Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally. [Archive] - Page 4

kiwi grey

4th Oct 2022, 00:54

I think the damage to Boeing if they are forced to cancel the dash 7 and dash 10 variants due almost entirely to Boeings inability to get their shyte together, is not that significant. There has been almost no take up for the dash 7 because a dash 8 costs virtually the same to operate and carries more pax and the dash 10 has been buried by the 321LR and XLR. The only way they are selling any dash 10's is with a huge discount.

This is an opportunity for the FAA to draw a line in the sand with Boeing. No more same old same old with the minimum cheap and nasty solution to everything, they need to meet the standards imposed 2 years ago or no FAA certification; full stop

The senior management of Boeing still thinks that spooling up their lobbyists, instead of their engineers is the preferred response when the FAA tells them they need to step up. They need to be disabused of that notion and Congress has got to support the FAA, not the company that caused the deaths of over 300 people because they were too cheap to properly design the MAX upgrades and then lied to the regulator about what they did.
+1

In an ideal world, the FAA would also issue an AD requiring the MAX-8 & -9 to be brought up to the standard required for the -10 (& -7) and provide a third AoA input (possibly synthetic) so that a single failure would neither create a catastrophe nor require the air system (MCAS to be precise) to reduce to a degraded/inoperative state.
It won't happen, though

Loose rivets

4th Oct 2022, 01:12

The image of the FAA being on some sort of high ground should rankle fair minded observers. In the many months of discussion on PPRuNe, it became obvious that this supposedly standard-setting body would have had to take on or divert substantial staff just to cover the Boeing work. It's even conceivable that new premises would have been needed to house enough skilled teams. What we had was a, "They wrote it, I signed it" means of not spending all that government money. I can even understand finding it not in the public interest to rewrite the mountainous piles of technical information Boeing produced. After all, who could know more about the content than Boeing? What could possibly go wrong? Well, what did go wrong. "They rote it, I signed it", was a real face into camera confession.

It's not that the unthinkable has happened that rankles with me, it's hearing the FAA echoing from the high ground - where in reality, they should be going to the same sack-cloth and ashes tailors as Boeing management.

MechEngr

4th Oct 2022, 02:28

It's not the money. The FAA wants to have no responsibility. If they did, they could have asked to be put on a push-notification for the software that manages their software development. It would have cost nothing to get an e-mail notification. They would have gotten notice that the MCAS parameters had been changed when the status changed to "Approved for released," if not sooner. If Boeing was even more cooperative the FAA would have access to the linked documents showing the internal analysis of the change, but the FAA could have asked if that link wasn't given, also a cheap ask. The FAA doesn't need to be in every meeting, not read every memo - they just need to see what is going to production and that all passes through a document and software vault that can flag significant changes and alert a list of people when they do.

However, with that information they would have done what everyone else did and decide that the outcome of any problem was controllable and now would have that bit of evidence sitting right there when circumstances proved it was not. So they want to avoid ever having any responsibility. As a regulator they can make simple rules like, "Every system must be fail safe." They don't have any obligation to evaluate every system to ensure it is fail safe; just wash their hands of the results and blame the maker for not accomplishing that all-encompassing task.

It still bothers me more that for decades it was acceptable for an ADIRU to lie about the plane being in a stall when it wasn't. The FAA was OK with this. The airlines were OK with this. The maker of the plane was OK with this. And this lie got passed to MCAS. How did that ability to lie get approved? Oh - yes, there is a sink for handwashing in Washington DC. where that lie was deemed not a problem by the regulators.

BlankBox

5th Oct 2022, 22:10

Allied Pilots Association President Capt. Edward Sicher said "Boeing needs to proceed with installing modern crew alerting systems on these aircraft to mitigate pilot startle-effect and confusion during complex, compound system malfunctions."

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pilots-union-opposes-granting-boeing-737-max-7-10-cockpit-alerting-extension-2022-10-05/

fdr

5th Oct 2022, 22:51

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pilots-union-opposes-granting-boeing-737-max-7-10-cockpit-alerting-extension-2022-10-05/

UPRT is on it's way, and that will address at least in passing startle and similar matters, but it doesn't get away from the fact that aircraft that have all the bells and whistles as is being asked for Boeing, still lose the plot biggly. We have seen drivers hold full backstick on SSCs to impact on many occasions, while every siren, bell and whistle under the sun has been blaring at the befuddled driver, assuming that they aren't committing Seppuku. Our fundamental frailty remains being in a device that necessitates prompt detection of anomalies before the kitty litter gets scattered untidily, which requires high levels of SA, and that SA gets eroded by the mundane and routine nature of 99.9% of the operation.

When you flop a Part 25 jet out of the normal envelope, the interesting observations are not that the stuff gets interesting, it is it gets noisy, and buffetty, and dynamic; it tends to spoil your latte sip.

The B737's have all the information under the sun provided to the crew already, other than a mandated, train station size AOA gauge in front and center of the drivers. Giving a linear scale would be nice, an E index would be helpful, but anything works better than nothing at all. Alternatively, hard wire the FPV for the B737... and every other aircraft that has a EADI/PFD.

When stuff goes kinetic, the most common outcome is narrowing of the processing bandwidth of the driver, and that gives target fixation on limited data, hopefully the stuff that is needed. Having more bells/whistles doesn't improve the outcome, the guys are forgetting that they are in a moving vehicle already on many occasions, we need simpler not more displays and presentations of information. What we have now still functions, where the crew are aware of the distractions that are inherent in the system architecture.

Big Pistons Forever

6th Oct 2022, 04:11

It is not just the FAA that has a say in the dash 7 and dash 10 certification. I expect both Transport Canada and EASA were expecting these airplanes to meet the higher standards within the specified timelines. After the initial MAX certification fiasco the FAA is very cognizant of their breach of trust with other regulators who took the FAA stamp of approval at face value.

Congress can force the FAA to give Boeing a pass but they can’t demand the same of other countries regulators. A MAX variant that could only fly in US airspace would not be of much value to airlines.

WillowRun 6-3

6th Oct 2022, 15:29

WHBM

6th Oct 2022, 21:20

I really don't get this about "extending" the time to complete certification of the additional models. It seems that, for a global aviation leader, Boeing were given quite sufficient time before the deadline date to get everything done, dusted and documented, with time to spare before things change. Basically, they blew it, yet again. And that's why one really can't support extending things. If they blew this, what else have they blown. Could the full resources have been made available if the funds had not been squandered on stock buybacks ?

I wonder how those arguing for an extension would feel if their pilots on their next flight were out of currency. "Hey ho, it's not really important, on we go" ? Sorry guys, it was up to you to manage the dates. If you're out of currency you are out of currency. Period.

fdr

7th Oct 2022, 11:56

It was once the case that FAA was considered the "gold standard" insofar as certification was concerned (and if I've been misled by everything I've read or heard about the good old days, I'm sure someone here will straighten it out).

Now where we're at is that the MAX crew alerting system is at a technology level of something like "your father's Oldsmobile". (That is, if I've understood the discussions of this factor here.) Leave to the side the current question of whether the Congressionally imposed deadline will be retained in place or extended.

The point I'm interested in is, with Transport Canada and EASA stepping up their game, so to speak, and possibly having leveraged previous certification practices into higher fidelity with current levels of technology, will FAA return the courtesy, and begin to see the work of those CAAs as now constituting the gold standard? I mean, this isn't to disrespect or disparage the FAA whatsoever . . . but just as elections have consequences, so also do certification debacles, especially ones involving 346 fatalities.

And on the engineering and/or technology isn't it widely accepted by people who do understand the aerodynamics (I'm not among them) that the MAX still has questionable, or at least subpar, stability in some parts of its flight regime? It seems unlikely either TC or EASA would have allowed this.

Also, if TC and EASA gain higher levels of recognition for setting the standard, will China's CAAC follow suit?

History... :ok:

The B737 as it stands with the Max meets the requirements of Subpart B to Part 25... however, the inherent issue of the stabilizer-elevator problems when manual trim is applied with a substantial miss-trim condition is not a pleasant feature of the aircraft. The 737 is the last of the manual trim wheel backups to the stabilizer.

early on with the Max acceptance by EASA, the ELS related to stab trim was B-05/MAX: Longitudinal trim at Vmo
It covered:

CS 25.161(a),
CS 25.161(c)(3),
CS 25.1301(a) and
CS 25.1309(a)

The unfortunate matter was missed due to lack of information on system architecture and the pertinent comment was:

"The need to use the trim wheel is considered unusual, as it is only required for manual flight in those corners of the envelope".

As the Max introduced a second electrical circuit to the trim motor, EASA was slightly surprised. However, to the best of my awareness, the cut tout switches take out both yoke and pedestal trim switches, which left the manual trim as a necessity following a stab runaway, in order to comply with §25.161. Unfortunately, the fact that the manual stab trim can be defeated where there is a severe out of trim condition even within the envelope was either unknown or overlooked, it being a latent issue of the 737 design, which followed prior types that had accepted the issue through training and crew awareness.

The trim system could have the ratios changed which would be a significant design change, or have a second trim motor/power/control circuit to give full redundancy, that would then have full trim authority, like a B777, B744, or B747 (levers v alternate trim switches).

It still is a poor system and questionably compliant as it stands to §25.161 IMHO.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
The aisle stand trim switches can be used to trim the airplane throughout the flight envelope and fully complies with the reference regulation Simulation has demonstrated that the thumb switch trim does not have enough authority to completely trim the aircraft longitudinally in certain corners of the flight envelope, e.g. gear up/flaps up, aft center of gravity, near Vmo/Mmo corner, and gear down/flaps up, at speeds above 230 kts.

In those cases, longitudinal trim is achieved by using the manual stabilizer trim wheel to position the stabilizer. The trim wheel can be used to trim the airplane throughout the entire flight envelope. In addition, the autopilot has the authority to trim the airplane in these conditions. The reference regulation and policy do not specify the method of trim, nor do they state that when multiple pilot trim control paths exist that they must each independently be able to trim the airplane throughout the flight envelope.

Boeing did not initially consider this to be a compliance issue because trim could always be achieved, even during the conditions where use of the aisle stand trim switch was required. Subsequent to flight testing, the FAA-TAD expressed concern with compliance to the reference regulation based on an interpretation of the intent behind “trim”. The main issue being that longitudinal trim cannot be achieved throughout the flight envelope using thumb switch trim only.

EASA POSITION

Boeing set the thumb switch limits in order to increase the level of safety for out-of-trim dive characteristics (CS 25.255(a)(1)). The resulting thumb switch limits require an alternative trim method to meet CS 25.161 trim requirements in certain corners of the operational envelope.

The need to use the trim wheel is considered unusual, as it is only required for manual flight in those corners of the envelope.

The increased safety provided by the Boeing design limits on the thumb switches (for out-of-trim dive characteristics) provides a compensating factor for the inability to use the thumb switches throughout the entire flight envelope. Furthermore, the additional crew procedures and training material will clearly explain to pilots the situations where use of the trim wheel may be needed due to lack of trim authority with the wheel mounted switches.

The trim systems on the 737Max provide an appropriate level of safety relative to longitudinal trim capability.

wrench1

7th Oct 2022, 14:20

begin to see the work of those CAAs as now constituting the gold standard?
It depends on how you define what the "gold standard" is. Since the existing bilateral agreements basically level the certification standards for all signatories, technically each participating entity operates at their own perceived "gold standard." From what I've seen the MAX issue got lost in politics, upmanship, etc. and the problem now is no longer a simple certification issue. If you are suggesting these existing bilateral agreements need to be rewritten, that is a completely different subject outside the context of the MAX. As to China becoming a player on the international certification level, they first need to entertain some bilateral agreements of their own to get things rolling, however, I don't see that happening for the same reasons Russia never got to that level years ago.

safetypee

7th Oct 2022, 14:43

The crux of the problem involves alerting.
The FAA has to consider its own research findings and associated regulations.
and, although the “The United States Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.” Congress could reflect on the ethical, moral aspects of any dispensation from the requirements.

”Human Factors Considerations in the Design and Evaluation of Flight Deck Displays and Controls”
https://www.volpe.dot.gov/sites/volpe.dot.gov/files/docs/Human_Factors_Considerations_in_the_Design_and_Evaluation_of _Flight_Deck_Displays_and_Controls_V2.pdf

Other certification agencies could throw the whole book back at the FAA / Boeing; your book, your rules, … you comply.

Page 113 onwards:
Warning: For conditions that require immediate flightcrew awareness and immediate flightcrew response.
Red - if immediate action required

Flightcrew alerts must: [14 CFR 25.1322 (a)]
(1) Provide the flightcrew with the information needed to:
(i) Identify non-normal operation or airplane system conditions, and
(ii) Determine the appropriate actions, if any.
(2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including conditions where multiple alerts are provided.
The absence of the words - MCAS or TRIM

Prioritize alerts so that the most urgent alert is presented first to the flightcrew. [AC 25.1322-1, 8]

Warning information must be provided to alert the crew to unsafe system operating conditions, and to enable them to take appropriate corrective action. Systems, controls, and associated monitoring and warning means must be designed to minimize crew errors which could create additional hazards. [14 CFR 23.1309(b)(3), 25.1309(c), 29.1309(c)]

Time-Critical Warnings
Some warnings may be so time-critical for the safe operation of the airplane that general alerts such as a master visual alert and a master aural alert may not provide the flightcrew with immediate awareness of the specific alerting condition that is commensurate with the level of urgency of flightcrew response necessary. In such cases, warning elements dedicated to specific alerting conditions should be provided that give the flightcrew immediate awareness without further reference to other flight deck indications. [AC 25.1322-1, 6.b]

Documentation should include the results of analyses and tests that show that any delayed or inhibited alerts do not adversely impact safety. [AC 25.1322-1, 8.a(5)]
When following the guidance in AC 25.1322-1, document any divergence, and provide the rationale for decisions regarding novel or unusual features used in the design of the alerting system. This will facilitate the certification evaluation because it will enable the FAA to focus on areas where the proposed system diverges from the AC and has new or novel features. [AC 25.1322-1, 13.b]

and finally, but not least; Workload

(c) Operationally-relevant behavior of the installed equipment must be:
(1) Predictable and unambiguous, and
(2) Designed to enable the flightcrew to intervene in a manner appropriate to the task.
(d) To the extent practicable, installed equipment must incorporate means to enable the flightcrew to manage errors resulting from the kinds of flightcrew interactions with the equipment that can be reasonably expected in service.

