Airbus Within 6ft of the Ground nearly 1 mile Short of Runway

[Youmightsaythat]

An Airbus 320 with 172 passengers and 6 crew came within 6ft of the ground when nearly a mile short of Paris CDG airport. In the report, released yesterday by the French Investigation Organisation BEA, it was confirmed French ATC repeatedly gave the wrong pressure setting (QNH) to the flight crew, but the correct setting to an Air France aircraft, in French. The first hole in a cheese riddled with holes.

https://pullingwingsfrombutterflies.com/common-aeronautical-language-part-duex

[paulross]

Link to the preliminary BEA report [PDF] (https://bea.aero/fileadmin/user_upload/BEA2022-0219_9H-EMU_preliminary_report_for_publication_EN_finalise.pdf)

[DaveReidUK]

An Airbus 320 with 172 passengers and 6 crew came within 6ft of the ground when nearly a mile short of Paris CDG airport. In the report, released yesterday by the French Investigation Organisation BEA, it was confirmed French ATC repeatedly gave the wrong pressure setting (QNH) to the 'Air Sweden' Airbus, but the correct setting to an Air France aircraft, in French. https://pullingwingsfrombutterflies.com/common-aeronautical-language-part-duex

Notwithstanding the references to "Air Sweden", the flight was operated by Maltese/Lithuanian carrier Airhub Airlines on an ACMI lease.

[FlightDetent]

9 seconds between minima and TOGA.

Learning point #1.

[Uplinker]

Thank goodness they somehow escaped a horrible CFIT.

I didn't see in the BEA report whether the crew had listened to the ATIS and written it down on a 'bug card'. Nor if they had set the ATIS QNH on the PIC altimeter, and then returned PIC altimeter to standard pressure. Both were SOP in airlines I flew with.

When instructed by ATC to change to QNH, a cross-check is made that this agrees with the ATIS figure obtained previously. It would appear that the easyJet nearby had cross-checked the ATIS, because they read back the correct QNH.

Odd that the RAD ALT did not make any call outs, and strange that both crew apparently did not notice what must have been low RAD ALT readings, turning to amber on their PFDs at DH + 100'. Or maybe they did and the amber readout is what saved them?

And presumably GPWS did not call out because their rate of descent was not excessive, on a 3° approach, (mode 1), they were in landing configuration, (mode 4), and there was no glide-slope, (mode 5)?

I am wondering how 1001 and 1011 are spoken in French by French ATC; 'mille une' and 'mille onze' perhaps? instead of 'une zero zero une' or 'une zero une une'. This could have led to confusion in the ATCs mind; not realising the mistake when translating to English.
.

[oceancrosser]

Airhub Airlines… a subsidiary of Getjet Airlines. So a cheaper subsidiary of the cheapest… what could go wrong?
Operating for Norwegian… is that still going on?

[alf5071h]

From the initial report:- “Particular attention will be given, but not limited, to the analysis of the following points: - non-activation of TAWS alert, …”

Which ‘TAWS’ system (generic term) is fitted to this version (age) of aircraft, EGPWS or TAWS ?

[Max Angle]

A clear demonstration of the inherent danger of NPAs, whether conventional or RNP, compared to an ILS, you are reliant on a pressure setting to define your vertical profile. The aviation world is making, in my opinion, an unwise rush backwards in safety with the proliferation of new RNP approaches that may look all shiny and new but have the same flaws as older NPA's. In some ways it is worse as we have inconsistent terminology and procedures between various organisations, states, manufactures and airlines, they have all combined to make it a bit of a mess.

[A320LGW]

From experience ATC are usually hot on picking you up for minor altitude deviations. How did no one query why these guys were flying 300ft below their assigned altitude before beginning their approach?

[DaveReidUK]

How did no one query why these guys were flying 300ft below their assigned altitude before beginning their approach?

If it helps, at no point after leaving FL360 were they in level flight.

[DIBO]

I am wondering how 1001 and 1011 are spoken in French by French ATC; 'mille une' and 'mille onze' perhaps? instead of 'une zero zero une' or 'une zero une une'. This could have led to confusion in the ATCs mind; not realising the mistake when translating to English..I've done it only once in French (non-native French speaker) a long time ago with a small ATC unit, and then it was 'by the (french) book': 1001 unité zéro zéro unité / 1011 unité zéro unité unité. But wouldn't be surprised that at busy CDG the faster and less tongue breaking 'mille et un' / 'mille et onze' are used

[MPN11]

As a former (Mil) ATCO, I find that simply atrocious. Wrong QNH passed? QNH read backs missed? Approach Lights not ON in foul weather? And the 'traditional' dual-language scenario?

God was clearly on the side of 178 people on this occasion, albeit by the smallest of margins.

[Equivocal]

That report makes rather startling reading with so many, some arguably minor, errors which very nearly led to the loss of the aircraft. My background is ATC and I am many years out of operational work, but the description of the ground-based aspects of this event are quite frightening to me. I may be living in a rose-tinted world when I think back to my operational days but I can't help thinking that almost every aspect of the event would have rung alarm bells - particularly the MSAW alert which I am sure would have had everyone running around double-checking the QNH in my day. And the idea that at 6ft RA there was no visual reference from the aircraft suggests that the weather (even the localised conditions included in the METAR) was less good than reported.

[AndiKunzi]

They used LNAV/VNAV minima and obviously had no GP?

[MissChief]

On the first approach, why did the PF not engage TOGA and thereby initiate to go-around as soon as the aircraft reached the indicated MDA? (It appears not from the diagrams above).

And why did the PF disengage the autopilot when finally initiating the go-around? That is not a standard procedure.

And it is hard to imagine that no "minimums" call was not made by PM as well as called by the relevant audio system on the A320.

Nor any EGPWS warning? All sounds a little bit fabricated.

[compressor stall]

If it helps, at no point after leaving FL360 were they in level flight.
they would likely have been after the go around manoeuvring for approach #2.

[WhatShortage]

They used LNAV/VNAV minima and obviously had no GP?
You have a brick telling you whether you are good or not from the rwy threshold so yeah, you do have a "glide path", that "obviously" was not so obvious after all ;)

[DaveReidUK]

they would likely have been after the go around manoeuvring for approach #2.

Well, yes - for avoidance of doubt, I was referring to the absence of level segments in the descent between cruise and the GA, in response to the point raised in the post preceding mine.

[fdr]

9 seconds between minima and TOGA.

Learning point #1.
Hmmm,

On peut dire que le fromage a failli toucher le ventilateur!

Les passagers ont droit à une visite panoramique de Roissy-en-france, sans supplément, vous êtes les bienvenus.
Vous revenez maintenant, vous entendez !

... et prendre un taxi peut être si pénible à CDG, les pilotes de l'avion étaient serviables.

au revoir

[fdr]

Thank goodness they somehow escaped a horrible CFIT.

I didn't see in the BEA report whether the crew had listened to the ATIS and written it down on a 'bug card'. Nor if they had set the ATIS QNH on the PIC altimeter, and then returned PIC altimeter to standard pressure. Both were SOP in airlines I flew with.

When instructed by ATC to change to QNH, a cross-check is made that this agrees with the ATIS figure obtained previously. It would appear that the easyJet nearby had cross-checked the ATIS, because they read back the correct QNH.

Odd that the RAD ALT did not make any call outs, and strange that both crew apparently did not notice what must have been low RAD ALT readings, turning to amber on their PFDs at DH + 100'. Or maybe they did and the amber readout is what saved them?

And presumably GPWS did not call out because their rate of descent was not excessive, on a 3° approach, (mode 1), they were in landing configuration, (mode 4), and there was no glide-slope, (mode 5)?

I am wondering how 1001 and 1011 are spoken in French by French ATC; 'mille une' and 'mille onze' perhaps? instead of 'une zero zero une' or 'une zero une une'. This could have led to confusion in the ATCs mind; not realising the mistake when translating to English.
.

It is remarkable that in the 21st century, my ipad and iphone have greater system safety than the airspace design and procedures we follow. Down in the weeds, a C145 GPS system will give reliably geometric height above the real world, without the issues of metric, french, or JFK's rapid fire info, and in the end the only information that we want is the absolute height at that point, the reason that we consider cold temperature corrections going into Nome, Bismark, or Ulan Bator...

The RALT should certainly have been giving the auto callouts, unless it is another Air Inter type deal where the "GPWS was not needed, as we don't make mistakes", until chopping off the tops of trees and the bottom of the plane and pax in the hills.

Not pretty. Any 5-G nearby?

[FlightDetent]

BTW GetJet had some funny evolutions at MAD with a 737 as well.


fdr not sure what you mean. I was somewhat shocked the reaction at DDA=MDH+50 did not arrive. Unlike many other strange manoeuvres where I think - okay, they should know but no one really trains to proficiency on that - a simple absence of vis ref at decision was, I assumed, a wholly resolved issue since over two decades ago.

I can't fix or avoid the ATC mistakes on the next sector, but I better be sure to act faster on the throttles than 9 seconds.

observation 2, they call-sign was Red Nose xx11. Can't train the brainfarts out of humans, there goes the ATC's "1011" and a bit of understanding of the crew of not picking that up immediately.

Strangely they re-set it, whereas the Airbus has the means to pre-select QNH in 3 separate boxes before descent. A more conventional failure mode would be not to notice the instructed value was any different from the briefed one, so to speak make a second error which would negate the first one.

[The FUB]

"FAF altitude checks, MAP set."

Gross error of altimeter QNH should be evident.

[FlightDetent]

MSN 1087 / manufactured 1999. Not great, not critical.

additionally: Some bravely older A320 with QFE option need to set MDH (!) to the minima prompt when flying VNAV approach on QNH, in order to avoid undue AP disconncect. Some of the values just don't link properly inside the FMS. Another effect of that is the RA callout '100 above' and 'minumum' is also unuseable / missing (not rembeber which one).

Some operators "in the region of the parent AOC" believed that flying mixed configuration was prone to pilots getting overreliant on the auto-callouts and in turn presented a large risk on an old ship as explained above where no radio callouts would come. The solution was to deactivate the auto callouts on all airplanes for minima and 100 above in an attempt to drill the crews into observing the altimeters at all times.

Was this crew perhaps not ingrained with synthetic callouts from their previous life, so a deactivated (if) missing audio removed a useful trigger for them to GA swiftly?
Did the PM call Approaching and Minima at all?
What sort of ACMI suppliers do Norwegians hire (Go2sky non-RTO story, anyone)?
Is the EGPWS TCF not capable of picking this one?

Why cannot we yet, pretty please, get a rough GPS-alt vs. Baro-alt comparator for gross errors? In a form of "CHECK QNH REFERENCE" ??? Come on, it's 2022!

[A320LGW]

The incident at MAD was with Klasjet, not Getjet. Though they both belong to the aviasolutions group with questionable business practices.

As for level flight. Fair enough if they had no level offs below TL initially. After the GA though there was as someone has mentioned. I'd expect ATC to pick this 300ft deviation up and query it. But then again I'm not a controller ...

[paulross]

That report makes rather startling reading with so many, some arguably minor, errors which very nearly led to the loss of the aircraft. My background is ATC and I am many years out of operational work, but the description of the ground-based aspects of this event are quite frightening to me. I may be living in a rose-tinted world when I think back to my operational days but I can't help thinking that almost every aspect of the event would have rung alarm bells - particularly the MSAW alert which I am sure would have had everyone running around double-checking the QNH in my day. And the idea that at 6ft RA there was no visual reference from the aircraft suggests that the weather (even the localised conditions included in the METAR) was less good than reported.

It does seem that ATC became aware that there was a problem and acted at the time. From page 4 of the report:"At 11:42:27 the LOC N controller switched ON the approach lights. Following the MSAW and the omission of switching ON the approach lights, the LOC N was replaced by his LOC-N assistant and a new LOC-N assistant took over."

The report also states (page 12) the expected ATC response to a MSAW, which includes QNH. Neither happened in this case.

[A320LGW]

The biggest mystery for me here is how a crew got as low as 6 feet/2 metres (!) above terrain and did not see it!!?? Whatever about visibility reductions, this is outlandish.

[tubby linton]

The biggest mystery for me here is how a crew got as low as 6 feet/2 metres (!) above terrain and did not see it!!?? Whatever about visibility reductions, this is outlandish.
Children of the Magenta not looking out of the window?

[RatherBeFlying]

Harmonised Transition Altitude (https://ifatca.wiki/kb/wp-2014-93/)

In North America, it's 18,000 which gives time for ATC systems to spot a mismatch between cleared altitude and mode C readout. It seems more sensible to me to set the altimeter to ATIS once I receive it, than have an opportunity to forget to do it sometime later.

[Jonnyknoxville]

They used LNAV/VNAV minima and obviously had no GP?
😂😂I hope your not in charge of an airliner

[vilas]

Dual language instructions always has the potential for an incident. It should be stopped.

[alf5071h]

FD #23
“… please, get a rough GPS-alt vs. Baro-alt comparator for gross errors?“
Yes !
The point of question #7 is that depending on the particular ‘TAWS’ vendor, (maybe software standard), some versions in association with GPS, external input or embedded in the Terrain System, will provide alerting.

Do operators understand the specifics of the equipment fitted in their aircraft or how with mixed fleets equipment fit varies ?

[DaveReidUK]

Do operators understand the specifics of the equipment fitted in their aircraft or how with mixed fleets equipment fit varies ?

Apropos that, Airhub operates four A320s with YoM ranging from 1999 (the incident aircraft) to 2010, according to their website.

[tubby linton]

The year of manufacture is not relevant, it is the mod state of the aircraft that is important.

[WideScreen]

......
Why cannot we yet, pretty please, get a rough GPS-alt vs. Baro-alt comparator for gross errors? In a form of "CHECK QNH REFERENCE" ??? Come on, it's 2022!
I am glad, you raise this item. This event (and many, many others) do scream for an E2GPWS or EGPWS-NG, or what-ever. GPWS is a kind of static virtual 2-D vs. height "where am I". EGPWS effectively creates a dynamic multidimensional "virtual-path", where it is safe to fly. The E2GPWS would add the GPS version of the approaches, down to acceptable Terra-Tarmac-Touchdown-Zones, and produce warnings, when the factual GPS flight path goes outside that "cone" (low/high/left/right). The closer the airplane gets to the GPS ground, the smaller the cone size will be.

Of course, there are a lot of "but's", though such a feature working properly, would (have) save(d) quite a few potential and real mishaps. This would be relevant, not only for this case, though 2 times the near accident with an A380 (Moscow/New York), the ACT/Bishkek, the PIA touch-and-go on engine pods at Karachi, all the Asian water touch-downs just short of the runway, and a lot more. Not to say, it gives quite a solid checkmark for being stable at 1000 ft (or at least in the approach cone).

[FullWings]

The biggest mystery for me here is how a crew got as low as 6 feet/2 metres (!) above terrain and did not see it!!?? Whatever about visibility reductions, this is outlandish.
That surprises me as well. From the report they said they never saw anything, but even in fog you’d expect to see something at 6R. Daytime as well but heavy rain with the wipers on. I suppose the 6R was reached at a high pitch attitude during the GA, so you’re looking at somewhere between 50’ and 100’ AGL - still one would have thought something would be visible, especially as you’re supposed to be visual below MDA!

Apparently no RAD ALT calls apart from 2,500’ and 1,000’ which kind of makes sense, because getting 50 30 20... on an NPA with no visual reference is definitely attention getting.

[DaveReidUK]

The year of manufacture is not relevant, it is the mod state of the aircraft that is important.

Indeed it is.

With Airhub's four aircraft having originated variously from Iberia, Jazeera and Indigo (two of them CFM-engined and two IAE) I wouldn't put any money on their respective mod states being remotely consistent.

[tubby linton]

The origin is irrelevant, it is the current state of the aircraft and the only organisation that will know that is Airbus .The mod stae will depend on whether the mods are mandated or the operator decided to upgrade the aircraft. I worked for an airline that had CFM A320s. IAE A321 with numerous differences.There were even differences between the type of CFM56 and whether they had sharklets, gps etc etc. The airline borrowed from a flag carrier a differences sheet which was part of the pre-flight briefing to brief the crew what they were going to operate. I can also think of another large operator that has a mixed single aisle fleet with seven distinctly different sub types.

[Equivocal]

It does seem that ATC became aware that there was a problem and acted at the time. From page 4 of the report:"At 11:42:27 the LOC N controller switched ON the approach lights. Following the MSAW and the omission of switching ON the approach lights, the LOC N was replaced by his LOC-N assistant and a new LOC-N assistant took over."Fully accepted. It is the nature of such reports that some information that is available to investigators may not be included. It would be interesting to know how long after the first event that the original LOC N was replaced and why - simply omitting to switch the lights on seems unlikely to be a suitable justification. But if the significance of the QNH was recognised as a potential contributing factor, I would expect the correct value to be stressed somewhere before the second approach was commenced and, as someone else pointed out, there was likely a period of level flight during which the discrepancy between assigned level and mode C could have been checked - and back in my day, in an incident with which I was involved that bears some similarity, it most certainly was! There are many other 'ground-based' questions which could be investigated, and I hope that they will form part of the final report

[A320LGW]

Children of the Magenta not looking out of the window?
I myself am probably a child of the magenta line, but even I have not (knowingly) achieved this, to date at least.

Good point RE pitch attitude at the time and that may explain it. I was also watching in a sim recently and saw 2 pilots staring aggressively at their instruments below DA with the runway perfectly visible, but neither looked up to see it. Instructor not impressed. That may have happened here.

