Latest Boeing News

[Mike Flynn]

Claims that Boeing (https://www.theguardian.com/business/boeing) knew of safety flaws in the manufacture of one of its largest passenger jet aircraft, but covered them up to speed production, are under investigation by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), according to a reports.

The information came from a whistleblower inside the beleaguered US aircraft maker, and relates to the structural integrity of the 787 Dreamliner jet, a report published by the New York Times (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html) alleges.

The engineer, identified as Sam Salehpour, told the newspaper that sections of the fuselage of the Dreamliner were improperly fastened together and could eventually break apart mid-flight.

Salehpour said he had worked for the company for more than a decade, including on the jets in question, and claimed Boeing (https://www.theguardian.com/business/boeing) employed “shortcuts” in the manufacturing process intended to reduce production bottlenecks – but which ultimately compromised safety.


WASHINGTON, April 9 (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is investigating a Boeing whistleblower's claims that the company dismissed safety and quality concerns in the production of the planemaker's 787 and 777 jets, an agency spokesperson said on Tuesday.In a statement, Boeing said it was fully confident in the 787 Dreamliner, adding that the claims "are inaccurate and do not represent the comprehensive work Boeing has done to ensure the quality and long-term safety of the aircraft."
Boeing shares were down nearly 2% at $178.19 on Tuesday afternoon after the FAA confirmed the investigation, which was first reported by the New York Times.

Boeing engineer Sam Salehpour said he identified engineering problems that affected the structural integrity of the jets and claimed Boeing employed shortcuts to reduce bottlenecks during the 787 assembly process, his attorneys said in a release.In a statement,
Reuters was not able to independently verify the whistleblower's claims.

Source https://www.theguardian.com/business/2024/apr/09/boeing-whistleblower-faa-investigation-report and https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/faa-probing-boeing-whistleblowers-quality-claims-787-777-jets-2024-04-09/

[DIBO]

More of the same: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/u...le-blower.html (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html)

[MechEngr]

Could people heading to the press about problems include specific detail about what the shortcut was and what they believe the effect of it to be?

No doubts about some shortcut and no tolerance for them, but knowing the potential problem gives a bit more information for risk management. Is this "may allow a leak to develop at 10,000 landings" or "these should be grounded immediately?"

[WillowRun 6-3]

Complete "Agree" with MechEngr as to importance of knowing the particulars insofar as any engineering, manufacturing and production, and potentially certification, issues are concerned.

For the present, this SLF/attorney comments that the individual raising these concerns has engaged the services of a truly heavy-hitter attorney. Based only on press reports and absolutely no personal knowledge whatsoever, consider that Attorney Debra Katz, founding partner of Katz Banks Kumin in Washington, has already evidently driven extensive media and press coverage, and arranged for a spotlight appearance before Ccongress.

From the New York Times article: "Mr. Salehpour’s concerns are set to receive an airing on Capitol Hill. Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut and the chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s investigations subcommittee, is planning to hold a hearing with Mr. Salehpour on April 17. Mr. Blumenthal said he wanted the public to hear from the engineer firsthand.

'Repeated, shocking allegations about Boeing’s manufacturing failings point to an appalling absence of safety culture and practices — where profit is prioritized over everything else,' Mr. Blumenthal said in a statement." (internal quotation as in NYT article).

And, according to the law firm's website, Attorney Katz was "[r]ecognized by the Washington Post as 'the feared attorney of the #MeToo movement (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/09/24/meet-christine-blasey-fords-lawyer-debra-katz-nerves-of-steel-and-proud-to-be-among-the-top-10-plantiffs-attorneys-to-fear-most/?utm_term=.56f18e1570ce),' [and she] has been successfully litigating employment discrimination, civil rights, and whistleblower protection cases for nearly 40 years." (internal quotation as in original)

In my law firm years I had exactly one matter defending claims brought by a D.C. whistleblower legal specialist; there was pretty extensive use of press releases (it was circa 2006) and it was, in a word, a wild ride. (Health care field, not aviation, client). Based on all this, and discounting some for "politics", Boeing appears highly likely to be gettin' into some chop over this, I'll bet.

[proper form of law firm name corrected, WR 6-3]

[BoeingDriver99]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

[OldnGrounded]

Based on all this, and discounting some for "politics", Boeing appears highly likely to be gettin' into some chop over this, I'll bet.

Yes, I'd make the same bet. Katz's firm didn't take this case without being very confident that it has legs. Almost certainly, Salehpour doesn't have nearly deep enough pockets to pay for the level of representation that this will require, which means that Katz & Co. have probably agreed to fund it. And that means that they expect recovery under whistleblower statutes is likely.

[WillowRun 6-3]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

Excuse me, but that slam on lawyers doesn't apply to yours truly. My interest in threads on this site isn't to be found in any form of pecuniary gain. You might take note, for example, of the extensive (totally voluntary and - happily - unpaid in any way) work I did on-thread, attempting to derail the unfair scapegoating prosecution of Forkner. I am NOT taking any credit for his being found not-guilty.... but it was the outcome for which I advocated in a good number of posts.

No apologist for Boeing here, and if you can point to even one single solitary post within the past 10 years on this forum where I have expressed a viewpoint intended to line my own or anyone else's pockets, do tell.

[Big Pistons Forever]

WR 6-3

I value your lawyerly perspective as it brings additional context to important issues. I hope you continue to contribute to this forum.

[Claybird]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.

[ATC Watcher]

@ WR 6-3
" The dogs bark but the caravan pass by " ( Arab and French proverb) Do not pay too much attention , your input and legal remarks on this forum are highly appreciated as it gives another side perspective and brings knowledge most of us do not have. .

[ATC Watcher]

On the CNN web there is a quote from the whistleblower
“I literally saw people jumping on the pieces of the airplane to get them to align,” Salehpour said. “By jumping up and down, you’re deforming parts so that the holes align temporarily … and that’s not how you build an airplane.”
If true and can be sustained by a video or by more witnesses , then this will become another nightmare for the Boeing PR team .
But it it is all made up to attract attention and cannot be sustained , then we enter another game .

[sudden twang]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO,

.
Ok I’ll bite on this one.
iirc this incident involved the APFDS in a mode that would not provide speed protection. I’ve seen posters adorned to walls warning of the A/T speed trap. The use of the word TRAP is telling. I believe there is /was a mod to change the logic.
To simply say pilot error is somewhat simplistic imho.

[waito]

On the CNN web there is a quote from the whistleblower

If true and can be sustained by a video or by more witnesses , then this will become another nightmare for the Boeing PR team .
But it it is all made up to attract attention and cannot be sustained , then we enter another game .
Video is probably too much to ask. Other witnesses, yes. To confirm the whistleblowers credibility. But it sounds very specific - and terrible.

Another way: if he remembers the day it happened, maybe the airframe(s) can be identified and that particular part inspected for evidence?

[Lomon]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.

Until the wreckage of MH370 is found, and the CVR and FDR analysed, you have no way of knowing what the cause of its disappearance was. The flight could have been down to pilot error, it could just as easily have been a sudden decompression which incapacitated the crew and the autopilot just kept on flying until it fell out of the sky.

[BizJetJock]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

Better have deep pockets for the slander lawsuits against you that will be forthcoming by Boeing - I am strictly referring to the 777 which I have intimate knowledge in.

Enjoy your 15' of fame pal
.
A total red herring since he is talking about the 787, not the 777

[procede]

Good luck pal trying to taint the 777 which in 31 years of service has had 8 hull losses where all the deaths were due to either pilot error / input (Asiana SFO, MH370) or external factors (SAM hit over the Ukraine). Zero deaths due to Boeing defects. In terms of years in the sky, the safest plane (if we take into account no Boeing faults in the 3 death-related accidents)

On that train of thought, the A340 wins hands down, with no fatalities whatsoever in 33 years. And the A380 for example has not even had a single accident, with the exception of QF32.

[Andy_S]

And the 787 itself has had zero hull losses and zero fatal accidents / incidents in 15 years of service.

[Less Hair]

Not fatal but it had those battery fires early on.

[OldnGrounded]

No apologist for Boeing here, and if you can point to even one single solitary post within the past 10 years on this forum where I have expressed a viewpoint intended to line my own or anyone else's pockets, do tell.

I've read your posts for most of that decade and have never seen the slightest indication that you've done any such thing. You're a valuable contributor to these conversations.

[BFSGrad]

A total red herring since he is talking about the 787, not the 777
Multiple news sources are reporting that the whistleblower is alleging problems with both the 787 and 777.

I thought the problem of 787 fuselage section mating tolerances was known and already addressed.

[sjmf]

Do you also have intimate knowledge of the assembly conditions the whistle blower alleges? The performance of the existing fleet (whilst impressive) does not speak to the conditions that new planes are being manufactured under, you could have a very safe existing fleet and terribly manufactured new airframes.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Many pertinent factual items are reported in the Reuters article linked above. Considering the intense attention focused on Boeing and its manufacturing problems in particular, this SLF/attorney offers some things to keep in mind, based on a very early assessment of what is known or reported publicly.

1. The whistleblower (Mr Salehpour) filed some type of complaint or report with FAA, according to every published item. I found this odd, because we recently saw much discussion of the whistleblower claims being litigated by the now-deceased John Barnett - claims that were filed with the U.S. Department of Labor under the AIR21 Whistleblower Protection Program. FAA does have a Hotline for reporting safety concerns. Perhaps FAA has a complaint resolution (or adjudication) process parallel or similar to the DOL - if it does, it isn't promiment on the agency website.

Not saying FAA isn't going to investigate and also not saying anything against Mr Salehpour's claims or anything else. Maybe going to FAA first, and then having DOL as a later option, is seen as creating pressure for a settlement - it plainly has created publicity.

2. The press reports mention both 787 and 777. On the former, after the shims issue and "skin-flatness specifications" issues which were subjects of intense attention previously, presumably FAA has a thorough background on the manufacturing process problems and at least much of what to look for.

3. The whistleblower and legal counsel have provided documents to the FAA and a letter dated January19 to FAA chief Whitaker, according to Reuters. If and when these are placed on the public record at the hearing before a Senate Subcommittee, things are quite likely to get very interesting. My guess is that the early January door plug incident could have motivated an actual filing to FAA, as pressure on Boeing had just spiked rather higher. (Boeing reportedly has offered to provide documents, testimony and technical briefings to Senate staff - perhaps showing some insight after delays and omissions in disclosing information about the door plug handling in the shop.)

4. Last and not at all least, there very likely is more to Mr Salehpour's "retaliation story" than the one-word claim of "threats"' combined with "exclusion from meetings" - as to which press reports do not add any detail about either claim. I've seen retaliation claims predicated on perceived exclusion or shunning but then management comes forward and shows pretty extensively that the aggrieved party did not have an assigned or routine role in a group or unit meeting, rather the person wanted to join and participate, but it wasn't part of their job in fact. If the reason the person was not allowed to join or participate was retaliatory - i.e., we don't need no stinking safety concerns - that's one thing. But arbitrary exclusions from some among a large volume of groups and meetings within a large manufacturing facility? I'm shocked.

