CASA premature ADS-B mandate will result in even more pilots losing jobs
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Think About it
I dont Think Dick is arguing that the technology is a problem - far from it he thinks its a positive step forward. My understanding is that Dick is saying that the timing of the rollout being ahead of the US will push up costs and pushing up costs is rarely a good thing.....
I'd rather adopt a low cost proven technology than be an early adopter of a high cost early model technology. Dick is on the other end of that spectrum but is warning the industry about the cost and potential ramifications of costs of compliance.
I think Dick might be off the mark in the scale of the fallout from the cost differential and the subsequent employment issues, i think this is a crumbs issue compared to other operational costs but his basic premise that it will cost more to go earlier than the US is correct
I'd rather adopt a low cost proven technology than be an early adopter of a high cost early model technology. Dick is on the other end of that spectrum but is warning the industry about the cost and potential ramifications of costs of compliance.
I think Dick might be off the mark in the scale of the fallout from the cost differential and the subsequent employment issues, i think this is a crumbs issue compared to other operational costs but his basic premise that it will cost more to go earlier than the US is correct
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There never was a subsidy
ASA and the airlines do not spent a cent if they can possibly avoid it. This was a sugestion that never went any further, and the "dumb" people knew it would not.
The "dumb" people also did not believe the fairy stories that circulated about the magic things that ADSB was going to do for them at no cost, just because the benevolent airlines and ASA liked them.
And they were right. The proposed ADSB fit was in effect only another transponder that they would have to carry around and have serviced, probably at a coastal city 1000 miles away from base. And it would only work at one or two locations in their area.
It reminds me of the story of a counterfieter who printed a lot of 12 dollar bills and , realising his mistake decided to visit those "dumb" people in the outback to get them changed.
Yes they changed them alright. For three dollar bills..
The "dumb" people also did not believe the fairy stories that circulated about the magic things that ADSB was going to do for them at no cost, just because the benevolent airlines and ASA liked them.
And they were right. The proposed ADSB fit was in effect only another transponder that they would have to carry around and have serviced, probably at a coastal city 1000 miles away from base. And it would only work at one or two locations in their area.
It reminds me of the story of a counterfieter who printed a lot of 12 dollar bills and , realising his mistake decided to visit those "dumb" people in the outback to get them changed.
Yes they changed them alright. For three dollar bills..
Folks,
Perhaps we should all take a step back, and look at where the push for mandatory ADS-B actually originated.
All easily available to those who want to take the time --- are the records of the ATLAS program. Please allow me to simplify it, because I don't want to write pages that nobody wants to read.
ATLAS proposed a "brave new world" where there would be only two classes of airspace, "controlled" and "uncontrolled", or in its new guise (ASTRA last week) , "managed" and "unmanaged" --- although there was some confusion, would all airspace be "designated" (for want of a better word), and traffic be divided into "managed" and "unmanaged".
Regardless, a central concept is that all aircraft have to have a full time datalink with HAL, or whatever the giant airspace management computer might be called.
There is a not so uncommon story here, some Australia persons at ICAO succeed in having a relatively low level CNS/ATM committee (detailed in ATLAS records) come up with the grand two class airspace plan, then, low and behold, we are told ( all in ATLAS records and subsequently) that this is the way ICAO is going, so Australia has to fall in line.
The "need" for mandated (ie universal) ADS-B as a datalink sprang from the need to have a full time datalink, so that "all" aircraft became known/managed traffic ----- all absolutely nothing to do with any present or future "safety" problems ---- but to enable "freeflight".
To a large degree the "radar savings" were a red herring, the "bottom line" savings were minuscule to nothing, again all easily verifiable from published data ---- AA Annual report being the starting point ----- at best 3%.
This even before a "promoter bias" discount was applied to the "savings". Those of you familiar with assessment of public sector "cost/benefit" analysis, will be all too familiar with why a "promoter (or proponent bias) discount" should be applied to such project assessment of savings. See Australian Government guidelines (OBPR etc) for this adjustment.
How do you think the JCP fared when this was applied??
All the unquantified or (at times hilariously) mis-quantified benefits ( in the two CASA cost/benefit studies/JCP) were, in the opinion of many, post facto justifications to mask the proposal of mandatory ADS-B as a necessary enabler for what was, essentially, one class of airspace.
Why has nobody risen to Dick Smith's challenge to justify the asserted savings to airlines?? Maybe, just maybe, with the current AUSEP standards and RVSM, and current and projected traffic levels, a reduction to a 5 mile standard produces no en-route savings. Virgin top management seem to have come to that conclusion.
That is not an argument against the present FL290+ program, if the service provider and it's customers want it, that's their decision. There is no doubt ADS-B/C will make an increasing contribution to provision of CNS/ATM services.
The greatest single attribute of the present ICAO airspace classifications is that it is built around the premise that a minimum "separation assurance" standard should apply to all airspace ----- all classes are to be equally "safe".
