ANZ Erebus crash 28 November 1979 - 34 years later.

[Vmo248]

Air NZ history May 4th, 1981

Mr M R Davis retires as chief executive of Air New Zealand.

#Just realised been a month or twelve since I actually posted anything here!#

[prospector]

They had nothing of the sort.

If they were in the area that was approved for the sightseeing, and not below 6,000ft, and had been identified on radar, what would whiteout have to do with anything? there is no high ground in that area, and if they had of been identified on the radar do you not think the radar operator would advised them if they were approaching any high ground?

As has been stated before, if you want to break the rules you have to be 100% certain you are right.

[Hempy]

Originally Posted by Brian Abraham

I'm afraid you still don't get it prospector, the traps that lay with whiteout.

Given all those facts I would have thought anybody or perhaps I should say any reasonable person, would accept the Company and CAA had done their bit to ensure a safe operation.

They had nothing of the sort.

I'm struggling to understand this 'sector whiteout' argument in regards to this accident. Undoubtedly the phenomenon was not widely known about amongst civilian pilots at the time of the accident. It's probable that no one on the tech crew knew of it's nature. They thought they were in VMC but the conditions meant that the rising ground in front of their mis-identified position was impossible to spot visually against the cloud/horizon..

So what?

If they had stayed IFR above the MSA (F160) until they were radar identified (as per every other flight, and company procedure), not only would have they discovered the gross navigation error (as they appeared on the scope overhead Erebus), but the 'sector whiteout' would have been irrelevant.

They were flying into a potentially inhospitable environment, with much more to worry about than sector whiteout. In conditions other than perfect blue to MSL, and with a 12 thousand foot mountain close to their elected flight path.

VHF radio is line-of-sight. So is primary and secondary radar. Clear comms dropping out on descent, and lack of radar identification well within the expected coverage of both was the first little whiff that something wasn't quite right.

Yet the crew decided to descend. Anything after this was always going to be in the lap of the God's...all of the preset safety measures were redundant as soon as they dropped below 16,000".

Are you suggesting that had 'sector whiteout' been a commonly known phenomena that ANZ would have amended the SOPs for descent below MSA? or that ANZ should have known about this phenomena and push more stridently in their SOP's for radar identification and VHF with McMurdo prior to descending below MSA? Or are you suggesting simply that Collins would not have descended until he was identified had he known about 'sector whiteout'?

What's the relevance? They plowed into a mountain at 260 kts and 1500". The argument seems to be that they didn't see the mountain and had no way of knowing it was there. Well fk me, of course they didn't see it. That's the whole point..

[Ornis]

There's nothing mysterious about whiteout. It is simply the eye having nothing to focus on, a special case of empty field myopia. If there's poor light under full cloud over ice and snow, you would still see a large-enough dark object. If you can't, it's not VMC (day) - by definition.

Collins didn't see Erebus for exactly the same reason pilots in VMC don't see the nearer snowy ridge when there is another higher snowy ridge behind: No contrast.

Whether or not Collins was in VMC as defined by the company, and thus required legally under CARs, is an other matter.

I have already broached one aspect of VFR with the CAA. It is that whatever the rules are about visibility and cloud, there is an implicit requirement that you fly with reference to the ground. In my opinion this should be explicit in the rules. In general terms it means you recognise the ground for what it is, preferably identify it. If you are above cloud then you must be in clear air such that higher ground or its cloud cover is obvious.

The fact is Captain Collins, flying VFR, descended without identifying his position with reference to the ground. He couldn't see a very large mountain he knew was close by, either above the cloud or below it. That is not a good position to be in. A prudent pilot might have retraced his path out over the sea and climbed. So confident was he of his instruments he continued. Under VFRs he was not permitted to do so.

I know Brian Abraham is, quite rightly, more concerned with the lessons to be learned than apportioning blame, but the sad fact is a large number of people out for a joyride were killed quite unnecessarily and I don't think the lessons were learned. That is why I brought up Perpignan.

If airline pilots are not going to accept the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight, why have them at all? Why not just program the aircraft and send it on its way? After all, it's probably at the point you really only need a pilot when something goes wrong.

