Do you realise the importance of communication?

[Jetheat]

A factor that is instrumental in determining interpersonal behaviour on the Flight Deck is the “Role” of a pilot. The problem is, when the other pilot is not handling things the way they should, ideally you’d like to take control away from him but since doing so may be perceived as a lack of faith in the other’s ability, you don’t. This is where MCC plays a vital part in avoiding catastrophe.
Although there are a lot of other factors contributing to safety, I reckon good communication is the best method to avoid most mistakes.
For e.g:
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.

[SpeedBird22]

Is that a true incident?

So I also presume, then, that the FO didn't even look at the Captain either during or after the checks cause I sure as hell wouldn't notice that something was wrong with my Captain if he was not replying to my checks, slumped in his chair and turning blue....

:) SpeedBird22 :)

[Jetheat]

I guess it means that he kept focusing at the Instruments whilst other things were going through his mind. Obviously, he didn't look at the Captain at all. maybe he should have asked a question and waited for an answer. Maybe he should have just LOOKED at the captain. Maybe he did look and the pilot was dead with his eyes open holding the CC. Who knows?

[AffirmBrest]

There are many different ways in which pilot 'incapacitation' can have a bearing on flight operations. One of the easiest to train for is the above situation - that's why we have challenges across the cockpit that should be met with an appropriate response at critical phases of flight.

More subtle is when your colleague perhaps becomes confused with the aircraft, or starts talking b*llocks, or just aggessive. Again, this is why we try to practice these scenarios in the sim or the cabin trainer on recurrent CRM/MCC courses.

I suspect this sort of thing is included in the required MCC courses that you will do as part of your JAA ATPL - it was in mine - and then once armed with the theory, you have to go out and discover all is not quite as strightforward as it seems in the classroom with 200hrs TT!

Good CRM and MCC are two of the main reaons why it takes many years to gain your first command, even though you have the same licence as the guy sitting next to you...have fun finding out y'all

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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...

[purple haze]

sorry to sound ignorant but what does mcc mean, ive looked everywhere, and the only thing i can guess is multi crew something something.

can anyone enlighten

cheers

[Capt Wannabee]

Wasn't a major crash between a 747 and a 737 caused by an aggresive Captain many years ago. I cannot remember the airfield (it is Friday!) but it was a Dutch 747 and an American 737.
The 747 was running late and the Capt was tired and piss*d off.
The 737 was holding up the take off clearence as it was exiting the runway.
THe 747 Capt asked to go a couple of times was denied and then when fed up started to roll.
The F/O told the Capt that he didn't think they had been cleared but was to scared to do anything but alert tower they were rolling.
The 737 tried to get out of the way couldn't and the resulting loss of life was huge.
The conditions were very foggy and the accident report (by the dutch) blamed bad RT and the fog.
The American report however put the blame on bad crew interaction and a F/O being to scared to contradict the Capt.

Another case I heard was a single turbo prop doing a mail run to the netherlands was on an instruments approach. The F/O was having trouble maintaining the glide slope and was basically all over the show. On asking the Capt advice he got no firm response so he continued.
Finding himself High and fast he asked the Capt what to do. Again no firm response to either go around or continue.
F/O continued, landed well down the runway skidded, ran off the runway and ended up in the sea.
Accident report stated bad communication to be the cause. Neither pilot understanding the other and rather than clarifying what had been asked or said just blundered on.

P.S If anyone has spotted any mistakes here then fill in the gaps or correct. There are bound to be some.

[This message has been edited by Capt Wannabee (edited 27 April 2001).]

[Evo7]

Capt Wannabe

I think you are thinking of Tenerife - two 747's. One KLM, the other was an American carrier.

[GJB]

CAPT WANNABE:

The accident to which you refer actually involved 2 747's, one operated by Pan-Am and the other by KLM; it occurred in Tenerrife.

