Garuda Pilot Jailed
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There are no legitimate comparisons with respect to the crew's culpability when discussing the QF Bangkok and The GA Yogjakarta overrun incidents. Repeat, none.
The Garuda crew had initially been cleared for a circling approach to the reciprocal runway to the one from which the accident eventually occurred, and had managed the aircraft's descent and speed parameters with this in mind. When offered a straight in approach to the reciprocal runway late in proceedings, despite the fact that the aircraft's energy state was completely inappropriate for such an approach, the PIC, apparently without any consideration to the potential ramifications, or consultation and input from his F/O, requested it.
The PIC, irrespective of cultural issues, elected to continue with an approach from which it was patently obvious from the outset would have the aircraft land in an uncertified configuration, and massively in excess of the aircraft type's required velocity for the approach and landing manoeuvre phase.
His subsequent attempts to shirk responsibility for such gross incompetence and, more crucially from a legal perspective, negligence and recklessness, by blaming environmental conditions, the performance of his offsider, equipment failure, medical issues, etc are offensive and nauseating. Relatives and friends of the victims are rightly outraged.
The offsider in question did pretty much everything that his training and culture allowed to try and avert the tragedy. Realistically, physical intervention by him in order to attempt to avert what transpired was not feasible, nor would necessarily have led to a less extreme result.
The QF crew were still operating within required limits when approaching the threshold in Bangkok, and at no time in a reckless or non-conscientious fashion, and became victims of circumstance.
The Garuda crew had initially been cleared for a circling approach to the reciprocal runway to the one from which the accident eventually occurred, and had managed the aircraft's descent and speed parameters with this in mind. When offered a straight in approach to the reciprocal runway late in proceedings, despite the fact that the aircraft's energy state was completely inappropriate for such an approach, the PIC, apparently without any consideration to the potential ramifications, or consultation and input from his F/O, requested it.
The PIC, irrespective of cultural issues, elected to continue with an approach from which it was patently obvious from the outset would have the aircraft land in an uncertified configuration, and massively in excess of the aircraft type's required velocity for the approach and landing manoeuvre phase.
His subsequent attempts to shirk responsibility for such gross incompetence and, more crucially from a legal perspective, negligence and recklessness, by blaming environmental conditions, the performance of his offsider, equipment failure, medical issues, etc are offensive and nauseating. Relatives and friends of the victims are rightly outraged.
The offsider in question did pretty much everything that his training and culture allowed to try and avert the tragedy. Realistically, physical intervention by him in order to attempt to avert what transpired was not feasible, nor would necessarily have led to a less extreme result.
The QF crew were still operating within required limits when approaching the threshold in Bangkok, and at no time in a reckless or non-conscientious fashion, and became victims of circumstance.
Last edited by jaded boiler; 8th Apr 2009 at 09:41.
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Comparisons
Jaded boiler, my only reason for making comment on the QF Bangkok overrun was to point out that even in a prestigious airline like Qantas, with it's enviable safety record, mistakes which have the potential to end in the loss of an aircraft and death or injury to those on board can and have been made. Of course the level of incompetence and the dereliction of duty by the Garuda Captain could not be compared to the Qantas accident, nor do I make that comparison. That said however, the enquiry into the Qantas accident did point out deficiencies in the Qantas training system, deficiencies in the Operational aspects in terms of the use of 25 flap/idle reverse thrust in the prevailing conditions and also inadequacies in the CRM training provided. Some posters to this forum have called for the Garuda F/O's head. I have merely tried to point out that given the culture which prevails within many Asian airline crews and the likelihood that any attempt by the F/O to take control from the Captain, especially late in the approach, could have had led to an even more catastrophic outcome. Rather than "baying for blood" we should all be prepared to accept that none of us is infallible and that we can all learn from both the Qantas and Garuda accidents. QF 1 was not just a case of being victims of circumstance, they were also victims of not giving sufficient consideration to the prevailing weather and the most appropriate configuration for landing in those conditions. A degree of poor communication between the two control pilots was also evident. I am sure Qantas will have addressed those issues mentioned. I am not so sure about Garuda doing the same in the aftermath of their accident.
The F/O did all he could reasonably have been expected to do in this instance, by expressing his concern with the continued approach and landing, backed up by the aural warnings generated by the aircraft systems. That the Captain ignored both the F/O's concerns,
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Thanks Centauras, you agreed with my post and I am glad a man of your experience thinks this way too.
If only...........could have been a whole heap less trouble for many.
If only...........could have been a whole heap less trouble for many.
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Words mean nothing.