[Unnumbered] Participation on this forum . . . I try to take it seriously. Thanks very much for all encouragement.

[warbirdfinder]

And of course to balance the blood sucking lawyers viewpoint above… the 737 Max has smashed to pieces 346 people.

346 people are dead and unrecognisable due to Boeing mismanagement and failings. And that’s only until the next disaster.

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

[artee]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.
Here we go again. It was the plane/it was the pilots, ad infinitum.

[PEI_3721]

Hear we go again; not necessarily so.

Consider the mindset, the thinking, which should precede activity.

The thinking required in evaluation, design, testing, production, and the assumptions made about human performance.

The responsibilities which the higher levels of management should have held which were systematically past down through the organisation, apparently without considering the local capabilities and effects; effects which would rebound back up to the highest level of management.

Instead of looking at outcome, consider the process of safety management and the responsibilities which should be inherent.

[SLF3]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

So the FAA grounded the Max to protect the public from incompetent third world pilots? And the American pilots who tried to manage MCAS failure in the sim after the accident were carefully chosen to be representative of third world pilots?

[Ollie Onion]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.

[OldnGrounded]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.

True. Perhaps, to limit such damage in the future, Boeing should try harder to produce fewer whistleblowers.

[mustafagander]

I must say that if the Ethiopian crew failed to follow laid down procedures in which they were trained and operated the aircraft outside the flight envelope they deserve harsh criticism.
It's not Boeing's fault if crews refuse to operate the aircraft within the flight envelope and fail to apply procedures within their training to mitigate a problem.

[Ben_S]

I must say that if the Ethiopian crew failed to follow laid down procedures in which they were trained and operated the aircraft outside the flight envelope they deserve harsh criticism.
It's not Boeing's fault if crews refuse to operate the aircraft within the flight envelope and fail to apply procedures within their training to mitigate a problem.

Indeed. But then they shouldn't have been flying an aircraft that should never have been certified. Paint it on the crew as much as people want, the reality is, the aircraft should never have been allowed to take off.

[Equivocal]

But then they shouldn't have been flying an aircraft that should never have been certified. Are you correct to say it should never have been certified? Maybe the problem at certification was that not all of the functionality was declared and properly managed. If you accept that, perhaps you should be questioning whether Boeing should have Design Approval (or whatever it's called in the US).

[hec7or]

The comments on here post accident highlighted the fact that a great many "informed" individuals were unable to differentiate between main trim and manual trim and therein lies the problem. The main trim will not work if the cutout switches are positioned to off. If you think you are using manual trim when flicking the trim switch after the cutout switch has been selected then you will be somewhat disappointed.
In manual flight, main trim is the usual option not manual trim.

[warbirdfinder]

If one does not know the difference between main trim (the pickles switches) with the trim switches in normal and manual trim, when the trim switches are off, the handle on the trim wheel is extended and moving the trim wheel manually by muscle force, then that person should not be in the cockpit.

[phantomsphorever]

Hard to believe that there are still people out there, that claim that the whole MCAS debacle is down to badly trained 3rd world pilots.
Even more unbelievable that the FAA and other bodies of airworthiness around the world would ground a whole fleet for nearly 2 years for no reason.

I guess many years from now the US history books will say that Boeing fell due to inkompetent behaviour of pilots from other nations and that all of that was instigated by the European countries that wanted to push Airbus ahead - despite being the inferior solution.

;););)

[Bergerie1]

I think most pilots who have flown the 707 would have known how to cope. But this doesn't absolve the gradual erosion of pilot training and the defects in Boeing's design of the Max.

[Flatiron220]

When it comes to the 2 crashes, I think the emphasis needs to be on the design because:
Regardless of the quality of pilot training and procedures, MCAS went against the basic principles of redundancy and ‘failing safe’ and this potential threat could have been minimised with minimal effort. That is the real black mark for Boeing IMO, that and trying to conceal as much information about MCAS as they thought they could get away with.

[tdracer]

Problem for Boeing is that now when the next 787 or 777 crashes it is going to lead to a massive reputational damage due to this whistleblower.
It depends on the nature of the crash. For example, I doubt many people find the A350 crash that happened a few months ago reflects badly on Airbus.

[MechEngr]

Hard to believe that there are still people out there, that claim that the whole MCAS debacle is down to badly trained 3rd world pilots.
Even more unbelievable that the FAA and other bodies of airworthiness around the world would ground a whole fleet for nearly 2 years for no reason.

I guess many years from now the US history books will say that Boeing fell due to inkompetent behaviour of pilots from other nations and that all of that was instigated by the European countries that wanted to push Airbus ahead - despite being the inferior solution.

;););)

They failed to follow any portion of the stall warning procedure prior to completing all the triggers for MCAS. How badly trained must pilots be to be considered a part of the problem? The airline had tripled in size in a decade. This isn't a 3rd world problem - it appears to be a corporate greed problem of not spending sufficient time building a safety culture in order to build the size of the airline as rapidly as possible, but with the added twist that the CAA, the airline, and the training, was all done by the government. They chose to sell tickets rather than exhaustively train their pilots.

The 2 years was trying to figure out what to do about pilots performing the opposite to every required step.

[Loose rivets]

During the long threads about the accidents, I suggested that MCAS was a device - in the form of software - that operated when commanded. Such functions are incredibly common and often not presented to the users, and so it doesn't surprise me that much that it wasn't part of the technical course. I'm not judging, I'm just not surprised. It would be interesting to know what else we don't know about that inputs into that 47' 1" of flying surface.

I also mentioned that I'd found one airline with it covered in the Pilot's Handbook. By covered, I mean about three lines in a page segmented by lines into three or four paragraphs. Sorry, I can only remember it was a south American country.

Further, I suggested that the Ethiopian captain may have been adversely affected by news of what cause the previous crash. A vague image of systems in his mind, with the end result burning into his brain.

I'm still bewildered by the world's indifference, or even admiration, for the continuation of the first flight. 'They got it right.' Really? Making a flight with a very sick aircraft, and then minimalistic write up? Is it just me?

[Bergerie1]

When the Boeing 707 was introduced every pilot was trained and made very well aware of the possibility of a trim runaway. The procedure for dealing with this was trained on the simulator and even in the aircraft itself during training flights. On some 707 variants there was also a tendency in some configurations for a slight pitch up at high angles of attack (incidence) when approaching the stall. This was of concern to D.P. Davies who required the fitting of a stick nudger on UK registered 707 aircraft.

I quote below from a Leeham News article which you can access in this link:-
https://leehamnews.com/2019/11/01/a-basic-mcas-system-was-installed-in-the-boeing-707-in-the-1960s/

It seems to me that this basic knowledge and associated training became "diluted" over time in some countries and airlines. Had the proper emphasis and training been applied by all operators perhaps the 737Max accidents could have been avoided.

See also this link to listen to DPD talking about certificating the 707 and other early jet types:-
https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/602953-d-p-davies-interviews-certificating-aircraft.html

QUOTE
Additional Certification Requirements to the 707 by the UK CAAPrior to the introduction of the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) each country, should it elect to, was responsible for approving each model and variant destined to be operated by their own domiciled carriers. As a result of its own aircraft manufacturing industry the United Kingdom (UK) was in reality the only other country in the world that could effectively complete an independent airworthiness review of an aircraft. Each foreign aircraft that was to be registered with the UK authorities underwent a review of its design and, equally important, was also subject to rigorous flight tests.

In his book Handling the Big Jets (first published in 1967) D. P. Davies, formally head of the flight test department of the UK Air Registration Board (ARB), now the CAA, describes at length the different stalling characteristics exhibited by aircraft with different wing and tail configurations. He personally test-flew every new jet aircraft model that was destined to fly with UK operators, such as BOAC and BEA. Davies also describes the various control systems that were incorporated on both British and American aircraft that reduced the possibility of a line pilot entering a stall. Details of flying characteristics and the use of automated control systems at high angles of attack are also included.

Davies is best known for mandating the fin of the Boeing 707 be lengthened by approximately 36 inches in order to achieve published Vmcg speeds (minimum control speed on the ground). Boeing ultimately accepted Davies recommendation and, we understand, halted production of the 707 for 10-11 months, whilst a new fin was designed and installed. All existing 707s were then retrospectively modified. A ventral fin was also installed on some variants to prevent ‘fully stalled take-offs’ which the Comet was also susceptible to.

Whilst test flying the 707-400 series at Renton, Davies noted that with the first stage of flap selected, the aircraft had a tendency to pitch up just prior to entering the stall. This was determined to be caused by the inboard leading edge devices, peculiar only to the 707-3/400 series which, when extended, effectively retained lift to higher angles of attack, and moved the Center of Pressure forwards, causing the nose to pitch up. Davies was not comfortable with this pitch up tendency and insisted that all UK certified 707 series aircraft were modified with the installation of a ‘stick nudger’ system.

In his book Davies stated that “The stick nudger introduces a small force into the elevator circuit which imposes positive stick free stability and removed the otherwise self-stalling tendency”. He goes onto to say that “as its input is so small all the runaway cases are completely innocuous.”

The ‘stick nudger’ should not be confused with a ‘stick pusher’, which is an entirely different system with a different objective. The stick pusher is typically installed on aircraft with T tail configurations which are susceptible to “super deep” stalls, such as the Bae 146 and Bac 1-11. All those Boeing 727s on the UK register were also modified with a stick pusher.
END QUOTE

[Tu.114]

Gentlemen, are You sure that this is not a red herring?

The issue with MCAS, as far as I can see it, is the following:

Slice 1:
It uses the most powerful control surface on the aircraft to force the nose down. On the accident aircraft (plural!), it was triggered not by multiple AOA vanes that all agreed about an approaching high AOA condition. The system was fired due to one single input from a quietly failed sensor without any checks, redundancy, whatever in place to keep it from happening. This was by design, not by a further system error. And unlike what has been written about the B707-400 above, it certainly introduced more than a tiny nose-down nudge.

Slice 2:
This protection system (for that is what it is, I consider it similar to the Airbus alpha protection in normal law in essence) has not been told about to the flight crews. It is said that this was due to cost cutting in training and intended to keep the Max under the same type rating as the previous models.

Slicee 3:
Self-certification, minimum authority supervision, ...

These are all cheese slices that had their holes lined up even before any crew set foot into the aircraft. Please take care not to bark up wrong trees.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Tu.114
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[Bergerie1]

TU.144 and WR6-3,

What I wrote is not a red herring and certainly does not absolve Boeing and the FAA from blame. All I was doing was pointing out that previous generations of pilots and airline training departments were well aware of, and used to dealing with, 1960s certificated aircraft and their deficiences. If you listen to what DPD had to say in the RAeS podcasts, the FAA was 'rather too lenient' in the application of its certification requirements for the 707, hence the changes DPD required for the rudder and the addition of a stick nudger.

Again, I think the FAA has had a rather too cosy arrangement with Boeing which, over the years, allowed Boeing to use grandfather rights for the 737. That, in itself, allowed later variants of the 737 to be built to less stringent requirements than would have been the case had it been a totally new type. But, so long as the training departments continued to apply training standards consistent with those earler requirements, safety was not significantly affected.

