply as occupying the apex of a pyramid of causation that fails at several levels. Reason’s model is now internationally mainstream within aviation circles, though Young & Faulkner (2005) have argued that the pendulum has swung too far toward blaming management for latent systems weaknesses. There is still such a thing as human error.
P9- Australian Transport Safety Bureau
The Bureau proudly proclaims itself as `independent’ because it is institutionally separate within the transport portfolio from the regulator, the service deliverer and the policy office. The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 provides that the Executive Director is “not subject to directions from the Minister or the Secretary” in exercising their powers under this Act (s.15). However, the depth of independence is contestable. Some claim that the body cannot be independent unless it is situated within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and so not accountable to the same minister as CASA; or even directly funded by the parliament so that it is `independent’ of all ministerial departments. On funding, an insider wrote anonymously: “The [US] NTSB gets its funding by a direct allocation by Congress. We do not. Our budget is determined by the Secretary of the Dept and is being steadily tightened.”
Seven years later, the 2009 amendments seem to address this long-standing issue. When ICAO in its February 2008 “Safety Oversight Audit” (AIG/01, 1-6-01) gently chided Australia because the performance indicators had been based on the budget allotted to ATSB, whereas ideally, the typical number of accidents and incidents should be used as a basis of determining the budget, this was one of the only 3 out of 48 findings that Australia declined to accept at least in part – because it was “impractical…within resources available.” Budget was driving safety, still.
The Bureau proudly proclaims itself as `independent’ because it is institutionally separate within the transport portfolio from the regulator, the service deliverer and the policy office. The Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 provides that the Executive Director is “not subject to directions from the Minister or the Secretary” in exercising their powers under this Act (s.15). However, the depth of independence is contestable. Some claim that the body cannot be independent unless it is situated within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and so not accountable to the same minister as CASA; or even directly funded by the parliament so that it is `independent’ of all ministerial departments. On funding, an insider wrote anonymously: “The [US] NTSB gets its funding by a direct allocation by Congress. We do not. Our budget is determined by the Secretary of the Dept and is being steadily tightened.”
Seven years later, the 2009 amendments seem to address this long-standing issue. When ICAO in its February 2008 “Safety Oversight Audit” (AIG/01, 1-6-01) gently chided Australia because the performance indicators had been based on the budget allotted to ATSB, whereas ideally, the typical number of accidents and incidents should be used as a basis of determining the budget, this was one of the only 3 out of 48 findings that Australia declined to accept at least in part – because it was “impractical…within resources available.” Budget was driving safety, still.
P9- Civil Aviation Safety Authority
Before the reforms of 1988 and later, the staff had apparently been proud of their record: “...there was, over a period of 40 years [1948-1988], a complete body of safety regulations established... It was not perfect, but it was the foundation of the best safety record in the history of aviation” (Yeend, 1994a:2,5,6). Yet “Despite our record and experience, the industry clamoured for a new civil aviation authority, loudly supported by the aviation press in the late 1980s. I am one of those who was in that process labelled as part of the dead hand and the cement-headed bureaucracy of the 1980s” (1994:6). Yeend deplored the self-serving capture of the Authority in the early reforms by “some industry operators and adventurers” and the destruction of corporate expertise.
Either his was a rose-coloured perspective or relationships deteriorated rapidly in the wake of the restructure. By 1989 more than 61% of staff in a survey said they would not recommend CAA as an employer (John Walker, 1989). Worse was to come. According to witnesses Foley and Haines, within CASA there was instituted a “culture of fear, fiat and favouritism” (TQS, 1994) commencing in early 1991, when under Dick Smith the Authority was reviewed and
restructured.
Before the reforms of 1988 and later, the staff had apparently been proud of their record: “...there was, over a period of 40 years [1948-1988], a complete body of safety regulations established... It was not perfect, but it was the foundation of the best safety record in the history of aviation” (Yeend, 1994a:2,5,6). Yet “Despite our record and experience, the industry clamoured for a new civil aviation authority, loudly supported by the aviation press in the late 1980s. I am one of those who was in that process labelled as part of the dead hand and the cement-headed bureaucracy of the 1980s” (1994:6). Yeend deplored the self-serving capture of the Authority in the early reforms by “some industry operators and adventurers” and the destruction of corporate expertise.
