Qantas A330 Emergency Landing in Learmonth
A380-800 driver
Yeh thanks for that. I realise that in "Direct Law" the pilot is still flying the aircraft through the "Sec's" but wanted to keep my answer simple and explain to peuce that all protections can be overidden by turning the "Prim's" off. You and I know that the airbus is just like any other aircraft in "Direct Law" except we have no feel through the side stick, hense we have to be careful not to over control it.
Yeh thanks for that. I realise that in "Direct Law" the pilot is still flying the aircraft through the "Sec's" but wanted to keep my answer simple and explain to peuce that all protections can be overidden by turning the "Prim's" off. You and I know that the airbus is just like any other aircraft in "Direct Law" except we have no feel through the side stick, hense we have to be careful not to over control it.
A380-800
Yes it did, but became immediately totally controllable by the crew using the wires pulleys and bellcranks control system as soon as they decided that that was appropriate and the electronics had gone haywire. 
I have actually. The subtle difference was that it didn't involve a virtually uncommanded rather harsh pullup to FL380, straight through the level of another aircraft, which thankfully was slightly off track (unusual for GPS tracking). Otherwise, there would have been a few hundred dead people splattered over the North Atlantic. 
Computers are really good until they come to a point that the programmers didn't consider (QF72?) or they respond so unexpectedly that the crew is caught completely unawares (TC-JDN).
Didn't a 717 do something similar in WA a couple of years ago, stick shaker etc.
Haven't you ever oversped a 717?
Computers are really good until they come to a point that the programmers didn't consider (QF72?) or they respond so unexpectedly that the crew is caught completely unawares (TC-JDN).
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Firstly the C/Bs in the Avionics Compartments are accessible in Flight, I have actually been in the fwd cargo compartment of an A330 during flight.
Secondly Airbus claim that the all the 'breakers' in the cockpit are just software resets but I dare any driver a320,a330,a340,a380 to reset all you FCCs in flight without upset/incident.
Anytime you mess with a system or practice you know little about or have little used you run the risk of something going wrong. In LAME land that's why we do everything IAW the manual the mind no matter how good is never infallable.
BTW there is 'no blame' for mine on the flight crew for two reasons first I do believe they did ask for assistance (not that we know exactly what that assistance was) and secondly if they did make a mistake (and ffs we are human) they righted it by getting all to the ground safely.
As a side question 'scanners' in the NW picked up the initial 'Pan' then a 'MAYDAY' call, could any flyboys (or girls) enlighten me, I thought MAYDAY was only used if the aircraft was or believed to be out of control and in serious trouble ?
Secondly Airbus claim that the all the 'breakers' in the cockpit are just software resets but I dare any driver a320,a330,a340,a380 to reset all you FCCs in flight without upset/incident.
Anytime you mess with a system or practice you know little about or have little used you run the risk of something going wrong. In LAME land that's why we do everything IAW the manual the mind no matter how good is never infallable.
BTW there is 'no blame' for mine on the flight crew for two reasons first I do believe they did ask for assistance (not that we know exactly what that assistance was) and secondly if they did make a mistake (and ffs we are human) they righted it by getting all to the ground safely.
As a side question 'scanners' in the NW picked up the initial 'Pan' then a 'MAYDAY' call, could any flyboys (or girls) enlighten me, I thought MAYDAY was only used if the aircraft was or believed to be out of control and in serious trouble ?
I thought MAYDAY was only used if the aircraft was or believed to be out of control and in serious trouble ?
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 16th Oct 2008 at 13:00.
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Correct A380 Driver, I don't think any crew would venture down there, I also think they would think twice about resetting any system in flight esp. a flight control system.
Thanks Peuce, that's what I was trying to confirm.
Has anyone actually qualified to time lapse between initial climb and control of a/c ? was it secs ? mins ? an hour ?
Thanks Peuce, that's what I was trying to confirm.
Has anyone actually qualified to time lapse between initial climb and control of a/c ? was it secs ? mins ? an hour ?
Some facts ..
Our fleet management has just published a memo to Airbus crew, containing an extract from the Airbus Operator Information Telex.
