Qantas fly A330 over the MTOW
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Qantas fly A330 over the MTOW
Bit of a stuffup on behalf of the ground crew but this sort of thing will get your AOC cancelled if you are a GA operator however Qantas do it and there seems to be no problem. No threat to safety Qantas says.....
They were 884kg overweight with the wrong COG and wrong data in the FMC
Qantas overloaded aircraft
Investigation: AO-2009-011 - Weight and balance event - Airbus A330-303, VH-QPJ, Sydney Aerodrome, New South Wales, 6 March 2009
They were 884kg overweight with the wrong COG and wrong data in the FMC
Qantas overloaded aircraft
Qantas overloaded aircraft
Andrew Heasley
March 23, 2011 - 6:10AM
An overloaded Qantas Airbus A330 flying from Sydney to Hong Kong was a risk to flight safety, air investigators have found.
A breakdown in the flow of paperwork controlling pallets of freight loaded on to the passenger aircraft led to it being overloaded, exceeding its maximum structural take-off weight by almost a tonne.
As a consequence, pilots configured the plane's flight computers for take-off based on the wrong data about the aircraft's weight and centre of gravity, which "had the potential to affect the safety of flight", investigators with the the Australian Transport Safety Bureau found.
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A delay in notifying the error resulted in the aircraft making another 10 flights before maintenance checks for any damage were undertaken. The delay "presented a risk to the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft", investigators said.
The safety bureau also trawled its records and found 28 freight load control incidents at Qantas in the 2½ years to last August, with the most recent being on July 8 last year.
The investigation also uncovered a lapse of quality control at the airline.
Qantas had not reviewed its Sydney freight loading centre for quality assurance in the 22 months before the incident on March 6, 2009.
These reviews were supposed to be carried out by senior Qantas management personnel every six months. The last review was conducted in May 2007, investigators found.
"The investigation could not discount that, had those quality assurance reviews been carried out, this occurrence might have been avoided," the bureau's investigators said.
No damage was subsequently found to the aircraft and Qantas has since made changes to the way it loads and checks freight into aircraft, reports incidents and has revamped its staff training, the bureau said.
Andrew Heasley
March 23, 2011 - 6:10AM
An overloaded Qantas Airbus A330 flying from Sydney to Hong Kong was a risk to flight safety, air investigators have found.
A breakdown in the flow of paperwork controlling pallets of freight loaded on to the passenger aircraft led to it being overloaded, exceeding its maximum structural take-off weight by almost a tonne.
As a consequence, pilots configured the plane's flight computers for take-off based on the wrong data about the aircraft's weight and centre of gravity, which "had the potential to affect the safety of flight", investigators with the the Australian Transport Safety Bureau found.
Advertisement: Story continues below
A delay in notifying the error resulted in the aircraft making another 10 flights before maintenance checks for any damage were undertaken. The delay "presented a risk to the ongoing airworthiness of the aircraft", investigators said.
The safety bureau also trawled its records and found 28 freight load control incidents at Qantas in the 2½ years to last August, with the most recent being on July 8 last year.
The investigation also uncovered a lapse of quality control at the airline.
Qantas had not reviewed its Sydney freight loading centre for quality assurance in the 22 months before the incident on March 6, 2009.
These reviews were supposed to be carried out by senior Qantas management personnel every six months. The last review was conducted in May 2007, investigators found.
"The investigation could not discount that, had those quality assurance reviews been carried out, this occurrence might have been avoided," the bureau's investigators said.
No damage was subsequently found to the aircraft and Qantas has since made changes to the way it loads and checks freight into aircraft, reports incidents and has revamped its staff training, the bureau said.
Investigation: AO-2009-011 - Weight and balance event - Airbus A330-303, VH-QPJ, Sydney Aerodrome, New South Wales, 6 March 2009
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884kg? whilst not good, and i don't believe anyone would intentionally do it - in reality it would make 3/5s of 5/8s difference. Of course you wouldnt want an engine failure on the day out of Honkers to test your performance.
I heard a bloke in a certain freight department of an airline reckon that on LAX - SYD flights reckon their 747s were potentially 10-15 tonnes overweight regularly....
I heard a bloke in a certain freight department of an airline reckon that on LAX - SYD flights reckon their 747s were potentially 10-15 tonnes overweight regularly....
884kg over 233,000kg (ish). You've gotta be joking. Sure, a stuffup but...