I'm surprised there isn't passenger footage or scare articles. I'd have thought even the most fashionably aircraft unaware passengers would know that being so low without tarmac beneath them wasn't normal.

[CVividasku]

I am wondering how 1001 and 1011 are spoken in French by French ATC; 'mille une' and 'mille onze' perhaps? instead of 'une zero zero une' or 'une zero une une'. This could have led to confusion in the ATCs mind; not realising the mistake when translating to English.
.
Indeed.
"Mille un" and "mille onze" which is much easier than "un zero zero un".
Similarly I don't understand why in english we couldn't use "thousand one" and "thousand eleven" which is much clearer than a jolt of zeros and ones.

Separation number by number is only used as a way of disambiguation, in a very slow manner.

[DaveReidUK]

The origin is irrelevant, it is the current state of the aircraft and the only organisation that will know that is Airbus .The mod state will depend on whether the mods are mandated or the operator decided to upgrade the aircraft. I worked for an airline that had CFM A320s. IAE A321 with numerous differences. There were even differences between the type of CFM56 and whether they had sharklets, gps etc etc. The airline borrowed from a flag carrier a differences sheet which was part of the pre-flight briefing to brief the crew what they were going to operate. I can also think of another large operator that has a mixed single aisle fleet with seven distinctly different sub types.

Yes, once again all perfectly true. But if it's all right with you, I won't be putting money on our Lithuanian friends.

[Lonewolf_50]

I'm surprised there isn't passenger footage or scare articles. I'd have thought even the most fashionably aircraft unaware passengers would know that being so low without tarmac beneath them wasn't normal. This may have been a case of "ignorance is bliss" among the Pax. The good news is that the crew missed the ground / waved off / went around. Close one. :uhoh::eek:

[meleagertoo]

I don't think I have ever heard French ATC using the ridiculously un-phonetic "un" "une" or "onze"
Give them their due all I recall is the unmistakable "unité".

Despite the fact the buggers should have been speaking English in the first place...

[KRviator]

Doublecheck my arithmetic, but it seems to me had the PF delayed the go-around actions by only half a second more, they would have touched down short. At -717FPM at DH, that's pretty much exactly 12' / second vertically. The reason they took 9 seconds to initiate the GA is another matter entirely, though, and they should count their lucky stars it was open fields under the approach, rather than a substantial obstacle.

To think that in this day and age a ("relatively") modern airliner came within half a second of CFIT due to confusion, from whatever source, about 1011 / 1001 is unacceptable. I well know the HF at play, including the French ATC speaking French, but a single slip should not result in something like this.

Then again, missing a single step in a single procedure did cause BHP to have the biggest derailment in history (https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2018/rair/ro-2018-018/) in terms of terms of tonnes, size and speed - but the rail industry is decades behind aviation in terms of HF & safety culture. :ugh:

[FlightDetent]

From the report they said they never saw anything, but even in fog you’d expect to see something at 6R. Daytime as well but heavy rain with the wipers on. I suppose the 6R was reached at a high pitch attitude during the GA, so you’re looking at somewhere between 50’ and 100’ AGL - still one .I kindly refer to post #4 (@A320lgw - n.b.) and my best scared guess is they actually did see 'something'. And hence the belated G/A at last, MK1 eyeball might just saved many lives.

Also interesting to learn about the history of crew with the operator. All of AviaSolution is hiring like crazy and people out of currency line up in drowes.

[Wizofoz]

The "smart landing" EGPWS add-on includes an "Altimeter setting" alert- if there is a disagreement between GPS and indicated altitude (and it knows the transition level) it gives a voice annunciation. Hated the system except for this feature, which should probably be a requirement for Baro-based approaches.

[john_tullamarine]

If someone else has raised the point, my apologies for missing it.

We old chaps might wonder why a significant discrepancy between forecast/ATIS and advised QNH did not present an immediate red flag "need to query" requirement to the crew ?

[HF3000]

A GPS Altitude vs Baro Altitude warning system is incorporated in the EGPWS enhancement known as Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS).

https://skybrary.aero/articles/runway-awareness-and-advisory-system-raas

See section 2.3 of the manual here:

https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/files/bookshelf/1974.pdf

[FlightDetent]

If someone else has raised the point, my apologies for missing it.Raised but not verbalized.

There are about 5 operators in the owners group. AvEx and Lynx pay about 8000 EUR/m invoiced during the summer, and 80/blh in winter if they call you.

GetJet probably pays around 2000/m less than that.

Recency, proficiency, skill and talent. Why would you not go work for the better paying companies in the group is the​​​ razor question.

Whoever signed GJ is complicit.

​​​​​FO probably on 1100 EUR/m

[Klauss]

Just wondering: at 6 ft from the ground.....did anyone look out of the window ??

[ATC Watcher]

From an ATC point of view : first it would help if people would read the BEA report before making comments and wrong statements here, but it is probably too much to ask.
From the report : Communications with the flight were in English and only in English , QNH was passsed according English phraseology 1 0 0 1 and 1 0 1 1 , digit per digit . So it is not an dual language issue.
The LOC controller had a mental fixation on the wrong QNH and passed it to at least 2 aircraft ( and I would bet probably more during his shift ) it happens .But he/she should not have been alone on his position and his/her assistamt should have picked it up .It did not happen.
The controller twice did not use correct pharesology on the MSAW alerts, . That is a training issue . Serious and need to be corrected.
Finally the APP lights were not on and should have been. Another training issue combined with a lack of supervisory oversight. .
Not a good day for CDG . I hope they learn from it .

[das Uber Soldat]

Children of the Magenta not looking out of the window?
Yeh thats probably it. God knows CFIT never happened "back in my day".

[KRviator]

From an ATC point of view : first it would help if people would read the BEA report before making comments and wrong statements here, but it is probably too much to ask.
From the report : Communications with the flight were in English and only in English , QNH was passsed according English phraseology 1 0 0 1 and 1 0 1 1 , digit per digit . So it is not an dual language issue.Bollocks it isn't a dual language issue.

From the report:
1134:28, incorrect QNH issued to NSZ4311 in English
1135:37, incorrect QNH issued to EJU75MA in English
1136:04, correct QNH issued to AFR crew in French.

Had the controller used English for that 3rd transmission, which was less than 30 seconds, and probably closer to 15-20 seconds after her incorrect call to the EasyJet crew, there's every chance at least they, if not both of them would have queried them about it, "Hey, bud, you just gave us 1011 but Air France 1001 - which is it?"

Sure, they might not have picked it up either, but the whole point of the entire planet using English for aviation is to avoid mistakes and allow others to pick up on them should they occur.

[hans brinker]

Bollocks it isn't a dual language issue.

From the report:
1134:28, incorrect QNH issued to NSZ4311 in English
1135:37, incorrect QNH issued to EJU75MA in English
1136:04, correct QNH issued to AFR crew in French.

Had the controller used English for that 3rd transmission, which was less than 30 seconds, and probably closer to 15-20 seconds after her incorrect call to the EasyJet crew, there's every chance at least they, if not both of them would have queried them about it, "Hey, bud, you just gave us 1011 but Air France 1001 - which is it?"

Sure, they might not have picked it up either, but the whole point of the entire planet using English for aviation is to avoid mistakes and allow others to pick up on them should they occur.

I'm guessing from the language you are using, you speak English. There's a reasonable amount of people that don't. Some of them live in countries bigger than the USA and the EU combined, and making the pilots in those countries speak English to the controllers there would probably lead to a lot of problems. I am all in favor of using one language in aviation until I realize that there's probably more Hindi and Mandarin native speaking pilots than English.

[bluesideoops]

Which raises the question, why is the MAWS response not 'go-around' rather than 'check terrain, QNH blah blah' - by the time the crew do all this could well be catastrophic!

[pilotlux]

I am all in favor of using one language in aviation until I realize that there's probably more Hindi and Mandarin native speaking pilots than English.
If only there was a STANDARDISED language like lets say English, so that these things do not happen. Let me real quick learn Mandarin on my way to Beijing.

[das Uber Soldat]

I am all in favor of using one language in aviation until I realize that there's probably more Hindi and Mandarin native speaking pilots than English.
English is the most spoken language in the world, and the language of the people who literally invented powered flight.

https://www.ethnologue.com/guides/most-spoken-languages
https://www.berlitz.com/blog/most-spoken-languages-world (https://www.berlitz.com/blog/most-spoken-languages-world)

There is absolutely no reason to change the international language of aviation.

[FlightDetent]

If only there was a STANDARDISED language like lets say English, so that these things do not happen. Let me real quick learn Mandarin on my way to Beijing.Correct, the standardised language in PRC is Mandarin, English accepted.

English is the only golden standard for international ops, which really CDG should have embraced long ago.

In the presented case, it is but a one very thin slice of cheese that got removed because of this.

Some great contributions upthread already, amidst the frog bashing screams.

[Eutychus]

There is absolutely no reason to change the international language of aviation.

I may be SLF but I am also a professional interpreter and translator.

Whatever the language, when humans are involved it is not merely code that will always be processed exactly the same way. I understand ATC procedures are designed to make communications as code-like as possible but so long as people are involved, other factors will come into play. This limitation needs to be understood.

There is nothing more painful in my trade than hearing two native speakers of the same non-English language talk to each other in English. They will never achieve the same degree of communication as in their own native language and there's a degree of unnaturalness about it that is inherently frustrating.

I appreciate the potential benefit of other pilots being able to listen in and spot errors, but I'm asking myself whether that actually happens and how often it is actually useful.

As others have hinted, I invite those on here for whom English is their native language to imagine landing at an airport in an English-speaking country and being required to conduct communications with the ATC in a learned foreign language. Can you see the problem? Language isn't just code.

[Birdy1062]

In all my previous airlines we used to preset the QNH when receiving Atis in cruise or early descent, meaning going from STD to QNH, setting the airport QNH and the going back to STD till transition altitude.
That way, when going through transition altitude, you had only to switch from STD to QNH and adjust for the 1 or 2 mb possible change for the last 20 mins.

With this procedure I’m pretty sure that a 10 mb change to what had been preset would have at least raised an eyebrow….

[1201alarm]

Airbus has the approach page in the FMGC which is filled out by the crew before every approach. One of the entries to be filled out on this page is the expected QNH, it is done during cruise from an automatic weather report.

Never understood why Airbus does not compare the QNH on this approach page with the QNH set in the FCU and give an alarm if off by more than 1. Can't be that difficult to construct such a feature.

[Locked door]

I think the main issue here is that we have crews flying around who are utterly reliant on the information given to them by outside agencies and the pretty pictures on the ND and PFD.

A miss set QNH can kill during an NPA as nearly demonstrated by this event. If a crew builds their SA from scratch in a robust manner they will pick up a mis set QNH by comparing it to the ATIS, by checking what the baro altimeter reads when the rad alt comes alive and latterly by realising they are too far from the field as they pass 500radio, 100 radio etc.

This crew was dependent on the pretty vertical profile displayed by the avionics which was incorrect.

Build your own SA, and place traps in your procedures to detect mistakes.

LD

[Youmightsaythat]

I may be SLF but I am also a professional interpreter and translator.
I appreciate the potential benefit of other pilots being able to listen in and spot errors, but I'm asking myself whether that actually happens and how often it is actually useful.


As the OP it was my intention to raise the very first gaping void in a cheese that has more holes in it than Garry Gilmore.

It's a fact. The use of two languages at CDG has already killed. Along with the apparent failure of the crew to deal with the resulting situation, It came within 6ft of killing again.

The appalling reality is, the Regulators were told in 1998, and, in the same year, an article in CHIRPS concerning the use of French at CDG it stated “I am sad to say, maybe show how a major incident is waiting to happen if French ATC continue to be constrained by Ministerial Order No 7.”

One year later there was a fatal collision on the runway at CDG. The reason? A French a/c was cleared to take off in French while a British aircraft was cleared to line up in English.

This is not about bashing a country. Its about common sense . It appear "lessons have STILL not been learnt."

The ultimate 'well I did warn you years ago' can be found here. (https://pullingwingsfrombutterflies.com/common-aeronautical-language?et_fb=1&PageSpeed=off)

[Uplinker]

Hi John Tullarmarine, yes, your question about QNH cross checking already queried by me; post #5 :ok: And seemingly not performed by this crew. With horrible weather and the wipers going on fast, it would have been difficult to hear ATC clearly, hence it is very important to cross-check such things.

Regarding having the aircraft technology warn us about incorrect QNH. Yes, a possibility, but as above, we already have a proven way of cross-checking and double-checking the QNH, that has worked for many years. I am a fan of technology, but also believe that we should retain some element of pilot competence and error checking, with the pilots having a 3D model of their flight situation in their minds.

Re language and saying numbers digit by digit: That is so non-English speakers can hear standard English phrases and understand them, particularly when transmitted across an analogue voice radio link, which is subject to distortion, fading, noise etc. American ATC for example often say 'runway three' instead of 'runway zero three', and make other verbal short cuts. These are understood by local American pilots, but not necessarily by non-local, non-American pilots, whose first language is not English/American. Hence my question about how French ATC speak QNH in French. It is many years since I regularly flew in and out of CDG, and even when I did, my brain would not have listened closely to instructions given to others in French, so I don't know if ATC use digit by digit for QNH, or the short cut of 'mille un' etc. Having to say 'unité' instead of 'un' takes longer, at three syllables vs one, so 1011 spoken digit by digit in French would take a long time and at a very busy airfield such as CDG, having to say that over and over again; it must be very tempting to abbreviate. This in turn, might have caused confusion in the ATC's mind when they translated for the English speaking pilots.

Someone asked if anyone had ever corrected incorrect transmissions given to others. Yes, I did once, in the London TMA. It was busy - always is, but REALLY busy - and I picked up that another aircraft had responded to our descent clearance. I managed to tell ATC which aircraft had taken our clearance, and that we were maintaining (whatever) until we received further instructions. ATC were very grateful; as were we, and I am sure the other aircraft were too. Could have been very messy.

Another occasion, on our initial descent in Mexican airspace, ATC told us the QNH was '992'. This sounded very low to us and it didn't cross-check, so we queried it several times, without satisfactory resolution - the guy kept saying '992'. We were luckily in very empty skies with nothing around us, and not near the ground, so we continued cautiously with very heightened monitoring until we were handed over to the next controller. We worked out that the first guy was saying '2992', i.e. 29.92 mm/hg; equivalent to 1013 millibars, but he was saying it so quickly and cutting off the first '2' then emphasising the '....9 9 2' part, so the first '2' could barely be detected, and it sounded like a millibar QNH. Had the first controller said 'decimal' as he should have, we would have heard '....9 decimal 92' and would have realised the correct setting.
.

[ATC Watcher]

Bollocks it isn't a dual language issue.
the whole point of the entire planet using English for aviation is to avoid mistakes and allow others to pick up on them should they occur.
May i suggest you travel a bit outside your confort zone and discover that 80% of the world airspace in not primarily English speaking., as to the reason you state to make English the common aviation communication language you obvioulsy do not fly IFR in busy airspace. . Anyway tthis incident is not a language issue, it is a combination of facts which started with an ATC error. giving the wrong QNH.

[Eutychus]

This is not about bashing a country. Its about common sense .

The problem is that complex systems tend to be more and more counter-intuitive rather than easily analysed in terms of "common sense".

I can easily see how use of more than one language in ATC could lead to some disasters. What is not so easy to see is what the best way of mitigating that might be, bearing in mind that the solution needs to ensure other, more serious disasters will not ensue as a result.

Supposing English is implemented as the only ATC language at CDG. A quick Google suggests that a large proportion of flights in and out of CDG are domestic. My guess (and it is a guess) is that many of the pilots in question will be French native speakers flying only or mostly domestic routes (I don't know enough about rostering to be sure). With the best will in the world, it's very difficult to remain fluent in a non-native language when living and working in your native country. Communication in French will always have the edge for those operating mostly in a dominantly French-speaking general environment. Would communication between Sully and ATC have been so fluid in such a short space of time if both he and ATC had been obliged to communicate in a non-native language? I think not.

If I'm flying into CDG with a French pilot up front I'd feel much safer with French being an approved ATC language than knowing it was prohibited. Of course my perception may be wrong, but I'll need some convincing!

[Cornish Jack]

Very, VERY worrying and lots of comments - but #26 and #27 say it all !

[ATC Watcher]

One year later there was a fatal collision on the runway at CDG. The reason? A French a/c was cleared to take off in French while a British aircraft was cleared to line up in English.
Again not factual. find an read the officilal accident repport before posting statements like this. One in a long list of possible contributing factors was not the cause of this accident.

[Youmightsaythat]

Again not factual. find an read the officilal accident repport before posting statements like this. One in a long list of possible contributing factors was not the cause of this accident.

You are correct the 'official; report did not highlight this as being a serious problem. Now I wonder why that might be? Can I suggest you look at the FACTS of the crash. When you have, get back to me and tell me that this wasn't a major factor.

[ATC Watcher]

Hence my question about how French ATC speak QNH in French. It is many years since I regularly flew in and out of CDG, and even when I did, my brain would not have listened closely to instructions given to others in French, so I don't know if ATC use digit by digit for QNH, or the short cut of 'mille un' etc. Having to say 'unité' instead of 'un' takes longer, at three syllables vs one, so 1011 spoken digit by digit in French would take a long time and at a very busy airfield such as CDG,

French officilal phraseology spells numbers in full . here the QNH would have been mille onze. English phraeology spells all numbers digit per digit , one-zero-one- one, No French controller mixes this up,
For "one" in the French phraeology we use "unite" instead of "un" (1) this is to avoid the mix up with vingt ( 20) sounding the same. One othert hing to remember is that in France , like in many other countries, the French Phraseology is the one to be used, English is secondary and must be used if you do not have a French language endorsement on your licence. In addition most GA airports in France are French language only.