Either his was a rose-coloured perspective or relationships deteriorated rapidly in the wake of the restructure. By 1989 more than 61% of staff in a survey said they would not recommend CAA as an employer (John Walker, 1989). Worse was to come. According to witnesses Foley and Haines, within CASA there was instituted a “culture of fear, fiat and favouritism” (TQS, 1994) commencing in early 1991, when under Dick Smith the Authority was reviewed and
restructured.
More of Edwards and a bit of Sandilands..??
Yes the Edwards article is still very relevant, five years may have passed but we as a modern supposedly 1st world aviation safety administrator have not progressedinstead....
So Edwards three fundamental observations stand the test of time so far..:
Meanwhile Ben has published his wishlist/expectations/predictions for 2014 and lo' and behold guess what it is at the top of the list??
:
Subsequently Ben's IOS 2014 annual membership has been accepted as paid in full...
Addendum:
My 2 bob's worth.. Coroner Chivell's quote.."I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved."...perfectly sums up the standard modus operandi
for both the ATSBeaker & Fort Fumble and should be the IOS catchcry for '14...
instead....So Edwards three fundamental observations stand the test of time so far..
:
First, some of the internal problems have not yet been resolved. The 2008 Issues Paper and Green Paper and public submissions indicate that a coordinated and forward-looking air traffic policy is missing; tensions characterise the relationship between CASA and ATSB; and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete. Was CASA’s skills base eroded too much in the 1990s or is the whole notion of non-prescriptive regulation misconceived anyway?
Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.
Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.
Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.
Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.
has published his wishlist/expectations/predictions for 2014 and lo' and behold guess what it is at the top of the list??:
Air safety administration
A Senate committee will ask very detailed questions as to precisely how the Federal Police investigated the earlier concerns of the committee which considered the ATSB Pel-Air crash report, and referred possible breaches of the law by CASA to the AFP. The Federal Police will be asked if certain lines of inquiry were discontinued or disregarded.
My expectation is that a massive whitewash will be attempted, and … it won’t wash. I’m happy to say on a reasonable reading of all of the evidence that the ATSB and CASA probably conspired to suppress incompetence on the part of CASA, that the Transport Safety Investigation Act was offended, and that they set out to frame the pilot of the flight in a manner severely prejudicial to all tests of procedural fairness and failed to produce a report which meets internationally accepted standards of an air accident investigation by a first world country.
I expect that the treatment by various parties of the injuries and personal damage suffered by one of the survivors of that crash will shame all concerned, and that includes in the Opposition as well as Government.
I am concerned that this Government will try suppress disclosures about the ATSB and CASA that reflect very poorly on their current administration on the basis that our country should go to sleep and not be disturbed by such matters.
However I am especially concerned that this will lead to Australia being sanctioned by the US administration on the issue of governance and performance in air safety administration and that it will do to this country what it did to Israel, another very important ally, and bust us down to second tier status, causing the cancellation of the US code shares vital to Qantas and Virgin Australia as well as other negative consequences.
I expect that the Minister has, or will, ask why nothing material has been done change the ludicrously stupid regulations that apply to the refuelling of oceanic flights by Australian run air ambulance services in the more than four years since the Pel-Air crash occurred.
It is not unreasonable to expect the Minister to ask tough questions about CASA’s chronic inability to protect the public from operations it knew to be dangerous in advance such as those involving the late Barry Hempel and Transair, the operator that slaughtered 15 people in the Lockhart River crash of 2005.
I expect the Minister to come under pressure from both sides of the house to bring aviation accident investigations in this country into line with the open hearing practices of ICAC in NSW re the criminality of the previous NSW State Government and the Pink Batts Royal Commission and the various open inquiries into priests fiddling with our children and being protected by churches and organisations acting with evil and loathsome intent to deny justice to the victims and their families.
