Merged: Erebus site launched
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When I started this thread it was to let people know the Erebus site built by NZALPA was up. The debate here has been largely circular for some time now and people will believe what they want to believe.
If there is substantial material missing from the site by all means contact NZALPA and let them know.
If there is substantial material missing from the site by all means contact NZALPA and let them know.
what happend to the pages in Collins notebook?
why didn't the US Navy ATC personnel want to testify? were their tapes erased acidentally or on purpose?
if their was an 'orchestrated litany of lies', who was the puppetmaster. Morrie Davis, or was he the fall guy for Des Dalgety?
if the CVR was analyzed today, would new technology decipher it better?
were all the passengers camera films examined? were there any shots that showed the view to the south as they orbited that were disregarded because they were perceived not to show anything?
Was a passenger filming on a movie camera at point of impact?
if you put some cameras on a UAV and got it to fly the circuit over and over throughout the summer, would you get some footage of conditions as they were that day?
and having watched Erebus: The Aftermath on tv1 last 2 days and what was a whos-who of NZ Actors twenty years ago, Was that a youthful Jim Hickey playing one of the pilots with a 1 line speaking role?
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I remember watching "Erebus : The Aftermath" as a kid when I was home sick from school in about 1989/90, and being fascinated by the subject. For years and years I did a lot of reading on the subject and had a nostalgic trip down memory lane when I found the YouTube upload and the NZALPA website.
While the fundamental argument that a pilot should be aware of where he is at all times is fair, the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound.
Several things in the story proposed at the time by ANZ simply don't make sense, and Mahon was quite justified in believing it likely that someone was trying to pull the wool over his eyes. The only thing he was censured for was stating this belief as plainly as he did - his investigation and conclusions regarding the accident were never in doubt, though the full force of the New Zealand Government and Air New Zealand's PR operations did their best to claim that the censure for the former invalidated the latter - quite successfully it would seem, given some of the posts on this thread.
The meat of what Mahon was saying was that there was a fundamental organisational failure at ANZ, and in Civil Aviation, in the time leading up to the crash - to whit:
1. For whatever reason, the 1977 and 1978 requirement that any captain taking an Antarctic flight should first take a familiarisation flight down there was rescinded for 1979. By all accounts, ANZ simply said they weren't going to require it anymore, and Civil Aviation acquiesced.
2. While the initial, manually navigated flights did indeed have their final waypoint a route that took them over Mt. Erebus, in all cases the weather and visibility were good enough for the crew to take them off that track and fly the McMurdo Sound route. It should be noted that Mahon was of the opinion that the initial waypoint and route directly over Erebus could not be justified under any circumstances for a sightseeing flight and should never have been approved in the first place.
3. Chief Navigator Brian Hewitt of Navigation Section made a gross error when he miskeyed the waypoint - he simply did not perform the final re-check as required by the standards set by the company, and for 14 months the computerised track took every single ANZ Antarctic flight down McMurdo Sound, and because that route was very close to the military McMurdo Sound route that the line pilots had been flying visually prior to computerisation anyway - to the line pilots it seemed like a perfectly logical waypoint.
3. In any case, the only department of ANZ that continued to believe that the route went over Erebus was the Navigation Section themselves. Every single line pilot that flew the route testified to the fact that the route took them down McMurdo Sound, and at least some, if not most of the briefing materials given Captain Collins indicated that route, and not the route over Erebus. Now, here's where things get tricky - because all the hard copies of the briefing materials other than the few provided by Captain Gemmell (which could be argued supported ANZ's claims) were either lost on the mountain, lost in transit, or possibly destroyed (see the story about Captain Collins' ring binder, recovered at the site intact, yet reappearing at the commission with the pages missing). All briefing materials bar one indicated the McMurdo Sound route, or an approximation of that route - and upon cross-examination Chief Navigator Hewitt was "very surprised" that these documents indicating the McMurdo Sound route constituted part (in fact a majority) of the briefing materials.
4. Regardless of the reason - Navigation Section updated the computer track only hours before Captain Collins and his crew took TE901 off the ground and failed to tell them. Collins may have plotted the route on the maps at home using the numbers he had - but they were the old (incorrect) numbers. Now it could be argued here that he should have cross-checked the new numbers with the old - and logically this was an oversight. But the prevailing culture at ANZ at the time, as testified to by the line pilots, allowed pilots to safely assume that the co-ordinates given at the briefing would be the same ones they'd be flying. This right here is a major systems failure, and, Mahon (IMO rightly) considered, the fundamental cause of the accident.
