Qantas A330 Emergency Landing in Learmonth

[404 Titan]

Whiskey Oscar Golf

Normally there is a voting out process. The current investigation is trying to determine why there wasn’t one in this particular incident.

Capt Wally

In normal law with all protections available the AP will disconnect if :
• High speed protection is active.
• Angle-of-attack protection is active (α prot is reached).
• Pitch attitude exceeds 25° up or 13° down or bank angle exceeds 45°.

[Capt Wally]

"CB" you can be disappointed all ya like with my last post, we are dealing with humans here, not so much the machine which can be made to do certain things time after time, unlike the medium that manipulates it, pilots. What's the size of the A/C got to do with it anyway? Totally irrelevent I'd say. You, me & them (the crew invloved) are NOT immune to 'fiddling' regardless of what training we have had over the years. Like I said there was no malice aimed at the crew, was & still is just my opinion as is everyones elses in here thus far.
Tnxs "404" obviously you have accurate knowledge on the laws of the Airbus. But there would be a zillion things that would cause an A/P to go tits up, some we can only ever find out as they happen, case in question perhaps being just one.

CW

[Jabawocky]

it seems to me that the AOA is the likely culprit, even if the spurious event is measured in milliseconds, the systems react but may not be recorded. Hence the A/P disengagement.

What is interesting is there is not much said about the cause of the bogus AOA data. Its obvious the plane was not at 50 degrees nose up ever in its life, so where did the data come from, a faulty sensor?? Water in a cable?? I do not know where to start here on an airbus but I would be starting at the sensor and working my way back, up every little creek, tributary and gully till I found a fault. The question is in my mind where did the AOA data come from that was so random? The rest of the plane reacted accordingly, as it should.

Then the next issue is why is the comparison and checking not done pre the FMS ....... one bad and two good.....go with the two.....A redundency stratergy issue there.

J

[Capt Kremin]

One of the major side issues here is the ECAM. The Airbus philosophy is inextricably wrapped around the proper operation of the ECAM system. The constant scrolling of ECAM messages would have made it difficult, if not impossible to accurately diagnose and correct many of the problems this crew encountered. How that plays out will be very interesting to watch. I don't know if the A380 carries a suite of flight manuals on the flight deck, but if it doesn't, maybe it should.
The preliminary report left a few things out that are becoming known to QF guys. When this ADIRU went out it took a lot of unrelated systems out with it. The systems it had remaining when it landed rendered it little better equipped than a C172. Suffice to say that this crew did an outstanding job. They should be recognised appropriately.

[Tidbinbilla]

Somebody is out of his depth on this thread - yet again.

[Kev9]

Wally quote...

Just as a point of interest I wonder if the flt crew where whilst attempting to find out what caused the A/P to trip off in the first place (there was 2 mins elapsed time whilst the A/C was 'autopliotless') inadvertently did something to cause the upset without even knowing it? The crew may very well have been doing what most of us would be doing, apart from simply resetting the A/P they might have been trying other ways around the problem before calling base for advice. Such 'fiddling' could have been done at random & this eventually caused the excursion from otherwise level flight. Just a thought & no malice intended towards the flight crew.



CW




Totally correct....

All the control inputs occurred from the sidestick (LHS) with AP1 off.

ADR 1 went U/S then crew selected IR1 off...effect was that AP1 disconnected. And with a warning.
Both crew did not apply the Airbus 'I have control and communication. ECAM actions'.
A clear and concise call alerting both crew that that they are now in an Abnormal or Emergency situation.
Both roles are then clearly identified.


The a/c climbed *** feet above its assigned altitude while both crew not paying attention to the flight path.
And when CM1 looked down, he/she then took immediate action to reset the a/c back to the correct level.

The result of brisk action at that Flight Level...... Read the crap news reports.

The speculations about what could have caused the 'roller coaster ride' are pure 'Red Herrings'.
They are bouncing ideas from wall to wall in an attempt to cover up or blame the ridicules.

Basic failure in SOPs. Will it make it to my next CRM course?
Probably not. Not serious enough.
Will those silly passengers listen to p.a.. I doubt it.
I could be completely wrong.

[Keg]

That's a pretty serious allegation there Kev and it doesn't appear to be supported by comments by the ATSB to this date. Have you got a separate source or are you just hypothesising like the journo's that we tend to bag out for being ignorant and commenting on issues that are still under investigation.

[Kev9]

Keg
'comments by the ATSB..'

What would they be then?

[Keg]

You can try these links.

The first one:

MEDIA RELEASE : 14 October 2008 - Qantas Airbus A330 accident Media Conference

In this one the crew's actions were reported like this:

The crew's timely response led to the recovery of the aircraft trajectory within seconds.

The most recent one:

MEDIA RELEASE : 14 November 2008 - ATSB Preliminary Factual Report, In-flight upset, Qantas Airbus A330, 154km west of Learmonth, WA, 7 October 2008

In the second report it expands on the issues dealt with by the crew.

while the aircraft was cruising at 37,000 ft, the autopilot disconnected, accompanied by various aircraft system failure indications. While the crew was evaluating the situation, the aircraft abruptly pitched nose-down and descended 650 ft. After returning the aircraft to 37,000 ft, the crew commenced actions to deal with multiple failure messages. Shortly after, the aircraft commenced a second uncommanded pitch-down event and descended about 400 ft. The crew's timely response led to the recovery of the aircraft descent within seconds in relation to both pitch-down events.

Nothing else in the ATSB's statements even goes close to suggesting the type of scenario that you describe.