The words of the F/O certainly did mean nothing to the Garuda Captain. Neither did the words of the automated warnings. I am in agreement with what the F/O should have done as expressed by Centaurus and others. I am, however, also aware of the way in which many Asians think in relation to their position in the hierarchy of their company. It is all very well for us, who do not have the same cultural background, to be critical of the F/O in this instance. Many of the Garuda flight crew members are drawn from the Thai Airforce, where to question a "superior" would be considered as insubordination, and I am sure the F/O felt intimidated. That he did not take control of the situation was certainly a regrettable failure to assert himself. The fact is he did not, and all the posturing by others is futile. My question of those wanting the F/O's blood is "How many of you, as the F/O, have ever been placed in the situation which confronted the Garuda F/O?" None, I hope.
Centaurus
I really believe, based on some time in PK reg 737s, that any pilot so tunnel visioned as to be unaware of the configuration and speed to the extent that he was would have continued the fatal approach even if the FO raised the gear. The outcome would have been even worse and these forums would be excoriating the late FO for making a bad situation worse.
I really believe, based on some time in PK reg 737s, that any pilot so tunnel visioned as to be unaware of the configuration and speed to the extent that he was would have continued the fatal approach even if the FO raised the gear. The outcome would have been even worse and these forums would be excoriating the late FO for making a bad situation worse.
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http://www.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_ho...ease_GA200.pdf
Here's the English version of the accident report , even when they had touched down the co-pilot was yelling at the PIC to go-around.
How this Joker thought he was going to stop with all that speed is beyond me , most of the runways are JUST long enough to stop from a normal approach
What was interesting at the time is a lot of Indonesians were waiting for the accident report and a friend of mine (retired air force mig pilot) was saying it should be out soon and I handed him a copy of Australian Aviation which had a very complete write up on the crash and he was furious at the stupidity of the accident as a close friend of his had lost a family member in the crash and the fact that he could read all the details in an overseas magazine where locally details on the accident were hard to find.
Here's the English version of the accident report , even when they had touched down the co-pilot was yelling at the PIC to go-around.
How this Joker thought he was going to stop with all that speed is beyond me , most of the runways are JUST long enough to stop from a normal approach
What was interesting at the time is a lot of Indonesians were waiting for the accident report and a friend of mine (retired air force mig pilot) was saying it should be out soon and I handed him a copy of Australian Aviation which had a very complete write up on the crash and he was furious at the stupidity of the accident as a close friend of his had lost a family member in the crash and the fact that he could read all the details in an overseas magazine where locally details on the accident were hard to find.
Last edited by aseanaero; 9th Apr 2009 at 04:04.
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On 11 April 2007, Indonesia's National Safety Transport Committee released a preliminary finding into the crash, confirming that Garuda Flight 200 was travelling at around 410 km/h - almost twice the normal speed - when it came in to land. A Garuda Pilots' Association official has speculated that the pilot could have been trying to save fuel due to a new fuel conservation bonus scheme recently introduced by Garuda Airlines.[23]
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I dont know why the Fed Govt continues to play friends with Indo. We continue to send hundreds of millions of our tax dollars over there. And what do we get in return?? Zilch, our citizens murdered, our fishing grounds plundered and our public put at risk by their dodgy airline. Idf it i good enough for the Eu to ban Garuda, than it should be done without question by oz!
I shall go lie down now.
I shall go lie down now.
The question is though what has the EU ban achieved? While Garuda may have passed an IATA safety audit last year the safety record of the industry as a whole is still appalling. Look at the accidents that have already occurred this year and it is clear that there is still a desperate need for regulatory reform.
If Australia were to put in place a ban it would not have any affect on Australians traveling within Indonesia. Of course the risk analysis would need to focus on the potential danger of Garuda aircraft flying into Australian airports but I think there is more to be gained by CASA and the like trying to assist the Indonesian Government/DGCA effect real change in oversight and the regulatory environment.
The status quo is not acceptable, even if life is cheap.
If Australia were to put in place a ban it would not have any affect on Australians traveling within Indonesia. Of course the risk analysis would need to focus on the potential danger of Garuda aircraft flying into Australian airports but I think there is more to be gained by CASA and the like trying to assist the Indonesian Government/DGCA effect real change in oversight and the regulatory environment.
The status quo is not acceptable, even if life is cheap.
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I might add to that SGT that we also supply them with patrol boats, helicopters, etc, and God only knows what happened to all the money collected after the Tsumani, there are still plenty of people who never saw a cent of it, but you can bet some of the boss cockies got a nice new 4W drive, anyway I am diversing, I would rather swim or go by camel, before putting a foot on a Garuda Aircraft, as would anybody in the know, pis$ em off outa here until they get their act together, I mean you blokes are sharing the same sky with them, thats good enough reason.
