Transair and the Regulator.
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Transair and the Regulator.
Just heard that tonights 7.30 report on the ABC will cover the above issues.
Perhaps that should read the Regulator and Transair!!
Perhaps that should read the Regulator and Transair!!
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I asked the question in a previous thread; "Why didn't CASA shut these guys down years ago?"
What followed was a diatribe of legal excuses and gobblygook!
It appears now that the question is being asked by more than one interested party.
It blows me away to think that in the 21st Century we still have a regulator that is either unwilling or unable to protect the travelling public from these type of operators.
The question needs to be asked and it needs to be answered.
Shane Urquhart and the other families of the victims deserve nothing less.
What followed was a diatribe of legal excuses and gobblygook!
It appears now that the question is being asked by more than one interested party.
It blows me away to think that in the 21st Century we still have a regulator that is either unwilling or unable to protect the travelling public from these type of operators.
The question needs to be asked and it needs to be answered.
Shane Urquhart and the other families of the victims deserve nothing less.
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What if there is not an answer to the questions ?.
What if this terrible accident happened purely through one mistake by the crew on that day, note that crew and aircraft had flown that route many many times, on the same approach in equally miserable or worse weather and survived.
This is a storm in a tea cup, I would tend to agree that the regulator looks a tad silly having appeared to change its mind mid stream.
In my opinion, Mr Urquhart is entitled to some closure ( as is other PPRUNE regulars involved ), but they are hardly a constructive part of the process, grieving families have a very narrow agenda.
Do a search on PPRUNE, there are many many accidents, C206-Horne Is, C210-Groote, C210 - Sweers, where the families spend tens of thousands of dollars and years of their lives trying to prove the pilot / operator are negligent.
How many operators want their aircraft to kill crew/pax ?.
What if this terrible accident happened purely through one mistake by the crew on that day, note that crew and aircraft had flown that route many many times, on the same approach in equally miserable or worse weather and survived.
This is a storm in a tea cup, I would tend to agree that the regulator looks a tad silly having appeared to change its mind mid stream.
In my opinion, Mr Urquhart is entitled to some closure ( as is other PPRUNE regulars involved ), but they are hardly a constructive part of the process, grieving families have a very narrow agenda.
Do a search on PPRUNE, there are many many accidents, C206-Horne Is, C210-Groote, C210 - Sweers, where the families spend tens of thousands of dollars and years of their lives trying to prove the pilot / operator are negligent.
How many operators want their aircraft to kill crew/pax ?.
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Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower,
Grieving families may have a very narrow agenda but you can hardly blame us. I don’t know if you’ve ever experienced losing someone in such a sudden devastating way but I’m sure you can empathise with how horrendous it is to have a conversation with your loved one the night before and then never have that privilege again.
I don’t think there is any doubt that the pilots mad a mistake on the day but the fact is Transair clearly promoted a poor safety culture – one that seemed to be endorsed by CASA.
Transair have been made accountable, although CASA still state that none of their operational or maintenance problems identified contributed to the accident. Again, the words “Poor Safety Culture” spring to mind! Mr. Urquhart, myself and other relatives of the victims may chose to spend money on making others accountable and again can you blame us! I guess until someone walks in our shoes it may seem like we have a “narrow agenda”.
Cheers,
Fiona Norris
Grieving families may have a very narrow agenda but you can hardly blame us. I don’t know if you’ve ever experienced losing someone in such a sudden devastating way but I’m sure you can empathise with how horrendous it is to have a conversation with your loved one the night before and then never have that privilege again.
I don’t think there is any doubt that the pilots mad a mistake on the day but the fact is Transair clearly promoted a poor safety culture – one that seemed to be endorsed by CASA.
Transair have been made accountable, although CASA still state that none of their operational or maintenance problems identified contributed to the accident. Again, the words “Poor Safety Culture” spring to mind! Mr. Urquhart, myself and other relatives of the victims may chose to spend money on making others accountable and again can you blame us! I guess until someone walks in our shoes it may seem like we have a “narrow agenda”.
Cheers,
Fiona Norris
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Hi Fiona,
I certainly do not blame the families for wanting answers, there is only one way i could understand your pain, and i hope that never happens. I guess i also would have a narrow agenda, other than making me feel better, what will it achieve ?.