[ATC Watcher]

You are correct the 'official; report did not highlight this as being a serious problem. Now I wonder why that might be? Can I suggest you look at the FACTS of the crash. When you have, get back to me and tell me that this wasn't a major factor.
You mean your FACTS ? Not the ones established by my colleagues after months of invstigation and intervewings the pilots and the controllers involved ? It feel a bit like arguing with a pro Trump replubican Senator.
By the way the Shorts Captain statement was relatively clear, , very sadly he committed suicide 6 months later. A second victim of this tragic accident.

[Fursty Ferret]

Regarding having the aircraft technology warn us about incorrect QNH. Yes, a possibility, but as above, we already have a proven way of cross-checking and double-checking the QNH, that has worked for many years. I am a fan of technology, but also believe that we should retain some element of pilot competence and error checking, with the pilots having a 3D model of their flight situation in their minds.

100% agreed. Technology would have trapped this error slightly further back, but ultimately it shouldn’t be happening in the first place.

My operator highlighted this very risk in training a few years ago and we reproduced pretty much this exact scenario. Instructor froze the sim at minima and then set VMC conditions. It’s sobering just how close to the ground you get and with a 10hPa discrepancy it’s quite easy to justify it in your head (terrain under approach path, temperature etc etc) when the rad alt gives the 2500 call out.

We set QNH on the standby altimeter during cruise and independently check it against the ATIS, and then verify it again when ATC clear us to an altitude. But then I keep an eye on the rad alt too.

[Youmightsaythat]

My facts? Do you really want to go down the rabbit hole of French Investigations?

You mean your FACTS ? Not the ones established by my colleagues after months of invstigation and intervewings the pilots and the controllers involved ? It feel a bit like arguing with a pro Trump replubican Senator.
.

Well I suppose when your argument begins to look a little frayed its time to resort to insults.
Still not convinced about the issue?

​​​​​​​Literally a few months after the Concorde crash I was behind an Italian aircraft at the holding point. A KLM aircraft had just landed. He reported that he had blown a tyre, in English. Immediately after acknowledging this the controller cleared the Alitalia to line up and take off.

​​​​​​​The Italian pilot immediately refused this clearance and informed ATC they would remain at the holding point. ATC queried the reason. The Alitalia commented replied that the KLM had reported a blown tyre and there was likely debris on the runway. Now, can you imagine if that had been a French aircraft that had shead a tyre. If you still can't see there is a problem then there is not much more I can say.

[rudestuff]

How on Earth are the French allowed to remain in EASA/ICAO with such unsafe rules? A global industry requires a global language. If Napoleon had tried a bit harder that language might have been French, but he didn't so here we are...

[Eutychus]

​​​​​​​The Italian pilot immediately refused this clearance and informed ATC they would remain at the holding point. ATC queried the reason. The Alitalia commented replied that the KLM had reported a blown tyre and there was likely debris on the runway. Now, can you imagine if that had been a French aircraft that had shead a tyre. If you still can't see there is a problem then there is not much more I can say.
Seeing a problem is not the same thing as identifying an appropriate solution, and may not be the same thing as seeing the predominant problem.

In the case you relate above the first question in my SLF mind is the grounds on which ATC cleared an aircraft for takeoff when they had been informed of FOD on the runway. That issue remains the same however recent another FOD event or the language of the ATC conversation.

On the incident referred to in the OP, I think there's little disagreement that language may have played a role, but a lot more disagreement about how big a hole in the cheese that was compared to the others, and how that particular factor should best be mitigated. Short of requiring all pilots and ATC everywhere to conduct all communications in a given language (would you personally accept any language other than English?), the use of more than one language cannot be excluded entirely, and I'm far from convinced that implementing such a measure would be safer overall than educating those involved about the limits of language-based communication and the need for greater awareness when not communicating in one's native language.

Some of the best-paid jobs I get are ones untangling disputes caused by people believing they understood each other adequately in what was a non-native language for at least one of the parties. Fortunately none of them so far were in the aftermath of situations requiring split-second decisions...

[FlightDetent]

Sure the French colleagues operating at CDG all have ICAO ELP 4+.

I still think the mixed languages were irrelevant to the situation as it unfolded here.

The proposed safeguard is the Incident aircraft picking on the 4the transmission about the different QNH.

They seem to have been too deep in a hole of their digging at that point. For sure they did not pick it from the 3rd transmission (EZY read back, proper English I would suppose).

Blame the French for language problem other time, blame the French for useless MSAW intervention. Over here the lingo did not play a role nor would have changed the outcome, your honour.

- - -
Would it not be ironic if one of the GetJets pilots was actually a native French speaker?

​​​​

[island_airphoto]

Am I the only one thinking my iPad would have had a screen full of red if I tried this?
Also are radar altimeters no longer a thing?

[compressor stall]

Highly probable that the wrong QNH might have been passed to the French crew as well if in English.

[40years]

As noted above in various posts, the issue of pilots being able to maintain their situation awareness by monitoring all relevant transmissions to and from other aircraft is a significant defence in closing the holes. When CPDLC was being introduced, the fact that pilots would be operating in their own non-RT silo was raised as a risk-assessment hazard requiring mitigation. Incidents since then have shown that the hazard still exists.

[fokker1000]

Detent.

This is multi point mistake, but to say mixed languages isn't a factor is frankly bollox. Haven't read the report, but were the crew on day 5 and on the edge of FTLs? Was the latest METAR accurate and up to date? Do we know the techlog status etc etc

I do know that the LTMA controllers are very careful to speak super clear and be mindful if a pilot is not an English speaker, as are the Dutch and the Germans. Try ORD on a bad stormy night and that's a different ball game.

FK10

[WHBM]

Before descent, the flight crew prepared for a RNP approach with LNAV/VNAV minima3 to CDG runway 27R4 . The meteorological conditions indicated in the ATIS Q used by the flight crew when preparing the approach were the following: transition level 70, wind 280 / 10 kt, visibility 10 km, broken clouds at 1,500 ft, few cumulonimbus (CB) at 5,000 ft, temperature 19 °C, dew point 14 °C, QNH 1001. The crew stated that during all the approach they remained in clouds, without visual references. They experienced moderate turbulence and flew through heavy rain, using the wipers at high speed ... At the time of the incident, the ILS of runway 27R was out of service.
No ILS ? - um, remind me how many parallel main runways CDG, one of the key airports of Europe, has. And in heavy rain, with questionable cloud base. And seemingly advised even at first contact they were getting a runway with no ILS.

[8314]

Dear fellow pilots!
You have to be vigilant flying in France. They do funny things!
Be safe.

[Sailvi767]

My $3500 dollar EFIS in a light aircraft cross checks the closest airports altimeter settings via ADSB in with what I have set and gives me a warning if there is more than a slight difference. Would be nice at my work job!

[fokker1000]

8314,

Indeed they do. But not always funny sadly. But things NEVER change...... :rolleyes:

[Uplinker]

French officilal phraseology spells numbers in full . here the QNH would have been mille onze. English phraeology spells all numbers digit per digit , one-zero-one- one, No French controller mixes this up,
.

Thanks for the info :ok:

Not wishing to start an argument, but the ITM controller did mix it up. According to the BEA report, ATC got it wrong twice, by saying one zero one one in English when speaking with two English speaking aircraft, but got the QNH correct when speaking in French to a French speaking crew.

Edit: thanks for the correction, spekesoftly. (below) Ironic mistake !

[spekesoftly]

According to the BEA report, ATC got it wrong twice, by saying one zero zero one in English when speaking with two English speaking aircraft, but got the QNH correct when speaking in French to a French speaking crew.

ATC got it wrong twice by saying one zero one one, not one zero zero one.

[Request Orbit]

If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised there’s not similar for CDG. Link (https://skybrary.aero/articles/barometric-pressure-setting-advisory-tool-bat)

On the subject of do pilots check others transmissions for their own SA: yes they do. Multiple airports in our sector, we prefix the relevant airport when issuing QNH to save the next couple of transmissions being “confirm QNH?” from a pilot inbound to a different airport with a different QNH.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I try (as SLF/attorney) not to post this sort of comment on every instance or incident where human beings save a situation that was headed toward a seriously bad outcome from reaching that outcome --

Write the computer app or algorithms or software that will do as good a job in this exact situation as the flight crew in the pointy end of the aircraft performed in actual fact. I realize that up to that point, all kinds of flight-operational things happened or didn't happen and that I don't understand (as only SLF, etc.) but nevertheless, disaster was averted, was it not?

Oh, and when programming the mainframe (latest model, or System 4Pi-Model ML-1, or anything else), be sure to allow for uncertainties in translation as between all languages in use in civil aviation, globally. Thanks in advance, ....

[DaveReidUK]

I realize that up to that point, all kinds of flight-operational things happened or didn't happen and that I don't understand (as only SLF, etc.) but nevertheless, disaster was averted, was it not?

Well clearly the outcome wasn't a smoking hole in the ground, but I'm not entirely sure what point you're trying to make.

[Herod]

An explanation please. I'm way out of the loop, having retired in '04, so before computer-generated approaches had come about. If the aircraft is carrying out a NPA, and has no ILS glidepath, would not the EGPWS be screaming well before this point? Back when, home base on one runway flew over an escarpment. At about 2 miles, suddenly the rad alt went from about 1,000' to 600' almost instantaneously. The GPWS (no EGPWS then) certainly shouted at that point.

[Fursty Ferret]

would not the EGPWS be screaming well before this poin

You'd think so but in reality the terrain clearance floor function* inhibits the alert due to the vicinity of the runway.

* I think it's this component
​​​​​

[oceancrosser]

Is Norwegian (Sweden or any part) still using the services of this operator?

[FlightDetent]

An explanation please.As mentioned. The old, RA-based GPWS had no reason to go off.

The basic (most likely fitted as per mandate) E-GPWS has a 'Terrain Clearance Floor' which protects you from killing people fully configured where there's no airport - but in this case they were sufficiently close to a runway the alarm did not trigger.

There are more evolved setups, EGPWS+ if you will, unlikely to be fitted to this ship.

[WillowRun 6-3]

DaveReidUK

1. That devotees of the inevitability as well as desirability of more and more flight control automation, to and including deactivating the roles and responsibilities of human being aviators, should acknowledge that the programs or code that run the automation do not at this time have the capacity to deal with a situation such as the one that is the subject of this thread.
2. It can be anticipated that some would point out that the occurrence of the situation resulted from human error, by the controller, and perhaps also by the pilots with regard to various systems, decisions, situational awareness or lack thereof, and probably others. Before noting the human operator saved the situation, the post acknowledges that it doesn't claim or assert an understanding of the pilots' acts or omissions prior to their acts to avert imminent disaster.
i hope that helps as clarification.

[FlightDetent]

Contrary.

The technology exists to save this much sooner than 6 ft RA. It's not deployed yet.

The technology exists to avoid this from even starting to develop. A fistful of elements were there on the flight deck already but not all of the wide range.

Re-counted my chicken yesterday, 6 places in the A320 cockpit where the correct QNH was to be found as per a very unassuming run off the mill set of SOP. (less than Uplinker alludes to).

We're devotees for the not-so-much-of-a-pilots be not allowed to kill the travelling public.

The industry

A) de-skill the crew (check BA dual engine over London),

B) equip the planes with more human centric technology and imperfect solutions to bridge the newly built gap (gazilion cases, from nuisance TCAS, across the whole RNAV freakshow, to ad-extremis MCAS)

C) provide less training overall after putting all those additional systems in place, compared to the old up/forward/down/reverse days

and expect a constant improvement in professional conduct (=maintaining margins from undesirable aircraft state)

Does not work. Overwhelmed and undertrained.

Checkpoint one: PBN is a mandatory part of the Type Rating chckride. For many years, even so it is not listed on the endorsement anymore as a unique skill and becomes embedded.

Then: How many training departments actively teach that for Baro-VNAV 3D approach (this case), the altitude distance checks are futile, not part of the system or certification, and better not be done in lieu of the important stuff? (sound of brains exploding..., sure). There are critical items to verify, about 4 and QNH being one of the 2 more severe - does not have self-monitoring and alerting.

Checkpoint two: Wrong QNH kills immediately on NPA since before WWII and the invention of ATC. How come crews lost the sight of what separates them from TV headlines?

Checkpoint three:
Does your favourite EU lo-co run the annual line-flying checks on real airplane or have they given up 1 of the yearly training sessions (50%) to simulate a normal route flight (with a glitch), depriving the crew of a valuable learning opportunity?

It does not please us to observe and explain that while flying cannot be reduced to become fully deterministic, much of what we do so proudly can be algorithmized (in the non IT sense). That is where supervised automation (even remotely) will completely circumnavigate the challenges above at a lower overall industry cost.

And there you go again, the very last, single word is the crux of all this.

[HalfGreen]

Close call. Really suprising how the French controllers said the incorrect QNH in english - the ICAO standard aviation language, and correct in French. Something is wrong, or ATC was on autopilot that day.

[Bidule]

English is the most spoken language in the world, and the language of the people who literally invented powered flight.

https://www.ethnologue.com/guides/most-spoken-languages
https://www.berlitz.com/blog/most-spoken-languages-world (https://www.berlitz.com/blog/most-spoken-languages-world)

There is absolutely no reason to change the international language of aviation.

There is not only one international language of aviation (see ICAO).
More importantly, beyond the language itself, the English phraseology should also be the same everywhere in the world, which is not a given! (USA for instance)

.

[Less Hair]

Every "phrase" could be data transmitted to be a symbol or text on a cockpit display (with confirmation button) anyway to keep voice frequencies clear for any non standard needs.

There will be more non-native english speaking pilots in the future and more long range capable narrowbodies with less long range experienced crews at the controls mixing up global ATC.

[FlightDetent]

There will be more non-native english speaking pilots in the future and more long range capable narrowbodies with less long range experienced crews at the controls mixing up global ATC.this.

The Airbus Global Market forecast for the next 18 years, growth factors:
China domestic = 2.5 (becoming world's largest)
India = 4
​​

[1201alarm]

Checkpoint one: PBN is a mandatory part of the Type Rating chckride. For many years, even so it is not listed on the endorsement anymore as a unique skill and becomes embedded.

Then: How many training departments actively teach that for Baro-VNAV 3D approach (this case), the altitude distance checks are futile, not part of the system or certification, and better not be done in lieu of the important stuff? (sound of brains exploding..., sure). There are critical items to verify, about 4 and QNH being one of the 2 more severe - does not have self-monitoring and alerting.

That is why the Aircraft should automatically compare the QNH put (during cruise or early descent) into the FMGC approach page with the QNH set on the FCU during transition and give an alarm if off by more than one.

With the increase in PBN, we need more protection against wrong QNH. This would lead to a strong safety net against wrong QNH information or wrong setting.

[Cyberhacker]

It does not please us to observe and explain that while flying cannot be reduced to become fully deterministic, much of what we do so proudly can be algorithmized (in the non IT sense). That is where supervised automation (even remotely) will completely circumnavigate the challenges above at a lower overall industry cost.

Agreed... and if one lesson can be learned from the push for autonomy in the automotive world - if you automate everything when nominal, do not expect the driver to take over in an instance when it all goes rats.

[Clop_Clop]

That is why the Aircraft should automatically compare the QNH put (during cruise or early descent) into the FMGC approach page with the QNH set on the FCU during transition and give an alarm if off by more than one.

With the increase in PBN, we need more protection against wrong QNH. This would lead to a strong safety net against wrong QNH information or wrong setting.

Quite common for QNH to change by one, so chances are the alerting will go off a lot when it's not needed and the alerting system could be seen as a nuisance 99% of the time when it's not needed. Maybe the manufacturers thought about it already and possibly a reason why it's not implemented already, should be a way around that one perhaps as well... Including pilots comparing forecast to actual, RA... But it's a nasty one if the error is the wrong way additionally and actual alt is lower than indicated...

[DaveReidUK]

Quite common for QNH to change by one, so chances are the alerting will go off a lot when it's not needed and the alerting system could be seen as a nuisance 99% of the time when it's not needed.

The OP said that a difference of ±1 hPa would not trigger an alert, so why would you expect large numbers of false alarms ?

[FlightDetent]

Perhaps. Airbus put a comparator between THS setting and the MCDU TO Page trim prompt. Unnecessary for the SA fleet where it never was a standard fit.

Comparing FCU Baro selection to MCDU APPR page will be a piece of cake.

Threshold alert 2/3 of MOC = 3 hPa.
​​​​​​

​​​​​​

[Uplinker]

An explanation please. I'm way out of the loop, having retired in '04, so before computer-generated approaches had come about. If the aircraft is carrying out a NPA, and has no ILS glidepath, would not the EGPWS be screaming well before this point? Back when, home base on one runway flew over an escarpment. At about 2 miles, suddenly the rad alt went from about 1,000' to 600' almost instantaneously. The GPWS (no EGPWS then) certainly shouted at that point.

My (probably out of date) copy of the A320 FCOM for GPWS suggests that mode 1, mode 4 and mode 5 might not have been triggered.

Mode 1 Excessive descent rate : they were on a 3° approach profile, which might not trigger mode 1?

Mode 4 Unsafe terrain clearance when not in landing configuration : they were in landing configuration.