Relying on a requirement of “train to proficiency” may be unforeseeable, economically impracticable, or unachievable by some pilots without excessive mental workload as compensation. [AC 27-1B, AC 27.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1); AC 29-2C, AC 29.1303b(4)(ii)(B)(1)]

GlobalNav

7th Oct 2022, 15:44

The saga is good for an afternoon soapie, replace "days of our lives".

At some point TBC needs to bring their product into the 21st century. The argument based on crew commonality didn't pass muster when first made, SWA went on to buy other carriers and maintain multiple types, and that was apparently considered to be beneficial. That desire to grandfather was a factor in the actions and inaction's that led to the Max debacle.

I doubt that the wing has much more development left in it to permit it to keep up with the developmental potential that the Airbus has. Tying an extension of the time to conclude the 7 and the 10 with a termination of any further grandfathering of that aircraft would be a win in the short term, and a win long term, as TBC needs to be producing a replacement airframe that can compete with the Airbus.

Changing the alerting functions right now would be a stressed program, and the potential to have a latent failure introduced is a higher risk than accepting the conclusion of a final series of aircraft in this program.

TBC has misbehaved and in normal times should be rapped over the knuckles, but the industry and country needs them to get on and sort out their litter box. senior management separately needs to be held accountable for the 27 years of degradation of the company, the ethics, production shambles and nonsense that have occurred.

IMHO...

Agree, hit the nail on the head. Too bad we can’t turn the clock back ten years and do the right thing for the original Max

MechEngr

7th Oct 2022, 21:49

"(2) Be readily and easily detectable and intelligible by the flightcrew under all foreseeable operating conditions, including conditions where multiple alerts are provided."

All three flight crews detected the increased yoke force - and they detected the stick shaker falsely indicating a stall. In human factors nothing is better than tactile feedback to the controls in the hands of the operator.

Still, that's the sort of requirement I was referring to with:

"They don't have any obligation to evaluate every system to ensure it is fail safe; just wash their hands of the results and blame the maker for not accomplishing that all-encompassing task."

Is there a requirement to never make a false warning and never report a false measurement? That's the initiator for the MCAS problem.

Edit: Now I wonder where the warnings for false warnings should be presented.

WillowRun 6-3

8th Oct 2022, 01:41

fdr

8th Oct 2022, 03:03

Allied Pilots Association Opposes Extension of Equipment Exemption for Boeing 737-7 MAX and 737-10 MAX Aircraft
FORT WORTH, Texas (Oct. 5, 2022) – The Allied Pilots Association (APA), representing the 15,000 pilots of American Airlines, expressed its strong opposition to any extension of the equipment exemption for the Boeing 737-7 MAX and Boeing 737-10 MAX.

“Boeing needs to proceed with installing modern crew alerting systems on these aircraft to mitigate pilot startle-effect and confusion during complex, compound system malfunctions,” said APA President Capt. Edward Sicher. “Once these systems are installed and pilots have been properly trained on them, our crews will be better able to identify system failures and prioritize corrective actions that could save lives.”

“We oppose any extension of the exemption and don’t agree with Boeing’s claim that pilots could become confused when moving from an airplane without the modern alert system to one that is equipped with it. Nothing could be further from our flight deck reality,” Capt. Sicher said. “Consider the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 – they’re substantially different airplanes, yet operate under a single certificate. Pilots have routinely flown both on the same day without any confusion

It is an interesting issue, however, the example of how an intermix can function without impact to the operator is not a brilliant choice. The function of the 757 and 767 is common. There are a few system differences between the two, but they talk to the pilot with a common architecture. If the M7 and M10 are going to talk a different language, there is the potential for unintended consequences with a mixed fleet.

The legacy alerting systems have had some areas of issues, such as the use of a sound alert for two different functions, assumption being that as one acts on the ground.... and the other above 10,000' perhaps the crews would not get discombobulated. That didn't pan out in the real world, and a new annunciator was mandated to add to the general visual "noise".

Where would enhanced alerting have made a difference? Would the B737-800W flop into Amsterdam have helped, for a failure of a LRRA that confused the ATR mode and was not picked up by the drivers? Only if it was darned smart, smarter than the designers, and certainly smarter than us mere drivers. Is the enhanced system gonna give wise messaging for that sort of deal? Or where the crew turn off the IRUs to sort out a minor deal, while in IMC? Will it pick up a throttle clutch pack that drops a THR lever during a power change? That would be an interesting logic diagram....

One of the smarter systems about was the A380-800 that had the whoopsie in SGP. There, the crew were inundated with pages upon pages of smart alerts that interrupted their processes, and didn't really help in the immediate actions of back to basics. The 777/787 has some of the best concepts out there, and on occasions, the same smart systems will set the crew off on a wild goose chase. Love the ECL, but occasionally, it isn't what you need. Oddly, the one time that I think the ECL and EICAS would have been very helpful, the FO couldn't read either the ECL, or the EICAS, and we were back to memory of where in the cockpit a couple of switches were.

Smarter systems are not a magic bullet, and if they cause interoperability issues, they may not be desirable for the legacy equipment. I would still think that concluding the Max 7 and 10 and drawing a firm line under any future expansion of the model line in any form would be in the industry, drivers, and manufacturer's interest. Don't have a dog in the fight, but prefer that an well developed, well tested new model starts to be considered. Right now, that would be problematic to the OEM and to industry, and the merits are marginal, and not without unintended risks.

Logically, it is questionable to be OK to fly the same machine with "inferior" systems in the morning, and then fly afternoon tasks with the "new improved" system... do passengers then have to ask the pilots when they last used the system that they are sitting in with said passenger? The OEM missed an opportunity to do a greenfield development following the NG, which was generally a very good program, with a couple of just awful issues that the OEM remains unaccountable for. The delay however has provided an opportunity to improve some matters such as composite damage tolerance, lightning protection etc... and perhaps to come up with a design that gets the Vs to a reasonable value, so we can stop digging jets out of the mud at the far end of the runway.

MechEngr

8th Oct 2022, 03:48

Unless they are calling for grounding the NG fleet as well, this sounds like arm twisting American Airlines to give ground on the contract negotiation the APA has been working on to get a 20% pay increase and retroactive pay.

The leverage for twisting is that these two models will require training that no other aircraft requires, but the airline has expressed they need to train more pilots currently to stay competitive. So, if there is no extension then American Airlines might not get planes they need for particular routes AND when they do get them, there might not be training available for a significant time.

And what of the pilot of an NG who expects one sort of alert and gets a different one? Or a long term NG pilot moved up who doesn't get the sort of alert he expected.

I agree with FDR - the best plan is to let the 737 series retain the interface it has now and expect that this is the necessary end, though I am unsure that alerts for critical systems necessarily improve safety. What I am sure about is inconsistency can generate a far greater safety issue as the initial MCAS software did.

Big Pistons Forever

8th Oct 2022, 14:31

WHBM

8th Oct 2022, 15:06

I agree with FDR - the best plan is to let the 737 series retain the interface it has now and expect that this is the necessary end, though I am unsure that alerts for critical systems necessarily improve safety. What I am sure about is inconsistency can generate a far greater safety issue as the initial MCAS software did.
One of the key things that did it for me was an early comment, possibly around the time of the first accident, by a US airline crew member. The NG and the Max, supposedly same flight deck thus needing no training, weren't identical, there were differences, which were covered in a PowerPoint presentation which they had to review. This particular crew had done so previously and were down for the NG all that day, as before, but a reassignment gave them both their first Max for the second half of the duty. So they whizzed through the Powerpoint again in the crew room, then set off.

Comment on arrival : "Gee, it sure was a good thing nothing went wrong. All sorts of things are just different ...".

I wonder if anyone ever did a "Real Max/NG differences" video and stuck it on YouTube.

tdracer

8th Oct 2022, 18:55

Meanwhile, Southwest Pilots want just the opposite of what the American pilots are demanding:
Siding with Boeing, Southwest pilots ask Congress to grant MAX extension | The Seattle Times (https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/siding-with-boeing-southwest-pilots-ask-congress-to-grant-max-extension/?utm_content=personalization&utm_source=marketingcloud&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Top+of+The+Times+10-8-22_10_8_2022&utm_term=Active%20subscriber)Breaking ranks with another major pilot group, the president of the Southwest Airlines pilots’ union said Friday that the airline’s 10,000 pilots support Congress granting Boeing the deadline extension it needs to put the final two MAX models into service without changes to a safety alert system.

Describing the 737 MAX as “one of the safest aircraft ever to fly,” union President Casey Murray said changing the flight deck of the newer versions, MAX 7 and MAX 10, could confuse pilots who regularly switch between other models.

MechEngr

8th Oct 2022, 22:54

That would be 10,000 exclusively 737 pilots vs 15,000 "some are flying 737s" pilots. I wonder how many AA 737 pilots there are.

What's interesting is, contract negotiations aside, both groups could be correct. That the American Airlines pilots would benefit from the change and the Southwest Airlines pilots would be endangered by the change.

It's certainly possible for AA to buy some upgraded 7s and 10s and SW to buy uniform reporting 7s and 10s and the FAA to let what appears to be a market that is better informed to decide, just as they decide to buy Boeing or Airbus. It would be interesting to see if either group, faced with that possibility, would change their position and expose posturing.

fdr

9th Oct 2022, 01:17

What I say here will annoy almost all drivers, that's OK.

We seem to have devolved into a compliance evidence based system that is obviously one way to do something, but borrowing shamelessly from The Princess Bride, where Inigo Montoya says:

You Keep Using That Word, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means

The average driver can hop from a DC-9 to a B-777, put the pennies in the slot, get noise going, and follow a checklist, grab data and go aviate, following the jepp procedure, anywhere in the world. When they get a surprise, they will respond with "[expletive]".... and a few seconds later, confirm the blue is on the top, they are still flying, and ask for "...checklist please...." Pretty much the rest of the mess before during and after is lip gloss.

We don't bingle from a lack of knowledge normally, although on occasions, the drivers and their load have met their demise with no comprehension of what was happening. And that is actually the point; We lose planes for a failure of situational awareness in most events. 441; full back stick? what plane has anyone flown that will not desist the art of flying with full back stick for a couple of minutes? all the rest, 427, 585. Very few cases would insider knowledge massively alter the outcome, and in those cases, it was information that was not included as a matter of course in training programs. UAL 232, the guys are coping with a catastrophic event, and manage to keep the blue up top through both competency and a modicum of good fortune. Fantastic job, the last phugoid nearly turned it to custard, but their clean living came to the fore. UAL 881, the drivers had severe compound emergencies, and simplified the stuff to the point of being in a survival mode, and they got the bird back. Stunningly well composed team. Clipper Young America; RWY 01L, approach lights. The hole they dug was recovered from by using their inherent skills at the most simplistic level, to get the mortally wounded aircraft back onto the deck. XL888T, went out of their box ticking process into "there be dragons" and under perceived time pressure did an ad-hoc test point without proper set up, and then ran out of airspeed, elevator authority, and altitude without comprehending the condition they were in, "USE MANUAL TRIM", an advanced, directive lost in the clamor of all of the bells and whistles that they unleashed all because of an AOA probe that was frozen (sound familiar).

The surviving critical events are most frequently characterized by rational loadshedding of the cues and noise, and reverting to the simplest basics. We teach this, but the difference is getting to happen in real world while dealing with the sudden stress of a critical event.

Assuming that an advanced alerting system will make planes safer is unfortunately not supported by the facts in evidence.

Is flying different types that much of a complication? Maybe, maybe not. I checked my log back a ways, when I was doing some testing, I did 12 different fixed wing and a helicopter flights in the same day, and the only issue was it was hot and a number of the planes had no aircon. Point is simple, push/pull, chat, blue on top etc doesn't change between types. The emergency drills for the all start the same, blue on top; "checklist please..." Everything else is the same. The same thing will kill you in a C-150 or a PA-18-150 as will ruin your retirement in a B777-300ER, although to be fair, PT-22's were designed altered to kill students on base turn.... (thanks to Hap Arnold's input into design, good leader though). Losing a primary control is time critical, and that is where we seem to get discombobulated most, and our adherence to bureaucratic processes seems to be limiting. There are classes of aircraft that will behave in manners that are common, as that is how they are designed. There are some outliers, but a pitch issue in a B737 is similar to one in a B747, or an A320 if in alternate control laws. The aerodynamics are pretty agnostic. We are running through the UPRT stuff now, which is in essence a great step forward for aviation but we have added another level of bureaucracy, and my concern is that when trying to apply Ed DeBono's simplicity concepts to what remains a simple set of problems, we are adding more trees to the forest.

How bad is the problem? How many Amazon Prime customers missed their delivery after a B767-300F plants itself at a steep angle into the bay east of Houston? We did the same sort of stuff on the runway at Dubai with a B777 that apparently didn't have the skids added to the fuselage, the A320 that did the carnival 1 arrival into Bahrain, the B738 that put a neat hole into the ground proximate to Rostov runway. These crews got outside of their comfort zone, and did not have enough time or capacity to recover their SA and avoid trying to nudge the earth into a new orbit.

The large planes more or less (MD11's being an outlier) behave in a similar manner. Even T tailed vs conventional, until provoked they are similar (F100 being suitably odd, for reasons of design).

The problem with advanced alerting systems is, even the simplest get overlooked and the crew get outside of their safe space, and have issues determining they have an SA issue, and then have inadequate time to recover the SA loss and recover the aircraft to a safe state.

Having better alerting is fine, but our problems don't stem from the alerting, they arise from how we cope with SA loss in a stressful situation, and that doesn't have a simple solution from within § 25.1322. XL888T had a cockpit-full of state of the art alerting.... and that was in fact part of the problem.

Are there solutions? Sure, stop flying removes the risk, otherwise, the crews need to be able to comprehend their world in real time under levels of stress, and that is not an alerting function, it is a matter of simplicity such that the reduced bandwidth of the driver is not compromised. The recovery thereafter is a formality.