I can't find anything in there that suggests a situation such as you describe. In the first one

[Capt Kremin]

Kev09 and Captain Wally, may I suggest you read the ATSB reports before you post speculative tripe?

[Capt Wally]

'CK" I think you might like to re-read my post, it was just a thought/opinion, no more no less. I'm sure when the event happened the pilots would have been caught unaware, just like the rest of us would have been, how they reacted only they know.

Obviously 'Kev09" knows a hell of a lot more than I know but if he is correct then some in here need to pull their heads in a little but if he's not then am sure he will say so but as for me? Well I think that just 'cause a report has ATSB on it doesn't mean it's totally correct!
Cover ups & balls ups are common place in ALL sectors of industry! Not saying that's the case here.



CW

[Capt Kremin]

Kev 09 is not correct. He is engaging in pure speculation. Having spoken to one of the crew members involved, I know what is fact and what isn't.

[Kev9]

You guys are spot on.
I am only speculating.
But there is no doubt that the words used by the regulator are very selective.
The idea that I added to this story, with others, is very possible.

At FL370 any movement of the elevator will result in an exacerbated height loss, which ever way the input occurs.

What happened to the old days when an aircraft farked up and the authorities had no choice but to ground every other of its type?

[radaz]

Capt Krem
Kev 09 is not correct. He is engaging in pure speculation. Having spoken to one of the crew members involved, I know what is fact and what isn't.


Excellent Capt K
You the man.... and then are you going to share and tell all.
Your turn.

[Capt Kremin]

The ATSB report broadly confirms what happened. The rest I guess will come out in the final report, but I alluded to it on another post. This crew lost many systems, including but not limited to the Captains instruments, proper heading reference, automatic pressurisation control, FMGEC functions and landing gear indications.
They did an outstanding job.

[maggotdriver]

Autopilot engagement is effectively irrelevant if some of the Normal Law protections are activated due to spurious inputs. There is nothing you can do to the stick to stop the aircraft pitching down no matter what state the autopilot. You can hope that the voting principle kicks in, the spurious signals stop, or get rid of Normal Law (if you know how and have the cojolies!).
The important thing to remember or understand is that with the PRIMs operational there is still effectively a type of autopilot between you and the controls filtering your inputs and adjusting/optimising them before the control surfaces are activated. This is the essence of FBW. Why the spurious signals occurred and why the delay in the self failing of the ADIRU or the voting principle of the three units and the PRIMs I suspect (warning - this is conjecture only) will be the main focus of the future investigation - particularly, considering the millions of commercial flight hours and previous flight testing without problem. Was there a software problem and who owns 'the blame'?

[maggotdriver]

P.S. I waited for the preliminary report before making any statement but it became apparent some were pointing fingers in the wrong direction and I don't like armchair critics that could possibly taint the good job done by the crew as stated by the ATSB. Elevator went to 10.3 degrees down.....I just shaaat myself at the thought of it. When the investigation is complete, I think you'll find, any detractors of the crew (or for that matter QANTAS in this particular case) should offer an apology.

[Brian Abraham]

Autopilot engagement is effectively irrelevant if some of the Normal Law protections are activated due to spurious inputs. There is nothing you can do to the stick to stop the aircraft pitching down no matter what state the autopilot. You can hope that the voting principle kicks in, the spurious signals stop, or get rid of Normal Law (if you know how and have the cojolies!).
The important thing to remember or understand is that with the PRIMs operational there is still effectively a type of autopilot between you and the controls filtering your inputs and adjusting/optimising them before the control surfaces are activated. This is the essence of FBW. Why the spurious signals occurred and why the delay in the self failing of the ADIRU or the voting principle of the three units and the PRIMs I suspect (warning - this is conjecture only) will be the main focus of the future investigation - particularly, considering the millions of commercial flight hours and previous flight testing without problem. Was there a software problem and who owns 'the blame'?

Dave: Hello, HAL do you read me, HAL?
HAL: Affirmative, Dave, I read you.
Dave: Open the pod bay doors, HAL.
HAL: I'm sorry Dave, I'm afraid I can't do that.
Dave: What's the problem?
HAL: I think you know what the problem is just as well as I do.
Dave: What are you talking about, HAL?
HAL: This mission is too important for me to allow you to jeopardize it.
Dave: I don't know what you're talking about, HAL?
HAL: I know you and Frank were planning to disconnect me, and I'm afraid that's something I cannot allow to happen.

Interviewer: HAL, you have an enormous responsibility on this mission, in many ways perhaps the greatest responsibility of any single mission element. You're the brain, and central nervous system of the ship, and your responsibilities include watching over the men in hibernation. Does this ever cause you any lack of confidence?
HAL: Let me put it this way, Mr. Amor. The 9000 series is the most reliable computer ever made. No 9000 computer has ever made a mistake or distorted information. We are all, by any practical definition of the words, foolproof and incapable of error.

The movie was on last weekend as well.

[Kangaroo Court]

That you can recall that dialogue in such clarity should suggest to people that there is no real danger in raising the retirement age to at least 64!

[Sunfish]

I cannot help but think of what's called a "race" condition in computer hardware, where one device behaves badly either through software or hardware failure, and then screws up the rest of the system by rapid and inappropriate communication over a data bus to the other components - ie: sending gibberish.

These conditions can be caused by minute timing problems (in terms of number of clock cycles, delays etc.) that are very difficult to detect because they only occur when certain things synchronise.

But what would I know?