Mid Air collision over S Germany
 

Reports of a mid air collision betwen a DHL B757F and a Bashkirian TU154 over Germany at FL350.
Buildings on the ground near lake constance are ablaze, 2 confirmed dead, one would assume that all on board both aircraft have perished.
Collision happend in Zurich upper Airspace at FL350.

How could this happen???????????


May God have mercy on the souls of those who have lost their lives

The possibilities are endless radar707....this is after all aviation.

Time will tell.

:confused:

May God also console the poor ATCO who watched it happen.

There was an incident at Heathrow a few years ago where traffic off LAM and BNN were on the usual headings, at the same level. The ATCO, well known on these forums, tried to descend one and got no answer. So he went to the other and got no answer. They got to 4 miles apart, slightly crossing tracks and dead ringers before the BNN traffic stumbled back onto the frequency. From the recording, I would say... another 30 seconds would have been too late. He thought he was going to watch a midair happen and it must have been a most awful few moments. Just watching the recording was hearthumping and I knew they missed!

This poor soul in Switzerland will always have to live with this, where ever the responsibility lies. God bless him.

Point 4


:(

Yup - saw film of it on the news tonight - my heart goes out to all the victims in the aircraft and on the ground - seems there were a lot of kids on the Tupolev whaich makes it even worse.

As for the poor sods in front of their radars, what can you say - they must be shattered, and I hope the Swiss or whoever have a strong and supportive union to help them through this.

:(

What happened to TCAS - is it not mandatory in that airspace?

Here's the link to the BBC

Tragic.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/wor...00/2081332.stm

It seems from the reports that the Russian pilot didn't respond to ATC, and the DHL pilot descended in response to TCAS.
Was the Russian on the wrong frequency? Or was his avoidance system faulty? Or neither?
Who knows. The worst irony, as the bbc quoted, was that the children on the Russian flight had the flight specially chartered so that they would not miss any of their holiday. The parents believed their children were already enjoying themselves.

Let's hope they recover the black boxes in order to find out the true reason for this tragedy, to help avert another one.

:(

Frequency confusion
 

Interesting that much of the speculation so far has concentrated on the fact that the Tup154 may not have been listening, or may have been 'lost' on another frequency.

Both the BBC and Sky News have had experts along who state that this temporary communication failure is rare. In my experience (at whatever center) a/c getting the wrong frequencies, misdialling or otherwise being temporarily incommunicado is a daily occurrence.

Without really wishing to join in the speculation, I would like to ask whether these occurrences, and particularly this incident, would be possible if all a/c and all centers (other than just Maastricht) had a/g link?


All our thoughts are with the victims, their families and the controllers at their respective units. There but for the Grace of God......:(

Have a look at the post by Volume on the reporting point forum (copied below). It implies that it was standard practice for the controller to instruct one of two a/c at the same level to start descent only 50 seconds before collision, and this is in fact what happened. By missing just one call, a disaster happened.

This seems very strange practice to me, and definately not SOP as stated in previous reports from the Swiss!

The report seems to be from the German Aviation Authority.



_______________________________________

02.07.2002 05:00
BFU Press release
Actual Aircraft Accident


On July 1st 2002, 23:35 MESZ (21:35 UTC), well above the Bodensee a midair collision happened with a B757-200 (DHL) and a TU154 (Bashkirian Airlines – Russian Ferderation). The RNAV-Route Salzburg-Traunstein-Kempten-Trasadingen was used by the TU154 while B757 flew along RNAV-Route ABESI-AKABI-TANGO, both aircraft approached each other at FL 360. The collision took place close to AKABI at FL 354. At the time of occurrence both aircraft were under control by Zürich ACC.
The accident is under investigation by the BFU.

An investigation team is out to arrive at the accident site and to meet the investigation team of the Police in Friedrichshafen.