By definition, once that separation assurance standard is achieved, provision of additional CNS/ATM services, and their associated cost, are "economic waste", because it is expenditure for which there is no possible return, and can be no return, because the separation assurance standard is so high, that no additional level of services will further reduce the residual collision risk.
Have a look at the Airservices risk analysis of providing C v. E services between 10,000 and FL200 ---- in both cases, the assessed collision risk was statistically zero ----- "vanishingly small", to use the proper expression. Therefor, C was not "safer" than E, because it could not be, given the traffic levels. If there was a vast increase in traffic, the answer might be different.
Sadly, this is all a complete perversion/inversion of the original "freeflight" concept, where there was a potential for considerable economic savings (by a reduction in ATM costs, not an increase) and collision risk reduction (removing traffic concentration) in areas of high traffic levels, but that is too big a topic for this thread.
Tootle pip!!
Perhaps we should all take a step back, and look at where the push for mandatory ADS-B actually originated.
All easily available to those who want to take the time --- are the records of the ATLAS program. Please allow me to simplify it, because I don't want to write pages that nobody wants to read.
ATLAS proposed a "brave new world" where there would be only two classes of airspace, "controlled" and "uncontrolled", or in its new guise (ASTRA last week) , "managed" and "unmanaged" --- although there was some confusion, would all airspace be "designated" (for want of a better word), and traffic be divided into "managed" and "unmanaged".
Regardless, a central concept is that all aircraft have to have a full time datalink with HAL, or whatever the giant airspace management computer might be called.
There is a not so uncommon story here, some Australia persons at ICAO succeed in having a relatively low level CNS/ATM committee (detailed in ATLAS records) come up with the grand two class airspace plan, then, low and behold, we are told ( all in ATLAS records and subsequently) that this is the way ICAO is going, so Australia has to fall in line.
The "need" for mandated (ie universal) ADS-B as a datalink sprang from the need to have a full time datalink, so that "all" aircraft became known/managed traffic ----- all absolutely nothing to do with any present or future "safety" problems ---- but to enable "freeflight".
To a large degree the "radar savings" were a red herring, the "bottom line" savings were minuscule to nothing, again all easily verifiable from published data ---- AA Annual report being the starting point ----- at best 3%.
This even before a "promoter bias" discount was applied to the "savings". Those of you familiar with assessment of public sector "cost/benefit" analysis, will be all too familiar with why a "promoter (or proponent bias) discount" should be applied to such project assessment of savings. See Australian Government guidelines (OBPR etc) for this adjustment.
How do you think the JCP fared when this was applied??
All the unquantified or (at times hilariously) mis-quantified benefits ( in the two CASA cost/benefit studies/JCP) were, in the opinion of many, post facto justifications to mask the proposal of mandatory ADS-B as a necessary enabler for what was, essentially, one class of airspace.
Why has nobody risen to Dick Smith's challenge to justify the asserted savings to airlines?? Maybe, just maybe, with the current AUSEP standards and RVSM, and current and projected traffic levels, a reduction to a 5 mile standard produces no en-route savings. Virgin top management seem to have come to that conclusion.
That is not an argument against the present FL290+ program, if the service provider and it's customers want it, that's their decision. There is no doubt ADS-B/C will make an increasing contribution to provision of CNS/ATM services.
The greatest single attribute of the present ICAO airspace classifications is that it is built around the premise that a minimum "separation assurance" standard should apply to all airspace ----- all classes are to be equally "safe".
By definition, once that separation assurance standard is achieved, provision of additional CNS/ATM services, and their associated cost, are "economic waste", because it is expenditure for which there is no possible return, and can be no return, because the separation assurance standard is so high, that no additional level of services will further reduce the residual collision risk.
Have a look at the Airservices risk analysis of providing C v. E services between 10,000 and FL200 ---- in both cases, the assessed collision risk was statistically zero ----- "vanishingly small", to use the proper expression. Therefor, C was not "safer" than E, because it could not be, given the traffic levels. If there was a vast increase in traffic, the answer might be different.
Sadly, this is all a complete perversion/inversion of the original "freeflight" concept, where there was a potential for considerable economic savings (by a reduction in ATM costs, not an increase) and collision risk reduction (removing traffic concentration) in areas of high traffic levels, but that is too big a topic for this thread.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 31st May 2009 at 05:50.
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An interesting view of the world, Ledsled.
So, if there is no difference in the cost to provide the service in C or E, why would anyone be interested in changing C to E? Unless you A). had the idea that you wanted to introduce vast amounts of E, thinking that it is cheaper to service than C, and B). ignore the fact that traffic will increase in the future, and are prepared to design/introduce an airspace system that is aimed at current traffic levels and will require changes in the near future to cope with unspecified traffic increases.
I put it to you that the savings to be made in the freeflight concept were not to do with airnav charges. More to do with efficiencies in fuel and aircraft utilisation etc. Airnav charges are an indirect tax, which will occur regardless of the mode of service (or the cost of that service).