There is a basic legislative frame work put in place by CASA that defines how we operate safely, that is the CAR's, CAO's, AIP's, CAAP ( i'm sure you know what i'm talking about ).
For AOC holders there is an additional document, the ops manual, that covers operation/company specific issues.
"Poor Safety Culture", that is a very subjective catch cry. There is legislation in place from CASA to ensure what did happen, was not supposed too, and then post accident modified to ensure it does not happen again, this is how it works.
Many unfortunately have died before Paul to put the current legislation in place, these rules are cast in blood.
You may have heard recently from disgruntled staff that also offered their personal interpretation of how poor the safety culture was, but put it into perspective. There is nothing more a disgruntled employee wants to say more than " i told you so", this is not constructive.
Transair have operaed for many many years, why is it that Pauls flight was the unlucky one ?, i often think of the swiss cheese model, on that day all the holes lined up.
Safety in aviation is a risk management strategy, grounding all aircraft and revoking all pilots licences is the only way to ensure no one dies in an aircraft.
I have never worked for Transair and have no vested interest in the organisation, it saddens me to see families attacking their perceived adversary when they should be trying to get on with life.
You could dedicate your life to putting Transair out of business or making CASA pay, when you succeed someone with the same business plan will step in and take his place and nothing will change in CASA.
Cheers,
Joshua Cox
I certainly do not blame the families for wanting answers, there is only one way i could understand your pain, and i hope that never happens. I guess i also would have a narrow agenda, other than making me feel better, what will it achieve ?.
There is a basic legislative frame work put in place by CASA that defines how we operate safely, that is the CAR's, CAO's, AIP's, CAAP ( i'm sure you know what i'm talking about ).
For AOC holders there is an additional document, the ops manual, that covers operation/company specific issues.
"Poor Safety Culture", that is a very subjective catch cry. There is legislation in place from CASA to ensure what did happen, was not supposed too, and then post accident modified to ensure it does not happen again, this is how it works.
Many unfortunately have died before Paul to put the current legislation in place, these rules are cast in blood.
You may have heard recently from disgruntled staff that also offered their personal interpretation of how poor the safety culture was, but put it into perspective. There is nothing more a disgruntled employee wants to say more than " i told you so", this is not constructive.
Transair have operaed for many many years, why is it that Pauls flight was the unlucky one ?, i often think of the swiss cheese model, on that day all the holes lined up.
Safety in aviation is a risk management strategy, grounding all aircraft and revoking all pilots licences is the only way to ensure no one dies in an aircraft.
I have never worked for Transair and have no vested interest in the organisation, it saddens me to see families attacking their perceived adversary when they should be trying to get on with life.
You could dedicate your life to putting Transair out of business or making CASA pay, when you succeed someone with the same business plan will step in and take his place and nothing will change in CASA.
Cheers,
Joshua Cox
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Constructive
Fiona
There are many who cannot, and will not possibly understand the terrible experience that you have had, and the effect this has on you. We must forgive them, for they lnow not what they do.
I have "walked in your shoes", albeit a long time ago. The memories and emotions have faded over the years, but the loss is still there.
You have every right to make every effort to do what you consider necessary to find out what happened, and help prevent a repeat of disasters of this nature in the future. I am sure your input and influence will be constructive. and must be respected.
I am sure you are well aware that aviation is a very complex affair and great efforts are made to find the factors that cause these things to happen.
But more complex and incomprehensible are the rules, the regulatory processes, the legal system, and the people involved.
Often, they work in mysterious ways, their miracles to perform. CASA makes lots of rules, and does audits, as it believes it should. It calls itself a "safety authority" (Overseas authorities do not use the word "safety" in their title) and believes it controls safety. Safety is really controlled by the people who are doing the job, working as a big team, and checking one another. But people can, and do make mistakes. I suggest you look at Dick Smith's web site, and see the mistakes that are listed, including the accidental inflight shutdown of an engine in a 737. CASA can find fault with almost any operator, if they wish.
I have no knowledge of, or experience with Transair, and I mke no comment on their integrity or otherwise.