If the ATSB is so worried about weights, it should propose weighing of pax. I wouldn't mind betting that on a fair number of my flights the actual weight of the aeroplane bears no resemblance to what I think it is, based on the size of the blokes getting on.
If the ATSB is so worried about weights, it should propose weighing of pax. I wouldn't mind betting that on a fair number of my flights the actual weight of the aeroplane bears no resemblance to what I think it is, based on the size of the blokes getting on.
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Couldn't agree more Captn Bloggs. I believe average weights would lead to errors of +/- 2t on an A330. On the 747-400 it was funny when taxying out close to MTOW and having to hold prior to takeoff to burn off 100 kg of fuel to get down to MTOW, when you know the actual weight would be +/- 4T.
The -300 can be purchased with a 235,000 kg MTOW, and has the single engine performance to handle over 250,000 kg out of SYD.
And the hand carriage items ...
QF should be able to look at their QAR data to see what weight the aircraft calculated it was in flight anyway, the FE computer works that out all the time anyway and uses VS1G calculated by the PRIM for VLS , F, S, and green dot. Alpha prot, Alpha max, and Vsw care calculated from PRIM AoA data. The FE computer also cross checks the imputed CG vs the calculated, and will use a default of 30% if it out of tolerance by too much.
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
I wouldn't mind betting that on a fair number of my flights the actual weight of the aeroplane bears no resemblance to what I think it is, based on the size of the blokes getting on.
QF should be able to look at their QAR data to see what weight the aircraft calculated it was in flight anyway, the FE computer works that out all the time anyway and uses VS1G calculated by the PRIM for VLS , F, S, and green dot. Alpha prot, Alpha max, and Vsw care calculated from PRIM AoA data. The FE computer also cross checks the imputed CG vs the calculated, and will use a default of 30% if it out of tolerance by too much.
The fly by wire Airbus aircraft aerodynamically "weigh" themselves in flight and it is possible to go into the flight management system and find out what the aircraft thinks it weighs based on angle of attack, altitude and temperature.
There is usually a slight difference between between the captains and first officers indications which in turn differ from the load sheet. Usually our aircraft thinks it's lighter because our Asian passengers come in under standard weights.
Any large cargo aircraft which carries fruit and vegetables longhaul and lands with the maximum payload it could have carried on take off with, was overweight on departure. There is a substantial evaporation of water which takes place during the flight.
884kg in a 233 000kg aircraft is an error of less than 0.4%
There is usually a slight difference between between the captains and first officers indications which in turn differ from the load sheet. Usually our aircraft thinks it's lighter because our Asian passengers come in under standard weights.
Any large cargo aircraft which carries fruit and vegetables longhaul and lands with the maximum payload it could have carried on take off with, was overweight on departure. There is a substantial evaporation of water which takes place during the flight.
884kg in a 233 000kg aircraft is an error of less than 0.4%
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Sorry if this is a dumb SLF question, but has anyone ever proposed weighbridges at airports to help resolve this conundrum? Not that every flight would need to be weighed, but just like truck weigh stations, they could spot check a few flights here and there, and see how closely the actual weight matches the pilots' and dispatchers' calculations.
Or would that upset the applecart too much, if a 747 came in e.g. 2 tonnes overweight due to having a couple of rugby teams on board -what would they do? Obviously the airline wouldn't want to go back to the gate and offload some freight...
Or would that upset the applecart too much, if a 747 came in e.g. 2 tonnes overweight due to having a couple of rugby teams on board -what would they do? Obviously the airline wouldn't want to go back to the gate and offload some freight...
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All what you guys say is true the error was small relative to the aircraft weight.
What I am concerned about of the findings of the inquiry.The lack of procedural review despite company policy and the number of stuff ups.
Lining up a few holes in the cheese.
What I am concerned about of the findings of the inquiry.The lack of procedural review despite company policy and the number of stuff ups.
Lining up a few holes in the cheese.
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The key is not the amount of the overload. It doesn't matter whether it is 10 kg or 10 tonnes. The issue is the failure of Qantas' internal quality system to pick up the organisation's ability to make such an error.That is where the real embedding of "Safety First" comes from, not counting the bags on an individual flight per se, but having a system that works to ensure such errors can't happen.