IMHO

[Before the bricks start flying, I can only talk from my experience, and that includes evaluation of over 3500 serious events that had 98% of cases where an SA loss was a primary factor in the event; from many major accident investigations where the crew have little comprehension of their dynamics until the moments at the end of the CVR/FDR recordings. In 110+ types that I've flown, the closest to a mean streak I have encountered in a plane was from the revised layout of the PT-22 following Hap's demand, which turned a sweet handling plane into a little rascal. Still really pretty though, and the engine note of a 3 stack exhaust Kinner radial puts a smile on your face...]

Big Pistons Forever

9th Oct 2022, 04:28

fdr

9th Oct 2022, 06:15

There is a reason that the airliner fatal accident rate is a fraction of what it was 40 years ago. Alerting is a big part of that. For example how many lives has a GPWS and TCAS saved since their introduction? In principle no pilot should ever get into a position where it’s needed, in reality people screw up and these systems saved them. Yes the 737 has both but it is missing the integrated alerting system every other airliner in production has.

No system is perfect but there is a pretty good consensus on what alerting systems a modern airliner should have and the 737 is now the outlier. It is past time the 737 family is updated.

Granted, that is the case. The A320 is vastly more advanced in it's systems than the B737, and has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding what is written in front of them on the ECAM. The B737 has had two spectacularly bad events from an undisclosed function. If the function wasn't going to be disclosed to the drivers, it is unlikely that any alerting function would be provided, that was the background reticence to disclosing the mod. Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA. I was frustrated by what TBC did on the Max, but it is still the case that had the crew been able to recognize the unwanted stab input, that would have been appropriately responded to as a stab [runaway] anomaly - if it isnt doing what we expect it to do, it's time to do our piloting magic stuff, and get back to flying.

safetypee

9th Oct 2022, 09:15

fdr

9th Oct 2022, 10:26

fdr, caution in concluding without justifying argument or data:-
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”

The alerting issue must be considered as a combination of human and aircraft, without judging either by accident outcome. Neither is perfect, infallible; highly dependent on context which for the main part depends on the situation and how this is perceived.
Alerting - communicating, is critical in awareness and understanding.

Whilst safety objectives continually seek improvement, first start with a level datum - as low as reasonably practical (tech, money, politics).
The industry has judged the MAX as ‘unreasonable’ thus the variants should be levelled-up.
Previous variants (old 737) might be judged as reasonable based on lengthy in-service risk assessment, but never to the extent that the past safety record implies future success, particularly with human activity in both operations and safety judgement.

P.S. “Improved alerting is great, but doesn't stop the crews losing SA.”
If crews lose something, both pilots simultaneously, then what was this something they had beforehand - and how was it obtained … magic? ;)

We have the same family of events occurring on vanilla flavor systems, through loss of SA, as occur with the best of breed, later integrated systems of Airbus, or late series Boeings, like the ground lovin' B777s in dubai, for departures and arrivals, (take your pick) and the crew still have an SA loss, and the dart gets planted in the dirt. The common issue is the event causes a loss of bandwidth of the crew, and SA loss arises.

The industry considers that the lack of system safety analysis of the Max was an issue, and that the lack of advice that the plane had such a system, and what may precipitate a failure would be, and what the consequences would be was utterly lacking to the OEM's great embarrassment and responsibility. I remain more concerned that the Max has the same manual backup that is unable to function throughout the envelope that it may be required to, if it is substantially out of trim.

P.S.; re caution in concluding without justifying argument or data:-
“… has had multiple disasters from the crew not understanding …”

Would love to give the database of the A330 wild rides that I have investigated, but they are not public domain. What is in public domain are the events where wild rides eventuated in spite of having world leading system alerting functions. These are from memory, but are the ones that I was generally familiar with. Don't get me wrong, advanced alerting is faaaantastic. It won't fix every problem, people will still lose SA, in spite of, and as a result of the best of breed. The human in the loop is still a desirable piece of gear, as for every one of the oddities that follows, ~500,000 flights landed safely due to (or in spite of) the presence of a crew that can interpret and deal with non linear, stochastic events.

In the context of the B737, putting lipstick on the pig isn't going to solve the immediate issues of design, they aren't even int he areas that have the highest risks. Put a set of flaps on it that gives a reasonable Vref, so the crews don't continue to use the end fence as an arrestor wire. They aren't going to fix the stabilizer anytime soon on the plane, but at least teach it!. The Airbus has issues, the B737 has own goals in design trades, they took a brilliant flap system (refer to Peter Randolph's paper on Jet transport High Lift devices...) and they ended up with cheaper, simpler, lighter, and higher Vrefs compared to what could have been achieved. That's a beancounters tradeoff, not an operational safety one involving drivers.

HDA 323
INDON AIR ASIA 8501
USAIR 1702
XL888T
Smartlynx Estonia ES-SAN MYX-9001
PIA 8303
LH1829 dual AOA failure
AA300 smart plane…
Air France 296
Air Inter 148
GulfAir 072
Airbus Industry 129
Air Transat 236
Air France 447
Odd ball CI-202
Emirates 407

There are about another 10 odd wildly out of trim reversion cases with Airbus's...

kiwi grey

9th Oct 2022, 21:46

Why is nobody talking about a forced retrofit of MAX 8/9 airframes with the updated alerting system over say a 3 year period. These airframes have a 30 year life span so they should be set up for success with a common superior alerting system.

Yes it’s expensive and disruptive but it only has to prevent one accident to be worth it. Boeing screwed the pooch on this it is past time for them to step up

Why is there so little talk about this?
Perhaps because Boeing and its customers are hoping that if they stay schtum, maybe the FAA and Congress won't notice this rather large elephant in the regulations room?
If Congress doesn't change the rules, and Boeing doesn't decide to scrap the MAX-7 & MAX-10, then there ought to be major pressure for the MAX-8 & MAX-9 to be brought up to the 'new standard' that will have been set by the MAX-7 & MAX-10

I don't think it will happen, though

John Marsh

18th Oct 2022, 11:40

Captain Sullenberger opposes an extension to the equipment exemption. From Simple Flying article (https://simpleflying.com/captain-sully-opposes-boeing-737-max-exemption/):
The legendary pilot Captain Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger has added his name to those lobbying to deny the Boeing 737 MAX 7 and MAX 10 an exemption to the upcoming federal requirement to install Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) into their cockpits. Per Jon Ostrower of The Air Current, Sullenberger is concerned about the “startle effect” Allied Pilots Association mentioned in their October 5 statement, which can delay a pilot's response to any in-flight event, much less an emergency.

"As someone who has been in the Left Seat of an airliner when very suddenly faced with an extreme emergency of a lifetime, I can tell you from firsthand experience that the startle effect is real and it is huge, which means that the airliners we fly must have the most effective and state-of-the-art crew alerting systems so that pilots can quickly determine the nature and severity of emergencies and act rapidly and correctly to keep safe everyone on board, passengers and crew alike.

I agree with Allied Pilots Association and their opposition to the extension of Boeing's current equipment exemption, which allows them to put older crew alerting systems on new 737 MAX airplanes. Instead, the Federal Aviation Administration must require Boeing to install modern crew alerting systems on them."

MechEngr

18th Oct 2022, 15:31

I'd be more inclined to accept his opinion if he started with the ADIRUs falsely reporting stalls, the genesis of both crashes. I don't see an alerting system being proposed that reported false reports of other reporting systems. I'd also be backing him if he was for grounding every single existing plane immediately until it was fitted with a state-of-the-art crew alerting system if he believed them to be fundamentally unsafe.

Since neither of these seem of any concern, it just comes across as ax-grinding

I support the decision of the purchasing airlines to specify if they want to fly with the long-time standard configuration or to buy the entirely new one. If American Airlines, for example, decides they need it then it's up to Boeing to decide if it's worth the separate certification costs to provide it. If Southwest's risk analysis shows that the alerting system won't make their operations safer then the existing option should be available to them. Make two new models for each variant: -7AS and -10AS for the alerting system version. If those aren't economical to produce or there are no buyers then Boeing can cancel those variants.

fdr

19th Oct 2022, 04:37

Captain Sullenberger opposes an extension to the equipment exemption. From Simple Flying article (https://simpleflying.com/captain-sully-opposes-boeing-737-max-exemption/):

Does it follow that we ground all other RPT jet transports until there are no birds in the air that our planes can fly into and result in multiple failures and shock/surprise to the crew? That is as logical an extension as the grounding of the other B737s or not proceeding with the Max 7 and 10.
Sully makes the case that enhanced crew alerting is essentially a bandaid. It is odd, that the mess of alerts and distractions in Sully's cockpit are greater than they would have been in a B737. Enhanced alerting functions provide some benefits in some cases, not all, and can also act as a distraction. I contend (and I am no fan of Boeing as a company) that forcing a change that would by necessity be rushed is not an overall improvement to aviations safety.

For a fair position, Sully should try the same event in a geriatric B737NG, and record the distractions. I fly both types, Boeing and Airbus, and cannot see an overriding justification to the position that seems to be developing at all levels. By all means make things better, but do it for the right reasons and in a logical manner to come up with real enhancements.

We have a set of rules for all of aviation, and the number of bandaids that sit on top of bandaids is an endemic, and systemic frustration.

ImbracableCrunk

19th Oct 2022, 14:34

I don't see an alerting system being proposed that reported false reports of other reporting systems.

Isn't that part of a synthetic AOA which would probably reduce the effects of a bad AOA signal?

Australopithecus

19th Oct 2022, 20:38

oceancrosser

20th Oct 2022, 11:47

The lack of EICAS/ECAM technology isn’t as important as the fixing poor critical systems sensors and failure modes. However, since the Boeing QRH has been dumbed down while retaining its frankly bizarre formatting the timely management of non-normals is not assured for all crews.

The first things that need to be fixed are systems design, then sensors followed by unambiguous displays.

I don’t think they can certify a 737 under the new rules period, and not just because of EICAS integration.

Agree entirely with the comments regarding the Boeing QRH. Progressively “dumbed down” to the level of the lowest common denominator, the 737. A truly awful document to work with due to the weird formatting and at my lot errors are regularly found.

WHBM

20th Oct 2022, 17:10

Nil by mouth

22nd Oct 2022, 08:26

More woes for Boeing https://euroweeklynews.com/2022/10/22/u-s-judge-rules-boeing-737-max-crash-passengers-are-crime-victims/
This will effectively seal the fate of the 7 and 10 ?

Australopithecus

22nd Oct 2022, 08:41

Probably not, but I would be grateful if Willow Run could opine.

DaveReidUK

22nd Oct 2022, 08:54

It's hard to see how this latest development isn't going to influence the decision on whether Boeing gets off the hook, certification-wise.

fdr

22nd Oct 2022, 11:34

It's hard to see how this latest development isn't going to influence the decision on whether Boeing gets off the hook, certification-wise.

May be more interesting than that.... TBC management will be finally facing some music for the last 25 years of ambivalence. What TBC and the DOJ previously concocted was outrageous in the circumstance, and done on Trumps watch by his AG.
It doesn't preclude the 7 and 10, but it sure doesn't give TBC any leeway on further shoddy managerial decisions. It ain't over till the appeals are over, and the DOJ has to look at it's role in this. The fine funds should have all gone to the families, the govt also had unclean hands in the matter and should have not benefited from the disaster at the cost of the rights of the families.

The B737 is not a bad plane, it is just average. The failure to provide information was unconscionable and the basis of the stabilizer manual mode to meet the Part is flawed still. To rework the design to make it compliant with the intent of the rule would be a monumental undertaking, and proper training and awareness is a better solution.

WillowRun 6-3

22nd Oct 2022, 13:23

Probably not, but I would be grateful if Willow Run could opine.
Thank you for the invitation.

I'll latch onto the court's written order and offer more if I can, although for now, I think fdr hit the point squarely on center: the plea agreement [correction: Deferred Prosecution Agreement] was a sorry excuse for an outcome and resolution of that criminal matter in federal court. Let it be recalled that a more vigorous criminal prosecution did in fact take place, namely the effort to convict Mark Forkner, an effort that - thankfully - failed.

As to the looming certification deadline..... Earlier this fall I had occasion to fly to Brussels to attend a gabfest featuring some worthies in European aviation. I asked a senior flight attendant if I could get permission to visit the flight deck of the 787-10 after landing and gate-parking and ask the pilots some questions I'd been reading about regarding flight control systems and, to my surprise, the aviators did invite me up. I'm here to report nothing about how the 787-10 crew alerting systems work or compare to less contemporary systems . . . because all that happened is I got my Enthusiast membership renewed again - so excited to see through the windscreen and (at Capt's suggestion) sit in the left-hand seat (oh boy!), put hands on the control yoke (....!) I utterly blanked on any questions. I'll save the forum from seeing the photos of this SLF-atty looking so Enthusiastic. But my point is, I'm more convinced than ever that Congress is not quite capable of dissecting the real questions about extending the deadline. I have to put some faith and hope on FAA and, yes, this latest news about the legal aftermath of the two crashes would seem to weigh against FAA giving TBC such a benefit of doubt (.... subject to reading the district court judge's ruling).

MechEngr

22nd Oct 2022, 15:34

Thank you for the invitation.

I'll latch onto the court's written order and offer more if I can, although for now, I think fdr hit the point squarely on center: the plea agreement [correction: Deferred Prosecution Agreement] was a sorry excuse for an outcome and resolution of that criminal matter in federal court. Let it be recalled that a more vigorous criminal prosecution did in fact take place, namely the effort to convict Mark Forkner, an effort that - thankfully - failed.

As to the looming certification deadline..... Earlier this fall I had occasion to fly to Brussels to attend a gabfest featuring some worthies in European aviation. I asked a senior flight attendant if I could get permission to visit the flight deck of the 787-10 after landing and gate-parking and ask the pilots some questions I'd been reading about regarding flight control systems and, to my surprise, the aviators did invite me up. I'm here to report nothing about how the 787-10 crew alerting systems work or compare to less contemporary systems . . . because all that happened is I got my Enthusiast membership renewed again - so excited to see through the windscreen and (at Capt's suggestion) sit in the left-hand seat (oh boy!), put hands on the control yoke (....!) I utterly blanked on any questions. I'll save the forum from seeing the photos of this SLF-atty looking so Enthusiastic. But my point is, I'm more convinced than ever that Congress is not quite capable of dissecting the real questions about extending the deadline. I have to put some faith and hope on FAA and, yes, this latest news about the legal aftermath of the two crashes would seem to weigh against FAA giving TBC such a benefit of doubt (.... subject to reading the district court judge's ruling).