In the Air New Zealand crash at Mt Erebus there were a number of things not quite as they should be before the cresh, and a whole lot more nasty things after the crash. The legal processes were long and far reaching. One honest man who I greatly admire, stood up in court, and admitted a serious mistake. A respected judge was one of the casualties of the legal processes. No-one was jailed.
But slowly and quietly all the baddies disappeared, and Air New Zealand went on to become the great airline that it is today.
Accident investigators learned a lot from those processes, and often refer back to it as the beginning of a new era in accident investigation.
These things work in mysterious ways, their miracles to perform. Sonetimes the obvious things do not appear to be done, but the end result is good.
No doubt there will be legal processes on going from the Lockhart river crash
and these can be frustrating, testing times.
Fiona, you are obviously a strong, sensible woman, and will cope. There are many on PRUNE and elswhere who do understand, and wish you well.
And if you think that silly old bugger in Alice Springs can help. send me a PM.
Good luck.
There are many who cannot, and will not possibly understand the terrible experience that you have had, and the effect this has on you. We must forgive them, for they lnow not what they do.
I have "walked in your shoes", albeit a long time ago. The memories and emotions have faded over the years, but the loss is still there.
You have every right to make every effort to do what you consider necessary to find out what happened, and help prevent a repeat of disasters of this nature in the future. I am sure your input and influence will be constructive. and must be respected.
I am sure you are well aware that aviation is a very complex affair and great efforts are made to find the factors that cause these things to happen.
But more complex and incomprehensible are the rules, the regulatory processes, the legal system, and the people involved.
Often, they work in mysterious ways, their miracles to perform. CASA makes lots of rules, and does audits, as it believes it should. It calls itself a "safety authority" (Overseas authorities do not use the word "safety" in their title) and believes it controls safety. Safety is really controlled by the people who are doing the job, working as a big team, and checking one another. But people can, and do make mistakes. I suggest you look at Dick Smith's web site, and see the mistakes that are listed, including the accidental inflight shutdown of an engine in a 737. CASA can find fault with almost any operator, if they wish.
I have no knowledge of, or experience with Transair, and I mke no comment on their integrity or otherwise.
In the Air New Zealand crash at Mt Erebus there were a number of things not quite as they should be before the cresh, and a whole lot more nasty things after the crash. The legal processes were long and far reaching. One honest man who I greatly admire, stood up in court, and admitted a serious mistake. A respected judge was one of the casualties of the legal processes. No-one was jailed.
But slowly and quietly all the baddies disappeared, and Air New Zealand went on to become the great airline that it is today.
Accident investigators learned a lot from those processes, and often refer back to it as the beginning of a new era in accident investigation.
These things work in mysterious ways, their miracles to perform. Sonetimes the obvious things do not appear to be done, but the end result is good.
No doubt there will be legal processes on going from the Lockhart river crash
and these can be frustrating, testing times.
Fiona, you are obviously a strong, sensible woman, and will cope. There are many on PRUNE and elswhere who do understand, and wish you well.
And if you think that silly old bugger in Alice Springs can help. send me a PM.
Good luck.
Last edited by bushy; 17th Dec 2006 at 08:30.
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LHRT, I disagree...
Left Handed Rock Thrower,
I am sorry, but reading your threads, I must disagree with some of your notions on accident causation.
For example...
In the next post, you refer to James Reason's swiss cheese model...
According to James Reason, "Organizational acidents have multiple causes involving many people operating at different levels of their respective companies." (Reason, J. 1997. Managing the Risks of Orgnisational Acidents, Ashgate, Aldershot, p1)
Reason explains, through his swiss cheese model, that the 'one mistake by the crew on that day' is not a sufficient explanation for an accitents cause.Pilot Error or more widely, Operator Error has not been accepted as the conclusion of an investigation into an organisational accident for a very long time.
Safety culture, to those who have studied it is not subjective, it is a very observable phenomena.
Just as a person can be judged by their actions, so can an organisation. Specific observable actions and behaviours, discovered by the investigators through interview of 'disgruntled staff' can lead investigators to conclude objectively that a poor safety culture existed. I refer you to chapter 9 of the book mentioned above, as it expands quite well on the concept of safety culture. It is available at the Joondalup campus of ECU.