In a case such as this a hypothetical regulator might well take the forensic view that if there is a failure in the quality system in one area then there may well be in others. And that would hypothetically point to a failure of the organisation to run itself according to the required levels of internal oversight and safety management. And that hypothetically would point to the executive management of the organisation and the accountable managers who collectively hold the AOC. A far bigger issue than a few kg here or there.
Just a thought
Quote from the "Age" report:
"The investigation also uncovered a lapse of quality control at the airline.
Qantas had not reviewed its Sydney freight loading centre for quality assurance in the 22 months before the incident on March 6, 2009.
These reviews were supposed to be carried out by senior Qantas management personnel every six months. The last review was conducted in May 2007, investigators found.
"The investigation could not discount that, had those quality assurance reviews been carried out, this occurrence might have been avoided," the bureau's investigators said"
In a case such as this a hypothetical regulator might well take the forensic view that if there is a failure in the quality system in one area then there may well be in others. And that would hypothetically point to a failure of the organisation to run itself according to the required levels of internal oversight and safety management. And that hypothetically would point to the executive management of the organisation and the accountable managers who collectively hold the AOC. A far bigger issue than a few kg here or there.
Just a thought
Quote from the "Age" report:
"The investigation also uncovered a lapse of quality control at the airline.
Qantas had not reviewed its Sydney freight loading centre for quality assurance in the 22 months before the incident on March 6, 2009.
These reviews were supposed to be carried out by senior Qantas management personnel every six months. The last review was conducted in May 2007, investigators found.
"The investigation could not discount that, had those quality assurance reviews been carried out, this occurrence might have been avoided," the bureau's investigators said"
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System Integrity vs Near Enough Is
Bloggs,
The issue here is really the integrity of the loading system and trying to control as many of the variables as is practical to do so. The statistical analysis of passenger weights is intended to avoid the issue to which you refer, since the first airline to start weighing our increasingly obese passengers is going to drown in the ensuing PR nightmare.
How good is the procedural control of W&B in your operation? Are systems reviews and QA checks being done on a regular basis? Are crews actively feeding back detected errors or are they working around known deficiencies in the system?
Defence in depth requires system integrity and the parallel tenet of keeping the problem as remote from the aircraft as possible.
However, I was charmed by the QF reference to their "proactive" response - which strangely only came about after they got caught out...
The issue here is really the integrity of the loading system and trying to control as many of the variables as is practical to do so. The statistical analysis of passenger weights is intended to avoid the issue to which you refer, since the first airline to start weighing our increasingly obese passengers is going to drown in the ensuing PR nightmare.
How good is the procedural control of W&B in your operation? Are systems reviews and QA checks being done on a regular basis? Are crews actively feeding back detected errors or are they working around known deficiencies in the system?
Defence in depth requires system integrity and the parallel tenet of keeping the problem as remote from the aircraft as possible.
However, I was charmed by the QF reference to their "proactive" response - which strangely only came about after they got caught out...
Nunc est bibendum
I agree Sherm. This is not the Qantas of a decade ago. Sacked too many experienced staff (or let them take voluntary redundancy) and promoted too many people into positions that they simply don't have the skills or experience to cope with.
This type of behaviour is rapidly becoming systemic and it comes from the top. Focussing on all the wrong things- getting rid of experience in order to go low cost- and it's starting to come home to roost. This is just the beginning. It's going to get worse. I can not fathom why Qantas are continuing down this road.
This type of behaviour is rapidly becoming systemic and it comes from the top. Focussing on all the wrong things- getting rid of experience in order to go low cost- and it's starting to come home to roost. This is just the beginning. It's going to get worse. I can not fathom why Qantas are continuing down this road.
Keg is so right! 
The run-down started years ago when Strong, Jackson, Dixon and Gregg did little more than keep the shareholders happy. They invested in neither people nor fleet, and now AJ and his colleagues are paying for their incompetence. The loss of corporate knowledge and expertise has almost been total, and near irreplacable. It can only be recovered over a genration or two. I suggest that a background in domestic aviaition is not a receipe for the successful management of a large international airline and its many complexities.
The run-down started years ago when Strong, Jackson, Dixon and Gregg did little more than keep the shareholders happy. They invested in neither people nor fleet, and now AJ and his colleagues are paying for their incompetence. The loss of corporate knowledge and expertise has almost been total, and near irreplacable. It can only be recovered over a genration or two. I suggest that a background in domestic aviaition is not a receipe for the successful management of a large international airline and its many complexities.
