Dubai near disaster..?

[JanetFlight]

Hi all... Some rumours in some aviation web and Facebook groups are saying an EK 777 to Hyderabad last night lined up and rolled for takeoff without clearance... Tower order asked EK to stop his roll around 130kts , its was only a couple of seconds away from another Tenerife it seems ... There's a clip also wich can't post here but here's a vidcap of the red EK decelerating the TO roll while another plane crossing the rwy ahead. Can't find more on the net...
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x796/screenshot_20220112_202151_216fc3ec9e9927a743e9880a41ae2f8c4 2b130f8.jpg

[Seat4A]

Incident: Emirates B773 at Dubai on Jan 9th 2022, rejected takeoff without clearance due to crossing aircraft (http://avherald.com/h?article=4f30b5c8&opt=0)

By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Jan 12th 2022 21:18Z, last updated Wednesday, Jan 12th 2022 21:18Z

An Emirates Boeing 777-300, registration A6-EQA performing flight EK-524 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Hyderabad (India), was accelerating for takeoff from Dubai's runway 30R when the crew was instructed to reject takeoff at high speed (above 100 knots over ground) due to a crossing aircraft. The aircraft slowed safely and vacated the runway via taxiway N4 behind the aircraft, that had crossed the runway.

An Emirates Boeing 777-300, registration A6-EBY performing flight EK-568 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Bangalore (India), was taxiing for departure and was cleared to cross runway 30R from taxiway M5A to N4 and was entering the runway just when EK-524 began the takeoff roll.

According to information The Aviation Herald received from two independent sources, EK-524 began their takeoff roll without ATC clearance. Tower subsequently instructed EK-524 to stop. According to information EK-524 may have reached 130 KIAS when they rejected takeoff. According to ADS-B data transmitted by the aircraft's transponder EK-524 had reached 100 knots over ground about 790 meters/2600 feet down the runway and about 1700 meters/5700 feet short of taxiway N4.

EK-568 continued taxi and departed normally. EK-524 taxied back the holding point of runway 30R and departed about 30 minutes after the rejected takeoff.

[Una Due Tfc]

Is this one of the airlines only counting time at the controls for duty limits?

[White Knight]

Is this one of the airlines only counting time at the controls for duty limits?

Not for many years…

[Sailvi767]

I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off after just 30 minutes brake cooling. I know the A330 would have been much longer at average takeoff weights. Pilots almost always underestimate Abort speed by 10 to 20 knots. We required the data to be read from the aircraft for that reason on any high speed abort.

[macdo]

I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off after just 30 minutes brake cooling. I know the A330 would have been much longer at average takeoff weights. Pilots almost always underestimate Abort speed by 10 to 20 knots. We required the data to be read from the aircraft for that reason on any high speed abort.
Brake Fans? Even so it seems short for a 130kt reject.
EK cropping up on here a bit too often for my liking.

[Sailvi767]

I don’t think brake fans were a option on the 777.

[Dropp the Pilot]

Ah the weknowbetterwe'reEmirates and the 777 brake fans. Now that's an even better story than the thread starts with.

[FatPilot]

Ah the weknowbetterwe'reEmirates and the 777 brake fans. Now that's an even better story than the thread starts with.
Yes indeed. Many such tales abound.

I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off after just 30 minutes brake cooling.
I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off without having the Captain's seat-cover replaced. After a high speed RTO on instruction by the Tower with another 777 looming in the windscreen I'm not sure I'd be in the right state of mind to continue the pairing, not least because the outcome is almost assured. What did Ops have to say? Still, plenty of time to be sacked after the duty is completed.

The luck of the devil continues: DXB, JNB, MEL, DXB, DME, JFK, DXB, DXB.....

[fulminn]

I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off after just 30 minutes brake cooling. I know the A330 would have been much longer at average takeoff weights. Pilots almost always underestimate Abort speed by 10 to 20 knots. We required the data to be read from the aircraft for that reason on any high speed abort.

That's totally empirical

[Whip717]

Pilots are gone already. Easy solution for EK in this times of full pools…

[DaveReidUK]

Hi all... Some rumours in some aviation web and Facebook groups are saying an EK 777 to Hyderabad last night lined up and rolled for takeoff without clearance... Tower order asked EK to stop his roll around 130kts , its was only a couple of seconds away from another Tenerife it seems ... There's a clip also wich can't post here but here's a vidcap of the red EK decelerating the TO roll while another plane crossing the rwy ahead. Can't find more on the net...
https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1080x796/screenshot_20220112_202151_216fc3ec9e9927a743e9880a41ae2f8c4 2b130f8.jpg

Without wishing to minimise the seriousness of the event (which elsewhere would likely prompt an AIB investigtion), beware of "real-time" action replays from the flight trackers, which are prone to suffer from synchronicity issues.

Here's another screenshot, this time from FR24 (again to be viewed with caution), which shows a rather different picture from the above:

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/669x510/ek2_f3cd3db1dc1b0dd5c88d9232b21ad61ef9637123.jpg

Examination of the data would suggest that reality lay somewhere between those two extremes.