5. Prior to this you had a situation whereby the national carrier and the Civil Aviation authority of New Zealand had a relationship that some would say was too cosy. And you also had Prime Minister Muldoon as the majority shareholder in the national carrier, and a personal friend of ANZ's then-CEO to boot. Had this not been the case, I suspect the reaction to Mahon's findings would have been very different.
In any case, it transpired that the minority decision by the Court Of Appeal censuring Mahon (for his language regarding the "litany of lies" remember - not his findings), was taken by two judges who had children working for ANZ at the time. After the report was published, ANZ also released the minutes of meetings taken directly after the accident which revealed that the board and senior pilots were well aware of the discrepancy in the nav track, and yet denied this publicly and to Mahon himself - proof they were indeed lying. But because this evidence was not entered in the original Commission (ANZ took the request for documents to include those up to the time of the accident - again pretty convenient), this could not be produced either during the Appeal, or to the Privy Council.
Finally, Chippindale himself said in 1989 that Civil Aviation was actively trying to avoid a large insurance payout, and while he stood by his report, it was relevant.
While the fundamental argument that a pilot should be aware of where he is at all times is fair, the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound.
Several things in the story proposed at the time by ANZ simply don't make sense, and Mahon was quite justified in believing it likely that someone was trying to pull the wool over his eyes. The only thing he was censured for was stating this belief as plainly as he did - his investigation and conclusions regarding the accident were never in doubt, though the full force of the New Zealand Government and Air New Zealand's PR operations did their best to claim that the censure for the former invalidated the latter - quite successfully it would seem, given some of the posts on this thread.
The meat of what Mahon was saying was that there was a fundamental organisational failure at ANZ, and in Civil Aviation, in the time leading up to the crash - to whit:
1. For whatever reason, the 1977 and 1978 requirement that any captain taking an Antarctic flight should first take a familiarisation flight down there was rescinded for 1979. By all accounts, ANZ simply said they weren't going to require it anymore, and Civil Aviation acquiesced.
2. While the initial, manually navigated flights did indeed have their final waypoint a route that took them over Mt. Erebus, in all cases the weather and visibility were good enough for the crew to take them off that track and fly the McMurdo Sound route. It should be noted that Mahon was of the opinion that the initial waypoint and route directly over Erebus could not be justified under any circumstances for a sightseeing flight and should never have been approved in the first place.
3. Chief Navigator Brian Hewitt of Navigation Section made a gross error when he miskeyed the waypoint - he simply did not perform the final re-check as required by the standards set by the company, and for 14 months the computerised track took every single ANZ Antarctic flight down McMurdo Sound, and because that route was very close to the military McMurdo Sound route that the line pilots had been flying visually prior to computerisation anyway - to the line pilots it seemed like a perfectly logical waypoint.
3. In any case, the only department of ANZ that continued to believe that the route went over Erebus was the Navigation Section themselves. Every single line pilot that flew the route testified to the fact that the route took them down McMurdo Sound, and at least some, if not most of the briefing materials given Captain Collins indicated that route, and not the route over Erebus. Now, here's where things get tricky - because all the hard copies of the briefing materials other than the few provided by Captain Gemmell (which could be argued supported ANZ's claims) were either lost on the mountain, lost in transit, or possibly destroyed (see the story about Captain Collins' ring binder, recovered at the site intact, yet reappearing at the commission with the pages missing). All briefing materials bar one indicated the McMurdo Sound route, or an approximation of that route - and upon cross-examination Chief Navigator Hewitt was "very surprised" that these documents indicating the McMurdo Sound route constituted part (in fact a majority) of the briefing materials.
4. Regardless of the reason - Navigation Section updated the computer track only hours before Captain Collins and his crew took TE901 off the ground and failed to tell them. Collins may have plotted the route on the maps at home using the numbers he had - but they were the old (incorrect) numbers. Now it could be argued here that he should have cross-checked the new numbers with the old - and logically this was an oversight. But the prevailing culture at ANZ at the time, as testified to by the line pilots, allowed pilots to safely assume that the co-ordinates given at the briefing would be the same ones they'd be flying. This right here is a major systems failure, and, Mahon (IMO rightly) considered, the fundamental cause of the accident.
