8 years for ATC murder
ex-Tanker
Joined: Apr 2000
Posts: 907
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From: Luton Beds UK
Chain of blame
And let's not forget that although the controller allowed a bad situation to develop unnoticed, it was still a rescuable one. If the TCAS had been followed by both aircraft, the situation would have been saved - precisely why TCAS was invented and installed.
This fact has apparently been callously ignored in the Russian press (it was the wrong reaction of the Russian crew which caused their aircraft to deviate in the same sense as the freighter). That was the end of the chain, which began with one controller too little on duty and various ATC system maintenance programmes in progress.
With proper TCAS training and use, this sorry story would have been "just another airmiss" but perhaps one from which we could have learned a lot.
I also feel sorry for the German controller who witnessed the whole accident but couldn't contact his Swiss colleague due to maintenance on the telephone connection.
As for the killing, well it was premeditated murder and revenge, of which we see too much in the world these days. Judging by some of the reactions on this site, it is no wonder that wars happen.
This fact has apparently been callously ignored in the Russian press (it was the wrong reaction of the Russian crew which caused their aircraft to deviate in the same sense as the freighter). That was the end of the chain, which began with one controller too little on duty and various ATC system maintenance programmes in progress.
With proper TCAS training and use, this sorry story would have been "just another airmiss" but perhaps one from which we could have learned a lot.
I also feel sorry for the German controller who witnessed the whole accident but couldn't contact his Swiss colleague due to maintenance on the telephone connection.
As for the killing, well it was premeditated murder and revenge, of which we see too much in the world these days. Judging by some of the reactions on this site, it is no wonder that wars happen.
Joined: Nov 2000
Posts: 80
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From: Not Jesusland (and not a Brit)
Alpha Leader,
Deine Arroganz spottet jeder Beschreibung. Ich möchte gar nicht erst darüber spekulieren, was Dein Problem sein könnte (werde mal meine Kontakte bei Skyguide fragen...
).
And of course you possess this ability to analyse a chain of logic based on your vast experience in ATC, don't you?
Fact is, you never worked for Skyguide as a civil ATCO, and yet you claim to carry the ultimate truth regarding the events of July 1st 2002. You might be a "cut and paste" expert, but that's about it.
BTW, notice Few Cloudy's post. I suppose, you accuse him as well of being unable to analyse a chain of logic, since his remarks regarding TCAS concur with mine...
Deine Arroganz spottet jeder Beschreibung. Ich möchte gar nicht erst darüber spekulieren, was Dein Problem sein könnte (werde mal meine Kontakte bei Skyguide fragen...
).And of course you possess this ability to analyse a chain of logic based on your vast experience in ATC, don't you?
Fact is, you never worked for Skyguide as a civil ATCO, and yet you claim to carry the ultimate truth regarding the events of July 1st 2002. You might be a "cut and paste" expert, but that's about it.
BTW, notice Few Cloudy's post. I suppose, you accuse him as well of being unable to analyse a chain of logic, since his remarks regarding TCAS concur with mine...
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
From: where I shouldn’t be
Alpha
Sorry if I hurt your feelings. As they say: If ya cant take the heat, stay out of the kitchen!
Now as I said, lets exchange knowledge and experience to make our industry better and safer. If you are not a member of this industry but have an interest and care to know a little bit what we do than ask questions and educate yourself but don’t come on this board and tell folks what is going on at skyguide, Swiss airspace or anything in relation to those issues.
You said:
As what?
You also said on 3rd July 2002 at 11:24:
Further:
What for? To evade responsibility before any investigation has concluded let alone begun? (on the by by I like your expression: the absolute sh1thouse)
So there you answer your own Q. skyguide does have proper SOPs in effect. The fact that they were not adhered to or only partially implemented is and was an issue of concern at that particular time. That would be a human factor failure under these particular circumstances and not a systemic failure.
So who antagonizing who here?
You have send a link to a BFU (NTSB) document which I haven't seen before. Thank you.
Let me roughly translate some of the highlights of that report:
- The impending reduction in separation was noticed late by the ATCO.
- The crew of the TU154M followed the advice of the ATCO and initiated a descent.
- The TU154M continued the descent even though TCAS was calling for a climb.
- Thus the crew flew the opposite of a TCAS RA maneuver.
- Upon reaching FL350 the TU154M had a sink rate of 1900 ft/min
- The TU154M has left the ATCOS assigned flight level.
- The ANSP does not guarantee for a permanent staffing of all open WP during the night shift.
- The ANSP allows the second ATCO to rest during the times of low/none traffic during the night sift.
Are you relating the last 2 points as systemic skyguide failures?
These are not uncommon SOPs to my knowledge.
Yes, it leaves room for improvements and these improvements have been implemented on all fronts.
So there you have it Alpha! I said it before and I says it again! If one would want to reproduce the event of Ueberlingen willfully one would not be able to.
This was a freak accident and it just had to happen.
Now, where do you come in? What is your knowledge? What is your wisdom? What can you do to prevent such similar freaky event from reoccurring elsewhere under such impossible conditions?
Sorry if I hurt your feelings. As they say: If ya cant take the heat, stay out of the kitchen!
Now as I said, lets exchange knowledge and experience to make our industry better and safer. If you are not a member of this industry but have an interest and care to know a little bit what we do than ask questions and educate yourself but don’t come on this board and tell folks what is going on at skyguide, Swiss airspace or anything in relation to those issues.