[ATC Watcher]

Indeed Dave, I am constantly amazed to see how people constantly believe what they see on FR24 to be the absolute truth and nothing but the truth.
That said, from an ATC point of view the initial post here does not make much sense.( Tower order asked EK to stop his roll around 130kts ) but waiting to see the initial report.

[Austrian Simon]

Without wishing to minimise the seriousness of the event (which elsewhere would likely prompt an AIB investigtion), beware of "real-time" action replays from the flight trackers, which are prone to suffer from synchronicity issues.
Here's another screenshot, this time from FR24 (again to be viewed with caution), which shows a rather different picture from the above:
Examination of the data would suggest that reality lay somewhere between those two extremes.

To add to this:

According to the raw data received from the Mode-S transponders from both aircraft:

- at 18:04:04 EK-568 had already passed the hold short line M5A but was still short of the runway edge at position N25.2576 E55.3616
- at 18:04:05 EK-524 had reached 102 knots over ground at position N25.2500 E55.3767 while accelerating on runway 30R.
- at 18:04:15 EK-568 was at position N25.2582 E55.3620 crossing the runway centerline
- at 18:04:19 EK-568 had crossed the other runway edge and was now on taxiway N4 between runway edge and hold short line N4 at position N25.2586 E55.3623
- at 18:04:24 EK-524 had slowed to 24 knots over ground again at position N25.2537 E55.3702

[Chiefttp]

I fly primarily at night. When given instructions to cross an active runway, while another aircraft is lined up and holding for me, I often do a triple check to insure that aircraft is indeed holding, and not commencing it’s takeoff roll. With all the technology we have today, I always wondered why they cant develop a system, perhaps tied to the nose wheel lights, to flash or signal that an aircraft is accelerating.. It’s very difficult to sense an aircraft is accelerating, in darkness, head on, until it too late. Food for thought. I understand this wasn’t the case here, but we all know taxing around an airport can be one of the most dangerous times of a flight.

[Kennytheking]

I would have thought that the runway status lights that they have in the USA would be very effective to prevent this kind of event. Should be mandatory throughout the world.

[3Greens]

I would have thought that the runway status lights that they have in the USA would be very effective to prevent this kind of event. Should be mandatory throughout the world.
They can be useful yes, but not a great deal of use in the glaring Middle East sunlight to be honest in the middle of the day

[Seat4A]

Additional info on AvHerald:

"On Jan 13th 2022 the airline reported, that EK-524 was instructed by tower to abort takeoff on Jan 9th 2022, the crew rejected takeoff successfully. There was no damage to the aircraft and there were no injuries. An internal investigation has been initiated, UAE's GCAA also opened an investigation."

[Airmann]

I fly primarily at night. When given instructions to cross an active runway, while another aircraft is lined up and holding for me, I often do a triple check to insure that aircraft is indeed holding, and not commencing it’s takeoff roll. With all the technology we have today, I always wondered why they cant develop a system, perhaps tied to the nose wheel lights, to flash or signal that an aircraft is accelerating.. It’s very difficult to sense an aircraft is accelerating, in darkness, head on, until it too late. Food for thought. I understand this wasn’t the case here, but we all know taxing around an airport can be one of the most dangerous times of a flight. What needs to change is that it should become standard procedure that aircraft only turn on thd landing lights once starting T/O role, as opposed to when entering the runway. This is the best indication for pilots crossing. They can be useful yes, but not a great deal of use in the glaring Middle East sunlight to be honest in the middle of the day I've never had a problem deciding whether the stop bar lights are on or off, so why would RWSLs be any more difficult?

[3Greens]

What needs to change is that it should become standard procedure that aircraft only turn on thd landing lights once starting T/O role, as opposed to when entering the runway. This is the best indication for pilots crossing. I've never had a problem deciding whether the stop bar lights are on or off, so why would RWSLs be any more difficult?

RWSL have their uses maybe but of far more Importance here is a complete analysis of the human factors involved. I have grave concerns that these will be addressed given the employers history though.
Not a bad idea about the landing lights though. I quite that about the USA

[gearlever]

Pilots are gone already. Easy solution for EK in this times of full pools…

What do you mean?
Were they fired?

[DIBO]

According to the raw data received from the Mode-S transponders from both aircraft:

- at 18:04:04 EK-568 had already passed the hold short line M5A but was still short of the runway edge at position N25.2576 E55.3616
- at 18:04:05 EK-524 had reached 102 knots over ground at position N25.2500 E55.3767 while accelerating on runway 30R.
- at 18:04:15 EK-568 was at position N25.2582 E55.3620 crossing the runway centerline
- at 18:04:19 EK-568 had crossed the other runway edge and was now on taxiway N4 between runway edge and hold short line N4 at position N25.2586 E55.3623
- at 18:04:24 EK-524 had slowed to 24 knots over ground again at position N25.2537 E55.3702

To avoid any shortcomings in the 'presentation layer' of online ADSB-tools, abovementioned raw data timestamps & associated coordinates in a Google Maps composite picture:
https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1912x1072/ek_524_b0f8c7b3d441f5a41d20b2c356141e0dd08f476f.jpg

[DaveReidUK]

Nice graphic.