Speak to more people at the coal face as to whether they think E is as safe as C, and their reasons.
The US is moving to an "in or out" system (regardless of where ICAO goes). That fact is an inconvenient truth for certain 'activists'.
Therefor, C was not "safer" than E, because it could not be, given the traffic levels. If there was a vast increase in traffic, the answer might be different.
Sadly, this is all a complete perversion/inversion of the original "freeflight" concept, where there was a potential for considerable economic savings (by a reduction in ATM costs, not an increase)
Speak to more people at the coal face as to whether they think E is as safe as C, and their reasons.
The US is moving to an "in or out" system (regardless of where ICAO goes). That fact is an inconvenient truth for certain 'activists'.
Ferris,
I discussed separation assurance figures, derived by AA, for C versus E between 10,000 and FL200, that is all. I made no comment about the cost of providing the service.
If you understood all the ICAO rules for IFR operation in E versus C, you would understand some of the potential savings of operating cost (flight time) in E versus C, in like for like conditions, without consideration of any ATC charges. That is, even if the ATC charges are the same for each, there are still potential operational savings in E v. C, like for like.
Go have a look at the AA projected traffic levels out to 2025, even if these rather optimistic traffic levels are achieved, they will still only be one fifth of the current US traffic levels, in roughly the same volume of airspace.
You are not talking about the original freeflight concept, which was a result of a study by (as I recall MIT) for United Airlines in the late 1960s-early1970s. This was a study of en-route collision risk in the US upper airspace system , versus random tracking.
And yes, they already had 100% radar coverage in that airspace. A most interesting study, the results validated by a comparison with collisions at sea, and before you jump in about cruise speeds and all the other differences, dig up a copy and read it, MIT are not a pack of fools ---- and there are about 6.5 million ships over 2500DWT, and by definition, they all cruise at the one level.
United's interest was reducing collision risk, other operational savings were secondary.
Has it ever occurred to you that high level separation services might not provide ANY additional risk reduction, compared to true random tracking, indeed possibly the reverse. Then have a look at the history of ATC error in Australia, and say: "Thank (insert deity of choice) for TCAS".
Remember Ansett and TAA both fitted TCAS, long before it became mandatory for "airlines" in Australia, because of just that problem. I must say TAAATS seems to have reduced the en-route error rate, but approach and departure areas are another animal.
What is currently tagged "freeflight" is a complete inversion of the original concept, US PATCO (before Regan fired them all) went ballistic at the original thought --- I will leave you to figure out why ---- suffice to say it would have produced all the saving you mentioned, and a few more. What is being promoted now should be called "nofreeflight", but that wouldn't sell, would it?
I am well familiar, this is a particularly "Australian thing", identified in the PCH report as "a perception of a problem", and remains entirely unvalidated, ie: it is (only in Australia) asserted by a particular group of (Australian) domestic pilots, without them being able to produce a shred of evidence to back up their claims.
If you care to get yourself a full set of (say) Jepp. world wide en-route charts, you will find really quite large areas of E airspace, in some cases right up to FL450, which is non-radar E. Indeed, you might find quite remarkably large areas, up to similar heights, as G airspace. Last time I noticed, there was not much F left, it used to be quite popular.
It has been said that E is now the most widely used controlled airspace, this is probably true, it is far more widespread than just in US. It is also quite possible that there is now more non-radar E, than radar E, but I am certainly not going to be the one to work it out. There is a swag of both.
I have spent a considerable part of my logged hours in Class E (and G) airspace, my colleagues and I have never had any qualms, and we were/are flying something a little bigger than Australian regional equipment ---- and for quite a while, into places where a "CTAF" would have been an upgrade.
Never mind, we understood the ICAO SARPS, it all worked fine, although those occasional pilots who were brought up in the "ATC clears" from cradle to grave used to take a little while to adapt, some never did, and bid back on to "shorthaul", which in this case meant European.
With the minuscule size aviation in Australia, outside a couple of coastal sectors, I never cease to be amazed at the self generated problems that just don't seem to happen in the rest of th world of aviation.
Finally, as confirmed in the Senate RRA&T hearings last week, the FAA have no intention to move from the current airspace classification between now and 2025 and beyond, despite the fond imaginings of a few ATC boffins. In the ICAO sphere, even less chance of a brave new world of "one airspace concept plan", in between concepts and realization, there are always changes when theory collides with real life, just like the JCP, really.
Tootle pip!!
I discussed separation assurance figures, derived by AA, for C versus E between 10,000 and FL200, that is all. I made no comment about the cost of providing the service.
If you understood all the ICAO rules for IFR operation in E versus C, you would understand some of the potential savings of operating cost (flight time) in E versus C, in like for like conditions, without consideration of any ATC charges. That is, even if the ATC charges are the same for each, there are still potential operational savings in E v. C, like for like.
---is aimed at current traffic levels and will require changes in the near future to cope with unspecified traffic increases.
