Another Jetstar Whistleblower
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Another Jetstar Whistleblower
The following has been submitted in confidence to the ongoing senate inquiry. Cop this ya' pack of mongrels
. Oh, and BB/AJ - this time you can't sack or intimidate him/her, cause you don't know who it is, - frustrating, isn't it??
SENATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AND AIRLINE SAFETY
I have been a pilot in the aviation industry for over 25 years.
I am a captain on the Airbus A320 with Jetstar.
This submission is provided on the basis that my identity remains confidential.
This is due, contrary to parliamentary privilege, to the strong probability of reprisal from
Jetstar management.
Pilot Experience
Jetstar have instigated a pilot cadet program and intends to place these cadets as first
officers on their aircraft. These cadets would have around 200 flight hours at the time that
they start to fly for Jetstar. To put this into some perspective, I sometimes fly 200 hours
in two months. It is not a lot of experience. Jetstar policy under the requirements of its
operations manual (OM1) as approved by the government regulator, CASA, has a
requirement of 1500 flight hours for initial intake for employment as a first officer. The
cadet program would appear to be at odds with this policy, as approved by the regulator.
Of the three airlines that I have worked for, the Jetstar operation would be by far the most
complicated. In great part this is a result of the low cost model and the lack of resources
that this model provides. For instance, traditionally, airlines have load control
departments that look after the entire weight and balance of each flight and once
completed, a load sheet is handed to the captain of the flight. The only input that the
flight crew have is to provide the required fuel figure. This department look after all
facets of the loading of the aircraft including passengers and where they are seated,
baggage and where it is loaded, cargo and where it is loaded, including the carriage of
special loads and dangerous goods with their special placement in specific positions on
the aircraft and many other variables including the segregation of certain types of
dangerous goods and the non carriage of particular dangerous good on particular aircraft
due to such things as lack of ventilation in the cargo hold of some specific aircraft in the
fleet. At Jetstar, this load control function is undertaken by the flight crew, while looking
after all of the other aspects associated with the flight and all on 30 minute turn around.
Jetstar recently outsourced its flight planning department to Manila as part of a cost
saving initiative. This has resulted in many mistakes being made in the flight plans which
are provided to the flight crew including, but not limited to, insufficient and therefore
illegal fuel loads being provided. This results in increased work load in a time limited
environment for the flight crew, to ensure that the flight departs legally.
The Airbus A320 requires, by certification, a runway that is 45 metres wide. Jetstar, by
way of a narrow runway exemption from the regulator, CASA, have approval to operate
the aircraft into and out of 30 metre wide runways. Landing and takeoff on such a narrow
runway, which also tend to be short, leaves little room for error with regard to both lateral
deviation from the centre line of the runway and touchdown due to the runway being
short. If asked off the record, few managers in the flight department of Jetstar would
argue that operations into such ports are not without risk, yet these people lack the
courage to voice these concerns to the commercial department of Jetstar, which basically
dictates where we operate to. The A320 is the largest aircraft in Australia to be granted
such approval.
The A320, apart from being a high performance transport jet also has a unique flight
control set up. Instead of a control column that is in front of the pilot, it has a small side
stick on each side. With the conventional control column, each movement made by the
pilot flying the aircraft is also made by the column in front of the pilot that is not flying.
The pilot not flying can see every control input, because they can see the movement in
their column. If needed, some assistance on the column by the captain, for instance,
would not be that unusual if the inputs being made were deemed insufficient during
landing, for instance. The side stick on the non flying side in an Airbus, however, remains
neutral at all times and if this happens to be the captain, he cannot feel or see the inputs
being made by the first officer. Additionally, if both pilots were to make inputs, they are
algebraically added. This means that if both pilots make the same input, the effect on the
aircraft will be doubled and if both pilots make equal but opposite inputs, the effect will
be zero input. Neither of these may be have good outcomes depending on the situation.
This is known on the Airbus as dual input. It is non standard procedure to have dual input
on an Airbus and the procedure, if required, is for the captain to take control of the
aircraft. This is very rarely required and a last resort. It is a fine line between taking over
too early when it is not required and taking over too late, especially on landing. This
makes the A320 more challenging for the captain with an inexperienced first officer, who
through no fault of their own, still makes errors of judgement due to inexperience.
Additionally, Jetstar scheduled services operate into airports that are outside of controlled
airspace without the assistance of a control tower or air traffic control radar services,
sometimes at night. These airports tend to have 30 metre wide, short runways and tend to
have a large amount of light aircraft traffic associated with them as these airports were
built for lighter traffic. It is the responsibility of the pilots at these airports to maintain
separation from each other. This system is only as strong as the weakest link and the
information that is provided by the pilot of the light aircraft. This pilot can sometimes be
a student pilot flying by themselves. If the position and/or altitude information they
provide is inaccurate and if the crew of the larger transport aircraft are not on the ball,
then this single person light aircraft has the potential to bring down an aircraft carrying
close to 200 people.
Jetstar pilots can fly up to 1000 hours per year. We do this around the clock, 24 hours per
day. We can work up to 14 hours per day up to six days in a row. Under present roster
protocol, we can and do, sign on as early as 5 AM for up to four days in a row and fly up
to four sectors per day and on the fifth day we could be signing on at 10 PM to fly until
7AM the next day, to then extend beyond this time due to delays. This last sign on time is
probably an hour or more past bed time of the previous few days and the duty period is
180 degrees opposed to the previous duties from the clocks view point. These shifts are
known as ‘back of the clock’. There is no way to be adequately rested for such a duty, as
is required by law, and there can be no fatigue risk management in such rostering
practices. Conversely, we could finish at 6AM after working all night, and then be
signing on at 5AM the next day. Still no chance to be adequately rested with such a lack
of routine.
Engineering, like all other departments, are under resourced and their attitude is
sometimes that they have not got time to fix things that are wrong with the aircraft and
‘push’ flight crew to take the aircraft and have it fixed some other place or at the end of
the day so that the schedule is not affected by their department. Flight crew however,
have responsibility for the overall operation and at times have to insist that something is
fixed prior to departure while under some pressure to continue regardless.
Add to these Jetstar specific threats, the normal ones of bad weather and instrument
approaches, thunderstorms, fog, cyclones, general traffic, international operations with
limited support, diversions to unfamiliar places both within Australia and internationally,
high terrain and single runway operations, where if an aircraft becomes disabled on the
runway, the flight may be unable to land and will probably have few options available
with regard to other airports with the available fuel, and you really start to see the
complication of this Jetstar operation overall.
As a captain on the A320, I rely on a competent and aviation experienced first officer for
support in high work load and non normal/emergency situations. When all is good, one
could probably fly the aircraft alone. It is when things are not good that you need the
experience sitting beside you and, you can never tell when that will be.
Jetstar, by providing insufficient resources in other operational areas, place a great deal of
responsibility on the flight crew, particularly the captain, to ensure that the operation is
not only carried out safely but is also done within the requirements of the law. This can
add significantly to the pressure of an already, well known to be, stressful job.
I have provided a lot of specific and general information under this sub section of ‘pilot
experience’ quite deliberately, and that is to show that this Jetstar operation specifically
and regular public transport jet operations more generally, are complicated and
sometimes high risk and are no place for a pilot with 200 flight hours or the experience
equivalent of two months in the industry.
USA 1500 flight hours requirement for RPT services
As is shown on page 4-20 of the Jetstar operations manual (OM1), as approved by the
government regulator, CASA, Jetstar already have a requirement to employ pilots with in
excess of 1500 flight hours to act as first officers. For all of the reasons already stated in
sub section a, this seems to be a reasonable level of experience to start on an operation as
I have described it and, indeed, is seen as such by the Jetstar flight department and
CASA.