A quick bit of back-of-the-envelope arithmetic, based on a couple of additional runway points in the data, would suggest that groundspeed at the point where the RTO was initiated could have been of the order of 140 kts.

[Airmann]

RWSL have their uses maybe but of far more Importance here is a complete analysis of the human factors involved. I have grave concerns that these will be addressed given the employers history though.
Not a bad idea about the landing lights though. I quite that about the USA

Yes RWSL were developed to deal with the human factors issue of pilots starting takeoff roles and/or crossing active runways without a clearance. It’s an issue, always has been, worldwide, and RWSL add another layer of defense to mitigate against it. Reality is however, not too many airports have installed the system, I guess the costs are prohibitive. I’ve my own defense against unintentionally taking off or landing without clearance by simply verbalizing whether or not we were cleared (or not) after the final checklist prior to T/O or landing. I generally find quiet cockpits are a recipe for disaster.

[andrasz]

Not absolving any of the guilty from blame, but I do not fathom why is it necessary to give taxi instructions that involve crossing the active runway when there are at least two perfectly feasible (and possibly shorter) tracks to the departure threshold that do not require a runway crossing. Maybe not direct, but certainly a contributing cause. EK524 took the direct route, so clearly they did not have a mental image of possible departing traffic crossing ahead of them.

[FullWings]

Unlike the one that just missed the houses at the other end of the runway, you can see how this could happen. Crossing, I look both ways, check TCAS and listen out (not that they’d have heard a takeoff clearance in this instance) but am aware of how vulnerable you can be. Same with entering: I verbalise “line up ONLY” whether I’m PF or PM, but I sometimes get a moment of doubt half down the runway if we had clearance or not.

I have been impressed by RWSL whenever I’ve encountered them - no way would you set off by mistake. I’d have thought DXB would have installed them by now?

[Chiefttp]

Airmann wrote,
”What needs to change is that it should become standard procedure that aircraft only turn on thd landing lights once starting T/O role, as opposed to when entering the runway. This is the best indication for pilots crossing.”

On the surface this sounds like a good idea, but remember the accident at LAX in 1991 where USAir 1493 a 737 landed on top of a Metroliner awaiting takeoff clearance on the runway. If memory serves me right, the Metroliner’s lights were washed out by the centerline lights and the arriving 737 didn’t see it on the runway and landed on top of it. If the Metroliner had all their lights on while holding short, this accident may have been averted. It’s also why I don’t line up exactly on centerline when I’m told to “line up and wait” with another aircraft on approach to the same runway. If I offset my jet a few feet the lights of my jet won’t align with the runway centerline lights and might be more easily seen at night by an approaching aircraft.

[physicus]

Airmann wrote,
”...If I offset my jet a few feet the lights of my jet won’t align with the runway centerline lights and might be more easily seen at night by an approaching aircraft.

That makes a lot of sense - I suspect you're not the only one. Was flying EK A388 as pax the other night and noticed on line up the airframe was not centred and at an angle while lined up and waiting. Straightened out smoothly with minimal power before applying t/o thrust. Seemed intentional.

[PAXboy]

A pax here: Are there many airports in Europe with this equipment? I doubt at any in the UK but I might be too cynical about cost.

[Dct_Mopas]

A pax here: Are there many airports in Europe with this equipment? I doubt at any in the UK but I might be too cynical about cost.

The only airport I’ve come across with them in Europe is Paris CDG. They have every landing aircraft needing to cross an active departure runway, so the RWSL system is a huge safety net in CDG. In the UK very few airports (off the top of my head) have a departure runway where crossing traffic is a common sight.

[procede]

Heathrow T4 comes to mind.

[FullWings]

A pax here: Are there many airports in Europe with this equipment? I doubt at any in the UK but I might be too cynical about cost.
As the old saying goes: if you think safety is expensive, try having an accident...

Maybe this will be a wake-up call for airports around the World to invest in RWSL? It comes into its own in poor vis, and is also completely autonomous.

[Airmann]

They have every landing aircraft needing to cross an active departure runway, so the RWSL system is a huge safety net . And that's the key. Every airport doesn't need the system, it's those that have designs that require constant crossing of active runways. Some only need it on a few runways e.g. LHR only needs it on the southern runway.

[The AvgasDinosaur]

Heathrow T4 comes to mind.
EGCC departing on 23L

[Dct_Mopas]

EGCC departing on 23L

Not really, the main issue at hand is aircraft crossing an active departure runway. So crossing whilst an aircraft has commenced it’s takeoff roll.

RWSL wouldn’t do anything at MAN with 23L, no aircraft cross that runway. They cross 23R which in that configuration is for landing only, when the pilots have a clear view of the runway and the RWSL system wouldn’t make a difference.