Come the Max, Boeing decided to correct for the longitudinal stability problems using the MCAS which operated on the whole stabilsier rather than a stick nudger operating on the elevators alone. Furthermore, allowing such a powerful control to be activated through inputs derived from a sole-source AoA sensor rather than having this duplicated or even triplicated, meant that there was now a gaping hole in the Swiss cheese. Thus, in no way, am I absolving Boeing and the FAA.

My comments regarding pilot proficiency concern the fact that, over time, flight operations departments may (probably?) have become less stringent regarding the awareness of, and training for, a runaway stabilser when compared with the way this was treated in the early days of the 707. I speak as an antique aviator and so am not aware of how much emphasis was placed on the runaway stabiliser drill on the 737Max.

And, WR6-3, I fully endorse your three likes above :-
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[Tu.114]

No disagreement here in principle.

However, the core of the issue may then be summed up by stating that the 737 Max is an 1960s aircraft at heart coming with 1960s style issues and, consequently, an 1960s safety record. All thanks to the grandfathering rights and obviously some reluctance to spend money on a whole new modern design instead of squeezing what can be squeezed out of an available model...

[tdracer]

However, the core of the issue may then be summed up by stating that the 737 Max is an 1960s aircraft at heart coming with 1960s style issues and, consequently, an 1960s safety record. All thanks to the grandfathering rights and obviously some reluctance to spend money on a whole new modern design instead of squeezing what can be squeezed out of an available model...

Sorry, but "1960s safety record" is a demonstrably false statement.
Hull loss statistics for the 737NG series is nearly identical to the A320 series (stats as of 2022 - they may have changed a bit since).
Hull loss rate/million departures (fatal/total):
737NG: 0.08/0.18
A320 Series: 0.08/0.17
(knowing a little bit about statistics, the difference is not statistically significant)

In contrast, the true 1960's safety record 737-100/200: 0.87/1.78

There is plenty to criticize about the 737 MAX MCAS system and how it was certified, but to say the 737 is inherently unsafe because of its basic design heritage simply doesn't hold water.

[Big Pistons Forever]

I would suggest that both MCAS accidents would not have occurred if the airplane was certified to modern certification standards. So yes in this case grandfathering 1960 certification standards directly lead to both tragic accidents. The airplane is full of systems that are completely uncertifable under today’s certification standards.

[Loose rivets]

Tu

The system was fired due to one single input from a quietly failed sensor without any checks, redundancy, whatever in place to keep it from happening

Quietly failed? The vane was wildly out of alignment with the shaft it rotates. The result was chaos.

I too am an old guy with far too much time on my hands. I read every post, some many times, in that two intensive years.

The replacement of the nearly new sensor with a refurbished one from somewhere in Florida still leaves me stunned. It's exactly the kind of trap fault-finders fall in to. It's vital to assume the new part might also be faulty, though the aviation industry is unlikely to provides time for a test flight for such a small part. Again, I question what was in the minds of the first crew and technicians in those first two days? Remember, it followed a grievously under-played emergency from the day before. In fairness, no one knew about the part's 'chaotic' status, simply because it didn't fall into that catagory yet.

The 707 nosing up at the late stages of a stall sounds related to the reason for MCAS. However, despite routinely reading duff gen about the reason MCAS was introduced, I only know about the inability to certify the MAX while nacelle lift was making the late stages of pulling back much too light on the pole. This was nearing the stall, and in certain turns - the latter being vitally important to get right.

[tdracer]

I would suggest that both MCAS accidents would not have occurred if the airplane was certified to modern certification standards. So yes in this case grandfathering 1960 certification standards directly lead to both tragic accidents. The airplane is full of systems that are completely uncertifable under today’s certification standards.
Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

[GlobalNav]

Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

In my opinion it was noncompliance because the analysis did not apply to the actual design, which why the hazard classification was insufficient. Perhaps one can consider this unintended but it is a consequence of deliberate obfuscation and a rush to certification of the design for financial purposes. Inexcusable.

The ineffectiveness of FAA oversight due to the new processes surrounding ODA is a major contributing factor. ODA should be eliminated, particularly in Boeing’s case.

[Big Pistons Forever]

The ineffectiveness of FAA oversight due to the new processes surrounding ODA is a major contributing factor. ODA should be eliminated, particularly in Boeing’s case.

I don't think that is realistic or even desirable and I say that as as someone who used to work for an aviation regulator. The reality is that the expertise exists in industry not the FAA, especially in this era of rapid technological advancements. The problem was regulatory capture of the ODA by Boeing. That, that was happening should have been obvious to the FAA and they should have taken action.

[BoeingDriver99]

Cherry picking statistics is pretty poor form. Deciding to choose only the 737NG to compare it with the A320 series is frankly embarrassing. How about comparing the 737NG to the A318 alone? Zero hull losses for the A318. You would agree that is an unfair and unrealistic comparison?

The discussion is about the 1960s era 737 that is a dead horse that continues to be beaten by Boeing. So compare apples to apples. The Boeing 737 is demonstrably less safe than the Airbus A320. Boeing’s own statistics show it, you even acknowledge the rate of the 100/200 being so much worse than the NG. What about the 3/4/500? Again much worse than the A320 family. And look at the Max - 1.48! So how about we compare that to the A320 NEO for most modern variants?

A320 NEO 0.11/0.11 versus 737 Max 1.48/1.48. Your own data confirms it. Do better. :ugh:

https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf

[ATC Watcher]

I think it was Winston Churchill who once said :" never trust a statistic you have not manipulated yourself .." or something similar.
Simple example : are Germanwings and Sully's US Air counting as A320 hull losses accidents in that comparison?

[tdracer]

Cherry picking statistics is pretty poor form. Deciding to choose only the 737NG to compare it with the A320 series is frankly embarrassing. How about comparing the 737NG to the A318 alone? Zero hull losses for the A318. You would agree that is an unfair and unrealistic comparison?

The discussion is about the 1960s era 737 that is a dead horse that continues to be beaten by Boeing. So compare apples to apples. The Boeing 737 is demonstrably less safe than the Airbus A320. Boeing’s own statistics show it, you even acknowledge the rate of the 100/200 being so much worse than the NG. What about the 3/4/500? Again much worse than the A320 family. And look at the Max - 1.48! So how about we compare that to the A320 NEO for most modern variants?

A320 NEO 0.11/0.11 versus 737 Max 1.48/1.48. Your own data confirms it. Do better. :ugh:

https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/boeing/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf

Talk about cherry picking stats! There are substantial systems differences between the various 737 versions (-1/200, -3/4/500, -6/7/8/900NG, and MAX). The -1/200 really was a 1960s design, and it's hull loss stats are comparable to other models from that period. Newer versions of the 737 incorporated various safety systems that simply were not available or feasible with then existing technology of the early versions. Newer technology has made aircraft safer, and the various 737 models have incorporated newer technologies that were available at the time the various models were designed - making them safer. That's why aircraft in general are so much safer today than they were in the 1960s - it's new systems such as TCAS and GPWS, along with improved crew training and ATC improvements.
The basic issue is - are derivative aircraft certified under the Changed Product Rule (CPR) meaningfully less safe than all-up new designs of the same vintage. By that metric, there is absolutely nothing wrong with the 737NG.
Yes, mistakes were made with the MAX, and Boeing deserves criticisms for the way they designed and certified it. But those are not related to the grandfathered aspects of the cert that were allowed by CPR (nearly all of the grandfathered cert aspects of the 737 are related to structures, not systems).

[Semreh]

Also demonstrably false. MCAS met current certification standards - but only because of some very bad assumptions regarding pilot reactions and training. MCAS failure was classified as "MAJOR" (classifications are MINOR, MAJOR, HAZARDOUS, and CATASTROPHIC). MAJOR failures are allowed to occur at ~10-5/hr (for example, 'routine' engine failures are considered MAJOR) - which basically means 'increased crew workload', and redundancy is not required. The regulations regarding such faults haven't materially changed in decades.
In 20-20 hindsight, MCAS should have been classified as at least HAZARDOUS (and probably CATASTROPHIC) - which means probability of occurrence of 10-7/hr (or 10-9 for catastrophic) and require redundancy.
The problem wasn't the cert rules, it was the interpretation of the seriousness of the fault (which, to some extent, was hidden from the FAA).

For the benefit of others, Unicode includes code points for superscripted numerals and 'plus' and 'minus' signs.

10⁺⁻¹²³⁴⁵⁶⁷⁸⁹⁰

So the maximum failure rates can be rendered as:

MAJOR: ~10⁻⁵
HAZARDOUS: ~10⁻⁷
CATASTROPHIC: ~10⁻⁹

The relevant code points are
Superscripted 'plus' sign: U+207A
Superscript 'minus' sign: U+207B
Superscript Left Parenthesis: U+207D ⁽
Superscript Right Parenthesis: U+207E ⁾
Superscript Numeral One: U+00B9
Superscript Numeral Two: U+00B2
Superscript Numeral Three: U+00B3
Superscript Numeral Four: U+2074
Superscript Numeral Five: U+2075
Superscript Numeral Six: U+2076
Superscript Numeral Seven: U+2077
Superscript Numeral Eight: U+2078
Superscript Numeral Nine: U+2079
Superscript Numeral Zero: U+2070

Copying and pasting from this post should work.

[tdracer]

I think it was Winston Churchill who once said :" never trust a statistic you have not manipulated yourself .." or something similar.
Simple example : are Germanwings and Sully's US Air counting as A320 hull losses accidents in that comparison?
Sully, yes (although as a hull loss, not a fatal hull loss since no one died). "Bad Luck" accidents are included, as is blatant crew error.
Germanwings - probably not. The stats specifically exclude intentional acts such as war or terrorism and I suspect pilot suicide would qualify.

[BoeingDriver99]

So stick with the Max statistics alone then. Approximately twice as dangerous as the 100/200. And approximately 15 times as dangerous as the Neo. But I’m sure you’d make another argument that those statistics don’t apply.

Hey ho - I can see where you sit on the issue. Such a shame to see the destruction of such a successful brand.

[MechEngr]

The problem with statistics of small numbers of events is that probabilities based on them have huge problems determining the confidence interval.

It's better to focus on the sequence that led to the accident and identify any places where the same initiator might start onto a different path. Like, before MCAS was involved, why did the last crew do exactly all the opposite things in response to a simple stall warning? Nice day, plenty of visibility, engines running fine. Set pitch and power and go on with the day. Or just concentrate on the autopilot to the exclusion of lowering the thrust until Vmo is exceeded?

What fault in the training allowed the crew the understanding that only autopilot could possibly be the answer to a problem that demanded autopilot be given no authority?

No point on continuing worry over MCAS as that software has been altered to perform a different function, but this won't be the last stall warning a crew gets on an airplane.

[Asturias56]

I think we've thrashed the MAX issue to death elsewhere

[DaveReidUK]

I think we've thrashed the MAX issue to death elsewhere

Yes, here we go again ...

