Virgin Australia Boeing 777 dirty dive at Melbourne 34
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[quoteFool Sufferer
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Qantas has sensibly and carefully erred on the side of caution. Appropriate risk mitigation by a conservative airline with experienced and thoughtfully well-trained crews. Problem?
Last edited by Fool Sufferer; 5th Nov 2013 at 04:15.
][/quote]
Big problem : HYPOCRISY! ( taking into account the drift of TB's post )
Sensible and " carefully " erred on the side of caution.....errrr..uuhmmmmm....ahemmmmmm, why only now?
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Qantas has sensibly and carefully erred on the side of caution. Appropriate risk mitigation by a conservative airline with experienced and thoughtfully well-trained crews. Problem?
Last edited by Fool Sufferer; 5th Nov 2013 at 04:15.
][/quote]
Big problem : HYPOCRISY! ( taking into account the drift of TB's post )
Sensible and " carefully " erred on the side of caution.....errrr..uuhmmmmm....ahemmmmmm, why only now?
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Perhaps in response to this and other events, Qantas has advised their 747 and A380 crew not to accept the 34 Sheed arrival.
Have Management finally worked out that due to the amount of assigned leave being doled out on these fleets that flying skills might suffer if pilots only get to fly once in a blue moon!
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And then of course there was the 747 crew that attempted to land on Essendon Rwy 35 off this approach ( the pre-SHEED version ).That was an extreme approach and is why Rwy34 at ML has the flashing threshold strobe lights! ( 'report the strobes in sight' was standard at ML for a long time afterward )
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I have been on this 34 APP several times in the 747, and it really is a horrible procedure. That last turn to final is quite the adventure, even on a good day.
LAHSO and Missed dont go well at all together, and the HS exits arent usable.
With QANTAS and few other auth RNP, I very seldom see ATC clear for RNP. Too mnay non-RNP in the queue to blend right. Not that one cant tell when RNP is enabled...it is a virtual overlay anyways.
LAHSO and Missed dont go well at all together, and the HS exits arent usable.
With QANTAS and few other auth RNP, I very seldom see ATC clear for RNP. Too mnay non-RNP in the queue to blend right. Not that one cant tell when RNP is enabled...it is a virtual overlay anyways.
Nunc est bibendum
I have been on this 34 APP several times in the 747, and it really is a horrible procedure. That last turn to final is quite the adventure, even on a good day.
Bloggs wrote:
Errr, how about 600-odd feet high with about 5 track miles to run. Work out the 3x for that.
Errr, how about 600-odd feet high with about 5 track miles to run. Work out the 3x for that.
Please do not take this personally..... It has certainly sparked some interesting debate here, which is good.... But it also seems it is good enough to throw at your company's potential candidates sitting a stressful enough first glass/jet ride/turbine of any type interview sim.
You folks did it to two of us on the same day earlier this year (repositioning the sim so as to be way high on profile and above glidepath), fast and clean, and pointedly ignoring the published multi crew calls you provide in your pre-interview litrature and what you pointedly brief your candidates on, therefore making the task impossible for candidates warned to NEVER close the power levers on a jet...
This is not aimed at you personally, however glass houses and all that....
The vid about "Flying the Magenta Line" is a must-see for anyone who inputs into an FMS during the course of their employment.
Ops Normal, wot are you on about? My comment was directed at Wally, and if you thought-through my post you'd realise that I was saying his simplistic "use 3x" cannot work. I am not suggesting that we try a 450ft/nm descent after Sheed. As for "you folks" I haven't the foggiest about which you talk/write.
NTSB Asiana Flight 214 accident hearing- Culture & automation dependency
sheppey:
Not sure if VA or the bureau attended but none the less there are some interesting prelim findings coming out of the NTSB hearing...
Flightglobal on NTSB factual summary:
Culture and automation dependency:
From Alarm, but Insufficient Response, in Moments Before Asiana Airlines Crash
..."In the minutes before Asiana Airlines flight 214 crashed at San Francisco International Airport on July 6, one of the three pilots in the cockpit called out three times that the plane was descending too fast. But none of the pilots noticed that they were flying the plane too slowly until shortly before it hit the sea wall at the end of runway 28 Left.
..."The captain, Lee Kang Kuk, who was flying the plane, told investigators that any of the three pilots could have decided to break off the approach, but for “the low-level people,” including himself because he was being supervised by an instructor pilot, “it’s very hard,” he said.
Documents released on Wednesday by the National Transportation Safety Board, which held a daylong hearing on the crash, show that inexperience and Korean culture played a role in the way the pilots handled the landing..."
..."The documents indicated that there was confusion among the crew about how the Boeing 777’s auto throttles worked. Captain Lee had just 35 hours experience in that model, and in an interview with investigators he appeared to have confused some details of the automation system with that of the Airbus A320, with which he had extensive experience..."