[Equivocal]

Although many aspects are good, there is one potential problem with some of the suggestions about RWSL, particularly if it is only installed at an airport where it is perceived that 'there is a need'. The mindset with RWSL is that when the red lights are off, we can cross/roll, when you then arrive at an intersection or line up on a runway where there is no need, at least half the protection of the system is lost. There is an additional gotcha if you are used to operating from airports with RWSL and then find yourself somewhere with a less sophisticated system, the usual mindset can be a problem.

I've also got a slight hesitation about the control systems, which are driven by ASMGCS data, and rules about when the RWSL is activated - having had some involvement in setting up RIMCAS (Runway Incursion Monitoring and Alerting System) at a pretty simple airport, getting the rules correct so there are no false alerts is not easy. With RIMCAS, the alerts are 'only' raised to ATC and humans can assess whether the alert is legitimate, although there is often little time for this (or, worse, an alert is ignored because 'it always goes off when this happens'), RWSL, as I understand it, is fully autonomous - the system is most useful at complex airports where the ruleset which does not produce erroneous operation will be difficult to compile. And then, of course, one day ATC will say, "Ignore the THLs, clear for take-off". The tech-savvy will now start talking about AI......

[planedrive]

Not really, the main issue at hand is aircraft crossing an active departure runway. So crossing whilst an aircraft has commenced it’s takeoff roll.

RWSL wouldn’t do anything at MAN with 23L, no aircraft cross that runway. They cross 23R which in that configuration is for landing only, when the pilots have a clear view of the runway and the RWSL system wouldn’t make a difference.

Actually Manchester is one airport I thought of where the system would be of great use. Landing traffic on 05R has to cross the active departure runway and vice versa for 23 operations. There is also quite a pronounced hump in the runway, so anyone crossing near T3 (23 threshold end) cannot see the 05 threshold. Back before COVID you could also have had 2/3 aircraft crossing the runway at the same time. Tegel would also have benefited from the system but obviously that isn't an issue any more!

[42psi]

There might be an argument for it at EGCC on 05 dual RWY ops.

However a "ring of red" policy already exists with the stop bars in use 24/7.

[terrain safe]

Fact: There have been more collisions and near misses on runways than in the air.

So, where is RTCAS? (Runway Traffic Collision And Avoidance System). It needs to be an onbaord system. Going forward, ICAO should demand all runway lighting is LED and have the edge lights turn red when there is crossing traffic.

Wouldn't turning the edge lights red upset the iRVR system, which is calibrated to the edge light brightness setting, making LVPs a bit fun?

[double_barrel]

It sometimes seems strange that despite such levels of automation, redundancy and independent checking by multiple different systems on both aircraft and ATC, designed to catch even fantastically unlikely errors, some absolutely critical information is transmitted between the two by voice alone. And then it’s held in short term memory in human wetware before being being fed into a/c systems.

couldn’t there at least be a status flag on both a/c and ATC showing released for takeoff or not?

[mahogany bob]

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS



I don’t know that this was a factor in this incident but I have always thought poor communications has the potential to cause major accidents !

How often have you been uncertain of clearances given by ATC ?

Poor English ,regional accents, jargon,speed talking,background noise,receiver problems and general casualness being a possible contributor!



At a busy airport remembering and reading back a clearance can be a embarrassment - who wants to go to the sin bin!

If you are flying regularly in a certain environment you become acclimatised to the words and accents/ comms is less of a problem but after a long layoff ie now -and perhaps operating in a strange country the brain does not react as quickly and mistakes can easily be made- everything is more difficult - see currency thread.



Crew co-ordination obviously helps - but in a situation where perhaps you have a senior captain and a new under confident co-pilot- would the co-pilot be bold enough to question a captain’s action in case it makes him look slow/ foolish!

i.e if ATC is noisy /busy and a captain turns confidently onto the runway and piles on the power would a young co- pilot say ‘hang on’ ?



I have always thought that a useful ( cheap) aid would be a training tape with transcripts of ATC from around the world which one could listen to and mug up on before going to a new environment in order to get used to accents etc.

Food for thought??

[Warren Peace]

I don’t think that anyone sitting in the front row, has any right to be there, if they can’t voice a concern.

Clearly, if they didn’t get a clearance, they should not have moved the aircraft, nor let it move without a challenge.

Should the cvr reveal an ignored or overruled challenge, then there might be cultural issues at Emirates in need of resolving.

[ATC Watcher]

It sometimes seems strange that despite such levels of automation, redundancy and independent checking by multiple different systems on both aircraft and ATC, designed to catch even fantastically unlikely errors, some absolutely critical information is transmitted between the two by voice alone. And then it’s held in short term memory in human wetware before being being fed into a/c systems.