[PEI_3721]

"The problem with statistics of small numbers of events is that probabilities based on them have huge problems determining the confidence …"

Which is why the use of outcome - fatalities, as a measure of safety is of little value in a very safe industry.

Alternatively, risk based safety - reducing the level of risk of harm to an acceptable minimum, considers current activity. The process looks to the future based on what has happened, and what is happening now; neither measure absolute, but a useful a guide for judgement of an uncertain future.

The 737 Max recent history should not be overly projected forward because of the mitigations from modifications.
However, the continuing manufacturing issues involving several types, and the difficulties in providing a quick fix for culture, etc, suggest that there is an increased level of risk which may take time to reduce.
Furthermore, the regulator who should oversee these aspects has suffered similar problems.

Thus the current situation has to be judged relative to the excellent historical record of Boeing aircraft and the industry in general; better than most forms of transport.
Flying is 'safe', and flying in Boeing aircraft is sufficiently comparable with other aircraft not to be concerned relative to other transport activities.
The issue remains about who and how risk based judgements are made:- manufacturing governance, regulator oversight, and the context of presentation - media and personal, human bias.

http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2006/risk,%20freedom%20&%20responsibility.pdf
,,

[Big Pistons Forever]

The problem Boeing has is that any significant accident that has causal factors linked to design or manufacturing failures by Boeing will be an extinction level event for Boeing.

If the door plug had come off at FL360 instead of 16,000 feet the airplane and everybody in would likely have been lost, so only luck saved Boeing on that “quality escape”. There is no question in my mind if the airplane had been lost due to the door plug blow out the MAX would still be grounded and Boeing would be in its death throes.

The “Latest News from Boeing” seems to be missing an understanding and acknowledgement that they are now runway limited. They have used up all their room for maneuver and simply can’t afford another egregious Fu*k Up, therefore immediate steps need to be taken to address the systemic issues in design and production even if it results in a short to medium term hit to profitability and share price.

[GlobalNav]

I don't think that is realistic or even desirable and I say that as as someone who used to work for an aviation regulator. The reality is that the expertise exists in industry not the FAA, especially in this era of rapid technological advancements. The problem was regulatory capture of the ODA by Boeing. That, that was happening should have been obvious to the FAA and they should have taken action.

Eliminating ODA is not the same thing as eliminating delegation. Delegation with appropriate and independent FAA OVERSIGHT has a long successful history, ODA is too rife with the OEM fox watching the chicken coop, with locks to keep the regulator out and busy with paperwork. The FAA executives that allowed and even promoted ODA bear a great deal of blame. You can find them now, retired from FAA, and enjoying lucrative industry jobs.

[MechEngr]

Congress legislates the function of the FAA and oversees the funding of the FAA and has not been providing the funding required to keep the FAA attractive enough to hire enough people skilled enough to do the job they are expected to do.

FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.

I remain unconvinced that FAA would have noticed the potential that pilots would not trim an airplane because the stall warning was sounding at the same time. ODA or not, that problem was going to remain. FAA already accepted that a false stall warning could be sounded and stick shaker enabled when there was no stall.

Greater oversight by the FAA on the factory floor would very likely have called a halt to production out of Spirit a long time ago, avoiding the door departing due to out-of-sequence re-work, but that's a Congressional funding issue for not having enough FAA inspectors vs supporting Boeing and Boeing customers getting the planes sold and used to promote aviation.

Accepting so much discrepant material seems the bigger problem and it seems unreasonable that instead of Boeing inspectors in Wichita they had Spirit re-work teams in Renton.

[tdracer]

FAA has always had a divided charter - to promote the aviation industry and to promote aviation safety. Clearly the FAA cannot do both and be effective at both.


Actually the part about promoting aviation was removed from the FAA charter several years ago.
That being said, the FAA is still obligated to consider the 'cost effectiveness' of its various dictates. For example, if you look at proposed (and issued) Airworthiness Directives, it has a section where it estimates the costs of compliance with the intent of the AD.

I completely agree with Global about the delegation vs. ODA. The FAA has used delegation for many decades (DERs and DARs being just one example). The difference being that a DER reported directly to the FAA (I was a DER for nearly 20 years before Boeing went ODA). DERs were selected by the FAA, and I had an FAA advisor that I could contact whenever I had a question or concern. With ODA, everything had to go through the Boeing compliance office - which not only had little knowledge of the intricacies of Propulsion), I was specifically bared from unilaterally contacting the FAA without going through the Boeing compliance office.
It also dumped far more responsibility on the ARs - along with the potential for 'undo pressure' from management. Personally I never experienced undo pressure as an AR (although, interestingly, I did as a DER - my case actually went into the development of the rules regarding undo pressure when Boeing went ODA) - and even had a Supervisor tell an engine manufacture to stop pressuring me when I raised concerns about functionality of a new FADEC s/w that I was responsible for certifying.
I don't know how much of it was the concept of ODA being fundamentally flawed, and how much was just the horrid Boeing implementation, but many of us raised concerns that the Boeing ODA was flawed and bound to fail.

[Bergerie1]

tdracer, The delegated examining system worked well in Britain back in the 1980s when I was a flight training manager (I have no idea what it is like now). And I always emphasised to the instructors that when, they were conducting pilot tests, they were working on behalf of the CAA and, by extension, the safety of the travelling public.

Equally, when we did CofA air tests on aircraft, we were acting on behalf of the ARB and later the CAA.

Delegation works well so long as the integrity of the process is maintained.

[SLF3]

Seattle times has an interesting response from Boeing to the 787 whistleblower claims. Google ‘Seattle Times Boeing’. Two comments:

Boeing engineer says ‘at normal loads’: I thought the acceptance criteria was ‘good for the design load at end of life’? A much tougher acceptance criteria.

And we are asked to believe Boeing redesigned the assembly process and delayed deliveries, at significant cost, to address a non problem?

This gentlemen may have a point.

[slacktide]

Actually the part about promoting aviation was removed from the FAA charter several years ago.

It was actually several decades ago. Which is why trotting out the old "dual mandate" meme is so tiresome, and marks the person who posts it as ignorant of basic aviation regulation.

It was changed after the ValuJet crash. Remember ValueJet? The Critter? Way back before Y2K and all that? The dual mandate was removed with the passage of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996.

[MechEngr]

I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.

More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.

[W9SQD]

@ MechEngr "More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public."

Your Fox News view of the world is jaundiced.

[MechEngr]

I never watch the pro-Putin, Mudoch news. I'm also skeptical, not jaundiced.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I am not ignorant of aviation, thanks very much. The political reason FAA exists is to reassure the flying public that aircraft and aviation are safe, not primarily to ensure that aircraft are safe. They removed it from the charter as it was a visible conflict of interest, not because they were changing their attitude about it.

More people die in the USA every year under FAA management in GA crashes than in the two 737 MAX crashes. Ever see the FAA demand before Congress more authority to decrease those deaths? Nope. Because makers of general aviation equipment want the public to remain confident in their products and operations and their lobbyists are in Congressional offices. So FAA papers over the flaws and reassures the flying public.

Pretty sure the folks in the parts of the FAA that manage the operations of the NAS would bristle, even if only slightly, at the . . . jaundiced overall indictment of the agency. Beyond that, as the part of the federal interagency that operates the National Airspace System, I think your characterization of its reason for being is incomplete and to that extent at least incorrect.

On whether FAA's role and responsibilities for safety in any and all sectors of aviation in the United States is infected and corrupted by conflict of interest, I'd pay good hard-earned lowly cabdriver money to watch a moderated discussion between someone advocating the viewpoint you articulated about conflict of interest and, say, a recent or current Administrator. Maybe recent would be better, because unconstrained by political static and signals in D.C. (Part of your viewpoint refutes itself. FAA doesn't need or want to "promote" aviation, because the armies of lobbyists have that task list constantly "in work", as you contend.)

Insofar as commercial aviation has an excellent safety record in the United States, why would anyone think FAA needs to reassure the public of something that has become a cliche - flying on an airliner is safer than any other form of transportation. It's a cliche, and it's the truth, too, is it not?

As to GA, what solution would be recommended? No to product liability law reform, or, bring on the trial lawyer bar? Tight up licensing rules so fewer persons who shouldn't be operating an aircraft cannot do so?

Just in case, totally just contingency - anyone who regards you as ignorant is a complete fool.

[waito]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3

One of the witnesses, MIT aeronautics lecturer - - - - - - -, lost his sister when a Boeing 737 Max 8 crashed in Ethiopia in 2019. - - - - commented on the disconnect between Boeing management’s words about safety and what workers observe on the factory floor.

“They hear, ‘Safety is our number one priority,’” he said. “What they see is that’s only true as long as your production milestones are met, and at that point it’s ‘Push it out the door as fast as you can.’” In talking to Boeing workers, - - - - - - said he heard “there was a very real fear of payback and retribution if you held your ground.”

​​​​​​​A second Senate hearing Wednesday will feature a Boeing engineer who claims that sections of the skin on 787 Dreamliner jets are not properly fastened and could eventually break apart.​​​​​​​

​​​​​​​Also scheduled to testify before a Senate investigations subcommittee Wednesday is - - - - - - - , a former manager on the Boeing 737 program. Two other aviation technical experts are on the witness list as well.

And about Boeing statements rejecting some allegations

[WillowRun 6-3]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3 (https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3)

AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.

(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)

[waito]

AP on today Senate hearings https://apnews.com/article/boeing-wh...7cd74b9ea264e3 (https://apnews.com/article/boeing-whistleblowers-safety-senate-hearings-f8354ddddc6372e3337cd74b9ea264e3)

AP article very helpfully includes link to [correction: letter to Boeing CEO from Chair and Ranking Member of Permanent Investigations Subcomm.] - which cites letter to FAA Admin. from Mr. Salehpour's attorney.

(FWIW, any attorney can slap a brief or pleading together but correspondence to official addressees and subject matter of high importance - something of a lost art in most offices, though fortunately for Mr Salehpour, not in his law firm representation.)

Any news from the actual hearing?

[waito]

I seem to have missed Sully's interview on MSNBC from end of March

Capt. ‘Sully’ on Boeing’s aviation safety: ‘They have lost their way’

[BFSGrad]

Any news from the actual hearing?
Today’s hearing available from multiple news sources. This ABC News video seems to be complete. Recommend viewing at 2X speed if you don’t want to waste 100 minutes of your life.

Senate Hearing 4/17/24 - ABC News

[waito]

Today’s hearing available from multiple news sources. This ABC News video seems to be complete. Recommend viewing at 2X speed if you don’t want to waste 100 minutes of your life.


I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances. I speculate:
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.

[tdracer]

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?
The 777X wing is composite, as are several other major structural elements (this going back to the original 777) such as the cabin floor and some of the tail. The fuselage itself is still aluminum but has been redesigned to be 'slimer' structurally so making the inside of the cabin wider (something like six inches IIRC).