5. Prior to this you had a situation whereby the national carrier and the Civil Aviation authority of New Zealand had a relationship that some would say was too cosy. And you also had Prime Minister Muldoon as the majority shareholder in the national carrier, and a personal friend of ANZ's then-CEO to boot. Had this not been the case, I suspect the reaction to Mahon's findings would have been very different.
In any case, it transpired that the minority decision by the Court Of Appeal censuring Mahon (for his language regarding the "litany of lies" remember - not his findings), was taken by two judges who had children working for ANZ at the time. After the report was published, ANZ also released the minutes of meetings taken directly after the accident which revealed that the board and senior pilots were well aware of the discrepancy in the nav track, and yet denied this publicly and to Mahon himself - proof they were indeed lying. But because this evidence was not entered in the original Commission (ANZ took the request for documents to include those up to the time of the accident - again pretty convenient), this could not be produced either during the Appeal, or to the Privy Council.
Finally, Chippindale himself said in 1989 that Civil Aviation was actively trying to avoid a large insurance payout, and while he stood by his report, it was relevant.
Last edited by DozyWannabe; 15th Jan 2010 at 17:48.
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So Dozywannabe, with the TACAN out on the day, can you find me another airline that descends below MSA based solely on what the IRS is telling them? Another airline, anywhere in the world? Can you find me a navigation systems maker who made a prelaser gyro system and claimed it never required updating?
On the day, with the correct co-ordinates, that aircraft still could have hit terrain if the IRS had wandered and there was no Tacan to do a position update.
Yes, the company panicked and did some stupid things subsequent to the disaster but it was very poor airmanship that put the aircraft at an altitude where CFIT could take place.
If an engine caught fire due to incorrect assembly, as a crew do we put the fire out and land somewhere safe or do we crash and say the engine shouldn't have been on fire?
Descending below MSA, under radar, does basic airmanship still dictate we check our position?
On the day, with the correct co-ordinates, that aircraft still could have hit terrain if the IRS had wandered and there was no Tacan to do a position update.
Yes, the company panicked and did some stupid things subsequent to the disaster but it was very poor airmanship that put the aircraft at an altitude where CFIT could take place.
If an engine caught fire due to incorrect assembly, as a crew do we put the fire out and land somewhere safe or do we crash and say the engine shouldn't have been on fire?
Descending below MSA, under radar, does basic airmanship still dictate we check our position?
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What burty said - don't forget that ATC cleared them for descent under VMC, and they were not in bad weather at the time - as was proven by the photos and film taken in right up to the second the aircraft hit. Chippindale got that dead wrong.
In answer to your question, probably not nowadays. But the 1970s were a whole different kettle of fish, as you should well know.
In answer to your question, probably not nowadays. But the 1970s were a whole different kettle of fish, as you should well know.
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"Chippindale got that dead wrong."
That statement is dead wrong. Before you make statements like that, get hold of the known, undisputable facts.
This is what the Company orders were for that flight, there is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was found in the cockpit after the crash.
" Delete all reference in Briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY let-down procedure available in VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120degrees Grid through 360G to 270G, from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4 Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
You will note that this is the ONLY let down available.
Which of these requirements was complied with??
You should also be aware that the requirements as stated was to cover the fact that this crew were completely inexperienced in AntArctic operations, in fact the only one to have been down to the ice was one of the Flight Engineers.
You no doubt know, that all other operators required a minimum time as First Officer, observer etc before going down there in command.
The weather at McMurdo was below requirements for the only approved let down procedure. To go and invent your own let down procedure, especially when at no time Mt Erebus was ever sighted, is surely the hight of folly, and the end results were exactly what the approved descent procedure was designed to avoid.
That statement is dead wrong. Before you make statements like that, get hold of the known, undisputable facts.
This is what the Company orders were for that flight, there is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was found in the cockpit after the crash.
" Delete all reference in Briefing dated 23/10/79. Note that the ONLY let-down procedure available in VMC below FL160 (16,000ft) to 6,000ft as follows.
1. Vis 20 km plus
2. No snow showers in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120degrees Grid through 360G to 270G, from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH29.
4 Descent to be co-ordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.
You will note that this is the ONLY let down available.
Which of these requirements was complied with??