Mode 5 Descent below glideslope : The approach they were following had no glideslope, so this would not have triggered.

EGPWS has Modes 4A, 4B, and 4C, which should trigger with ground proximity, but only if the aircraft is not in landing configuration?

So it would seem that (E)GPWS cannot help a crew on an NPA with a mis-set QNH? Am I reading that right?

@FlightDetent: good post #95. Perhaps all NPA approach plates should publish Radio Altimeter heights vs distance to the threshold, (having surveyed the actual terrain), instead of altitudes, which of course are based on the QNH set in the cockpit.
.

[ATC Watcher]

Thanks for the info :ok:
Not wishing to start an argument, but the ITM controller did mix it up. According to the BEA report, ATC got it wrong twice, by saying one zero one one in English when speaking with two English speaking aircraft, but got the QNH correct when speaking in French to a French speaking crew.
Sorry was not clear when I said no controller will mix up the two, I was taking about the 2 different phaseologies,( digit per digit in English and full numbers in French) Indeed the controller here mixed up 1011 with 1001 but a possible explanation ( speculating I do not have more info on this case) is that it could be due to what we call brain automatism or brain cloud. A well known phenomena, which we find often in call sign confusions . When faced with stress caused by a perticular fact or event , the brain reverts to a similar event in the past, you end up automatically saying things that are not what you meant. Good examples of this is pilots facing an emerncy reverting to an old call sign or , the call sign they used in the simulator when execrcising that emergency. ( e. the Happag Lloyd A310 accident in Vienna , or more recently the BA777 accident in Heathrow ) In all cases the individual is not aware, even afterwards that he/she did this. People are extremely surprised when they listen to their transmissions on the tape.. The only mitigation for this is the 4 eyes/ears principle. The person sitting besides is supposed to pick up these discrepancies .

[1201alarm]

Perhaps. Airbus put a comparator between THS setting and the MCDU TO Page trim prompt. Unnecessary for the SA fleet where it never was a standard fit.
Comparing FCU Baro selection to MCDU APPR page will be a piece of cake.
Threshold alert 2/3 of MOC = 3 hPa.​​
​​​​​​

I also think it would be a piece of cake. But nevertheless it is not implemented. A pity.

The three things put into some performance page should be automatically crosschecked: trim, flaps, QNH.

It is especially a pity as non-ILS approaches are becoming again more and more popular with the PBN thing.

How does the hardware look on Boeings? Do they have similar prompts in the FMGC that could be used to compare it with FCU settings?

[AndiKunzi]

Quote:
Originally Posted by AndiKunzi View Post (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/647745-airbus-within-6ft-ground-nearly-1-mile-short-runway.html#post11260269)
They used LNAV/VNAV minima and obviously had no GP?
😂😂I hope your not in charge of an airliner

Thank you for your educated comment. I fly a Citation Mustang, am single pilot rated and am an IRI and CRI.

An LNAV/VNAV approach using SBAS for GP (not Baro VNAV) will provide you a correct GP regardless of (wrong) altimeter setting.
I assume an A320 today is using SBAS for the GP. If not, you might have corrected me in a less offensive way.
Most modern business jets do use SBAS for GP and for an LPV you don‘t even have a choice.
Baro VNAV is only a back-up for those aircraft and not available at all in some business jets. I consider Baro VNAV to be outdated and much less safe. I assumed that an A320 nowadays is capable of LPV (and, thus, RNP SBAS VNAV).

So for me, if they briefed and flew an LNAV/VNAV (using the SBAS VNAV GP), they would not have arrived at ground level 1 NM before the threshold - unless old avionics using Baro VNAV.
If they flew an LNAV, they should have applied LNAV minima (+ 130 ft here).

[blind pew]

Had two occurrences in the frankfurt hold when lufthansa changed into German and was taken out from above us and given priority..
The second was much more scary as the eyebrow window was filled with the belly of a lufty 747..declared it was a 1000ft..bollix

[Youmightsaythat]

Had two occurrences in the frankfurt hold when lufthansa changed into German and was taken out from above us and given priority..
The second was much more scary as the eyebrow window was filled with the belly of a lufty 747..declared it was a 1000ft..bollix

Maybe ATC should start talking cockney rhyming slang at Heathrow. "Ok me old china airways, up the apples and pears to spirit tom mix" When there is a collision we can come on here and announce there is a large number of ex pearly kings and queens who are now working as pilots and ATC and when they get stressed they revert to talking Jason Pollocks. EASA and ICAO will be falling overthemsleves to allow it on an 'inclusion' ticket.

[FlightDetent]

I consider Baro VNAV to be outdated and much less safe.That is exactly it. Narrowbody Airbus standard equipment is APV Baro-VNAV flown to LNAV+VNAV mimima. MSN 112xx straight out of factory.

People get aggravated about things they care passionately about, you came out of this as the better gentleman.

Despite the other poster being, after all, actually right. With a wink and a bitter tear. :E We want your kit.
​​​​​​
​​​​​

[172_driver]

Thank you for your educated comment. I fly a Citation Mustang, am single pilot rated and am an IRI and CRI.

An LNAV/VNAV approach using SBAS for GP (not Baro VNAV) will provide you a correct GP regardless of (wrong) altimeter setting.
I assume an A320 today is using SBAS for the GP. If not, you might have corrected me in a less offensive way.
Most modern business jets do use SBAS for GP and for an LPV you don‘t even have a choice.
Baro VNAV is only a back-up for those aircraft and not available at all in some business jets. I consider Baro VNAV to be outdated and much less safe. I assumed that an A320 nowadays is capable of LPV (and, thus, RNP SBAS VNAV).

So for me, if they briefed and flew an LNAV/VNAV (using the SBAS VNAV GP), they would not have arrived at ground level 1 NM before the threshold - unless old avionics using Baro VNAV.
If they flew an LNAV, they should have applied LNAV minima (+ 130 ft here).

Different terminologies across continents and manufacturers...
I flew LPV approaches in the US 13 years ago. In Europe I have yet to fly an LPV approach.

In the lingo I am used to, an LNAV/VNAV minima is based on baro-VNAV. An LPV minima is based on the GPS receiver being SBAS enabled and your glide path is GPS derived. Not sure if there is a single A320 out there that can do that.... I think that's where you were shot down!

[FlightDetent]

Did someone say FMS cold temperature compensation?

#notinstalled
​​​​

[Oldaircrew]

Just wondering: at 6 ft from the ground.....did anyone look out of the window ??

That’s a good argument for the mplementation of monitored approaches in limited visibility.

plus, does nobody do basic height/distance checks as part of their approaches anymore? It’s considered an SOP at many airlines.

[EXDAC]

Comparing FCU Baro selection to MCDU APPR page will be a piece of cake.​​​​​​

What system or LRU would perform the comparison and does it currently receive both parameters to be compared?

[FlyingStone]

plus, does nobody do basic height/distance checks as part of their approaches anymore? It’s considered an SOP at many airlines.

Those checks won't help you one bit, if you are relying on your barometric altimeter for vertical guidance. Your checks can be spot on, yet you will still end up in a smoking hole, if your altimeter isn't set correctly.

[A320LGW]

That’s a good argument for the mplementation of monitored approaches in limited visibility.

plus, does nobody do basic height/distance checks as part of their approaches anymore? It’s considered an SOP at many airlines.

It doesn't capture the error here as mentioned above.

Think if the platform altitude for the FAF was 3000' AGL at 10 miles. With a barometer set 10hPa high, your altimeter will show 3000' but you'd actually be at an altitude of 2700'. This error is maintained the whole way down the approach path - you are reading what appear to be correct altitude readings v the distance, but you are actually 300' lower at each mile. This culminates in you being at 0' at 1nm from the threshold, with your altimeter reading 300'.

[Alex Whittingham]

How many training departments actively teach that for Baro-VNAV 3D approach (this case), the altitude distance checks are futile A big take away point for me, and this incident will be featuring in the next amendment to our ATPL notes together with this warning. It never ocurred to me.

[A320LGW]

That's a very good point RE training departments but I do think we should be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater here. The height v distance checks are not futile when the correct supporting information is used. There should be an emphasis on the importance of not taking QNH figures for granted, especially when they differ from ATIS values.

[Discorde]

Tech solution: ATC data base automatically transmits current local QNH to aircraft ADCs via data link - no humans involved! (Except to check for disparity between received QNH and expected QNH.)

[SAM 2M]

This risk was identified by the UK CAA in 2018.

see UK CAA SAFETY NOTICE SN/2019-001. Risk of Controlled Flight into Terrain during 3D BARO-VNAV and 2D Approaches
(Altimeter Setting Procedures)

This latent Risk remains and must be mitigated on every approach using TEM. The lack of a PULL-UP Warning makes the issue acute.

Link to CAA Safety Notice: SN-2019/001: Risk of Controlled Flight into Terrain During 3D BARO-VNAV and 2D Approaches (Altimeter Settings) (http://publicapps.caa.co.uk/modalapplication.aspx?appid=11&mode=detail&id=9015)

[Uplinker]

Well, as we have said, there have been SOPs in place for years to cross check the QNH : PM listens to the ATIS at a suitable point and writes it down on a "bug card", which is placed on the centre console where both pilots can see it. And CM1 sets the ATIS QNH on their altimeter and resets their altimeter to standard, or sets it on the standby altimeter. Then, when ATC gives descent to an altitude, they will state the QNH and the crew will check that it is close to what is written on the bug card and agrees with what has been set on CM1's or the standby altimeter.

I agree with Alex, a good revision point for all of us.

Altitude vs distance checks are meaningless if the QNH is incorrect. Height, (from the RAD Alt) vs distance checks would be a proper, meaningful check, and NPA plates should be published with this information.

I am not sure that throwing more technology at this problem, e.g. automatic setting of QNH via radio link or whatever, would be worth bothering with : it would bring more problems than it might solve. We already know how to do this: make an independent cross-check of the QNH - especially if there is no ground transmitted glide-slope information available.

[A320LGW]

Well, as we have said, there have been SOPs in place for years to cross check the QNH : PM listens to the ATIS at a suitable point and writes it down on a "bug card", which is placed on the centre console where both pilots can see it. And CM1 sets the ATIS QNH on their altimeter and resets their altimeter to standard, or sets it on the standby altimeter. Then, when ATC gives descent to an altitude, they will state the QNH and the crew will check that it is close to what is written on the bug card and agrees with what has been set on CM1's or the standby altimeter.

I agree with Alex, a good revision point for all of us.

Altitude vs distance checks are meaningless if the QNH is incorrect. Height, (from the RAD Alt) vs distance checks would be a proper, meaningful check, and NPA plates should be published with this information.

I am not sure that throwing more technology at this problem, e.g. automatic setting of QNH via radio link or whatever, would be worth bothering with : it would bring more problems than it might solve. We already know how to do this: make an independent cross-check of the QNH - especially if there is no ground transmitted glide-slope information available.

The plates we use at least don't include any height v distance table, you could of course subtract elevation from each checkpoint but I'd also not be using the rad alt at 6 or 9 miles out in built up areas. Ensuring correct QNH and using the baro alt has worked so far at least .. until it doesn't evidently.

[Oldaircrew]

It doesn't capture the error here as mentioned above.

Think if the platform altitude for the FAF was 3000' AGL at 10 miles. With a barometer set 10hPa high, your altimeter will show 3000' but you'd actually be at an altitude of 2700'. This error is maintained the whole way down the approach path - you are reading what appear to be correct altitude readings v the distance, but you are actually 300' lower at each mile. This culminates in you being at 0' at 1nm from the threshold, with your altimeter reading 300'.

Doh! Don’t I look like a charlie. I should have clarified that I meant using the distance from the threshold(inserted on the prog page) and then doing a basic x3 as a gross error check.

With the weather as advertised, a properly executed monitored approach would have had at least one crew member looking out of the window and realizing they were in the wrong place.

[alf5071h]

Isn't the point that whilst altitude is checked first, the distance has to be from the runway / threshold.

The intent is to achieve some independence from the FMS, ideally from DME, or if not, apply the small, simpler distance correction between the DH position and threshold.

Simple rules of thumb required - general awareness - I recall ‘never less than 150 ft RA until DH’.

EGPWS should have detected this event; T2CAS, not known, but very surprising if it isn't capable.

[Uplinker]

@A320LGW; The plates we use at least don't include any height v distance table
Yes exactly; that's why I am suggesting it. With a NPA approach, you are heavily reliant on having set the correct QNH, and have no means of cross checking that you are on the correct profile - as you do with a ground transmitted glide-slope. Bear in mind it may be IMC, with absolutely no external visual references and a bad radio link in a noisy cockpit, with language issues. A surveyed series of Rad Alt heights, for, say, the last 4 miles* written on the NPA plate might be an easy way of providing that cross check, and allowing a safe go-around if something did not match up. Checking altitudes against distance to go on a NPA is useless if the QNH is set wrong, as this near CFIT has shown.

Even if a crew does monitor the Rad Alt, the terrain might not be flat, as you say, so the readings might be quite different from the altitudes - even if using QFE, so not always easy to decide if the Rad Alt figure is reasonable or not. Having a series of surveyed heights vs distances on the plate, might give improved reassurance?

*Or perhaps just one radio altimeter check height printed on the plate for the 4 nm point would serve as a gross error check?

[farsouth]

@A320LGW;
Yes exactly; that's why I am suggesting it. With a NPA approach, you are heavily reliant on having set the correct QNH, and have no means of cross checking that you are on the correct profile - as you do with a ground transmitted glide-slope. Bear in mind it may be IMC, with absolutely no external visual references and a bad radio link in a noisy cockpit, with language issues. A surveyed series of Rad Alt heights, for, say, the last 4 miles* written on the NPA plate might be an easy way of providing that cross check, and allowing a safe go-around if something did not match up. Checking altitudes against distance to go on a NPA is useless if the QNH is set wrong, as this near CFIT has shown.

Even if a crew does monitor the Rad Alt, the terrain might not be flat, as you say, so the readings might be quite different from the altitudes - even if using QFE, so not always easy to decide if the Rad Alt figure is reasonable or not. Having a series of surveyed heights vs distances on the plate, might give improved reassurance?

*Or perhaps just one radio altimeter check height printed on the plate for the 4 nm point would serve as a gross error check?

Is the problem with this that, within the acceptable lateral tolerance of flying the approach, there could easily be e.g. a 200’ high building that you may or may not bounce your radalt off?

[fdr]

because getting 50 30 20... on an NPA with no visual reference is definitely attention getting.

While you would hope that is the case, history suggests otherwise.
When we get into increased stress situations, the ability for the average human to cope and even comprehend external stimuli drops off, as a function of stress and cognitive load. We then start to drop signals that would normally be received as we tend to focus on the highest priority task. Whether we even can multitask as such (except for our better halves, that can certainly do that....) is a question that has raised some debate, do we multi task or do we rapidly serialise demands. I suspect it is a bit of both normally, but under stress we prioritise on highest perceived risk items and "loadshed". In this case, it is possible that the crew really didn't get the EGPWS expanded height callouts, but that would include the IQ challenge of "Retard, Retard" which is a simple RALT function... Its a while since I looked at A320/330 DFDR readouts, I don't believe that the alt call discretes are recorded though.

[Oldaircrew]

Checking altitudes against distance to go on a NPA is useless if the QNH is set wrong, as this near CFIT has shown.

No it’s not if you’re using an independent source as ALF507 says.

[FlightDetent]

No it’s not if you’re using an independent source as ALF507 says. high latitudes career, sir? You are still beating the wrong drum. Wrong QNH = correct numbers in view, despite the wrong profile.

[Alex Whittingham]

I think the suggestion is to cross check distance with radio height. The chart being used in this incident had a table of altitude vs distance.

[FlightDetent]

Not on his line of thinking, but it is an excellent idea.

Why not have every​​ NPA publish the radio height at 1000 height point (or equivalent). Alive serious.

The final report will not be nice reading. ​​​​The RA autocall 50, 30, 20 or de-configured (why!) and the RETARD call too at 10.

BTW I recall a training session going very wrong and causing a similar situation. Under workload the orange RA lettering did not deliver the message. The 100 RA preceding 100 above surely did.

The event is exactly verbatim what the CAA.UK document linked above warns about. Also with the explanation why EGPWS could not pick it up.

[slast]

Oldaircrew commented regarding the use of "monitored approach", which many regular readers will know I totally support. While I’m always reluctant to assume too much before a full report is issued, the preliminary report seems to be clear that in this event the crew flew straight through (what they believed to be) the MDA at a constant descent rate of 12 ft/sec, without any visual references. It appears that the need for a go-around was not manifested for a further 6 seconds (72 ft further descent), when the Captain disconnected the autopilot and made a nose-up input, but a full go-around was not initiated for a further 3 seconds when TOGA was applied. So even if the altimeters had been set correctly obstacle clearance would have been infringed – at the lowest point the aircraft was 123 feet below the MDA in full IMC. From the Captain’s actions (autopilot disconnect and stick back and then TOGA power 3 seconds later) it seems likely that he was not mentally prepared for a go-around.

So regardless of the altimetry issue, we have a prima facie serious breach of AOM in that the aircraft descended below the MDA without the Captain having seen visual cues which had [already] “been in view for sufficient time for the pilot to have made an assessment of the aircraft position and rate of change of position in relation to the desired flight path.” (ICAO definition of reqjired visual refernce).