My point is that while aviation is indeed a 'risk management strategy' the methods used to manage those risks, the regulations and the standard operating procedures are often bent, forgotten or 'overlooked' by commercial organisations in order to increase capital gain. It takes a robust regulator to ensure that organisations comply with the regulations and standard operating procedures in order to ensure a safe environment for all users of the aviation system.
The 7.30 report seems to have uncovered a weakness in the methods used by CASA to enforce the stated safety systems. I thank Fiona for her continuing efforts. It takes this level of scrutiny to highlight weaknesses in the regulator, empowering them to force organisations to comply with safety systems.
So, in answer to your question...
The end result: The crew and passengers in our skies and people on the ground over which we fly, will be exposed to reduced levels of risk.
I am sorry, but reading your threads, I must disagree with some of your notions on accident causation.
For example...
What if this terrible accident happened purely through one mistake by the crew on that day
... i often think of the swiss cheese model, on that day all the holes lined up.
Reason explains, through his swiss cheese model, that the 'one mistake by the crew on that day' is not a sufficient explanation for an accitents cause.Pilot Error or more widely, Operator Error has not been accepted as the conclusion of an investigation into an organisational accident for a very long time.
"Poor Safety Culture", that is a very subjective catch cry.
Just as a person can be judged by their actions, so can an organisation. Specific observable actions and behaviours, discovered by the investigators through interview of 'disgruntled staff' can lead investigators to conclude objectively that a poor safety culture existed. I refer you to chapter 9 of the book mentioned above, as it expands quite well on the concept of safety culture. It is available at the Joondalup campus of ECU.
My point is that while aviation is indeed a 'risk management strategy' the methods used to manage those risks, the regulations and the standard operating procedures are often bent, forgotten or 'overlooked' by commercial organisations in order to increase capital gain. It takes a robust regulator to ensure that organisations comply with the regulations and standard operating procedures in order to ensure a safe environment for all users of the aviation system.
The 7.30 report seems to have uncovered a weakness in the methods used by CASA to enforce the stated safety systems. I thank Fiona for her continuing efforts. It takes this level of scrutiny to highlight weaknesses in the regulator, empowering them to force organisations to comply with safety systems.
So, in answer to your question...
other than making me feel better, what will it achieve ?
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casa stink
Fiona I have great sympathy with what you are attempting to do and agree with dog 1 that hopefully we all learn and improve air safety and move on; sadly in the case of CASA this is seldom true. CASA has a culture of deceit, evasion and cover-up. My involvement with them has been a lesson in bureaucratic cock-ups and cover-ups. I would bring to you attention the situation at Albion Park. CASA has made major errors in what it has allowed to occur at Albion Park and now is involved in a massive cover-up which involves, to quote their own internal e-mail, the application of Teflon. CASA does not apply the regulations as been previously stated; CASA is sometimes actively involved in assisting operators to get around the regulations. At Albion Park CASA has issued improper classifications to some of the limited category aircraft based there, has included concessions on the certificates of airworthiness that fly in the face of the regulations and have allowed aircraft to fly over housing estates for the past four years. The regulations clearly state these aircraft are banned from flying over built up areas. Although CASA has been sent Video and photographic evidence it writes to people denying it happens. It is impossible not to happen because the airfield is now surrounded by housing estates and totally unsuitable for the operation of limited category aircraft. These violations are still happening today. For those who wish to debate this fact they should first read the AAT decision at Bankstown on Top Gun. This was another example where a delegate of CASA was bending regulations for particular organizations. It should be no surprise to the public, and an internal scandal at CASA, that the same person is now up to the same set of tricks at Albion Park. If you need assistance in clearly showing the absolute disregard that CASA has for public safety and its own regulations then I suggest you contact the action group at Albion Park. These people will confirm your worst fears about CASA. You can also e-mail me.
Fiona,
ASAC expresses some very strong feelings, he (if that is so) sounds to me like an ex-CASA bloke I know who believed the aviation law should be what he thought it should be, not what it actually is.
