At Last - A Voice of Reason
I've always been under the impression the more you do something, the less you need to think about it, and the more 'head space' you have for analyzing your predicament.
The first time I polled around a transport category aeroplane, my mind was completely occupied with how to fly it, what to say and when to say it, checklists, SOPS etc. This lasted for at least the first 500 hours (on type). My total time was around the 2000 hours mark at that stage. After that, everything was ingrained, I didn't need to think about what I was doing anymore, and could concentrate on the 'big picture', my decision making, the overall operation, company needs, crew needs etc etc.
At 200 hours I was still learning how to be a Pilot, I certainly was not ready to fly a jet.
The first time I polled around a transport category aeroplane, my mind was completely occupied with how to fly it, what to say and when to say it, checklists, SOPS etc. This lasted for at least the first 500 hours (on type). My total time was around the 2000 hours mark at that stage. After that, everything was ingrained, I didn't need to think about what I was doing anymore, and could concentrate on the 'big picture', my decision making, the overall operation, company needs, crew needs etc etc.
At 200 hours I was still learning how to be a Pilot, I certainly was not ready to fly a jet.
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IMHO experience is getting the crap scared out of you, and learning from it. A 200 hour pilot probably hasnt been in that situation. Some 2000 hour pilots haven't yet either, but there are far fewer of them.
Experience is a "gut" feeling that something isnt right. It is an instinct. It is rat cunning, it is survival, it is interacting with other humans in a mature fashion.
There are probably a few 200 hour pilots who have natural abilities in these areas, but I would suggest not too many. I know I wasnt. I had to earn my experience. I scared myself. I listened and interacted with guys who had been there and done that. I earned the right to my position through EXPERIENCE, not hours.
So, I guess what I am saying is those 1500 hours suggested as a minimum? It isnt about the hours. It is about the experiences that are IN the hours. Those hours are a general mimimum to give you some experiences, not just experience.
Look deeper. Cadets with 200 hours won't have these experiences, through no fault of their own, unless they too earn their story.
Those who havent read "Fate is the Hunter" by Earnest K Gann, I humbly suggest that you do. Therein lies "experience".
Experience is a "gut" feeling that something isnt right. It is an instinct. It is rat cunning, it is survival, it is interacting with other humans in a mature fashion.
There are probably a few 200 hour pilots who have natural abilities in these areas, but I would suggest not too many. I know I wasnt. I had to earn my experience. I scared myself. I listened and interacted with guys who had been there and done that. I earned the right to my position through EXPERIENCE, not hours.
So, I guess what I am saying is those 1500 hours suggested as a minimum? It isnt about the hours. It is about the experiences that are IN the hours. Those hours are a general mimimum to give you some experiences, not just experience.
Look deeper. Cadets with 200 hours won't have these experiences, through no fault of their own, unless they too earn their story.
Those who havent read "Fate is the Hunter" by Earnest K Gann, I humbly suggest that you do. Therein lies "experience".
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The issue is "HOW DO YOU LEGISLATE A RULE TO CAPTURE THE 'THING' ", given that you can't legislate to "be an ex-footballer" or having "the rightcombination of training and experience". A simple way (as the yanks are alluding to) is just to require 1500 hrs (and maybe an ATPL). It's a blunt instrument, however, achieves an outcome.
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just to require 1500 hrs (and maybe an ATPL). It's a blunt instrument, however, achieves an outcome.
With the possible exception of some in 2007 I suggest that there hasn't been any pilot accepted into an airline in Australia who hasn't had 1,500 hrs and at least ATPL theory. Despite this there have continued to be "close calls" which the ATSB have identified as been due to poor training.
It would be an impossible task to craft a training regime for each individual candidate so I suggest the only answer is to improve the quality of the training. This starts at ab-initio level and continues throughout the pilot's career. For an airline pilot this would include specific multi-crew training and airline specific operations. We should not be continuing the broad brush approach to airline training that some are choosing to implement for no other reason that cost.
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What makes an expert
Google the 10,000 hour rule.
Download & read "The Making of an Expert".
Read the wikipedia page on the book Outliers by Malcolm Gladwell.
Experience & practice do count. Experts are made with ability PLUS practice. Whilst a 200 hour cadet, with 500 hours experience may look the part, when the **** hits the fan they don't have the "I've seen something similar to this" insight & intuition. There is no frame of reference to evaluate confusing, contradictory or incomplete information.