I'm with you there - there should never be any plea agreements allowed in federal cases.

Would there be any reason not to?

What verdict is the correct one and what punishment is deserved?

Big Pistons Forever

23rd Oct 2022, 01:36

Whatever the views, it's now only nine weeks to the introduction of the new requirement, less holiday shutdown time, and we haven't seen any sign (I am aware) that the US government is even starting to move to give the exemption. I presume it has to be given before the cutoff date - all the initial discussion was based on this.

I think a lot is going to depend on the makeup of the next Congress. Since it is likely to be a Republican majority and many Republican Representative seem to have unusually flexible ethical boundaries I fully expect Boing will get an 11 hour reprieve. How the other world regulatory authorities react will be interesting to see...

megan

23rd Oct 2022, 04:23

U.S. judge rules Boeing 737 MAX crash passengers are ‘crime victims’

That has to be an industry first does it not? What a disaster for a once proud company who had personages in their alumni who were truly industry giants, Allen, Sutter, one weeps.

Blackfriar

23rd Oct 2022, 11:23

May be more interesting than that.... TBC management will be finally facing some music for the last 25 years of ambivalence. What TBC and the DOJ previously concocted was outrageous in the circumstance, and done on Trumps watch by his AG.
It doesn't preclude the 7 and 10, but it sure doesn't give TBC any leeway on further shoddy managerial decisions. It ain't over till the appeals are over, and the DOJ has to look at it's role in this. The fine funds should have all gone to the families, the govt also had unclean hands in the matter and should have not benefited from the disaster at the cost of the rights of the families.

The B737 is not a bad plane, it is just average. The failure to provide information was unconscionable and the basis of the stabilizer manual mode to meet the Part is flawed still. To rework the design to make it compliant with the intent of the rule would be a monumental undertaking, and proper training and awareness is a better solution.
Let's add TDS to your TLAs.
The 737 (all variants) are not bad aircraft. The conspiracy to cover up the differences between old and MAX was criminal. The design of MAX MCAS with only two inputs to a safety critical system, instead of "best-of-three" was yet another appalling cost-saving decision that cost lives.

fdr

23rd Oct 2022, 14:01

Let's add TDS to your TLAs.
The 737 (all variants) are not bad aircraft. The conspiracy to cover up the differences between old and MAX was criminal. The design of MAX MCAS with only two inputs to a safety critical system, instead of "best-of-three" was yet another appalling cost-saving decision that cost lives.
:ok: Three Letter Acronyms seem to come naturally to The Boeing Company. If that led to more insightful FCOMS that would be worth the extra letter or two.

The failure to disclose the novel system came about from one messed up process, which the FAA had many heads up over a very long time. In the end, a single fall guy gets dragged into court for sending poor prose that came back to bite him. The one guy that sat in front of a judge was not the cause, he was a result of the companies systemic issues and happened to be the guy who actually found an issue by accident, and then messed up. He didn't design it, and, reading his emails, I'm not 100% certain that what he saw was actually what the plane eventually encountered. The process that the engineers followed was flawed, but they did not develop the system that pressed them to come up with such solutions, and then they failed to evaluate the system architecture they had arrived at for failure modes. That, the engineers failed in, and that is what occurs in design fro time to time. They didn't act criminally, they did act with less than stellar competence. The system is owned by the Companies senior managers, they oversaw the behaviour towards production QA being marginalised, as did the FAA, and they oversaw the ethics of the company, which is a sorry tale of it's own.

The Dept of Justice moved with unseemly haste to marginalise the victims and to give cover to the Company, and that is unconscionable A penalty that values the lives lost at around 25% of what the govt wanted for the embarrassment of the Companies failings on the watch of the govt is poor taste.

fdr

23rd Oct 2022, 14:24

I think a lot is going to depend on the makeup of the next Congress. Since it is likely to be a Republican majority and many Republican Representative seem to have unusually flexible ethical boundaries I fully expect Boing will get an 11 hour reprieve. How the other world regulatory authorities react will be interesting to see...

That will be interesting to watch from afar. As it is your country, it is inappropriate for those around the world to pass comment, but.... golly!

The B737 at this juncture has proven itself in spite of a few gotchas to be a reasonable workhorse. I would prefer to see improved high lift devices over alerting functions, but of course, beancounters would alter that immediately from a safety buffer against runway overruns to more payload range. The alerting and sensors are a double edge sword, and forcing expedient solutions tends to come back and bite one n' all. Realistically, the growth potential of the B737 is approaching it's rational limits, and making changes from the devil we now know to institute new and novel things to find out seems a curious solution. That may be in keeping with other knee jerk responses however, like Colgan, an icing/fatigue/awareness event becoming a new industry of adding fluff that is covered immediately thereafter in greater depth and relevance than the course that Congress mandated.

Advanced alerting aircraft have fallen out of the sky for the same reasons as classic systems. Both from SA type I "sorry, I'm thinking of soup...." SA II, "what's it doing?" and SA III "what's that mountain goat doing in this cloud..?".
The potential for the advanced cockpit to become a distraction of its own has not been adequately resolved, and with the potential for compound problems to conspire to be new and entertaining, I doubt we will ever get a perfect solution. Sully's A320 would have had more noise' distractions than the NG, so perhaps we should all just go take up cycles instead. I did some work on the advanced HMI interfaces on spacecraft long time back; was interesting, and yes it was nice to have stuff, but, so is an iPad. Time spent on foam adhesion may have been more productive.

SOPS

24th Oct 2022, 12:55

Big Pistons Forever

26th Oct 2022, 17:26

I see Alaska Airlines has just inked another big MAX order. It appears they have already committed to taking MAX 9's in lieu of the MAX10 if (when ?) it is not certified. I think it is looking increasing less likely the dash 7 and dash 10 MAX variants will ever be built.

WillowRun 6-3

27th Oct 2022, 14:07

Following Boeing's Calhoun's statements on CNBC yesterday, today Southwest CEO Jordan has also said that certification of the 737 MAX 7 - of which his airline has ordered quite a few - still is expected. The interview did not reach any specific factors concerning the alerting system update issue. The CEO did, though, indicate that if the airline had to switch to the -8 it would find a way forward, impliedly without much difficulty. Plus if I understood the q&a, if the airline ended up with some -8s now and some -7s later on following certification at some undefined future time, the mix of aircraft would not be a problem until at least a few years from the present.
((SLF-attorney still intending to post further on meaning - within scope of forum and thread - of "crime victims" court decision in Texas federal district court. Teaser: U.S. Sen. Ted Cruz filed a "friend of the court" brief in the case.))

WHBM

27th Oct 2022, 14:41

Southwest CEO Jordan has also said that certification of the 737 MAX 7 - of which his airline has ordered quite a few - still is expected ... The CEO did, though, indicate that if the airline had to switch to the -8 ... i
This situation looks more like the story of "The Emperor has no Clothes" every day.

Mike Flynn

28th Oct 2022, 18:59

Having flown the 737 200, 300, 400, 700 and 800 for a total of over 10000 hours, I can say it’s a great aircraft. A great aircraft that has reached the end if it’s useful life. A new aircraft ( or an updated 757) should have replaced it.

That statement says it all. The Comet was a great aircraft for its time but was doomed after the crashes following the window issue.

CAEBr

29th Oct 2022, 14:02

The Comet was a great aircraft for its time but was doomed after the crashes following the window issue.

Not quite the same comparison though. The window issue - and RF aerial cutout - was an issue with the Comet 1 and was corrected in the later larger Comet 4. That aircraft was by no means doomed following those changes, simply no longer in prime position and eventually lost out accordingly numbers wise. It remained capable and used by a number of operators.

Nil by mouth

29th Oct 2022, 20:00

That statement says it all. The Comet was a great aircraft for its time but was doomed after the crashes following the window issue.

Not exactly doomed, Dan Air, Nimrod ???

WHBM

29th Oct 2022, 20:24

Comet 4s carried on for a couple of decades, and some operators (like BEA Airtours) set up operations from scratch with a significant fleet.

What was surprising is how De Havilland kept the same name after it became so tainted, instead of choosing a different model name.

PEI_3721

7th Nov 2022, 17:45

Boeing: “We won’t contemplate a new airplane”

https://airinsight.com/boeing-we-wont-contemplate-a-new-airplane/

… until we know we’re capable of doing that.

tdracer

7th Nov 2022, 17:49

Boeing: “We won’t contemplate a new airplane”

https://airinsight.com/boeing-we-wont-contemplate-a-new-airplane/

… until we know we’re capable of doing that.
A more factual interpretation would be:
After the financial bath we've taken over the last four years (due to the MAX and COVID), we can't afford to launch a new airplane program for the next five or ten years.
So we're desperately hoping that the technological progress over the next decade makes that a financially wise move...

Big Pistons Forever

7th Nov 2022, 18:17

Boeing is this Twenty First century GE. A once great industry leader brought down by CEO hubris. Boeing Commercial has no future, it will just bump along becoming more and more irrelevant until it exist solely as a support provider for in service Boeing aircraft

Organfreak

7th Nov 2022, 18:28

It breaks my heart. I was a local lad when the first 707s were rolled over a crowd at the hydroplane races. We were so proud of this great company.

Less Hair

7th Nov 2022, 19:08

By the time Boeing starts the next clean sheet there will be nobody with the old experience left and nobody who already developed, designed and certified a new aircraft. It's derivatives, damage control and repaying their loans how they spend their money. If they get the 787 line up and running again with no more hickups that's at least one good program. The MAX might carry on, however I am not sure about 7 and 10. Will EASA agree to another grandfathering? And the 777X will take years to be through certification.
They should invest in some midsized model above the A321neo and prepare to launch the 737 follow on family. They must do it right the first time.

Australopithecus

7th Nov 2022, 20:56

When business schools teach case studies showing how massive corporations can be ruined by bad management I expect that many MBA students wonder how much money the CEOs got away with. With envy.

WHBM

7th Nov 2022, 20:58

So we're desperately hoping that the technological progress over the next decade makes that a financially wise move...
And of course this becomes self-fulfilling. Airbus don't do a clean sheet A320 replacement. Why should they, it would cost a packet, and they would just be competing with their own current product. Boeing will bounce along as a No 2 competitor, Russian and Chinese attempts are amateurish. I suspect the next advances will come not from the airframers, but from the engine manufacturers.

PEI_3721

7th Nov 2022, 21:39

TD, so 'until we know we’re capable of doing that' is much more influenced by the financial situation, opposed to existing or new engineering capability which can develop alongside the new technologies.

But then money = people (engineers); a delicate balance of investing for the future in people, technology, or something else.
What will commercial aviation look like over those time scales.

Public statements to the investors; stay with us for the long term … … hmm.
How big is the credibility gap; not that large when viewed together with the military perspective.

kiwi grey

7th Nov 2022, 22:50

A more factual interpretation would be:
After the financial bath we've taken over the last four years (due to the MAX and COVID), we can't afford to launch a new airplane program for the next five or ten years.
So we're desperately hoping that the technological progress over the next decade makes that a financially wise move..

And of course this becomes self-fulfilling. Airbus don't do a clean sheet A320 replacement. Why should they, it would cost a packet, and they would just be competing with their own current product. Boeing will bounce along as a No 2 competitor, Russian and Chinese attempts are amateurish. I suspect the next advances will come not from the airframers, but from the engine manufacturers.
.
On the other hand, Airbus has buildings full of design engineers and an industrial relations environment where they're difficult to lay off, so maybe they'll keep them gainfully employed. AB can now be confident that BA won't be launching any major threats to their product lines for a decade or so, which means they can afford to design & launch derivatives that will have a long-enough market life to earn their capital back. If they do it right, or even only fairly right, they can also make life even more difficult for Boeing and China to get into the market.
This could lead to:

the A220-500;
an A325 - an A320 with a small stretch;
an A326 & A327 - a re-winged A321 & A321XLR; and
an A350neo, including a -1200/-2000 model if the 777-9 looks like it might make any market impact

Bidule

8th Nov 2022, 06:36

A more factual interpretation would be:
After the financial bath we've taken over the last four years (due to the MAX and COVID), .

No, it is "after having bought back shares and given 62 billions to shareholders over a decade".
Having put only half of this amount in R&D/Engineering would mean that a new aircraft is there now!

.

threep

8th Nov 2022, 12:24

Less Hair

8th Nov 2022, 12:32

I'd expect another "boring" tube and wing design, but with even higher bypass geared engines, made from CFRP in more advanced shapes on robot lines. The factories will change the most, enabling much higher precision assembly, with everything being more lightweight and cloud connected.

WideScreen

8th Nov 2022, 14:08

The next clean sheet design from either AB or BA will need to make a big step forward regards efficiency/carbon emissions. From an airframe manufacturers point of view they only place they can really go is a blended-wing design and making that work regards customer experience, emergency escape, cargo and a whole host of other design challenges.. I don't see either company eager to push the go button on that work from a commercial standpoint, but if we start getting any emissions targets for airlines coming from governments (eg COP27) then their hands may be forced.
Take as an example, the A350 development. Airbus heavily objecting, because there was an A330, bla bla, though it turned out to be a significant success, with more growth potential.

So, I think, there are still realistic evolutionary developments possible for the BA line of airplanes.

The fact, BA doesn't have money, OK, that's a serious item and the longer they delay biting the sour apple, the less competent knowledge they will have in-house available. So, yeah, it doesn't look good and recovery can easily take 20-30 years, IF BA wants this at all.

Maybe split-off the airline airplanes from BA and sell this to China ???????? I think, China would be eager to obtain that BA part (the other parts too, though that's not going to happen).

Less Hair

8th Nov 2022, 14:17

The window to sell strategic US assets to China might have closed already.

WideScreen

8th Nov 2022, 14:45

The window to sell strategic US assets to China might have closed already.
At first sight, yep, though you never know what is going to happen, when the US again becomes a one-man show, ruled by the Putin-lapdog. And, China is very good in finding out secrets, so, who knows, the ruler is also a Xi-lapdog nowadays (or maybe Putin did trade secrets with Xi around this subject, to get Ukraine support ....).