If a monitored approach procedure had been in use it is LIKELY that the go-around would have occurred much earlier, with the F/O flying the go-around for which he/she had been fully prepared, while the Captain would have been seeking visual references prior reaching MDA and responding to a “Decide” call AT MDA. Speculatively only, it’s also possible that as the pilot operating the radio would have been the Captain, the initial incorrect QNH from ATC would have have been more readily queried.
There’s also a (probably irrelevant) discrepancy in that the preliminary report text says the lowest point reached was 0.8nm from the threshold. This places it very close to the Route Nationale N1104, while the Google map trace provided puts it a further 0.2 nm away on the far side of a field. Depending on which is correct, there’s clearly the possibility of the aircraft hitting vehicles at an RA of 6ft.
https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1400x708/threshold_0_8nm_b27fc8f3ac30d00f59bd0a4fa27f023121406fe0.png
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/672x480/near_cfit_paris_2_small__9c0caab8534e4230c16a3dc771299a58898 aa4d5.png

[WHBM]

I've still not seen why they were given the runway with the ILS out of service in these poor conditions. It's bizarre that the country who strove to be the world's first with full Autoland (which the French were, at Paris and Lyon, in the 1960s) lapses down to this.

[Discorde]

Tech solution: ATC data base automatically transmits current local QNH to aircraft ADCs via data link - no humans involved! (Except to check for disparity between received QNH and expected QNH.)

Here's the kit:
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1803x816/altim_set_v4_3258d4df71ed9b3e6752bba73d18b4bead0aae8c.jpg

[MPN11]

Possibly a red herring [ou hareng rouge] but I wondered whether the controller was mentally saturated by certain numbers ...
4311 Callsign
1001 QNH
1011 Wrong QNH

[Youmightsaythat]

And as the correct QNH was given in French, and read back in French, two further opportunities for the crew, to pick up on the error. I will remind those who claim two languages are not an issue when the next collision occurs. tick tock tick tock.

[alf5071h]

“Possibly red herring …”, best grilled slowly.

Even if the view is irrelevant in this incident, it is an important contribution to wider thinking and alternative understandings required in modern aviation.

:ok:

[Uplinker]

ALF507 and Oldaircrew; My point earlier was that the altitude was the thing that was seriously wrong here, not the distance.

With the QNH being grievously wrong; quite why this crew did not notice their low Rad Alt, readings; quite why it did not call out, (maybe pin-programmed off), quite why PF disconnected the auto-pilot in an A320 family to perform a go-around are pertinent questions. Were they completely conversant with RNAV approaches in A320 family?

At 11:32:24 the PM did appear to hesitate when reading back the QNH early on - so there may have been doubt there, but they presumably convinced themselves that they were wrong and assumed ATC were correct.

Can anyone throw more light on EGPWS - should it have called out?

From old copy of Airbus FCOM:

The [EGPWS] reference altitude is computed based on the current aircraft altitude or, if descending more than 1 000 ft/min, the altitude expected in 30 s


My addition and bold

[alf5071h]

Uplinker,

The error appears to be incorrect QNH, which results in erroneous indicated altitude - what the pilots see.

An altitude - range table, based on threshold distance, relates the altitude which should be seen at a specific distance, thus a check of the displayed altitude at x nm would identify an indicated value which was below the required chart altitude - below flight path.

The critical points here are (1) having a chart and (2) an appropriate reference position for distance - ideally the threshold. So with an adequate distance reference, the low altitude / below flight path could be identified (but not necessarily the wrong QNH).
The above does not relate to the report of this incident; see # 149

Rad Alt points noted (value of call outs … ‘Retard’ !!!!), but this assumes that crews regularly check RA indication and that it can be related to the approach; hence my previous rule of thumb - nothing complicated. Also, hearing perception - voice input is the first sense to degrade with increasing workload.

I recall that there should be a min RA in the design of every type of approach, e.g. not less than xxx at FAF; memory fails me, so my >150 ft until visual, if I look at the RA
But what did the crew look at, see?
A lesson to be shared is how the crew identified the need to GA, awareness, understanding, and how this was actioned.


EGPWS VIII Pilots Guide Rev F, dated May 2009 - check for later versions.

“The Terrain Clearance Floor (TCF) function (enabled with TAD) enhances the basic GPWS Modes by alerting the pilot of descent below a defined “Terrain Clearance Floor” regardless of the aircraft configuration. The TCF alert is a function of the aircraft’s Radio Altitude and distance (calculated from latitude/longitude position) relative to the center of the nearest runway in the database (all runways greater than 3500 feet in length).”

Improvements by modification standard:-

“In -210-210 and later versions, the TCF alert envelope and Envelope Bias Factor are improved. … . The Envelope Bias Factor is reduced (moved closer to the runway) when higher accuracy aircraft position and runway position information is available.
This is typically 1/3 to 1 nm providing greater protection against landing short events.
With version -218-218 and later models, the envelope bias factor is reduced to 1/4 nm if runway and position data is of high integrity.
Also in -210-210 and later versions, runway selection logic is improved to better identify the destination runway. Comprehensive aircraft position and navigation information is used to evaluate proximate runways and determine the most likely destination runway for all alerting purposes.”

“In -210-210 and later versions, a Runway Field Clearance Floor feature is included. This is similar to the TCF feature except that RFCF is based on the current aircraft position and height above the destination runway, using Geometric Altitude (in lieu of Radio Altitude).”

A critical aspect of the above is the nav accuracy, and GPS geometric altitude, which should have been sufficient given the type of approach being flown. But not overlooking modification standard and database updates.

I strongly suspect that this aircraft was fitted with T2CAS, an Airbus standard at some point.
I have only evaluated that system in early development thus cannot relate to current performance, but surprising if not equivalent to EGPWS.

Another factor is the generic use of ‘TAWS’, which might mask differences in systems’ capability - regulatory issue (level playing field, ambiguity, etc - the crew will manage, will m…)

.

[FlightDetent]

I strongly suspect what was installed at production was only updated to the minimum regulatory standard by the operator.

Our fleet of 36 planes has only 2x T2CAS and 3x T3CAS. The oldest is 9 years junior to the GetJet ship.

​​​​​​BTW: I can only check the charted values against the altimeter: if it was over reading I will be low despite all the best efforts and DME fixes?

[FullWings]

The error appears to be incorrect QNH, which results in erroneous indicated altitude - what the pilots see.

An altitude - range table, based on threshold distance, relates the altitude which should be seen at a specific distance, thus a check of the displayed altitude at x nm would identify an indicated value which was below the required chart altitude - below flight path.

The critical points here are (1) having a chart and (2) an appropriate reference position for distance - ideally the threshold. So with an adequate distance reference, the low altitude / below flight path could be identified (but not necessarily the wrong QNH).
I think the point that quite a few people on this thread have been making is that, no, you can’t do a meaningful range/altitude check on a Baro-VNAV approach because it will always appear correct: the navigation computers are following a profile based on altitude, which is determined from static pressure and QNH. Get the QNH wrong and the flightpath will be above/below what it should be but the indications will be right, i.e. if the procedure says 3,000’ at 8DME, that’s what you’ll see, even if you’re actually at 2,500’ or 3,500’ at that point.

The only way to cross-check would be to utilise another, independent source, e.g. RAD ALT or GPS. On the charts I have (Lido) there isn’t really enough information in terms of terrain elevation along the approach track to catch any but the grossest of errors. Hence the need to be vigilant over pressure settings.

[KAPAC]

GPS dist to threshold and a dist / alt from there to reflect where the profile is ?

[FougaMagister]

Interesting thread, especially being CDG-based and having operated in and out of it 865 times over the past 15 years. Language is a contributing factor here, if only for the ATCO mis-translating "mille un" by "one zero one one". I remember from Human Performance and R/T lessons that mixing up figures including only ones and zeros is fairly common in English (such as FL100 for FL110, which is why we are supposed to say "Flight Level One Hundred" instead of "Flight Level One Zero Zero", for instance).

However, for those who believe that using a single language would mean that everyone is on the same hymn sheet and that as a result no confusion could occur, check out this past accident: https://aviation-safety.net/database/record.php?id=19890219-0 (Sorry, can't find the official report now!)

I cannot comment on technical specifics as I am not A320 type-rated, but as mentioned in previous posts, I cannot figure out why the crew would accept (and read back) a QNH 10Hp higher than the one broadcast on ATIS. Even with rainshowers going through, a 10Hp difference between the time the ATIS was picked up and the approach time is at best improbable in temperate climes such as CDG's. (I sometimes question on frequency a difference of 1-2Hp). Getting the QNH right is simply paramount on 2-D non-precision approaches.

Oh, and btw... whatever happened to going around at MDA (+50 ft) if not visual?

Cheers :cool:

[Uplinker]

Thanks for the EGPWS info, alf5071h :ok:

[redflyer]

With my previous airline, when ever a GPS approach was carried out, as soon as you approached the FAF equivalent you would report established and ask ATC to confirm the QNH. Anyway, flying into CDG requires all pilots to to exercise threat error management briefing.

[Eutychus]

And as the correct QNH was given in French, and read back in French, two further opportunities for the crew, to pick up on the error. I will remind those who claim two languages are not an issue when the next collision occurs. tick tock tick tock.
I'm more interested in knowing how you propose to overcome this issue. As a linguist, I'm far from convinced that imposing a single language would solve more problems than it might create.

[NoelEvans]

Dear fellow pilots!
You have to be vigilant flying in France. They do funny things!
Be safe.

The reason why I never, ever, ever intend to fly in or out of CDG ever again.

The most dangerous airport that I have flown in and out of.

Reading all of this had just reconfirmed that sentiment.

[alf5071h]

FullWings, #142

“… you can’t do a meaningful range/altitude check on a Baro-VNAV approach“.

You are correct.

Some of my previous points were made as a generic guide applying to NPAs without FMS, this does not apply in this specific Baro-VNAV approach.

However, having an appropriately modified EGPWS using geometric altitude could detect an incorrect QNH. Then again, as above, does this aircraft have EGPWS, or some other system, and would that system have alerted the crew; assuming the system was working.

[ZeBedie]

Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?

[Uplinker]

Certainly should do, and this sort of thing should be caught.

See post #5 :ok:

[Capn Bloggs]

GPS dist to threshold and a dist / alt from there to reflect where the profile is ?
Already published on the chart, but obviously will be in error if the QNH is set incorrectly.

[pineteam]

Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?

I always do that exactly to avoid this kind of potential serious incidents..

[Lookleft]

Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?

I have looked but I can't find the FCOM reference for that procedure.

[ScepticalOptomist]

I have looked but I can't find the FCOM reference for that procedure.

Airmanship isn’t in the FCOM.

[ONE GREEN AND HOPING]

Looking back on my own airline career that began mid 1960s Being English, a working knowledge of core aviation French and Portuguese was protective. French perhaps easier for British with closer links to France than Portuguese for operating into Brazil - especially GIG....!

[SW1]

Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?

Some companies, mine for instance, requires us to set 1013mb before pulling standard passing transition altitude. This is to prevent the wrong level being transmitted to ATC.

We then set QNH when told to descend to an altitude or transition level according to whats been provided by ATC at that time. There is a blunder check where we are supposed to cross check what we've heard with whats on PERF page QNH

[FlightDetent]

set 1013mb before pulling standard passing transition altitude. This is to prevent the wrong level being transmitted to ATC. Understood, the OIT behind this made it to PPRuNe as well. Do you have any knowledge if the issue actually causes problems in your operating region? Within the range of EU seems it does not, despite some zealot calls we managed to survive without it. As someone said - it's not in the FCOM (OEB) and then fortunately there were no complaints.

[DaveReidUK]

Some companies, mine for instance, requires us to set 1013mb before pulling standard passing transition altitude. This is to prevent the wrong level being transmitted to ATC.

AFAIK, the altitude that ATC see on Mode C/Mode S isn't affected by your altimeter setting - it's always based on a 1013 hPa datum.

[SW1]

Understood, the OIT behind this made it to PPRuNe as well. Do you have any knowledge if the issue actually causes problems in your operating region? Within the range of EU seems it does not, despite some zealot calls we managed to survive without it. As someone said - it's not in the FCOM (OEB) and then fortunately there were no complaints.

Ive only been back in Europe less than a year after being in Asia over 9 years so haven't seen if there are any problems if you leave QNH value and just pull standard when passing transition. We never did that in previous companies but at my present European mob flying MSN 2000s its SOP to set 1013 before pulling standard. No info in FCOM either as to why, just in layer 2 of normal procedures,and a mention in a company KORA slide about not transmittjng the wrong level for level bust prevention. My reply was just in response thats its not as simple as just push QNH and hey presto the correct value from ATIS, METAR etc is already there.

[1201alarm]

Doesn't every A320 pilot set QNH on his altimeter in the cruise when the ATIS is received, before reverting straight back to STD? Then when ATC later tells you to go QNH, the correct value should already be displayed?

We do this too, it is procedure, but I guess not coming from Airbus FCOM, it is just a company SOP for both crew members. We also have to compare the QNH given by approach control when descending to an altitude with an alternative source, typically ATIS. On non-precision approaches we again have to confirm QNH with tower.

I still think the machine should do this automatically by comparing QNH on the perf approach page with the QNH set on the FCU once on QNH.

[roundsounds]

"FAF altitude checks, MAP set."

Gross error of altimeter QNH should be evident.
That’s the issue with PBN approaches and incorrect QNH settings, it all looks good. It’s frightening that people flying these approaches don’t understand this risk.

[FlightDetent]

Ive only been back in EuropeI stand geographically corrected.

[sonicbum]

This is a typical case study of QNH blunder error where an SOP such as pre-setting the METAR/ATIS QNH prior to TOD could have prevented the incident. Many operators use this procedure as a safety net and it does work well indeed to trap errors both from the crew side and ATC. I believe that after this event more and more operators will include it in their procedures.

[FlightDetent]

AFAIK, the altitude that ATC see on Mode C/Mode S isn't affected by your altimeter setting - it's always based on a 1013 hPa datum.Mode C is not, however a strange quirk of Airbus avionics suite sends the last used before setting the STD through the downlink S mode.

The extended squitter seems to have a data filed for selected Baro ref, however the last value is retained for transmission instead of STD when the crew changes to that.

Which brings us to another unexpected conclusion. Mode S must have been transmitting Q1011 after this almost doomed crew accepted the wrong instruction.

​​​​​​Hmm, some opportunities there!
​​​​

[fab777]

Dual language instructions always has the potential for an incident. It should be stopped.

Indeed. All in French. All you need is a French level 4.

[SAM 2M]

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[vegassun]

Did this happen at an airshow?

[DaveReidUK]

The extended squitter seems to have a data filed for selected Baro ref, however the last value is retained for transmission instead of STD when the crew changes to that.

Which brings us to another unexpected conclusion. Mode S must have been transmitting Q1011 after this almost doomed crew accepted the wrong instruction.​​​​

AFAIK, baro pressure setting isn't part of the ADS-B extended squitter, but is only sent as part of Mode S EHS, if and when interrogated by SSR.

I don't know whether the CDG controllers typically see it on their screens (either fulltime or as an option) or not.

[FlightDetent]

Point being made, would it not be a useful feature of the ATC kit to automatically track and alert for any selected Baro REF discrepancies of the arriving aircraft?

Surely that was the idea behind having it in the dataset.

[B888]

This is a typical case study of QNH blunder error where an SOP such as pre-setting the METAR/ATIS QNH prior to TOD could have prevented the incident. Many operators use this procedure as a safety net and it does work well indeed to trap errors both from the crew side and ATC. I believe that after this event more and more operators will include it in their procedures.

This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.

[Request Orbit]

Point being made, would it not be a useful feature of the ATC kit to automatically track and alert for any selected Baro REF discrepancies of the arriving aircraft?

Surely that was the idea behind having it in the dataset.

If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised there’s not similar for CDG. Link (https://skybrary.aero/articles/barometric-pressure-setting-advisory-tool-bat)

(Apparently I need to add words to a quote to be able to hit post)

[DaveReidUK]

If this had happened in the LTMA the approach controller would have had a flashing alert on the radar that the wrong QNH was set as soon as they were descending through the TL, surprised there’s not similar for CDG.

The Preliminary Report contains the following Safety Recommendation

Implement without delay, a procedure to mitigate the risks of an incorrect QNH setting affecting both altimeters during approaches using the baro-VNAV function, possibly by crosschecking the QNH with another source of information, in particular with the ATIS information when available or by asking the controller for confirmation of the QNH.

which strongly implies that CDG has no current safety-net involving automated detection of incorrect QNH setting.

The BEA makes no reference to the solution adopted by NATS, though it's anybody's guess whether it is simply avoiding being prescriptive as to the solution that it is recommending CDG should adopt, or whether they are unaware of how other ANSPs tackle the issue.

[Lookleft]

I have looked but I can't find the FCOM reference for that procedure.

Airmanship isn’t in the FCOM.

This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.

That was exactly my point. Trying to fix one point of failure by introducing another point of failure is not airmanship, it is called cultural SOP. With QNH and RNAV approaches, awareness of what the QNH should be from the TAF and comparing it with the ATIS is the best defense. Of course sitting there and just accepting information without cross checking it is certainly not airmanship. Introducing procedures into a flightdeck as a workaround is also not airmanship.

[Check Airman]

This procedure was used by my outfit when we operated Airbus and worked well. However one pitfall ( and this happened on a flight ) is the setting of QNH and forgetting to switch back to STD.
This crew ( PF ) set the QNH but forgot to switch back to STD and was cleared descent to a Flight Level. A Level bust occurred using QNH instead of STD.