You should also be aware that the requirements as stated was to cover the fact that this crew were completely inexperienced in AntArctic operations, in fact the only one to have been down to the ice was one of the Flight Engineers.
You no doubt know, that all other operators required a minimum time as First Officer, observer etc before going down there in command.
The weather at McMurdo was below requirements for the only approved let down procedure. To go and invent your own let down procedure, especially when at no time Mt Erebus was ever sighted, is surely the hight of folly, and the end results were exactly what the approved descent procedure was designed to avoid.
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This is what the Company orders were for that flight, there is no doubt the crew were aware of these requirements, a copy was found in the cockpit after the crash.
The whole thing stunk like a boathouse at low tide and the company execs were trying to save their own skins at the expense of good men.
Graybeard - Captain Collins took an atlas with him with his intended route marked on it (having marked it out on a large-scale table map the previous evening) - his wife and daughters testified to this. The atlas was never found, or was disappeared because it would have been devastating to ANZ's case.
Anyone who has read all prospector's views and arguments on this subject knows that he has much detailed insight. But that does not make him a complete authority, and to be so sarcastic adds little to the standard of debate.
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Fantome,
Perhaps you are correct in that the sarcasm was uncalled for BUT
"don't forget that ATC cleared them for descent under VMC,"
Did they?? when can a controller CLEAR anybody for descent below route MSA before they have been identified on radar??? the flight was never identified, and by definition requesting a VMC descent requires you, and tells the controller, you can maintain own separation from other traffic and TERRAIN.
"
"No, the company said that's what was found in the cockpit after the crash"
Really?? That is where Elvis comes in. Can he, or anyone, prove that this is only because the Company said it was?? It was in fact a Company memorandum to AntArctic crews dated 8 Nov 1979 OAA:14/13/28. and it was advising that the McMurdo NDB was not available, and it stated as has been posted in this thread many times, the ONLY let down procedure available.
The weather and belief as to position.
"
"the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound."
If the crew had of noticed, in this good weather, as it was at the time and place, photo's are available showing Beaufort Island quite clearly, but if they were on the track they thought they were on, they were on the wrong side of the island, hard to mistake that Island, it is the only one there.
"as was proven by the photos and film taken in right up to the second the aircraft hit. Chippindale got that dead wrong."
Really? Less than 4 minutes before impact, Mulgrew told the pax "I still cant see very much at the moment, keep you informed as soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are".
This was the positional awareness as the aircraft was in a descent at more than 265 kts, that descent going down to a little under 1500ft.
To be told that the Chief Aircraft Accident Inspector was "Dead wrong"
and that Mahon got it all correct I must admit makes me a little sarcastic.
Perhaps you are correct in that the sarcasm was uncalled for BUT
"don't forget that ATC cleared them for descent under VMC,"
Did they?? when can a controller CLEAR anybody for descent below route MSA before they have been identified on radar??? the flight was never identified, and by definition requesting a VMC descent requires you, and tells the controller, you can maintain own separation from other traffic and TERRAIN.
"
"No, the company said that's what was found in the cockpit after the crash"
Really?? That is where Elvis comes in. Can he, or anyone, prove that this is only because the Company said it was?? It was in fact a Company memorandum to AntArctic crews dated 8 Nov 1979 OAA:14/13/28. and it was advising that the McMurdo NDB was not available, and it stated as has been posted in this thread many times, the ONLY let down procedure available.
The weather and belief as to position.
"
"the fact is that there is scant, if any evidence to believe that Captain Collins thought he was anywhere other than over McMurdo Sound."
If the crew had of noticed, in this good weather, as it was at the time and place, photo's are available showing Beaufort Island quite clearly, but if they were on the track they thought they were on, they were on the wrong side of the island, hard to mistake that Island, it is the only one there.
"as was proven by the photos and film taken in right up to the second the aircraft hit. Chippindale got that dead wrong."
Really? Less than 4 minutes before impact, Mulgrew told the pax "I still cant see very much at the moment, keep you informed as soon as I see something that gives me a clue as to where we are".
This was the positional awareness as the aircraft was in a descent at more than 265 kts, that descent going down to a little under 1500ft.
To be told that the Chief Aircraft Accident Inspector was "Dead wrong"
and that Mahon got it all correct I must admit makes me a little sarcastic.
Last edited by prospector; 20th Jan 2010 at 20:55.