It is simply NOT TRUE that aircraft certified in the Limited Category cannot fly over built up areas, the operational limitations for ALL Limited Category (and many Experimental certificated aircraft) are as entered on the Annex attached to the Limited Cat. C. of A., and forming a part of the C. of A., and compliance is required by law.
As ASAC is so far off the beam with his comments about Albion Park, perhaps you should treat his other comments with caution.
All the Historic Aircraft Restoration Society (HARS) aircraft have straight forward C.of A’s issued in accordance with the regulations, and they are operated accordingly. Most of the flying HARS aircraft are in the Operational Index Zero category, the operational restrictions are the same as for a Standard Category C.of A. aircraft.
After all, many of the pilots of the larger aircraft are current airline pilots, do you really think they are going to put their day jobs on the line and operate illegally.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I am not a member of HARS.
ASAC expresses some very strong feelings, he (if that is so) sounds to me like an ex-CASA bloke I know who believed the aviation law should be what he thought it should be, not what it actually is.
It is simply NOT TRUE that aircraft certified in the Limited Category cannot fly over built up areas, the operational limitations for ALL Limited Category (and many Experimental certificated aircraft) are as entered on the Annex attached to the Limited Cat. C. of A., and forming a part of the C. of A., and compliance is required by law.
As ASAC is so far off the beam with his comments about Albion Park, perhaps you should treat his other comments with caution.
All the Historic Aircraft Restoration Society (HARS) aircraft have straight forward C.of A’s issued in accordance with the regulations, and they are operated accordingly. Most of the flying HARS aircraft are in the Operational Index Zero category, the operational restrictions are the same as for a Standard Category C.of A. aircraft.
After all, many of the pilots of the larger aircraft are current airline pilots, do you really think they are going to put their day jobs on the line and operate illegally.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I am not a member of HARS.
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Dog1,
i guess you missed ,my point,
Accidents do sometimes just happen, unfortunately not all accidents can fall into the systemic or cultural category, systemic or culture indicate a trend of behaviour, how many metros hit the hill in LHR ?.
Aviation is risk management, for eg, when we arrive at a location, how often is the met significantly different to the forecast ?, how can we ensure it is not, have a full time met guy/gal there, but that is not financially viable right, so met forecasting is done by satelite from Mel or Brissy.
So if we arrive at a location and the weather is worse than forecast, this should be a major incident right ?, it could and probably has cost lives in the past.
To suggest that all risk can be removed from aviation is absurd ( not saying you did ), to say there is a level of maintenance that can be administered to ensure your aircraft will never break down is absurd ( no saying you did ), do you see my point, there are still many unknowns, combined with best guess, some SOP's and a very small amount of exact science.
But still the biggest safety issue is the flight crew, how can we ensure they/we are performing at 100%, 100% of the time, or make the right decision when required.
In my opinion it gets very hazy what actually works, one thing i am certain of is that many if these safety catch crys are mere hot air. no agruement from me, good maintenance, good training and relevant thorough SOPs are the essential ingredients for a "safer" operation.
Safe and aviation is like playing a safe game of russian roulette, it just helps if you are spinning the barrel of john waynes 50 shot revolver, as opposed to the conventional six shooter.
It was a sad accident, but is turning into a witch hunt.
"What goes up might come down"
i guess you missed ,my point,
Accidents do sometimes just happen, unfortunately not all accidents can fall into the systemic or cultural category, systemic or culture indicate a trend of behaviour, how many metros hit the hill in LHR ?.
Aviation is risk management, for eg, when we arrive at a location, how often is the met significantly different to the forecast ?, how can we ensure it is not, have a full time met guy/gal there, but that is not financially viable right, so met forecasting is done by satelite from Mel or Brissy.
So if we arrive at a location and the weather is worse than forecast, this should be a major incident right ?, it could and probably has cost lives in the past.
To suggest that all risk can be removed from aviation is absurd ( not saying you did ), to say there is a level of maintenance that can be administered to ensure your aircraft will never break down is absurd ( no saying you did ), do you see my point, there are still many unknowns, combined with best guess, some SOP's and a very small amount of exact science.
But still the biggest safety issue is the flight crew, how can we ensure they/we are performing at 100%, 100% of the time, or make the right decision when required.