How true. You can put all the automation you want on the ground you still depend ultimately on communicating that info via R/T and there are the two main hurdles : Phraseology and crossed transmissions . In both Tenerife and Uberlingen the ultimate calls that would have most probably prevented the collisions were blocked out by crossed transmissions and were not heard by either the other pilot and the controller. and in both cases correct phraseology had not been used and was a contributing factor.

couldn’t there at least be a status flag on both a/c and ATC showing released for takeoff or not?
This will be very expensive to fit all various systems currently in use in different airports around the world and will not help in all cases. In Linate (SAS/Citation ) , it was an unqualified pilot under LVP combined to deficient taxi way markings and in Vnukovo ( the DA50 ) a snow removal driver under alcohol influence and runway markings ( no stop bars on intersecting runways) . RWSL is probably the best system around at the moment , however it is a pure US/FAA system , still defined as an advisory system (*) and only installed in 20 airports in the US. and as far as I know is not for export ( waiting to be corrected if I am wrong)

[FullWings]

Although many aspects are good, there is one potential problem with some of the suggestions about RWSL, particularly if it is only installed at an airport where it is perceived that 'there is a need'. The mindset with RWSL is that when the red lights are off, we can cross/roll, when you then arrive at an intersection or line up on a runway where there is no need, at least half the protection of the system is lost. There is an additional gotcha if you are used to operating from airports with RWSL and then find yourself somewhere with a less sophisticated system, the usual mindset can be a problem.
My take on RWSL is: to cross a runway or takeoff, you need a) a clearance from ATC, b) to be confident from your own assessment that it is safe and c) that RWSL haven’t activated, telling you that there is (or will be shortly) something on the runway that you may not be aware of. I see it as a last fail-safe or backup to procedures already in place, similar to TCAS. Does it encourage a lack of rigour? I don’t know but I would guess the safety benefit is greater?

I've also got a slight hesitation about the control systems, which are driven by ASMGCS data, and rules about when the RWSL is activated - having had some involvement in setting up RIMCAS (Runway Incursion Monitoring and Alerting System) at a pretty simple airport, getting the rules correct so there are no false alerts is not easy. With RIMCAS, the alerts are 'only' raised to ATC and humans can assess whether the alert is legitimate, although there is often little time for this (or, worse, an alert is ignored because 'it always goes off when this happens'), RWSL, as I understand it, is fully autonomous - the system is most useful at complex airports where the ruleset which does not produce erroneous operation will be difficult to compile. And then, of course, one day ATC will say, "Ignore the THLs, clear for take-off". The tech-savvy will now start talking about AI......
Valid points but I think the autonomy is a big positive, for the day when all the holes in the cheese line up. Would have made what happened in DXB into a complete non-incident? Ignoring the THLs would be like ignoring an RA, GPWS or RAAS alert... Last chance to avoid a potential disaster.

RWSL is probably the best system around at the moment , however it is a pure US/FAA system , still defined as an advisory system (*) and only installed in 20 airports in the US. and as far as I know is not for export ( waiting to be corrected if I am wrong)
I was under the impression that it was installed at Paris CDG; if it isn’t the system is a dead ringer and is called RWSL (and if it was truly a French design it would be called LSRW or something...)

[ATC Watcher]

I was under the impression that it was installed at Paris CDG; if it isn’t the system is a dead ringer and is called RWSL
and you are correct, thanks . makes me look for the doc and I found it :

The RWSL system was deployed at Paris-CDG on the Northern inner runway (09R/27L) on the 24th of October 2016 and on the Southern inner runway (08L/26R) on the 23rd of May 2017 RWSL is a type of autonomous runway incursion warning system (ARIWS) as defined in ICAO Annex 14 aerodromes. Also deployed in the USA and in Japan, France participated, together with Japan, the USA and other worldwide experts in criteria harmonization, promoted by ICAO, to ensure worldwide and consistent operational use where implemented.
So my bad, it is not a pure US system and we are going to see more of then hopefully in the future., however I doubt it is cheap and will therefore probably be only restricted for very large airports I fear. .

[andrasz]

Should the cvr reveal an ignored or overruled challenge ...
But of course they continued to destination, making sure that the CVR was conveniently overwritten...

[DaveReidUK]

If, as reported, no ATC takeoff clearance was issued, it won't need a CVR to confirm that.

[megan]

How about a big pair of big lights at the runway line up point, one red, one green, with the green saying "clear to take off", not necessarily said tongue in cheek.

[Chronic Snoozer]

How about a big pair of big lights at the runway line up point, one red, one green, with the green saying "clear to take off", not necessarily said tongue in cheek.

Why not just have a challenge and response R/T between a controller and two or four well-rested, well paid, qualified pilots and simulators to practice in?

[mahogany bob]

The crew obviously THOUGHT that they had take off clearance - the question is why?
Perhaps they mistook departure clearance for t/o clearance?
All should be revealed in the inquiry.

[cLeArIcE]

Yes indeed. Many such tales abound.


I am somewhat surprised they were able to take off without having the Captain's seat-cover replaced. After a high speed RTO on instruction by the Tower with another 777 looming in the windscreen I'm not sure I'd be in the right state of mind to continue the pairing, not least because the outcome is almost assured. What did Ops have to say? Still, plenty of time to be sacked after the duty is completed.