Keg & Ken , you are missing the point. Keeping the the share holders happy or providing them with maximum return is the primary role for the CEO of a public company. You can't blame them if they are just following their job description.
Your comments about the health of Qantas are so true, and also valid for many airlines amounst the developed nations. Unfortunately while Qantas remains in its present form the sell off of experince and the relunctance to invest in training and retention of experience will continue. I hate it !
Seriously though a 1 ton stuff up on a A330 is not life threatening. These mistakes happen in all airlines and while regretable and potentially dangerous, Qantas pilots and the Australian public should be grateful for the investigation.
Your comments about the health of Qantas are so true, and also valid for many airlines amounst the developed nations. Unfortunately while Qantas remains in its present form the sell off of experince and the relunctance to invest in training and retention of experience will continue. I hate it !
Seriously though a 1 ton stuff up on a A330 is not life threatening. These mistakes happen in all airlines and while regretable and potentially dangerous, Qantas pilots and the Australian public should be grateful for the investigation.
Bottums Up
My first twin job was flying folk to Lady Eliott Isl off the coast of Bundy. Islander, Nomad & Twooter were the workhorses, and given the island strip was 600 metres, high water mark to high water mark, every thing, pax included, was weighed before it was loaded. Many a larger person, usually women, squirmed and tried to beg off climbing onto the scales, or admonished their better half not to look at the weight display. 
I recall the Chief Pilot's surprise after some admin work, when over several years he found that the average weight of all the pax carried was 77kg. That was the standard weight of the day (late 80's).
I recall the Chief Pilot's surprise after some admin work, when over several years he found that the average weight of all the pax carried was 77kg. That was the standard weight of the day (late 80's).
Keg & Ken , you are missing the point.
We are not! Where are the returns to which you refer? And although you didn't mention it, where is the growth? There should have been a return to shareholders but also an investment in staff, fleet etc etc etc which are the lifeline to continued returns.
Seriously though a 1 ton stuff up on a A330 is not life threatening.
Agreed, but mistakes of this nature cam become systemic. What if the EK A340 was only 1 ton underweight instead of 100 tons? We'd be none the wiser. There is no substitute for good training and accuracy for without either, the industry is doomed.
Last edited by Ken Borough; 23rd Mar 2011 at 04:14.
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Fluke
I think the point here is that this is not just a company making Frisbees or manhole covers. It is a hybrid-a commercial no-holds barred business run in a regulatory environment where many promises and demonstrations and compliance checks are necessary to get and maintain the AOC which is at the core of the free-enterprise business whose fares, routes and capacity are completely un-regulated.
Central to the issue of an AOC, before the shareholders see even a dollar change hands, is the operator demonstrating that they can actually control and manage their fleet, people and infrastructure. That is done partly by a robust and capable management structure (with key posts actually approved by CASA) and also through the internal accountability structures including Quality and SMS. If the accountability bit was done solely by CASA Inspectors then there'd have to be thousands of them. It is not done that way. Part of the issuance conditions of an AOC is that the operator shows (and continues to show) that Quality and SMS systems are actually effective and that the Accountable Manager and the other AOC Post Holders fulfill their obligations to the CARs and the Authority.
A systematic failure to manage any part of the business, or failure of any or all parts of the internal "self-test" mechanisms is a threshold event......it is like separation in a marriage, the first step to the divorce court or in the case of an airline or an AMO, the pulling of their licence. Part of the criticism of Qantas after the QF accident at Bangkok was that CASA had failed to adequately address systemic failures in the airline's Risk Management and Training regimes. No doubt the failures saved money (at least in the short term) for both the Regulator and the airline, but the fact is that these failures constitute a failure to fulfill the conditions required to obtain, maintain or oversee an AOC.
Well meaning management folks who have never really got actual airline dirt under their fingernails or seen the flowing of passenger and crew blood may groan and moan about the regulatory system. They might privately feel that life would be better if the pesky rules and inspectors were out of the way. The job of the regulator is (a) to make sure that the airline is not run by too many of such folk and that (b) the airlines internal "self test" structures function well and pick up instances where the rubber band is just being stretched too far.
The job of the regulator is made tougher if across an entire group (with many operations business units, a dozen fleet types, 150 aircraft, 100 ports, thousands of pilots and engineers etc etc) well meaning KPI-driven amateurs are daily stretching that rubber band to near the limit without any overall assessment of where or when it might break and what will be the consequences. That in essence is a dis-functional organism and in the ordinary course of events the operator would be denied an AOC or if they have one, see it suspended. The Regulator is the public's defence against that needing to happen.