ATC Watcher

8th Nov 2022, 17:33

(or maybe Putin did trade secrets with Xi around this subject, to get Ukraine support ....).
Where did you get that Xi is supporting Putin on Ukraine,? Not yet at least , China refused their ammo request, and so far Xi had made very neutral statements,
The Max is still grounded in China and : China formally announced longstanding deals for Airbus jets worth $17 billion during a visit last week by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

Add the COMAC C919 coming up next year and I cannot see a bright future for Boeing in China, But as you said, with the MAGA messiah possibly coming back in 2024, who knows what deals might be made then , and who will benefit ... :rolleyes:

tdracer

8th Nov 2022, 17:52

Add the COMAC C919 coming up next year and I cannot see a bright future for Boeing in China, But as you said, with the MAGA messiah possibly coming back in 2024, who knows what deals might be made then , and who will benefit ... :rolleyes:

You mean the guy who first implemented heavy tariffs against China (much to the distress of the other party, even though they left them largely in place once they were back in power)?
It took a while (far too long IMHO), but the powers that be have finally figured out that China isn't our friend.

WideScreen

8th Nov 2022, 18:26

Where did you get that Xi is supporting Putin on Ukraine,? Not yet at least , China refused their ammo request, and so far Xi had made very neutral statements,
Buying large qty of oil/gas, because it's cheap and humanity is a function serving the CCP ?
And, yep, Xi looks hesitating, though that is because he fears more (and long-lasting) sanctions, not because of principles of honesty. Be aware, we will have many difficulties to find out what is done sneaky, China is still largely walled off for foreigners. Not so say, the anti-foreigner atmosphere makes most foreigners flee the country, asap.

The Max is still grounded in China and :
Add the COMAC C919 coming up next year and I cannot see a bright future for Boeing in China, But as you said, with the MAGA messiah possibly coming back in 2024, who knows what deals might be made then , and who will benefit ... :rolleyes:
IF they could trade in Airbus aircraft purchases for BA commercial airplanes' ownership/technology, the Airbus deal is out of the window, fast.

Xi perfectly knows, the China state of technology as well the way the society is organized, doesn't work to reach the quality level, Airbus has reached.

You mean the guy who first implemented heavy tariffs against China (much to the distress of the other party, even though they left them largely in place once they were back in power)?
It took a while (far too long IMHO), but the powers that be have finally figured out that China isn't our friend.
Yep, China is not your friend, everybody knows that, though Russia is neither nor was so in 2016, despite that the one and only MAGA messiah (nice description) praised Putin he was the best guy on earth (and this MAGA messiah still does so, whenever he thinks to get away with that).

So, yeah, the moment Xi does know about the MAGA messiah, what Putin knows, the impossible deals with China will suddenly be arranged on a Sunday afternoon, before the congress or what-ever government bureau is able to object.

WillowRun 6-3

9th Nov 2022, 22:29

On a related subject...
News reports state that the federal district court in Chicago has dismissed the class action complaint filed by pilots whose careers were negatively affected after they gained qualification to operate the 737 MAX but the aircraft then was grounded.
Basis of the ruling is a principle of state tort law - absence of proximate cause linking Boeing's wrongful acts and omissions on one hand, and the injuries claimed on the other.

WillowRun 6-3

2nd Dec 2022, 20:10

Wall Street Journal reporting on development of legislative initiatives to deal with the imminent end-date for the certification process for the MAX 7 and MAX 10, particularly with regard to updated crew alerting systems (as compared to systems and configurations in currently certified MAX variants). The date, it should be noted, isn't any sort of magical - it was included in wide-ranging legislation originated out of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that addresses several areas in the wake and/or aftermath of the two 737 MAX accidents.

WSJ reporting indicates the scorecard for the inside baseball going on - United, Delta and Southwest want the MAX 7 & 10 variants with orders reaching approx. 50 billion USD; Southwest's pilots union and ALPA support extension of the date, along with former NTSB head Robert Zumwalt. Opposed are the pilots union at American, and a group of family members of the accident victims. House Transportation & Infrastructure Chair, Rep. Peter DeFazio (D.-Ore.) also opposes extension. (The estimable Mr. DeFazio retires from the Congress at the end of this session.)

State of play in Congress reportedly is that Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.) is driving legislative measures to extend the date, with a requirement for "additional safety improvements" not otherwise identified in the reporting. The measure "would require newly produced 737 MAX jets and the existing fleet to be retrofitted with safety features currently slated for the 737 MAX 10." (Though stated in plain enough English, this SLF/attorney doesn't quite understand what is being proposed here.)

Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?

In other Boeing news, WSJ also reporting that United is close to a deal for dozens of 787 Dreamliner aircraft, as segments of its wide-body aircraft fleet continue to age out. Some things do get better with age, but not everything.

DaveReidUK

2nd Dec 2022, 20:35

WSJ reporting indicates the scorecard for the inside baseball going on - United, Delta and Southwest want the MAX 7 & 10 variants with orders reaching approx. 50 billion USD

It's becoming increasingly hard to believe that any airline really wants the MAX 7.

tdracer

2nd Dec 2022, 21:07

State of play in Congress reportedly is that Sen. Maria Cantwell (D.-Wash.) is driving legislative measures to extend the date, with a requirement for "additional safety improvements" not otherwise identified in the reporting. The measure "would require newly produced 737 MAX jets and the existing fleet to be retrofitted with safety features currently slated for the 737 MAX 10." (Though stated in plain enough English, this SLF/attorney doesn't quite understand what is being proposed here.)

Perhaps, if the date is extended, then as an earlier poster suggested, the result might be two sub-variants of the MAX 7 and MAX 10 - a "commonality" sub-variant, and a "new alerting" sub-variant. And what is within "additional safety improvements"?

According to what I've read, the proposal is that a third AOA source (probably synthetic rather than another physical sensor) be a mandatory retrofit to the entire MAX fleet. As it currently stands, EASA would require the 3rd AOA source, but other authorities haven't mandated it.
DR - I think the MAX 7 is appealing to current MAX operators that want something a little smaller, but don't want to add another type (e.g. the A220) to their fleet. I keep hearing that Southwest really wants them for their lighter routes. Southwest currently has a huge fleet of 737-700s.
f that market is large enough to justify the expense of development/cert is a different question. Certainly it wouldn't justify a multi-Billion dollar effort to update the flight deck (especially since it would adversely affect the common type rating).

Big Pistons Forever

2nd Dec 2022, 21:24

tdracer

2nd Dec 2022, 23:15

My understanding is that due to the fact that the computational power of the legacy 386 chip in the MAX is already maxed out, incorporating the third AOA input is problematic so Boeing is resisting this with an all out lobbying blitz.
Boeing already committed the 3rd AOA source to get the MAX re-certified by EASA. So they have to do it one way or another or EASA will stop further MAX deliveries to the EASA countries.
The lobbying is being directed at not having to change the flight deck for the MAX-7 and -10. Third AOA is too late to back out of...

MechEngr

3rd Dec 2022, 06:56

I think the management of validity of the AoA system should be with the ADIRUs. This should remove code within the flight/nav computer and would move the interface to noting any AoA sensor failure reported by the ADIRU. It's important that the ADIRU do this task in order to avoid the previous panic inducing trigger of a false stall warning that is issued directly by the ADIRU.

WillowRun 6-3

3rd Dec 2022, 13:19

Article currently in Seattle Times covers the situation in more depth and with a discussion of the EASA factor.

India Four Two

3rd Dec 2022, 13:45

If Congress doesn’t mandate Boeing 737 MAX safety retrofits, Europe will
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/if-congress-doesnt-mandate-boeing-737-max-safety-retrofits-europe-will/

MechEngr

3rd Dec 2022, 21:46

A continuous false alarm stick shaker was one major distraction for the pilots throughout the two crash flights.

That's just dumb. The stick shaker is a hand massager if the pilots understand that the stall warning is false. If they think it is true then shutting it off is insane. Why would Transport Canada or any other agency think it's useful to disable the stick shaker? Disabling an audio alarm that might cover other alarms or communication in the cockpit makes sense, but not the shaker.

What makes little sense is Gate's confusing this with an EASA requirement - his previous article said the stick shaker cutout was an addition only from Transport Canada who wanted stick shaker circuit breaker training and maybe some tactile indicators of which breakers they are. What EASA wanted in that regard was a vaguely described solution to the general warning system problem.

Does anyone have information directly from EASA, et al, rather than through the Dominic filter?

Porto Pete

4th Dec 2022, 16:14

That's just dumb. The stick shaker is a hand massager if the pilots understand that the stall warning is false. If they think it is true then shutting it off is insane. Why would Transport Canada or any other agency think it's useful to disable the stick shaker? Disabling an audio alarm that might cover other alarms or communication in the cockpit makes sense, but not the shaker.

I'd have to disagree there. I had an unusual pitot heat failure mode a bit more than a decade ago on an NG. The stick shaker and overspeed warning were triggered simultaneously along with a plethora of master cautions. While we figured out pretty quickly it was unreliable airspeed, communication in the flightdeck became very difficult and stressful. The overspeed stopped but the stick shaker continued until touchdown and it's a noisy bit of kit.

ImbracableCrunk

4th Dec 2022, 16:46

Stick Shaker Canon Plug . . . . . . . . Disconnect
Crew Communications . . . . . . . . . . Establish

Seriously, unplug it. Why fly with something that obviously is hindering the flight crew?

MechEngr

4th Dec 2022, 17:56

I'd have to disagree there. I had an unusual pitot heat failure mode a bit more than a decade ago on an NG. The stick shaker and overspeed warning were triggered simultaneously along with a plethora of master cautions. While we figured out pretty quickly it was unreliable airspeed, communication in the flightdeck became very difficult and stressful. The overspeed stopped but the stick shaker continued until touchdown and it's a noisy bit of kit.

The purpose from Transport Canada seemed to be related to pilot mental overload by the stick shaker, but that opens the question of why that is not being demanded of all aircraft in operation. However, adding silencer controls does open the opportunity that the override will prevent a legitimate alert from sounding/shaking when it is supposed to. It's easy to imagine a service operation where the override is checked and not reset.

Consider that at least two aircraft have been dispatched with aileron controls reversed fresh from service (one by cable and the other fly-by-wire,) especially if this was added to a limited number of planes, there is a good chance of overrides set incorrectly and being overlooked.

Big Pistons Forever

4th Dec 2022, 18:50

The purpose from Transport Canada seemed to be related to pilot mental overload by the stick shaker, but that opens the question of why that is not being demanded of all aircraft in operation. However, adding silencer controls does open the opportunity that the override will prevent a legitimate alert from sounding/shaking when it is supposed to. It's easy to imagine a service operation where the override is checked and not reset.

Consider that at least two aircraft have been dispatched with aileron controls reversed fresh from service (one by cable and the other fly-by-wire,) especially if this was added to a limited number of planes, there is a good chance of overrides set incorrectly and being overlooked.

But the stick shaker disconnect will trigger a EICAS alert when the override is checked and not reset……..Oh silly me I forgot the MAX is the only jet airliner in production anywhere that doesn’t have EICAS……

Australopithecus

5th Dec 2022, 08:47

Seriously? If you have a false stick shaker event which you manage, then disable the warning, what do you estimate the chances are of having a subsequent 1x10e9 stall event later on the same flight?

The 737 needs three independent alpha sensors as per modern thinking on the subject. anything less is …primitive

keesje

5th Dec 2022, 10:51

It seems the outlook all 737-8s/-9s in operation will need to be modified, pilots trained etc. next to the new 737-10 and 737-7 made Boeing fight back, for economic reasons.

Maria Cantwell bit the bullet I think firmly including the -8 modifications and setting deadlines. That will probably create good will at the FAA, AESA and CAAC.

FlyingStone

5th Dec 2022, 16:37

There seems to be a lot of misunderstanding as to how the stick shaker on the 737 works, and how it can be disabled (at the pilot's discretion), in the TC/EASA (and probably for many other regulators) versions of the Airspeed Unreliable NNC - already in place ever since the MAX re-certification.

The 737 has two SMYDs (Stall Management Yaw Damper computers), which take various inputs (including AoA) to calculate whether stick shaker needs to operate or not. Each SMYD is connected to its onside stick shaker (left SMYD to captain's stick shaker motor and right SMYD to the first officer one), so one SMYD can only make one stick shaker motor to operate. That being said, even with a single stick shaker motor operating, there will be vibration felt on both control columns (as they are interconnected), but it will be stronger on the side where stick shaker is operating.

Now, if one of the AoA sensors fails, or other malfunction occurs on that side, only one stick shaker motor will operate - potentially continuously. With both control columns vibrating, detecting a difference between this false stick shaker and an actual stall detected by the other SMYD will be very difficult. For that reason, the NNC gives the crew an option to disable the false stick shaker (currently by pulling a collared CB for the onside stick shaker motor), which will make subsequent detection of an actual stall extremely simple, as it will be identical to a normal approach to stall with a fully serviceable aircraft.

Nobody is talking about disabling both stick shakers when one goes crazy, it's all just about disabling that single one to lower the workload for the crew. MAX 10 prototypes have been seen with stick shaker inhibit switches, which is probably a safer solution than having crew pulling circuit brakers:

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/673x454/overspeed_switches_max_ccdb2b8151f87f32868ee72e8a54178092798 5c6.jpg

MechEngr

5th Dec 2022, 23:45

My mistake on the ADIRU. It's been a while since I looked and I'd forgotten the SMYD. Still, I think that is the level of evaluating if there is an actual stall and not a sensor failure rather than, for example, making that the MCAS software responsibility. If the plane is not in fact stalling there should not be a stick shaker running. I recall that the stick shaker control is not routed through the flight computer.

If the AoA sensor or SMYD is falsely reporting a stall aren't all outputs from that side suspect and should see power pulled from that side SMYD and ADIRU?

WillowRun 6-3

9th Dec 2022, 02:12

Australopithecus

9th Dec 2022, 05:16

Well, by the time the new congress manages to elect a speaker it will be time for the “all Hunter, all the time” legislative agenda so I don’t see any actual governing on the horizon.

