Beware VFR traffic in USA

[ferris]

most likely you will use 500 feet separation

Errr, Im a bit confused. How are you separating when you stop the jet off at 17000'? As the VFR is not under control when in E, the Kingair might just as easily start a descent as the jet approaches.

Being in control of only one of the two in the conflict means you aren't separating anything.

[Blockla]

King Air crossing x to x at 17500ft VFR would have been more appropriate IMHO.

If the aircraft is squawking A1200 (probably) how would the controller know it was a King Air, how would he know the destination or intentions, is the level 'verified'? Making 'separation' decisions based on a whim (as Ferris mentioned) is often not the best advice.

As a controller who used to work class E; if you spot a VFR late (very easy to do) it's best to give traffic advice and leave it to TCAS if necessary; remember the VFR is technically responsible for his separation from IFRs in E. Although I think my 'traffic information' would have been better than described.

If I spotted the VFR in E early I wouldn't play vertical I would attempt to get lateral, this of course means vectoring and penalising the commercial airline or IFR out of the way of the "FREE VFR".

This is a significant sticking point in Australia, not so in the US.

The biggest problem I see is lack of education about Class E and what it means to the commercial airline pilot. Base on the first post, I'd suggest whoever wrote that text had little awareness they were even operating in Class E. Big Sky Theory at play I'm afraid.

[M609]

Since the type was known i assume the controller had some info on him. If he used the mode C he must have.

For a 7000/1200 unknown I would use "unknown traffic passing x to y indicating 17500ft unverified, will pass directly in front of you, suggest 15 degrees to the left for avoidance" or some such.

There is quite a few countries where class E effectivly becomes D at night, and you have to seperate VFR night from IFR due to a "all flight at night in class E airspace must be performed according to the instrument flight rules" clause in the national version of Annex 2.

VFR Night in class E = IFR = Need to separate



I´m sooo glad the last non offshore/int. waters class E in our FIR is going on some airac date this spring

[Farrell]

"If the aircraft is squawking A1200 (probably) how would the controller know it was a King Air"

Controller probably asked, or there may have been flight information passed, or flight following requested or any number of comms made in which the pilot invariably would have used their aircraft type and callsign as was the norm during my training in the US:

N123AB would be called as "Kingair N123AB"

Farrell

[West Coast]

VFR is prohibited at night in the UK..... sensibly.

I hope that attitude of over regulation doesn't infect the US national airspace system any time soon.

[Rhino1]

VFR at night is fine...

Rhino

[criss]

It can happen in (and did) in Europe too, you just have to brief what class of airspace you're in. On the other hand, if the controller KNEW about the traffic, even though he legally DOESN'T have to separate, I for one would have done. Would you be happy if you legally allowed people to be killed?

[malcolmf]

Whatever the legalities (and I've certainly learned a lot) are, it still begs the question as to why a controller would knowingly put an aircraft into a situation where a TCAS RA is inevitable, with all the uncertainty that produces. Has SOCAL got mode S so knows what cleared altitude is on the MCP? What if the RA manoeuvre isn't carried out sufficiently sharply and the aircraft goes through the cleared altitude? The crew were at 4am body time so like most longhaul pilots operating in LAX airspace possibly not as sharp as they could be.
It's a bit like driving your car at a wall and relying on the airbag to inflate and save you

[West Coast]

Would you be happy if you legally allowed people to be killed?

No one was killed. Play that theory out to it's end game and no one would take off for fear of someone dying as that's the only way to make aviation entirely safe.

[criss]

I'm talking about a specific situation, not some vague and broad parallels. It seems strange to me not to take action (or to take it in that manner), just because you're not legally required to. That's all.

[West Coast]

I understand your point and spoke in general, vague terms to answer your return of the same.

The controller (to my knowledge) was under no legal obligation to do anything. He chose not to, perhaps another controller might.

Different set of regulations than what your used to.

[criss]

Not different, as we have class E too. I work in class C, and we often have VFRs flying same altitude via same waypoints. I wouldn't sit happily watching as they approach same point same time same altitude even though legally I can. That's all. Of course one could argue in lon run we'll all be dead.

So yes, legally it's fine, also it might have happened he only learned about the vfr traffic when it was too late to actually do something constructive. Otherwise, I would find it strange.