(The writer has expectations that go way beyond air transport.)
But these are only expectations, and they may not be fulfilled.
A Senate committee will ask very detailed questions as to precisely how the Federal Police investigated the earlier concerns of the committee which considered the ATSB Pel-Air crash report, and referred possible breaches of the law by CASA to the AFP. The Federal Police will be asked if certain lines of inquiry were discontinued or disregarded.
My expectation is that a massive whitewash will be attempted, and … it won’t wash. I’m happy to say on a reasonable reading of all of the evidence that the ATSB and CASA probably conspired to suppress incompetence on the part of CASA, that the Transport Safety Investigation Act was offended, and that they set out to frame the pilot of the flight in a manner severely prejudicial to all tests of procedural fairness and failed to produce a report which meets internationally accepted standards of an air accident investigation by a first world country.
I expect that the treatment by various parties of the injuries and personal damage suffered by one of the survivors of that crash will shame all concerned, and that includes in the Opposition as well as Government.
I am concerned that this Government will try suppress disclosures about the ATSB and CASA that reflect very poorly on their current administration on the basis that our country should go to sleep and not be disturbed by such matters.
However I am especially concerned that this will lead to Australia being sanctioned by the US administration on the issue of governance and performance in air safety administration and that it will do to this country what it did to Israel, another very important ally, and bust us down to second tier status, causing the cancellation of the US code shares vital to Qantas and Virgin Australia as well as other negative consequences.
I expect that the Minister has, or will, ask why nothing material has been done change the ludicrously stupid regulations that apply to the refuelling of oceanic flights by Australian run air ambulance services in the more than four years since the Pel-Air crash occurred.
It is not unreasonable to expect the Minister to ask tough questions about CASA’s chronic inability to protect the public from operations it knew to be dangerous in advance such as those involving the late Barry Hempel and Transair, the operator that slaughtered 15 people in the Lockhart River crash of 2005.
I expect the Minister to come under pressure from both sides of the house to bring aviation accident investigations in this country into line with the open hearing practices of ICAC in NSW re the criminality of the previous NSW State Government and the Pink Batts Royal Commission and the various open inquiries into priests fiddling with our children and being protected by churches and organisations acting with evil and loathsome intent to deny justice to the victims and their families.
(The writer has expectations that go way beyond air transport.)
But these are only expectations, and they may not be fulfilled.
Addendum:
My 2 bob's worth..
Coroner Chivell's quote.."I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved."...perfectly sums up the standard modus operandi for both the ATSBeaker & Fort Fumble and should be the IOS catchcry for '14...
Last edited by Sarcs; 2nd Jan 2014 at 05:23.
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2014 - Year of the wet lettuce leaf
My 2014 prediction is that we will see the increased use of the wet lettuce leaf. Nothing has happened over the past 24 years to give me any confidence that a positive 12 degree bank to the left has started. Australia is still caught up in a phugoid motion, and more nose down than anything.
Unfortunately Clarise the lambs are still crying.
Nothing definitive will take place because nobody in power cares. Things weren't much better in New Zealand in the 70's until the Erebus accident. It then took a long time for things to start to change for the better but it did happen, although things are still not perfect. Several accidents in Canada in the 90's were a catalyst that saw their hands twisted by those in high places, and again positive changes were made by TC, and as a result safety standards improved.
Australia is in an aviation safety slumber ........... ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ .......... The standard of the CASA and what is now the ATSB is proof that mental illness truly is an underestimated illness with far reaching tentacles. What other excuse could there be? An FAA downgrade or smouldering hull appear to be the only two unpalatable options at this point in time that could trigger change.
Tendentious bloggers like Xenophon, and succinct reporters like Sandilands are certainly a breath of fresh air, but they are two very small pawns in the giant CASA ocean. Until Australian aviators hand power to the Independent politicians the only way change will occur will be by way of something I have sadly experienced before, and you really really don't want to go there my friends.