WHBM

9th Dec 2022, 05:57

One wonders, even if passed by the US legislation, what view EASA (and elsewhere) would have and whether they will tag along and certify it as well. Professionally, how can they ? And then, if it can't be used in Europe, the insurers (particularly the worldwide ones based in Europe) will start to have cold feet about it (particularly having been burned by two Max claims), and then the lessors and financiers will start feeling if it can only be leased in part of the world, what second user value is it going to have ? I know we have had aircraft only partially certified in the past, like the Trident, which was never even offered to the FAA, but that was from times when aircraft were just bought outright and had limited markets.

MechEngr

9th Dec 2022, 06:45

WillowRun 6-3

9th Dec 2022, 13:18

Well, by the time the new congress manages to elect a speaker it will be time for the “all Hunter, all the time” legislative agenda so I don’t see any actual governing on the horizon.

Granted, one must first believe that cooler heads in fact exist in the majority conference and its leadership, in order then to believe that down the calendar a bit, we'll be able to say "cooler heads prevailed."

Much of the factual content which could be produced by those investigations likely already is known, although not on the record in the way that House panels proceed on the record. But what is the ultimate revelation, that ..... some politicians and their immediate family members give in to temptations of corruption? I dunno, being from Chicago, I think this outcome wouldn't have a ready answer to the question in response, "So what?"

Reminds me of a sign behind the bar in one of my favorite watering holes:
"WINE
Because your friends just aren't that interesting"

GlobalNav

9th Dec 2022, 19:54

All that is in question is the extension, not the press for a particular compliance mechanism. So, it won't matter to the EASA until the FAA t approves the compliance mechanism results or approves the plane without them and EASA doesn't like the solution It's only a possible problem if the FAA allows Boeing to build one version with and one version without in order to satisfy the US market as to what the EASA would do. I believe Southwest pilots essentially voted "without."

Doesn't the extension concern the approved certification basis, which defines the amendment levels of the rules in play? It's not a small issue. Updating the cert basis would almost certainly lead to new negotiations over provisions of 21.101, and in this regulatory climate, far less lenient than when the original certification basis was agreed. EASA, of course, was reluctant to agree to the original certification basis and less likely to re-approve the same. As others have suggested, this probably nixes the airplane because redesign to comply with an updated certification basis is cost prohibitive.

Big Pistons Forever

9th Dec 2022, 20:55

According to multiple press reports, the Congress has not included an extension of the timeline for the certification of the 737 MAX 7 and 10 in the annual "defense policy bill", actually the NDAA, National Defense Authorization Act. Since the NDAA is annually a must-pass legislative measure, often times "riders" are attached to it, to ease their passage.

Options for getting an extension done in this Congress are narrowing (insert details of legislative process here).

The lame duck Congress has a huge shopping list of must pass legislation so I think missing a rider attached to the NDAA means that the chance of getting a further extension is greatly diminished.

My understanding is when the drop dead date passes the dash 7 and 10 are done as they will have missed the grandfather window. Is there anyway the next Congress could retroactively reinstate the grandfathering ?

MechEngr

9th Dec 2022, 23:36

Doesn't the extension concern the approved certification basis, which defines the amendment levels of the rules in play? It's not a small issue. Updating the cert basis would almost certainly lead to new negotiations over provisions of 21.101, and in this regulatory climate, far less lenient than when the original certification basis was agreed. EASA, of course, was reluctant to agree to the original certification basis and less likely to re-approve the same. As others have suggested, this probably nixes the airplane because redesign to comply with an updated certification basis is cost prohibitive.

More than the cost, it adds an incompatible aircraft to what would have been a uniform fleet. It should not matter to EASA when the plane is approved - it could be 10 years from now if it met the EASA demands for upgrades. I'd argue the new requirements aren't less lenient, at least in terms of enhancing safe operations - they are far more expensive. Much more sophisticated planes have crashed with all the bells and whistles screaming at the crew. PIA 8303 comes to mind and that plane had only a human factors software development failure to take it down, a plane EASA approved.

Less Hair

10th Dec 2022, 08:45

The No.1 stopper now is Congress possibly not deciding during the old term anymore and having removed MAX extension votes on several occasions. Stopper No. 2 is the FAA needing and taking all its time and moving forward only step by step after each requirement has been demonstrated to have been implemented. Stopper No. 3 is EASA that had own firm requirements for modifications needed like the third sensor that were linked to the promised old deadline.
It looks like this might take a little longer? Didn't Boeing mention mid 2024?

WHBM

10th Dec 2022, 10:50

One would like to hope, particularly being aviation, that there would be a straightforward plan for everything that was done, and needed to be done, and progress seen as it was worked through. Yet with apparently just 20 days to go there has been no sign of this at all, just speculation and opposing views, no credible statements from those involved, etc. It just looks like Boeing are sleepwalking into it. Possibly their board have been hoping that the Ukraine situation will lead to substantial military aircraft losses and the need to re-equip same at full list price.

And regarding incompatible aircraft, carriers have long had a range of incompatible aircraft in their fleets. Sure, at the margins of cost it can make a (bit of a) difference, but nothing like the hoopla that seems to have gripped some commentators. Plus I suspect the 737 would be very difficult to re-engineer at this stage for such an operational difference; I wonder how much design effort, if any, Boeing has put into evaluating how to do it. Better spend the money on stock buy-backs would be their board's view. Regarding the Southwest pilots voting "without" for the new versions, I suspect they have only thought about their own standing, promotions and seniority in a divided fleet rather than anything to do with developing safety standards.

Less Hair

10th Dec 2022, 10:54

I guess we can bet Boeing started to work on some 737-follow on family however the CEO said no new programs are to surface within this decade.

BFSGrad

10th Dec 2022, 17:06

My understanding is when the drop dead date passes the dash 7 and 10 are done as they will have missed the grandfather window. Is there anyway the next Congress could retroactively reinstate the grandfathering ?
Of course there is. It's just federal legislation.
At one time the U.S. had a federal law for a balanced budget. You might wonder how that's working out.

WideScreen

10th Dec 2022, 17:30

....... Much more sophisticated planes have crashed with all the bells and whistles screaming at the crew. PIA 8303 comes to mind and that plane had only a human factors software development failure to take it down, a plane EASA approved.
Not sure, whether a touch&go on the engine pods, after a mis-communicated intentional dive&drive attempt, can be considered a plane-development issue.

tdracer

13th Dec 2022, 18:33

The lame duck Congress has a huge shopping list of must pass legislation so I think missing a rider attached to the NDAA means that the chance of getting a further extension is greatly diminished.

Not to worry, Congress is busy sweating the really important stuff facing the country:
House Considering Removal of Gendered Pronouns From US Code in the National Archives (theepochtimes.com) (https://www.theepochtimes.com/house-considering-removal-of-gendered-pronouns-from-us-code-in-the-national-archives_4920829.html)
:ugh:

GlobalNav

20th Dec 2022, 14:24

According to what I've read, the proposal is that a third AOA source (probably synthetic rather than another physical sensor) be a mandatory retrofit to the entire MAX fleet. As it currently stands, EASA would require the 3rd AOA source, but other authorities haven't mandated it.
DR - I think the MAX 7 is appealing to current MAX operators that want something a little smaller, but don't want to add another type (e.g. the A220) to their fleet. I keep hearing that Southwest really wants them for their lighter routes. Southwest currently has a huge fleet of 737-700s.
f that market is large enough to justify the expense of development/cert is a different question. Certainly it wouldn't justify a multi-Billion dollar effort to update the flight deck (especially since it would adversely affect the common type rating).

Congress did it, part of the continuing resolution bill, how ironic. Next accident, families can address their grievances to Sen Cantwell.

Longtimer

20th Dec 2022, 18:24

Congress did it, part of the continuing resolution bill, how ironic. Next accident, families can address their grievances to Sen Cantwell.

U.S. lawmakers back key Boeing 737 MAX certification deadline waiver (msn.com)

llagonne66

20th Dec 2022, 18:45

https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/congress-year-end-bill-clears-faa-to-certify-boeing-737-max-7-10-unchanged/

WHBM

20th Dec 2022, 19:49

Let's see what EASA say on January 1 when it's not certified.

WillowRun 6-3

20th Dec 2022, 21:37

Just as a point of information - WHBM, your reference to January 1 is based on the fact that the 2020 legislation deadline (regardless of Congressional action now) in the U.S. will have passed, and the January 1 date is just the next logical calendar date of reference? There's not an EASA formal January 1 2023 requirement or deadline, is there? (if there is, I've not found it....).

Big Pistons Forever

21st Dec 2022, 00:17

I think there are 3 significant points to the extension

1) Being will now be required to retrofit the synthetic 3rd AOA and stick shaker inhibit switches to all MAX's. Shocking to me is the fact that Boeing pushed very hard for an unconditional extension. I have to ask what alternate reality does the Boeing C suite inhabit ? Instead of getting in front of the perception of a lack of safety culture at Boeing and be proactive they fought a logical safety upgrade to all MAX's only because it was going to cost some money. It took the politicians in Congress to tell them to do their job.....Really ?

2) The deadline for the retrofit is 3 years AFTER the Max 10 is certified which is now realistically early 2024 so that means passengers could be flying in a non updated MAX in the beginning of 2027. Can you imagine the Shyte storm for Boeing if one of the unmodified MAX's crashes and there was any nexus to the AOA ?

3) Both EASA and Transport Canada have not announced what they will require in order for an operator to register a Dash 7 or Dash 10 MAX in their jurisdiction. After being so badly burned by Boeing in the past it will be interesting to see if they are OK with the current time table.

WHBM

21st Dec 2022, 09:09

So what is the actual cost of the additional AOA requirements ? Are they readily available from manufacturers/software designers ? Are they certified already ?

I'm aware that the dates extension is a US legislation issue, and also that the other administrations have tended to follow along. But not always. They may have been accepting the 31 Dec 22 date as about the last thing they would go along with, and now that's been sidelined as well.

MechEngr

21st Dec 2022, 10:30

I'd guess an easy $1 Billion for the project.

Related reading for a plane with a system similar to the proposal: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2015/aair/ao-2015-149 An Australian report on a 787 incident. It illuminates some design trade-offs made for such systems.

Curiously the 787 only does synthetic airspeed, not AoA.

A full SADS (Synthetic Air Data System) looks expensive.

Less Hair

21st Dec 2022, 10:52

How does the 787 tail strike protection feature work then? It must use attitude from internal systems data not from sensors?

MechEngr

21st Dec 2022, 11:09

How does the 787 tail strike protection feature work then? It must use attitude from internal systems data not from sensors?
While that is off topic, AoA is not the same as attitude; attitude is the governing concern for tail strike. I presume whatever sensor they use to manage the artificial horizon could also be used to indicate aircraft attitude for tail strike protection.

Per https://www.boeing.com/commercial/aeromagazine/articles/qtr_1_07/article_02_5.html, for the 777:

Tailskid height and rate are computed from radio altimeter signals, pitch attitude, pitch rate, vertical speed, and the length between the radio altimeter location and the tailskid location. A complementary filter is used to provide acceptably smooth rate and height signals. Provisions are included to account for the bending of the forward fuselage when the nose wheel gear lifts off the ground.

Less Hair

21st Dec 2022, 11:20

DaveReidUK

21st Dec 2022, 12:23

Curiously the 787 only does synthetic airspeed, not AoA.

A full SADS (Synthetic Air Data System) looks expensive.

My understanding (which may be completely wrong) is that it's relatively easy to synthesise either airspeed or AoA, but to do both together is much more difficult.

MechEngr

21st Dec 2022, 13:09

You said the 787 would use only synthetic airspeed. It is not off topic as the MAX will need a similar likely more complex attitude reference system. It would make a difference if Boeing had something at hand already.

It would but I'm not sure any commercial operator does. There are articles suggesting that small UAVs might use SADS because of the difficulty of producing good sensors suitable for the smaller aircraft.

The off-topic part is that there is little overlap between anti-tail strike systems and synthetic AoA and airspeed. The attitude sensor is past the 90th year since its invention.

Less Hair

21st Dec 2022, 13:58

I seem to miss what you want to say.

hans brinker

28th Dec 2022, 17:07

IMO Boeing should have been forced to change the cockpit when the NG came out. Absolutely not right they were allowed to keep that cockpit for the MAX. Just look at the DC9/MD80/B717. All still on the same type rating, but huge changes/improvements were made. Also no excuse for the handling by the pilots, and the lack of addressing that in the official report. Agree with most of the NTSB additional notes.

WideScreen

29th Dec 2022, 14:45

The NTSB Release at this time is a 'shot across the bows', a reaction to political intervention in aviation safety processes. Highlighting the continuing need for strong, independent investigation (NTSB) to support an ailing regulatory body (FFA).

The core issue (NTSB report) remains … "design mitigation must adequately account for expected human behavior to be successful, and a thorough understanding of the flight crew’s performance in this accident is required not only for robust design mitigations but also for operational and training safety improvements necessary to achieve multiple layers of safety barriers to trap human errors and prevent accidents."

Note that ops and training are 'also'; another layer of safety, neither the primary nor ultimate safety barrier.

Thus the fundamental problem is how the processes of design and regulation consider human performance in certification: train humans to mitigate design weakness: or design systems to protect humans from their weaknesses.
There is no unique solution, thus the starting view is important.

The safety concern is where politicians define the starting view - law, control, regulation, thence issues of human activity 'are not our problem'. This is of particularly concern in an operating environment which now requires an alternative view - the human as an asset, learn from success in very safe system.

Politicians, FAA; Safety-I;

NTSB, and other regulators moving towards Safety-II.
.
Actually, I smell Boeing lobbying in Ethiopia, to downplay the relevant aspects on the Boeing diner plate.

The same what happened with Turkish in AMS, where the impact of the (I would call it) criminal unlogical logic of the captain RA sensor feeding to both Captain and FO control logic got significantly downplayed from the draft version to the final version of the crash report. Not to say, the weak cockpit overhead panels attaching, crushing the cockpit crew in case of a major accident, seems to have encountered the same faith.

Understandable, the NTBS comes up against this.

WillowRun 6-3

29th Dec 2022, 15:40

WideScreen
(as the MAX accidents continue to be the unwanted gifts that keep on giving)
Could you expand on a couple items in your post?