Jetstar have started a pilot cadet program and intend to employ first officers with as little
as 200 flight hours, which is well below that which is required by the operations manual.
They have done this, not due to the fact that there is a lack of suitable pilots in Australia,
but purely for financial reasons. The list of cost saving and money making exercises that
Jetstar have running is long and none of them have safety as a consideration, but most are
outside of the terms of reference for this enquiry. For the record, policy of Jetstar senior
management is for a 10 percent cost reduction per year. This is absolutely unsustainable.
There are many examples of major accidents of aircraft that were operated by companies
that, for whatever reason, were in the process of long term, aggressive cost cutting
programs.
Jetstar are possibly making a profit from the substantial training costs associated with the
self funded cadet program. One hundred and seventy thousand dollars, seems to be a
rather large amount of money to train a person to be a first officer on an A320. On top of
this is the fact that once employed (there are no guarantees), these pilots will be on a
much inferior contract to the certified agreement that the rest of the Jetstar Australia
pilots are on. Add the possible profit from training to the significantly reduced wages that
these pilots will be on and you start to see that this is not about demand for pilots but
about a new recruitment method which fits in with Jetstar’s constant drive to undercut
wages and reduce costs and, for the reasons mentioned under sub section a, this will have
a detrimental effect on safety.
Qantas have long run a successful cadet program, employing pilots into their company
with 200 hours or similar. The difference however, is that these pilots are employed as
second officers and are not in the control seat for takeoff or landing. They are there for in
flight rest purposes on long haul flights and it is the captain and first officer who conduct
the flying. These pilots gain experience on the job over some years and would have some
thousands of hours experience by the time that they become first officers on, say, a
Boeing 737.
It needs to be remembered that the USA 1500 hour requirement was introduced as a
result of a catastrophic aircraft accident in the United States that was deemed, in part, to
be the result of crew inexperience. Let us not have to introduce such an initiative after an
event.
Pilot Recruitment and Pay for training schemes
I have touched on Jetstar pilot recruitment and my belief of the reasons that Jetstar have
set up a pilot cadet program, in sub section b. That reason is to reduce wages costs and
has nothing to do with the availability of suitable pilots from within the industry and that
it will have a detrimental effect on safety.
In days past, a pilot would be employed by an airline and that airline would be
responsible for, and take the risk for, the provision of all costs associated with the training
of this pilot including the endorsement on the applicable aircraft. This investment in this
employee was taken seriously at the recruitment stage, as the investment was large. So
seriously, in fact that, in days gone by, an applicant would not even be considered if
above the age of 26. This was so that the airline concerned would get a reasonable return
on the investment made in the individual. Additionally, due in great part to a strict
seniority system (date of joining determines promotion ect.) and the fact that terms and
conditions were much better than they are today in low cost carriers, a pilot would, in
almost all circumstances, stay with the first airline to employ them until retirement.
Today, however, things are very different. Today all of the risk is placed on the employee
and the company have little from a cost view point. It costs around $35,000 dollars
including GST, for a pilot to gain an aircraft endorsement on say an A320. (The pilot is
required to pay the full amount even though Jetstar claim the GST as a business expense
and pocket this in spite of it being paid by the pilot) As the pilot has paid for the
endorsement, after a small amount of company provided induction training, what remains
is line training on the aircraft. Unlike in the past, the first time that a pilot in Jetstar
actually flies the aircraft and probably the first time that they have flown a jet aircraft will
be with a load of passengers on board. I make this point to show that even under training,
this pilot is providing revenue for the airline and is of no cost. If at the end of this
training, which takes around two months, the pilot is considered unsuitable, then their
employment will be terminated. The $35,000 is still paid by the pilot. This means that the
recruitment that in the past was taken so seriously is no longer as critical, as all of the cost
risk is now transferred to the pilot and little cost has been incurred by the airline through
this process. This may mean that a pilot, who would not have been found suitable at the
recruitment stage, in the past, is let through to the training stage due to the low cost risk
for the airline. This pilot may slip through the net and, even though substandard, will
remain at the airline. Along similar lines, when substandard pay and conditions are
offered, such as those offered in New Zealand by Jetstar, then this means that the best
applicants are not attracted to these positions. Jetstar seem willing to accept this
unarguable reduction in safety so long as there is a commensurate reduction in wages
costs.
In days past, the employing airline provided the training via their own simulators with
training conducted by airline employees who were generally current senior training and
checking captains who were obviously up to date with current airline procedures and
processes. Today, these aircraft endorsements are provided by third parties and not an
airline. The instructors are generally not current pilots and may not have flown for many
years. In the case of my A320 endorsement, my instructor had never flown a jet aircraft
and had little idea of Jetstar procedures. This makes it much more difficult for the trainee
to come into the Jetstar system and achieve a reasonable result at a training level. It must
be remembered that the first time that the trainee flies the aircraft will be with passengers
on board. This has not always been the case, with airlines previously providing takeoff
and landing training in the aircraft without passengers. This makes the endorsement
training now, so much more important than in the past, when in fact, the training is, for
reasons stated above, much inferior. Combine this type of training with low experience
cadet pilots and the safety implications really start to multiply.
Continued in next posting %
. Oh, and BB/AJ - this time you can't sack or intimidate him/her, cause you don't know who it is, - frustrating, isn't it??SENATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AND AIRLINE SAFETY
I have been a pilot in the aviation industry for over 25 years.
I am a captain on the Airbus A320 with Jetstar.
This submission is provided on the basis that my identity remains confidential.
This is due, contrary to parliamentary privilege, to the strong probability of reprisal from
Jetstar management.
Pilot Experience
Jetstar have instigated a pilot cadet program and intends to place these cadets as first
officers on their aircraft. These cadets would have around 200 flight hours at the time that
they start to fly for Jetstar. To put this into some perspective, I sometimes fly 200 hours
in two months. It is not a lot of experience. Jetstar policy under the requirements of its
operations manual (OM1) as approved by the government regulator, CASA, has a
requirement of 1500 flight hours for initial intake for employment as a first officer. The
cadet program would appear to be at odds with this policy, as approved by the regulator.
Of the three airlines that I have worked for, the Jetstar operation would be by far the most
complicated. In great part this is a result of the low cost model and the lack of resources
that this model provides. For instance, traditionally, airlines have load control
departments that look after the entire weight and balance of each flight and once
completed, a load sheet is handed to the captain of the flight. The only input that the
flight crew have is to provide the required fuel figure. This department look after all
facets of the loading of the aircraft including passengers and where they are seated,
baggage and where it is loaded, cargo and where it is loaded, including the carriage of
special loads and dangerous goods with their special placement in specific positions on
the aircraft and many other variables including the segregation of certain types of
dangerous goods and the non carriage of particular dangerous good on particular aircraft
due to such things as lack of ventilation in the cargo hold of some specific aircraft in the
fleet. At Jetstar, this load control function is undertaken by the flight crew, while looking
after all of the other aspects associated with the flight and all on 30 minute turn around.
Jetstar recently outsourced its flight planning department to Manila as part of a cost
saving initiative. This has resulted in many mistakes being made in the flight plans which
are provided to the flight crew including, but not limited to, insufficient and therefore
illegal fuel loads being provided. This results in increased work load in a time limited
environment for the flight crew, to ensure that the flight departs legally.