It's a detailed account of "what" actually happened, if not "why".
Once again ... well done Kev.
It's a detailed account of "what" actually happened, if not "why".
'As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected. From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as follows:
* unjustified stall & overspeed warning
* loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD).
* several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes. A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMAN (previously LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.'
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE (Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected. From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as follows:
* unjustified stall & overspeed warning
* loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display (PFD).
* several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes. A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMAN (previously LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.'
The Mr Fixit
The next time you are in the cockpit of and A330 have a look in the QRH regarding the resetting of computers. Resetting the FMGEC’s, PRIM’s/SEC’s x One at a time, and LGCIU’s in flight isn’t a problem as long as you follow the procedures prescribed. I have done all three numerous times since I have been on the bus.
Regarding circuit breakers in the avionics bay, yes there is a hatch in the cockpit but just like “A380-800 driver” our SOP’s prohibit us from going down there in flight. All the Reset Switches in the cockpit are just that Reset Switches. They aren’t Circuit Breakers and aren’t designed to protect the relevant system as a Circuit Breaker would.
The next time you are in the cockpit of and A330 have a look in the QRH regarding the resetting of computers. Resetting the FMGEC’s, PRIM’s/SEC’s x One at a time, and LGCIU’s in flight isn’t a problem as long as you follow the procedures prescribed. I have done all three numerous times since I have been on the bus.
Regarding circuit breakers in the avionics bay, yes there is a hatch in the cockpit but just like “A380-800 driver” our SOP’s prohibit us from going down there in flight. All the Reset Switches in the cockpit are just that Reset Switches. They aren’t Circuit Breakers and aren’t designed to protect the relevant system as a Circuit Breaker would.
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The reason why only two people "got it right" is that the event has never happened before whereas CAT events are relatively common. Even the two who got it right were speculating at the time.
Regarding PAN or Mayday
I remember in a sim being told by an instructor to give a mayday call if in doubt. I think the exercise was an emergency descent. He said something like "Just give a mayday call. If you are over India, you want to make sure you've got their attention".
So a Mayday call might not necessarily be as a result of the crew believing they "are in grave and imminent danger". It may be that they are using a Mayday to ensure any risk (e.g. traffic) outside of the current situation is kept to a minimum. This is especially the case during a very high workload non-normal when it is not completely apparent what the problem is, how much time there is to deal with it and what the risk of the problem is.
On the airbus, a sim instructor said to "work the colours". If it's LAND ASAP in Red give a Mayday, LAND ASAP in amber give a pan. We were told that if it goes from RED to Amber (e.g. fire goes out) then make sure you downgrade.
Anyway, sounds like the crew did a great job.
I remember in a sim being told by an instructor to give a mayday call if in doubt. I think the exercise was an emergency descent. He said something like "Just give a mayday call. If you are over India, you want to make sure you've got their attention".
So a Mayday call might not necessarily be as a result of the crew believing they "are in grave and imminent danger". It may be that they are using a Mayday to ensure any risk (e.g. traffic) outside of the current situation is kept to a minimum. This is especially the case during a very high workload non-normal when it is not completely apparent what the problem is, how much time there is to deal with it and what the risk of the problem is.
On the airbus, a sim instructor said to "work the colours". If it's LAND ASAP in Red give a Mayday, LAND ASAP in amber give a pan. We were told that if it goes from RED to Amber (e.g. fire goes out) then make sure you downgrade.
Anyway, sounds like the crew did a great job.
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Regarding PAN or Mayday
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Havnt been following the thread, cant be arsed reading 7 pages, but i herad it was the Navy`s LF radar in that aera which threw the a/c systems out of wack. Apparently the same thing happened to a 777 in the same place. Only a rumour though.
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ct2k
the story in the news re the vlf station being investigated as being the source quite likely started here on the prune.Its not a radar signal its genuine very low freq ie antenna to the moon at 19.8 khz.
journo's seem to come across a lot of "facts" on this fine rumour mill.
There is another thread on this incident and its(the vlf issue) been discussed at length either here or there cant remember which one.
Personally I dont buy it.Possible but unlikely imho.
journo's seem to come across a lot of "facts" on this fine rumour mill.