No, 2014 will see more government obsfucation, the occasional bitch slap with a wet lettuce leaf by the Minister, lots of tough talk with no action, and lots of clever little decoys designed to fool the masses into believing our skies are actually safe.
So grab the beer and popcorn, plant some fresh lettuce seeds, stock up on the turd polish and raise your eyes skywards because 2014 will absolutely be the year of the wet lettuce leaf!
I believe this is now customary? TICK TOCK
Unfortunately Clarise the lambs are still crying.
Nothing definitive will take place because nobody in power cares. Things weren't much better in New Zealand in the 70's until the Erebus accident. It then took a long time for things to start to change for the better but it did happen, although things are still not perfect. Several accidents in Canada in the 90's were a catalyst that saw their hands twisted by those in high places, and again positive changes were made by TC, and as a result safety standards improved.
Australia is in an aviation safety slumber ........... ZZZZZZZZZZZZZ .......... The standard of the CASA and what is now the ATSB is proof that mental illness truly is an underestimated illness with far reaching tentacles. What other excuse could there be? An FAA downgrade or smouldering hull appear to be the only two unpalatable options at this point in time that could trigger change.
Tendentious bloggers like Xenophon, and succinct reporters like Sandilands are certainly a breath of fresh air, but they are two very small pawns in the giant CASA ocean. Until Australian aviators hand power to the Independent politicians the only way change will occur will be by way of something I have sadly experienced before, and you really really don't want to go there my friends.
No, 2014 will see more government obsfucation, the occasional bitch slap with a wet lettuce leaf by the Minister, lots of tough talk with no action, and lots of clever little decoys designed to fool the masses into believing our skies are actually safe.
So grab the beer and popcorn, plant some fresh lettuce seeds, stock up on the turd polish and raise your eyes skywards because 2014 will absolutely be the year of the wet lettuce leaf!
I believe this is now customary? TICK TOCK
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patience, dear
Dancing Dog,
I guess we are all just ignoring it because the report is already drafted and we are now just going through the motions of appearing to consult with the great unwashed out there
Try a couple of lines down the list for something containing clues like Truss and Aviation Safety Regulation Review
Looks a bit like:
http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-...on-review.html
I guess we are all just ignoring it because the report is already drafted and we are now just going through the motions of appearing to consult with the great unwashed out there
Try a couple of lines down the list for something containing clues like Truss and Aviation Safety Regulation Review
Looks a bit like:
http://www.pprune.org/australia-new-...on-review.html
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Nuts or a cigar?
Coroner Chapel's quote.."I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate scientific analysis of the factors involved."..
Are we to expect more of the same with the present whimsical Truss effort?
A Senate committee will ask very detailed questions as to precisely how the Federal Police investigated the earlier concerns of the committee which considered the ATSB Pel-Air crash report, and referred possible breaches of the law by CASA to the AFP. The Federal Police will be asked if certain lines of inquiry were discontinued or disregarded.
My expectation is that a massive whitewash will be attempted, and … it won’t wash. I’m happy to say on a reasonable reading of all of the evidence that the ATSB and CASA probably conspired to suppress incompetence on the part of CASA, that the Transport Safety Investigation Act was offended, and that they set out to frame the pilot of the flight in a manner severely prejudicial to all tests of procedural fairness and failed to produce a report which meets internationally accepted standards of an air accident investigation by a first world country.
I expect that the Minister has, or will, ask why nothing material has been done change the ludicrously stupid regulations that apply to the refuelling of oceanic flights by Australian run air ambulance services in the more than four years since the Pel-Air crash occurred.
The serenity of Sleepy Hollow and all who graze in the lush, Elysian fields must not be disturbed, least of all by those miscreant elements who had the temerity to survive. And anyway, there is a welcome party for four newcomers to prepare, overseas guests are always especially welcome.
Now Sir, will you have nuts or a cigar?
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the AFP referral
Has anyone seen any evidence of the RRAT Committee actually referring the alleged breaches of the TSIA 03?