The Airbus A320 requires, by certification, a runway that is 45 metres wide. Jetstar, by
way of a narrow runway exemption from the regulator, CASA, have approval to operate
the aircraft into and out of 30 metre wide runways. Landing and takeoff on such a narrow
runway, which also tend to be short, leaves little room for error with regard to both lateral
deviation from the centre line of the runway and touchdown due to the runway being
short. If asked off the record, few managers in the flight department of Jetstar would
argue that operations into such ports are not without risk, yet these people lack the
courage to voice these concerns to the commercial department of Jetstar, which basically
dictates where we operate to. The A320 is the largest aircraft in Australia to be granted
such approval.
The A320, apart from being a high performance transport jet also has a unique flight
control set up. Instead of a control column that is in front of the pilot, it has a small side
stick on each side. With the conventional control column, each movement made by the
pilot flying the aircraft is also made by the column in front of the pilot that is not flying.
The pilot not flying can see every control input, because they can see the movement in
their column. If needed, some assistance on the column by the captain, for instance,
would not be that unusual if the inputs being made were deemed insufficient during
landing, for instance. The side stick on the non flying side in an Airbus, however, remains
neutral at all times and if this happens to be the captain, he cannot feel or see the inputs
being made by the first officer. Additionally, if both pilots were to make inputs, they are
algebraically added. This means that if both pilots make the same input, the effect on the
aircraft will be doubled and if both pilots make equal but opposite inputs, the effect will
be zero input. Neither of these may be have good outcomes depending on the situation.
This is known on the Airbus as dual input. It is non standard procedure to have dual input
on an Airbus and the procedure, if required, is for the captain to take control of the
aircraft. This is very rarely required and a last resort. It is a fine line between taking over
too early when it is not required and taking over too late, especially on landing. This
makes the A320 more challenging for the captain with an inexperienced first officer, who
through no fault of their own, still makes errors of judgement due to inexperience.
Additionally, Jetstar scheduled services operate into airports that are outside of controlled
airspace without the assistance of a control tower or air traffic control radar services,
sometimes at night. These airports tend to have 30 metre wide, short runways and tend to
have a large amount of light aircraft traffic associated with them as these airports were
built for lighter traffic. It is the responsibility of the pilots at these airports to maintain
separation from each other. This system is only as strong as the weakest link and the
information that is provided by the pilot of the light aircraft. This pilot can sometimes be
a student pilot flying by themselves. If the position and/or altitude information they
provide is inaccurate and if the crew of the larger transport aircraft are not on the ball,
then this single person light aircraft has the potential to bring down an aircraft carrying
close to 200 people.
Jetstar pilots can fly up to 1000 hours per year. We do this around the clock, 24 hours per
day. We can work up to 14 hours per day up to six days in a row. Under present roster
protocol, we can and do, sign on as early as 5 AM for up to four days in a row and fly up
to four sectors per day and on the fifth day we could be signing on at 10 PM to fly until
7AM the next day, to then extend beyond this time due to delays. This last sign on time is
probably an hour or more past bed time of the previous few days and the duty period is
180 degrees opposed to the previous duties from the clocks view point. These shifts are
known as ‘back of the clock’. There is no way to be adequately rested for such a duty, as
is required by law, and there can be no fatigue risk management in such rostering
practices. Conversely, we could finish at 6AM after working all night, and then be
signing on at 5AM the next day. Still no chance to be adequately rested with such a lack
of routine.
Engineering, like all other departments, are under resourced and their attitude is
sometimes that they have not got time to fix things that are wrong with the aircraft and
‘push’ flight crew to take the aircraft and have it fixed some other place or at the end of
the day so that the schedule is not affected by their department. Flight crew however,
have responsibility for the overall operation and at times have to insist that something is
fixed prior to departure while under some pressure to continue regardless.
Add to these Jetstar specific threats, the normal ones of bad weather and instrument
approaches, thunderstorms, fog, cyclones, general traffic, international operations with
limited support, diversions to unfamiliar places both within Australia and internationally,
high terrain and single runway operations, where if an aircraft becomes disabled on the
runway, the flight may be unable to land and will probably have few options available
with regard to other airports with the available fuel, and you really start to see the
complication of this Jetstar operation overall.
As a captain on the A320, I rely on a competent and aviation experienced first officer for
support in high work load and non normal/emergency situations. When all is good, one
could probably fly the aircraft alone. It is when things are not good that you need the
experience sitting beside you and, you can never tell when that will be.
Jetstar, by providing insufficient resources in other operational areas, place a great deal of
responsibility on the flight crew, particularly the captain, to ensure that the operation is
not only carried out safely but is also done within the requirements of the law. This can
add significantly to the pressure of an already, well known to be, stressful job.
I have provided a lot of specific and general information under this sub section of ‘pilot
experience’ quite deliberately, and that is to show that this Jetstar operation specifically
and regular public transport jet operations more generally, are complicated and
sometimes high risk and are no place for a pilot with 200 flight hours or the experience
equivalent of two months in the industry.
USA 1500 flight hours requirement for RPT services
As is shown on page 4-20 of the Jetstar operations manual (OM1), as approved by the
government regulator, CASA, Jetstar already have a requirement to employ pilots with in
excess of 1500 flight hours to act as first officers. For all of the reasons already stated in
sub section a, this seems to be a reasonable level of experience to start on an operation as
I have described it and, indeed, is seen as such by the Jetstar flight department and
CASA.
Jetstar have started a pilot cadet program and intend to employ first officers with as little
as 200 flight hours, which is well below that which is required by the operations manual.
They have done this, not due to the fact that there is a lack of suitable pilots in Australia,
but purely for financial reasons. The list of cost saving and money making exercises that
Jetstar have running is long and none of them have safety as a consideration, but most are
outside of the terms of reference for this enquiry. For the record, policy of Jetstar senior
management is for a 10 percent cost reduction per year. This is absolutely unsustainable.
There are many examples of major accidents of aircraft that were operated by companies
that, for whatever reason, were in the process of long term, aggressive cost cutting
programs.
Jetstar are possibly making a profit from the substantial training costs associated with the
self funded cadet program. One hundred and seventy thousand dollars, seems to be a
rather large amount of money to train a person to be a first officer on an A320. On top of
this is the fact that once employed (there are no guarantees), these pilots will be on a
much inferior contract to the certified agreement that the rest of the Jetstar Australia
pilots are on. Add the possible profit from training to the significantly reduced wages that
these pilots will be on and you start to see that this is not about demand for pilots but
about a new recruitment method which fits in with Jetstar’s constant drive to undercut
wages and reduce costs and, for the reasons mentioned under sub section a, this will have
a detrimental effect on safety.
Qantas have long run a successful cadet program, employing pilots into their company
with 200 hours or similar. The difference however, is that these pilots are employed as
second officers and are not in the control seat for takeoff or landing. They are there for in
flight rest purposes on long haul flights and it is the captain and first officer who conduct
the flying. These pilots gain experience on the job over some years and would have some
thousands of hours experience by the time that they become first officers on, say, a
Boeing 737.
It needs to be remembered that the USA 1500 hour requirement was introduced as a
result of a catastrophic aircraft accident in the United States that was deemed, in part, to
be the result of crew inexperience. Let us not have to introduce such an initiative after an
event.
Pilot Recruitment and Pay for training schemes
I have touched on Jetstar pilot recruitment and my belief of the reasons that Jetstar have
set up a pilot cadet program, in sub section b. That reason is to reduce wages costs and
has nothing to do with the availability of suitable pilots from within the industry and that
it will have a detrimental effect on safety.