We do that at my outfit. We’ll set the QNH while doing the perf app page, about an hour out. What you described shouldn’t happen in an Airbus, as I believe it’ll eventually start flashing at you.

Some people set the destination QNH when climbing through TA on the sid.

Both methods are only technique though.

[ATC Watcher]

DaveReidUK : The BEA makes no reference to the solution adopted by NATS, though it's anybody's guess whether it is simply avoiding being prescriptive as to the solution that it is recommending CDG should adopt, or whether they are unaware of how other ANSPs tackle the issue.
It is the second option. afaik.

[fdr]

When we sit in our aircraft, we have in front of us 120 year old pressure displayed instruments.... we also have a display that gives our geometric altitude, and a synthetic view of the world in front, including terrain alerting and obstacles. Operating into an airfield that is 6,000' up and -30C makes it desirable to actually know what your physical separation from bad days are. In this event, the crew would have received an alert that they were landing in a paddock, outside of the passengers preferred arrival location, and they would see a FPV that was aiming 1nm short of the runway threshold, the display would show the threshold moving away from the FPV at an ever increasing rate until it gets rowdy.

Point is, our safety is predicated on a weak system of communications, mon dieu, and placing the fix at the same side that is already showing problems with task saturation and process maintenance seems to be less than optimal. The people with the vested interest in arrival at the correct place in space if not time are the drivers.

At cruise, the difference is a curiosity, geometric altitude is normally around 1500' higher than the FL, but it remains quite stable for periods dependent on the airmass, on an approach, the PA and geometric altitude converge, and at around 3000' PA there is normally not more than 20' error at ISA, but as per cold temp correction factors, there is considerable difference to the uncorrected PA altitude... If the corrections are correctly applied, or the G/S is a valid (geometric) track, then the FPA sits on the end of the runway. There is no cognitive load to looking at a happy map of the world in front, and this display is specifically not corrected to PA for the very reason that we want to see real world, not someones communicated information on the local airmass characteristics.

It happens to display on an iPad, it can display on an iPhone... Could it be added as a display to any aircraft? of course, but there is no current TSO standard that would be relevant to such a display, as we are firmly committed to the 18th century in technology.


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[Youmightsaythat]

I suspect 99% of the replies on here have missed the overriding law in aviation.

Its referred to as 'tombstone safety'. Nothing changes until there are deaths and it costs more in insurance payouts than to fix the problem.

How much would it cost, apart from the dint in nationalistic pride, for it to be compulsory for English to be used at one of the busiest airports in Europe. Let's remember standard RT phraseology does not mean having to be fluent. Indeed if you said 'QNH' to a typical Englishman you might as well be talking Mandarin. How hard can it be?

[WideScreen]

I suspect 99% of the replies on here have missed the overriding law in aviation.

Its referred to as 'tombstone safety'. Nothing changes until there are deaths and it costs more in insurance payouts than to fix the problem.

How much would it cost, apart from the dint in nationalistic pride, for it to be compulsory for English to be used at one of the busiest airports in Europe. Let's remember standard RT phraseology does not mean having to be fluent. Indeed if you said 'QNH' to a typical Englishman you might as well be talking Mandarin. How hard can it be?
Fortunately, for this situation, the third one got the correct QNH in French instead of the wrong one in English. Otherwise, that aircraft might have created a real smoking hole.

I did not see an explanation/assumption in the report, why the ATC got it wrong in English.

[WideScreen]

When we sit in our aircraft, we have in front of us 120 year old pressure displayed instruments.... we also have a display that gives our geometric altitude, and a synthetic view of the world in front, including terrain alerting and obstacles. Operating into an airfield that is 6,000' up and -30C makes it desirable to actually know what your physical separation from bad days are. In this event, the crew would have received an alert that they were landing in a paddock, outside of the passengers preferred arrival location, and they would see a FPV that was aiming 1nm short of the runway threshold, the display would show the threshold moving away from the FPV at an ever increasing rate until it gets rowdy.

Point is, our safety is predicated on a weak system of communications, mon dieu, and placing the fix at the same side that is already showing problems with task saturation and process maintenance seems to be less than optimal. The people with the vested interest in arrival at the correct place in space if not time are the drivers.

At cruise, the difference is a curiosity, geometric altitude is normally around 1500' higher than the FL, but it remains quite stable for periods dependent on the airmass, on an approach, the PA and geometric altitude converge, and at around 3000' PA there is normally not more than 20' error at ISA, but as per cold temp correction factors, there is considerable difference to the uncorrected PA altitude... If the corrections are correctly applied, or the G/S is a valid (geometric) track, then the FPA sits on the end of the runway. There is no cognitive load to looking at a happy map of the world in front, and this display is specifically not corrected to PA for the very reason that we want to see real world, not someones communicated information on the local airmass characteristics.

It happens to display on an iPad, it can display on an iPhone... Could it be added as a display to any aircraft? of course, but there is no current TSO standard that would be relevant to such a display, as we are firmly committed to the 18th century in technology.


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fdr I agree with your writing, though my issue is, that this "tool" still is the (admittedly much better) primary driver for the flight path.

What we are missing is the "independent and automated verification" of what flight path the flight crew creates/follows with the tools they have available (or should have available in the ideal situation). The verifier is the one that saves the lives, when the flight crew screws up, for whatever reason.

[Eutychus]

I suspect 99% of the replies on here have missed the overriding law in aviation.

Its referred to as 'tombstone safety'. Nothing changes until there are deaths and it costs more in insurance payouts than to fix the problem.

How much would it cost, apart from the dint in nationalistic pride, for it to be compulsory for English to be used at one of the busiest airports in Europe. Let's remember standard RT phraseology does not mean having to be fluent. Indeed if you said 'QNH' to a typical Englishman you might as well be talking Mandarin. How hard can it be?

Harder than you might think, in my view.

Various suggestions have been made about how the initial incorrect value could or should have been caught, irrespective of how that incorrect value came to be communicated by ATC. They are way outside my area of expertise, but language use isn't, and my conviction, informed by professional and personal experience, is that requiring people who share a native language to communicate in a non-native language is a recipe for poor communication and potentially just as great a problem as any due to the use of multiple languages.

[safetypee]

There is considerable focus on the human aspects of this incident, but consider the technologies supposed to catch human error; why didn't they work.

[Youmightsaythat]

I think a few flights into or out of CDG when it is busy and thunderstorms are about would concentrate your mind on if the use of French and English is a serious problem.

[deltahotel]

Eutychus. I think all the aviators on here see where you’re coming from. However….. consider my own airline which is by no means unique. Until recently with 20 odd nationalities on the flight deck operating in pretty much every country in Europe plus a few others every day. Much as I’d love to have level 4 or better in multiple languages, it’s not going to happen. Picture our Italian/Spanish flight deck into Cdg speaking French, or (just as bad) Scandi/German going to Spanish speaking Madrid or indeed any European flight deck going to native speaking China.

I guess in specific cases (probably regional airports) operating national airline only, native language could work but otherwise I can’t see how anything other than a common language could be safe. Fortunately for linguistically lazy Brits that language happens to be English.

[MPN11]

I recall many many years ago, as a Mil Controller on the rather 'interesting' Clacton Sector, handling a 4-ship of Italian F-104s heading for home. Only the lead seemed to speak English, and he thus translated everything I said into Italian for the benefit of the rest of the formation. Mercifully neither I, nor the frequency, were particularly busy.

[FlightDetent]

As much as I think there's bigger galaxy-class cruisers to fry on this one compared to the dual language at CDG (which bites different ways)

​​​​​​.
.
​​​​​​.

Did the French not file a variation? Instead of spelling the Kweu-enh-aich they verbalise Quebec-November-Hotel?

[Eutychus]

Eutychus. I think all the aviators on here see where you’re coming from. However….. consider my own airline which is by no means unique. Until recently with 20 odd nationalities on the flight deck operating in pretty much every country in Europe plus a few others every day. Much as I’d love to have level 4 or better in multiple languages, it’s not going to happen. Picture our Italian/Spanish flight deck into Cdg speaking French, or (just as bad) Scandi/German going to Spanish speaking Madrid or indeed any European flight deck going to native speaking China.

I guess in specific cases (probably regional airports) operating national airline only, native language could work but otherwise I can’t see how anything other than a common language could be safe. Fortunately for linguistically lazy Brits that language happens to be English.

Thanks for your response. I think you slightly misunderstand where I'm coming from.
I have absolutely no problem with there being a standard aviation language and there are plenty of arguments in favour of it being English.
I would also expect ATC at any international airport (as well as pilots!) to have a sufficient command of it.
The point I'm trying to make is that no matter how good the respective parties' English may be, it's never going to be as fluid as them using a shared native language if they do share one.
And it's with that in mind that I'm disputing the notion that making CDG English-speaking only would make it a safer airport considering the number of parties talking to each other whose mutually shared native language is French.

Anecdote: Calling my internet provider helpline, I once happened on a tech support guy here in France whose native language was audibly English. Both their French and mine were excellent (my basis for this claim on my part is that I make a living out of being fluent in both), but I can't tell you how frustrating it was trying to troubleshoot the problem in what was not our non-native language because his company policy required it.

[Maninthebar]

Many many posts referencing language difficulties but.....

QNH is a very simple datum

What prevents HAL being responsible for this?

[Youmightsaythat]

Anecdote: Calling my internet provider helpline, I once happened on a tech support guy here in France whose native language was audibly English. Both their French and mine were excellent (my basis for this claim on my part is that I make a living out of being fluent in both), but I can't tell you how frustrating it was trying to troubleshoot the problem in what was not our non-native language because his company policy required it.

Give me an altitude, a speed, a heading a QNH and a runway...Thats wall we need.

[jumpseater]

Seeing a problem is not the same thing as identifying an appropriate solution, and may not be the same thing as seeing the predominant problem.

In the case you relate above the first question in my SLF mind is the grounds on which ATC cleared an aircraft for takeoff when they had been informed of FOD on the runway.
..
SLF noted :-)
There are no grounds for clearing an aircraft for take off with FOD/suspected FOD on a runway. Procedure should be to check the report even if it incurs delays to arrival or departures.

[Eutychus]

SLF noted :-)
There are no grounds for clearing an aircraft for take off with FOD/suspected FOD on a runway. Procedure should be to check the report even if it incurs delays to arrival or departures.
That was kind of my point. The root problem in the FOD incident referred to is not which language was being used but why suspected FOD didn't lead to a runway check. In my SLF view over-fixation on the language issue here may lead to other more serious problems being overlooked.

[Eutychus]

Give me an altitude, a speed, a heading a QNH and a runway...Thats wall we need.
Isn't that what precisely the aircraft in the incident in your original post got, in English? (Or at least thought it got?). How would *mandating* the use of English have prevented this incident?

[First_Principal]

...how frustrating it was trying to troubleshoot the problem in what was not our non-native language because his company policy required it.

? I would have thought that conversing in 'not your non-native language' would have improved things, but then again if you used a lot of double-negatives I can see how it would get frustrating :} !

[Eutychus]

? I would have thought that conversing in 'not your non-native language' would have improved things, but then again if you used a lot of double-negatives I can see how it would get frustrating :} !
But look how easy it is to clear up the misunderstanding between native speakers :}

[ATC Watcher]

Always amazed to see how the language issue is alawys coming back here to the French , and CDG as if it was the only country and only airport in the world using dual language.
This acident is not a language issue. Actually you could turn this argument around, if English had been mandated for all aircrfaft in CDG that day , the QNH passed to the AF would most likely been 1011 as well., so in fact decreasing significantly the overall saftey by increasing the risk to other aircraft. .
I always was and still am all for a single global language in the R/T , but I also know that there is absolutely zero chance of having this pass any ICAO meeting., even more today than in 1944 with nationalsim on the rise everywhere. Language is cultural and part of a State Sovereingty and a change is never going to happen , Same as having the US adopting the metric system ( which is the international ICAO standard btw) . So we all have learned to live with these and mitigate the shortcomings.

[Compton3fox]

You are correct the 'official; report did not highlight this as being a serious problem. Now I wonder why that might be? Can I suggest you look at the FACTS of the crash. When you have, get back to me and tell me that this wasn't a major factor.
The TWR controller "did not notice" the circled '16' annotation on the strip. Just over two minutes after the transfer to listen out on TWR, with the 737 having meanwhile landed and passed in front of the SD330 waiting on taxiway 16 before clearing the runway, TWR cleared the MD83 (in French) for take-off. Five seconds after this, the SD330 was instructed by TWR (in English) to "line up runway 27 and wait, number 2". On receipt of this clearance, its crew then began to taxi onto the runway "whilst looking for the Number 1"

It doesn't seem the comms in French and English was a major factor. The SD330 knew there was an A/C on the runway as they were looking for it. It seems the root cause was clearing the A/C onto the runway into the path of another A/C already rolling as the TWR controller thought it was behind the MD. No2 implies there is an A/C to depart before you. Of course, hearing "Clear for Take-off" in English just before you are cleared to Line up and wait No2, may have provoked a different reaction but it equally may have made no difference. To say the language difference was the cause, I don't think is backed up by the facts.

[Youmightsaythat]

The TWR controller "did not notice" the circled '16' annotation on the strip. Just over two minutes after the transfer to listen out on TWR, with the 737 having meanwhile landed and passed in front of the SD330 waiting on taxiway 16 before clearing the runway, TWR cleared the MD83 (in French) for take-off. Five seconds after this, the SD330 was instructed by TWR (in English) to "line up runway 27 and wait, number 2". On receipt of this clearance, its crew then began to taxi onto the runway "whilst looking for the Number 1"

It doesn't seem the comms in French and English was a major factor. The SD330 knew there was an A/C on the runway as they were looking for it. It seems the root cause was clearing the A/C onto the runway into the path of another A/C already rolling as the TWR controller thought it was behind the MD. No2 implies there is an A/C to depart before you. Of course, hearing "Clear for Take-off" in English just before you are cleared to Line up and wait No2, may have provoked a different reaction but it equally may have made no difference. To say the language difference was the cause, I don't think is backed up by the facts.

So he would have lined up if he had just heard an aircraft that had not yet passed him was cleared to take off?

[Oldaircrew]

Isn't that what precisely the aircraft in the incident in your original post got, in English? (Or at least thought it got?). How would *mandating* the use of English have prevented this incident?

I’m sure that if everyone on the frequency is given 1001 and you’re given 1011, you’ll be suspicious and query it. Furthermore, if the ATC is constantly giving out 1001, the odds on them giving you 1011, will be greatly reduced.

[fdr]

fdr I agree with your writing, though my issue is, that this "tool" still is the (admittedly much better) primary driver for the flight path.

What we are missing is the "independent and automated verification" of what flight path the flight crew creates/follows with the tools they have available (or should have available in the ideal situation). The verifier is the one that saves the lives, when the flight crew screws up, for whatever reason.


I get that, but say trying to fly in Paris, Bhutan, or around Mongolia, Kunming, South Korea in winter, and the error is easily greater than the 10mb in this case. Had a crew do an autoland once before they got to minima... Using PA below about FL180 is a technical backwardness. The system isn't going to change anytime soon, but in the interim, the next panel upgrade I'm doing to my jets includes space for an iPad as the EFB, and for general "SA" benefits. It already interfaces with the APFD and C145 nav systems. Geometric altitude is where there be dragons, that's the info I find nice to have on hand.

On a GPS based 3d source, if the aiming point is 3 degrees below the horizon, that is where you are going if you are flying your 3 degree path.

[derjodel]

Fortunately for linguistically lazy Brits that language happens to be English.

I speak a few languages, and English is by far the simplest one. Seriously, the most complicated thing in English is spelling, which is irrelevant for phraseology. It's a very good choice for an international language.

[Compton3fox]

So he would have lined up if he had just heard an aircraft that had not yet passed him was cleared to take off?
Nowhere was it stated that the A/C had not yet passed him. It was just a T/O clearance. It also stated 'while looking for No. 1' Now if he thought No1 was to his right, I would have thought he would not have entered the active runway.

[WideScreen]

I get that, but say trying to fly in Paris, Bhutan, or around Mongolia, Kunming, South Korea in winter, and the error is easily greater than the 10mb in this case.
I am not sure, what you want to state with this. Of course, with cold temperature, the effective height is lower as the PA, though the (really) closer you get to the ground, the more the PA display in the aircraft starts matching the factual height, corresponding with the given airport QNH, suffering from the same cold (inversions may give surprising effects, the Theta diagrams tend to be pretty irregular). The vertical flight path to the airport is no longer a straight-in-the-vertical flight-path in GPS/ground terms, though in PA terms, it still could be, though with variable VS in the GPS/ground system. Please correct me, when I get you wrong.
Had a crew do an autoland once before they got to minima...
If that wasn't an off-airport encounter, the off-height might have been (less than) 30 ft, 1 mb. Given the persistent rounding to whole digits, in digital calculations, just the reachable accuracy.

Using PA below about FL180 is a technical backwardness. The system isn't going to change anytime soon, but in the interim, the next panel upgrade I'm doing to my jets includes space for an iPad as the EFB, and for general "SA" benefits. It already interfaces with the APFD and C145 nav systems. Geometric altitude is where there be dragons, that's the info I find nice to have on hand.
I wise thing to have, and it could be a NG-EGPWS, if it does have the synthetically calculated cone, to warn for being too far outside the normal (granted, ground based) approach gradient.
On a GPS based 3d source, if the aiming point is 3 degrees below the horizon, that is where you are going if you are flying your 3 degree path.
Yep, though, hey, when doing a PA based approach, we aren't aiming with a 3 degrees glideslope from a 10000+ ft PA, as if it would be in the GPS/ground reference system.