-----in the freeflight concept
And yes, they already had 100% radar coverage in that airspace. A most interesting study, the results validated by a comparison with collisions at sea, and before you jump in about cruise speeds and all the other differences, dig up a copy and read it, MIT are not a pack of fools ---- and there are about 6.5 million ships over 2500DWT, and by definition, they all cruise at the one level.
United's interest was reducing collision risk, other operational savings were secondary.
Has it ever occurred to you that high level separation services might not provide ANY additional risk reduction, compared to true random tracking, indeed possibly the reverse. Then have a look at the history of ATC error in Australia, and say: "Thank (insert deity of choice) for TCAS".
Remember Ansett and TAA both fitted TCAS, long before it became mandatory for "airlines" in Australia, because of just that problem. I must say TAAATS seems to have reduced the en-route error rate, but approach and departure areas are another animal.
What is currently tagged "freeflight" is a complete inversion of the original concept, US PATCO (before Regan fired them all) went ballistic at the original thought --- I will leave you to figure out why ---- suffice to say it would have produced all the saving you mentioned, and a few more. What is being promoted now should be called "nofreeflight", but that wouldn't sell, would it?
-----as to whether they think E is as safe as C, and their reasons.
If you care to get yourself a full set of (say) Jepp. world wide en-route charts, you will find really quite large areas of E airspace, in some cases right up to FL450, which is non-radar E. Indeed, you might find quite remarkably large areas, up to similar heights, as G airspace. Last time I noticed, there was not much F left, it used to be quite popular.
It has been said that E is now the most widely used controlled airspace, this is probably true, it is far more widespread than just in US. It is also quite possible that there is now more non-radar E, than radar E, but I am certainly not going to be the one to work it out. There is a swag of both.
I have spent a considerable part of my logged hours in Class E (and G) airspace, my colleagues and I have never had any qualms, and we were/are flying something a little bigger than Australian regional equipment ---- and for quite a while, into places where a "CTAF" would have been an upgrade.
Never mind, we understood the ICAO SARPS, it all worked fine, although those occasional pilots who were brought up in the "ATC clears" from cradle to grave used to take a little while to adapt, some never did, and bid back on to "shorthaul", which in this case meant European.
With the minuscule size aviation in Australia, outside a couple of coastal sectors, I never cease to be amazed at the self generated problems that just don't seem to happen in the rest of th world of aviation.
Finally, as confirmed in the Senate RRA&T hearings last week, the FAA have no intention to move from the current airspace classification between now and 2025 and beyond, despite the fond imaginings of a few ATC boffins. In the ICAO sphere, even less chance of a brave new world of "one airspace concept plan", in between concepts and realization, there are always changes when theory collides with real life, just like the JCP, really.
Tootle pip!!
Last edited by LeadSled; 31st May 2009 at 15:45.
If you understood all the ICAO rules for IFR operation in E versus C, you would understand some of the potential savings of operating cost (flight time) in E versus C, in like for like conditions, without consideration of any ATC charges. That is, even if the ATC charges are the same for each, there are still potential operational savings in E v. C, like for like.
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With the minuscule size aviation in Australia, outside a couple of coastal sectors, I never cease to be amazed at the self generated problems that just don't seem to happen in the rest of th world of aviation.
Getting pretty sick of trying to get some quarters to understand this. Whilst you may sweep away some opposition as being 'cultural', this is a fundamental lack of appreciation of the task.
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To back up Ferris' point; I now work in Ireland and we divide our airspace which is smaller than the TAS sector at home into 10 different 'flexible sector' configurations and they are currently working on dividing it further up to 14 high level sectors.
When it's quiet we 'collapse' the sectors back onto 2 positions, ie late at night before the East bound rush (around 3.30am)... When working one of the two sectors achieving anywhere near the operational efficiency that we can when we un-collapse the airspace is next to impossible.
It's amazing how inefficient you are judging conflict points and distances when looking at a bigger range. You tend to use 10NM instead of 5 beacuse you are unable to monitor it all effectively.
That bigger "Irish" range is still smaller than most Australian sectors. It matters not what standards you can apply or what classification the airspace is, if you are looking at a 500NM range aircraft that are 5NM apart are touching... Ultimately the bigger the range the less efficient the system.
You might only have 2 aircraft to work, but working them efficiently and maintaining a watch on the rest of your airspace is next to impossible if you are on a large range.
When it's quiet we 'collapse' the sectors back onto 2 positions, ie late at night before the East bound rush (around 3.30am)... When working one of the two sectors achieving anywhere near the operational efficiency that we can when we un-collapse the airspace is next to impossible.
It's amazing how inefficient you are judging conflict points and distances when looking at a bigger range. You tend to use 10NM instead of 5 beacuse you are unable to monitor it all effectively.
That bigger "Irish" range is still smaller than most Australian sectors. It matters not what standards you can apply or what classification the airspace is, if you are looking at a 500NM range aircraft that are 5NM apart are touching... Ultimately the bigger the range the less efficient the system.
You might only have 2 aircraft to work, but working them efficiently and maintaining a watch on the rest of your airspace is next to impossible if you are on a large range.
Thread Starter
Ferris and others, the reason operating Class C is claimed to be no more expensive than operating Class E in Australia is because the Class C is not correctly manned.
For example, under the NAS, a Class D controller is responsible for a small amount of airspace – normally 4.3 miles in radius, up to 2,500 feet AGL. This is so the controller can concentrate on the airspace where the collision risk is greatest – i.e. close to the airport.
Let’s look at what happens in Australia. The single controller in the tower at a place like Albury not only has to be responsible for the Class D airspace to 4,500 feet, but also responsible for the Class C airspace to 8,500 feet. Obviously if there is circuit traffic including an airline aircraft, and suddenly someone calls up 40 miles away in the Class C airspace at 7,500 feet, the concentration of the controller must move elsewhere.
This is the whole secret to it. It is the reason the United States and other countries don’t turn their Class E above D into Class C. That is, the controllers would then be concentrating on a vast amount of airspace where the collision risk is small. They would also have greater responsibilities in that airspace – i.e. the separation of IFR and VFR procedurally.
Surely this is obvious, or are we going to wait for another incident like the one at Hamilton Island? Two airline aircraft were nearly put into each other there because (amongst other things) the controller was trying to hold other aircraft out of the zone – because it is so huge, and because we don’t use proper Class D procedures.
The ATSB at the time was so convinced that I was right that they refused to allow a release of the transcript of other aircraft talking on the frequency around the time the incident took place.
Some of the military people at the ATSB have their minds set in concrete, and basically they look backwards. They don’t even have the self-confidence to ask experts in other countries – say, the NTSB – on how we can actually do it better.
I will say it again. We will wait for the accident, killing 40 or so people in one of these Class D zones before we realise that to give one controller a huge amount of Class C airspace (as well as the Class D) is just going to increase the chance of an accident.
For example, under the NAS, a Class D controller is responsible for a small amount of airspace – normally 4.3 miles in radius, up to 2,500 feet AGL. This is so the controller can concentrate on the airspace where the collision risk is greatest – i.e. close to the airport.
Let’s look at what happens in Australia. The single controller in the tower at a place like Albury not only has to be responsible for the Class D airspace to 4,500 feet, but also responsible for the Class C airspace to 8,500 feet. Obviously if there is circuit traffic including an airline aircraft, and suddenly someone calls up 40 miles away in the Class C airspace at 7,500 feet, the concentration of the controller must move elsewhere.
This is the whole secret to it. It is the reason the United States and other countries don’t turn their Class E above D into Class C. That is, the controllers would then be concentrating on a vast amount of airspace where the collision risk is small. They would also have greater responsibilities in that airspace – i.e. the separation of IFR and VFR procedurally.
Surely this is obvious, or are we going to wait for another incident like the one at Hamilton Island? Two airline aircraft were nearly put into each other there because (amongst other things) the controller was trying to hold other aircraft out of the zone – because it is so huge, and because we don’t use proper Class D procedures.
The ATSB at the time was so convinced that I was right that they refused to allow a release of the transcript of other aircraft talking on the frequency around the time the incident took place.
Some of the military people at the ATSB have their minds set in concrete, and basically they look backwards. They don’t even have the self-confidence to ask experts in other countries – say, the NTSB – on how we can actually do it better.
I will say it again. We will wait for the accident, killing 40 or so people in one of these Class D zones before we realise that to give one controller a huge amount of Class C airspace (as well as the Class D) is just going to increase the chance of an accident.
Dick and others, how is mentioning D towers relevant to the vast majority of E airspace? I have to provide exactly the same separation in C as E for a pair of IFR. Same cost.
The D tower still needs to be manned - it takes the same number of staff whether the airspace is small as per your model or larger.
The controller can still be distracted by an aircraft calling at whatever point - 40 miles, 20 miles, 10 miles, 5 miles.
The D tower still needs to be manned - it takes the same number of staff whether the airspace is small as per your model or larger.
The controller can still be distracted by an aircraft calling at whatever point - 40 miles, 20 miles, 10 miles, 5 miles.
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It is fascinating, Dick, how you can either
A) totally ignore the issue of sector size/range scale or
B) deceptively try and move the argument away from that issue because there is no way around it.
So, you believe that by shifting some workload away from a tower controller, that workload "goes away"? At present, under your scenario, there is one controller in the tower (not overworked or distracted by traffic further than 5 nm from his tower ), and there is another controller in a centre that works the airspace overhead (on a range scale of 500nm, because that's an efficient use of that resource). Under Dickspace, what happens? You have one controller in the class D tower, with a tiny little zone, so he reads the paper for most of the day because his workload is now so low that he is bored stiff (but still has to be there). The controller that was working the airspace above single-handed, now has had to split the airspace into a high/low split. So now there are two controllers in the centre working that sector. Increase in manning of 50% overall, and no more traffic in total being worked. Yeah, right, Dick. The reason they do it the way they do in the States is because the overlying airspace has already been split into ten different sectors because of the larger amount of traffic. They already have 20 controllers working the volume of sky that 2 controllers are working in oz. Due to their higher volume of traffic. I know it might be really heart-breaking to figure out that maybe the oz system is the most efficient use of resources for the given traffic density/geography/radar coverage etc. etc., but suck it up.
Spurious arguments about class D towers and zone size cannot shift the fundamentals of sector sizes, and centre manning.
A) totally ignore the issue of sector size/range scale or
B) deceptively try and move the argument away from that issue because there is no way around it.
Ferris and others, the reason operating Class C is claimed to be no more expensive than operating Class E in Australia is because the Class C is not correctly manned.
Spurious arguments about class D towers and zone size cannot shift the fundamentals of sector sizes, and centre manning.
Out of interest ...
Has ASA, or anyone for that matter, done a study on radar sector sizes ... and specifically ... at what size/display scale does it become unmanageable/uncontrollable/unsafe ?
I guess, when you get to a certain scale, you can't "visually" determine if separation exists and would have to rely on alarms. Are a reliance on alarms a valid separation tool?
Has ASA, or anyone for that matter, done a study on radar sector sizes ... and specifically ... at what size/display scale does it become unmanageable/uncontrollable/unsafe ?
I guess, when you get to a certain scale, you can't "visually" determine if separation exists and would have to rely on alarms. Are a reliance on alarms a valid separation tool?
Thread Starter
Ferris, your mind appears to be totally set in concrete. I remember when the air traffic control manager of Juneau tower came on this site and explained how Class D works in the USA. Within 2 or 3 posts, controllers – no doubt similar in thinking to you – were saying that he wasn’t even a controller because the way he was explaining how Class D works was beyond the realms of possibility. In fact he was a controller with over 20 years experience. He’d even been to Australia and stayed with the President of Civil Air.
I’ll say it again. It is proudly stated by Airservices that the airspace between Melbourne and Sydney is equivalent to some of the busiest airspace in the world. Look at this link showing air traffic over a 24 hour period. Note how the airspace between Melbourne and Sydney has similar densities to busy airspace in other countries. If this is a fact, I ask why can’t we have airspace similar to that in highly trafficked areas in the USA? Or are you suggesting that we are not as wealthy and we don’t value human life as much?
It appears to me that your mind is totally closed and you are going to fundamentally stick with what you learnt - probably 20 to 30 years ago.
Believe it or not, there are better ways of doing things. Yes, in some cases it will require extra controllers. They will be paid for by the airlines, not by general aviation.
Keep you mind closed and resist any change until we put a big one in – and then you will obviously run for cover and say, “I wasn’t a decision maker so you can’t blame me.”
For the more laterally minded people reading this thread, if countries such as the USA can give a proper control service to IFR aircraft at low levels in similar traffic density to what we have between Melbourne and Sydney, there is no reason why we can’t. In some cases you will have to increase the manning slightly.
Look at what happened at Benalla. The aircraft was not only well off course, but descended below the lowest safe altitude by more than 1,000 feet – when in good radar coverage. The pilot wasn’t even told this by the controller because the alarm system is not enabled, and we don’t even have a procedure for the pilot to inform the controller that he is now visual.
This is because people like Ferris have resisted every change. Six people were killed at Benalla. When will you actually listen? When it is 50 people? 100? 120 people?
That enroute airspace below 8,500 feet was designed for radio operators – originally from the 1930s. We have never updated our procedures to use air traffic controllers and radar to give maximum safety.
Anyway, you show your resistance to change by calling the airspace “Dickspace.” The airspace classifications are actually set by ICAO, and work extremely well in some of the densest trafficked areas in the world.
I once again ask you to read this post by Voices of Reason in relation to Class E.
Resist change as much as you want, but one day it will come in. Remember I’m not asking for Class E at Bourke – that would be a huge misallocation of resources. But between, say, Melbourne and Sydney, if we can’t afford Class E to lower levels, there is something drastically wrong with the practices at Airservices.
I’ll say it again. It is proudly stated by Airservices that the airspace between Melbourne and Sydney is equivalent to some of the busiest airspace in the world. Look at this link showing air traffic over a 24 hour period. Note how the airspace between Melbourne and Sydney has similar densities to busy airspace in other countries. If this is a fact, I ask why can’t we have airspace similar to that in highly trafficked areas in the USA? Or are you suggesting that we are not as wealthy and we don’t value human life as much?
It appears to me that your mind is totally closed and you are going to fundamentally stick with what you learnt - probably 20 to 30 years ago.
Believe it or not, there are better ways of doing things. Yes, in some cases it will require extra controllers. They will be paid for by the airlines, not by general aviation.
Keep you mind closed and resist any change until we put a big one in – and then you will obviously run for cover and say, “I wasn’t a decision maker so you can’t blame me.”