In days past, a pilot would be employed by an airline and that airline would be
responsible for, and take the risk for, the provision of all costs associated with the training
of this pilot including the endorsement on the applicable aircraft. This investment in this
employee was taken seriously at the recruitment stage, as the investment was large. So
seriously, in fact that, in days gone by, an applicant would not even be considered if
above the age of 26. This was so that the airline concerned would get a reasonable return
on the investment made in the individual. Additionally, due in great part to a strict
seniority system (date of joining determines promotion ect.) and the fact that terms and
conditions were much better than they are today in low cost carriers, a pilot would, in
almost all circumstances, stay with the first airline to employ them until retirement.
Today, however, things are very different. Today all of the risk is placed on the employee
and the company have little from a cost view point. It costs around $35,000 dollars
including GST, for a pilot to gain an aircraft endorsement on say an A320. (The pilot is
required to pay the full amount even though Jetstar claim the GST as a business expense
and pocket this in spite of it being paid by the pilot) As the pilot has paid for the
endorsement, after a small amount of company provided induction training, what remains
is line training on the aircraft. Unlike in the past, the first time that a pilot in Jetstar
actually flies the aircraft and probably the first time that they have flown a jet aircraft will
be with a load of passengers on board. I make this point to show that even under training,
this pilot is providing revenue for the airline and is of no cost. If at the end of this
training, which takes around two months, the pilot is considered unsuitable, then their
employment will be terminated. The $35,000 is still paid by the pilot. This means that the
recruitment that in the past was taken so seriously is no longer as critical, as all of the cost
risk is now transferred to the pilot and little cost has been incurred by the airline through
this process. This may mean that a pilot, who would not have been found suitable at the
recruitment stage, in the past, is let through to the training stage due to the low cost risk
for the airline. This pilot may slip through the net and, even though substandard, will
remain at the airline. Along similar lines, when substandard pay and conditions are
offered, such as those offered in New Zealand by Jetstar, then this means that the best
applicants are not attracted to these positions. Jetstar seem willing to accept this
unarguable reduction in safety so long as there is a commensurate reduction in wages
costs.
In days past, the employing airline provided the training via their own simulators with
training conducted by airline employees who were generally current senior training and
checking captains who were obviously up to date with current airline procedures and
processes. Today, these aircraft endorsements are provided by third parties and not an
airline. The instructors are generally not current pilots and may not have flown for many
years. In the case of my A320 endorsement, my instructor had never flown a jet aircraft
and had little idea of Jetstar procedures. This makes it much more difficult for the trainee
to come into the Jetstar system and achieve a reasonable result at a training level. It must
be remembered that the first time that the trainee flies the aircraft will be with passengers
on board. This has not always been the case, with airlines previously providing takeoff
and landing training in the aircraft without passengers. This makes the endorsement
training now, so much more important than in the past, when in fact, the training is, for
reasons stated above, much inferior. Combine this type of training with low experience
cadet pilots and the safety implications really start to multiply.
Continued in next posting %
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% - Continued from previous post
Retention of experienced pilots
In sub section c, I explained that in the past a pilot would join an airline and stay with that
airline for their whole career. This was due to a strict seniority system (date of joining)
which determined, amongst other things, promotion. If the pilot, after a number of years,
left one airline and joined another then they would start at the bottom again and, from a
promotion view point, the time spent in the previous airline is wasted. These days, in low
cost carriers at least, the seniority system tends to be much less rigid, if it exists at all, and
therefore I could spend many years at Jetstar and have a more junior pilot take a
promotion ahead of me at the discretion of management. This has already happened on
numerous occasions in the history of Jetstar. It means that the guarantees that were
provided previously are no longer there and that to leave is not with the same risks as 1; I
may not get the promotion that I would be due under a strict seniority system and 2; If I
leave and go to another airline I may take a promotion at the expense of another pilot at
that airline and thereby do not take such a risk to leave the first airline. This does,
however, mean that the first airline looses my experience and possibly replaces me with a
first time captain who, now, is a new captain flying with first officers with 200 flight
hours under the Jetstar cadet scheme. This may be okay as a single event but if you end
up with a mass exodus of captains from one airline due to, say, a foreign airline setting up
a base in Australia offering better terms and conditions, then this becomes a serious
safety issue, with inexperienced captains flying, constantly, with inexperienced first
officers. This brings me to my next point.
In the past, apart from a strict seniority system, airline pilots were paid well and the
conditions associated with the job were also good. Additionally, due to the fact the pilots
were well supported with resources to do their job well, as opposed to low cost carriers,
the job was easier. Today, however, in low cost carriers such as Jetstar this is not the case
and we are not, by world standards, well paid. Jetstar A330 pilots would be some of the
lowest paid in the western world. This manifest itself as a negative safety outcome due to
lack of retention of experienced pilots when, for instance, the new foreign airline opens
its base in Australia and for the reasons stated above there is a mass exodus of
experienced crew, leaving a hole in the experience base. It is by no accident that Australia
has the exemplary aviation safety record that it has. That it does has is, historically, due to
well structured training systems in airlines, due to stable working conditions and due to
well maintained aircraft operated by highly experienced crew. As the industry stands
now, I feel that the jury is out on what the next few years will hold if there are not
significant changes made in the legislation that allows airlines to now operate in very
different ways to that which has seen our airline safety record as the envy of the rest of
the world.
Type rating and recurrent training
I have covered the negative aspects of the way type ratings are obtained under sub section
c.
With regard to recurrent training, the point that I will make is that once trained to the
‘line’ on a particular aircraft, and apart from some recurrent courses through the year,
there really isn’t any training. The great majority of time spent in simulators is not
training at all but, instead, checking. A great deal of opportunity is missed to improve
standards by taking this approach. Yes, one has to meet a minimum standard and as long
as this is met there is no training. Once again this comes down to a lack of commitment
by these airlines to improving standards by committing funds, not to meet minimum
standards, but to exceed them.
Capacity of CASA
Casa have in the past allowed Jetstar to vary minimum industry standards to the detriment
of safety for commercial reasons. That is cost cutting.
As one example, is the reduction of required flight attendants on the Airbus A321. In
their constant pursuit of cost cutting, Jetstar approached CASA with a view of reduction
below minimum crew. This involved many changes to standard procedures to make
things work. This means that there are different procedures in place, both normal and
emergency, between the A320 and the A321. It needs to be understood that pilots and
flight attendants fly on both of these aircraft. Some flight attendants also fly on the A330.
This lack of standardisation affects safety and, adds pressure to, and makes crew jobs
more difficult. On the A321, due to the crew reduction, the cabin manager is, during
takeoff and landing, up the front by themselves, when normally and on the A320, two
crew are at the front of the aircraft. During the pre-flight briefing, passengers are required
to be asked to help with an evacuation even when all crew are conscious. It is one thing to
brief passengers on the use of an over wing exit but quite another to require them to use a
primary door just so that Jetstar can reduce the crew compliment by one. What if the
passenger wants to have an alcoholic drink or two in-flight? Are they still fit to be
assisting a flight attendant to operate doors during an emergency evacuation? During a
ditching, the procedure for the first officer is varied on the A321 when compared to the
A320 due, once again, to Jetstar reducing below minimum crew to cut costs. This means
that the first officer needs to remember to vary this procedure depending on the aircraft
type involved. All of this has a negative impact on safety, complicating further, an
already complicated operation and I feel that CASA have erred in granting this approval
to Jetstar based on commercial cost cutting and have negatively impacted safety in the
process.
This will not be the only instance of CASA approving company requests, for commercial
reasons, which have a negative impact on safety.