[ampan]

Hempy #123:

“Undoubtedly the phenomenon was not widely known about amongst civilian pilots at the time of the accident. It's probable that no one on the tech crew knew of it's nature. They thought they were in VMC but the conditions meant that the rising ground in front of their mis-identified position was impossible to spot visually against the cloud/horizon.”

The captain knew about the difficulty distinguishing the cloud from the ice. On hearing of the low cloud layer over McMurdo Station, he considered baling out and going elsewhere.

[Paragraph377]

The captain knew about the difficulty distinguishing the cloud from the ice. On hearing of the low cloud layer over McMurdo Station, he considered baling out and going elsewhere.

The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset were virtually completely unknown in commercial aviation, particularly at ANZ in 1979. Of course Capt Collins understood the difficulty of distinguishing between snow and ice, as would the other crew who flew those sightseeing sectors, but that in itself is completely different to the condition of whiteout phenomena.

[Ornis]

Paragraph377: The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset...

Sounds more like syphilis.

NZALPA: THE EREBUS STORY. What was the official finding of the Mahon Report? FAQs

“In my opinion, neither Captain Collins nor First Officer Cassin nor the flight engineers made any error which contributed to the disaster, and were not responsible for its occurrence.”

Whiteout, whitewash, hogwash, I don't care, I just don't want to fly with these pilots.

[ampan]

“Cases of aircraft flying directly into snow-covered terrain in clear air, but with an unbroken low overcast, have been so numerous in aviation history as to be a matter of common knowledge among pilots who fly at low altitudes in polar regions and in northern Europe and Canada in the winter months.” (Mahon’s 1981 report, page 71)

[Paragraph377]

Ampan;

“Cases of aircraft flying directly into snow-covered terrain in clear air, but with an unbroken low overcast, have been so numerous in aviation history as to be a matter of common knowledge among pilots who fly at low altitudes in polar regions and in northern Europe and Canada in the winter months.” (Mahon’s 1981 report, page 71)

ANZ was not experienced in flying under these conditions. ANZ still isn't a Europe/Canada style operation. Best ask the ANZ flight ops department of the day how much training they gave fleet Captains and crews of the day in relation to whiteout.

Ornis;

Sounds more like syphilis.

Typical response. At least we now know about your area of expertise!
And;

Whiteout whitewash, hogwash, I don't care, I just don't want to fly with these pilots

. Another stupid comment. Go back to flying your little Caravans mate.

[ampan]

The issue is whether the captain was entitled to descend below the cloud layer on the basis that he was visual. In fact, he wasn't - but did he know that at the time? If he did, then it was a very bad case of pilot error, which bordered on outright recklessness.


If the relevant issue is the captain's knowledge, the lack of training provided by Air NZ has no relevance. If he already knew about the visual problem below the cloud, then what damage was done by Air NZ's not telling him? None.


Captain Collins clearly had a basic understanding of the problem. Note that we have snow in New Zealand, and mountains. For example, there is a Mount Hutt on the edge of the Canterbury Plains which, coincidently, is where the RNZAF Wigram base used to be and which is where the captain spent four years. When the cloud layer is lower than the mountain's summit, the mountain is not visible, which is an important piece of information for a trainee RNZAF pilot flying a Harvard over the Canterbury Plains.

[prospector]

The condition known as whiteout, it's insidious nature and its rapid onset were virtually completely unknown in commercial aviation,

Why do you persist with such rubbish? They should never have been in a position that whiteout was going to be a problem.

Are we talking about an aero club pilot doing his first solo? No, we are talking about an ex RNZAF pilot, who had worked his way up to command of a DC10, had been given his standing orders for this flight, and the requirements for descent had been very clearly laid out. He took it upon himself to completely disregard company orders and CAA requirements with the end result that many people lost their lives in exactly the circumstances that these descent requirements were meant to avoid.

[Oakape]

He took it upon himself to completely disregard company orders and CAA requirements

If these were so watertight as you seem to be suggesting, why was the company busy destroying records immediately after the accident, instead of wheeling them out & pointing the finger of blame squarely at the crew?

The various systemic & operation failures that led to this accident are far more complex than some here seem to comprehend.