Momentarily the follwing is known: B757-200 / TU154

Aircraft Operator: DHL / Bashkirian Airlines
People aboard): 2 / ca. 57 + 12
Departure Aerodrome: Bergamo / Moskau
Destination: Brüssel / Barcelona
Flightplan:
Mode of operation: Cargo / Charter PAX-Transport
People killed:
People hurt:
Aircraft damage: Both aircraft crashed
Third party damage: Buildings and environmental damage
Phase of flight): cruise
Type of accident: Mid Air Collision

As soon as new information is available, it will be published on the BFU-internet-homepage or released.

Ergänzung der BFU-Presseinformation von 05:00 Uhr
(Supplemental Information, 5am UTC)

Eine erste Auswertung des Sprechfunkverkehrs der Schweizer Flugsicherung mit den beiden Flugzeugen hat ergeben, dass die Besatzung der TU 154 ca. 50 Sekunden vor dem Zusammenstoß die Anweisung bekam, von Flugfläche 360 auf Flugfläche 350 zu sinken. Dieses Sinken war für den Weiterflug nach Barcelona notwendig und war gleichzeitig eine Maßnahme, um einen Höhenstaffelung zu der Boeing B 757 herzustellen.

(Analyzing swiss radio recording, the 154 was advised to sink from FL360 to FL 350 50 seconds prior to the collision, this altitude change was already planned for the flight to barcelona and an action to achive separation with the 757)

Während die Besatzung auf eine erste Aufforderung nicht reagierte, reagierte sie auf eine zweite Aufforderung und begann den Sinkflug ca. 25 Sekunden vor dem Zusammenstoß. Kurze Zeit später begann auch die Boeing 757 aufgrund einer TCAS RA zu sinken. TCAS bedeutet „Traffic alert and collision avoidance system". Dies ist ein Gerät, das die Besatzung eines Flugzeuges vor anderem Flugverkehr warnt und der Besatzung Anweisungen gibt, wie zu reagieren ist, um einen Zusammenstoß zu verhindern.

(Ignoring the first advise, the 154 crew started to descend 25 seconds before the crash, shortly AFTER the 757 also started a descent due to an TCAS RA [...])

Warum die Warnung dieses Gerätes ebenfalls zu einem Sinkflug der Boeing 757 führte, ist noch unklar und wird Gegenstand weiterer Untersuchungen sein.

(Further investigations will show why the warning advised a descend for the 757)


So maybe someone put the blame on the russians much to early ?



Verry, verry sad, condolences to all involved

Just read this myself at CNN in the paragraph titled 'Double descent'.

Just spent half the evening reading through the posts on "Reporting Points" forum. Some interesting stuff on there. Everybody in the media has been quick to jump on the russian crew as they are an easy horse to beat. If it is true that Swiss ATC had two Co-ordinated in at FL360 (from different centres) on crossing tracks and then failed to attempt to resolve the situation until they were 8-10nm apart then that is a bit frightening. I know we are all human and we all make mistakes which is why STCA, TCAS and the like evolved. It was also said by swiss ATC that they have medium term conflict alert but it was down for maintainence. Surely it will all come out in the wash....
But for the grace god go us all and lets spare a thought not just for the families of those killed in this tragedy, but the poor guy or guyess at the console who, regardless of any blame or not, saw it happen on the tube. I'm that is something that will stay with them forever and I hope to god I never have to deal with it................................................

To much reliance on "gadgets and Gizmo's", lets get back to raw ATC and flight operations and also use some of the more basic, and yet effective ATC tools at hand. Radar is wonderful, but at the end of the day the triple redundant radars (as always so proudly advertised by manufacturers!!!) do fail, ours only 2 days ago..... my point is that it is still important not to forget the basics of our procedural standards and build a bit of "fat" into the program to allow for, poor comms, possible language problems, co-ordination failures, radar failures etc. It should be noted that quite a few of these issues are human factor related and on last check we are all human.

I am sure for the controllers that have been in the business long enough and have filled their "little bag of tricks", that one of the most dangerous times is when it is quiet. Having had a few good scares on these grounds, I ensure now that during these times I am proactive with conflict resolution because I have let myself down before through complacency. This point is made not necessarily to the actual case at hand, which investigation is still only in its infancy, but more as a wake up call to us all in every aspect of the industry to ensure we all maintain our highest possible standards and support each other to provide the best and safest service possible.