From NTSB probes fatal Asiana Flight 214 crash
..."Bong said the crew practiced "cockpit resource management," training that encourages subordinates to speak up about safety concerns to other crew members, despite their senior rank, experience or seniority. But when the student captain was asked whether he had contemplated an aborted landing as the plane descended, Lee Kang Kuk said it was a "very hard" decision to make, given the deference shown in Korean culture...
By the time he pushed the throttle forward, just seconds before impact, he discovered the instructor pilot had already done so.
Culture also kept the pilot flying from wearing sunglasses, the interviews suggest. That was a factor momentarily when the student captain saw a flash of light as the plane descended through 500 feet.
Asked whether he wore sunglasses in the cockpit he said no, because it would have been considered impolite for him to wear them when he was flying with his PM. He said it was very important in their culture," the NTSB report says..."
...."The NTSB is focusing on what it says may have been the pilot's overreliance on autopilot and other automation on the sophisticated Boeing 777 aircraft.
Investigators asked the three-pilot crew about their understanding of auto-thrust, which controls the plane's power. The NTSB has previously said the pilots believed the auto-thrust was engaged, but it was not..."
Much still to be learnt from Asiana Flight 214...
Addendum: Totally agree Bloggsy the two events are like 'chalk and cheese' or in another perspective 'proactive' vs 'reactive' (reactions being about 2 miles behind the aircraft in FL214's case..) but sheppey did initiate the thread with the NTSB media release of the planned hearing (held yesterday), so..why not try to learn from it??
Perhaps VA management and also ATSB could learn something useful about automation dependency by attending the USA conference on the Asiana 777 accident. See below.
Flightglobal on NTSB factual summary:
Investigators detail flight mode changes in moments prior to Asiana crash
The pilots of the Asiana Boeing 777-200ER that crashed 6 July in San Francisco made a number of changes to the aircraft’s autopilot system in the moments prior to the crash, according to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
In opening remarks held during a hearing in Washington, DC, the board adds that investigators have found no evidence of mechanical problems with the aircraft, which operated flight 214 from Incheon International Airport near Seoul.
The crash, which led to three fatalities, was the first fatal 777 accident.
“The investigation to date has not identified any anomalies with the airplane prior to impact, although airplane systems testing and performance evaluation is on-going,” says the NTSB in opening remarks.
The board says that shortly after the aircraft descended through 4,800ft, the crew switched the autopilot to “vertical speed mode” with a commanded descent rate of 1,000ft per minute.
They also switched the autothrottle system to “speed mode” with a selected speed of 172kt.
But the rate of descent was not fast enough to remain on the normal glidepath, causing the aircraft to diverge above the normal angle, the board says.
When the aircraft was 5.2nm from the runway and descending through 2,400ft at 175kt, the altitude in the aircraft’s “mode control panel” was set to 3,000ft to prepare for a possible go-around, a normal action, the board says.
Then, at an altitude of about 1,600ft and 3nm from the runway, data indicates the flight level change switch, an autopilot mode normally used to climb or descend to a selected altitude, was activated.
That caused the autopilot to pitch the aircraft up and increase power in an effort to climb to 3,000ft, says the board.
The pilot responded by disconnecting the autopilot and manually pulling the throttles to idle, which moved the autothrottle switch into “hold” mode, meaning it no longer controlled the aircraft’s speed, says the board.
“When the flight level change mode was set... [the aircraft] wanted to climb... When [the pilot] overrode that mode by disconnecting the autopilot, he was telling the system... that he wanted to fly manually,” witness John Cashman, a retired Boeing 777 chief test pilot, explained to the board.
“He is flying away from the requested commands of the system, which would normally be controlling the speed,” Cashman says.
The pilots then changed the selected airspeed to 137kt, but the aircraft slowed below that target as it descended through the glidepath and continued “rapidly decelerating”, says the board.
At the same time, the pilot applied back pressure to the control column, increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude.
“But there was no mention of the decaying speed on the recorders at this time. The thrust levers remained at idle, [the] airplane continued to lose airspeed and sink below the glidepath,” says the board.
The pilots of the Asiana Boeing 777-200ER that crashed 6 July in San Francisco made a number of changes to the aircraft’s autopilot system in the moments prior to the crash, according to the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
In opening remarks held during a hearing in Washington, DC, the board adds that investigators have found no evidence of mechanical problems with the aircraft, which operated flight 214 from Incheon International Airport near Seoul.
The crash, which led to three fatalities, was the first fatal 777 accident.
“The investigation to date has not identified any anomalies with the airplane prior to impact, although airplane systems testing and performance evaluation is on-going,” says the NTSB in opening remarks.
The board says that shortly after the aircraft descended through 4,800ft, the crew switched the autopilot to “vertical speed mode” with a commanded descent rate of 1,000ft per minute.
They also switched the autothrottle system to “speed mode” with a selected speed of 172kt.
But the rate of descent was not fast enough to remain on the normal glidepath, causing the aircraft to diverge above the normal angle, the board says.
