Virgin Australia Boeing 777 dirty dive at Melbourne 34
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Virgin Australia Boeing 777 dirty dive at Melbourne 34
Latest Flight International has a report on a Virgin Australia Boeing 777 doing an unexpectedly rapid descent on autopilot and low level approach to Melbourne Runway 34. The media report said the ATSB inquiry will focus on how data was incorrectly inserted into the FMC and remained undetected.
Rather than hang the crew on incorrect data input that occurred earlier in the cruise, it would be more beneficial if ATSB focused on why the company SOP emphasis to stick with the autopilot until the last few seconds of a visual approach, led to a potentially critical situation. Surely it is not that hard to hand fly a 777 on a visual approach from over Essendon to touch down on Melbourne 34 without resorting to heads down on automatics until the last minute. Talk about company induced automation dependency. No wonder airline pilots are reputed to be losing basic handling skills.
Perhaps VA management and also ATSB could learn something useful about automation dependency by attending the USA conference on the Asiana 777 accident. See below.
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board is conveninga 2-day investigative hearing to discuss the ongoing investigation into the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 and to gather additional factual information. The hearing, which will be held December 10-11, 2013, at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference Center in Washington, DC, will focus on pilot awareness in highly automated aircraft, emergency response, and cabin safety. Parties participating in the investigative hearing will be announced at a later time.
Rather than hang the crew on incorrect data input that occurred earlier in the cruise, it would be more beneficial if ATSB focused on why the company SOP emphasis to stick with the autopilot until the last few seconds of a visual approach, led to a potentially critical situation. Surely it is not that hard to hand fly a 777 on a visual approach from over Essendon to touch down on Melbourne 34 without resorting to heads down on automatics until the last minute. Talk about company induced automation dependency. No wonder airline pilots are reputed to be losing basic handling skills.
Perhaps VA management and also ATSB could learn something useful about automation dependency by attending the USA conference on the Asiana 777 accident. See below.
WASHINGTON - The National Transportation Safety Board is conveninga 2-day investigative hearing to discuss the ongoing investigation into the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 and to gather additional factual information. The hearing, which will be held December 10-11, 2013, at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference Center in Washington, DC, will focus on pilot awareness in highly automated aircraft, emergency response, and cabin safety. Parties participating in the investigative hearing will be announced at a later time.
Last edited by sheppey; 25th Oct 2013 at 12:26.
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Interesting bulletin from the FAA. Maybe the OP is on the right track after all?
Subject: Manual Flight Operations
Purpose: This SAFO encourages operators to promote manual flight operations when appropriate.
Background: A recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents, and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations.
Discussion: Modern aircraft are commonly operated using autoflight systems (e.g., autopilot or autothrottle/autothrust). Unfortunately, continuous use of those systems does not reinforce a pilot’s knowledge and skills in manual flight operations. Autoflight systems are useful tools for pilots and have improved safety and workload management, and thus enabled more precise operations. However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.
Subject: Manual Flight Operations
Purpose: This SAFO encourages operators to promote manual flight operations when appropriate.
Background: A recent analysis of flight operations data (including normal flight operations, incidents, and accidents) identified an increase in manual handling errors. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) believes maintaining and improving the knowledge and skills for manual flight operations is necessary for safe flight operations.
Discussion: Modern aircraft are commonly operated using autoflight systems (e.g., autopilot or autothrottle/autothrust). Unfortunately, continuous use of those systems does not reinforce a pilot’s knowledge and skills in manual flight operations. Autoflight systems are useful tools for pilots and have improved safety and workload management, and thus enabled more precise operations. However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.
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Effective threat and error management starts from the time you prepare to leave home/hotel until you complete the parking checklist; it is then constantly re-evaluated and modified to suit the circumstances at the time.
If the crew involved in this event did have interrupted rest (which in my experience is the norm on every longhaul duty) - I fail to see how turbulence enroute can be used as a contributing factor - then an alternative open to them was to require (not request) the RNAV or VOR approach onto 34.
Or if VA management want to enjoy the benefit of uninterrupted rest while curled up next to Mrs VA management, do as EK have done for years and mandate that visual approaches are not permitted whenever there is an instrument approach available to the duty runway (for longhaul ops).
But having said that, the 34 visual approach via SHEED is no biggie if given a few minutes of considered thought. The last time I did it was the first time in about 7 years (some guy living near the final approach to 34 had barricaded himself in his house and was firing shots...thus no IAP to that runway). The old queues were there; MCDU showing 5nm to lose nearly 2200' and visual confirmation at SHEED that we were high.