Is there a public document that establishes a timeline for any subsequent examination of the AFP's actions?
Is there a public document that establishes a timeline for any subsequent examination of the AFP's actions?
----and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete.
The above, of course, from the Edwards paper quoted in previous posts.
But, of course, you all realised, didn't you, how out of date is the reference to "performance based" regulation, with the present regime at CASA completely abandoning performance based regulation, with a return to complex and ultra-prescriptive regulation, based on a very narrow and literal interpretation of S.9A of the Civil Aviation Act 1988.
Tootle pip!!
PS: IN my personal view, the Edwards paper is interesting, but the selection of quotes from a selection of sources is a very personal one. I, for one, would not agree with many of the "conclusions", which you are expected to make.
Feds run a protection racket for the bureaucrats??
PNM:
How about this Prince Nick....from Hansard of CASA - RRAT, 18/11/2013, Estimates:
However given that the former PM KRUDD couldn't get the AFP to properly investigate the PMC bureaucrats (see here)...
Access was sought to a copy of the referral letter sent by the Hon. Kevin Rudd MP to the AFP seeking an investigation into the unauthorised release of a video onto YouTube.
...what chance have we got that the Feds will do a proper job of the Senate referral for investigation of the trough dwellers (bureaucrats) at Fort Fumble??
Quote slightly adjusted for the Feds:
That said it would be interesting for the RRAT committee to request a copy of the AFP PROMIS file & case notes to scrutinise the thoroughness of the Feds investigation...
Has anyone seen any evidence of the RRAT Committee actually referring the alleged breaches of the TSIA 03?
Senator XENOPHON: But, Minister, with respect, the Senate unanimously handed down its findings, and they were scathing findings by any objective measure. It was a damning report of CASA and the ATSB—absolutely damning. No-one can criticise the methodology of the committee and the forensic work that the committee put into this.
Insofar as there are a number of recommendations made based on what the committee found to be very serious failures in respect of the Pel-Air investigation, then surely that is relevant in looking at systemic failures on the part of CASA and the ATSB.
Senator SINODINOS: I do not think we are talking at cross-purposes. I am just saying that this is not a forum to replay the whole of that investigation.
Senator XENOPHON: Yes, but insofar as the Senate made a number of recommendations that were scathing of the ATSB and CASA—
Senator SINODINOS: All of which is on the public record.
Senator XENOPHON: from my point of view we do not want it swept under the carpet. There is a genuine concern by all members of this committee about airline safety in this country.
CHAIR: There was some dramatic downgrade of the incident.
Senator XENOPHON: That is right.
CHAIR: What was it from?
Senator XENOPHON: It went from being a safety issue identified as critical to being downgraded significantly. That is something that Senator Fawcett asked many questions about. There were issues about whether CASA and the ATSB colluded or not. That was raised. Can I remind the minister that the committee took such a serious view of this that it referred the evidence to the Federal Police for investigation into whether there was a breach of the TIA legislation.
Senator SINODINOS: I think we are in furious agreement.
Senator XENOPHON: I still do not know how the panel is going to do its job if it does not give privilege to people.
Senator SINODINOS: Having listened to all of this, we will go away and get advice on how we can handle this in a way that means that—
Senator XENOPHON: If you can.
Insofar as there are a number of recommendations made based on what the committee found to be very serious failures in respect of the Pel-Air investigation, then surely that is relevant in looking at systemic failures on the part of CASA and the ATSB.
Senator SINODINOS: I do not think we are talking at cross-purposes. I am just saying that this is not a forum to replay the whole of that investigation.
Senator XENOPHON: Yes, but insofar as the Senate made a number of recommendations that were scathing of the ATSB and CASA—
Senator SINODINOS: All of which is on the public record.
Senator XENOPHON: from my point of view we do not want it swept under the carpet. There is a genuine concern by all members of this committee about airline safety in this country.
CHAIR: There was some dramatic downgrade of the incident.
Senator XENOPHON: That is right.