The KLM 74 was given a "line-up" whilst the clipper was taxing up the runway. Yes - fog came in with vis down to about 100metres. The irritated KLM Captain commenced his take-off roll without clearance and collided with the clipper, who desperately attempted to clear the runway as they heard the roar of engines coming towards them.

I believe that the F/O on the KLM flight deck stopped the Captain 3 times by retarding the throttles; he knew they didn't have clearance. To this the Captain responded, words to the effect that he knew and told him to obtain clearance. He finally conceded and they began rolling......

Horrendous waste of life and a totally avoidable accident.

I think this accident was covered in the 'Black Box' series - quite a factual and well written book.

The 1st incident discussed here, with the Captain suffering a heart attack, and the fearful junior F/O not intervening, is another sad lesson from which we can all learn.

[This message has been edited by GJB (edited 27 April 2001).]

[Lucifer]

Try two 747s capt wannabe and the largest loss of life in a civil aviation accident ever.

[Capt Wannabee]

Thanks to everyone with a much better memory then me for clearing all that up.

The point (however much I forgot) is communicate your fears. Not happy then say or do someting about it.

[AffirmBrest]

And my point is - in the real world that's a lot easier said than done, CW.

The best advice - try to think of your own strategy for questioning things you don't understand/agree with before you find yourself in a sticky situation. Good CRM starts in the crewroom.

PH - MCC usually means Multi-crew co-operation/co-ordination, unless you're a cricket fan.

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...proceeding below Decision Height with CAUTION...

[Buffy Summers]

I don't think the flight in the first post was an actual event.
However, yes, this sort of scenario is often practised in the sim, usually at some inopportune moment the captain will die by just not doing anything and its to see if the FO responds to the situation. Its done at any time, but usually on the take off roll before V1 or on an approach in lousy weather to a go-around. Believe me, when you are single engine, cat 3, and the ILS dies, single pilots go-around becomes quite busy.
However, all FOs must remain assertive at all times. I would not hesitate to question something I was uncomfortable with. I have flown with management and done sim checks with them and even seen them do incorrect drills but I don't just sit there and let it happen, I make an input. I am always surprised at how the trainers will then congratulate me on my "good CRM" and say how pleasantly surprised they were to see someone challenge a management pilot.
In the scenario at the top, I can't believe the FO just sat there and watched the aircraft fly into the ground. I mean, come on, its his life too. When do you call it? One dot low on the glide? 2?

[DeltaTango]

my first lesson in MCC was on my introduction flight 6 years ago.
I told the instructor that I had flown about 40 hrs. in the airforce before I got the kick and he said that he would be doing the t/o and landing but besides that I did all the flying.
On final, full flaps ready to land..I'm waiting for him to take over and he sits on the controls but I don't feel any feedback on the yokebut still I did'nt ask him anything.
5' we both feel that something is wrong and we manage to avoid breaking the nose with a quick pull on the nose.

and we both exclaimed:
"I thought YOU had it".....


What was that with a bag of luck....or something?

DT

[schuler_tuned]

i can remember seeing the tenerife accident
reported on the telly as a news flash( i was very young!).the dutch cap was the blue eyed boy of klm, and even appeared in their adverts, shock of blonde hair, super shiny teeth and bob monkhouse tan.
the panam was back tracking at the time mr shiny applied thrust for the second time , and transmitted he was rolling for t/o.
panam tried to turn off once they became aware of the gravity of the situation, but unfortunately they got hit broadside, the klm had rotated and was just airborne.
mr shiny was very experienced, senior training cap if i remember, and paid the ultimate price of believing in his own ego.
as a direct result r/t procedures were overhauled, and re-written, and hence the introduction of "departure" into the phraseology, and the growing acceptance of the importance of crm.(read the accident report if you can , also the staines trident disaster. accidents usually start way before the incident itself!)
flying isn't inherently dangerous. but the enviroment is particularly unforgiving.