First, can you identify particular portions or parts of the NTSB comments which you claim show - or at least suggest - that Boeing lobbied the investigation by Eithiopian authorities to deflect or reduce culpability of Boeing?

Second, with regard to how the FO in the Turkish AMS accident mishandled the FCU ... just an SLF/attorney here but it has been reported that the FO set up for single-channel using CMD A rather than dual channel - are you asserting that the possibility of an FO making such an error is a design flaw on Boeing's part? Isn't that the main assertion of the NYT article which is the main source for implications about the Turkish AMS accident investigation?

WideScreen

29th Dec 2022, 16:20

WideScreen
(as the MAX accidents continue to be the unwanted gifts that keep on giving)
Could you expand on a couple items in your post?
OK, let me elaborate.
First, can you identify particular portions or parts of the NTSB comments which you claim show - or at least suggest - that Boeing lobbied the investigation by Eithiopian authorities to deflect or reduce culpability of Boeing?
No it doesn't. That's why I write "I smell". There is no proof of this, though on the contrary, there is neither a realistic reason to just ignore serious remarks from the (what I consider to be the best) accident investigation bureau, just dropping their whole comment.

Be aware, I did not indicate "who" were being lobbied on, only "Ethiopia". It could very well be, and probably is, not a "direct" connection. We should need to be aware, that the Ethiopian airline industry is -similar to the ME ones- pretty well intermingled around subjects/responsibilities which are considered to be mandatory/legally split over independent organizations (and even then....), in Western countries.

Second, with regard to how the FO in the Turkish AMS accident mishandled the FCU ... just an SLF/attorney here but it has been reported that the FO set up for single-channel using CMD A rather than dual channel - are you asserting that the possibility of an FO making such an error is a design flaw on Boeing's part? Isn't that the main assertion of the NYT article which is the main source for implications about the Turkish AMS accident investigation?
I think, the Turkish at AMS had little to do with single/dual channel setup mistakes.

It was pretty well known in the cockpit, the Captain side RA didn't work. As such, they configured the FO side computers to do the approach, etc. expecting the FO side to work properly.

The mistake here is, that both Captain and FO computers do use the (faulty) Captains' RA sensor. An aspect that is completely outside normal logic thinking. Which caught them heavily for their specific approach situation (get on glide slope "aggressively", from above). My memory says, there was no training at Turkish for this RA aspect and the documentation itself around this subject was also minimal and could be easily overseen.

The subsequent manual take-over by the captain was neither performed perfectly. The automation was not turned off completely, with the consequence, the throttles moved back to idle, after the captain moved these to TO trust. It has to be seen, whether the TO trust, taking into account, the spool-up time, together with the in those days mandated "don't sink during stall recovery" would have been enough to avoid stall persistence and ground contact.

Many years later, it surfaced that the accident report draft did address this RA logic aspect as an important item, though got (largely) removed after Boeing "feedback" on the draft. This developed into a scandal around accident bureau, which gave a lot of lost-face and political consequences. I forgot about the exact outcome, though the then-head of the accident investigation bureau did have to do a lot of political (potato in the throat) assurance, that everything was still OK, but everybody knew how the situation around the investigation really was. Nothing different from the Boeing-MAX / FAA cooperation disaster, where Boeing effectively over classed the controlling organization(s).

safetypee

29th Dec 2022, 16:23

Good lobbying - Ethiopia or AMS - would not be detectable.(Nobbling the jury ?)
There are similarities between the Max and AMS, particularly in the Boeing stance that the pilots should have seen, understood, and managed the situation.

Decker provides a good overview of the human factors aspects at AMS, prepared for the Dutch Investigators; https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/nl/media/inline/2020/1/21/human_factors_report_s_dekker.pdf

Change the Flight No and highlight 737 Max, then the conclusions could be the same.

"The only defence agains a designed-in single-failure path are the pilots who are warned to mistrust their machine and to stare at it harder.
For flight crews of Boeing 737’s, like the crew of TK1951, there is no sufficient training, no written guidance or documentation, and no likelihood of line experience that would insulate them from the kind of automation surprise that happened …"

Also, in one of the Annexes to the AMS Investigation Report there is a good argument with simulator tests that Boeing's assumptions on system setup and use, and their piloted simulation (CAB) of the detection, understanding and action for pull-up during an AMS type malfunction, was an unrealistic view of human performance for certification - and not trained for.

Apparently the FAA did not respond to this aspect - why, … too difficult, we accepted thus believe Boeings view (self certification), and it (737) has been safe enough so far (but Boeing did modify some FGS aspects which would have disconnected the AP).

Other views:
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Zachary-Spielman/publication/342606191_Boeing_737_MAX_Expectation_of_Human_Capability_in_ Highly_Automated_Systems/links/603e6de64585154e8c7231b5/Boeing-737-MAX-Expectation-of-Human-Capability-in-Highly-Automated-Systems.pdf?origin=publication_detail

WideScreen

29th Dec 2022, 17:25

Good lobbying - Ethiopia or AMS - would not be detectable......
Actually it is, when the conclusions/results are just "off".

For example, in recent real life, where the now defunct vice-chair-she of the EU parliament publicly states that the human rights are perfectly regulated/respected in Qatar. Just recently, it became public, she got heavily paid in cash by several Mediterranean and ME governments (especially Qatar), right around the time, she did these really unbelievable statements. Ouch, she is from Greece (other money receptors from Italy).

Or so to say, when the offer is too good to be true, don't accept it, it'll show to be fraud.

Many countries are now overthinking all the controversial landing rights given to ME countries, recently, especially Qatar.

Nobody realizes, if you want to uphold human rights standards, you'll need to take care of a level playfield. So, if Qatar doesn't care about night flights at their local airport and the EU/US does, let them pay a fine for that, to create a level playfield with airlines who do (have to) and have reduced options to compete. Avoid your local airlines being out-competed on price and offerings, due to your local "do-good" intentions. Or what about the slavery wages / living conditions for airline (cabin) crews ?

safetypee

29th Dec 2022, 21:48

WS, ?

Context, viewpoint, subjectivity. Which report is to be believed, why.
'Seeing' is in the minds eye of the beholder.

The Ethiopian report challenges NTSB, what if it is correct?
Anyone party to the investigation (ICAO annex 13) can challenge the finding. It just so happens that this one is a little late. Note the glib comment re 'not in the NTSB format'.

Who judges accuracy, relevance, how can we tell ?

cf Dekker / Dutch AMS report; significantly different from Boeing, FAA view presented by NTSB; their comments on the Dutch report.
Who was lobbying (influencing) who.
Also note NTSB comment on Dutch report re not using an appropriate format; to which the Dutch replied that their format followed that in ICAO Annex13 !!

WillowRun 6-3

29th Dec 2022, 22:46

These last few posts are fascinating. .... for a couple different reasons.

First, the fallout from the various things that went wrong resulting in the 737 MAX accidents continues. As SLF/attorney I can't and don't claim to understand enough of the NTSB comments - along with the factors s.p. has noted - to say that this latest development will affect, or have any real influence upon, how the pending crew-alerting certification issues play out, as between FAA, EASA, and other CAAs. Other posters who are quite knowledgeable about the systems involved, and their integration and operation, lead an observer to believe that the issue is more complicated than just "go to the state of the art, or stay with the grandfathered system". (For example, what to do with or about stick-shaker activations... ) But having said that, if I was forced to guess, I'd say that the technically virtuous senior-level people who sooner or later will have to rule on this issue will see the NTSB-Ethiopia subtext as relevant.

I recall that the Dekker report surfaced on one or more threads on the forum some time ago, in the context of the two MAX accidents, and given the recent posts here, and a second factor, it just moved up higher on my reference/reading list.

Secondly, for some time now I have wanted to agitate, or at least try to find influence and apply it, to make aviation law curricula include a lot more study of the Annex 13 process. I am not saying that lawyers as lawyers ought to have more authority in these matters or that the overall process should become or needs to become more legalistic. To the contrary, the point emerging from Dekker's report surfacing again is that in order to be both knowledgeable about and useful to the aviation safety ecosystem, lawyers need to have a better understanding of the complications of piecing together what happened in an accident. I'd say every lawyer who really practices in public international air law, and most who practice in private int'l air law, can recite cold the basics about Annex 13. But ask them to read s.p.'s insightful post and then offer answers to the questions posed with regard to the NTSB comments on the Ethiopia report? Maybe some grizzled old-timers could tackle it. No one I've met in various aviation law settings could, though (neither can I, just to be clear). And out of some sense of decorum I'm not referring to any "lawmakers" here.

I realize this is could be drift worthy of the recent storm in the U.S. but there's a precedent in the law books proving that better understanding of accident investigation processes and the actual nuts-and-bolts cause-and-effect analysis is needed. When the U.S. FAA grounded DC-10s in the aftermath of the May 1979 accident in Chicago, operators of the type holding certificates from other CAAs sued over the denial of recognition of those airworthiness certificates. In the British Caledonian case, the U.S. federal appellate court ruled that the foreign operators had been unlawfully denied access to U.S. airspace. The problem with the court decision, though, is that at the time the U.S. was denying access despite the airworthiness certificates issued by foreign CAAs, it was not yet known how the loss of Flight 191 had occurred. As a poster on a different thread some months ago stated, it was still a perfectly flyable airframe - it just had suffered an increase in stall speed due to the ripping off of the engine from the left wing, severing of hydraulic lines, retraction of slats - none of which the tragically ill-fated aviators or other people aboard could have known. So unless the foreign operators of the DC-10 type (or their respectiive CAAs) knew, at the time they were denied access to U.S. airspace, how the accident had occurred -- and I have never yet found any information that they did know - the denial of access was proper in the interest of safety. The court decision was correct legalistically (under provisions of the Chicago Convention) but wrongly decided in a context of how the airplane operated, and did not operate.

Unless I've botched up understanding of the timeline regarding Flight 191 (SLF that I am), it would be quite a "case study" in a course intended to train future aviation lawyers about how little we legal types actually know, yet how much we must understand, even so.

WideScreen

30th Dec 2022, 01:55

WS, ?

Context, viewpoint, subjectivity. Which report is to be believed, why.
'Seeing' is in the minds eye of the beholder.
Of course. So, when you want a conclusion of the reality of the factual situation, you'll need to go back to the technical facts.

Compare that to Trump's 2020 election denials. Still, 50+% of the GOP "believers" follow their holy leader, despite the facts showing different (and got persistently confirmed in courts).

The Ethiopian report challenges NTSB, what if it is correct?
Of course, the NTSB could be wrong. Though, maybe you missed that part in my writing, when the different pillars around aviation in a country all merge into the same responsible / in-charge dictator or single ruling party, the pillars are no longer independent and the results start to show the preference of the leader vs. the reality of the situation (compare that to the zero-covid madness in China, this whole developed and derailed under the rain of Xi/CCP, it's simply the result of the way the state is organized).

After KLM-Tenerife, the Western world concluded that the airline industry would need several independent (!) parties (the pillars) to significantly improve safety in the airline industry. This has been implemented, and recent history of improved safety in Western countries has shown, this works. And when things go MAX-haywire, it shows the pillar-independence got compromised.

In countries like Ethiopia, ME, China, Russia and you name it, these instances are only independent on severe punishment, when not complying with the dictator or single ruling party in place. So, principally, the conclusions of the not so independent pillars are doubtful, right from the start. As such, I have significantly more trust in the correctness of the NTSB findings, than, in the probably politically and lobby saturated Ethiopian accident report. I did not read the Ethiopian report, though, I am just comparing the environments where the reports are created.
Anyone party to the investigation (ICAO annex 13) can challenge the finding. It just so happens that this one is a little late. Note the glib comment re 'not in the NTSB format'.
Yep, challenging, though it takes courage to stand-up with a deviating (and properly founded) description of the reality (I am not speaking about the Trump/Putin/Xi nonsense we are seeing in the past couple of years, this does suggest equivalents with the demise of the Roman Empire, some 20 centuries ago).
I don't think, the NTSB is "a little late", though they decided to stand-up, because of the faults in the Ethiopian report. And it just takes time to mature for such a decision.
Who judges accuracy, relevance, how can we tell ?
For this, you will need to go back to the facts, before these are colored by political and lobby interests. Unfortunately.
cf Dekker / Dutch AMS report; significantly different from Boeing, FAA view presented by NTSB; their comments on the Dutch report.
Who was lobbying (influencing) who.
My understanding is, the Dekker research results didn't make is into the original published Dutch AMS report, because it was considered to be too controversial towards Boeing. Please check, if it was referred to in the draft report.
Please note, the Dekker and the Dutch AMS report are reports at a different level. The Dekker report is focusing on the Human behavior around the just bad logic around the RA sensor usage with strings towards a conclusion, whereas the Dutch AMS report is an accident report, where the Dekker results got rejected in the final one.
Also note NTSB comment on Dutch report re not using an appropriate format; to which the Dutch replied that their format followed that in ICAO Annex13 !!
Yeah, typically Dutch, just stubborn, though that is a subject of the "format", not the content itself.

WideScreen

30th Dec 2022, 02:21

These last few posts are fascinating. .... for a couple different reasons.
1-2-3
.......
Unless I've botched up understanding of the timeline regarding Flight 191 (SLF that I am), it would be quite a "case study" in a course intended to train future aviation lawyers about how little we legal types actually know, yet how much we must understand, even so.
Yep, you are touching the biggest issue around legal proceedings.

These tend to detach from reality, because of the lack of subject knowledge at all legal parties involved, deviating the legal proceedings away from the factual reality into legal nitpicking. And the result of that, is a verdict no longer covering the factual situation, but moving into theoretical mesmerizing around tidbits not relevant for the situation at the ground. Have a look at the fall-out of the Colgan crash (the 1500 hours rule, which does have little to do with the cause(s) of the Colgan crash).

So, yeah, if one, as a lawyer, really wants to accomplish something useful for the society, take care, you have subject knowledge and understanding, and use that to "win" the lawsuits .......