The luck of the devil continues: DXB, JNB, MEL, DXB, DME, JFK, DXB, DXB.....
I know different airlines have different cultures etc, but If I had continued a duty after doing a high speed reject due to a lack Of clearance, some questions would be asked about that decision. I would certainly be returning to the gate and removing myself from the duty. You'd be thinking about it all day leaving yourself open for a bigger stuff up. But it is Emirates so, "complete the mission then return for firing squad at Dawn" mentality is hardly surprising.

[parkfell]

If, as reported, no ATC takeoff clearance was issued, it won't need a CVR to confirm that.

If as appears the case the CVR was overwritten, does software exist
to ‘dig deep’ & recover more than the last current 2 hours ?

[AlexGG]

If as appears the case the CVR was overwritten, does software exist
to ‘dig deep’ & recover more than the last current 2 hours ?

No, if it is overwritten, it is gone.

[The AvgasDinosaur]

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS



I don’t know that this was a factor in this incident but I have always thought poor communications has the potential to cause major accidents !

How often have you been uncertain of clearances given by ATC ?

Poor English ,regional accents, jargon,speed talking,background noise,receiver problems and general casualness being a possible contributor!



At a busy airport remembering and reading back a clearance can be a embarrassment - who wants to go to the sin bin!

If you are flying regularly in a certain environment you become acclimatised to the words and accents/ comms is less of a problem but after a long layoff ie now -and perhaps operating in a strange country the brain does not react as quickly and mistakes can easily be made- everything is more difficult - see currency thread.



Crew co-ordination obviously helps - but in a situation where perhaps you have a senior captain and a new under confident co-pilot- would the co-pilot be bold enough to question a captain’s action in case it makes him look slow/ foolish!

i.e if ATC is noisy /busy and a captain turns confidently onto the runway and piles on the power would a young co- pilot say ‘hang on’ ?



I have always thought that a useful ( cheap) aid would be a training tape with transcripts of ATC from around the world which one could listen to and mug up on before going to a new environment in order to get used to accents etc.

Food for thought??
At home base, I doubt the crew would be seriously unfamiliar with accents and phrasing ?

[double_barrel]

At home base, I doubt the crew would be seriously unfamiliar with accents and phrasing ?

How often have you received, eg, an instruction to line up and wait, acknowledged it, then done a bunch of other things and as you get to the hold short line, suddenly think, hang on were we told to line up and wait? I wonder if that sort of thing is more likely at your base when the same voice gives you exactly the same instructions that you have heard 100s of times before so that your brain somehow struggles to distinguish today’s sequence from all the others and starts to fill in gaps.

[RudderTrimZero]

It's one of the oldest challenges in aviation. You have to learn to associate an action with every important clearance. A clearance can be a trigger to write something or select something. Use a pen (remember those?). I personally use the MCDU scratchpad. "Taxi A, B, C1 to and hold short of 27L" becomes A/B/C1//27L. When I'm lining up, I will ad a /LU. Takeoff clearance is definitely the selection of the "Takeoff" light on Airbus. On Boeing, I don't know what you might use, but for gods sake, choose one!

[megan]

Why not just have a challenge and response R/T between a controller and two or four well-rested, well paid, qualified pilots and simulators to practice in?We know from experience that doesn't always work well.


https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/800x446/0_6c0gr4d8btnrb1if_522728f0e6ab73032d41163aa607ec54ee7209ef. jpg

[PFD]

Hi. I thought CVR recording time had gone up to 10 hours now? plus they have to have their own power supply. Perhaps you don't have to retrofit it. i would have thought though, that a failure to obtain Takeoff clearance, would necessitate the company pulling the CVR immediately for analysis, to clear or otherwise the pilots.

[fox niner]

We know from experience that doesn't always work well.

True. That accident gave us:
CRM
cockpit gradient awareness
”ready for departure”
silent cockpit concept

and more. Regards, klm-pilot.

[ATC Watcher]

True. That accident gave us:
CRM
cockpit gradient awareness
”ready for departure”
silent cockpit concept

and more. Regards, klm-pilot.
and " line up and wait" which took may years to be accepted by the US/FAA...

[Chronic Snoozer]

We know from experience that doesn't always work well.

Well enough for millions of departures each year. Whatever system you build, humans will find a way to defeat it. Is it worth the cost? After Tenerife, changing the R/T and training were solutions, not technology.

[Herod]

and " line up and wait".

And the banning of the word "clear" or "cleared" except for "cleared for take-off" or "cleared for landing". It removed the possible misunderstanding in for example "cleared to line up and wait"

[excrab]

It's one of the oldest challenges in aviation. You have to learn to associate an action with every important clearance. A clearance can be a trigger to write something or select something. Use a pen (remember those?). I personally use the MCDU scratchpad. "Taxi A, B, C1 to and hold short of 27L" becomes A/B/C1//27L. When I'm lining up, I will ad a /LU. Takeoff clearance is definitely the selection of the "Takeoff" light on Airbus. On Boeing, I don't know what you might use, but for gods sake, choose one!