It goes without saying that regardless of who is responsible, the controllers and supervisors at this centre will be enduring the most horrific time of the lives and it is important we make sure that we give them the support they need.

:(

I have just been hearing about another incident at LL yesterday involving a Shuttle off BNN which went PLOC (prolonged loss off communication). It went for about 15 miles across the top of LL (fortunately pre co-ordinated) and down the south side without talking.

So why have the Russians been blamed so quickly for this mid-air? Yes they didn't respond as quickly as one would like but surely, a system which allows crossing traffic to get that close at the same level before taking action is at the root of the cause?

The first lesson I learned at the college was that in this game sod's law works double but because things rarely go wrong, we have come to expect that they won't. It seems to me that, driven by commercial pressure, we are no longer allowing for the possibility of system failure and there are circumstances within the London TMA which could allow such an accident to happen here.

Point 4



:(

Nice point 120.4

It may turn out that, as normal in these circumstances, the blame is shared around.
But I really feel for the controllers involved, whatever happens, because I know that they will feel (probably correctly) that even if they acted to the letter of standard ops proc, they could have done something else, something extra, and averted this.

I'm very sorry for all involved, and us too. The last couple of days at work have been strange. Crews nearly never miss a call now, and everyone's a little bit more circumspect and sombre. In a way I look forward to the day the sick jokes start, then I know we will have started to recover.

But maybe it'll take us all some time.

accidents like this should not happen with today technology in uncongested skies at night... who or whatever is to blame will come out in the end.... prayes go out to all those who lost thier lives and thier families...

In my opinion non TCAS aircraft should not be allowed to fly in european airspace... why bother making oneperson compliant and not the other(s)....

GOD BLESS ALL INVOLVED

On a preventative note is it correct that the Swiss centre is the only other privatised ATCC in Europe, and did I hear that there was only one controller on the radar. Let that be stern warning to anyone still prepared to undertake both Tactical and Planner roles at LACC against the regulations - and management, lets hope this tragic event will prevent you from ever considering single manning of night shifts as a solution to our desperate staffing situation.

I feel as much for the families as the controller involved, a terrible tradgedy and one which we have to agree could have been prevented and MUST not be allowed to happen again. Whatever the issue, voice your opinions through all available channels and do not allow your concerns over safety to be brushed asside, we need the system to be as safe as possible.

Dover8Mike wrote: In my opinion non TCAS aircraft should not be allowed to fly in european airspace... why bother making oneperson compliant and not the other(s)....

This seems to be totally irrelevant in this case, however the greatest offenders are the various governments themselves. A large percentage of "state" aircraft are neither TCAS or RVSM equipped.

May their gods be with them

BBC news are now reporting that due to the 'conflict alert' system (STCA?) being off-line for maintenance, the procedures are for 2 controllers to man the sector (presumably as T & P). An extra set of eyes and ears to make up for the absence of the automated conflict alert, whether that be STCA or Medium Term Conflict Detection.

One of these controllers was reportedly on an "unauthorised break" when the accident happened.

The finger seems to be being pointed at the Russian crew. However, if, and it is only an 'if', both the aircraft were co-ordinated in at FL360, the controller has accepted a planning conflict that should be resolved by tactical means, i.e. vectoring or climb/descent, when on frequency. The fact that reports indicate instructions to change level were only given a minute prior to the accident occurring would suggest that 'avoiding action' was being instigated rather than a routine deconfliction of traffic. Vertical separation should of course be provided before the loss of lateral separation (presumably 5nm in the airspace concerned). Unfortunately, initial indications suggest that ATC error may be the root cause of the accident.

This should be a serious reminder to all ATC management of the responsibility of controllers and the job they do.

Yes this accident happened at night and complacency may have been a factor,as we know can happen when sectors are quiet.

However, management should now be very cautious on pushing flow rates up and providing very little contingency for when it does go wrong. The number of current overloads at LACC shows the position that people are being put into.

Sectors should never be working above 90% capacity to allow for unusual events, bunching or over delivery of traffic.