In my opinion it gets very hazy what actually works, one thing i am certain of is that many if these safety catch crys are mere hot air. no agruement from me, good maintenance, good training and relevant thorough SOPs are the essential ingredients for a "safer" operation.
Safe and aviation is like playing a safe game of russian roulette, it just helps if you are spinning the barrel of john waynes 50 shot revolver, as opposed to the conventional six shooter.
It was a sad accident, but is turning into a witch hunt.
"What goes up might come down"
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Geesuz
I don’t think there is any doubt that the pilots mad a mistake on the day but the fact is Transair clearly promoted a poor safety culture
Yes Your'e right - regular meetings were held to come up with new and innovative ways of how to be "less safe" .
Prizes were given to those with the most jackass ways to fly and break rules, thus 'promoting' the poor safety culture.
Choose your words more carefully please!
Yes Your'e right - regular meetings were held to come up with new and innovative ways of how to be "less safe" .
Prizes were given to those with the most jackass ways to fly and break rules, thus 'promoting' the poor safety culture.
Choose your words more carefully please!
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quote "but the fact is Transair clearly promoted a poor safety culture" end quote.
One can get themselves into a pickle using such statements.
Take the emotion out of it and you'll see that Transair "must" have been a compliant operator to be granted an AOC.
I believe if CASA looked close enough at any operation they would find issues that would probably warrant an RCA or two, that does not mean the operator is "unsafe".
Further to that point, it is infrequent for an audit on an AOC holder not to have atleast one RCA issued, regulations changes, different FOI's have different interpretations of legislation etc etc.
If CASA "knew" Transair was "unsafe" ( read an accident waiting to happen ) they would be obliged to shut them down, immediately. If they did not, someone in CASA will probably go to prison ( Duty of Care ).
So it does not seem so clear cut in that light.
Accidents do happen, that why they are accidents, not events / occurences / incidents / actions.
One can get themselves into a pickle using such statements.
Take the emotion out of it and you'll see that Transair "must" have been a compliant operator to be granted an AOC.
I believe if CASA looked close enough at any operation they would find issues that would probably warrant an RCA or two, that does not mean the operator is "unsafe".
Further to that point, it is infrequent for an audit on an AOC holder not to have atleast one RCA issued, regulations changes, different FOI's have different interpretations of legislation etc etc.
If CASA "knew" Transair was "unsafe" ( read an accident waiting to happen ) they would be obliged to shut them down, immediately. If they did not, someone in CASA will probably go to prison ( Duty of Care ).
So it does not seem so clear cut in that light.
Accidents do happen, that why they are accidents, not events / occurences / incidents / actions.
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Transair
These days enough accidents have occured to prove that the "Safety Culture" needed to ensure safe operations from pre-boarding to disembarkation requires a "safety state of mind".
The Leadership and Role Model for this way of thinking and operating is the General Manager.
You should find a statement saying this in the Transair (and other RPT operators) Ops Manual.
This philosophy of "Safety First" has to percolate all the way down from the GM to the apprentice looking for a left handed spanner.
What is required to make this work for pilots is a GM who can see this is the only way to go, (safety is no accident), a Chief Pilot with freedom to make his own independant decisions, Check/ Training staff who are knowledgeable and fair, and good initial and recurrency training.
This is not too much to ask from an RPT Operator who is licenced to take my family from A to B is it?
In my view these are the areas that CASA need to look at in the first place of any AOC holder and chase the paper trail later.
Imagine then if you had a GM and followers who looked only at the "bottom line".
The message from the top becomes "save every minute of flight time, join the holding pattern in a way that suits our revenue rather than the published chart, carry those maintenance snags until it is convenient for revenue to report it, take all the short cuts you can etc. etc".
Does this lead to a "Culture of Safety"?
Does this lead to risk taking?
Does this lead to a non standard GPS approach?
Does this lead to a descent below LSALT when not visual?
etc. etc.
Indications are the aircraft was not at fault.
What do you think!
The Leadership and Role Model for this way of thinking and operating is the General Manager.
You should find a statement saying this in the Transair (and other RPT operators) Ops Manual.
This philosophy of "Safety First" has to percolate all the way down from the GM to the apprentice looking for a left handed spanner.