But even Regulators are not perfect and how good that Australia has an independent ATSB. That is a valuable safeguard, even if it only seems to be picking up minor errors. They matter! If you read the report of the NTSB into (just for example) the Alaska Airlines MD-80 Stabilizer Failure accident near LA or the Aloha Airlines roof separation in Hawaii you will see damning indictments of what happens when such dis-function in upper management or indeed in the Regulator finally kills people.
It is my understanding that the head of Safety at QF is a well meaning pleasant fellow, from a thinnish but arguably respectable aviation background, who learned what he knows about safety at the management level at Jetstar. So be it. He has a difficult job, even more demanding now after the ATSB report. I wish him well. Enthusiasm and KPIs are wonderful things for a job like his, or his hundred management peers, but care must be taken lest they mask a toxic cocktail of overflowing In-Trays, denial, complacency and ignorance.
Ask the family of Clarabelle "C.B." Lansing what they think of the competence of the airlines’ management, safety systems and the FAA oversight. Clarabelle died when the roof separated from the fuselage of her Aloha 737 years ago. Her body was never found and she rests deep in Hawaiian waters, a rest I am sure that is denied the management people in Aloha at that time, or the FAA inspectors and managers who failed in their duty. The public trusted them and they both failed to live up to that trust.
The NTSB said the following of the Aloha accident’s cause:
• The systematic failure of Aloha Airlines’ maintenance program and its inability to detect serious structure and corrosion problems
• Contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha Airlines management to properly supervise its maintenance force and:
• The failure of the FAA to adequately evaluate and oversee Aloha’s maintenance, inspection and quality programs.
Or ask the families of the 88 souls who perished in the Alaska Airlines stabilizer failure in an MD-83 near LA. They probably all thought the airlines’ internal quality and safety processes were in place and regularly checked by a vigilant FAA. Not so. The symptom available to any competent QA inspector or FAA PMI was Alaska’s unilateral change (to lengthen) the stabilizer lubrication schedule and to use non-standard tools to measure wear in that area. No doubt saved a few thousand bucks and fed someone’s KPIs. The NTSB noted (of Alaska management and the FAA):
• "This was a maintenance accident. Alaska Airlines' maintenance and inspection of its horizontal stabilizer activation system was poorly conceived and woefully executed. The failure was compounded by poor oversight...
• …had any of the managers, mechanics, inspectors, supervisors or FAA overseers whose job it was to protect this mechanism done their job conscientiously, this accident would not have happened. Poor maintenance will find a way to bite”
Sorry for the rambling length of this….airlines are not and never will be “just another business” and not all the beguilingly attractive ethnic accents, management jargon, acronyms and KPI driven strategies will ever make this different. An airline doesn't even get to be a business unless it daily satisfies the Regulator that it is up to the task and stays that way. Having done that-then it's on for one and all to make money, subject to the rules and Safety First". It can be done, actually costs less than cutting corners and it can be done well.
Safe flying to all readers-and if a tough CASA watching your outfit’s systems and management makes life a little tough, small price to pay. The shareholders only get their slice AFTER the business is run properly. Unless they want Frisbees or manhole covers.
Sherm
I think the point here is that this is not just a company making Frisbees or manhole covers. It is a hybrid-a commercial no-holds barred business run in a regulatory environment where many promises and demonstrations and compliance checks are necessary to get and maintain the AOC which is at the core of the free-enterprise business whose fares, routes and capacity are completely un-regulated.
Central to the issue of an AOC, before the shareholders see even a dollar change hands, is the operator demonstrating that they can actually control and manage their fleet, people and infrastructure. That is done partly by a robust and capable management structure (with key posts actually approved by CASA) and also through the internal accountability structures including Quality and SMS. If the accountability bit was done solely by CASA Inspectors then there'd have to be thousands of them. It is not done that way. Part of the issuance conditions of an AOC is that the operator shows (and continues to show) that Quality and SMS systems are actually effective and that the Accountable Manager and the other AOC Post Holders fulfill their obligations to the CARs and the Authority.