[ampan]

I do not agree. Various NZALPA 'believers' trot out pompous pieces of nonsense about Swiss cheese etc., but the cause of this accident was obvious from the CVR transcript (whatever version is chosen). So how does a believer deal with that? By trying to turn something simple into something complicated.

[prospector]

If these were so watertight as you seem to be suggesting,

They were watertight, as has been posted numerous times in this thread

They also had company memorandum that covered requirements for descent OAA:14/13/28 dated 8th November 1979.

There was a copy recovered from the cockpit so the crew were aware

will post it again, though it seems quite straightforward to me.

Delete all references in briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the only let down procedure available is VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows:

1. Vis 20km plus
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 grid through 360 grid to 270 grid from McMurdo field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4.Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

[Oakape]

It would appear that there are 'believers' on both sides of the argument.

I really don't know that much about this accident. However, I do know what it is like to operate in the real world, where expectations from management seldom match exactly what the manuals, etc state. I know that the regulator often does not adequately address this situation for one reason or the other.

I also know that when it goes pear-shaped, that management & the regulator often run for cover behind the manuals & rules despite what has been allowed & sometimes actively 'encouraged' on the line.

In the real world, things are not as simple, or cut & dried as some would like to believe. Throwing some documents around & using them to 'prove' that the sole reason for the accident was the pilot's fault doesn't really help anyone, apart from giving some the satisfaction of 'knowing' what the cause was.

Aside from a few obvious exceptions, pilot's don't go to work to get themselves & their passengers killed. The cause of an accident is always a product of many factors & if all of these factors are not explored, understood & addressed, the risk of a repeat accident is high.

[Oakape]

prospector,

assuming your position is correct, why would the company be destroying documents like they did? Surely all the documents the company had to hand would have only supported your position that they were squeaky clean.

[prospector]

Surely all the documents the company had to hand would have only supported your position that they were squeaky clean.

I do not think anybody in this thread has stated the Company was "squeaky clean", that has been accepted, there were faults there granted. But they did not cause the accident, one thing caused the accident, the decision to descend against all the requirements laid down by the Company and CAA.

All these mandatory requirements have been quoted many times in this and other threads appertaining to this accident.

apart from giving some the satisfaction of 'knowing' what the cause was.

Exactly, the "probable cause" was given in the only official document relating to this accident, that was the report compiled by the Aircraft Accident Investigator, Ron Chippendale. Mahon report was but a legal opinion. That ground has been covered to, many times.

This subject keeps getting dragged up in this forum, and when some people try to tell us to respect the "deceased", and then carry on to pile abuse onto the late Ron Chippendale, then those of us who believe he was correct are going to say so.

[framer]

It would appear that there are 'believers' on both sides of the argument.

There is a faction that believes that Collins is completely without responsibility and they box that corner hard. In fact, Holmes's sorry book had an open letter to politicians asking for an acknowledgment that the crew were without blame.

The cause of an accident is always a product of many factors & if all of these factors are not explored, understood & addressed, the risk of a repeat accident is high.

Very true. And to say that the crew bore no responsibility for the outcome of the flight is to miss the opportunity to prevent history repeating.
Have we learned though?
The Erebus flight was below the legal altitude for the operation the were performing.
The Perpignan flight was below the legal altitude for the manoeuvres they were conducting.
The ANZAC day Iroquois was below the legal altitude for the operations the were conducting.
Imagine if all three Captains had refused to break the law.
By saying that I am not knocking the individuals because as you rightly pointed out there are many influences within the company etc that play their part....but there is reason for the all encompassing authority given to the pilot in command.
Good reason.

[Oakape]

I seem to be misunderstood here. I am not saying the crew are without blame. What I am saying is that there is more to it than simply that. When looking at accidents I am more interested in the why, rather that the who. That is where accident prevention really begins.

[ampan]

My sincerest apologies - You are badly misunderstood, Oakape (being the name, as I recall, of a large stupid-looking African goat). The whole reason for the continuing argument is the suggestion that the crew were blameless, being the view propounded by NZALPA, the thankfully-late Paul Holmes, and the rest of that rag-tag bunch of dimwits.