CHAIR: What was it from?
Senator XENOPHON: It went from being a safety issue identified as critical to being downgraded significantly. That is something that Senator Fawcett asked many questions about. There were issues about whether CASA and the ATSB colluded or not. That was raised. Can I remind the minister that the committee took such a serious view of this that it referred the evidence to the Federal Police for investigation into whether there was a breach of the TIA legislation.
Senator SINODINOS: I think we are in furious agreement.
Senator XENOPHON: I still do not know how the panel is going to do its job if it does not give privilege to people.
Senator SINODINOS: Having listened to all of this, we will go away and get advice on how we can handle this in a way that means that—
Senator XENOPHON: If you can.
Access was sought to a copy of the referral letter sent by the Hon. Kevin Rudd MP to the AFP seeking an investigation into the unauthorised release of a video onto YouTube.
"Dear Commissioner Negus
Re: Investigation of offenses associated with the theft and illegal transmission of a video recording
I write following my referral of possible criminal activities to you on 14 March 2012, my meeting with your senior officers on 29 October and your written response to my referral provided to me at that meeting. Copies of relevant records are attached.
In the first instance I wish to reemphasise to you that as an ordinary Australian citizen I take these offenses seriously. Also as the immediate past prime minister and foreign minister of Australia, I take these offenses seriously. They do not constitute a trivial matter.
As I noted in my referral of 14 March 2012, the stolen video recording in question was downloaded without legal authorisation, edited without my consent prior to being uploaded to YouTube, then released through a YouTube account for the explicit purpose of damaging my reputation nationally and internationally; and that notification of the existence of this YouTube video to the Australian media was first through an anonymous phone call."
...what chance have we got that the Feds will do a proper job of the Senate referral for investigation of the trough dwellers (bureaucrats) at Fort Fumble??
Quote slightly adjusted for the Feds:
"I gained the very distinct impression that this constituted an ex post facto justification for a conclusion that had already been reached rather than a genuinely dispassionate AFP investigation of the factors involved."
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Conundrum.
PNM # 195-Is there a public document that establishes a timeline for any subsequent examination of the AFP's actions?
Sarcs # 197 -That said it would be interesting for the RRAT committee to request a copy of the AFP PROMIS file & case notes to scrutinise the thoroughness of the Feds investigation.
While it's a very interesting exercise to review the Parliamentary Library List on aviation reviews, inquiry, and commissions for the past 20 years; it is an almost surreal experience to follow the post review results. The pattern is 'crystal' clear; the choreography elegant and the execution immaculate (plenty of practice-methinks). Basically there are five steps in this dance. Pel Air is passing effortlessly through step three onto step four; the Truss WLR has by-passed step one, has almost completed two and is lining up the transition to steps three and four; in short order. At step five it's all over, the music stops and the band goes home until next time.
Aye, it's a conundrum, about to become more complicated by the WA Senate elections. So even for our erstwhile, bi-partisan Senate inquiry, the clock is ticking. IMO the only show stopper is the amount of anger fuelled determination the Pel Air inquiry committee has remaining to break the never ending cycle; crash, review to nothing changed, at great expense.
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Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1)
Direct link, here you go;
Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1)
I had started a thread on this document as I did not realise it had since been repealed/ceased. I then removed the thread as I thought it no longer relevant. Sorry.
I for one would like too see more on this, how/why can an amendment be Made 19 Dec 2013, Registered 24 Dec 2013 and then repealed 26 Dec 2013.
Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1)
I had started a thread on this document as I did not realise it had since been repealed/ceased. I then removed the thread as I thought it no longer relevant. Sorry.
I for one would like too see more on this, how/why can an amendment be Made 19 Dec 2013, Registered 24 Dec 2013 and then repealed 26 Dec 2013.
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automatic repeal
Junior brother,
it goes like this:
procedural only...