It also re-ignites the old Airbus v. Boeing thing; team A recommend (and have done so for years) that AP is off for any visual approach, while Boeing don't appear to. Whether it is 'better' than not, I don't know - I do know that it takes away any ambiguity about how the approach will be flown and focuses the mind before the approach even starts. It also means that any botch-up is IMMEDIATELY manageable by a suitable control input. With AP engaged, a departure from the expected takes necessarily longer to correct; identify the excursion, evaluate the reason, determine if it can be saved using the AP, decide it can't, change mindset to that of taking over earlier than planned, recover (which is then far later than it probably should be).
If the crew involved in this event did have interrupted rest (which in my experience is the norm on every longhaul duty) - I fail to see how turbulence enroute can be used as a contributing factor - then an alternative open to them was to require (not request) the RNAV or VOR approach onto 34.
Or if VA management want to enjoy the benefit of uninterrupted rest while curled up next to Mrs VA management, do as EK have done for years and mandate that visual approaches are not permitted whenever there is an instrument approach available to the duty runway (for longhaul ops).
But having said that, the 34 visual approach via SHEED is no biggie if given a few minutes of considered thought. The last time I did it was the first time in about 7 years (some guy living near the final approach to 34 had barricaded himself in his house and was firing shots...thus no IAP to that runway). The old queues were there; MCDU showing 5nm to lose nearly 2200' and visual confirmation at SHEED that we were high.
It also re-ignites the old Airbus v. Boeing thing; team A recommend (and have done so for years) that AP is off for any visual approach, while Boeing don't appear to. Whether it is 'better' than not, I don't know - I do know that it takes away any ambiguity about how the approach will be flown and focuses the mind before the approach even starts. It also means that any botch-up is IMMEDIATELY manageable by a suitable control input. With AP engaged, a departure from the expected takes necessarily longer to correct; identify the excursion, evaluate the reason, determine if it can be saved using the AP, decide it can't, change mindset to that of taking over earlier than planned, recover (which is then far later than it probably should be).
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The visual approach over Essendon for 34 YMML is really questionable in this day and age. Why are we still doing this approach to satisfy some dumb airspace requirements. If you have any quartering tailwind on base then you need 1000'/minute at least if around Vapp 145-150 with G/S of 160 plus. Fine for a slower aircraft but for modern jets and restrictive parameters one must question the need for this approach when a safer easier approach via Rnav/Gnss is available. If the crew had just flown through the night then I can understand completely how this situation transpired. I have come close to being unstable numerous times in a heavy NG due to the rate of decent required. CFIT and unstable approaches are the number one safety issue and ATC expecting this sort of approach after a long duty is plain irresponsible. I bet more crew will request the longer arrival after this!
JetX, that was a good spray but largely misguided. Sheppey never suggested hand-flying in a thunderstorm with one engine out on limited panel with jammed asymmetric flaps on a circling approach so he could keep current.
As for
I'm not sure that the outcome would indicate that. They saved the day but seem to have got caught out to a certain extent (as I have been too).
They are the cues present for all Sheed arrivals; you have to be "high" at Sheed. The problem has the incorrectly entered altitude for the "finals" waypoint, and apart from the Active Plan altitudes in the box, nothing would be out of the ordinary until after passing Sheed, then down she goes.
Shlong Hauler, well said.
As for
I believe the crew did the right thing, trapped the error & managed it.
Originally Posted by Rad Alt Alive
The old queues were there; MCDU showing 5nm to lose nearly 2200' and visual confirmation at SHEED that we were high.
Shlong Hauler, well said.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 25th Oct 2013 at 23:38.
Simply ask yourself why MEL ATC issue the Sheed arrival to any Aussie airline, but almost never to a foreign airline. There is a cultural aspect here - the design is poor, there is an expectation that locals will be ready and do it and foreigners shouldn't. Apparently many foreign carriers prohibit the approach. Not appropriate for an international airport.
I once saw a Korean airline attempt it and woefully stuff it up.
I once saw a Korean airline attempt it and woefully stuff it up.
Can't blame ATC for issuing the arrival, they do what they believe will get approaches and arrivals processed as expediently as possible.
It is us pilots who should be coping the blame for accepting it. As Roller Merlin said, local guys and girls seem to be the only ones to take what ATC dish out. If you are not happy with the approach given, all you have to do is say "sorry I can't accept that, require XXX approach" and they will have no choice but to give it to you, and they will get over it.
Besides, it is only a handful of extra track miles and a minute or so V's a go-around or worse. Try it one day.
It is us pilots who should be coping the blame for accepting it. As Roller Merlin said, local guys and girls seem to be the only ones to take what ATC dish out. If you are not happy with the approach given, all you have to do is say "sorry I can't accept that, require XXX approach" and they will have no choice but to give it to you, and they will get over it.
Besides, it is only a handful of extra track miles and a minute or so V's a go-around or worse. Try it one day.