Legislative immunity to pilots reporting safety matters
Pilots need to be provided with legislative immunity when reporting safety operational
matters as this will encourage the reporting of such matters, without the fear of reprisal
and will thereby have a positive effect on safety.
j. other related matters
1. Fatigue risk management system
Australian airlines should be required by law to adhere to a common and acceptable
FRMS in order to combat poor and unsafe rostering practices.
2. Flight attendant training
Jetstar recently cut by around half, the training provided to cabin crew. This has resulted
in new flight attendants being stood down by both Cabin Managers and Captains due to a
lack of operational knowledge. In one instance, a crew member did not know how to arm
an aircraft door at the start of the flight even though they had completed training and had
been cleared to the line.
Airlines should have to meet acceptable training standard for flight attendant training.
3. Operating manuals
Jetstar pilots are not provided with up to date company documents for study purposes.
Instead, we are provided with a CD with these documents on them. This type of
information dissemination has a number of problems. Jetstar procedures are constantly
changing, and after being thrown a disk with thousands of pages of information, amended
as necessary, one is left with much work trying to work out what has changed. It is very
difficult to effectively study on a computer screen and in the format provided, it is not
possible to highlight text. Further, Jetstar do not provide equipment to read these disk and
don’t seem concerned that some pilots may not have a computer and therefore have no
way of accessing critical procedural information. Even our cabin crew are provided with
hard copies of their manuals. I don’t think that the travelling public would think it good
that the pilots flying their aircraft were not up to date with the latest information.
Jetstar should be required to provide its pilots with up to date manuals in hard copy form
or at least give the pilot the option of such.
4. Qantas group safety survey
A Qantas group airline safety survey has recently been conducted, with input sought from
all staff. If this information is available to this Senate enquiry, then this may provide
some interesting comparisons between the views of Qantas Airlines’ pilots and those of
their Jetstar counterparts. I feel that the views of safety in the respective airlines will be
vastly different and that Jetstar will be seen as much less safe, as an airline, by its pilots.
If this is the case, then it would show a lower level of safety in the low cost model, as
seen by the pilots, and that, in Australia, would be unacceptable.
5. Endorsement GST cost
If able, this Senate enquiry should investigate the fact that Jetstar claim the endorsement
cost GST back as a business cost and pockets this money, even though the pilot has
ultimately paid this money and not Jetstar.
6. Legislative powers granted to airline flight departments and safety departments
If able, this Senate enquiry should investigate the possibility of providing legislative
powers to airline flight department and/or safety departments so that they alone, are
responsible for the safety of the airline operation and have the power to determine how
and to where the airline will operate, with safety as its primary focus, with severe
penalties for not operating with safety as the primary focus.
Airline safety departments should be made, by law, to be separate and independent from
the commercial departments of airlines, just as the judicial system is separate from
government, in the interests of safety.
If an airline, such as Jetstar, is to maintain the ‘privilege’ of having the responsibility to
determine its own safety outcomes by the regulator, then they need to take this
responsibility seriously by allocating sufficient resources to allow safety departments to
do their work and, indeed, should be required to do so by the law. Jetstar, I feel strongly,
do not provide even nearly enough of these resources and they do not take safety nearly
seriously enough.
7. Pilot Morale
Since the inception of Jetstar in 2004 and even prior to this in Impulse Airlines, this pilot
group have ‘bent over backwards’ to ensure the success of the Airline during its
continued growth in the absence of suitable operational resources as has been explained
elsewhere in this document. They have accepted substandard wages and conditions, by
world standards, to ensure the viability of the model. All that they have expected in return
is for Jetstar management to honour the commitments, both legal and inferred, that they
have made to this group. Of particular note, are notices written by then C.E.O Allen
Joyce in the lead up to the 2008 Jetstar Pilot’s EBA vote. These notices indicated that if
the 2008 EBA was voted in the affirmative, that this would ensure that the pilots covered
by it would share in the future growth of the aircraft covered by it, most notably the
Boeing 787. The 2008 EBA was accepted by the majority of the pilot group on this basis.
As it now turns out, Jetstar decide that they are no longer willing to play by the rules set
in good faith by EBA 2008 and by contrast have decided that they will offshore, in one
instance, these jobs to overseas ports and in the second instance, start up a new contract
company within Australia, no less, featuring, no doubt, based on past performance, vastly
reduced terms and conditions. All the while reducing its wages bill and reneging on its
commitment that it made to its pilots in 2008.
The cause and effect of this is difficult to reconcile. The cause is the way that Jetstar
operate at an industrial level and is in no way covered by this Senate inquiry. The effect
however, is the potential to have a very negative safety outcome for aviation and is
therefore absolutely covered by this inquiry. I have described previously how
complicated that this Jetstar operation is and it needs no further expansion. With such an
operation however, comes a requirement for, at times, absolute concentration of thought.
In a company where a pilot, rightly or wrongly, feels to be under constant ‘attack’ this
can prove difficult. I can tell this inquiry through this submission that, rightly or wrongly,
a great deal of time on Jetstar flight decks is spent discussing the industrial relations
strategy of Jetstar management. This probably happens on every Jetstar flight deck every
day to varying degrees.
Pilots are a different employee group to any other by virtue of the fact that we tend to be
very long term. Contrary to Jetstar managements’ appalling ‘catch cry’ that they don’t
expect their pilots to last more than around five years, as we will be ‘burnt out by then’,
(this is a stolen catch cry from Ryan Air CEO Michael O’Leary) the vast majority of
pilots will be around for many years longer than this. Indeed, the average pilot will be
around many times longer than the average manager, including senior management. This
is why pilots take the future direction of a company so seriously. Long after the managers
have left, taking their KPI performance based bonuses, achieved through cost cutting,
with them, it is the new management and the long term employees who are left to pick up
the pieces and try to make things work. The attempted private equity buy out of Qantas
by, amongst others, TPG and Macquarie springs to mind and the open joy that this was
met with by then CEO Geoff Dixon, based on greed. Qantas would very probably be
bankrupt now, given that the whole transaction was based on debt and that the future, at
the time, would see the global financial crisis take place and claim a great many
companies worldwide with high debt profiles.
In my 25 years plus, in aviation, I have never seen morale amongst a group of pilots
nearly as low as that of this Jetstar group. I strongly believe that the Australian travelling
public deserve much better than to be flown around by pilots of a major Australian airline
who feel under constant threat and who are worried about their futures.
Jetstar management have, I can confirm, been warned by some very senior pilots, who
see what goes on on Jetstar flight decks, that they have a major problem in this regard.
The reply by these managers is typical, and to quote, ‘’we don’t think we have a
problem’’. I wish to state for the record, that I strongly feel that this low morale amongst
the Jetstar pilot group is a huge problem and has the potential for a negative safety
outcome.
If a solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this inquiry, then CASA should be
commissioned to recognise that the problem exists in the first instance, and to then work
with Jetstar and the pilot body to find solutions to its cause.
Conclusion;
The low cost model generally and the Jetstar model specifically, are operated with
minimum resources allocated to them in the interests of cost savings.
These airlines are operated to the limit in all areas, with the allocation of resources based
on a perfect outcome every time. In reality, however, this is never the case. As soon as
one aircraft runs late, for instance, the operation, which relies on the perfect outcome
each time, is adversely affected.
James Reason, an aviation risk expert, devised a simple model some years ago, which I
have included as a diagram. The model consists of slices of Swiss cheese lined up on end.