I hope it doesn't take something similar in the UK for management to take note!

And they think we are overpaid????:confused:

:(

Obviously we don't have all (or any?) facts from the press reports, generally all speculation. But I do wonder, if its true, that if the Russian failed to respond in time to the avoiding action given why the Controller never issued avoiding action to the DHL? Or why it wasn't given to both considering they must only have been about 15 miles apart if its true that the first descent instruction was given to the Russian at 50 seconds before impact.

PUZZLED!!

Just watched BBC1 6pm news talking about Swiss STCA being off for maintenance.

Followed up by saying that 'UK ATC say that their safety systems are never switched off'.

What about weekly shutdowns and DD+C events???
Everything goes off - or am I dreaming?

News also said tonight "this could never happen in UK airspace as there are always two controllers controling each aircraft".
Maybe at NERC (or maybe not) where there is the whole planner tactical thing going on, but what about other units where its just the guy (or gal) on the tube?

Uuuummm, STCA is not a safety tool, just a nice to have (although it saved my bacon a couple of times when I was an ATC!). Hence it can be off for Bypass mode at LATCC, DD&C etc. at LACC and so on.

Had a bit of a ruckus when I discovered this from the engineers! Seems that if it was safety then it would be a cat 2 tool with multi redundancy etc etc. Cost a fortune. As it is its a cat 5 (might have the numbers wrong, Engineers correct me please!) and costs a LOT less!!

Saddest day in European ATC for decades.
Our thoughts should be for the poor guy that was alone on that frequency that night, (his life as he knew it is gone, we all know this), and for the parents of those that perished , mostly children whose lives were taken by a sequence or errors.
Warning my friends, do not jump to conclusions on the Russians.
from my info, the TU154 crew spoke very good english ( confirmed by the previous controllers in EDDM )was RVSM ( confirmed by the overfly over Linz HMU an hour before ) and according to Eurocontrol database was one of the few TU154s equipped with TCAS.
The poor guy in LSZH was alone and the main system was in maintenance, therefore probably no OLDI as well as no STCA, verbal coordinations / estimates etc.. you get the picture.
The " unhautorised break " of the second guy is bull**** . Everyone that makes night shifts knows what Imean.
Now the rest below is speculation from my part :
For me this could be another TCAS induced error, where one pilot got an RA, the other got an opposite RA but which was conflicting with the (possibly emphatic )ATC clearance received.If traffic info was passed ( looks like it ) the russian pilot might have diregarded the Climb coordinated RA he probably received.
If you were in the TU 154 captain seat and had made visual with the 757, and got an ATC clearance to descent immediately, would you be 100% sure you would have reversed the manoeuvre on account of a TCAS RA ?

Anyway the main result of this is that in a few months or years a young guy will find himself in front of a judge , with 70 families of those who died in the room, and he likely will go down , failed by a system and his bosses. That makes me feel extremely bad.

The one that has never sat alone on a postion a night can throw the first stone....

ATC Watcher

Im not ATC but thanks for that sincere post, hope the controller and families can come to terms with what has happened

I was unfortunate enough to have a close, opposite direction same level (FL330) airmiss about seven years ago. We had TCAS on the a/c but it was u/s at the time and not mandatory in Europe. Luckily we were VMC and I saw the guy coming.

The only point I would like to make is that it is very difficult to visually judge the relative level of other traffic, especially now with RVSM and 1000'separation. It is even harder at night and sometimes cloud layers can add confusing optical inputs.

My condolences to all affected.

Conjecture - If the STCA was on maintenance, how much more of the system was compromised? That is, as Watcher pointed out, OLDI, EPCM/strip printing, track labels etc. It's possible that the controller only had c/s and Mode C displayed.
I heard that the system at Maastricht went down this morning as a result of on-line testing during the night and the Code Assignment Tables being full???