There is another thread on this incident and its(the vlf issue) been discussed at length either here or there cant remember which one.
Personally I dont buy it.Possible but unlikely imho.
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Original media reports stated that the incident occurred about 100 miles (nautical or statute?) north of Canarvon, which puts it about 100 km south of the VLF site.
A little far I would think. Though from memory there is a sign on the road to Exmouth, (just near Learmonth actually, so about 50km south of the site), which reads something along the lines of: "No electrical detonators past this point... due to EMF".
A little far I would think. Though from memory there is a sign on the road to Exmouth, (just near Learmonth actually, so about 50km south of the site), which reads something along the lines of: "No electrical detonators past this point... due to EMF".
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TO: A318/A319/A320/A321/A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 Operators
SUBJECT: A330 in-flight incident
OUR REF: SE 999.0083/08/LB dated 14 Oct 08
CLASSIFICATION: INFORMATION-FLIGHTS OPS
AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: All A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 in service aircraft
--------------------------------------------------------------
Notice:
This OIT/FOT covers an operational issue.
It is the Operators' responsibility to distribute this OIT/FOT, or the
information contained in this OIT/FOT, to all A330/A340/A340-500/A340- 600
flight crews without delay.
--------------------------------------------------------------
1. PURPOSE
The aim of this OIT is to:
- Update operators on the in-flight incident, which occurred on an A330
aircraft on Oct 07th.
- Advise A330/A340 operators about OEBs issuance and associated MMEL
operational procedure impact.
2. EVENT DESCRIPTION
As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the
incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has
then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE
(Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following
preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged
without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been
triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected.
From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the
flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded
parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary
wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not
sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as
follows:
- unjustified stall & overspeed warning
- loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display
(PFD).
- several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated
very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C
pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load
factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH
FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within
seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g
and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes.
A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with
less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to
generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with
the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from
NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance
message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which
have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any
abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data
indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMANN (previously
LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.
3. OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP
GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU
Pending final resolution, Airbus will issue an OEB 74-1 that will
instruct the crew to select OFF the whole ADIRU in case of IR failure,
instead of switching OFF only the IR part.
The aim of the following procedure is to isolate both the IR and ADR when
an IR is detected faulty in order to prevent the ADR from
providing erroneous data to the other aircraft systems.
PROCEDURE:
- If one IR is self detected faulty or if the ATT red flag is displayed on
the Captain or First Officer PFD the supplying IR and ADR must be
disconnected.
NAV IR 1(2)(3) FAULT or ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ______________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb _____________OFF
IF IR 3 NOT AFFFECTED
-ATT HDG SWTG _______________CAPT (F/O) ON 3
-AIR DATA HDG SWTG __________CAPT (F/O) ON 3
- In case of dispatch under MMEL and an IR failure in flight, either
detected by an IR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT or with ATT red flag displayed on
CAPT or F/O PFD, the supplying IR and ADR must be disconnected.
ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD or,
NAV IR 1+2(1+3)(2+3) FAULT
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ____________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb ___________OFF
SPD BRK____________________DO NOT USE
IF CG AFT 32%:
- T TANK MODE _______FWD
Note: In case of failure of IR 1 and IR 2 failure, the
Inertial and Air Data from ADIRU 3 should be provided on
Captain side.
Note: To isolate an ADIRU, IR mode rotary selector (OFF; NAV; ATT) remains
in the NAV position so that Inertial and Air Data be
disconnected from other systems without de-energizing the ADIRU (NAV mode
may be recovered if IR or ADR unduly selected OFF).
4. MMEL IMPACTS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU
In case of dispatch under MMEL 01-34-10-01-A), the associated MMEL
operational procedure is amended as follows:
IR (affected) pb sw____________________ OFF
ADR (associated) pb sw _________________OFF
IR (affected) mode rotary sel___________OFF
- If IR 1 (2) is affected:
ATT HDG sel ____________________ CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)
AIR DATA sel ____________________CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)
This will be reflected in MMEL Temporary Revisions:
TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A330
TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A340
5. FOLLOW-UP PLAN
Airbus is working together with the ATSB and the supplier to identify the
ADIRU failure mode.