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The Royal Commission Report convincingly clears Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin of any suggestion that negligence on their part had in any way contributed to the disaster. That is unchallenged.
It continues on to explain why Mr Chippindale’s finding of pilot error was wrong:
The judge was able to displace Mr. Chippindale's attribution of the accident to pilot error, for two main reasons. The most important was that at the inquiry there was evidence from Captain Collins' widow and daughters, which had not been available to Mr. Chippindale at the time of his investigation and was previously unknown to the management of A.N.Z., that after the briefing of 9 November 1979 Captain Collins, who had made a note of the co-ordinates of the Western Waypoint that were on the flight plan used at that briefing, had, at his own home, plotted on an atlas and upon a larger topographical chart the track from the Cape Hallett waypoint to the Western Waypoint. There was evidence that he had taken this atlas and chart with him on the fatal flight and the inference was plain that in the course of piloting the aircraft he and First Officer Cassin had used the lines that he had plotted to show him where the aircraft was when he switched from nav track to heading select in order to make a descent to 2,000 feet while still to the north of Ross Island which he reported to ATC at McMurdo and to which he received ATC's consent. That on completing this descent he switched back to nav track is incapable of being reconciled with any other explanation than that he was relying upon the line he had himself plotted of the flight track on which he had been briefed. It was a combination of his own meticulous conscientiousness in taking the trouble to plot for himself on a topographical chart the flight track that had been referred to at his briefing, and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster.
The other principal reason why the judge felt able to displace Mr. Chippindale's ascription of the cause of the accident to pilot error was that certain remarks forming part of the conversations recorded in the CVR of the crashed aircraft and attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers had suggested to him that shortly before the crash they were expressing to the pilot and navigator uncertainty about the aircraft's position. The tape from the CVR which had been recovered from the site of the crash proved difficult to interpret. The judge, with the thoroughness that characterised him throughout his investigations, went to great pains to obtain the best possible expert assistance in the interpretation of the tape. The result was that he was able to conclude that the remarks attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers could not have been made by them, and that there was nothing recorded in the CVR that was capable of throwing any doubt upon the confident belief of all members of the crew that the nav track was taking the aircraft on the flight path as it had been plotted by Captain Collins on his atlas and chart, and thus down the middle of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus.
Then they confirm that Justice Mahon was correct in castigating the airline
The judge's report contains numerous examples and criticisms of A.N.Z.'s slipshod system of administration and absence of liaison both between sections and between individual members of sections in the branch of management that was concerned with flight operations. Grave deficiencies are exposed in the briefing for Antarctic flights; and the explanation advanced by witnesses for the airline as to how it came about that Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin were briefed on a flight path that took the aircraft over the ice-covered waters of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus but were issued, for use in the aircraft's computer, as the nav track a flight path which went directly over Mt. Erebus itself, without the aircrew being told of the change, involved admissions of a whole succession of inexcusable blunders by individual members of the executive staff. None of this was challenged before their Lordships. No attempt was made on behalf of A.N.Z. to advance excuses for it.
It continues on to explain why Mr Chippindale’s finding of pilot error was wrong:
The judge was able to displace Mr. Chippindale's attribution of the accident to pilot error, for two main reasons. The most important was that at the inquiry there was evidence from Captain Collins' widow and daughters, which had not been available to Mr. Chippindale at the time of his investigation and was previously unknown to the management of A.N.Z., that after the briefing of 9 November 1979 Captain Collins, who had made a note of the co-ordinates of the Western Waypoint that were on the flight plan used at that briefing, had, at his own home, plotted on an atlas and upon a larger topographical chart the track from the Cape Hallett waypoint to the Western Waypoint. There was evidence that he had taken this atlas and chart with him on the fatal flight and the inference was plain that in the course of piloting the aircraft he and First Officer Cassin had used the lines that he had plotted to show him where the aircraft was when he switched from nav track to heading select in order to make a descent to 2,000 feet while still to the north of Ross Island which he reported to ATC at McMurdo and to which he received ATC's consent. That on completing this descent he switched back to nav track is incapable of being reconciled with any other explanation than that he was relying upon the line he had himself plotted of the flight track on which he had been briefed. It was a combination of his own meticulous conscientiousness in taking the trouble to plot for himself on a topographical chart the flight track that had been referred to at his briefing, and the fact that he had no previous experience of "whiteout" and had been given no warning at any time that such a deceptive phenomenon even existed, that caused the disaster.