[DeltaTango]

Hey ST-did the r/t rewrite introduce the "clearence" , as in, clearence will only be given in connection with a rwy(t/o, landing, crossing), eveything else is "approved"?

[ElFot]

read the accident report if you can , also the staines trident disaster. accidents usually start way before the incident itself!

I would very much appreciate any links about those accident reports.

[BEagle]

One direct result was that pilots would henceforth never use the words 'take-off' until ATC had cleared them for take-off.

A sound concept. We adopted it as an SOP immediately on the RAF VC10K fleet - but then along came some pompous Sqn Ldr ('Thrombo' - the wandering clot, for those who remember him) who said that it didn't correspond with the official wording in the RAF publications of the day ("C/S, Request take-off"), so we should continue to use the old wording - even though it was less safe.

Fortunately no-one paid any attention to the fool.

[Bluejet]

Gents, having caused my fair share of cock-ups and having recently moved to the LHS I can definately testify to the difficulty of a) speaking up when things are wrong and b) hearing a statement that things are wrong when it is 'incorrectly' couched. My advice is 2 fold. Firstly CRM has got absolutely nothing to do with being nice to each other, nor has it anything to do with being warm and fuzzy. Secondly facts is facts and words are just words.

So what am I saying? basically always make your statements as facts and never as 'veiled suggestions'
i.e. 'Captain/Bob/Bill we need to de-ice',
not 'do you think we need to de-ice?'.

i.e. 'Bob/Bill/Capt we are not stable'
not 'you '500',
him 'stable',
you 'erm....?'.

Present your fears and concerns as statements of fact, Confirmational Bias will nearly always lead an individual to confirm his previous assessment. Any question that is couched in such a way as to allow him/her to do that will cause him/her to do it. So you need to absolutely stop it, by making a simple statement of fact that absolutely denies them the ability to re-evaluate their previous decision using their previous assumptions.

This can be done in a non-hostile, friendly, 'we' way, that still allows the other to make the 'right' decision' without you robbing them of that ability. For example the 'Captain you must go-around' is a frighteningly difficult thing to say to a very senior training captain as a lowly new FO. But 'Capt/Bob/Bill, we are not stable' allows that senior training Captain to still make his command decision to go around without you taking it off him.

Cheers

BJ

[Check Airman]

For e.g:
A twin prop commuter aircraft was commanded by a pilot who was also a senior manager in the airline and known to be somewhat irascible. The F/O was junior in the company and still in his probation period. It was at the end of an already long day, and the captain was plainly annoyed when company Ops asked for a further flight, but he reluctantly undertook it. During the approach at the end of his leg, the First Officer went through the approach checks but received no response at all from the captain. Rather than question or challenge the Captain, the First officer sat tight and let the captain get on with it.
The aircraft flew into the ground short of the runway because the First officer did nothing to intervene. It transpired that the captain had failed to respond to the checks not because he was in a bad mood but because he had died during the approach.

Can you give a few more details on this accident please? I'd like to look up the official NTSB or AAIB report online.

[PLovett]

At one Australian airline the magic phrase is, "Captain you must listen to me" if a warning from the FO is being ignored.

That phrase, if ignored, on a CVR would trigger disciplinary action against the captain. :uhoh:

[fireflybob]

One aspect to this debate is that when an individual is concentrating hard (at times of high workload for example) they just do not hear what the other pilot says. That is to say the sense of hearing hears the sound but the message does not arrive at the brain! Human beings are what I call "deletion creatures" ´- right now you are not (consciously) aware of the blood pulsing though your left ear lobe or your heart beating away! In fact if we were aware of every sensory input we would not be able to cope.

If you are not convinced by this have you ever had an occasion when you have walked in the kitchen and your partner shouts "bring the salt with you when you come back!". You open the cupboard door but whilst doing so you start saying "I cannot see the salt....I cannot see the salt", only to have your partner walk in and say "here it is - right in front of you!". So the question is did your eye see the salt? I would answer yes but it did not register with the brain because your incantation was different. I believe in psychological terms its called a "schotoma".