Practice does make perfect. Any one who has attempted learn a new skill knows this to be intuitively correct, to deny it is just wishful BS by management to increase their bonus.
Download & read "The Making of an Expert".
Read the wikipedia page on the book Outliers by Malcolm Gladwell.
Experience & practice do count. Experts are made with ability PLUS practice. Whilst a 200 hour cadet, with 500 hours experience may look the part, when the **** hits the fan they don't have the "I've seen something similar to this" insight & intuition. There is no frame of reference to evaluate confusing, contradictory or incomplete information.
Practice does make perfect. Any one who has attempted learn a new skill knows this to be intuitively correct, to deny it is just wishful BS by management to increase their bonus.
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Thing is that in many countries, the cadet system works well. Training is the key and a good manufacturer based Ops Manual and robust SOPs.
It works when you have a well trained but green F/O who know his standard calls, knows the SOPs and systems and with a Captain who is competent and has properly "set the tone"-in particular pleasantly reminding his F/O that every flight is a training mission. It is tougher on the captain, that's for sure. And a good airline will therefore not push everything to the limits so that the captain is not only the last line of defence but possibly the only line of defence. Separate story.
The new generation non-normal checklists and innovations such as computer based flight planning, EGPWS, Windshear warning etc etc mean that the number of occasions is very few in which the whole show only works because of the world weary wisdom and foresight of the old grey haired Captain. Having lots of grey hair Sherm would naturally love to believe this isn't true but whatever once was the case, things have changed now. We have a great learning environment for the new F/O and it supports the rapid growth that builds even more jobs.
Lets remember that there have been many accidents where a bunch of very experienced pilots all thought that the "other" guy had lots of hours so therefore knew what he was doing or would call out if things got too bad. Southwest at Burbank and Midway, American at Little Rock, KLM at Tenerife, Air France at Toronto, Air Florida at Washington National, Qantas at Bangkok, American at Jamaica. How many hours were there in the cockpit when the BA 747 elected to cross the US and the Atlantic on 3 engines then had to divert because they couldn't get the fuel out of the tanks? How many hours in the cockpit of the Qantas 737 that very nearly had a double flame-out with fuel mismanagement.
Here's what happens when experienced crews use judgement or memory when simple SOPs and good embedded training would have saved the day:
The "Azores" glider (A330 fuel starvation)
"The captain's skill in conducting the engines-out glide to a successful landing averted a catastrophic accident and saved the lives of the passengers and crew," the report says.
However, the report makes clear that such heroics would not have been needed had the pilots shut down the right-side engine (where the fuel was leaking) or had not pumped tonnes of fuel from the undamaged left wing into the right-wing tanks, from where it was poured overboard at more than three kilograms a second.
"Either of these actions would have conserved the fuel in the left-wing tanks and allowed for a landing at Lajes with the left engine operating," the report says.
Instead, "opening the crossfeed valve put the fuel in the left tank at risk, and initiated a worsening of the serious fuel-leak situation."
The crew failed to comprehend that the aircraft had a major fuel leak, even after the second engine died.
"Notwithstanding indications that there had been a massive loss of fuel, the crew did not believe that there was an actual fuel leak," the report says. Instead, the crew believed they were dealing with a computer malfunction.
Investigators established that fuel began leaking from the twin-engined, wide-bodied jet more than an hour before the pilots noticed anything amiss. When they did, they treated the problem as a fuel imbalance and failed to heed the checklist warning of fuel-leak possibility.
They did not call up the checklist on the computer screen, relying instead on memory for their actions. Fifteen minutes later, with the fuel level dropping alarmingly and below the minimum needed to reach Lisbon, the crew elected to divert to the Azores. But they continued to transfer the dwindling fuel from the left wing to the leaking right side.
The report says that the Air Transat flight crew were inadequately prepared to recognize and deal with fuel leaks. "The flight crew members had never experienced a fuel leak situation during operations or training," the report says, adding the "lack of training in the symptoms of fuel-leak situations resulted in this crew not being adequately prepared."
I'm afraid that this thread's argument, or perhaps I should say constructive debate among professionals, needs now to be about HOW to manage cadet schemes, no longer is there any justification for WHETHER to manage cadet schemes.
It works when you have a well trained but green F/O who know his standard calls, knows the SOPs and systems and with a Captain who is competent and has properly "set the tone"-in particular pleasantly reminding his F/O that every flight is a training mission. It is tougher on the captain, that's for sure. And a good airline will therefore not push everything to the limits so that the captain is not only the last line of defence but possibly the only line of defence. Separate story.
The new generation non-normal checklists and innovations such as computer based flight planning, EGPWS, Windshear warning etc etc mean that the number of occasions is very few in which the whole show only works because of the world weary wisdom and foresight of the old grey haired Captain. Having lots of grey hair Sherm would naturally love to believe this isn't true but whatever once was the case, things have changed now. We have a great learning environment for the new F/O and it supports the rapid growth that builds even more jobs.
Lets remember that there have been many accidents where a bunch of very experienced pilots all thought that the "other" guy had lots of hours so therefore knew what he was doing or would call out if things got too bad. Southwest at Burbank and Midway, American at Little Rock, KLM at Tenerife, Air France at Toronto, Air Florida at Washington National, Qantas at Bangkok, American at Jamaica. How many hours were there in the cockpit when the BA 747 elected to cross the US and the Atlantic on 3 engines then had to divert because they couldn't get the fuel out of the tanks? How many hours in the cockpit of the Qantas 737 that very nearly had a double flame-out with fuel mismanagement.
Here's what happens when experienced crews use judgement or memory when simple SOPs and good embedded training would have saved the day:
The "Azores" glider (A330 fuel starvation)
"The captain's skill in conducting the engines-out glide to a successful landing averted a catastrophic accident and saved the lives of the passengers and crew," the report says.
However, the report makes clear that such heroics would not have been needed had the pilots shut down the right-side engine (where the fuel was leaking) or had not pumped tonnes of fuel from the undamaged left wing into the right-wing tanks, from where it was poured overboard at more than three kilograms a second.
"Either of these actions would have conserved the fuel in the left-wing tanks and allowed for a landing at Lajes with the left engine operating," the report says.
Instead, "opening the crossfeed valve put the fuel in the left tank at risk, and initiated a worsening of the serious fuel-leak situation."
The crew failed to comprehend that the aircraft had a major fuel leak, even after the second engine died.
"Notwithstanding indications that there had been a massive loss of fuel, the crew did not believe that there was an actual fuel leak," the report says. Instead, the crew believed they were dealing with a computer malfunction.
Investigators established that fuel began leaking from the twin-engined, wide-bodied jet more than an hour before the pilots noticed anything amiss. When they did, they treated the problem as a fuel imbalance and failed to heed the checklist warning of fuel-leak possibility.
They did not call up the checklist on the computer screen, relying instead on memory for their actions. Fifteen minutes later, with the fuel level dropping alarmingly and below the minimum needed to reach Lisbon, the crew elected to divert to the Azores. But they continued to transfer the dwindling fuel from the left wing to the leaking right side.
The report says that the Air Transat flight crew were inadequately prepared to recognize and deal with fuel leaks. "The flight crew members had never experienced a fuel leak situation during operations or training," the report says, adding the "lack of training in the symptoms of fuel-leak situations resulted in this crew not being adequately prepared."
I'm afraid that this thread's argument, or perhaps I should say constructive debate among professionals, needs now to be about HOW to manage cadet schemes, no longer is there any justification for WHETHER to manage cadet schemes.
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I'm afraid that this thread's argument, or perhaps I should say constructive debate among professionals, needs now to be about HOW to manage cadet schemes, no longer is there any justification for WHETHER to manage cadet schemes.
Cadets are needed only because most experienced pilots won't work for some of the lowest T&C in the world. If T&C where improved in j*/j*NZ/VB/PB/jetconnect, there would be a FLOOD of Oz citizens returning to fly. There is no shortage of Oz pilots with significant experience on every type currently flying. I say again, there is no shortage of Australian citizens with Australian licences capable of doing the job.
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7378FE
The cheapest one, I'll take my chances, as I do every day when I get into my car, a young driver may lose control of his/her vehicle and snuff me out in a moment, if your time is up, it's up, you have no say in the matter.
If the fuel tanks on QF32 ignited, it doesn't matter how many hours the tech crew have, the result would have been the same.
The cheapest one, I'll take my chances, as I do every day when I get into my car, a young driver may lose control of his/her vehicle and snuff me out in a moment, if your time is up, it's up, you have no say in the matter.
If the fuel tanks on QF32 ignited, it doesn't matter how many hours the tech crew have, the result would have been the same.
Might be time to buy some airbags for your car? Who said you have no say in the matter.
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b'fast burrito, t&c on the 737 at VB aren't that bad. I agree though that there are acceptable experience levels in this country at the moment. I think we all know that the companies are using the cadet schemes as a way to lock in a workforce and manipulate the industry.
It may seem extreme but most people do that sort of risk analysis before they buy the ticket and with safety of aircraft so good they are essentially correct - for their circumstance. They have a smaller chance than if they drive and that IS a fact. Where the problem comes into its own is the cost to the company and the society. No, I'm not a dispassionate t..d. The truth is that most of these things come back to money. Whilst you would have to be very unlucky as evidenced by aviation history in this country the cost of the accident as a whole to society and it's impact is what may finally change the minds of the powers to be. Aviation professionals have to sell the cost of inadequate training to the politicians and regulators. Average Joe will take his punt and even too a greedy manager as it may boost their career sufficiently that they will bet against the risk for the few years they may be exposed. The politicians and the regulators are the ones with the greater vested interest that we have to gain the attention of, even then they will probably make the decision on how many extra dollars the lower cost of tickets may boost the Australian economy.
Speaking of economies can one of the experts here explain to me why the UN has tax havens on a naughty list and yet we're so willing to let foreign carriers with such obviously slanted tax regimes in to compete with Australian and other legitimate companies from a more normally excepted tax regime? The cynic in me says it's about selling more sheep!
Speaking of economies can one of the experts here explain to me why the UN has tax havens on a naughty list and yet we're so willing to let foreign carriers with such obviously slanted tax regimes in to compete with Australian and other legitimate companies from a more normally excepted tax regime? The cynic in me says it's about selling more sheep!
I'm afraid that while the issue of the training and experience levels of airline pilots I don't have the experience to comment on, I can say that investors want to see the maximum return for their investment in new technology.
The thinking works on this line "Forty years ago you were flying with steam gauges, compass and ADF, now I have invested billions to give you GPS, intelligent autopilots, and God knows what else in the way of automation, and you still tell me that you need the SAME experience levels in the cockpit? I won't pay for it! I expect to see cost reductions!".
The result is what is called risk shifting, a not very well studied phenomenon which explains why the introduction of ABS brakes on cars has not resulted in any decrease in nose to tail collisions on the roads. People think "I have ABS, I can drive closer to the car in front because I can stop quicker.
"
To put it another way, if I can't get operational savings out if this stuff, then I had better be getting labour cost savings.
The thinking works on this line "Forty years ago you were flying with steam gauges, compass and ADF, now I have invested billions to give you GPS, intelligent autopilots, and God knows what else in the way of automation, and you still tell me that you need the SAME experience levels in the cockpit? I won't pay for it! I expect to see cost reductions!".
The result is what is called risk shifting, a not very well studied phenomenon which explains why the introduction of ABS brakes on cars has not resulted in any decrease in nose to tail collisions on the roads. People think "I have ABS, I can drive closer to the car in front because I can stop quicker.
"To put it another way, if I can't get operational savings out if this stuff, then I had better be getting labour cost savings.
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“Jetstar will be the first Australian based jets to have L-platers on the flight deck.”
Well, except for the cadets on the flight deck of QF aircraft, correct. Welcome to the real world, it’s about time.
“The accidents/incidents will come, as sure as night follows day.”
Really. Does the data support such sensationalism? Take a look at developed countries and you will find there is NO increase in accident rate as a result of the employment of cadet pilots.
“Tell us all-seeing omnipotent one.. which flight would you rather be on?”
I feel comfortable flying in any aircraft that is operated by competent, well-trained crew. Most of my business trips take me to Europe and most of these are with airlines largely crewed by pilots of cadet background. BA for example and LH. Were I to succumb to the QF pilots paranoia and chose a non cadet airline on these sectors, I would be forced to take a US based airline with a much poorer safety record such as AA or DL or god forbid, UA.
Is this really a sound decision?
Well, except for the cadets on the flight deck of QF aircraft, correct. Welcome to the real world, it’s about time.
“The accidents/incidents will come, as sure as night follows day.”
Really. Does the data support such sensationalism? Take a look at developed countries and you will find there is NO increase in accident rate as a result of the employment of cadet pilots.
“Tell us all-seeing omnipotent one.. which flight would you rather be on?”
I feel comfortable flying in any aircraft that is operated by competent, well-trained crew. Most of my business trips take me to Europe and most of these are with airlines largely crewed by pilots of cadet background. BA for example and LH. Were I to succumb to the QF pilots paranoia and chose a non cadet airline on these sectors, I would be forced to take a US based airline with a much poorer safety record such as AA or DL or god forbid, UA.