When Qantas first started operating 767s on domestic routes their pilots would "require" 16R when allocated 16L. It didn't take long before a stop was put to that presumably after some phone calls between ATC and QF. The argument over the SHEED approach is that it there is no valid reason for an approach to be designed in a way that requires high descent rates for it to place an aircraft in the correct position for a landing. ATC allocate it because they have to. Pilots accept it but there are better ways to process aircraft that don't require non-standard configurations and descent profiles.
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Some contributors have disregarded the main point made by the OP. After all ATSB, did not question the flyability or otherwise of this particular STAR.
It was more a question of why the captain did not promptly stop the automatic pilot placing the aircraft further into the steep angle of descent to the degree that it did. By the time he took action the autopilot had already done the dirty on him and the aircraft was very low on final.
The reluctance of crews to disengage the automatic pilot and revert to manual flight to correct an undesirable flight path is a re-occurring factor frequently noted by flight safety researchers into the subject of automation dependency.
A case in point?
It was more a question of why the captain did not promptly stop the automatic pilot placing the aircraft further into the steep angle of descent to the degree that it did. By the time he took action the autopilot had already done the dirty on him and the aircraft was very low on final.
The reluctance of crews to disengage the automatic pilot and revert to manual flight to correct an undesirable flight path is a re-occurring factor frequently noted by flight safety researchers into the subject of automation dependency.
However, continuous use of autoflight systems could lead to degradation of the pilot’s ability to quickly recover the aircraft from an undesired state.
Last edited by Tee Emm; 26th Oct 2013 at 07:21.
'Lookyleft' the SkyGods (QF) still think they own R16R! & I don't care what anyone says they get 'looked' after to.
Am not to sure what all the Hoo Hah is here, I mean gee it's not rocket science to fly a modern day Airliner in basic flight mode, I mean after all it's a visual App & if yr ahead of the A/C then via Sheed is no more difficult than staying ahead of the game.
Wmk2
Am not to sure what all the Hoo Hah is here, I mean gee it's not rocket science to fly a modern day Airliner in basic flight mode, I mean after all it's a visual App & if yr ahead of the A/C then via Sheed is no more difficult than staying ahead of the game.
Wmk2
'ratty' that sums it up well there
It is probably the last 'fun' App left & can be a challenge in windy conditions but still very doable knowing it's always ok to Go- Around
Good 2 C you acknowledge even with tongue in cheek that the SkyGods are being looked after, perhaps the beer is better handed over to ATC at xmas time
Wmk2
It is probably the last 'fun' App left & can be a challenge in windy conditions but still very doable knowing it's always ok to Go- AroundGood 2 C you acknowledge even with tongue in cheek that the SkyGods are being looked after, perhaps the beer is better handed over to ATC at xmas time
Wmk2
This approach is fun. But it's being made more difficult by the Qf new rule of maximum rod is limited to the height agl such that.
< 3000 max rod 3000fpm
< 2000 max 2000 fpm
<1500 is 1500 fpm
Etc
Often with light winds you need an initial high rod just after sheed to get back on profile .
I find myself concentrating more on not tripping a qAr event than flying the bloody thing
< 3000 max rod 3000fpm
< 2000 max 2000 fpm
<1500 is 1500 fpm
Etc
Often with light winds you need an initial high rod just after sheed to get back on profile .
I find myself concentrating more on not tripping a qAr event than flying the bloody thing
I find myself concentrating more on not tripping a qAr event than flying the bloody thing
Isn't that so true in airline operations nowadays? Worse still the tendency for some operators to pounce on the QAR as a punitive issue rather than a flight safety trend issue.
This approach is fun. But it's being made more difficult by the Qf new rule of maximum rod is limited to the height agl such that.
< 3000 max rod 3000fpm
< 2000 max 2000 fpm
<1500 is 1500 fpm
< 3000 max rod 3000fpm
< 2000 max 2000 fpm
<1500 is 1500 fpm
'centy' it's called "Just Culture", another one of those feel good comments
Sure we know yr human & accept that, so the Co's say, but just don't F*ck it up!!!
The ROD is conducive to the ground speed, flying into a H/W straight after Sheed means you have more time to get down, T/W from Sheed means don't dilly dally once you start down from Sheed. Pretty easy seeing as we are meant to be pilots although Co's seem to want more puppets these days!!:-)
Wmk2
Sure we know yr human & accept that, so the Co's say, but just don't F*ck it up!!!
The ROD is conducive to the ground speed, flying into a H/W straight after Sheed means you have more time to get down, T/W from Sheed means don't dilly dally once you start down from Sheed. Pretty easy seeing as we are meant to be pilots although Co's seem to want more puppets these days!!:-)
Wmk2