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.
For the sake of Boeing (and millions of the traveling public) I hope you're right.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances. I speculate:
He probably was applying metal knowledge and did assume that composite fuselage stress works the same
They initially took it serious but too many experts contradicted him. Even two company engineers (not known what leadership level) came forward to defend it as safe in public.
I think too many people were tired of Sam S. stubborn sticking to the issue although proven wrong.

They then transferred him to the more conventional 777 - wait a minute - is the 777x still conventional, apart from the skin?

For the benefit for him I hope I'm wrong, but this needs to be looked at with open mind, what's the truth.

On the same day, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing on a somewhat more structured (no pun intended) subject. It heard three witnesses, each with qualifications most people would say make them "experts", on the subject of the final report of the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization Expert Review Panel. As anyone following the Boeing saga will know, the Panel was mandated by the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act - the legislation which served as the vehicle for Congressional urges to "do something" after the MAX accidents as well as vehicle for arguably meaningful reforms.

Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis (lecturer at MIT Dep't of Aeronautics and Astronautics);
Dr. Tracy Dillinger (Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, NASA); and
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati (Professor, USC School of Engineering, Aviation Safety and Security Program).
link for Chair Sen. Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.) opening statement:
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/4/cantwell-opening-remarks-at-hearing-with-faa-s-independent-expert-panel-on-boeing-s-safety-culture

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court. I mean, to cut this short without stomping on parts of it to make it fit together, there is no equivalent of obligation to produce all relevant information, and nothing equivalent to cross-examination (partisan rotation of questioning, no, that's not cross).

I won't prejudge the individual whistleblowers' stories on the merits of what they've said and are saying. I will, however, say that their respective recitations depend on their having first painted a picture in which they not only are doing the right thing in the specific situation, and doing it in reasonable ways, but every action taken by company management in response is malevolently directed against them. Sometimes that picture turns out to be true, correct and valid. But it is far from the default setting, and cannot be taken as the default merely by reciting "whistleblower". Perhaps too much paper chasing of billable hours has turned this SLF/attorney cynical (or even, jaundiced).

Whatever the actual facts pertaining to each individual's situation turn out to be, do their stories really add content of significance to what already is known about Boeing's drift away from engineering first and down to bean-counter depths? Is it really new, does it add information not already assimilated into the overall set of facts? I guess we'll find out. The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Blumenthal is for Permanent Investigations, part of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. If this were a dispute between two labor organizations over which one has jurisdiction of the work (the subject matter), I think Senate Commerce and its Aviation Subcomm would win, hands and gavels down. But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points)

[artee]

On the same day, the Senate Commerce Committee held a hearing on a somewhat more structured (no pun intended) subject. It heard three witnesses, each with qualifications most people would say make them "experts", on the subject of the final report of the FAA's Organization Designation Authorization Expert Review Panel. As anyone following the Boeing saga will know, the Panel was mandated by the Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act - the legislation which served as the vehicle for Congressional urges to "do something" after the MAX accidents as well as vehicle for arguably meaningful reforms.

Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis (lecturer at MIT Dep't of Aeronautics and Astronautics);
Dr. Tracy Dillinger (Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, NASA); and
Dr. Najmedin Meshkati (Professor, USC School of Engineering, Aviation Safety and Security Program).
link for Chair Sen. Maria Cantwell (D. Wash.) opening statement:
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/2024/4/cantwell-opening-remarks-at-hearing-with-faa-s-independent-expert-panel-on-boeing-s-safety-culture

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court. I mean, to cut this short without stomping on parts of it to make it fit together, there is no equivalent of obligation to produce all relevant information, and nothing equivalent to cross-examination (partisan rotation of questioning, no, that's not cross).

I won't prejudge the individual whistleblowers' stories on the merits of what they've said and are saying. I will, however, say that their respective recitations depend on their having first painted a picture in which they not only are doing the right thing in the specific situation, and doing it in reasonable ways, but every action taken by company management in response is malevolently directed against them. Sometimes that picture turns out to be true, correct and valid. But it is far from the default setting, and cannot be taken as the default merely by reciting "whistleblower". Perhaps too much paper chasing of billable hours has turned this SLF/attorney cynical (or even, jaundiced).



Whatever the actual facts pertaining to each individual's situation turn out to be, do their stories really add content of significance to what already is known about Boeing's drift away from engineering first and down to bean-counter depths? Is it really new, does it add information not already assimilated into the overall set of facts? I guess we'll find out. The Subcommittee chaired by Senator Blumenthal is for Permanent Investigations, part of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee. If this were a dispute between two labor organizations over which one has jurisdiction of the work (the subject matter), I think Senate Commerce and its Aviation Subcomm would win, hands and gavels down. But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points)
I always appreciate the time you take to follow this stuff, and translate it into something closely related to English for us plebs to understand. :ok:

[waito]

The 777X wing is composite, as are several other major structural elements (this going back to the original 777) such as the cabin floor and some of the tail. The fuselage itself is still aluminum but has been redesigned to be 'slimer' structurally so making the inside of the cabin wider (something like six inches IIRC).

Cabin floor, I remembered but wasn't sure.
So what was Sam S pointing to on the 777? Only on the -x or also on the classic? (I mean 777 classic must have been the pinnacle of safety and reliability in the Boeing fleet, so I'd be surprised)
​​​


For the sake of Boeing (and millions of the traveling public) I hope you're right.
Fair enough.

[waito]

It almost never fails to amaze me how a hearing before a legislative committe can be mistaken for, or viewed as, the equivalent of full fact discovery in civil litigation in federal district court.

Thank you artee for the translatesummary 😉

I noticed as well, the public hearing is more of a confirmation of impressions, and to put pressure to act in a certain way. But if it results in an investigation with taking a look at all facts, that's ok.

[Chronic Snoozer]

But then, over at Senate Commerce, Senator Cantwell and Senator Cruz were in charge of a hearing (see above) with less p.r. drama, just the Expert Texpert Choking Smokers Panel stuff. (name the Beatles song, 50 points) I Am The Walrus.

[waito]

I'm not fully convinced of Sam S. worries regarding 787 fuselage tolerances.

Found another opinion in an NYT articleMr. Salehpour said the shortcuts that he believed Boeing was taking resulted in excessive force being applied to narrow unwanted gaps in the assembly connecting pieces of the Dreamliner’s fuselage. He said that force led to deformation in the composite material, which he said could increase the effects of fatigue and lead to premature failure of the composite.

John Cox, a former airline pilot who runs a safety consulting firm, said that while composites were more tolerant of excess force than metals, it was harder to see that composites had been stressed to the point that they would fail. “They just snap,” he said.

“The catastrophic in-flight breakup, yes, that’s a theoretical possibility,” Mr. Cox said. “That’s why you’d want to have the testing done to preclude that.”

Boeing’s tests are an appropriate step, Mr. Cox said, because “if the degradation goes far enough, that could potentially lead to a catastrophic failure.”

FAA Investigates Claims by Boeing Whistle-Blower About Flaws in 787 Dreamliner - The New York Times (nytimes.com) (https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/09/us/politics/boeing-787-dreamliner-whistle-blower.html)

[kontrolor]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZsUHIGGW7M

Boeing managment, from high to low, should be kicked out and put on trial.

[WillowRun 6-3]

[ no attempted Beatles humor this time ]

The Senate Commerce Committee hearing with three members of the Expert Panel included some very interesting and pertient information. It also includes some uninspired and simplistic (perhaps also essentially pointless) questioning by certain Members of the Committee - but the statements and answers to questions by the three witnesses struck this SLF/attorney as worth the time it took up. The truly expert witnesses are identified with their affiliations in a previous post. Here's the link from C-SPAN:
https://www.c-span.org/video/?534976-1/aviation-safety-specialists-testify-boeing-safety-culture

The Expert Panel report recommended certain actions be required of Boeing in (iirc) six months. FAA Administrator Whitaker chopped that timing down to 90 days, from the date of the final report (February 26). So despite some tedium and less-than-enlightening Senatorial questions, the content of this hearing provides context - imo important context - for the forthcoming 90-day deliverable(s) to FAA. Plus, Senate Commerce leaders have made it clear that the legislation enacted in the aftermath of the MAX accidents will not be the end of the legislative process - further reform or restructuring is under review (even if the incomplete FAA 5-year reauthorization clogs the lawmaking pipeline for now).

Particularly forceful were the comments by Illinois Senator Tammy Duckworth, who chairs the Subcommittee on Aviation Safety, Operations and Innovation. On the odd chance that there may be a few forum folks not enthralled by C-SPAN production values, Sen. Duckworth's turn with the witnesses is relatively early in the 2-hour program.

[Bbtengineer]

There are a few facts left out.
On the preceding Lion Air flight, the crew experienced the MCAS, however they followed Boeing checklist procedure, turned off the stab trim switches and returned for a safe landing.

The crew on the next flight Lion Air flight did not follow the checklist for an uncontrollable stab trim, left the stab trim switches in normal and crashed.

Ethiopian Airlines stated the crew had been trained on the MCAS after the Lion Air crash. However, the crew did not follow proper procedures to place the stab trim switches in cutout. Manual trim was unusable because they left the power levers at TO power and exceeded VNE. The high speed caused high aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer, making manual trim impossible.

This has already been argued to death.

MCAS had far too much authority and not nearly enough input validation.

The fact that the third pilot in the jump seat on the prior Lion Air flight could help successfully manage what the two person crew on the accident flight could not doesn’t invalidate any of that.

BA fixed it.

They didn’t fix it because it didn’t need fixing.

They didn’t have to adjust the design of the airframe when they reduced MCAS authority and that should tell us all we need to know.

If only the control system needed changing, then only the control system was broken to begin with.

I will leave you with Sully Sullenberger’s testimony on MCAS.

"was fatally flawed and should never have been approved."

[HighWind]

If only the control system needed changing, then only the control system was broken to begin with.

Just because it can be fixed in software, does not mean that a software fix to an aerodynamic issue is the right solution to begin with.
When 100+ Maxes has been produced, then fixing the control system becomes the only feasible solution.

MCAS had far too much authority and not nearly enough input validation.

Correct. Before I criticize all the B737’s from the classic (Speed trim), I will mention that the B737 safety statistics is on par with A320. So despite flaws in the architecture, it’s pretty darn safe.
When you give a computer the control of the trim, then you are heading into fly by wire territory. In a FBW system you need more than input validation, you also need to validate the computation (COM/MON), and the function of the actuators (Stuck/runaway).
A well designed FBW system does the fault isolation, and eliminates the need for (some) memory items (And the risk of pilots performing them incorrectly). A badly designed FBW system kills people.

[waito]

The Senate Commerce Committee hearing with three members of the Expert Panel included some very interesting and pertient information.

Thank you for the link. I need to find time watching this.
We as public can't get better insight than this one for the time being.

​​

[waito]

Boeing is one drastic example for the power shift from engineering to accounting (or read: shareholder interests)

I see it in my company. Customer satisfaction is important. That is a given. NO NEED to talk about it. Product quality? We are the best anyway, no doubt about it. NO NEED to talk about.