So getting back to the flight deck just because you have said something does NOT mean that it has registered with your fellow crew member. In these situations you may have to create a "pattern interrupt" and resort to, for example, touching (yes) your colleague, asking a crazy question to get his attention, and/or inextremis taking over control. This latter action may take some moral courrage (aka "balls") but if it saves the a/c who cares!

[Milt]

"Handing Over"
"Taking Over"

Was once a member of a court of inquiry into a double fatal where the only conclusion that could be reached was that the instructor had not confirmed the handing over procedure in a tandem trainer - Wirraway/Harvard type - at night in the circuit and a confirmed problem with a much deteriorated intercom.

Result - no one in control all the way to impact.

Do instructors and others now insist on a responsive waggle of a control of a tandem trainer to confirm a control handover?

[formulaben]

I don't think the flight in the first post was an actual event.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?id=DCA92MA022&rpt=fi

I think it was Peter Garrison who did a story about this accident in his "Aftermath" series in Flying magazine some years back. Apparently there was more info than in the FAA report.

[A37575]

I am always surprised at how the trainers will then congratulate me on my "good CRM" and say how pleasantly surprised they were to see someone challenge a management pilot

Well, that is nice for you...

Recent incident comes to mind where the captain failed to notice the speed brake did not automatically extend on touch down. The F/O was doing the landing, and as the wheels touched he noticed across the cockpit the speed brake lever did not operate even though it was correctly armed. The F/O called "Speed brake not up" and the captain just sat there. By now in reverse thrust, the F/O again called "Speed brake NOT UP." The captain disregarded him. So the F/O reached right across the pedestal to the captain's side and pulled up the speed brake lever himself meanwhile steering down the runway still in reverse.

The captain turned to the F/O with the aircraft doing 100 knots plus on the landing run and roared at him saying "Stay away from my side of the cockpit - the speed brake lever is my responsibility - not yours...."

The F/O was shaken by this outrageous outburst of petulance from the captain, but shrugged it off as the captain was well known for his temper.
CRM - a highly lucrative cottage industry to some, that seldom gets through to those that need it most. :(

[Blip]

There is a series of three books titled "Air Disasters" which are compulsary reading for anyone involved in the business of flying. Produced by an Australian named Macarther Job.

It just so happens that this link to Amazon includes a excerp from a chapter covering the Tenerife disaster with some reader reviews:

http://www.amazon.com/Air-Disaster-Vol-Macarthur-Job/dp/1875671110

I highly recommend all three volumes.

[Farmer 1]

At one Australian airline the magic phrase is, "Captain you must listen to me" if a warning from the FO is being ignored.
That phrase, if ignored, on a CVR would trigger disciplinary action against the captain. :uhoh:
Never heard that one before - brilliant!

Love it, PLovett.

[formulaben]

Links to commercial sites are not permitted by the owners.

However, the intent of formulaben's post can be met by running a search on, for example, "aircraft performance data", or similar, via your favourite search engine .. and then take your pick of the URLs returned.

JT

[Eugenio Grigorjev]

Regarding the communications problem, I always remember (actually I use it an example on how good the interpersonal skills must fit in the cockpit) an interesting "true-story".

I think I've read it in Airport Confidential (or was it Airport International) by Brian Moynahan. I don't know how true is it, but it sound a good story that makes an interesting point.

The story puts a captain and co-pilot in a complicated approach somewhere in Europe (I sincerely don't recall the place).

When the aircraft reached decision height, the PIC decided to execute a missed approach, and ordered "take-off power" (asking the co-pilot to set take off power to go around) but the co-pilot understood "take off power" so he took off the power.

As far as I remember, I beleave the aircraft touched down hard and short of the runway... I don't remember if there were any injuried or casualties.

But for me is a good example of how "tuned" must be whole flight crew. There is no place for missunderstandings in there...