[fdr]

I am not sure, what you want to state with this. Of course, with cold temperature, the effective height is lower as the PA, though the (really) closer you get to the ground, the more the PA display in the aircraft starts matching the factual height, corresponding with the given airport QNH, suffering from the same cold (inversions may give surprising effects, the Theta diagrams tend to be pretty irregular). The vertical flight path to the airport is no longer a straight-in-the-vertical flight-path in GPS/ground terms, though in PA terms, it still could be, though with variable VS in the GPS/ground system. Please correct me, when I get you wrong.

If that wasn't an off-airport encounter, the off-height might have been (less than) 30 ft, 1 mb. Given the persistent rounding to whole digits, in digital calculations, just the reachable accuracy.
I wise thing to have, and it could be a NG-EGPWS, if it does have the synthetically calculated cone, to warn for being too far outside the normal (granted, ground based) approach gradient.
Yep, though, hey, when doing a PA based approach, we aren't aiming with a 3 degrees glideslope from a 10000+ ft PA, as if it would be in the GPS/ground reference system.

Wide, you are quite correct normally, a QNH given at an airport will give a value that should be correct at that altitude for the conditions. which is why this one airport was perplexing, the errors at the approach end of the runway led to a number of odd approaches. Temp correction factors should correct for colder than ISA temperatures for altitudes above the reference datum, which should be the airfield itself. Everywhere else that seems to work quite well, except for one location. That location was very terrain affected on the approach, and was non-radar, so the concerns were related to the initial approach and then the rest up to the final fix. Then came the surprise reports on late finals... Why, not resolved in my time.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1578x966/screen_shot_2022_07_22_at_8_02_42_pm_089838cc80998bf98592be9 494ad3f2812669809.png

[WideScreen]

Wide, you are quite correct normally, a QNH given at an airport will give a value that should be correct at that altitude for the conditions. which is why this one airport was perplexing, the errors at the approach end of the runway led to a number of odd approaches. Temp correction factors should correct for colder than ISA temperatures for altitudes above the reference datum, which should be the airfield itself. Everywhere else that seems to work quite well, except for one location. That location was very terrain affected on the approach, and was non-radar, so the concerns were related to the initial approach and then the rest up to the final fix. Then came the surprise reports on late finals... Why, not resolved in my time.


Thanks for your confirm.

Actually, that table is a very mean one. The temperature in the vertical is not a "deviation from normalcy" temperature (as one would expect for a "correction" table), though, simply the absolute temperature (in Degrees Celsius, not Kelvin). Add a row with +15C at the top, and the first 4-5 columns will read "0".

IF only a handful of airports are "slightly" off with their PA, my first thought would be "just a calibration error", or, if not persistent, "just rounding". Or maybe something like "humidity" or just up/down drafts due to local geography is relevant ?

[redsnail]

.
By the way the Shorts Captain statement was relatively clear, , very sadly he committed suicide 6 months later. A second victim of this tragic accident.
No he didn't. I was flying with him for a couple of years after the event.

[Denti]

Harder than you might think, in my view.

Various suggestions have been made about how the initial incorrect value could or should have been caught, irrespective of how that incorrect value came to be communicated by ATC. They are way outside my area of expertise, but language use isn't, and my conviction, informed by professional and personal experience, is that requiring people who share a native language to communicate in a non-native language is a recipe for poor communication and potentially just as great a problem as any due to the use of multiple languages.

I would disagree. Yes, english is a tertiary language for me, but it is the primary language in a professional context. Since we do not use „free“ language in ATC communications but rather a very specific and prescribed phraseology, it is not normal english, or normal french, spanish or german for that matter. Quite honestly, using my native language in my home country for ATC would reduce my mental capacity, situational awareness and speed of communication. Simply because i always have to think about the correct phraseology which i haven’t used in over 25 years (and i have been based in my home country nearly all that time).

And of course there is the pesky issue of not being able to get full situational awareness and a correct mental model incase of multiple language use on frequency. Had that demonstrated once in MAD of all places, an Iberia (spanish communication) and us (english) under the control of the same ground controller got a conflicting clearance that could have resulted in some bent metal at the next intersection. It was easily solved by our colleagues in the Iberia by switching to english and querying that clearance prompting the ATCO to reply in english as well assuring that both crews and the controller had the same mental model. In the air conflicts are not always as easy to see and to solve, where dual language use is common.

“French ATC“ and „Spanish ATC“ are the number one threats during the TEM discussion in the briefing in those places.

[Nil by mouth]

“French ATC“ and „Spanish ATC“ are the number one threats during the TEM discussion in the briefing in those places.

Even when English is spoken by ATC, heavy accents can be a problem.
General aviation flying out of Jerez with Swiss friend who was handling comms and seemed to be concurring with ATC, I said that his command of English was better than mine because I could hardly understand a word of what was being said. Neither did I was his reply!
We got to Córdoba without incident.

[Lake1952]

Look, lots of Americans have trouble understanding a native English speaker in the UK, especially Scotland.

[Youmightsaythat]

I would disagree. Yes, english is a tertiary language for me, but it is the primary language in a professional context. Since we do not use „free“ language in ATC communications but rather a very specific and prescribed phraseology, it is not normal english, or normal french, spanish or german for that matter. Quite honestly, using my native language in my home country for ATC would reduce my mental capacity, situational awareness and speed of communication. Simply because i always have to think about the correct phraseology which i haven’t used in over 25 years (and i have been based in my home country nearly all that time).

And of course there is the pesky issue of not being able to get full situational awareness and a correct mental model incase of multiple language use on frequency. Had that demonstrated once in MAD of all places, an Iberia (spanish communication) and us (english) under the control of the same ground controller got a conflicting clearance that could have resulted in some bent metal at the next intersection. It was easily solved by our colleagues in the Iberia by switching to english and querying that clearance prompting the ATCO to reply in english as well assuring that both crews and the controller had the same mental model. In the air conflicts are not always as easy to see and to solve, where dual language use is common.

“French ATC“ and „Spanish ATC“ are the number one threats during the TEM discussion in the briefing in those places.

In the words of the Bard....'Nailed it'.

[tdracer]

Look, lots of Americans have trouble understanding a native English speaker in the UK, especially Scotland.
A little over 30 years ago, I went to Derby, England to take an RB211 maintenance course. The course was 2 weeks long and about half the class was made up of Derby locals, so they got together and set up a 'Pub Crawl' for the class.
Several Pub's into the Crawl, I was approached by an older Brit, who started speaking to me in such a thick accent that all I could make out was he knew I was an American and American's were "Okay". In frustration, I asked some of the local classmates for help in figuring out what the guy was saying. They laughed and said they couldn't understand him either :uhoh:. I finally decided he wanted me to buy him a beer and I figured what the heck - but when I got out some money it became apparent that he wanted to buy me a beer - because I was an 'American and Okay' :D.
I politely declined his offer (I was on an expense account anyway at the time), but I can only assume based on his age and the few words I could make out that he was trying to thank me (and Americans in general) for helping the British against the Nazi's in WWII.

[axefurabz]

Look, lots of Americans have trouble understanding a native English speaker in the UK, especially Scotland.

Actually, lots of Brits have trouble understanding (some) native English speakers in the UK.

[Eutychus]

Since we do not use „free“ language in ATC communications but rather a very specific and prescribed phraseology, it is not normal english, or normal french, spanish or german for that matter.
I don't spend my time listening to ATC transmissions but I don't get the impression that they are one hundred percent "specific and prescribed phraseology", even if there are core standard phrases. Especially not when an unexpected incident occurs.
More broadly, I think there's a problem treating any spoken language as just another form of code. Different accents are just the start of the issue. Cultures also interfere. Even the way people perceive English (native speakers and non-native speakers) differs. Some cultures are readier to adopt English purely for a specific professional use than others. Different interpretations and applications are always possible, too. For instance, I see a lot of discussion on here about the use of PAN PAN and MAYDAY on either side of the pond.

[Youmightsaythat]

I don't spend my time listening to ATC transmissions but I don't get the impression that they are one hundred percent "specific and prescribed phraseology",

99% of the time they should be. Can I ask...are you a pilot? If not you will not understand the circumstances behind the situation. A recent poll on Linkedin asked " Do you consider ATC RT transmissions in multiple languages at major international airports has"...currently the voting is as follows

NO Effect on safety 2%

A detrimental effect on safety 96%

Dont Know 2%

I think that is the reality that pilots see every day

[SASless]

Look, lots of Americans have trouble understanding a native English speaker in the UK, especially Scotland.

Especially if it is Gaelic!

But then there is Welsh, Scouse, Geordy, and a few other dialects/accents that trip us up as well.

[Eutychus]

99% of the time they should be. Can I ask...are you a pilot? If not you will not understand the circumstances behind the situation.

I've stated since the outset of this conversation that I'm SLF. If you want to ignore everything else I say on that basis, feel free. However, I do make a living out of knowing a thing or two about language. I freely admit to not understanding *all* the circumstances behind the situation, but I would like you to consider that *some* of the circumstances behind the situation might be better appraised by people who aren't pilots but who can bring an outside perspective with relevant expertise.

A recent poll on Linkedin asked " Do you consider ATC RT transmissions in multiple languages at major international airports has"...currently the voting is as follows

NO Effect on safety 2%

A detrimental effect on safety 96%

Dont Know 2%

Like most surveys the outcome depends a lot on how the question is framed, and LinkedIn is hardly a respected polling organisaion seeking a representative sample, etc.
I think that is the reality that pilots see every day
If you read upthread, you'll see I acknowledged some time ago that multiple languages certainly are a problem. The question that interests me, and that comes with my outside perspective, is whether replacing them in this setting with a single language might not run the risk of creating other, more serious problems.
By the way, an important point you haven't addressed upthread is that in the instance you cite at CDG in your opening post, the communication error was in English. Would you be happy accepting a universal aviation language that wasn't English?

[Youmightsaythat]

I I freely admit to not understanding *all* the circumstances behind the situation, but I would like you to consider that *some* of the circumstances behind the situation might be better appraised by people who aren't pilots but who can bring an outside perspective with relevant expertise.

Therefore you are not aware of the vitally important aspect, as a non pilot, of situation awareness. Knowing who is doing what and when is crucial. The fact is it is English that was adopted as the Language of the air.

Like most surveys the outcome depends a lot on how the question is framed, and LinkedIn is hardly a respected polling organisaion seeking a representative sample, etc.

Thats why the question was framed as it was. Can you see any issue with the 'framing'? Feel free to put a poll up here and see what the reaction is, but dont hold your breath that the outcome from international pilots would be any different.

If you read upthread, you'll see I acknowledged some time ago that multiple languages certainly are a problem. The question that interests me, and that comes with my outside perspective, is whether replacing them in this setting with a single language might not run the risk of creating other, more serious problems.

It hasn't, unless someone knows differently, happened in, for example Germany.

By the way, an important point you haven't addressed upthread is that in the instance you cite at CDG in your opening post, the communication error was in English. Would you be happy accepting a universal aviation language that wasn't English?

If it was a requirement to speak Mandarin and you wanted to be a pilot...you would learn Standard RT Mandarin. I had to lean Mose Code. It's what you do. I taught Malaysian airline cadets, in Malaysia. I leant to speak Malay. I gave ground school and flight lessons in English.

Still unsure, here are some of the comments from the linked in poll

"Absolutely degrading to safety."

"Situational Awareness (SA) is the key to a pilot’s survival. When you take a sense away (RT) you are lowering a pilot’s SA. When non-English RT is being used the risk increases. Proximate traffic speed/altitude info gets lost. Altimeter setting readings, wind reports, ATC frequencies all become useless to the non-lingual. This all has huge relevance to the world I’ve flown in over the last 30+ years and continues to increase as airspace useage intensifies. There is a good reason for being ICAO signatories; it’s called safety."

"You just have to fly regularly in to one of the Paris airports or places like Madrid / Rome when it’s busy and it becomes pretty clear what the effect multiple languages in ATC RT has, can have, on safety."

"It’s absolutely lethal."

"It is not just transmissions between ATC and Aircraft which must be carried out in one universal language. You will get transmissions BETWEEN aircraft too when required, especially when observations and messages need to be quickly passed. It always helps a crew to understand what is being said by other aircraft in the vicinity, especially near or on an airfield.

Communication saves lives."

[Eutychus]

Therefore you are not aware of the vitally important aspect, as a non pilot, of situation awareness.

I know what situational awareness is, and reading this forum makes me pay attention to SA when I'm driving my car. I'm prepared to learn from the expertise of others and apply it in my own field. Are you?

The fact is it is English that was adopted as the Language of the air.

Great. But that doesn't solve all the problems, especially when it comes to native English speakers:

Although the language proficiency of L1 English aviation professionals may typically be considered to be equivalent to Expert Level 6 on the ICAO Scale, they may also be sub-standard communicators in Aviation English, specifically by being prone to the use of non-standard terms, demonstrating impatience with non-native speakers, and speaking excessively, as well as too quickly. Such native speaker failings tend to worsen in emergency situations source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aviation_English

In other words, adopting English as a universal aviation language will not solve all the problems, neither does it put the onus on resolving those problems solely on non-native speakers. Would you agree?

Thats why the question was framed as it was. Can you see any issue with the 'framing'? I think whoever asked that question wanted the answer to be an overwhelming "a detrimental effect on safety". A more open question might have been "how would you rate the following factors in order of risk at major international airports", and even then one's choice of options would skew the findings. I note that in the other incident you referred to, language confusion was ruled out by aviation professionals as a contributing factor.

Feel free to put a poll up here and see what the reaction is As pointed out in my previous posts, straw polls on social media are not the same thing as a professionally organised poll.

"Communication saves lives."Of course it does. What I don't think you've acknowledged so far is that single language use does not remove all barriers to communication, even between native speakers.

For one thing, it gives non-native speakers of the 'universal' language a false sense of security that they understand each other perfectly because they are speaking the same language. My most lucrative jobs come from situations, usually with plenty of lawyers in attendance, in which it's become apparent that this is not the case (fortunately none involving fatalities so far).
For another, as the Wikipedia article points out, the way native and non-native speakers use a language differs and can in some cases make communication more difficult.

The fact is that we live in a multilingual world and language, even codified language, is not wholly unambiguous. Imposing a single language is not going to solve all communication problems and may well create others. In my view over-insistence on this aspect is likely to mask other contributing factors to incidents, and that would not be a good thing.

[Clop_Clop]

The OP said that a difference of ±1 hPa would not trigger an alert, so why would you expect large numbers of false alarms ?

Good point, still would get nuisance alerts in most cases i think, whenever the QNH set on the alt would be more than the limit... You also introduce an issue if the reference is wrong triggering a alert even if the set QNH is correct. I am sure there is a better way to design this instead of a comparison like that. If there is a need perhaps as mentioned one better is to upload the correct qnh...

[galacticosh]

[QUOTE=Eutychus;11272716]I know what situational awareness is, and reading this forum makes me pay attention to SA when I'm driving my car. I'm prepared to learn from the expertise of others and apply it in my own field. Are you?

Experienced pilots are among the most highly trained and experienced professionals in communication across all industries. We are aware of its limitations as we experience this every day. As such we are always open to new communication learning as ways to reduce errors and threats. However, maybe not from a SLF on an online forum.

“In other words, adopting English as a universal aviation language will not solve all the problems, neither does it put the onus on resolving those problems solely on non-native speakers. Would you agree?”

We use standard phraseology, that way the use of one language works well. Any comments on this thread about English being chosen as opposed to another language are just hot air. It’s already happened. We could switch to Klingon and use standard phraseology and have local languages like in this case, and the same problems would continue to occur.

[FlightDetent]

Experienced pilots are among the most highly trained and experienced professionals in communication across all industries. We are aware of its limitations as we experience this every day. As such we are always open to new communication learning as ways to reduce errors and threats.
Wouldn't it be nice if some of this was actually true.

[Eutychus]

We use standard phraseology, that way the use of one language works well. Any comments on this thread about English being chosen as opposed to another language are just hot air. It’s already happened. We could switch to Klingon and use standard phraseology and have local languages like in this case, and the same problems would continue to occur.Can you spell out for me exactly how your comment relates to the incident mentioned in the OP?

The "standard phraseology" didn't prevent the wrong value from being given. In English. The only difference I can see had English been the only ATC language is that the incorrect value (which is the root problem here, isn't it?) would very likely have been passed on to *everyone*.

[Busbuoy]

Can you spell out for me exactly how your comment relates to the incident mentioned in the OP?

The "standard phraseology" didn't prevent the wrong value from being given. In English. The only difference I can see had English been the only ATC language is that the incorrect value (which is the root problem here, isn't it?) would very likely have been passed on to *everyone*.

Surely you're missing the point that the incorrect value was given to just this one aircraft.

I would strongly suggest that if the CDG controllers used only English language phraseology at all times this incident would not have happened. If they weren't continually flipping between the standard language and French they would probably not have made the error to begin with. Even if they had had a momentary lapse and confused 1011 and 1001 in one transmission, the error would likely have been detected quickly when the correct QNH was transmitted to all other aircraft IN ENGLISH. The fact that the majority of these other transmissions were in a language foreign to the incident crew reduced their opportunity to catch the error.

As to the reasons for the Gallic refusal to adhere to the language stipulated as standard by ICAO (behaviour stubbornly echoed in China, I might add), who can say. It may be that domestic aviation in France would be drastically hindered by deficiencies in English language proficiency amongst the pilot population (it would certainly be in China), it may be national pride. But it's more fun to consider that it's sour grapes. Just be thankful the standard language isn't Esperanto.