Meanwhile, 60% of the agenda, discussions, infos are covering cost saving, accounting party tricks, cost distribution, cash flow strategy, stock buyback policy, re-sourcing to cheaper suppliers, lean management, reduce workforce,..., and the ever revolutionary ideas on boosting efficiency.

20% is adjusting self admin rules to align with accounting changes, and 20% of communication covers the product.

Too often a relevant product info only tickles down, as in "four weeks from now we will change the product characteristics, please prepare." Appears as almost accidental. And one week before the change is due.

Usually this is forwarded with a cascade of lean "FYI" comments from management, signalling "dunno if it is important, nothing I can add, you make up your mind."
​​​​​
That's from top to bottom in management. If we outline that product work is degraded, we see shoulders shrugged.

No, I'm not in accounting or administration department.

That's how "safety is our top concern" will be forgotten in the daily business!
​​

[Less Hair]

To me the issue seems to be that certain modern management approaches fail to see the value of many if not most "soft" factors: Customer satisfaction, trust, long term loyalty, employee satisfaction and motivation and such. If it can't be seen in SAP it gets ignored. You can measure and online monitor the time it takes to install every bolt and nut and how much torque got applied but the other soft elements are forgotten.
Plus Boeing had a heavy focus on legal terms and settings with "watertight" contracts, however when supplies still did not arrive on spec and time they were surprised and had to change their leaned down organisation and change processes in a hurry.
The third issue I see is that they reduced their staff, loosing experienced specialist know how in the process while sitting idle in terms of launching new programs for too long. This is why the next program will have to be expensive. New people need to learn their trade from scratch. Look at Airbus for comparison and how they fine tune the A320 over many years: Sharklets, engines, cabin, ACF door arrangements, tanks and center wing box, new flap settings. Step by step they are keeping their teams busy.

[PAXboy]

Less Hair Sums up the process that I saw begin in the mid 1980s, it emerged from the USA and spread to many English speaking countries - possible others too. I was working for an American company at the time, based in the UK with regular visits to HQ and saw what was coming down the track to us. In the UK, the big changes started with the recession of 90/92, after that the money men took over and the focus was away from the product and certainly from the staff.

One of the aspects of outsourcing that, I think, was not understood was this: The promise of outsourcing was that they would deal with all the problems and give you what you wanted. Some staff were transferred to the outsourced company and so their loyalty changed to all of their customers - not to you alone. Other staff, particularly seniors of course, often took the money and walked. More experience left the company. They thought they needed less managing of outsourcing. However, what I saw from the mid 90s onwards was that outsourcing needed to be MANAGED TIGHTLY. Because they now had many customers, it did not matter how important you were. You had screwed them down on price and so they had less to give you.

Boeing has simply hit the usual point of a mature company that was a fat cat and ripe for the picking. Airbus were the new kids on the block that were ignored but, as above, they steadily made their own road. Not least, they started with multiple productions sites and built it up. Boeing tried to do that with the 787 - which was ALSO a complicated new machine. To add to their problems, they were moving their production away - to save money and get subsidies. So they did (at least) three new things at once. That was not going to work out well.

The major problem for Boeing now is that, as this way of financial thinking has been around for 35+ years. This means that EVERYONE now in the system thinks that way. You cannot turn that around fast. It took some 20 years to get fully absorbed and will take at least 10 years to work through the system. That is, if Boeing make the right decisions now.

We have all heard the 'customer safety is our top priority' and variations from every sector of commerce. None of us believe that anymore. Just this week, I had to ring the bereavement department in a UK District Council. Automated phone answer and three levels of 'Press X' before I got to the department. They confirmed that I had to go through that sequence every time. Fantastic. When I worked in local government, we prided ourselves on answering the main phone number fast and dealing with the enormous range of enquiries with experienced and helpful humans.

There are other examples I (and all of us) can quote. When Coke-Cola decided to keep up with the kids and developed New Coke, they were fortunate that it was not at FL380 and they could bin the whole lot.

[pax britanica]

MBA s and management 'Consultants' are at the heart of this fatal corruption in the corporate world. Of course not every aspect of an MBA course nor every consultancy is flawed but overall they imbue the wrong culture and wrong values in technology and safety critical companies.
Some years ago before they were fully established I ended up being booked on Easyjet for the first time, Knowling little about them i checked outt heir corporate page on the internet , CEo CFO VP sales VP marketing etc etc . And of course the usual 'Safety is our first priority.' slogan So, for a laugh i rang them and said I was new to them and could they assure me that I would as safe as flying on BA say.. Oh yes of course, safety is our first priority . Ok sounds good but i have another question, , whats that? -well if safety is your first priority how come no one on the board has that in their title or responsibilit list. End of...

Another example occurred just yesterday, i had to meet someone off a train from London to a major West country station. 2 hours late due to track problems, break downs, lack of drivers usual stuff. When i get to the station there are 8 ticket inspectors (revenue protection personnel) barring the only exit . Quite an intimidating gang actually . No reason why they shouldnt do a random check at that station but was it really wise to demand to see all over again peoples tickets when they were 2 hours late and the company is always whining about staff shortages.
Money before customers every time and it wont change until we get a Tenerife 2 because modern managers do not regard their customers as people , they are just revenue and staff are not valued they are just costs.

[Big Pistons Forever]

The problem is on both sides. The same MBA led behavioural incentives developed in tandem in the regulators. Senior staff with a deep understanding of the issues were replaced by compliant managers that allowed the corporate capture that ensured effective oversight would be neutered.

Demoralized middle level staff then started leaving and were replaced by new hires without the knowledge and experience to know what was important and what wasn’t and brought a tick box mentality to every task.

The sad fact is that the MAX fiasco was probably inevitable, and if it wasn’t the MCAS, some other cheese hole would have lined up.

[Less Hair]

To be fair MBAs and consultants are very important as well. And legal people as well. Many great engineering marvels never made a profit or never saw the market at all. Just look at soviet airliners. But within a certain balance a strong engineering weight is important. And a long term strategy with big investments permitted beyond fearing for the next quarterly figures. It would be perfect to motivate the top people not only by bonuses for having pleased the stock market but maybe more for technical innovation, safety, employee and customer satisfaction, number of new orders coming in etc.

[Twitterati]

I hope Airbus are watching closely when it comes to refreshing the 320!

[PAXboy]

Less Hair you are correct - it is the balance between good work and money that has been lost. Further, in the last 30/35 years, there has been a real return to the stock market as casino. The idea that you invest in a company for the long term is an unknown idea. Remarkable developments in computing and telecommunications means that companies can make money in the tinest slivers of fractions - but, when they all land up, they make a pile. They also remove money from companies that need it. I often see reports that a particular stock is down 'because they did not provide the results that Wall Street expected'. They may have made a good profit and be trading well - but let's dump them to get a fraction more elsewhere.

On another point, PPRuNers may be amused to read the advice for Boeing from Mr O'Leary, as detailed in Fortune magazine:

Ryanair CEO Michael O’Leary shared some words of wisdom on how the aircraft manufacturer should navigate the future of its management.

“The best CEOs and owners are the accountants, the people who do the boring, repetitive, day-to-day delivery, and that’s what you need,” CEO Michael O’Leary told Bloomberg on Wednesday. “They already design great aircraft—you’ve got to make them, but you’ve got to make them on-time and within budget, and that needs accountants.”

He added that so-called accountants have clarity on the vision of a company, while personnel like engineers can lose sight of an overall mission in favor of tweaking what’s not broken.

“It’s like, never put a pilot in charge of an airline,” he said. “They want to buy new shiny toys.”

Right there is the problem of balance. You need the Finance, the Engineering, the Pilots and more to collaborate. He may have made FR successful by being a sole voice - but his business is very different to Boeing. I suggest that his reiteration of the past 35 years of mgmt behaviour adds to the problems.

Fortune Magazine (https://fortune.com/2024/04/24/ryanair-ceo-michael-oleary-boeing-dave-calhoun-faa-earnings-management-advice/?utm_source=search&utm_medium=suggested_search&utm_campaign=search_link_clicks)

[Asturias56]

I've always thought it interesting that the much disliked Michael O'Leary at Ryanair has always kept a focus on safety and and engineering - very early in their growth he approved locating spare engines around the network when, as a real bean-counter you'd have thought he'd have cut spares and centralised.

[ATC Watcher]

We can dislike MOL for his treatment of his staff ( and his Pax ) but on the Training and Safety front they are well above the average and certainly above some mainstream carriers ..including the one of my home country :(

[Bergerie1]

ATC Watcher, I agree. GNSS has its vulnerabilities. We need to keep sufficient alternative methods of navigation alive and active.

[WillowRun 6-3]

An important piece of reporting is published in the edition of Aviation Week dated April 22-May 5. Headlined, "Credibility Crisis", the article reports in some depth about the case Boeing has made publicly as to the safety of the 787 with particular reference to, and emphasis on, the allegations and/or concerns articulated by the whistleblower who testified recently before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Before a summary of key aspects of the AW&ST reporting, a couple of sidebars should be stated. First, and this is based on mere SLF/attorney background - though some of background is in employment law and labor relations - the move by Boeing to South Carolina seems to be a major factor in what has gone wrong in that aseembly plant and its operations. Not only flight away from union representation of the labor force, not only moving out of the historic airplane-building culture of Seattle, but those factors seem pretty evident in the demise of the safety culture - as was testified to in the other Senate Committee hearing (Senate Commerce, with the three membeers of the Expert Panel).

Second, the AW&ST article notes that the whistleblower's attorney's letter to the FAA included various documents. The letter "cited internal Boeing documents - including a white paper from engineers with similar critiques - to support his claims" and the magazine requested copies of such documents but the law firm "did not provide them." One could speculate about various reasons why not, but it would be just speculation. That said, it is quite tempting to say that the law firm representing the whistleblower should make those documents public.

The article's main point is to report on the analysis and evidence Boeing has compiled showing that the assembly of 787 airplanes has not produced any unsafe conditions, in any meaningful context. There was a media briefing given by a "vice-president and chief engineer for mechanical and structural engineering".

As the article reports, extensive examination of in-service airplanes did not reveal any degradation or weakening of the fuselage sections where "joins" are made. Inspections were done at heavy maintenance intervals and extensively of the in-service fleet. (Referring to the article, 980 airframes were built before the gaps/shims problem was discovered and acknowledged; eight have undergone heavy maintaenace checks at the 12-year interval and 671 have been inspected at the six-year interval.) No evidence was found to support the claims made by the whistleblower with regard to long-term degradation of the integrity of the structure.

Significant evidence also was derived from the fatigue test article.

I'm obvioulsy (real obviously, sorry to have to say) not an engineer, so I may not be doing a worthy job of summarizing the article. I do say, as a sometime-vocal critic of Boeing, anyone who cares about the "latest Boeing news" - whether to contribute to restoring the once-preeminent engineering powerhouse or to helping it slide into oblivion - owes it to a decent sense of intellectual honesty to read the article.