A systematic failure to manage any part of the business, or failure of any or all parts of the internal "self-test" mechanisms is a threshold event......it is like separation in a marriage, the first step to the divorce court or in the case of an airline or an AMO, the pulling of their licence. Part of the criticism of Qantas after the QF accident at Bangkok was that CASA had failed to adequately address systemic failures in the airline's Risk Management and Training regimes. No doubt the failures saved money (at least in the short term) for both the Regulator and the airline, but the fact is that these failures constitute a failure to fulfill the conditions required to obtain, maintain or oversee an AOC.
Well meaning management folks who have never really got actual airline dirt under their fingernails or seen the flowing of passenger and crew blood may groan and moan about the regulatory system. They might privately feel that life would be better if the pesky rules and inspectors were out of the way. The job of the regulator is (a) to make sure that the airline is not run by too many of such folk and that (b) the airlines internal "self test" structures function well and pick up instances where the rubber band is just being stretched too far.
The job of the regulator is made tougher if across an entire group (with many operations business units, a dozen fleet types, 150 aircraft, 100 ports, thousands of pilots and engineers etc etc) well meaning KPI-driven amateurs are daily stretching that rubber band to near the limit without any overall assessment of where or when it might break and what will be the consequences. That in essence is a dis-functional organism and in the ordinary course of events the operator would be denied an AOC or if they have one, see it suspended. The Regulator is the public's defence against that needing to happen.
But even Regulators are not perfect and how good that Australia has an independent ATSB. That is a valuable safeguard, even if it only seems to be picking up minor errors. They matter! If you read the report of the NTSB into (just for example) the Alaska Airlines MD-80 Stabilizer Failure accident near LA or the Aloha Airlines roof separation in Hawaii you will see damning indictments of what happens when such dis-function in upper management or indeed in the Regulator finally kills people.
It is my understanding that the head of Safety at QF is a well meaning pleasant fellow, from a thinnish but arguably respectable aviation background, who learned what he knows about safety at the management level at Jetstar. So be it. He has a difficult job, even more demanding now after the ATSB report. I wish him well. Enthusiasm and KPIs are wonderful things for a job like his, or his hundred management peers, but care must be taken lest they mask a toxic cocktail of overflowing In-Trays, denial, complacency and ignorance.
Ask the family of Clarabelle "C.B." Lansing what they think of the competence of the airlines’ management, safety systems and the FAA oversight. Clarabelle died when the roof separated from the fuselage of her Aloha 737 years ago. Her body was never found and she rests deep in Hawaiian waters, a rest I am sure that is denied the management people in Aloha at that time, or the FAA inspectors and managers who failed in their duty. The public trusted them and they both failed to live up to that trust.
The NTSB said the following of the Aloha accident’s cause:
• The systematic failure of Aloha Airlines’ maintenance program and its inability to detect serious structure and corrosion problems
• Contributing to the accident were the failure of Aloha Airlines management to properly supervise its maintenance force and:
• The failure of the FAA to adequately evaluate and oversee Aloha’s maintenance, inspection and quality programs.
Or ask the families of the 88 souls who perished in the Alaska Airlines stabilizer failure in an MD-83 near LA. They probably all thought the airlines’ internal quality and safety processes were in place and regularly checked by a vigilant FAA. Not so. The symptom available to any competent QA inspector or FAA PMI was Alaska’s unilateral change (to lengthen) the stabilizer lubrication schedule and to use non-standard tools to measure wear in that area. No doubt saved a few thousand bucks and fed someone’s KPIs. The NTSB noted (of Alaska management and the FAA):
• "This was a maintenance accident. Alaska Airlines' maintenance and inspection of its horizontal stabilizer activation system was poorly conceived and woefully executed. The failure was compounded by poor oversight...
• …had any of the managers, mechanics, inspectors, supervisors or FAA overseers whose job it was to protect this mechanism done their job conscientiously, this accident would not have happened. Poor maintenance will find a way to bite”
Sorry for the rambling length of this….airlines are not and never will be “just another business” and not all the beguilingly attractive ethnic accents, management jargon, acronyms and KPI driven strategies will ever make this different. An airline doesn't even get to be a business unless it daily satisfies the Regulator that it is up to the task and stays that way. Having done that-then it's on for one and all to make money, subject to the rules and Safety First". It can be done, actually costs less than cutting corners and it can be done well.
Safe flying to all readers-and if a tough CASA watching your outfit’s systems and management makes life a little tough, small price to pay. The shareholders only get their slice AFTER the business is run properly. Unless they want Frisbees or manhole covers.
Sherm