Each one represents a layer of resistance, representing procedures and processes that are
designed to ensure safety. Like all systems, there will be flaws and these are represented
by the holes in the cheese. Invariably, one layer will be penetrated via a hole, only to
have the next layer trap the threat and the problem is averted. When it just happens that
something goes wrong, and it so happens that all of the holes line up, then the treat gets
though each layer that is designed to trap it and the accident occurs. The first of these
layers tend to be systems and procedures controlled by senior management and are
representative of the way that the airline is run. Pilots tend to be the last layer of this
model and thereby represent the last chance to save the operation from an accident or an
incident occurring and this is often the case.
When an airline is run right to the limit every day, in all aspects, as I hope that I have
been successful in describing throughout this submission, then the odds of the holes all
lining up are vastly increased.
As detailed at the start of this submission, my name and contact details must remain
confidential and appear nowhere in any document that could reveal my identity.
SENTATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AND AIRLINE SAFETY
Summary
Pilot experience
An explanation of how complicated an RPT jet operation is, particularly one that is of
the low cost model and my view that it is no place for an inexperienced pilot.
USA 1500 flight hour requirement for RPT
An explanation of the Jetstar minimum experience requirements, as approved by the
regulator, the fact that these match the new USA minimum requirements for RPT and the
fact that these US requirements were introduced as a result of an accident and that we
should act prior to not after an event.
Pilot recruitment and pay for training schemes
An explanation of the way that recruitment and training in airlines used to be conducted
and that today it is not as good as then, even though the operation of low cost carriers is a
complicated one and now, the first time that a pilot will fly the aircraft is with passengers
on board.
Retention of experienced pilots
An explanation that a strict seniority system and good pay and conditions in the past
ensured that airlines retained their most experienced crew members and that today with
low cost carriers possibly having neither of these two things, that experienced pilots may
be hard to retain.
Type rating and recurrent training
An explanation that simulators are not, but could be, used to much greater effect for
recurrent training to not just meet, but to improve standards.
Capacity of CASA
An explanation that CASA have previously granted concessions to Jetstar, requested for
commercial reasons, and that these concessions have an adverse affect on safety.
Legislative immunity to pilots reporting safety matters
Self explanatory.
j. Other related matters
Self explanatory.
James Reason’s Model.
In sub section c, I explained that in the past a pilot would join an airline and stay with that
airline for their whole career. This was due to a strict seniority system (date of joining)
which determined, amongst other things, promotion. If the pilot, after a number of years,
left one airline and joined another then they would start at the bottom again and, from a
promotion view point, the time spent in the previous airline is wasted. These days, in low
cost carriers at least, the seniority system tends to be much less rigid, if it exists at all, and
therefore I could spend many years at Jetstar and have a more junior pilot take a
promotion ahead of me at the discretion of management. This has already happened on
numerous occasions in the history of Jetstar. It means that the guarantees that were
provided previously are no longer there and that to leave is not with the same risks as 1; I
may not get the promotion that I would be due under a strict seniority system and 2; If I
leave and go to another airline I may take a promotion at the expense of another pilot at
that airline and thereby do not take such a risk to leave the first airline. This does,
however, mean that the first airline looses my experience and possibly replaces me with a
first time captain who, now, is a new captain flying with first officers with 200 flight
hours under the Jetstar cadet scheme. This may be okay as a single event but if you end
up with a mass exodus of captains from one airline due to, say, a foreign airline setting up
a base in Australia offering better terms and conditions, then this becomes a serious
safety issue, with inexperienced captains flying, constantly, with inexperienced first
officers. This brings me to my next point.
In the past, apart from a strict seniority system, airline pilots were paid well and the
conditions associated with the job were also good. Additionally, due to the fact the pilots
were well supported with resources to do their job well, as opposed to low cost carriers,
the job was easier. Today, however, in low cost carriers such as Jetstar this is not the case
and we are not, by world standards, well paid. Jetstar A330 pilots would be some of the
lowest paid in the western world. This manifest itself as a negative safety outcome due to
lack of retention of experienced pilots when, for instance, the new foreign airline opens
its base in Australia and for the reasons stated above there is a mass exodus of
experienced crew, leaving a hole in the experience base. It is by no accident that Australia
has the exemplary aviation safety record that it has. That it does has is, historically, due to
well structured training systems in airlines, due to stable working conditions and due to
well maintained aircraft operated by highly experienced crew. As the industry stands
now, I feel that the jury is out on what the next few years will hold if there are not
significant changes made in the legislation that allows airlines to now operate in very
different ways to that which has seen our airline safety record as the envy of the rest of
the world.
Type rating and recurrent training
I have covered the negative aspects of the way type ratings are obtained under sub section
c.
With regard to recurrent training, the point that I will make is that once trained to the
‘line’ on a particular aircraft, and apart from some recurrent courses through the year,
there really isn’t any training. The great majority of time spent in simulators is not
training at all but, instead, checking. A great deal of opportunity is missed to improve
standards by taking this approach. Yes, one has to meet a minimum standard and as long
as this is met there is no training. Once again this comes down to a lack of commitment
by these airlines to improving standards by committing funds, not to meet minimum
standards, but to exceed them.
Capacity of CASA
Casa have in the past allowed Jetstar to vary minimum industry standards to the detriment
of safety for commercial reasons. That is cost cutting.
As one example, is the reduction of required flight attendants on the Airbus A321. In
their constant pursuit of cost cutting, Jetstar approached CASA with a view of reduction
below minimum crew. This involved many changes to standard procedures to make
things work. This means that there are different procedures in place, both normal and
emergency, between the A320 and the A321. It needs to be understood that pilots and
flight attendants fly on both of these aircraft. Some flight attendants also fly on the A330.
This lack of standardisation affects safety and, adds pressure to, and makes crew jobs
more difficult. On the A321, due to the crew reduction, the cabin manager is, during
takeoff and landing, up the front by themselves, when normally and on the A320, two
crew are at the front of the aircraft. During the pre-flight briefing, passengers are required
to be asked to help with an evacuation even when all crew are conscious. It is one thing to
brief passengers on the use of an over wing exit but quite another to require them to use a
primary door just so that Jetstar can reduce the crew compliment by one. What if the
passenger wants to have an alcoholic drink or two in-flight? Are they still fit to be
assisting a flight attendant to operate doors during an emergency evacuation? During a
ditching, the procedure for the first officer is varied on the A321 when compared to the
A320 due, once again, to Jetstar reducing below minimum crew to cut costs. This means
that the first officer needs to remember to vary this procedure depending on the aircraft
type involved. All of this has a negative impact on safety, complicating further, an
already complicated operation and I feel that CASA have erred in granting this approval
to Jetstar based on commercial cost cutting and have negatively impacted safety in the
process.
This will not be the only instance of CASA approving company requests, for commercial
reasons, which have a negative impact on safety.
Legislative immunity to pilots reporting safety matters
Pilots need to be provided with legislative immunity when reporting safety operational
matters as this will encourage the reporting of such matters, without the fear of reprisal
and will thereby have a positive effect on safety.
j. other related matters
1. Fatigue risk management system
Australian airlines should be required by law to adhere to a common and acceptable
FRMS in order to combat poor and unsafe rostering practices.
2. Flight attendant training
Jetstar recently cut by around half, the training provided to cabin crew. This has resulted
in new flight attendants being stood down by both Cabin Managers and Captains due to a
lack of operational knowledge. In one instance, a crew member did not know how to arm
an aircraft door at the start of the flight even though they had completed training and had
been cleared to the line.
Airlines should have to meet acceptable training standard for flight attendant training.
3. Operating manuals
Jetstar pilots are not provided with up to date company documents for study purposes.