Landing lights on when cleared for take-off had worked for everything I’ve flown over the last 40 years, starting with Cessna 150 and ending up on 737. I know it’s not a wide body but the principal is the same.
however the problem might arrive if a company SOP is landing lights on for line up, and they have a punitive safety policy and you never know if there’s a trainer or management pilot opposite you at the other intersection…. No idea if that applies to EK though, although the number of times I’ve been blinded by their landing lights perhaps it does.

[dixi188]

In my time it was : Strobes on at line up and Landing lights on when cleared for take off.
Used to cross 09R/27L at Heathrow quite often and I don't recall seeing landing lights dazzeling us from the next one lined up for take off.

[Kennytheking]

No amount of fiddling with landing lights is going to stop an accidental take-off without clearance. I think the status lights are a good start to solving the problem.

[hans brinker]

It's one of the oldest challenges in aviation. You have to learn to associate an action with every important clearance. A clearance can be a trigger to write something or select something. Use a pen (remember those?). I personally use the MCDU scratchpad. "Taxi A, B, C1 to and hold short of 27L" becomes A/B/C1//27L. When I'm lining up, I will ad a /LU. Takeoff clearance is definitely the selection of the "Takeoff" light on Airbus. On Boeing, I don't know what you might use, but for gods sake, choose one!

Small tip FWIW. I do the same, but I use spaces between the taxiways, and the slash for hold short, so "A B C1 /27L". I know it's unlikely you will use 27L to taxi, but I like the extra reminder.

[JeanKhul]

How long will EK luck remain ? so many misfits ....

[787PIC]

And Ryanair!

[Fog Ducker]

AIM 4-3-23 : the use of aircraft lights
g. When entering the departure runway for takeoff or to “line up and wait,” all lights, except for landing lights, should be illuminated to make the aircraft conspicuous to ATC and other aircraft on approach. Landing lights should be turned on when takeoff clearance is received or when commencing takeoff roll at an airport without an operating control tower.

In my first 33 years of professional flying, the company SOP was for the STROBES be selected to ON when cleared to POSITION, then the LANDING LIGHTS to be selected ON for TAKEOFF.

Then in my 3 years of flying in the Middle East, the company SOP was to select ALL lights ON when cleared to POSITION.

I did not like doing this because it is wrong.

I will still not accept a crossing clearance if the aircraft way down at the end has the LANDING LIGHTS ON.

[SATCOS WHIPPING BOY]

If as appears the case the CVR was overwritten, does software exist
to ‘dig deep’ & recover more than the last current 2 hours ?
CVR will have been over-written but the ATC tapes will still be available. That will at least go some way to determine if a clearance was issued, or if a confusing RT conversation led to an unchallenged error.
As real bonus, we still have all flight deck occupants around to tell their side of the incident.

[DaveReidUK]

And Ryanair!

Are you suggesting that Ryanair's safety record is cause for concern ?

[Schnowzer]

Apologies haven’t read all the comments. Could it have been as simple as EK524 lined up. Then EK568 was given clearance to cross which EK524 took as theirs? They were in position expecting EK5.., “heard it” and went. C/S confusion is a nightmare around DXB.

[White Knight]

3Greens , 13th Jan 2022 18:30
Quote:
Originally Posted by Kennytheking
I would have thought that the runway status lights that they have in the USA would be very effective to prevent this kind of event. Should be mandatory throughout the world.


They can be useful yes, but not a great deal of use in the glaring Middle East sunlight to be honest in the middle of the day

The LED lighting on the runways at DXB is bright enough even at midday on June 21st!

[escapedATCO]

Hi. I thought CVR recording time had gone up to 10 hours now? plus they have to have their own power supply. Perhaps you don't have to retrofit it. i would have thought though, that a failure to obtain Takeoff clearance, would necessitate the company pulling the CVR immediately for analysis, to clear or otherwise the pilots.
ATC recordings are also available!

[escapedATCO]

AIM 4-3-23 : the use of aircraft lights
g. When entering the departure runway for takeoff or to “line up and wait,” all lights, except for landing lights, should be illuminated to make the aircraft conspicuous to ATC and other aircraft on approach. Landing lights should be turned on when takeoff clearance is received or when commencing takeoff roll at an airport without an operating control tower.

In my first 33 years of professional flying, the company SOP was for the STROBES be selected to ON when cleared to POSITION, then the LANDING LIGHTS to be selected ON for TAKEOFF.

Then in my 3 years of flying in the Middle East, the company SOP was to select ALL lights ON when cleared to POSITION.

I did not like doing this because it is wrong.

I will still not accept a crossing clearance if the aircraft way down at the end has the LANDING LIGHTS ON.