What is required to make this work for pilots is a GM who can see this is the only way to go, (safety is no accident), a Chief Pilot with freedom to make his own independant decisions, Check/ Training staff who are knowledgeable and fair, and good initial and recurrency training.
This is not too much to ask from an RPT Operator who is licenced to take my family from A to B is it?
In my view these are the areas that CASA need to look at in the first place of any AOC holder and chase the paper trail later.
Imagine then if you had a GM and followers who looked only at the "bottom line".
The message from the top becomes "save every minute of flight time, join the holding pattern in a way that suits our revenue rather than the published chart, carry those maintenance snags until it is convenient for revenue to report it, take all the short cuts you can etc. etc".
Does this lead to a "Culture of Safety"?
Does this lead to risk taking?
Does this lead to a non standard GPS approach?
Does this lead to a descent below LSALT when not visual?
etc. etc.
Indications are the aircraft was not at fault.
What do you think!
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Joysticks,
all of what you see as regarding safety ethos is a part of any audit, 1-do they have SOP's that address safe operation, 2- are they following those published procedures.
With regards to the bottom line, all operator must be acutely aware of the bottom line, where the problem appears is when ABC Air Charter next door will do the Charter for $100 less.
To sit down and work out exactly what an aircraft costs to run, then add say about 20% profit, is about $650 dollars an hour for a C310/B58, there are still operators out there putting aircraft out for $500 and less, how do they do it you ask.
Take a close look at the Helicopter mustering world, if you sit a Robinson Safety course, they show how a R22 cost around the $400 mark to run, there are operations out there that have advertised $250 per hour, no cost for ferry to the job, interesting isn't it ?.
This type of corruption is in many facet of aviation, the parts not protected by a contract, many organisations that have direct competition ( especially GA ).
A good operator will walk a very fine line between the bottom line and doing things safely.
Logically CASA should be acutely interested in the financial situation of a company, an FOI or AWI are not the right people to be looking at the finances of a air operator.
I have seen 5 or 6 audits and have never seen a CASA accountant on the audit team. This would be a good thing to see happen, if a company is not able to afford proper maintenance and training, how are they going to afford proper maintenance and training, catch my drift ?.
Hey, lay off the left handed spanner jokes
all of what you see as regarding safety ethos is a part of any audit, 1-do they have SOP's that address safe operation, 2- are they following those published procedures.
With regards to the bottom line, all operator must be acutely aware of the bottom line, where the problem appears is when ABC Air Charter next door will do the Charter for $100 less.
To sit down and work out exactly what an aircraft costs to run, then add say about 20% profit, is about $650 dollars an hour for a C310/B58, there are still operators out there putting aircraft out for $500 and less, how do they do it you ask.
Take a close look at the Helicopter mustering world, if you sit a Robinson Safety course, they show how a R22 cost around the $400 mark to run, there are operations out there that have advertised $250 per hour, no cost for ferry to the job, interesting isn't it ?.
This type of corruption is in many facet of aviation, the parts not protected by a contract, many organisations that have direct competition ( especially GA ).
A good operator will walk a very fine line between the bottom line and doing things safely.
Logically CASA should be acutely interested in the financial situation of a company, an FOI or AWI are not the right people to be looking at the finances of a air operator.
I have seen 5 or 6 audits and have never seen a CASA accountant on the audit team. This would be a good thing to see happen, if a company is not able to afford proper maintenance and training, how are they going to afford proper maintenance and training, catch my drift ?.
Hey, lay off the left handed spanner jokes
Last edited by Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower; 29th Dec 2006 at 11:06.
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"Take a close look at the Helicopter mustering world, if you sit a Robinson Safety course, they show how a R22 cost around the $400 mark to run, there are operations out there that have advertised $250 per hour, no cost for ferry to the job, interesting isn't it?"
Interesting?? It is VERY interesting LHRT.... I have witnessed first hand 2 operators and the goings on... blatant "who gives a **** I'm 150 hrs over" attitude makes me cringe. I shall say no more... this message will self destruct....
Interesting?? It is VERY interesting LHRT.... I have witnessed first hand 2 operators and the goings on... blatant "who gives a **** I'm 150 hrs over" attitude makes me cringe. I shall say no more... this message will self destruct....