Though Boeing has significant heavy lifting to do to restore a meaninful safety culture (don't take my word for it, take it from the Section 103 Expert Panel), that imperative does not equate to this specific whistleblower's substantive claim about airframe structures being correct. I'll be happy to stand corrected (or, in equivalent terms, to return to my seat and fasten my . . . ) if it is shown the article does not actually establish that his claims (about the structure, not about the lack of safety culture) are incorrect. And if they are in fact incorrect, well . .. it would be pedantic to divert into points about the employment law principles and process. But that said, perhaps it isn't so curious after all why his attorneys did not file a retaliation claim with the Department of Labor (which, as all know, other whistleblowers did file).

[waito]

Thank you WillowRun 6-3 for this great summary. I assume we can't access that article online, so you took the burden to list the key facts?

​​​​​​Recently I read the signs and also "wasn't fully convinced" of the issues with the aft fuselage structure. This is another sign.

While these 6 and 12 years checks (C and D checks I assume) could suffer from missing practical experience with carbon fiber composites assessment, at least with the combination Boeing and the fuselage proportions and connection method...

​​​​​​... the fatique test should tell a lot about the level of degradation for this very circumstances. Depending on the test methods and test circumstances of course. Engineer Sam S, the whistleblower, complained that he never received those details after he requested them. Maybe that's why he sticks to his assessment. Like when the tests in reality had been the initial program structure tests with perfect tolerances, which did not consider out of tolerance gaps and "brutal methods" to make it fit. These would be a rather doubtful assessment in this case.

But I have now even more the feeling that experts could focus on the other issues first without missing much.

Just my humble opinion, with room for improvement.

[tdracer]

An important piece of reporting is published in the edition of Aviation Week dated April 22-May 5. Headlined, "Credibility Crisis", the article reports in some depth about the case Boeing has made publicly as to the safety of the 787 with particular reference to, and emphasis on, the allegations and/or concerns articulated by the whistleblower who testified recently before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations.

Before a summary of key aspects of the AW&ST reporting, a couple of sidebars should be stated. First, and this is based on mere SLF/attorney background - though some of background is in employment law and labor relations - the move by Boeing to South Carolina seems to be a major factor in what has gone wrong in that aseembly plant and its operations. Not only flight away from union representation of the labor force, not only moving out of the historic airplane-building culture of Seattle, but those factors seem pretty evident in the demise of the safety culture - as was testified to in the other Senate Committee hearing (Senate Commerce, with the three membeers of the Expert Panel).

I'm not sure I put much stock in the 'lack of union workforce' drumbeat (especially since much of that drumbeating seems to be originating with the IAM Union).
Two factors to keep in mind - prior to 2020 (i.e. Covid), roughly half of the 787's were assembled in Everett by the IAM. Despite claims by the union to the contrary, there is scant evidence that the Everett built 787s were of better quality than those made in South Carolina.
Second, all the 737 and 767-2C/KC-46 are assembled in the Puget Sound area by IAM union labor. It's not like those have been without issues....

[WillowRun 6-3]

I'm not sure I put much stock in the 'lack of union workforce' drumbeat (especially since much of that drumbeating seems to be originating with the IAM Union).
Two factors to keep in mind - prior to 2020 (i.e. Covid), roughly half of the 787's were assembled in Everett by the IAM. Despite claims by the union to the contrary, there is scant evidence that the Everett built 787s were of better quality than those made in South Carolina.
Second, all the 737 and 767-2C/KC-46 are assembled in the Puget Sound area by IAM union labor. It's not like those have been without issues....

I'll (always) defer to better-informed posters.

It may be a case of the S.C. plant being the source of two prominent whistleblowers and (given Steelworkers roots in this SLF/atty) maybe IAM claims have sounded especially strong. Also, in prior threads, iirc going back even before Lion Air, the move to S.C. was attributed to non-union workforce goals by various posters. (and possibly were given too much credence).

I scanned the AW&ST article again now, twice, and there is no discussion of S.C. airframes as compared to airframes assembled in Everett. I think the reporting is not based on one plant being more of a problem than the other.

waito: thanks for acknowledging the post.
And I'm pretty sure the article is published as subscription-paywall. There's also a Check 6 podcast but don't know how available it is.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Was the fatigue testing done on a fuselage with the specific fault ? That is one with the excessive gaps present?

The fatigue characteristics of riveted aluminum structures are very well understood, however all composite structures are quite new. I would be interested in hearing from a structures expert on how well these types of structures resistance to degradation can be evaluated.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I apologize in advance to the AW&ST interests for quoting from behind the paywall, but it's an important issue. I'll let the well-informed interpret this section on the fatigue testing. (The person quoted is the vp and chief engineer etc as noted previously.)

In-service reviews of the oldest and most used airframes underpin results from tests done early in the program to validate the 787’s design—tests that unknowingly trialed production flaws discovered years later.
“The most impactful data is the data that we got from our full-scale fatigue test,” Chisholm said. “The build condition [was] the same as what we saw in the later build.”
Put another way, the same nonconformances that crept into the first 980 aircraft were present in the fatigue test article. While the revelation does not reflect well on Boeing’s original quality assurance process, it bolsters the argument that its design—including material selection and tolerances—is robust.
“In over 165,000 cycles, there were zero fatigue issues in the composite structure,” Chisholm said.
The tests, which began in September 2010 on ZY998, the third 787 airframe built, ran through 2015 and simulated entire flights, from taxi through ascent, cruise, descent and back to taxi (AW&ST Dec. 21, 2015-Jan. 3, 2016, p. 51). Targeted at creating a dataset for the airframe’s durability, the
tests subjected the structure to loads that simulated more than 3.6 times the design life of 44,000 flight cycles.
Testing was conducted in a steel rig weighing more than 1 million lb. at the Boeing manufacturing plant in Everett, Washington. The rig included more than 100 mechanical connections to push, pull and twist the 182-ft.-long fuselage, wing forward leading edge and vertical stabilizer. The 787 structure incorporated over 3,000 sensors that evaluated more than 40 million discrete load conditions as the airframe was subjected to shear forces, bending moments and torsion loads typically experienced during five flight conditions ranging from benign to extremely turbulent.
Although some parts failed over the course of testing, they were all metallic. Components and parts that cracked or failed prematurely included a metal bearing pad in the main landing-gear support structure and tie-rod end lug and support fittings. There were no catastrophic failures during the test, Boeing adds.
The fatigue-test airframe incorporated additional sen￾sors along the side-of-body wingbox joint, which was reinforced after earlier static tests revealed weakness in the area. The redesign, which pushed back first flight of the 787 to December 2009, was validated in static tests the previous month and later incorporated into ZY998. Compared with fatigue tests on earlier metallic airframes, the 787 test unit included more sensors on various stiffener terminations and more extensive periodic inspections than required by the baseline maintenance program.
Average 787 utilization is about 600 cycles per year, Boe￾ing said. The busiest aircraft operate 900-1,400 cycles annually, Aviation Week Network Fleet Discovery data show. The highest-time 787, an All Nippon Airways 787-8, has flown 16,500 cycles in its 11-year service life.
The 44,000-cycle life expectancy is reflected in the extent of the 787 tests compared with previous fatigue tests on conventional aluminum-built airframes, such as the 777, which completed the then-record number of 120,000 simulated cycles in 1997. This represented the equivalent of 60 years in operation or twice the 777’s design service objective (DSO) of 60,000 flights. The DSOs of the 787 and 777 have both been significantly extended beyond previous generations, such as the 757 and 767, which underwent fatigue tests simulating 100,000 flights, or twice a 20-year DSO of 50,000 flights.
_______________________________________________________

[Commander Taco]

Have a listen to the Aviation Week “Check 6” podcast of April 19. It provides an excellent explanation of what the whistleblower’s allegations are all about, as well as the challenges of composite construction.

[waito]

The podcast is available to anybody, along with transcript. Good insight.

WR63:excellent.

Disclaimer: I'm Electric Engineer with no experience in the matter I discuss here. It's just a superficial opinion from someone with technical backgrounds.

IMO almost all is addressed by Boeing. Especially the fatigue test over 5 years and simulating 3x the maximum life cycles, was done with an also imperfect fuselage with exceeding the tolerances.

Also IMO, the remaining issue is the suspected overforcing of the composites for measurement of gaps in production. Causing possible microcracks, and causing possible gaps out of tolerance when finally assembled with lower force. This was not simulated in the fatigue test as far as I know.

There's no perfect experience with all that on the free market that we can hope to get a verdict easily.

I assume the fuselage issues form a lower risk than most people expect. It's not an urgent issue. The question is, can they detect individual cracks in time on the ["overbent" and "overgapping"] fuselages in time? Does it help to buy back an older airframe with this known condition and perform an accelerated fatigue test?

[ATC Watcher]

First disclaimer :I am not an composite specialist not engineer, but I fly composite gliders since 50 years, and I even own one now. I do not do the heavy maintenance on it but the regular 25h/50h and annual ones. Unlike in aluminium Cracks in standard composite ( e.g. fibreglass) are easily detectable and easily repairable. On the other hand Carbon composites does not pre-crack, it normally shatters in one go. no warning. , hence a strict G- limits and a non-extensible shelf life.
I read somewhere that , unlike many other parts, the 787 fuselage is made of : " carbon laminate composite" , . so my guess is the force (i.e. how many Gs " were used to force the parts in place) was probably under its limits otherwise it would have shattered. Immediately.
But waiting for specialists to comment..

[MechEngr]

The way fatigue cracks propagate through metal is very different from the way damage accumulates in composites. In particular, fatigue cracks in metal form and progress at very small stress loads - 10% or less of the maximum yield load**. The cracks start at some tiny mismatch in grain structures and, because the crack is into metal crystals, the size of the front edge of the crack is as little as a single atom in size, causing a huge stress concentration.

I think composites tend to fail from separation of the fibers from the matrix (usually epoxy for carbon fiber.) The usual final failure is by rupture of the fibers from the matrix which is usually rather explosive as the fibers can store a lot of energy from the combination of strength and elasticity, but the composite can accumulate damage with even the smallest loads, a characteristic shared with aluminum.

For much more about composite fatigue failure than is suitable to type here see Principal Features of Fatigue and Residual Strength of Composite Materials Subjected to Constant Amplitude (CA) Loading (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6720546/), section 2.5. The Hierarchy of Damage. It's an NIH report and mostly technical, but the 2.5 section gives a good overview.

**I have seen metal parts that failed in use where more than 90% of the original material had succumbed to the fatigue crack and only 10% or less remained to be twisted loose; a load that was very small compared to the strength capacity of the undamaged part.

[waito]

Maybe you are talented and knowing people - is it worth to open a separate special thread on this composite fuselage - shimming issue to take a detailed look? I could jump start by collecting relevant infos, but I need to stay out of technical conclusions.

[Hot 'n' High]

Is the latest whistleblower proven at least partially incorrect?

WR 6-3, always interesting to see your views and excellent assessments! :ok: I guess my only thought on this is that we really have 2 questions here:-

(1) Has the use of these practice on the joints caused a safety issue with the affected airframes? Maybe not - an engineering decision required there but it seems Boeing (and others) think not.