For the more laterally minded people reading this thread, if countries such as the USA can give a proper control service to IFR aircraft at low levels in similar traffic density to what we have between Melbourne and Sydney, there is no reason why we can’t. In some cases you will have to increase the manning slightly.
Look at what happened at Benalla. The aircraft was not only well off course, but descended below the lowest safe altitude by more than 1,000 feet – when in good radar coverage. The pilot wasn’t even told this by the controller because the alarm system is not enabled, and we don’t even have a procedure for the pilot to inform the controller that he is now visual.
This is because people like Ferris have resisted every change. Six people were killed at Benalla. When will you actually listen? When it is 50 people? 100? 120 people?
That enroute airspace below 8,500 feet was designed for radio operators – originally from the 1930s. We have never updated our procedures to use air traffic controllers and radar to give maximum safety.
Anyway, you show your resistance to change by calling the airspace “Dickspace.” The airspace classifications are actually set by ICAO, and work extremely well in some of the densest trafficked areas in the world.
I once again ask you to read this post by Voices of Reason in relation to Class E.
Resist change as much as you want, but one day it will come in. Remember I’m not asking for Class E at Bourke – that would be a huge misallocation of resources. But between, say, Melbourne and Sydney, if we can’t afford Class E to lower levels, there is something drastically wrong with the practices at Airservices.
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Resist change as much as you want, but one day it will come in. Remember I’m not asking for Class E at Bourke – that would be a huge misallocation of resources. But between, say, Melbourne and Sydney, if we can’t afford Class E to lower levels, there is something drastically wrong with the practices at Airservices.
The point you miss, over and over again, changing the classification of airspace and adding additional tasks to the existing sector structures (like removing the TWR C steps and turning them into E enroute steps isn't increasing safety (yes it might at the runway, where the collision risk is greater, but not between 10NM and 30NM and not everywhere else in the overlying sector due to workload issues), it's moving the workload, from one relatively quiet position and adding it to an already busy position. The service levels may be very similar (E vs C), but the efficiency provided will drop greatly and ultimately that will effect safety.
Australia stuffed up the implementation of Class E; because the industry were told cheaper and more efficient; which as a by product meant to ASA and project types that it means no extra ATC jobs, sectors, frequencies, radar heads, consoles, displays etc. This is where it was fundamentally butchered; added tasks to ones who were at capacity or close to it at times and removing tasks from those more able to cope, D TWRs with an ability when busy to say hold position to aircraft on the ground...
If you wanted to increase safety greatly you could have a class E (pseudo approach role) done with radar (or ADS-B) from each TWR location and have an ADC 'only' type role within those locations (staffing goes up, safety goes up). Put radar type displays into each class D TWR like most class D's have in the USA etc.
But this is useless supposition cause where are you getting the ATCs from?
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It is proudly stated by Airservices that the airspace between Melbourne and Sydney is equivalent to some of the busiest airspace in the world.
Or are you suggesting that we are not as wealthy and we don’t value human life as much?
Yes, in some cases it will require extra controllers. They will be paid for by the airlines, not by general aviation.
It appears to me that your mind is totally closed and you are going to fundamentally stick with what you learnt - probably 20 to 30 years ago.
When will you actually listen?
That enroute airspace below 8,500 feet was designed for radio operators – originally from the 1930s. We have never updated our procedures to use air traffic controllers and radar to give maximum safety.
But between, say, Melbourne and Sydney, if we can’t afford Class E to lower levels, there is something drastically wrong with the practices at Airservices.
Dick,
Strangely, I think most punters on this thread, including you, are in violent agreement.
Both sides are basically saying that the increased use of current (and future) surveillance would be a great thing.
Both sides are now admitting that there is most probably a pricing/staffing cost connected to such an expansion.
The only difference now is that you are saying ... well, go ahead and do it... the other side is saying ... well, we don't control the purse strings and resources, so perhaps you should be trying to convince someone else.
Strangely, I think most punters on this thread, including you, are in violent agreement.
Both sides are basically saying that the increased use of current (and future) surveillance would be a great thing.
Both sides are now admitting that there is most probably a pricing/staffing cost connected to such an expansion.
The only difference now is that you are saying ... well, go ahead and do it... the other side is saying ... well, we don't control the purse strings and resources, so perhaps you should be trying to convince someone else.
Owen Stanley
Could you please provide details, including price, and where I can look up the TSO details. It seems Microair are still struggling to get their basic Mode S transponder TSO'd and into the market, let alone an ADS-B enabled version.
How often does it need to be repeated:
The "subsidy" proposal never even got as far as a firm proposal to the Airservices Board, let alone to top management of Qantas or Virgin for their agreement, because those two airlines would be contributing the bulk of funds ---- remember it was always called a "cross-industry" subsidy. Asking Geoff Dixon to stump up $100M+ for GA, you have to be kidding!! With the current financial state of Qantas, what do you think Alan Joyce's reaction would be. ASTRA records already show that the Virgin workerbees could not justify the cost of ADS-B to top management in terms of any operational savings ---- it's all public information.
