As a controller over twenty years on the job, I am desperately unhappy about the incedent, but I would ask just one question, were the controllers properly trained to see procedural conflicts? I have the feeling that the current attitude is "Trust the software" and you will be OK. This I have seen as the modern attitude from the system designers - happily not all. The STCA was off but for a procedurally trained controller, that would not have been a problem. I just cannot help thinking that, not only "but there for the grace of God" were the controllers trained to the levels that were extant in the past?

I feel that it is about time that the controllers were placed in the system design team rather than being an after thought. Sorry systems engineers, but the question needs putting. I know the answer to the last point, yes we include controllers, but do you listen? And act?

hello romeowiz,
i agree with you in every point. i know many people from zurich acc (i was training as a atco, but got fired during training. tough job). it is HORRIBLE! everyone knows it could have happened to anyone, and the fingerpointing from the medias, even though the causes were not known, is too quite hard for them. and of course, everyone thinks he understands atc. the controller was late in descending, so he is guilty....
the most unbeliavable thing is the chance of such a thing to happen. just imagine - the STCA U/S, first phone line U/S, not beeing able to contact EDNY on the second line, second atco on break, a clearance to descend just one (!!) second after the tu got his climb-RA, and two aircraft ending up in the same bit of airspace at the same time, ending the life of 70+ people...
thanks god the one aircraft was not a pax jet with 200+ people. even what happened is tragic - it could have been far worse. oh, and no casualities on ground...

my feelings are with the families of the victims, and with the atco. don't forget him, he did his job, and now his life will never be the same as before

al

CM...

Not ideal - BUT if the TCAS RA(s) had been followed, no collision would result. I know its not ideal - that an aircraft ends up "busting its level" and the next one down, but the system could not do anything else?

The route cause was probably someone descending too rapidly - and hopefully that lesson will come out of that instance.

There's only 2 ways to go - either ditch TCAS altogether, OR everyone follow it religiously. A half way house where some follow it, some query it, some ignore it has resulted in one mid air and one near mid air in the last 10 days or so alone...

The best advice was from CPB on that thread - the TA is your chance to intervene - reduce the VS!

NoD