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I heard the Captain was "SINGING" down finals...? False news report..?
I would miss some warnings if I was singing down final, but surely you would still know you were screwed?
I would miss some warnings if I was singing down final, but surely you would still know you were screwed?
Why GPW "whoops"?
If the plane was initially well above the glide slope and later on the glide slope, why were there GPW warnings? Is it to do with configuration perhaps? Full flap & gear suppress certain alarms perhaps? Or maybe these alarms are a standard feature when landing and therefore were given undue prominence in the reports? (Sorry, only an ex SEP poler so I do not know these things)
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... any pilot so tunnel visioned as to be unaware of the configuration and speed to the extent that he was ...
I think the far more likely explanation is that he was aware that he was "outside the envelope" but because he had gone outside the envelope before, and gotten away with it, he could do so again.
I don't know whether this is true or not, but I certainly think it is the far more likely scenario.
Which, of course, implies a history of gross SOP deviations and breaking of rules.
If you could have asked this captain, whilst on the approach, "how are we looking?", I think he would have said something like:
"Not the best - we're high and fast - but don't worry, I have done this before".
And whilst he may have gotten away with similar on previous occasions, this one was just that little bit more difficult, but he had succeeded, this would have been his new "benchmark".
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Re post #41
The QF crew were still operating within required limits when approaching the threshold in Bangkok, and at no time in a reckless or non-conscientious fashion, and became victims of circumstance.
So it was just bad luck eh..!!....
So it was just bad luck eh..!!....
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Jabawocky
A simple and firm yell..... GOING AROUND....AND GEAR IS UP as he pushes the gear lever up and pushes the throttles to 100%.....
Centaurus
The F/O failed to take direct action to prevent the accident. Words mean nothing apart from covering himself legally via the CVR. The obvious action is to order the captain to go-around and at the same time reach over and select the landing gear lever to up. The F/O had ample opportunity to do just that.
Afterwards, whilst being away from a dynamic actual cockpit scenario at the time of an event, having all the time in the world to put all known and recorded facts and several ‘what-if’s’ side by side, with nothing else bothering the mind other than only assessing a particular accident, evaluating it whilst stationary seated behind a desk or similar, it is very easy to state what could or should have been done…
Things that could have been done by a FO, who was actually seated in an aircraft doing a routine flight on a routine day and planned to do a routine circling approach, as the captain changed his mind regarding the briefed circling approach and elected to change for a straight in approach.
Most probably from that moment on the FO found himself suddenly in an ever-changing situation that required very fast thinking. He had very little time to put the changed facts that his mind was bombarded with so suddenly and the consequent ‘what-if’s’ side by side and in perspective. Certainly also a lot of spontaneous upcoming second thoughts would have bothered his mind.
He had to do the evaluating of all this whilst listening to ‘his master’s voice’ speeding down towards the runway in a plane driven by his master.
Unfortunately, reality shows that: it is not simple to do just that obvious action…
Kind regards, learner . . .
A simple and firm yell..... GOING AROUND....AND GEAR IS UP as he pushes the gear lever up and pushes the throttles to 100%.....
Centaurus
The F/O failed to take direct action to prevent the accident. Words mean nothing apart from covering himself legally via the CVR. The obvious action is to order the captain to go-around and at the same time reach over and select the landing gear lever to up. The F/O had ample opportunity to do just that.
Afterwards, whilst being away from a dynamic actual cockpit scenario at the time of an event, having all the time in the world to put all known and recorded facts and several ‘what-if’s’ side by side, with nothing else bothering the mind other than only assessing a particular accident, evaluating it whilst stationary seated behind a desk or similar, it is very easy to state what could or should have been done…
Things that could have been done by a FO, who was actually seated in an aircraft doing a routine flight on a routine day and planned to do a routine circling approach, as the captain changed his mind regarding the briefed circling approach and elected to change for a straight in approach.
Most probably from that moment on the FO found himself suddenly in an ever-changing situation that required very fast thinking. He had very little time to put the changed facts that his mind was bombarded with so suddenly and the consequent ‘what-if’s’ side by side and in perspective. Certainly also a lot of spontaneous upcoming second thoughts would have bothered his mind.
He had to do the evaluating of all this whilst listening to ‘his master’s voice’ speeding down towards the runway in a plane driven by his master.
Unfortunately, reality shows that: it is not simple to do just that obvious action…
Kind regards, learner . . .