I believe that SOP changed awhile ago.
The strobe lights should have been visible to the departing crew, and also as an aircraft the size of a 777 crosses you lose sight of a large number of runway and centreline lights.
Many possible reasons, mixed lang/culture flight deck, fatigue, press on mindset, take off clearance already received on previous flights, crossing clearance on 30L confusing the brain etc but there was two guys up front so I cannot understand why it wasn't questioned and confirmed its what crews have been trained to do, if there is doubt/there is no doubt ask!

[hans brinker]

AIM 4-3-23 : the use of aircraft lights
g. When entering the departure runway for takeoff or to “line up and wait,” all lights, except for landing lights, should be illuminated to make the aircraft conspicuous to ATC and other aircraft on approach. Landing lights should be turned on when takeoff clearance is received or when commencing takeoff roll at an airport without an operating control tower.

In my first 33 years of professional flying, the company SOP was for the STROBES be selected to ON when cleared to POSITION, then the LANDING LIGHTS to be selected ON for TAKEOFF.

Then in my 3 years of flying in the Middle East, the company SOP was to select ALL lights ON when cleared to POSITION.

I did not like doing this because it is wrong.

I will still not accept a crossing clearance if the aircraft way down at the end has the LANDING LIGHTS ON.

Aircraft have landed on top of other aircraft that were on the runway, it might have been prevented if those on the runway had all their lights on. Also the AIM isn't regulatory in the US NVM the ME, you not accepting a legal clearance because of a difference of opinion does not help. I follow my companies SOP.

[Chris2303]

ATC recordings are also available!

DO you mean to the enquiry or to the general public?

[Little One]

COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS

I have always thought that a useful ( cheap) aid would be a training tape with transcripts of ATC from around the world which one could listen to and mug up on before going to a new environment in order to get used to accents etc.

Food for thought??

Not really transcripts of ATC and standard phraseology, however ICAO Has published rated speech samples used in the training of English Language Proficiency Assessors/Interlocutors.

These can be accessed at https://cfapps.icao.int/RSSTA/ and give an overview of different English Language Proficiency Levels.

It may assist in understanding the different regional accents and Language Proficiency Levels.

[escapedATCO]

DO you mean to the enquiry or to the general public?
Nothing official released to the general public

[megan]

After Tenerife, changing the R/T and training were solutions, not technologyWell, there is still a problem as this incident shows. Remember standing in the terminal at West Palm Beach and watching a Shorts 360 and a Gulfstream lined up on crossing runways and both beginning their take off rolls, sat there transfixed waiting for the two to meet at the intersection, but both aborted in good time, tower on the ball I assume.

[172_driver]

Can R/T really be blamed for everything? The minds of the pilots were making (incorrect) assumptions at the time but they were both perfectly convinced they were doing everything right.
Remeber to engage your brain before doing something that can kill you.
Not sure what else we can do, a pace car driving around in circles on the runway before you're released?

Daniel Kahneman has written a good book, Thinking fast and slow.

[procede]

Emirates is not having a great time with it's 777's. Diversion to St. Petersburg after "control problems" over the Barentz sea on route to SFO.

Incident: Emirates B773 over Barents Sea on Jan 18th 2022, control problems (http://avherald.com/h?article=4f35d137&opt=0)
https://simpleflying.com/emirates-777-control-problems/?utm_source=pop

Ps: I doubt 5G is an issue. ;-)

[EDLB]

That should be in another thread. The Mods may split this. Winding up in Petersburg due to control problems is another significant event. With this young 777 can be an EK or a Boeing issue.

[DaveReidUK]

Emirates is not having a great time with it's 777's. Diversion to St. Petersburg after "control problems" over the Barentz sea on route to SFO.

Incident: Emirates B773 over Barents Sea on Jan 18th 2022, control problems (http://avherald.com/h?article=4f35d137&opt=0)
https://simpleflying.com/emirates-777-control-problems/?utm_source=pop

Ps: I doubt 5G is an issue. ;-)

Emirates haven't operated B773s since 2018 - nowadays their Boeing fleet is almost all B77Ws plus a handful of B77Ls.

[FUMR]

Emirates haven't operated B773s since 2018 - nowadays their Boeing fleet is almost all B77Ws plus a handful of B77Ls.

You are splitting hairs DRUK. The B77W is an B777-300ER.

[DaveReidUK]

You are splitting hairs DRUK. The B77W is an B777-300ER.

Not really - there are several perfectly good reasons why ICAO allocates separate designators to -300 ERs and non-ERs.

[procede]

Not really - there are several perfectly good reasons why ICAO allocates separate designators to -300 ERs and non-ERs.

The wingspan was increased from 60.93 to 65.8 meters and with that the fuel capacity was increased from 117,340 liters to 181,283 liters.

Most important issues are gate planning (next to higher air navigation charges and landing fees). I have heard some stories that unnoticed last minute changes in aircraft type from non-ER to an ER's caused wingtips to get uncomfortably close at the gate.

But I doubt that has anything to do with this incident.

[DaveReidUK]

But I doubt that has anything to do with this incident.

True.

Well, other than the fact that the incident didn't involve a variant that EK has none of.