Instead, we are provided with a CD with these documents on them. This type of
information dissemination has a number of problems. Jetstar procedures are constantly
changing, and after being thrown a disk with thousands of pages of information, amended
as necessary, one is left with much work trying to work out what has changed. It is very
difficult to effectively study on a computer screen and in the format provided, it is not
possible to highlight text. Further, Jetstar do not provide equipment to read these disk and
don’t seem concerned that some pilots may not have a computer and therefore have no
way of accessing critical procedural information. Even our cabin crew are provided with
hard copies of their manuals. I don’t think that the travelling public would think it good
that the pilots flying their aircraft were not up to date with the latest information.
Jetstar should be required to provide its pilots with up to date manuals in hard copy form
or at least give the pilot the option of such.
4. Qantas group safety survey
A Qantas group airline safety survey has recently been conducted, with input sought from
all staff. If this information is available to this Senate enquiry, then this may provide
some interesting comparisons between the views of Qantas Airlines’ pilots and those of
their Jetstar counterparts. I feel that the views of safety in the respective airlines will be
vastly different and that Jetstar will be seen as much less safe, as an airline, by its pilots.
If this is the case, then it would show a lower level of safety in the low cost model, as
seen by the pilots, and that, in Australia, would be unacceptable.
5. Endorsement GST cost
If able, this Senate enquiry should investigate the fact that Jetstar claim the endorsement
cost GST back as a business cost and pockets this money, even though the pilot has
ultimately paid this money and not Jetstar.
6. Legislative powers granted to airline flight departments and safety departments
If able, this Senate enquiry should investigate the possibility of providing legislative
powers to airline flight department and/or safety departments so that they alone, are
responsible for the safety of the airline operation and have the power to determine how
and to where the airline will operate, with safety as its primary focus, with severe
penalties for not operating with safety as the primary focus.
Airline safety departments should be made, by law, to be separate and independent from
the commercial departments of airlines, just as the judicial system is separate from
government, in the interests of safety.
If an airline, such as Jetstar, is to maintain the ‘privilege’ of having the responsibility to
determine its own safety outcomes by the regulator, then they need to take this
responsibility seriously by allocating sufficient resources to allow safety departments to
do their work and, indeed, should be required to do so by the law. Jetstar, I feel strongly,
do not provide even nearly enough of these resources and they do not take safety nearly
seriously enough.
7. Pilot Morale
Since the inception of Jetstar in 2004 and even prior to this in Impulse Airlines, this pilot
group have ‘bent over backwards’ to ensure the success of the Airline during its
continued growth in the absence of suitable operational resources as has been explained
elsewhere in this document. They have accepted substandard wages and conditions, by
world standards, to ensure the viability of the model. All that they have expected in return
is for Jetstar management to honour the commitments, both legal and inferred, that they
have made to this group. Of particular note, are notices written by then C.E.O Allen
Joyce in the lead up to the 2008 Jetstar Pilot’s EBA vote. These notices indicated that if
the 2008 EBA was voted in the affirmative, that this would ensure that the pilots covered
by it would share in the future growth of the aircraft covered by it, most notably the
Boeing 787. The 2008 EBA was accepted by the majority of the pilot group on this basis.
As it now turns out, Jetstar decide that they are no longer willing to play by the rules set
in good faith by EBA 2008 and by contrast have decided that they will offshore, in one
instance, these jobs to overseas ports and in the second instance, start up a new contract
company within Australia, no less, featuring, no doubt, based on past performance, vastly
reduced terms and conditions. All the while reducing its wages bill and reneging on its
commitment that it made to its pilots in 2008.
The cause and effect of this is difficult to reconcile. The cause is the way that Jetstar
operate at an industrial level and is in no way covered by this Senate inquiry. The effect
however, is the potential to have a very negative safety outcome for aviation and is
therefore absolutely covered by this inquiry. I have described previously how
complicated that this Jetstar operation is and it needs no further expansion. With such an
operation however, comes a requirement for, at times, absolute concentration of thought.
In a company where a pilot, rightly or wrongly, feels to be under constant ‘attack’ this
can prove difficult. I can tell this inquiry through this submission that, rightly or wrongly,
a great deal of time on Jetstar flight decks is spent discussing the industrial relations
strategy of Jetstar management. This probably happens on every Jetstar flight deck every
day to varying degrees.
Pilots are a different employee group to any other by virtue of the fact that we tend to be
very long term. Contrary to Jetstar managements’ appalling ‘catch cry’ that they don’t
expect their pilots to last more than around five years, as we will be ‘burnt out by then’,
(this is a stolen catch cry from Ryan Air CEO Michael O’Leary) the vast majority of
pilots will be around for many years longer than this. Indeed, the average pilot will be
around many times longer than the average manager, including senior management. This
is why pilots take the future direction of a company so seriously. Long after the managers
have left, taking their KPI performance based bonuses, achieved through cost cutting,
with them, it is the new management and the long term employees who are left to pick up
the pieces and try to make things work. The attempted private equity buy out of Qantas
by, amongst others, TPG and Macquarie springs to mind and the open joy that this was
met with by then CEO Geoff Dixon, based on greed. Qantas would very probably be
bankrupt now, given that the whole transaction was based on debt and that the future, at
the time, would see the global financial crisis take place and claim a great many
companies worldwide with high debt profiles.
In my 25 years plus, in aviation, I have never seen morale amongst a group of pilots
nearly as low as that of this Jetstar group. I strongly believe that the Australian travelling
public deserve much better than to be flown around by pilots of a major Australian airline
who feel under constant threat and who are worried about their futures.
Jetstar management have, I can confirm, been warned by some very senior pilots, who
see what goes on on Jetstar flight decks, that they have a major problem in this regard.
The reply by these managers is typical, and to quote, ‘’we don’t think we have a
problem’’. I wish to state for the record, that I strongly feel that this low morale amongst
the Jetstar pilot group is a huge problem and has the potential for a negative safety
outcome.
If a solution to this problem is beyond the scope of this inquiry, then CASA should be
commissioned to recognise that the problem exists in the first instance, and to then work
with Jetstar and the pilot body to find solutions to its cause.
Conclusion;
The low cost model generally and the Jetstar model specifically, are operated with
minimum resources allocated to them in the interests of cost savings.
These airlines are operated to the limit in all areas, with the allocation of resources based
on a perfect outcome every time. In reality, however, this is never the case. As soon as
one aircraft runs late, for instance, the operation, which relies on the perfect outcome
each time, is adversely affected.
James Reason, an aviation risk expert, devised a simple model some years ago, which I
have included as a diagram. The model consists of slices of Swiss cheese lined up on end.
Each one represents a layer of resistance, representing procedures and processes that are
designed to ensure safety. Like all systems, there will be flaws and these are represented
by the holes in the cheese. Invariably, one layer will be penetrated via a hole, only to
have the next layer trap the threat and the problem is averted. When it just happens that
something goes wrong, and it so happens that all of the holes line up, then the treat gets
though each layer that is designed to trap it and the accident occurs. The first of these
layers tend to be systems and procedures controlled by senior management and are
representative of the way that the airline is run. Pilots tend to be the last layer of this
model and thereby represent the last chance to save the operation from an accident or an
incident occurring and this is often the case.
When an airline is run right to the limit every day, in all aspects, as I hope that I have
been successful in describing throughout this submission, then the odds of the holes all
lining up are vastly increased.
As detailed at the start of this submission, my name and contact details must remain
confidential and appear nowhere in any document that could reveal my identity.
SENTATE INQUIRY INTO PILOT TRAINING AND AIRLINE SAFETY
Summary
Pilot experience
An explanation of how complicated an RPT jet operation is, particularly one that is of
the low cost model and my view that it is no place for an inexperienced pilot.