There were and are two chances of the Government of the day reducing their dividend demands of AA, none and Buckley's.
The subsidy issue was only part of the reason the low level ADS-B program was dropped, and not even a very important reason.
If safety problems demanded low level ADS-B as the solution, it would be imposed, and we would have to wear it.
There was and is no air safety problem or pressing airspace capacity issue to which mandatory (low level) ADS-B was or is the answer in the foreseeable future.
Watch for the flow of exemptions come 2013.
izzatso? I recommend you go back and look at the various figures, CASA, Access Economic, and the JCP, even without allowing for the fact that the actual cost of replacing the SSR radar heads will be a lot less than shown, in fact about the same cost per item as has been achieved by our neighbors across the Tasman.
Even allowing the AA figures in the JCP, and before applying any "proponent bias" discounting of the claimed savings, the "SSR radar" savings were about 3% or less on the AA bottom line, it's all public information.
Quite simply, from a high level policy perspective (Treasury, Finance and PM&C), the low level ADS-B program didn't make sense, regardless of what its band of fervent supporters thought and obviously still think.
It wasn't and isn't about technology ---- it was about best use of (national) resources. Being technologically the first'st with the most'st doesn't cut any ice around the Treasury or the Dept. of Finance, much less PM&C. There are some seriously hard nosed individuals in the upper echelons of that lot, as any Canberra based public servant well knows ---- and that was all before the GFC.
Dick Smith didn't kill it, it died a natural death.
Do you actually understand which SSR's were to be withdrawn?
You do know about the program for the new primary radars, I trust, with some major improvements in capability, certainly not new for old.
All the high density routes will be covered, and a lot more beside, and down to a quite low level in important areas. Does "90%+" of the population (as in people) will be covered" ring any bells ----- clue ---- the US has a major primary radar upgrade program in progress --- for the same reasons.
Tootle pip!!
The technology is out there and at very reasonable cost, Australian technology to boot. Product that fits into the cost range of the ill fated proposed subsidy.
This subsidy proposal was destroyed by a couple of pompous, self serving, 'gentlemen' with 'power, influence and money' why they did this no one will ever know.
The "subsidy" proposal never even got as far as a firm proposal to the Airservices Board, let alone to top management of Qantas or Virgin for their agreement, because those two airlines would be contributing the bulk of funds ---- remember it was always called a "cross-industry" subsidy. Asking Geoff Dixon to stump up $100M+ for GA, you have to be kidding!! With the current financial state of Qantas, what do you think Alan Joyce's reaction would be. ASTRA records already show that the Virgin workerbees could not justify the cost of ADS-B to top management in terms of any operational savings ---- it's all public information.
There were and are two chances of the Government of the day reducing their dividend demands of AA, none and Buckley's.
The subsidy issue was only part of the reason the low level ADS-B program was dropped, and not even a very important reason.
If safety problems demanded low level ADS-B as the solution, it would be imposed, and we would have to wear it.
There was and is no air safety problem or pressing airspace capacity issue to which mandatory (low level) ADS-B was or is the answer in the foreseeable future.
Watch for the flow of exemptions come 2013.
-----subsidy for the fitment of the airborne equipment and ground equipment cost could come in under the cost of replacing the radar heads.
Even allowing the AA figures in the JCP, and before applying any "proponent bias" discounting of the claimed savings, the "SSR radar" savings were about 3% or less on the AA bottom line, it's all public information.
Quite simply, from a high level policy perspective (Treasury, Finance and PM&C), the low level ADS-B program didn't make sense, regardless of what its band of fervent supporters thought and obviously still think.
It wasn't and isn't about technology ---- it was about best use of (national) resources. Being technologically the first'st with the most'st doesn't cut any ice around the Treasury or the Dept. of Finance, much less PM&C. There are some seriously hard nosed individuals in the upper echelons of that lot, as any Canberra based public servant well knows ---- and that was all before the GFC.
Dick Smith didn't kill it, it died a natural death.
OK, so it might not benefit you every day, if it benefits the majority in high density areas we should scuttle it for you?
Do you actually understand which SSR's were to be withdrawn?
You do know about the program for the new primary radars, I trust, with some major improvements in capability, certainly not new for old.
All the high density routes will be covered, and a lot more beside, and down to a quite low level in important areas. Does "90%+" of the population (as in people) will be covered" ring any bells ----- clue ---- the US has a major primary radar upgrade program in progress --- for the same reasons.
Tootle pip!!
Resist change as much as you want, but one day it will come in. Remember I’m not asking for Class E at Bourke – that would be a huge misallocation of resources. But between, say, Melbourne and Sydney, if we can’t afford Class E to lower levels, there is something drastically wrong with the practices at Airservices.
Or do you seriously believe ATCs have the power to do as we want?
If you want to change things stop bleating on in here & start bashing the appropriate ears. Hmmm, or maybe you have & they've been pointing at us as the problem...... That sounds strangely familiar.