The other principal reason why the judge felt able to displace Mr. Chippindale's ascription of the cause of the accident to pilot error was that certain remarks forming part of the conversations recorded in the CVR of the crashed aircraft and attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers had suggested to him that shortly before the crash they were expressing to the pilot and navigator uncertainty about the aircraft's position. The tape from the CVR which had been recovered from the site of the crash proved difficult to interpret. The judge, with the thoroughness that characterised him throughout his investigations, went to great pains to obtain the best possible expert assistance in the interpretation of the tape. The result was that he was able to conclude that the remarks attributed by Mr. Chippindale to the flight engineers could not have been made by them, and that there was nothing recorded in the CVR that was capable of throwing any doubt upon the confident belief of all members of the crew that the nav track was taking the aircraft on the flight path as it had been plotted by Captain Collins on his atlas and chart, and thus down the middle of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus.
Then they confirm that Justice Mahon was correct in castigating the airline
The judge's report contains numerous examples and criticisms of A.N.Z.'s slipshod system of administration and absence of liaison both between sections and between individual members of sections in the branch of management that was concerned with flight operations. Grave deficiencies are exposed in the briefing for Antarctic flights; and the explanation advanced by witnesses for the airline as to how it came about that Captain Collins and First Officer Cassin were briefed on a flight path that took the aircraft over the ice-covered waters of McMurdo Sound well to the west of Mt. Erebus but were issued, for use in the aircraft's computer, as the nav track a flight path which went directly over Mt. Erebus itself, without the aircrew being told of the change, involved admissions of a whole succession of inexcusable blunders by individual members of the executive staff. None of this was challenged before their Lordships. No attempt was made on behalf of A.N.Z. to advance excuses for it.
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This continually goes around and around over the same old ground proving little to any, satisfying nil.
Plus more than a little out of date; surely more than time for the Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum???
DK
This continually goes around and around over the same old ground proving little to any, satisfying nil.
Plus more than a little out of date; surely more than time for the Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum???
DK
Cannot agree. There are still aspects of the flight/crash/investigation
that have not been thoroughly examined. Such as the anomalies between
the FDR and CVR that on circling and descent have unaligned time references. Also passenger photos and videos not as yet subjected to thorough forensic analysis. Some there are, largely working quietly on their own, striving to put together sufficient evidence to warrant a full reappraisal. Never close a case if there is any possibility of revealing hitherto unconsidered evidence.
that have not been thoroughly examined. Such as the anomalies between
the FDR and CVR that on circling and descent have unaligned time references. Also passenger photos and videos not as yet subjected to thorough forensic analysis. Some there are, largely working quietly on their own, striving to put together sufficient evidence to warrant a full reappraisal. Never close a case if there is any possibility of revealing hitherto unconsidered evidence.
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Not so.
There have been the investigations and inquires, the evidence has been re-examined there and here many, many times where some remain unconvinced and probably will forever.
The investigations, the inquires have been done, recommendations made and implemented to prevent further or similar accidents in the future. That is the nature of aviation and it is time to move on better using our energies and resources preventing other incidents in the future, not wasting them futilely rehashing, rehashing the past.
It becomes like roadside memorials; attempts to pass the grief and guilt to others whilst, within days, the flowers rot and putrefy leaving a blight on the landscape: continued spurious searching for `answers' achives little except extending the grief of those involved.
Time to let them rest in peace.
Move On!
DK
Mods; the lock or Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum?
There have been the investigations and inquires, the evidence has been re-examined there and here many, many times where some remain unconvinced and probably will forever.
The investigations, the inquires have been done, recommendations made and implemented to prevent further or similar accidents in the future. That is the nature of aviation and it is time to move on better using our energies and resources preventing other incidents in the future, not wasting them futilely rehashing, rehashing the past.
It becomes like roadside memorials; attempts to pass the grief and guilt to others whilst, within days, the flowers rot and putrefy leaving a blight on the landscape: continued spurious searching for `answers' achives little except extending the grief of those involved.
Time to let them rest in peace.
Move On!
DK
Mods; the lock or Aviation History and Nostalgia Forum?
It's not about unresolved grief. It's not about rotting flowers or 'moving on'.