Thanks G spot ( I like your name )

While browsing through the skyguide web site I found this ( unfortunaley only in French :

Zurich, le 3 juillet 2002, 14:30 heures

Dans une interview qui a malheureusement déjà été publiée, M. Maag, responsable du centre de contrôle aérien (ACC) de Zurich, s´est exprimé de façon peu claire au sujet d´une consigne de service selon laquelle le travail de contrôle est effectué par un homme seul. Le fait que l´un des deux contrôleurs aériens en service prenne sa pause après en avoir convenu avec son collègue correspond aux consignes de service officielles. En effet les - Single Manned Operation Procedures - pour le service de nuit prévoient cette manière de faire qui ne porte donc nullement atteinte aux prescriptions en vigueur.

skyguide, swiss air navigation services ltd
Media Relations


Renseignements état-major de crise:

+41 1 816 62 05
+41 1 816 62 06
+41 1 816 62 07


( It basically says that the Head of Zurich ACC screwed up in an interview to the media and that single manned operations during night is not only legal but part of the regulations in use in Zurich ! )
Management at his best once more.

Famous last words. I'll bet they'd have said the same about German and Swiss airspace a week ago. :rolleyes:

Come the midnight shift over here we are ALWAYS with just one person on the radar. In our areas we have three people on duty with two radar positions open. One on each radar and one delivering flight strips while it is busy and then as break relief when things slow down...

regards

This is a truely tragic event and my thoughts go out to the bereaved and the ATC on duty that night.

To correct a few inaccuracies that have appeared on this thread regarding STCA at LACC

1) T3C5 - The ALP servers (These provide the STCA warnings) are a dual redunant pair. If the PAS (Primary Address Space) fails then the SAS (Secondary Address Space ) will take over.

Although not considered a safety system the coding and testing of the application is the same as any other system. I was also surprised to find this out, but as someone explained you don't use STCA to control aircraft. Given recent events that thinking may change.

2) Ahh-40612 - STCA is unaffected during DD&C or NAS shutdown at LACC. The TDU has a complete set of Servers and these are running providing the same services as OPS (including STCA). STCA also works purely on Radar and therefore has no need for flight plan data.

What a truly awful thing to happen. I can not express in words how I feel for those affected.

Can we please learn from this (bean counters take note) THIS IS REAL AND REAL PEOPLE GET HURT!!!!!

Safety IS the only consideration - not how cheaply you can provide a service.......one little mistake and.....there but for the grace of God etc etc.

What a pittance is a few more salaries against the deaths of children going on holiday....

God sometimes I wish I was not in this line.

Lon More, you say that TCAS not being fitted to the Russian a/c is irrelevent in this case. If it had a functioning TCAS, then it would have co-ordinated an RA with the DHL, and had both RAs been obeyed, then it would have prevented this accident. TCAS RAs should always be obeyed, even if contrary to an ATC demand.

Two questions : can anyone confirm whether the Russian a/c was TCAS equipped? It may have been inoperative.
Also, whilst it is not mandatory for RVSM, I thought TCAS was mandatory in European airspace - is there a 'lead in' time to allow operators to modify there a/c, or should they all have it by now. Perhaps it ought to become a requirement in RVSM.

Seems a bit worrying if there was only 50 secs or so allowed to resolve the known conflict. We all know that blocked frequencies, pilots dialling the wrong frequency up, or pilots not hearing instructions happen every day - and can easily take minutes to resolve.

I hope we can all (pilots and controllers) learn lessons from this
and make sure it doesn't happen again - next time it could be over Manchester etc with even worse consequences. I hope this will change the way that controllers and the infratructure are being treated and run right now, and should be a wake up call for all.

Let's stop this rubbish about TCAS. If one aircraft is fitted, and the other has a functioning altitude reporting transponder, then they 'should not' hit.

If both have TCAS, the RAs will be co-ordinated, and they 'should not' hit.

If all pilots have always reacted correctly to TCAS RAs, then my name is Graham Norton. Too little training, and of the wrong type, has led to enormously widespread mis-understanding of TCAS by those involved in its use.

Now if the TCAS action was downlinked to ATC and linked into STCA, in order to allow controllers to back-up the TCAS RA guidance, THAT would be a step forward.

Mind you that's like saying that TCAS shouldn't be necessary. It wasn't, until recently. Now, it's preventing collisions every day. Just not on July 1st.