Stay Alive,
it goes like this:
48A Automatic repeal of amending and repealing instruments
(1) This section repeals a legislative instrument that is made on or after the commencement of this section and whose only legal effect is to amend or repeal one or more other legislative instruments (without making any application, saving or transitional provisions relating to the amendment or repeal).
Time of repeal
(2) The repeal of the instrument by this section happens on the day after the last occurrence of one of the following events:
(a) the commencement of the instrument or of the last of its provisions to commence;
(b) the registration of the instrument.
Effect of repeal
(3) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not affect any amendment or repeal made by the instrument. This does not limit the effect of section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 as it applies in relation to the repeal of the instrument by this section because of section 13 of this Act.
(4) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not prevent section 38 or 42 from applying to the instrument after the repeal. That application does not delay the repeal of the instrument by this section.
(1) This section repeals a legislative instrument that is made on or after the commencement of this section and whose only legal effect is to amend or repeal one or more other legislative instruments (without making any application, saving or transitional provisions relating to the amendment or repeal).
Time of repeal
(2) The repeal of the instrument by this section happens on the day after the last occurrence of one of the following events:
(a) the commencement of the instrument or of the last of its provisions to commence;
(b) the registration of the instrument.
Effect of repeal
(3) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not affect any amendment or repeal made by the instrument. This does not limit the effect of section 7 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 as it applies in relation to the repeal of the instrument by this section because of section 13 of this Act.
(4) The repeal of the instrument by this section does not prevent section 38 or 42 from applying to the instrument after the repeal. That application does not delay the repeal of the instrument by this section.
Stay Alive,
As a matter of interest??
While we're waiting for the debate....
PNM post #1686:
....Kharon brings up an interesting point, post #1687...
As of two days ago the US are now operating to an amended FAR 117: "PART 117 - Flightcrew Member Duty and Rest Requirements"
And as "K" mentions besides one or two points of difference, the new rules have been generally well accepted, here's an example from ALPA:
Here in Oz Fort Fumble in their usual bombastic way rammed through into law Civil Aviation Order 48.1 Amendment Instrument 2013 (No. 1) despite criticisms from similar industry groups to the US ALPA...
AIPA: Safety risked by flawed aviation rules that would result in fatigued pilots landing planes after 20 hours at the controls
“AIPA believes that a scientific review of the proposed limits is necessary, ensuring efficiency is balanced with flight safety through principles developed by thorough scientific analysis, not lobbying. The motion to disallow CAO 48.1 will allow all industry stakeholders to go back to the table with CASA and produce legislation that is more aligned to international best practice, which will provide an outcome that is significantly better for public safety.”
VIPA: New Regulations
"CASA has previously stated that the current CAO 48 is devoid of sound scientific principles to define the prescribed Flight and Duty limits cites this inadequacy to advocate for its new rule set. The new CAO 48 is supposed to be based on currently recognised and credible fatigue science. Sadly the new CAO 48.1 does not come close to satisfying the scientific principles. For example the scientific studies that ICAO relied upon to develop the SARP for FDP limits recognise that flight duty should not exceed 8 to 9 hours at the controls. The new rules routinely allow for this, which is no different to what we currently do.."
This FF total disconnect with industry concern was further highlighted by a speech made by the DAS at Clive's dinosaur park:Reforming civil aviation regulations - enhancing safety standards through new flight crew fatigue management rules
Hmm...so while we wait and ponder the next political moves, on yet another reg debacle, it would appear the rest of the world has addressed the problem and are getting on with it......TICK TOCK indeed!
PNM post #1686:
1 - if the motion lapses without debate then the Instrument is disallowed and ceases to have the force of law;
2 - if the motion is debated and voted in, then the Instrument is disallowed and ceases to have the force of law; or
3 - if the motion is debated and voted out, then the Instrument continues to have the force of law.