It's about questions based on the long and searching review of all published material that is still being undertaken by individuals who have no axes to grind, but can see with a forensic clarity not available to all who were involved in the official process. What transpires for this thread is neither here nor there.
It's about questions based on the long and searching review of all published material that is still being undertaken by individuals who have no axes to grind, but can see with a forensic clarity not available to all who were involved in the official process. What transpires for this thread is neither here nor there.
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Dark Knight
Some were saying that after the Chippendale investigation.
But subsequent information and events have proven that further investigation was indeed appropriate.
Some were saying that after the Chippendale investigation.
But subsequent information and events have proven that further investigation was indeed appropriate.
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It was a long time ago and none of us were there but:
Failed to mark the waypoints off on the chart. (They MUST have had some sort of chart)
Didn't do a track check out of the last waypoint (Mt Hallet?)
Sent the spare pilot back and kept the spare engineer in the cockpit for the lo-level bit. (Big mistake. Gotta be.)
Relied on the INS which they knew at that stage could have been 15 miles out.
What was the weather radar picture?
Didn't ping on the no VHF, no radar contact, and where is this mountain which is supposed to be fifteen miles away on our left??
Feel free to pick me up on any of that if you feel like it, anyone. !!!!!!!!!!!
Failed to mark the waypoints off on the chart. (They MUST have had some sort of chart)
Didn't do a track check out of the last waypoint (Mt Hallet?)
Sent the spare pilot back and kept the spare engineer in the cockpit for the lo-level bit. (Big mistake. Gotta be.)
Relied on the INS which they knew at that stage could have been 15 miles out.
What was the weather radar picture?
Didn't ping on the no VHF, no radar contact, and where is this mountain which is supposed to be fifteen miles away on our left??
Feel free to pick me up on any of that if you feel like it, anyone. !!!!!!!!!!!
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Erebus and SilkAir MI 185
There is similar current debate on the South Asia and the Far East Forum on continuing to try and resolve the SilkAir MI 185 tragedy as more detail gradually comes into circulation. There are similarities in the two cases, or more correctly of their investigation, and until they are finally resolved then the full lessons are not learned and the circumstances not guarded against in future.
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Jafa:
It's been a long, long time since I looked at this. Isn't Hallet some 200 miles back? A 10 mile or whatever difference in next wpt would be on the order of 3 degrees. Is that enough to trigger concern? There might be that much error reading the HSI.
The AINS-70 did triple inertial mix before the term was invented by Litton in their later LTN-72. From the 5 hours or so since last AINS position update near Christchurch, the position error was about 1.5 miles. ANZ and other KSSU configuration DC-10 operators had always seen that kind of accuracy. The crew had little reason to question the Nav system, and they obviously never checked the lat/long in their flight release against a good chart. In fact, it was the over-reliance on the AINS by the pilots and the company that resulted in complacency.
Whose responsibility was it for the pilots to have good charts appropriate for the route? The QF 747s flying Antarctica at that time didn't have AINS-70, just triple INS. What charts did they have as backup?
The RDR-1F Wx radar in the ANZ DC-10 fleet would paint only a thin line when presented with a steep mountain from 1500 feet altitude. It would have been useful before they descended, however.
GB
Didn't do a track check out of the last waypoint (Mt Hallet?)
Relied on the INS which they knew at that stage could have been 15 miles out.
What was the weather radar picture?
Relied on the INS which they knew at that stage could have been 15 miles out.
What was the weather radar picture?
The AINS-70 did triple inertial mix before the term was invented by Litton in their later LTN-72. From the 5 hours or so since last AINS position update near Christchurch, the position error was about 1.5 miles. ANZ and other KSSU configuration DC-10 operators had always seen that kind of accuracy. The crew had little reason to question the Nav system, and they obviously never checked the lat/long in their flight release against a good chart. In fact, it was the over-reliance on the AINS by the pilots and the company that resulted in complacency.
Whose responsibility was it for the pilots to have good charts appropriate for the route? The QF 747s flying Antarctica at that time didn't have AINS-70, just triple INS. What charts did they have as backup?
The RDR-1F Wx radar in the ANZ DC-10 fleet would paint only a thin line when presented with a steep mountain from 1500 feet altitude. It would have been useful before they descended, however.
GB
Last edited by Graybeard; 30th Jan 2010 at 01:33. Reason: Final thought.