[slatch]

From the way I read it the controller did do something. He stoped the IFR departure at 17,000 for a VFR at 17,500. He did not have to do that. He could have assigned FL230 and let them pass if he thought they were not a factor. The controller quoted traffic. It is not the controllers problem that TCAS went off. I am sure the pilot had set 17,000 in the flight director or whatever system he was using. With a LEVEL aircraft crossing at 17,500 and the aircraft programed to stop at 17,000, TCAS should not have presented a RA, a TA yes but no RA. Maybe the King air went down to 17,400 for an update or two, that would trigger an RA. Once the RA was reported the controller has to fill out a report and the report is forwarded on in 3 business days (I think, it has been awhile). Then it is reviewed and if the powers to be in Atlantic City think things did not go as they should have, they request the voice and radar tapes of the incident. (kept for 15 days) They use this data to improve the TCAS systems.

[Vector361]

And how come nobody is putting the "blame" squarely where it belongs here?....on TCAS. In this case TCAS created a conflict and possibly put two aircraft in dangerous proximity and nothing/nobody else. Generally, I'm a fan of TCAS but no controller familiar with it can honestly say it doesn't have a major flaw as this case clearly points out. There are hundreds of documented cases in the US alone where a climbing/descending IFR aircraft assigned 1000 feet above/below other IFR traffic initiate RAs on both aircraft, let alone when a VFR aircraft cruising at a VFR altitude is involved with an IFR and there is only 500 feet. Sounds to me like the controller DID do his job properly from the info provided. Anybody saying that he didn't is making other assumptions based on info not given in the initial posting.

So also be aware of:

1) Pilots that don't know the rules of the country in which they are operating,
2) Pilots that don't follow the recommended climb rate during the last 1000 feet of assigned altitude, and
3) TCAS. (Ask the engineers & they'll say "working as designed.)

[West Coast]

Only partial blame I would argue. Pilots know how to minimize the chances of receiving a RA with regard to climb rates the last thousand feet or so of the climb.

[slatch]

Well I would not say TCAS put two aircraft in close proximity. The controller put the aircraft 500 feet apart verticaly. That is the required seperation that the FAA tells controllers to apply if they think the VFR and IFR aircraft may be a factor to each other. The TCAS gave a Decending RA to the climbing IFR aircraft. TCAS increased the seperation it did not cause an unsafe situation. What it caused is an uncomfortable situation in the climbing aircraft where you are required to follow the Decending RA from a climb profile. If you have ever done this (I did once in a LR45) it can be quite the event. After that I try whenever possiable to limit vertical rate to 700 FPM in the last 1500 feet when stopped for traffic. It beats trying to explain to the boss why his drink and laptop slid off his table.

[Vector361]

slatch

All TCAS problem. Take it out of the picture and nothing happens. The only "control" type action was initiated by TCAS.

Without TCAS, as earlier in my career, the controller calls traffic, the IFR levels at 17,000 and nothing happens. The IFR is at 17,000 the VFR is at 17,500.

[malcolmf]

vector 361
All true of course, but we are where we are, primarily because of several nasty mid airs in US airspace. All it requires is for the FAA to say that all IFR traffic should be separated from known VFR traffic by 1000 feet. Simple.
Incidentally there have been TCAS problems at DEN for a while, with apparently local operators going to TA only, which in my company (Boeing approved manual) is strictly not permitted unless called for by a checklist.

[No Further Requirements]

The whole point of separating with VFR traffic in Class E is that they are not operating under a clearance and are not required to tell you if they alter their flightpath. So if you stop off a jet at FL170 due to traffic at FL175, and the FL175 decides to descend, what separation do you have?

NONE - you are just guessing and hoping.

Same with vectoring around VFR traffic - what if the VFR turns towards your traffic?

We rely on pilots of VFR aircraft talking up on the correct frequency and keeping a good lookout at all times. One day this will fall down, and we will wonder why we ever allowed it. If you are separating with the VFR traffic anyway, why not just call it class C?

Anyway, beating my head against a wall here. Awaiting the flack.

Cheers,

NFR.

[DFC]

remember the VFR is technically responsible for his separation from IFRs in E

That is not the case. If for whatever reason ATS are not providing separation (class E being a good example) then the rules of the air apply especially the rules regarding the avoidance of collisions.

Therefore, in class E, the IFR and the VFR flights are equally responsible for avoiding a collision.

My initial question about this example would be why a crew maintaining an adequate lookout were not able to visualy detect the VFR traffic when both flights were in VMC.

ATC traffic info, TCAS and VMC so what else could help the 3+ pilots comply with the rules of the air

500ft between VFR and IFR crusing levels has been around for decades. TCAS does not try to provide 1000ft separation. It uses 600ft as a minimum. However, in level flight the RA will not require a change in level if a VFR flight is passing 500ft below.