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Okay Okay - I know I am going to recieve some flack but perhaps? just perhaps a little inside information could be useful. I have no axe to grind but the speculation is hijacking the topic.
SOP's - having worked for TA I can state that until mid Nov 06 there was very little in written SOP even a corporate governance statement. In fact the methodolody in the training department was as has always been since the initial setup to get on the job with a more expereinced aviator as soon as practical. It is was also common practice that the ICUS pilots recieved minimal or sometime no formal assessment as a trainer. The CAR 217 organisation was never operated correctly for years. It may have also been lost that the LHR accident Captain was a Supervisory pilot and base manager - so as such he MUST have held the highest professional standard at the time. The question as to why he permitted and maybe flew the approach is still unknown - but the number of pilots flying for this operator right up to closure without RNAV may be an indicator.
I have flown with nearly every pilot involved with TA - and I have seen nearly all possible SOP variants in that time including some that were outright dangerous.
The fact that SOP's were spoken not written has always surprised me that there were only a small number of incidents. The incidents from the ATSB site are mainly crew related and can stem back to the procedures within the cockpit - not necessarily maintenance related. What is of interest is that did the pilot in command of the incidents report them to the ATSB as per their legal requirements or does the ATSB only act upon the company reported items. Will action be taken against the PIC's for their breakdown in procedure?
The action taken by CASA does not surprise me - when the EVU first came out there was a 2 month delay before action started - the question of CASA is why was a forensic audit NOT conducted on the 8th May 2005? A close look at the CAR 217 would have found some dramatic failings - the training of the CAR 217 flight crews, the experience of the crews and right down to who was doing what check !
Whilst all this will probably come out in the coronial enquiry the fact that the CASA did not act in time will surely not be missed. Perhaps the relationships between the CASA office and the operator need to be examined. It is a reminer to all involved that the names in the logbook can bite your arse for many a year that follows.
(Bunker doors - 'closed and locked')
SOP's - having worked for TA I can state that until mid Nov 06 there was very little in written SOP even a corporate governance statement. In fact the methodolody in the training department was as has always been since the initial setup to get on the job with a more expereinced aviator as soon as practical. It is was also common practice that the ICUS pilots recieved minimal or sometime no formal assessment as a trainer. The CAR 217 organisation was never operated correctly for years. It may have also been lost that the LHR accident Captain was a Supervisory pilot and base manager - so as such he MUST have held the highest professional standard at the time. The question as to why he permitted and maybe flew the approach is still unknown - but the number of pilots flying for this operator right up to closure without RNAV may be an indicator.
I have flown with nearly every pilot involved with TA - and I have seen nearly all possible SOP variants in that time including some that were outright dangerous.
The fact that SOP's were spoken not written has always surprised me that there were only a small number of incidents. The incidents from the ATSB site are mainly crew related and can stem back to the procedures within the cockpit - not necessarily maintenance related. What is of interest is that did the pilot in command of the incidents report them to the ATSB as per their legal requirements or does the ATSB only act upon the company reported items. Will action be taken against the PIC's for their breakdown in procedure?
The action taken by CASA does not surprise me - when the EVU first came out there was a 2 month delay before action started - the question of CASA is why was a forensic audit NOT conducted on the 8th May 2005? A close look at the CAR 217 would have found some dramatic failings - the training of the CAR 217 flight crews, the experience of the crews and right down to who was doing what check !
Whilst all this will probably come out in the coronial enquiry the fact that the CASA did not act in time will surely not be missed. Perhaps the relationships between the CASA office and the operator need to be examined. It is a reminer to all involved that the names in the logbook can bite your arse for many a year that follows.
(Bunker doors - 'closed and locked')
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Lefthanded_Rock_Thrower
Good point re the finances. Same applies to safety culture. Most regulators (and accident investigators) are ex line engineers or pilots. Very few have much idea about business or the socilology of a bad operator.
This thread is also worth a look.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=257700
Good point re the finances. Same applies to safety culture. Most regulators (and accident investigators) are ex line engineers or pilots. Very few have much idea about business or the socilology of a bad operator.
This thread is also worth a look.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=257700