Is this really a sound decision?
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Well, except for the cadets on the flight deck of QF aircraft, correct.
The cadet scheme for Jet* is proposed strictly as a cost saving device from management who have chosen not to educate themselves on the real issues at hand (or care beyond the next KPI- milestone / bonus package payout).
It is true enough that in Europe, low time pilots are employed to fly narrow body jets. Why there and not here you may ask? Well, first of all, there is a very limited amount of GA in Europe (as compared to she sheer numbers employed by the airlines). This means that the military does not produce enough experienced pilots to facilitate the traditional learning curve and experience accumulation prior to airline entry, that you find here in Australia and the US. Thay therefore have little other option than to go down this path, but the risks associated with this scenario is partially mitigated by retaining T&C's attractive enough to attract a very high number of quality applicants. This in turn allows recruiters access to a massive number of potential cadets to choose from and they are therefore able to ensure that only the very best and brightest are allowed entry into a cadet scheme. The T&C's on offer from Jet* will most definitely NOT achieve this aim, and as a result the training department will be presented with a group of young hopefuls, that lack the aptitude and talent being available to their European counterparts.
Here as anywhere else in life - you'll end up getting what you pay for.
Last edited by Red Jet; 23rd Nov 2010 at 00:22. Reason: Clarification
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Whilst I'm not convinced that you arent a troll, professor, I will make a short attempt to explain these things to you. Even though I suspect that your qualifications are in economics, and you cant see past your abacus.
Pilots are trained to keep their passengers safe. That in a nutshell, is our job. High time, low time, doesnt make a rats ass of a difference, as you so eloquently point out. Keeping ourselves and the punters safe is our job. You give us the tools, and we do it.
Experience sir, is what tells us that we and our passengers, are about to die, and it tells us to do something before that happens. Or it should do, anyway. But if you havent that experience to rely on, you just dont know when its gonna happen, do you?
Take for instance, the Turkish Airlines B737 that recently crashed. An inexperienced crew sat there and watch as their sophisticated B737-800 aircraft (all those systems and protections?) stalled and crashed. Why? Inexperience. They didnt know enough about the type to recognise that the rad alt had failed and the thrust retarded to idle. They didnt understand basic stall recovery. They were trained, as most multi crew pilot licence types are, to trust automation implicitly.
And look where it got them. Professor? Ask the passengers on that flight what they think about pilot training. Oh, that right, you cant. Most died. Get it now?
Pilots are trained to keep their passengers safe. That in a nutshell, is our job. High time, low time, doesnt make a rats ass of a difference, as you so eloquently point out. Keeping ourselves and the punters safe is our job. You give us the tools, and we do it.
Experience sir, is what tells us that we and our passengers, are about to die, and it tells us to do something before that happens. Or it should do, anyway. But if you havent that experience to rely on, you just dont know when its gonna happen, do you?
Take for instance, the Turkish Airlines B737 that recently crashed. An inexperienced crew sat there and watch as their sophisticated B737-800 aircraft (all those systems and protections?) stalled and crashed. Why? Inexperience. They didnt know enough about the type to recognise that the rad alt had failed and the thrust retarded to idle. They didnt understand basic stall recovery. They were trained, as most multi crew pilot licence types are, to trust automation implicitly.
And look where it got them. Professor? Ask the passengers on that flight what they think about pilot training. Oh, that right, you cant. Most died. Get it now?
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With all due respect, giving them another 1000 hours on light twin for example in GA wouldn't help them understand the systems better? Wouldn't training be a larger factor in this?
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Airline safety is based on airlines having multiple lines of defence against an accident. These lines of defence include maintenance and training amongst others.
Professor, I would posit that approximately 100% of all airline captains would include " experienced, and well trained First Officer" as an indispensible line of defence for a safe operation. Who are you to argue with their opinion?
Qantas has successfully used cadets in the past. But never directly into the FO's seat. Neither have BA or Lufthansa.
Why does Jetstar management think it knows better than the experts?
Professor, I would posit that approximately 100% of all airline captains would include " experienced, and well trained First Officer" as an indispensible line of defence for a safe operation. Who are you to argue with their opinion?
Qantas has successfully used cadets in the past. But never directly into the FO's seat. Neither have BA or Lufthansa.
Why does Jetstar management think it knows better than the experts?