[FlightDetent]

In 4 years the domestic PRC will have the largest traffic flow of all global regions. If they had been forced to use English phraseologies, surely some problems would appear now and then just because of that and the overall safety levels at the busiest world's busiest theatre would reduce.

That is part of what the linguist SLF gentleman had been saying. For all those who failed to understand his message or learn the meaning of it despite waving the flag of professionally utilizing those two very skills.

There are 6 official ICAO languages but that is not the point since the language of international aviation really is English.

Every country is allowed to use their own language and this cannot be disrespected. What happens at CDG and other French airports is select few of the local pilots insist on speaking their own at the detriment of the whole team.

When the CDG ATC tried to mandate English it's the French pilot unions who stood up against the order. Imagine that, a worker's union protecting the individual's legal right against unlawful rulings. Can't have the whole pie and eat it, dears.

All this talk of the French in use completely throws the focus off centre.

Unacceptable performance by a bottom paying operator by pilots without proper work contracts flying unsuspecting Western public.

Dysfunctional ATC reacation to low altitude alert.

Substandard Airport equipment in marginal weather. Which is not only safety issue but an economic too. Everybody pays good money to them to be ready for arriving aircraft.

​I don't read too many threads on PPRuNe about Binter speaking Spanish at Fuerteventura, the odd Dash 8 doing the same at Madrid. Italian at Palermo, Greek at Santorini, Russian at Moscow.


​​​​​​

[Eutychus]

FlightDetent, thank you.

I would strongly suggest that if the CDG controllers used only English language phraseology at all times this incident would not have happened.It seems just as likely to me that if only English had been used for all communications, the mistaken value could have been broadcast to all aircraft. Sure, that might have increased the chances of it being caught, but at the cost of multiplying the potential for similiar incidents with similarly inattentive crew.

If they weren't continually flipping between the standard language and French they would probably not have made the error to begin with.Again, I'm not sure. Remember the mistaken value was given in the non-native language. The issue here from a linguistic point of view isn't what that language is, it's that it's the ATC's non-native language. In my experience numbers are one of the hardest things to get right in a non-native language. The fact that the majority of these other transmissions were in a language foreign to the incident crew reduced their opportunity to catch the error.That is true, but as FlightDetent has pointed out, there appear to be a whole load of other ways of catching this error that deserve attention before deciding it's all the fault of dual language use. I'm sure crew picking up information from ATC communications with other aircraft is helpful to my SLF safety, but I sincerely hope it's not the first layer of safety...

As to the reasons for the Gallic refusal to adhere to the language stipulated as standard by ICAO See my quote from the Wikipedia article on Aviation English here (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/647745-airbus-within-6ft-ground-nearly-1-mile-short-runway-11.html#post11272716). One of the apparent misconceptions of some native English speakers on this thread is that speaking English, whether as a native speaker or not, suffices for RC to be intelligible. According to that page, it can actually be a disadvantage when used by native speakers, especially in non-standard and/or emergency situations.Just be thankful the standard language isn't Esperanto.The suggestion reveals another Western-centric blind spot. Esperanto isn't "neutral"; its use would favour Romance and Indo-European language speakers considerably. Somebody upthread suggested Klingon; the related Wikipedia article states that a design principle of the Klingon language was dissimilarity to existing natural languages in general, and English in particular (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Klingon_language), so that might make it a better candidate. Whether the more equal unfamiliarity of all pilots with this proposed universal aviation language would enhance safety overall is another question...

[netstruggler]

Surely you're missing the point that the incorrect value was given to just this one aircraft.

That isn't one of the points here. From the BEA report:

At 11:35:37, the ITM instructed an easyJet flight crew to descend to 5,000 ft with the same incorrect QNH,

[Uplinker]

My thinking is that the error occurred because (the aircrew did not properly cross-check the QNH, and did not look at their RadAlts*), but also because the ATC controller was speaking in two languages. It doesn't really matter what the languages were, but having to continually flip between native and words translated in their head was a big factor in this incident. Had they stayed in one language, this mis-translation would not have occurred.

Secondly, I can't remember what was said now, but if ATC gave the French QNH as "one thousand eleven" rather than "one zero one one" then this could have been another potential factor in the cock-up. I always bang on about CAP 413, but the phrases and methodology in that document have been carefully designed to avoid confusion when instructions are passed by voice over an imperfect radio link; one subject to distortion, interference, and fading. And being received on headsets in a cockpit that can itself have other audio noise and distractions. All of which means that messages are not always clearly heard; making the use of a set of very specific stock phrases vital. As soon as people start using lazy verbal short cuts then confusion can arise.

In a busy TMA, it must be very tempting to use abbreviations, especially if one has to say "unité zero unité unité" (11 syllables, and a right old mouthful), hundreds of times, rather than the much easier and shorter "mille onze" (2 syllables), but therein lies an elephant trap. If individual digits are spoken - in any language - instead of verbal shorthand, then fewer mistakes will occur.

*Perhaps also; NPAs referenced to QNH should have DHs rather than DAs, i.e. a final decision reference based on the Rad Alt, height rather than the QNH altitude? The QNH can be mis-set by the pilots or ATC as we all know, but a Rad Alt of course measures the actual height above the ground and therefore is a more reliable reference.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.

[Youmightsaythat]

I.

Every country is allowed to use their own language and this cannot be disrespected. What happens at CDG and other French airports is select few of the local pilots insist on speaking their own at the detriment of the whole team.
​​​​​​

No, it's not a "select few". It is Mandated by the French Govt way back
"“MINISTERIAL ORDER of 7th SEPTEMBER 1984 relating to radiotelephony procedures for the use of general air traffic. It states in particular (in paragraph 2.4) that French must, except in special case, be used between French flying personnel and French ground stations.”

Is there any other country that specifically mandates local language in ATC. If not why only in France?

[Eutychus]

It doesn't really matter what the languages were, but having to continually flip between native and words translated in their head was a big factor in this incident.I don't disagree, but the question of how to mitigate that for the best remains. Mandating a single non-native language is a red herring, in my view.Had they stayed in one language, this mis-translation would not have occurred.Speaking again here from a professional perspective, I don't think it's really a "mistranslation". More likely, as someone posted upthread, a 'brain fart', I think it could have happened in either language, but that it was more likely in a non-native language.Secondly, I can't remember what was said now, but if ATC gave the French QNH as "one thousand eleven" rather than "one zero one one" then this could have been another potential factor in the cock-up.Note that the 'cock-up' was in English... In a busy TMA, it must be very tempting to use abbreviations, especially if one has to say "unité zero unité unité" (11 syllables, and a right old mouthful), hundreds of times, rather than the much easier and shorter "mille onze" (2 syllables), but therein lies an elephant trap. If individual digits are spoken - in any language - instead of verbal shorthand, then fewer mistakes will occur.It's certainly much less counterintuitive for the respective native speakers to say "one zero one one" than to say "unité zéro unité unité"; and from that perspective the use of English is much better. But it isn't a panacea.

[FlyingStone]

Eutychus, you'll be surprised to find it's actually a legal requirement for all comunication between ATC and aircraft to be exclusively in English language at all busy European airports (more than 50,000 international IFR movements per year).

But of course, the regulators had their hands tied when nationalism won over common sense, and there is a provision for countries to conduct a safety study on risks associated with using two languages at the same time, which clearly there isn't any. The fact that places the likes of MAD, BCN and CDG have disproportionally high rate of TCAS RA events is probably just a pure coincidence, and in no doubt has absolutely nothing to do with ATC shuffling two different languages, and moreover, situational awareness of all parties is definitely not reduced by half of communication being in a language you don't understand. No problems there, whatsoever. It's also a pure coincidence that a lot of professional crews flying to those airports list ATC as the main threat during their departure/arrival briefings. Pure coincidence.

*Perhaps also; NPAs referenced to QNH should have DHs rather than DAs, i.e. a final decision reference based on the Rad Alt, height rather than the QNH altitude? The QNH can be mis-set by the pilots or ATC as we all know, but a Rad Alt of course measures the actual height above the ground and therefore is a more reliable reference.
In fact the last 2,500' of most NPAs could be referenced to height rather than altitude, which would add a little more precision and safety.

Generally a good idea, but I think it falls short when you consider that most Cat 2/3 approaches have very low minima (close to or at the runway), where terrain is generally flat. NPAs sometimes have quite high minima, over terrain that might be quite undulating, and it would be difficult to determine the accurate minima based on RA reading alone.

Perhaps the ATC's MSAW could be enhanced a bit more for NPAs, so if an aircraft crosses the FAF more than 100-200ft lower than the prescribed altitude, it would generate a warning while the aircraft is still quite far from terra firma.

[Uplinker]

I am sure the professional pilots among us have all counted down the altitudes versus distance to go for our PF during an NPA - referring to the table provided on the plate: "OK you were 50' high, at six miles you are looking for 2,360 feet" etc.

It would be a relatively simple matter to survey the land on the approach and publish a similar table of Rad Alt heights versus distances to go. Granted, the heights will not always be reducing in a linear progression, and there might be steps in the heights, but the Rad Alt measurement at least will be accurate, and combined with the DME, (assuming there is one available), would give a generally much more accurate picture. Even just having a DH rather than a DA would improve safety, in the sense that a reading 300' out, or reaching the DH at the wrong DME would/should ring alarm bells in the pilots' minds, and having only a DH would at least make them look at the Rad Alt.

Another safety improvement I think would be to mandate a Rad Alt auto call-out at, say 300', and not allow that to be pin-UNprogrammable. That way if a crew suddenly heard "three hundred" when not expecting it, their immediate actions would be to go-around.

[FlightDetent]

I stand corrected on the minister decree of FR use if in force as applicable.


Airbus should have automated crosscheck between the the FCU selection and MCDU. Same as the recently implemented useless THS reminder (narrowbody).

The method of transferring critical QNH value to airborne craft by voice only will be hopefully become obsolete soon. No idea when and how.

The NPAs should have a RA hard crosscheck somewhere (1000 afe) PUBLISHED by the AIS similar to G/S validity with DME or marker overflight.

Keep the ideas coming...




​​​​​

[Discorde]

The method of transferring critical QNH value to airborne craft by voice only will be hopefully become obsolete soon. No idea when and how.

Suggested 4000 pages ago:

Tech solution: ATC data base automatically transmits current local QNH to aircraft ADCs via data link - no humans involved! (Except to check for disparity between received QNH and expected QNH). Presentation in flight deck:


https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1803x816/altim_set_v4_fa1061af697edd3df95496109fa2a71b98d040ae.jpg

[Discorde]

And before too long altimetry will be via GPS, which will solve the problems of mis-setting. Transition levels consigned to history! Pressure altimetry (via data link with automatic adjustments to cross-check GPS) will be the back-up system.

[1201alarm]

Airbus should have automated crosscheck between the the FCU selection and MCDU. Same as the recently implemented useless THS reminder (narrowbody).​​​​​

Absolutely they should. Can't be that difficult to implement on a multi-million-value machine.

As long as we don't have that operators also should adopt a policy of presetting QNH during cruise in low workload from a weather report, and once you set QNH you again should confirm what you got from ATC with an independant source right before you do your altimeter check.

[DaveReidUK]

And before too long altimetry will be via GPS, which will solve the problems of mis-setting.

Good thinking, what could possibly go wrong ...

[fdr]

Good thinking, what could possibly go wrong ...

Quite so unfortunately. In the past few years we have had a number of occasions where the TSO'd GPS navs have decided to go cross country biggly, in L/L and height, yet the ipad GPS was not affected. Each time we happened to be near a certain quite large workers paradise country that is a bit uppity over some rocks in a local pond. Ipads were rock solid and were correct by radar fixes, TSO'd units went away and eventually came to their senses when we were in an area of less inhospitable natives.

[gums]

Salute!

I seem to agree...last thing I would soley rely upon would be GPS for altitude. Maybe use it as a crosscheck with the baro stuff. And then a radar altimiter that has a connection to a geographic terrain map.......

Gums sends...

[FlightDetent]

yet the ipad GPS was not affected. Each time we happened to be near a certain quite large workers paradise country them iPads be Designed in California made in Paradise by any chance, fdr?

[Capn Bloggs]

As long as we don't have that operators also should adopt a policy of presetting QNH during cruise in low workload from a weather report, and once you set QNH you again should confirm what you got from ATC with an independant source right before you do your altimeter check.
The PM writes the ATIS QNH on the TOLD card, then the first QNH that ATC gives you is verified against that. Not hard.

[FlightDetent]

Cards, 1980's. Unnecessary.

During approach preparation the PF fills
​​​​the MCDU Perf APPR page with the crew's latest QNH.

Later during descent, upon ATIS receipt, the Perf APPR page is updated.

When instructed to descent to altitude crew verifies the value against the prepared entries before re-setting the altimeters.

​​​​​​======

First 2 as per current SOP, the third as suggested and spelled out in the book for those with inadequate personal techniques.

Less work, more safe.

[fdr]

them iPads be Designed in California made in Paradise by any chance, fdr?


Made proudly in the sweatshops of.... Foxconn, where we give fresh chains to the doors to the toilets every week. At least the PRCians won't be lost while they muss up the westies.

[Discorde]

It would be an interesting exercise to find out how many aircraft around the world were flying with mis-set altimeters at any one time. Crews failing to change from QNH to STD climbing through TA or vice versa during descent, or simply incorrectly set QNH. Fortunately such errors usually result in nothing more serious than red faces when they are discovered.

A 'European' problem which US pilots are spared is low TAs. Every time a severe low pressure weather system crosses the continent the authorities have to send out Notams reminding pilots about setting altimeters correctly in order to avoid level busts or terrain warning episodes. The irony is that such weather systems invariably bring severe low level turbulence. Concentrating on basic aircraft control might distract crews from re-setting their altimeters when required.

[Smooth Airperator]

Some 10 years ago the idea of a European wide 10,000ft Transition Altitude/Level was floating around.

Corrigendum to A-NPA 2012-01 of 28 February 2012 on Harmonised Transition Altitude (https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiZmPjL9sD5AhXTEsAKHeEaDH4QFnoECAoQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.easa.europa.eu%2Fdownloads%2F578%2Fen&usg=AOvVaw2k_5xxfsvUVyQ4TS8EqIC8)

The project seems to have stalled. If you ask EASA why, there is no meaningful answer.

[RickNRoll]

And before too long altimetry will be via GPS, which will solve the problems of mis-setting. Transition levels consigned to history! Pressure altimetry (via data link with automatic adjustments to cross-check GPS) will be the back-up system.
I look forward to the day that GPS stops working. :)

[ve3id]

Harmonised Transition Altitude (https://ifatca.wiki/kb/wp-2014-93/)

In North America, it's 18,000 which gives time for ATC systems to spot a mismatch between cleared altitude and mode C readout. It seems more sensible to me to set the altimeter to ATIS once I receive it, than have an opportunity to forget to do it sometime later.
Mode C data are not corrected by the altimeter setting in the cockpit, but adjusted by computer at the ATC facility based on current altimeter setting - therefore the reading that was shown on their screens would be the actual altitude - ergo no excuse for the ATCO to not notice.

[DaveReidUK]

Mode C data are not corrected by the altimeter setting in the cockpit, but adjusted by computer at the ATC facility based on current altimeter setting - therefore the reading that was shown on their screens would be the actual altitude - ergo no excuse for the ATCO to not notice.

For avoidance of doubt, the adjustment that's made to what the ATCO sees on their screen is based on the prevailing QNH, not on the altimeter setting in the cockpit (although the baro setting is also typically transmitted to ATC via Mode S/EHS.

[MechEngr]

I think a solution is to add using a hash of the number. A simple one is to convert to base-26 with A=0, Z=25 for which 1011 => BMX and 1001 => BMN so the callout would be the pressure value followed by the hash. The hash is calculated by the system on the ground that is supplying the reading. The nav system would get both values put in and check the hash for the value against the hash that is supplied. If the number and its hash don't match in the nav system then the entry can be rejected. Alternatively the nav system can generate and display the hash which is read back to be compared by the controller. The advantage of the hash readback is that if the controller misread the value in the first place a readback of the same misread value is avoided.

I know - FAA/CAA = a 10 year study and $20M in investigations, but computationally this is cheap and easily verified.

This sort of addition is what allows the internet and CD/DVDs to function.

[Mr Optimistic]

Mentour Pilot has a video on this. Having all communications in English might have helped.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7LE98jp11js

[ve3id]

Mentour Pilot has a video on this. Having all communications in English might have helped.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7LE98jp11js

I used that video in my Air Cadet radio class yesterday and the 12-14 year old cadets immediately picked up the mistake!


Even when English is spoken by ATC, heavy accents can be a problem.
General aviation flying out of Jerez with Swiss friend who was handling comms and seemed to be concurring with ATC, I said that his command of English was better than mine because I could hardly understand a word of what was being said. Neither did I was his reply!
We got to Córdoba without incident.

And then of course there is Franglais, as evidenced by the confusion I heard once when flying into Dorval, an aircraft which had 'otel and hoscar in their callsign.

[MissChief]

What on earth is it with the French? I flew on contract for Air France back in the day, out of CDG and ORY. The confidence of both pilots and ATC was occasionally misplaced. And it only takes an occasional gross error to have dire consequences.

At the very least, speak English to all, as the Germans, Dutch, and the Nordics do. Nationalism has no place in professional aviation. (Merde!)