Additionally, as the same ADIRU PN standard is fitted on single aisle
family aircraft, Airbus is currently checking if temporary measures are
also required on these aircraft types.
However initial investigation result seems to indicate that single aisle
family aircraft flight control system is more robust against this ADIRU
failure mode.
OEB 74-1 (A330 family) and 88-1 (A340 family) will be issued in the coming
days.
Specific follow-up of this OIT will be provided through OIT revision when
pertinent information related to investigation results is
available
SUBJECT: A330 in-flight incident
OUR REF: SE 999.0083/08/LB dated 14 Oct 08
CLASSIFICATION: INFORMATION-FLIGHTS OPS
AFFECTED AIRCRAFT: All A330/A340/A340-500/A340-600 in service aircraft
--------------------------------------------------------------
Notice:
This OIT/FOT covers an operational issue.
It is the Operators' responsibility to distribute this OIT/FOT, or the
information contained in this OIT/FOT, to all A330/A340/A340-500/A340- 600
flight crews without delay.
--------------------------------------------------------------
1. PURPOSE
The aim of this OIT is to:
- Update operators on the in-flight incident, which occurred on an A330
aircraft on Oct 07th.
- Advise A330/A340 operators about OEBs issuance and associated MMEL
operational procedure impact.
2. EVENT DESCRIPTION
As the incident is subject to a formal ICAO Annex 13 investigation led by
the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), the updated data about the
incident included in this OIT have been approved for release by the ATSB.
The A330 aircraft was flying from Singapore to Perth. The aircraft has
then been diverted to Learmonth (Australia).
The preliminary analysis of the DFDR, Post Flight Report (PFR) and BITE
(Built-In Test Equipment) data allows to establish the following
preliminary sequence of events:
The A/C was flying at FL 370 with Autopilot and Auto thrust system engaged
without any reported or recorded anomaly, when the IRS 1 Fault has been
triggered and the Autopilot automatically disconnected.
From this moment, the crew flew manually the aircraft to the end of the
flight except for a short duration of few seconds.
From the time the IRS 1 Fault has been triggered, the recorded
parameters of the ADR part of ADIRU 1 include erroneous and temporary
wrong values in a random manner. These values are spike values and not
sustained values. ADIRUs 2 and 3 seemed to have operated normally.
This abnormal behaviour of the ADIRU 1 led to several consequences as
follows:
- unjustified stall & overspeed warning
- loss of attitude information on Captain Primary Flight Display
(PFD).
- several ECAM system warnings.
About 2 minutes after the initial IRS Fault, the ADIRU spikes generated
very high, random and temporary values of the angle of attack leading to:
1/ the flight control laws commanding nose-down aircraft movements (A/C
pitch attitude decreased from 2° nose-up to 8° nose-down and vertical load
factor changed from 1g to -0,8g.
2/ the Flight Control Primary Computer (FCPC) "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH
FAULT" ECAM WARNING was triggered
The crew timely response led to recover the A/C trajectory within
seconds. During the recovery, the vertical load factor did not exceed 1,6g
and the maximum altitude loss was 650 ft.
The DFDR data show that the ADR 1 continued to generate random spikes.
A second nose-down aircraft movement was encountered later on, but with
less important effects in terms of aircraft trajectory. It also led to
generate the "F/CTL PRIM 2 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING. This, combined with
the previous "F/CTL PRIM 1 PITCH FAULT" ECAM WARNING led to switch from
NORMAL to ALTERNATE law.
The BITE message of the ADIRU 1 does not include failure or maintenance
message. However the PFR also includes other system failure messages which
have been demonstrated as spurious but generated by the ADIRU 1.
Tests performed on the A/C following the incident did not reveal any
abnormal results that would allow explaining the reason for the event.
At this stage of the investigation, the analysis of available data
indicates ADIRU 1 abnormal behaviour is likely at the origin of the event.
The type of ADIRU, which is involved, is NORTHROP GRUMMANN (previously
LITTON), PN 465020-0303-0316.
3. OPERATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP
GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU
Pending final resolution, Airbus will issue an OEB 74-1 that will
instruct the crew to select OFF the whole ADIRU in case of IR failure,
instead of switching OFF only the IR part.
The aim of the following procedure is to isolate both the IR and ADR when
an IR is detected faulty in order to prevent the ADR from
providing erroneous data to the other aircraft systems.
PROCEDURE:
- If one IR is self detected faulty or if the ATT red flag is displayed on
the Captain or First Officer PFD the supplying IR and ADR must be
disconnected.
NAV IR 1(2)(3) FAULT or ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ______________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb _____________OFF
IF IR 3 NOT AFFFECTED
-ATT HDG SWTG _______________CAPT (F/O) ON 3
-AIR DATA HDG SWTG __________CAPT (F/O) ON 3
- In case of dispatch under MMEL and an IR failure in flight, either
detected by an IR 1+2 (1+3)(2+3) FAULT or with ATT red flag displayed on
CAPT or F/O PFD, the supplying IR and ADR must be disconnected.
ATT flag displayed on CAPT (F/O) PFD or,
NAV IR 1+2(1+3)(2+3) FAULT
-IR 1(2)(3) pb ____________OFF
-ADR 1(2)(3) pb ___________OFF
SPD BRK____________________DO NOT USE
IF CG AFT 32%:
- T TANK MODE _______FWD
Note: In case of failure of IR 1 and IR 2 failure, the
Inertial and Air Data from ADIRU 3 should be provided on
Captain side.
Note: To isolate an ADIRU, IR mode rotary selector (OFF; NAV; ATT) remains
in the NAV position so that Inertial and Air Data be
disconnected from other systems without de-energizing the ADIRU (NAV mode
may be recovered if IR or ADR unduly selected OFF).
4. MMEL IMPACTS for A330/A340 fitted with NORTHROP GRUMMANN - LITTON ADIRU
In case of dispatch under MMEL 01-34-10-01-A), the associated MMEL
operational procedure is amended as follows:
IR (affected) pb sw____________________ OFF
ADR (associated) pb sw _________________OFF
IR (affected) mode rotary sel___________OFF
- If IR 1 (2) is affected:
ATT HDG sel ____________________ CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)
AIR DATA sel ____________________CAPT ON 3 (F/O ON 3)
This will be reflected in MMEL Temporary Revisions:
TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A330
TR N°02-34/01Z ISSUE 01 for A340
5. FOLLOW-UP PLAN
Airbus is working together with the ATSB and the supplier to identify the
ADIRU failure mode.
Additionally, as the same ADIRU PN standard is fitted on single aisle
family aircraft, Airbus is currently checking if temporary measures are
also required on these aircraft types.
However initial investigation result seems to indicate that single aisle
family aircraft flight control system is more robust against this ADIRU
failure mode.
OEB 74-1 (A330 family) and 88-1 (A340 family) will be issued in the coming
days.
Specific follow-up of this OIT will be provided through OIT revision when
pertinent information related to investigation results is
available
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"Computers are really good until they come to a point that the programmers didn't consider (QF72?) or they respond so unexpectedly that the crew is caught completely unawares (TC-JDN)."
This can apply to any system, software or hardware.
Rudder hard overs were never meant to occur. DC-10's were never meant to crash following a single fan disk failure. 777's were not meant to glide following fuel icing.
The point is that the bogeyman computer driving the FBW system on the Airbus family of aircraft has never had a failure resulting in a crash. It has however, saved MANY aircraft from crashing that you and I have probably never heard about in situations that conventional aircraft would have been lost.
Enough of the macho "cables and pullies are better" crap.
This can apply to any system, software or hardware.
Rudder hard overs were never meant to occur. DC-10's were never meant to crash following a single fan disk failure. 777's were not meant to glide following fuel icing.
The point is that the bogeyman computer driving the FBW system on the Airbus family of aircraft has never had a failure resulting in a crash. It has however, saved MANY aircraft from crashing that you and I have probably never heard about in situations that conventional aircraft would have been lost.
Enough of the macho "cables and pullies are better" crap.