When the aircraft was 5.2nm from the runway and descending through 2,400ft at 175kt, the altitude in the aircraft’s “mode control panel” was set to 3,000ft to prepare for a possible go-around, a normal action, the board says.
Then, at an altitude of about 1,600ft and 3nm from the runway, data indicates the flight level change switch, an autopilot mode normally used to climb or descend to a selected altitude, was activated.
That caused the autopilot to pitch the aircraft up and increase power in an effort to climb to 3,000ft, says the board.
The pilot responded by disconnecting the autopilot and manually pulling the throttles to idle, which moved the autothrottle switch into “hold” mode, meaning it no longer controlled the aircraft’s speed, says the board.
“When the flight level change mode was set... [the aircraft] wanted to climb... When [the pilot] overrode that mode by disconnecting the autopilot, he was telling the system... that he wanted to fly manually,” witness John Cashman, a retired Boeing 777 chief test pilot, explained to the board.
“He is flying away from the requested commands of the system, which would normally be controlling the speed,” Cashman says.
The pilots then changed the selected airspeed to 137kt, but the aircraft slowed below that target as it descended through the glidepath and continued “rapidly decelerating”, says the board.
At the same time, the pilot applied back pressure to the control column, increasing the aircraft’s pitch attitude.
“But there was no mention of the decaying speed on the recorders at this time. The thrust levers remained at idle, [the] airplane continued to lose airspeed and sink below the glidepath,” says the board.
From Alarm, but Insufficient Response, in Moments Before Asiana Airlines Crash
..."In the minutes before Asiana Airlines flight 214 crashed at San Francisco International Airport on July 6, one of the three pilots in the cockpit called out three times that the plane was descending too fast. But none of the pilots noticed that they were flying the plane too slowly until shortly before it hit the sea wall at the end of runway 28 Left.
..."The captain, Lee Kang Kuk, who was flying the plane, told investigators that any of the three pilots could have decided to break off the approach, but for “the low-level people,” including himself because he was being supervised by an instructor pilot, “it’s very hard,” he said.
Documents released on Wednesday by the National Transportation Safety Board, which held a daylong hearing on the crash, show that inexperience and Korean culture played a role in the way the pilots handled the landing..."
..."The documents indicated that there was confusion among the crew about how the Boeing 777’s auto throttles worked. Captain Lee had just 35 hours experience in that model, and in an interview with investigators he appeared to have confused some details of the automation system with that of the Airbus A320, with which he had extensive experience..."
From NTSB probes fatal Asiana Flight 214 crash
..."Bong said the crew practiced "cockpit resource management," training that encourages subordinates to speak up about safety concerns to other crew members, despite their senior rank, experience or seniority. But when the student captain was asked whether he had contemplated an aborted landing as the plane descended, Lee Kang Kuk said it was a "very hard" decision to make, given the deference shown in Korean culture...
By the time he pushed the throttle forward, just seconds before impact, he discovered the instructor pilot had already done so.
Culture also kept the pilot flying from wearing sunglasses, the interviews suggest. That was a factor momentarily when the student captain saw a flash of light as the plane descended through 500 feet.
Asked whether he wore sunglasses in the cockpit he said no, because it would have been considered impolite for him to wear them when he was flying with his PM. He said it was very important in their culture," the NTSB report says..."
...."The NTSB is focusing on what it says may have been the pilot's overreliance on autopilot and other automation on the sophisticated Boeing 777 aircraft.
Investigators asked the three-pilot crew about their understanding of auto-thrust, which controls the plane's power. The NTSB has previously said the pilots believed the auto-thrust was engaged, but it was not..."
Much still to be learnt from Asiana Flight 214...
Addendum: Totally agree Bloggsy the two events are like 'chalk and cheese' or in another perspective 'proactive' vs 'reactive' (reactions being about 2 miles behind the aircraft in FL214's case..
) but sheppey did initiate the thread with the NTSB media release of the planned hearing (held yesterday), so..why not try to learn from it??
Last edited by Sarcs; 11th Dec 2013 at 23:01.
I'm unconvinced of the commonality of the two, Sarcs. Sure, the VA crew were using the automation, probably a reasonable thing to do after that (I assume long) flight (just as Asiana did), especially on the Sheed where you cannot afford to be level through Sheed; you need to clip 2500ft going down so as not to go higher still; VNAV helps to achieve that.
It would seem a simple waypoint/target altitude programming error was made by VA, subsequently picked up quickly and resolved. Asiana, however was different: unaware of what controls speed when in FLCH and continued inability to either notice or do anything about it. With VA, it was noticed and something done.
Not very sophisticated if it lets a crew get well below Vref with it doing anything about it?
It would seem a simple waypoint/target altitude programming error was made by VA, subsequently picked up quickly and resolved. Asiana, however was different: unaware of what controls speed when in FLCH and continued inability to either notice or do anything about it. With VA, it was noticed and something done.
sophisticated Boeing 777 aircraft