USA 1500 flight hour requirement for RPT
An explanation of the Jetstar minimum experience requirements, as approved by the
regulator, the fact that these match the new USA minimum requirements for RPT and the
fact that these US requirements were introduced as a result of an accident and that we
should act prior to not after an event.
Pilot recruitment and pay for training schemes
An explanation of the way that recruitment and training in airlines used to be conducted
and that today it is not as good as then, even though the operation of low cost carriers is a
complicated one and now, the first time that a pilot will fly the aircraft is with passengers
on board.
Retention of experienced pilots
An explanation that a strict seniority system and good pay and conditions in the past
ensured that airlines retained their most experienced crew members and that today with
low cost carriers possibly having neither of these two things, that experienced pilots may
be hard to retain.
Type rating and recurrent training
An explanation that simulators are not, but could be, used to much greater effect for
recurrent training to not just meet, but to improve standards.
Capacity of CASA
An explanation that CASA have previously granted concessions to Jetstar, requested for
commercial reasons, and that these concessions have an adverse affect on safety.
Legislative immunity to pilots reporting safety matters
Self explanatory.
j. Other related matters
Self explanatory.
James Reason’s Model.
The big question is will anyone take this submission at the inquiry seriously, for the simple reason that the author wants to remain unidentified, and quite rightly so.
This well written artical clearly indicates that budget airlines have destroyed the aviation industry in Australia.
This well written artical clearly indicates that budget airlines have destroyed the aviation industry in Australia.
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I would be very surprised if cadets don't meet Jetstar operations manual requirements.
There would have to be Australian regulator involvement and also an FCI/FCN (or whatever Jetstar's equivalent is) that would have the effect of an immediate ops manual amendment.
There would have to be Australian regulator involvement and also an FCI/FCN (or whatever Jetstar's equivalent is) that would have the effect of an immediate ops manual amendment.
Please thank the anonymous pilot for a lucid and informative submission.
Jetstar is now permanently off my airline list. This is not about "preference", I mean that if a destination is only served by Jetstar, then I'm not going there by air.
Jetstar will reply that they "take safety seriously and that their operations comply with all laws and regulations."
Jetstar is now permanently off my airline list. This is not about "preference", I mean that if a destination is only served by Jetstar, then I'm not going there by air.
Jetstar will reply that they "take safety seriously and that their operations comply with all laws and regulations."
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Location: On a long enough timeline the survival rate for everyone is zero
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Shell management, funny I didn't notice Easyjet mentioned once in the submission. How many non-towered & non-radar aerodromes do Easyjet operated into at night? How many 30m runways? I'd take a Cat II/III approach & autoland over a night non-tower non-radar non-precision approach everyday of the week with a 200 hour cadet sitting next to me.
To the author of the submission, excellent work.
To the author of the submission, excellent work.
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A great summation for which the author should be commended.
Are you reading this all you journalists out there? Are you happy to go flying still? So find a way to report it! Let the people know what is really happenning. Because we have seen what happens when a pilot reports it!
Jetstar pilots, you guys need to grow a backbone. You need to fight. You need to stop saying to Qantas pilots "but you guys didn't want us, you didn't help us". No - thats because we could see what was coming. And here it is happenning.
So now we ALL need to stand up and say "NO"! EVERYBODY. Engineers, Flight Attendants, Ground Staff and Pilots alike.
The consequences if we don't? As our friend suggested above, "A NEGATIVE SAFETY OUTCOME". Aka: a smoking hole in the ground.
In my 25 years plus, in aviation, I have never seen morale amongst a group of pilots nearly as low as that of this Jetstar group. I strongly believe that the Australian travelling public deserve much better than to be flown around by pilots of a major Australian airline who feel under constant threat and who are worried about their futures. Jetstar management have, I can confirm, been warned by some very senior pilots, who see what goes on on Jetstar flight decks, that they have a major problem in this regard.
The reply by these managers is typical, and to quote, ‘’we don’t think we have a problem’’. I wish to state for the record, that I strongly feel that this low morale amongst the Jetstar pilot group is a huge problem and has the potential for a negative safety outcome.
The reply by these managers is typical, and to quote, ‘’we don’t think we have a problem’’. I wish to state for the record, that I strongly feel that this low morale amongst the Jetstar pilot group is a huge problem and has the potential for a negative safety outcome.
Jetstar pilots, you guys need to grow a backbone. You need to fight. You need to stop saying to Qantas pilots "but you guys didn't want us, you didn't help us". No - thats because we could see what was coming. And here it is happenning.
So now we ALL need to stand up and say "NO"! EVERYBODY. Engineers, Flight Attendants, Ground Staff and Pilots alike.
The consequences if we don't? As our friend suggested above, "A NEGATIVE SAFETY OUTCOME". Aka: a smoking hole in the ground.
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couldn't agree with you more balance.........the sad fact remains that unfortunately 50% of the J* pilot group find it acceptable to run through the day without a backbone.....We should be out there with our Qantas brothers and sisters breaking these bastards knee caps (metaphorically speaking......
) . I can picture a couple of our captains writing this article, but its unfortunate that 100% do not feel the same way......To those...let it be know your gravy train is about to run dry...
) . I can picture a couple of our captains writing this article, but its unfortunate that 100% do not feel the same way......To those...let it be know your gravy train is about to run dry...
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The most well written, indepth, truthful publication to discribe the aviation industry here in Australia. I take my hat off to you Red Jet, your choice of words and sensitivity to the current issues involving Jetstar are immaculate. I support you 100% and agree that this is a growing issue that needs to be changed and needs to happen now!
It is a company like Jetstar and many alike who continue to drive safety standards into the ground. After reading that submission, I will never again fly Jetstar, and havn't done so for many years because of this very information. I knew it was there but not to this extent.
When is there an senate inquiry? This needs to be backed up by current pilots, engineers and managers who strive for a safe working evironment. I am all for this to change...GET RID OF CADETSHIPS (like J*)! your ruining it for everyone!
It is a company like Jetstar and many alike who continue to drive safety standards into the ground. After reading that submission, I will never again fly Jetstar, and havn't done so for many years because of this very information. I knew it was there but not to this extent.
When is there an senate inquiry? This needs to be backed up by current pilots, engineers and managers who strive for a safe working evironment. I am all for this to change...GET RID OF CADETSHIPS (like J*)! your ruining it for everyone!
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Well Done for taking the time and expending the considerable effort in constructing such a solid submission. I just hope the Senate inquiry reads it fully and understands what you have written.
Cant say I disagree with any of the content....
RESPONSE FROM SENATE - "We have reviewed the submission and have reviewed all of the allegations. At this point there is no evidence that there has been any safety compromise. In fact Jetstar has an unblemished safety record and CASA records show an outstanding compliance profile. We do not comment on individual workplace arrangements however industry and parliamentary consultation has indicated that the airline industry is under going rapid change. Our advice is that the innovative workplace arrangements introduced by Jetstar has actually contributed to job growth in the industry sector and helped save jobs from being exported to cheaper labour markets.
RESPONSE FROM SENATE - "We have reviewed the submission and have reviewed all of the allegations. At this point there is no evidence that there has been any safety compromise. In fact Jetstar has an unblemished safety record and CASA records show an outstanding compliance profile. We do not comment on individual workplace arrangements however industry and parliamentary consultation has indicated that the airline industry is under going rapid change. Our advice is that the innovative workplace arrangements introduced by Jetstar has actually contributed to job growth in the industry sector and helped save jobs from being exported to cheaper labour markets.
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