Qlink B717 stick shaker events
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Aircraft weight detectors in the landing gear would be something that pilots and anyone interested in flight safety would LOVE, but bean counters and airline managers would HATE. Guess who wins?
So I am not misunderstanding anyone here - am I interpreting correctly that you are saying inbuilt weight detectors in the undercarriage would prevent airlines from regularly overloading their aircraft to maximise profits?
Join Date: Apr 2006
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RedWine = no idea. Where do you want to go with the last minute dash reference? If you're trying to link this to the two eastern stick shakers, there's no link (no pun intended) as they were just loss of SA during an approach and no one watching the airspeed...
This 717 event is very similar to the EK A340 takeoff from MEL, where computers and automated systems have allowed an error to propagate right through to a near miss incident. It's the sort of stuff that's relatively easy to fix from a systems perspective, but hard to detect until you get an incident like this to show you where the holes line up...
This 717 event is very similar to the EK A340 takeoff from MEL, where computers and automated systems have allowed an error to propagate right through to a near miss incident. It's the sort of stuff that's relatively easy to fix from a systems perspective, but hard to detect until you get an incident like this to show you where the holes line up...
Join Date: Oct 2004
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The conversion of the Vanguard to the Merchantman incorporated a weight and trim device called STAN, sum total and nose, I think it stood for. You would taxi forward, stop and apply the park brake, then activate the system to check the load sheet. The tolerances were quite high, approximately 2 tonnes for an aircraft with a max take-off weight of 66.5 tonnes. However the system was far more accurate than that.
One winter one of the aircraft was continually just inside the limits. Eventually it was discovered that a drain hole in the fuselage had become blocked and considerably water had pooled which had then frozen.
One winter one of the aircraft was continually just inside the limits. Eventually it was discovered that a drain hole in the fuselage had become blocked and considerably water had pooled which had then frozen.
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Boeing FCTM's mention to respect the stick shaker at all times.
Good advice, they should also suggest that pilots respect the red bit at the bottom of the speed tape.
Generally, as previously posted, stick shaker onset is a factor of AoA, usually 1.1 Vs and does not reference the FMC weight inputs.
If the barber pole is closer than normal to your IAS or target speed something is not right, FMC or actual weight is not correct.
Obviously this will only be of use once airborne and won't protect you for take off calculation/loading errors.
Good advice, they should also suggest that pilots respect the red bit at the bottom of the speed tape.
Generally, as previously posted, stick shaker onset is a factor of AoA, usually 1.1 Vs and does not reference the FMC weight inputs.
If the barber pole is closer than normal to your IAS or target speed something is not right, FMC or actual weight is not correct.
Obviously this will only be of use once airborne and won't protect you for take off calculation/loading errors.
Last edited by Hey Driver; 14th Feb 2012 at 07:13.
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Timely reminder to all pilots that lift = weight and the critical component in calculating lift is the V bit. You can't ever rule out mistakes (pilot error) or design for every occurrence (tombstone technology). As SLF I don't want to end up charcoaled at the end of the runway because some pilot was lazy or had a bad day. What is happening to the checking and cross checking that is meant to happen in a cockpit? It seems to be a missing ingredient in this incident.