You said:
BTW, my own experience with Swiss ATC is based on my years with the Swiss air force.
You also said on 3rd July 2002 at 11:24:
I am not too familiar with (Swiss) civilian ATC (only military ATC)
To my knowledge, there have been no terminations, no resignations, and even the Swiss Transport Minister has refused to accept responsibility for the absolute sh1thouse Skyguide operated on that fatal night.
Skyguide were, on that particular evening, in violation of their very own operating rules, including - but not limited to - the fact that only one controller was in attendance.
If your German (or, for that matter, French) is insufficient to understand the documents that are in the public domain on this issue, I cannot help you.
Still more familiar - thanks to private contacts within Skyguide - than you will ever be, right?
Anyway: merci vielmal, da gseht me wider was für äs Bildigsniveau i de Schwiiz herrscht
You have send a link to a BFU (NTSB) document which I haven't seen before. Thank you.
Let me roughly translate some of the highlights of that report:
- The impending reduction in separation was noticed late by the ATCO.
- The crew of the TU154M followed the advice of the ATCO and initiated a descent.
- The TU154M continued the descent even though TCAS was calling for a climb.
- Thus the crew flew the opposite of a TCAS RA maneuver.
- Upon reaching FL350 the TU154M had a sink rate of 1900 ft/min
- The TU154M has left the ATCOS assigned flight level.
- The ANSP does not guarantee for a permanent staffing of all open WP during the night shift.
- The ANSP allows the second ATCO to rest during the times of low/none traffic during the night sift.
Are you relating the last 2 points as systemic skyguide failures?
These are not uncommon SOPs to my knowledge.
Yes, it leaves room for improvements and these improvements have been implemented on all fronts.
So there you have it Alpha! I said it before and I says it again! If one would want to reproduce the event of Ueberlingen willfully one would not be able to.
This was a freak accident and it just had to happen.
Now, where do you come in? What is your knowledge? What is your wisdom? What can you do to prevent such similar freaky event from reoccurring elsewhere under such impossible conditions?
Last edited by N380UA; 1st November 2005 at 08:08.
The Original Party Animal
Joined: Dec 2000
Posts: 375
Likes: 0
From: Around the corner
These are not uncommon SOPs to my knowledge.
There are (western) ATCs with no Controller Assistant, no Radar Planner, only one ATCO per sector all day and night.
One ATCO on the sector at night wasn't and isn't a specific Skyguide-only procedure.
Joined: Mar 2002
Posts: 346
Likes: 0
From: India
N380UA:
Glad you've read that letter.
You will, however, have noted that Skyguide's SMOP rules at the time did not permit two adjacent sectors to be covered by one controller, yet on that night that precisely was the case....... (apart from the fact that the SMOP rules had never been approved for night operations at Skyguide).
There is also clear reference to the fact that the Duty Supervisor must - according to SMOP rules - regularly check for actual traffic load on SMOP-controlled sectors. There was, as we know, no Duty Supervisor assigned on that night.
Proceed as Cleared
Permit me to yawn....... and add that if this collision had taken place over a third world country with a Swiss aircraft involved and a similar mess had been identified at that country's ATC, there would have been a massive outcry (with tabloid Blick leading the pack, of course).
Checking out now
Glad you've read that letter.
You will, however, have noted that Skyguide's SMOP rules at the time did not permit two adjacent sectors to be covered by one controller, yet on that night that precisely was the case....... (apart from the fact that the SMOP rules had never been approved for night operations at Skyguide).
There is also clear reference to the fact that the Duty Supervisor must - according to SMOP rules - regularly check for actual traffic load on SMOP-controlled sectors. There was, as we know, no Duty Supervisor assigned on that night.
Proceed as Cleared
Permit me to yawn....... and add that if this collision had taken place over a third world country with a Swiss aircraft involved and a similar mess had been identified at that country's ATC, there would have been a massive outcry (with tabloid Blick leading the pack, of course).
Checking out now
Last edited by Alpha Leader; 2nd November 2005 at 09:03.
Joined: Nov 2000
Posts: 80
Likes: 0
From: Not Jesusland (and not a Brit)
Alpha Leader,
The controller worked with two adjacent radar screens which were located at one sector.
Looks like we've cornered the b*****d
did not permit two adjacent sectors to be covered by one controller
Checking out now
Joined: Jul 2001
Posts: 427
Likes: 0
From: where I shouldn’t be
Alpha
As it has been pointed out by PAC and SMK, SMOP was not an issue or even a factor. In the case of adjacent screens covering an active sector and under low traffic SMOP is applicable. As it is further common practice (globally) to unman inactive sectors during the night shift the BFU has confirmed that not all WP were staffed, which as I said is common just about with any ANSP.
On this issue however I'd like to understand your knowledge on skyguides SMOP and its night ops implementation.
For as long as you keep trying to lay the blame on skyguide you will have to prove your accusation. "Nulla poena sine culpa"
Thus far you've come a bit short of proof.
As it has been pointed out by PAC and SMK, SMOP was not an issue or even a factor. In the case of adjacent screens covering an active sector and under low traffic SMOP is applicable. As it is further common practice (globally) to unman inactive sectors during the night shift the BFU has confirmed that not all WP were staffed, which as I said is common just about with any ANSP.
On this issue however I'd like to understand your knowledge on skyguides SMOP and its night ops implementation.
For as long as you keep trying to lay the blame on skyguide you will have to prove your accusation. "Nulla poena sine culpa"
Thus far you've come a bit short of proof.