The other arguably more important question is:-

(2) Was this technique an approved, formally safety assessed method of build documented by Boeing? Well, I think the answer is "no". This being the case, how many other non-documented, non-approved practices are taking place across all the company assembly lines? This latter point links nicely with the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 where it increasing looks like poor/undocumented work (for possibly a number of reasons) took place leading to the loss of the door plug in flight.

So, Boeing may be able to "prove" (1) is not an issue ....... but, in many ways, (2) is the far more serious question. Answering that one will be exceedingly difficult for Boeing to prove. And I'm sure other manufacturers will be using this as an opportunity to look critically at their own production lines. This last point is a very positive spin-off from Boeing's woes.

Anyway, just a thought........ :ok:

[KCode]

While the technical issue appears to have had a thorough and satisfactory engineering assessment, the cultural aspects remain unanswered. Per Hudson, Reason et al, trust must be in place before effective communication takes place. Had the whistleblower trusted that his concerns would be addressed through company channels, it is unlikely to have been escalated to a Congressional Hearing. The 103 report indicates that there is Management/worker diconnect on safety culture, SMS and safety initiatives.

[oceancrosser]

I was in AMS yesterday. On the stand beside us was a KLM 787-10, which is probably less than 3 years old. As I was doing the walkaround of my airplane, I noticed the sun reflecting off the blue color on the upper fuselage. And the fuelage surface looked pretty uneven all over. More so than with any aluminum airplane. Also the fuselage join where the AFT (Section 47) meets the MID (section 46) was really well noticeable. Something I have not noticed on other airplanes. Seems to my pilot eye, the Boeing method of making composite fuselages does not lend itself to making super even and smooth surfaces.
I have no idea whether I would see the same on an A350…

[SRMman]

Was the fatigue testing done on a fuselage with the specific fault ? That is one with the excessive gaps present?

The fatigue characteristics of riveted aluminum structures are very well understood, however all composite structures are quite new. I would be interested in hearing from a structures expert on how well these types of structures resistance to degradation can be evaluated.

In my time I have worked in and around metallic and composite aircraft structures, and also have some knowledge of fatigue testing for certification. I’d be very surprised if the fatigue specimen, whether it be a component or complete fuselage/wing assembly, was not built exactly to drawing. I agree that a composite structure behaves very differently to metallic, but nevertheless the fatigue test is the baseline at entry into service for the aircraft Maintenance/Inspection Program. Whilst the Program is initially conservative to account for unknowns and some build variability, the assumption is that production structure is built to drawing.

Deliberate deviation from drawing during manufacture, fitting, assembly, which obviously would include use of excessive force, missing/incorrect size shims, takes the component or structure into unknown territory and not covered by the pre-certification testing.

[Commander Taco]

Deliberate deviation from drawing during manufacture, fitting, assembly, which obviously would include use of excessive force, missing/incorrect size shims, takes the component or structure into unknown territory and not covered by the pre-certification testing.
That forms the basis of the whistleblower’s allegations. As a post-production engineer with responsibility to ensure that the finished product meets both the pre-production build and the pre-production certified standard, he alleges that the aircraft do not meet those requirements.

[WillowRun 6-3]

That forms the basis of the whistleblowers allegations. As a post-production engineer with responsibility to ensure that the finished product meets both the pre-production build and the pre-production certified standard, he alleges that the aircraft do not meet those requirements.

Given the allegations, is it possible to determine whether they are consistent with, or not consistent with, the analysis and evidence reported by Aviation Week in the article and the podcast? The reporting is based on inputs provided by Boeing; if their source is a reason to doubt those inputs are complete or even accurate, then it still is "information" as reported by the magazine. Though a less certain determination, are the allegations consistent with this information or not?

FAA presumably will reply to the letter filed by Mr Salehpour's attorneys. But until then . . .

Also given the content of various posts following the one in which I summarized the AW&ST article, the refusal to release the documents that were filed with FAA together with the attorney's letter now seems even more difficult to understand. The predicate for the hearing before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations - where the whistleblower testified - was that (paraphrasing) the American people have a right and/or need to know if these airplanes are safe. On what basis are the American people being told to ponder this question with only part of the relevant information? Is it because once FAA completes its review, the entire filing will be made public?

[MechEngr]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next. I know from aircraft radar development projects I was on, there was no way to afford to test every extreme tolerance excursion, but everything had a factor of safety; the main structure was capable of resisting 30 Gs and then some for margin.

The question bridges between if it met the certified configuration and if the deviations were run through engineering to confirm the result would meet the original requirement. Either should be acceptable.

[waito]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next.
I understood, from the sources WillowRun and Commander Taco mentioned, that this was already done meanwhile, and deviation approved. But I'm not sure what exactly I read.
EDIT: I found it. Not sure if I interpret it right. See in there:

I'll open I opened a tech deep dive thread (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/658885-tech-deep-dive-boeing-787-fuselage-shimming-issues.html) and jump start with a key facts collection from these articles and that expert podcast.

[SRMman]

This would ordinarily be handled by going to the FAA first, but it will probably go there next. I know from aircraft radar development projects I was on, there was no way to afford to test every extreme tolerance excursion, but everything had a factor of safety; the main structure was capable of resisting 30 Gs and then some for margin..

As I recall, the aircraft I was involved with, or at least the wings, in the static test had to meet a limit load of 2.5 G (without deformation); that was supposed to be the maximum load ever likely to be experienced by any aircraft in the life of the fleet. On top of that a factor of safety of 1.5, equivalent to a total load (Ultimate Load) of 3.75 G was applied to the test specimen (once!), which it had to sustain for a short period; permanent deformation was permitted as I recall. There are youtube videos of such structures undergoing these loads, ending with spectacular results!

[MechEngr]

Moved myself from other thread:

The " Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act" falls into the weird zone. It doesn't prevent errors, it simply adds another stick to beat people with. Mostly, if an unexpected thing happens, then it can be claimed it happened because the organization failed to follow the generalized, non-specific, requirements. And then there are requirements that likely won't help.

For example:

(d) Safety Reporting Program.—The regulations issued under subsection (a) shall require a safety management system to include a confidential employee reporting system through which employees can report hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents. A reporting system under this subsection shall include provisions for non-punitive reporting of such items by employees in a manner consistent with other confidential employee reporting systems administered by the Administrator. Such regulations shall also require a certificate holder described in subsection (a) to submit a summary of reports received under this subsection to the Administrator at least twice per year.

The complaint at hand was that the "hazards, issues, concerns, occurrences, and incidents" and the claim is the reporting was ignored. The anonymity would not make the reporting more effective - whatever defects are being reported would remain if anonymously reported - and the reporter would then still have the dilemma of whether or not to stay in a position they are unable to affect vs. being moved to some other position where they can also not affect the outcome, just as when they are identified.

Make the system: A system of anonymous reporting to the FAA for which the FAA has to extract answers and report to Congress within 30 days of receipt.

Why not? Because Congress doesn't want the burden of reviewing the FAA work and certainly won't allocate funds to create, manage, or man this effort. On top of that, it would put Congress in the chain of accountability. Being anonymous, one could set up a campaign of hundreds of false complaints every month, week, or day in order to bring the company, the FAA, and Congressional oversight to their knees. If such harassment reporting can be traced, then it's not truly anonymous.
Moved from the other thread:

(e) Code Of Ethics.—The regulations issued under subsection (a) shall require a safety management system to include establishment of a code of ethics applicable to all employees of a certificate holder, including officers, which clarifies that safety is the organization’s highest priority.

A longtime favorite. If a person is unethical then a Code of Ethics won't change that. Pressed too hard as a priority and it moves to being background noise that even ethical people won't pay any attention to. They can remain ethical, but the campaign is an irritation, as if they cannot be trusted.
---
For a law firm representing a whistle blower the main weapon I would expect them to use is the offer to sign an NDA in exchange for a large settlement. Unless the client wants otherwise, I would expect that of any damages litigation. The lack of publication isn't surprising.

2)

If the plaintiff wants to release the information, Wikileaks is available as are Google Docs.

In response to "strawman" then what happens to an item on a plane that is near delivery and they wait 6 months to deal with the complaint? How long was the door unsecured from the factory?

[BlankBox]

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-taps-debt-market-raise-10-billion-sources-2024-04-29/

Boeing taps debt market to raise $10 billion, sources say

April 29 (Reuters) - Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab on Monday tapped debt markets to raise $10 billion, after the U.S. planemaker burned $3.93 billion in free cash during the first quarter as production of its best-selling jet declined, sources familiar with the matter said.
Boeing shares rose 3.4% after the successful sale. Ratings agencies last week slashed the outlook on Boeing's credit to just above "junk" status. On Monday, both assigned ratings nearing junk to Boeing's new senior unsecured notes, with S&P assigning a BBB- rating and Moody's a Baa3 rating.


​​​​​​​Maybe all that burned buyback cash would come in handy now?

[Lonewolf_50]

Boeing has finalised an agreement with GKN Aerospace to integrate its St. Louis site under Boeing's wing. The agreement helps secure the future of key aircraft programmes and ensures workforce job continuity. The deal, completed in partnership with GKN Aerospace and its parent company, Melrose Industries, guarantees the continuation of essential parts manufacturing for the F/A-18 and F-15 programmes.
Boeing immediately assumes control of GKN's St. Louis site, integrating its operations into its own. Moreover, the transition ensures job security for approximately 550 employees previously employed by GKN, who will now become part of Boeing's workforce. The US, which is still in the process of acquiring the F-35 Lightning II multirole fighter aircraft, has also considered procuring the F-15X multirole fighter aircraft in small volumes to supplement its fleet of F-35 aircraft and maintain fleet diversity, according to GlobalData's "The Global Military Fixed Wing Aircraft Market 2023-2033 (https://www.globaldata.com/store/report/military-fixed-wing-aircraft-market-analysis/)" report.

Steve Parker, senior vice president and chief operating officer of Boeing Defense, Space & Security, emphasised the broader impact of the agreement, stating, "This agreement allows us to not only deliver for our customers but also gives the highly skilled GKN workforce the opportunity to bring their immense talents to bear in support of the warfighter and the St. Louis defence and aerospace industry. This is a win-win-win for those employees, Boeing, and the broader Saint Louis community." For what it's worth. I'd need to look but I suspect a bit of MD connection in there somewhere.

[MechEngr]

GKN had bought the site from Boeing in 2001, so this is just a return to the previous ownership status.

[MK 4A Tank]

Second Boeing whistleblower dies in less than two months (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-nz/news/national/second-boeing-whistleblower-dies-in-less-than-two-months/ar-AA1o0rED?ocid=msedgntp&pc=LCTS&cvid=389ae4c536854e8eab3c99fd25543636&ei=18)

[MechEngr]

MRSA was the initiator for causing his death.

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus Bacteria. See https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mrsa/symptoms-causes/syc-20375336 for details.

Not a doctor but it looks to me like it's one of those infections where the early symptoms can be taken as a "no big deal," like many other infections can be, and progress to "near to death" far more quickly than the infected person expects.

For transmission they list, among others, skin to skin contact as happens for wrestlers, so it's not a disease limited to the already unhealthy, but it can certainly take advantage.