[forget]

Extracts from Conclusions Presented to the Netherlands Board of Inquiry by the Director General of Civil Aviation.
Accident Inquiry Involving Boeing 747’s PH-BUF and N736A.
Tenerife March 1977.
1. Before I commence my argument I want to commemorate the 583 crew members and passengers who have lost their lives so tragically in this accident and to express my sympathy to their next of kin.
2. The Pam Am crew was alarmed by the way in which the Air Traffic Clearance was issued. The captain has declared to have feared that, from this communication, the KLM could possibly take the ATC clearance as a take off clearance and, immediately after the tower controller had said ‘0kay’, and pauses for almost two seconds, he and his first officer jumped in to inform the KLM crew that they were still taxiing on the runway.
3. The message of the Pan Am crew coincided with the message of the tower controller who, at that moment, told the KLM aircraft to wait for take-off clearance.
4. The coinciding transmission on the same frequency resulted, in the KLM cockpit only, in a strong squeal.
5. Because of this, both vital messages were lost to the KLM crew.
6. The primary cause, therefore, must be sought in the fact that the safety of the system in which all concerned were operating was depending, and still is depending on, the weakest link - the radio communication.
7. This fatal accident has shown, once more, that the oral transmission of essential information via a single and vulnerable radio connection implies considerable dangers.
8. Facts and circumstances show that information transmitted by radio communication can be understood in a different way to that intended as a consequence of ambiguous terminology and the obliteration of essential parts.
9. As I have said in the beginning of my argument, the eminent lesson to be drawn from this accident is the urgent need for improvement of the communication between aircraft and control tower.
10. Compared with other developments in aviation radio communication has lagged far behind in that the fail safe principle, which has been generally applied in modem aviation in the field of construction, systems and procedures, and which has materially contributed to attain a higher level of safety, does not apply to radio communication. The latter is not fail safe.
11. It is known that at several airports all over the world, but also during flights, a number of incidents have occurred in the last few years which arose from radio communication.
12. Although these did not result in accidents some of them bore a great resemblance to the Tenerife accident. To my opinion the situation is more serious then is being presented.
13. Although from the statements of the experts these past days it may be derived that serious problems hardly exist I have the opinion that, considering the potential risks, urgent attention is needed for possibilities to improve the radio communication system. It is obvious that improvements in the field of communications can only be achieved at an international level and this will require research and time.
14. On an international level the existing interest within the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the International Air Transport Association and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations should be fostered.
15. The problem of radio communication is recognised. IATA has established a working group to study the best approach to handle this problem. The Federal Aviation Administration requested a number of research institutes to make a fundamental study of the communications problems in which also NASA is involved.
16. It is essential that, on an international level, this matter receives the attention which it deserves so urgently. The problem needs our strongest efforts to obtain radical improvements soon. The public inquiry of your board and the world-wide publicity of your finding will, as I hope and expect, contribute considerably to this purpose.
-------------
Wait for it! .............Wait for it!...............and now! 2006!
TITLE.
Air-Ground Communication Safety:
Causes and Recommendations
EATMP Infocentre Reference:
Document Identifier Edition Number: 1.1
Safety Occurrence Package Edition Date: 16/01/2006
Abstract.
This report presents the analysis of 535 reported occurrences related to communication problems in Europe. The occurrence data used in the current study have been collected from European airlines and Air Navigation Service Providers. A survey of European airline pilots and air traffic controllers was organised in this study to identify lessons learnt and recommendations in the area of communication safety. The report provides a summary of the recommendations made by pilots and air traffic controllers in the survey questionnaire with respect to the following types of communication problems: similar call-signs, loss of communication, frequency change, nonstandard phraseology, blocked transmission and radio interference. This report is the result of a study conducted by the National Aerospace Laboratory NLR under a contract awarded by EUROCONTROL.

[Centaurus]

Personally, I like "Captain, you cocked up - I have control....":ok: