Peter Nielsen murderer to be retried
One of the aspects of the (post-crash) tragedy that still angers me, is the culpability that could be attributed to the media reportage of the event.
As is today's fashion, "yesterday's news" is no longer considered interesting enough to warrant the order of follow up that should have occurred.
When the facts started to emerge, and it became clear that Mr Nielsen's actions were not the sole cause of the accident (and, IMO, a long way down the chain of causality) the media should have been reporting this, as a number one story. Not relegated, several days or weeks later, to a smallish item on page 7, or twenty minutes into the news report.
This may have made a difference, but possibly not. As stated above, the man who killed him was quite possibly insane, to some degree, at the time.
Long and short is: Peters' name should never have been released.
Daermon ATC, I'm utterly in agreement with the sentiment of your post above. The only minor point of difference I have with what you wrote is that I don't think that the controller represented the last slice of cheese. The last slice was the TCAS system, which functioned perfectly, and was deliberately ignored by the flight crew (senior member) of the 154. Poor training, and the culture at the time were causal factors. And, I think, the speed at which the technology was required to be introduced.
One of CANSO's current dreams concerns remote towers. The technology has come along nicely. It promises to save a little bit of money, by combining sectors (towers) during projected light traffic times. I'm very interested to see just how the ANSP's who embrace this intend to mitigate against the obvious hazards involved in a split-sector operation, as were horribly demonstrated at Uberlingen.
But that is for another thread; hopefully not another news story. Memories can be awfully short.
As is today's fashion, "yesterday's news" is no longer considered interesting enough to warrant the order of follow up that should have occurred.
When the facts started to emerge, and it became clear that Mr Nielsen's actions were not the sole cause of the accident (and, IMO, a long way down the chain of causality) the media should have been reporting this, as a number one story. Not relegated, several days or weeks later, to a smallish item on page 7, or twenty minutes into the news report.
This may have made a difference, but possibly not. As stated above, the man who killed him was quite possibly insane, to some degree, at the time.
Long and short is: Peters' name should never have been released.
Daermon ATC, I'm utterly in agreement with the sentiment of your post above. The only minor point of difference I have with what you wrote is that I don't think that the controller represented the last slice of cheese. The last slice was the TCAS system, which functioned perfectly, and was deliberately ignored by the flight crew (senior member) of the 154. Poor training, and the culture at the time were causal factors. And, I think, the speed at which the technology was required to be introduced.
One of CANSO's current dreams concerns remote towers. The technology has come along nicely. It promises to save a little bit of money, by combining sectors (towers) during projected light traffic times. I'm very interested to see just how the ANSP's who embrace this intend to mitigate against the obvious hazards involved in a split-sector operation, as were horribly demonstrated at Uberlingen.
But that is for another thread; hopefully not another news story. Memories can be awfully short.
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One of CANSO's current dreams concerns remote towers. The technology has come along nicely
BAD AXE — When Michael Trapp ditched his 1966 Cessna 150 in Lake Huron on July 26, he shouldn't have waited nearly 18 hours for rescue, says Huron County Sheriff Kelly J. Hanson in an extensive report released today.
"Our agencies have come to the consensus that Lockheed Martin Flight Service played a major part in the lack of response to this incident," referring to the Federal Aviation Administration's move to subcontract flight services to Lockheed Martin, who then consolidated services and closed the Lansing Flight Service.
When Trapp contacted what he thought was Lansing Flight Service for rescue, he was actually speaking to a controller in Virginia, not in Michigan.
Additionally, Hanson's report questions "how the Coast Guard coordinates searches in our area from Cleveland, Ohio."
On the night the incident occurred, Hanson was at the Harbor Beach Coast Guard Station, where they were ready to launch a search boat but had not been told to do so, because the Coast Guard was unclear whether an airplane had actually ditched, even though Trapp told the Lockheed controller he was 100-feet off of the water and "going in the drink."
"That order came well over four hours after the ditching," Hanson stated.
Hanson, a commercial rotorcraft/fixed wing pilot, with more than 28 years of experience, launched the investigation in the days following the incident with the hope that the agencies involved will review procedures.
He is also contacting U.S. Rep. Candice Miller seeking assurance that changes have been or will be made.
Hanson said an audio recording of the New York pilot's distress call to the Lockheed controller left little doubt that Trapp was in serious trouble and that the controller in Virginia wasn't familiar with the landmarks Trapp tried to provide to locate him.
"Our agencies have come to the consensus that Lockheed Martin Flight Service played a major part in the lack of response to this incident," referring to the Federal Aviation Administration's move to subcontract flight services to Lockheed Martin, who then consolidated services and closed the Lansing Flight Service.
When Trapp contacted what he thought was Lansing Flight Service for rescue, he was actually speaking to a controller in Virginia, not in Michigan.
Additionally, Hanson's report questions "how the Coast Guard coordinates searches in our area from Cleveland, Ohio."
On the night the incident occurred, Hanson was at the Harbor Beach Coast Guard Station, where they were ready to launch a search boat but had not been told to do so, because the Coast Guard was unclear whether an airplane had actually ditched, even though Trapp told the Lockheed controller he was 100-feet off of the water and "going in the drink."
"That order came well over four hours after the ditching," Hanson stated.
Hanson, a commercial rotorcraft/fixed wing pilot, with more than 28 years of experience, launched the investigation in the days following the incident with the hope that the agencies involved will review procedures.
He is also contacting U.S. Rep. Candice Miller seeking assurance that changes have been or will be made.
Hanson said an audio recording of the New York pilot's distress call to the Lockheed controller left little doubt that Trapp was in serious trouble and that the controller in Virginia wasn't familiar with the landmarks Trapp tried to provide to locate him.
Although Bill Lukens was not present on the day New York pilot Michael W. Trapp put out his distress call prior to his plane crashing in Lake Huron July 26, he does provide some insight into the specialist who handled the call, and defends those actions as appropriate with consideration to the information the specialist was given by the pilot.
Lukens posted his comments today after reading the story about the Huron County sheriff's investigation:
Bill Lukens October 17, 2011 at 1:13AMFollow
Hello, Michigan;
I happen to have worked with the Air Traffic Control Specialist who is on the recording posted in this article.
I was a supervisor in the Ashburn, VA Lockheed Martin AFSS until June of this year. This specialist has many years of experience in the Great Lakes area and DOES know the Lansing AFSS airspace well.
He did an pretty good job considering what the pilot said and did. He coordinated the aircraft's location as given by the pilot, he attempted to clarify the location based on what the pilot said.
The Automated Flight Service Stations (AFSS) do not have access to the Air Traffic Radar systems used in the Towers and Enroute Centers. When the pilot squawked 7700 he should have shown up on any radar that had coverage.
The pilot apparently did not file a VFR flight plan, was not receiving ATC Flight Following, did not apply carb heat promptly, and did not communicate his location correctly on initial contact. The AFSS specialist involved coordinated the emergency with both the center and approach control radar controllers and gave the best information he had available.
While I believe the AFSS system has many flaws and problems created by the FAA and Lockheed's management of the contract, this specialist did as good a job as his tools would allow. His knowledge of the LAN AFSS flight plan area is better than most and his location in Ashburn, VA had little or no impact in this incident
Lukens posted his comments today after reading the story about the Huron County sheriff's investigation:
Bill Lukens October 17, 2011 at 1:13AMFollow
Hello, Michigan;
I happen to have worked with the Air Traffic Control Specialist who is on the recording posted in this article.
I was a supervisor in the Ashburn, VA Lockheed Martin AFSS until June of this year. This specialist has many years of experience in the Great Lakes area and DOES know the Lansing AFSS airspace well.
He did an pretty good job considering what the pilot said and did. He coordinated the aircraft's location as given by the pilot, he attempted to clarify the location based on what the pilot said.
The Automated Flight Service Stations (AFSS) do not have access to the Air Traffic Radar systems used in the Towers and Enroute Centers. When the pilot squawked 7700 he should have shown up on any radar that had coverage.
The pilot apparently did not file a VFR flight plan, was not receiving ATC Flight Following, did not apply carb heat promptly, and did not communicate his location correctly on initial contact. The AFSS specialist involved coordinated the emergency with both the center and approach control radar controllers and gave the best information he had available.
While I believe the AFSS system has many flaws and problems created by the FAA and Lockheed's management of the contract, this specialist did as good a job as his tools would allow. His knowledge of the LAN AFSS flight plan area is better than most and his location in Ashburn, VA had little or no impact in this incident