All this analysis aside, let's not forget the families who are left behind. They don't know enough about this business to achieve a change. We do, and if we can bear their loss in mind, we can take steps in the right direction.

more bad news
 

Evening

Newsnight has just quoted Russia as saying they had
the TCAS turned off for maintanance
and swiss still saying they had an unauthorisied break
Yet we all breathe a sigh of relief
Thank God this wasn't here here in the UK
(sorry condolences to all the families)
MM

BmPilot Read the much more comprehensive posts in the Reporting Points Forum. Both aircraft were TCAS/RVSM compliant.
I was merely pointing out that the statement made was irrelevant when the biggest "offenders" are also the lawmakers.

Terrifying for the controller who had to watch it unfold, terrifying for the pilots scrambling for an adequate resolution which was never forthcoming. We all know controllers make mistakes. We all know pilots make mistakes. We all know TCAS makes mistakes. When all facts are brought forth the correct action must be taken. There is no room for complacency from controllers, pilots, engineers, management...we are a team...we protect lives...priority number 1.

My thoughts and prayers go out to all involved...

I think there are some other messages that management need to take on board while they frantically try to find a controller or dead flight crew to pin the blame on.

Spotting conflicts and acting in good time is 'bread-and-butter' controlling (although I don't know what conditions were affecting the controller in charge when it happened). Yet a lot is being spoken about the Medium-term conflict detection being off. Don't Skyguide use strips or some sort of electronic data presentation? In which case couldn't the controller spot to a/c at 360?

Have the Skyguide management procured a system that ultimately de-skills the controller? Has use of the system left the controller without his/her bread-and-butter skills? Maybe management should be prepared to hold up their hand and share responsibility for decisions made a long-time ago, probably on the basis of financial (i.e. staffing) grounds, that may have contributed to this terrible tragedy.

NATS is looking at a variety of controller aides that will ultimately relegate the controller to the role of monitor. These may make us more efficient and safe, but without a fall-back mode. Let's hope management stop chasing the profit motive and consider the implications for controller skill.

If they don't, let's hope they start to take responsibility for their roles in any future incident.

Re TCAS
 

NorthernSky
BMPilot21

I am not a pilot, therefore the basics of TCAS aside, I will not pretend to understand company requirements etc. However, TCAS is not infallible and it may be worth looking at the thread on this Forum titled nasty incident and in particular the posts by Capt Pit Bull.
It shows how easily these perfect sytems can be fooled!!

G45G3

Careful - CPB's very informative post speaks nothing of anything being fooled. The TCAS, within its operational constraints, is determining/negotiating a course of action to achieve minimum separation based on information continuously available to it and can, if calculated necessary, reverse it's decision - one possible reason why... one or both crews didn't follow (or were slow to follow) an issued RA. Hesitation because of momentary confusion serves only to reduce the margin of separation. In fact ARINC pointed out at NBAA last year that operational data indicates that typical RA response is slower and weaker than that assumed by TCAS resulting in less than desired separation being achieved. An update on TCAS v7 - ARINC

TCAS may be your last resort when the system and "see and avoid" aren't working for you - like in the middle of the night over Lake Constance (God rest their souls in peace).

information please
 

Hello,

I am new here. A very close family friend was on board one of the aircraft that went down in Germany on July 1rst and I am trying to get a few answers. I have asked this question in other forum's but have yet to get an answer that makes any sense so I am trying here.

I used to be a very frequent flyer on business and on many occasions (pre 9/11) was invited to the flight deck on many aircraft, on many airlines, and even had an opportunity to observe landings and take-offs.

On these occasions I learned a little bit, and one thing that made me feel very safe was what a little screen that showed other aircraft in the vicinity. You folks have an acronym for it but I can't remeber what it is called. I remember one Captain telling me that it was adjustable, and could be tuned for various distances from the aircraft. You used a longer range when at altitude, and a closer range on approach.

If the two aircraft had this gizmo set to maximum range - how much notice (in distance or time) would they have received from this on-board anti-collision equipment.

Thanks for your help.