2 - if the motion is debated and voted in, then the Instrument is disallowed and ceases to have the force of law; or
3 - if the motion is debated and voted out, then the Instrument continues to have the force of law.
notice that the FAA, who can legitimately claim safety sovereignty, have shown the way (again) with their revised fatigue rules which have apparently managed to reach a most satisfactory conclusion. They probably have not satisfied everyone's wishes, but the interested parties have, in a democratic fashion, achieved a greatly improved regulation based on modern thinking. So Bravo the FAA. Meanwhile here at home – "round and around the garden" – seems an apt description and 25 years in not really a long wait in the life of a glacier; is it ?
And as "K" mentions besides one or two points of difference, the new rules have been generally well accepted, here's an example from ALPA:
ALPA Supports Same Flight And Duty Rules For All Airline Pilots
“ALPA applauds the FAA and DOT for their continued efforts to ensure that the U.S. airline industry remains the safest in the world. The new science-based flight- and duty-time rules are a significant victory for safety and the traveling public here in the United States because they represent a long-overdue overhaul of decades-old flight and duty regulations.
“Unfortunately, the regulations have one critical shortfall because they exclude cargo airline pilots. ALPA was fully engaged in the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee regarding pilot fatigue, and has long maintained that the new flight- and duty-time limits and minimum rest requirements must cover all airline pilots. It is clear from the science that all airline pilots experience fatigue in the same ways, regardless of whether they are transporting passengers or cargo. Cargo airline pilots fly the same aircraft types over the same routes, into and out of the same airports, as passenger airline pilots. This is why ALPA supports H.R. 182/S. 1692—the Safe Skies Act, which would require that cargo pilots be included in these regulations in order to increase safety for the public. We urge every U.S. senator and representative to support this important aviation safety legislation for all who rely on air transportation.”
“ALPA applauds the FAA and DOT for their continued efforts to ensure that the U.S. airline industry remains the safest in the world. The new science-based flight- and duty-time rules are a significant victory for safety and the traveling public here in the United States because they represent a long-overdue overhaul of decades-old flight and duty regulations.
“Unfortunately, the regulations have one critical shortfall because they exclude cargo airline pilots. ALPA was fully engaged in the FAA’s Aviation Rulemaking Committee regarding pilot fatigue, and has long maintained that the new flight- and duty-time limits and minimum rest requirements must cover all airline pilots. It is clear from the science that all airline pilots experience fatigue in the same ways, regardless of whether they are transporting passengers or cargo. Cargo airline pilots fly the same aircraft types over the same routes, into and out of the same airports, as passenger airline pilots. This is why ALPA supports H.R. 182/S. 1692—the Safe Skies Act, which would require that cargo pilots be included in these regulations in order to increase safety for the public. We urge every U.S. senator and representative to support this important aviation safety legislation for all who rely on air transportation.”
AIPA: Safety risked by flawed aviation rules that would result in fatigued pilots landing planes after 20 hours at the controls
“AIPA believes that a scientific review of the proposed limits is necessary, ensuring efficiency is balanced with flight safety through principles developed by thorough scientific analysis, not lobbying. The motion to disallow CAO 48.1 will allow all industry stakeholders to go back to the table with CASA and produce legislation that is more aligned to international best practice, which will provide an outcome that is significantly better for public safety.”
VIPA: New Regulations
"CASA has previously stated that the current CAO 48 is devoid of sound scientific principles to define the prescribed Flight and Duty limits cites this inadequacy to advocate for its new rule set. The new CAO 48 is supposed to be based on currently recognised and credible fatigue science. Sadly the new CAO 48.1 does not come close to satisfying the scientific principles. For example the scientific studies that ICAO relied upon to develop the SARP for FDP limits recognise that flight duty should not exceed 8 to 9 hours at the controls. The new rules routinely allow for this, which is no different to what we currently do.."
This FF total disconnect with industry concern was further highlighted by a speech made by the DAS at Clive's dinosaur park
:Reforming civil aviation regulations - enhancing safety standards through new flight crew fatigue management rules
The recent claims made by some sections of the industry appear to compare the standby requirements specified in the new CAO 48.1 with foreign regulators’ airport standby arrangements. However, these are two very different concepts, and comparing them is tendentious and misleading.
...TICK TOCK indeed!