And around the 737 and its over-extended life-line, the faults with this aircraft go much further than the nitpicking around the MAX introduced issues, the -7 / -10 cockpit items, and so on. The Turkish AMS, Kegworth and several other 737 incidents/accidents just show, the 737 airframe does lack sufficient integrity to protect its human content against the harsh effects of a crash. The 777 at SFO as well the 321 into the Hudson, showed to be a much, much better crash performer. But hey, this ancient 737 stuff is still allowed according to the regulations, signaling, these regulations do desperately need a stiff update......

MechEngr

30th Dec 2022, 02:46

WS, ?

Context, viewpoint, subjectivity. Which report is to be believed, why.
'Seeing' is in the minds eye of the beholder.

The Ethiopian report challenges NTSB, what if it is correct?
Anyone party to the investigation (ICAO annex 13) can challenge the finding. It just so happens that this one is a little late. Note the glib comment re 'not in the NTSB format'.

Who judges accuracy, relevance, how can we tell ?

I look at the FDR trace and would look at the CVR transcript, if that was made available. The Ethiopian report diverges from what was reported out of the FDR and matches, in relevant parts, what the NTSB claims.

WillowRun 6-3

30th Dec 2022, 02:47

WideScreen

30th Dec 2022, 05:03

WS

About Colgan - a few years ago R Zumwalt, NTSB Chair at the time, gave a guest lecture that I happened to attend. He commented on the subject of how pilot fatigue had been treated as a possible contributing factor in the Board's report.
The way the subject was raised, someone asked about whether an accident would need to happen for regulations to be tightened with regard to crew rest or fatigue.... the Chairman's reply: "We've already had that accident." It was quite a stark reply.
(The question was not mine. I asked something about the Air Canada 759 taxiway line-up incident at SFO in summer of 2017 - wish I could recall more specifically.)
Only "one" accident, where fatigue was a major factor ? I think, easily, half of the accidents do have a serious fatigue component. Not to say, the crew rest/scheduling regulations are a serious issue, world-wide.

Though, let me add on top of that, that quite a lot of pilot fatigue does have its cause in the pilots' private life, either due to excessive commuting (Colgan for example), or pilots who want to get the most out of their life and are very active aside of the job, or simply because pilots don't work a "full job" and have secondary jobs, where the total hours seriously active by large exceed the regulatory pilot hours.

I personally know a captain flying a 90% job at a major and doing secondary jobs to "adhoc" drive freight trucks at back hours of the clock. Oh, he also complains about fatigue being an issue, yeah sure.

Pilots often seem to forget that "rest" is intended for resting, just like when people have a 40 h/w office job.

But this deviates from the original subject .....

MechEngr

30th Dec 2022, 12:03

It is not a matter that the legal system has people who fail to understand - by the time lawsuits and laws are being considered all the primary participants understand in great detail that there is an opportunity to twist the narrative to achieve unrelated goals. "You cannot make a man understand what his job depends on him not understanding."

If you look at an initiating event and feel that the path to a proposed solution makes no sense - you are right. The original problem and the final solution are never linked via any legal process. Someone was searching for a way to set a high entry cost to becoming a commercial pilot; the Colgan crash gave them that chance.

In every big transaction, there is a magic moment during which a man has surrendered a treasure, and during which the man who is due to receive it has not yet done so. An alert lawyer will make that moment his own, possessing the treasure for a magic microsecond, taking a little of it, passing it on. If the man who is to receive the treasure is unused to wealth, has an inferiority complex and shapeless feelings of guilt, as most people do, the lawyer can often take as much as half the bundle, and still receive the recipient’s blubbering thanks. – Leech God Bless You, Mr. Rosewater, Kurt Vonnegut.

Usually it's not worth doing too much, but a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity based on human suffering is nearly impossible for many to ignore.

safetypee

30th Dec 2022, 13:51

WideScreen

30th Dec 2022, 15:33

"My understanding is, the Dekker research results didn't make it into the original published Dutch AMS report, because it was considered to be too controversial towards Boeing. Please check"

The Dutch authority published their reaction to media reports on the investigation of flight TK1951 in Jan 2020, explaining the 'belated' publication of the Dekker report.

Their comments concluded; -
"The key-question whether lessons of the TK1951-crash were sufficiently learned by Boeing and the American authorities, should be part of the ongoing international investigation in the recent crashes of Boeing 737 Max."

https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/16234/reaction-dutch-safety-board-on-media-reports-investigation-crash

The Dutch quote appears to be a 'safety-political' comment re continuing 737 Max issues - a reaction to the flawed certification (FAA - Boeing) and ineffective safety process (Congress - FAA).
Yep, only 10 years after the accident, and only when Dekker himself (?) initiated the publicity around his original research, based on the Boeing-MAX/FAA mishandling (I'd call that Fraud). When he did, it stirred the news and politics quite heavily, including heavy pressure on political figures to step down, etc. The (head of the) Onderzoeksraad is officially independent, though the guy in charge was a former high-profile cabinet member, under the same prime-minister (Mister compromise) as currently active after all these years.

The comment you quote is a non-answer (not blaming you), since the MAX issues weren't known at the time of the TK1951 investigations.

So, yeah, this is certainly a situation, where Boeing got saved by the Onderzoeksraad, quite likely because of its close relationship with KLM and the lobby work from Boeing. This refers to my earlier stating that lobbying IS visible in the results that become public. When these results aren't reflecting the reality, that's not because of technical limitations or mistakes in the investigation, but due to pressure from outside the investigation organization .....
In part this is similar to some aspects of the NTSB's publication ('a shot across the bows' #870) which may have more to do with politics than technical fact. I suspect that the NTSB would privately agree with the Dutch comment. Thus by publishing the Ethiopian report the NTSB re-emphasises that they are still an independent investigator.
Yep, the really independent pillars, that did make aviation safe, in Western countries, as such my admiration of their work and putting their results above the Ethiopian ones. The current head of the NTSB is not only good-looking, though does also have a good portion of brains and capabilities.
Q? Does the FAA have any rights enabling them to defy the Congressional ruling, e.g. a new or refreshed safety ruling for 737 Max .
Would be a good joke, when that happens ....

Without FAA re-intervention to uphold the previous 737 Max 7/10 position, then their world-standing is further degraded, a puppet of political (manufacturing) will. Congress gives the FAA a mandate to administrate safety them constrains them.
The core problem is, that the FAA does have two missions: Aviation promotion (which is largely contrary to maximizing safety) and Regulatory instance (which should not bother with all kinds of short-term promo/economic advantages). So, yeah, conflicting, I am not the only one raising this. It's a long-standing item in the US aviation world.

EU - EASA beware
Yep, EASA does have an A321XLR to certify, and Boeing will not like that (despite not having an alternative aircraft of their own, but who cares, make life for the competition difficult, anyway) and do everything possible to make the A321XLR certification an aviation Moskva.

BFSGrad

30th Dec 2022, 15:42

Q? Does the FAA have any rights enabling them to defy the Congressional ruling, e.g. a new or refreshed safety ruling for 737 Max .
Without FAA re-intervention to uphold the previous 737 Max 7/10 position, then their world-standing is further degraded, a puppet of political (manufacturing) will. Congress gives the FAA a mandate to administrate safety them constrains them.The “Congressional ruling” to which you refer is U.S. law. The FAA’s rule-making (i.e., administrative) process does not supersede U.S. law. The FAA could challenge the law in court but a legal basis appears to be lacking. As to your assertion that the FAA is a “puppet of political will,” that’s just some of that messy democracy in action, a concept more and more foreign to the EU as time goes on.

WillowRun 6-3

30th Dec 2022, 16:07

The reason the recently adjourned Congress extended the certification deadline for MAX 7 / 10 is that the 2020 legislation enacted into law in the aftermath of the two accidents imposed a deadline in the first place. In other words, the legislative deadline was highly atypical, and its inclusion in the legislation in 2020 was the only reason Congress had to act now, in order to allow the process to continue. (It could also have done so retroactively by action of the new Congress convening next week, but that option left lots of uncertainties.)

Relative to the deadline itself, FAA would not have any basis to challenge the extension in court. Can you imagine the oversight hearings? It would be stark political theater especially given GOP control of the House in the new Congress but, no.

As a practical matter, however, ..... well, when government agencies wish to extend their authority, they can (for example) slow their processes to a crawl. Of course in this instance (as previous posts and posters have observed) FAA on one hand wants to appear that it has lost its complacency - if that is the right characterization - but at the same time, the realities of its closeness with the airframer might just be harder to see. And yes, its dual mandate is a long-term issue.

Without the most recent legislative text in front of my SLF/legal counsel eyes, I can't say for certain whether the deadline extension included specific safety-related modifications in order for certification to be approved or what they require - news reports state that it did but tbh there hasn't been a reason to go get the actual legislative language.

GlobalNav

30th Dec 2022, 16:22

abbreviated quote
The Dutch authority published their reaction to media reports on the investigation of flight TK1951 in Jan 2020, explaining the 'belated' publication of the Dekker report.

Their comments concluded; -
"The key-question whether lessons of the TK1951-crash were sufficiently learned by Boeing and the American authorities, should be part of the ongoing international investigation in the recent crashes of Boeing 737 Max."

Q? Does the FAA have any rights enabling them to defy the Congressional ruling, e.g. a new or refreshed safety ruling for 737 Max .
Without FAA re-intervention to uphold the previous 737 Max 7/10 position, then their world-standing is further degraded, a puppet of political (manufacturing) will. Congress gives the FAA a mandate to administrate safety them constrains them.

EU - EASA beware
.

A rhetorical question I presume and I believe you hit the nail on the head. FAA can’t really change because Congress and special manufacturing interests won’t allow it. We must rely on the integrity of the relatively powerless to exercise their integrity and “blow the whistle” to anyone who will listen. EASA of course could do the right thing, but they also answer to other political and manufacturing interests. The FAA has said that aviation safety is really important and if they can give the impression to the public that they have it, they have succeeded. They are losing that battle.

tdracer

30th Dec 2022, 17:45

The core problem is, that the FAA does have two missions: Aviation promotion (which is largely contrary to maximizing safety) and Regulatory instance (which should not bother with all kinds of short-term promo/economic advantages). So, yeah, conflicting, I am not the only one raising this. It's a long-standing item in the US aviation world.

No, it doesn't. While promoting aviation was once part of the FAA charter, that was removed decades ago due to the rather obvious conflict of interest.

pax britanica

30th Dec 2022, 17:55

Always amusing to see comments from US about the undemocratic etc etc EU which of course is big enough to stand up to US agencies wheres individual European countries are not, that is not saying conflicts of interests do not ocur in the EU .

Aviation and politics are always intertwined and at the most visble level get a lot of public exposure.. It is the case in all 'open' / democratic socities that what was once industry/user cooperation crosses the boundary into industy /user coordination/collaboration and peopel lose site of the goal of regualtion and standards..

Boeing transformed from a technically/industry specific run company that recognised that it had a special level of responsibility because of its products, to a corrupt regime that couldnt differentiate a 737 from a tractor . Consequently they put too much reliance on a cosy regulatory regime. Eventually, as is always the case, something went seriously wrong and the wheels came off . Whether that results in a higher degree of emphasis put on integrity in business and politics is open to debate

safetypee

30th Dec 2022, 18:15

Thanks BFS

With that explanation, then my "is a puppet of political will,” would be better worded as might be seen 'as a puppet … ", by a worldly view of US process.

This may have a serious effect on world safety initiatives; will FAA rulings be seen as more politics than good safety intent. Can their views ever be accepted as bias free and thus the weight of their contribution in world issues will be diminished.

For these issues, the next move by those other authorities requiring 737 Max 7/10 modification could have a very significant effect. Even more so if the full alerting system modification is dropped - only specific, i.e. like Max 8.

If the other authorities hold the line (changed alerting system) then future safety activity should benefit. This is not so much about the 737 Max in particular, but as the principle of drawing a line, identifying the point in time, the need to change activity to improve safety. i.e. this grandfather (737 variant) is dead.

Alternatively, if the authorities 'harmonise' with the FAA, then it may be more difficult to achieve the much required change in aviation safety viewpoint: Safety-I and Safety-II, Resilience.
The dominant, controlling, legal backed rule making (FAA and EASA) will be able to avoid acceptance of the uncertainties associated with human activity (design, regulation, operation) in a modern and safe industry.

Next move; divide the opposition, diminish the strength of opposing views (US - world politics)

A safety 'line in the sand', is best drawn above the high-tide line of politics.

GlobalNav

31st Dec 2022, 02:12

No, it doesn't. While promoting aviation was once part of the FAA charter, that was removed decades ago due to the rather obvious conflict of interest.

The words changed, nothing else, certainly not the political influence exerted upon the FAA.

WideScreen

31st Dec 2022, 02:53

No, it doesn't. While promoting aviation was once part of the FAA charter, that was removed decades ago due to the rather obvious conflict of interest.
That's an interesting item, since this presumed conflict of interest seems to be floating around widely, and I read about it in the original MAX/FAA derailed thread. And I might (by far) not be the only one with a wrong impression. An impression that gets supported by the way the FAA did neglect its safety duties with the MAX and continues to attract critics around its operations in this area.

Do you have more information around this subject ? Did the promotion part just “watered down”, or got the whole subject “split off” from the FAA 1.0 ?

Looking at the FAA website, it still shows a lot of major subjects that are a very broad interpretation of the presumed “regulatory” FAA target. What have the organization and nationwide running of the ATC, and the commercial space adventures (“Promote” according to the FAA website) to do with regulatory duties ? Running the ATC and being the regulator for this business does look like the butcher certifying its own meat, or Boeing certifying its own aircraft.

ATC Watcher

31st Dec 2022, 11:21

A very interesting discussion , learning quite a lot. Thanks especially to WideScreen and Safetypee. On the subject of FAA promoting aviation , ( or more accurately promoting US aviation) , it might have been taken out of its original charter but they stil do it. I was attending an ICAO meeting very recently where the FAA put a Working paper on promoting Supersoninc and hypersoninc commercial operations , and requesting a waver to allow sonic booms over EU continental airspace, This was because one US company is currently building an SST aircraft and planning to cross the Atlantic.
This is in fact promoting a US private company plans.

I found this a bit ironic being unfortunately old enough to remember the FAA strong opposition to Concorde at the time , which by pure coincidence started as soon as Boeing and Lockheed shelved their own SST plans.. But I do not blame them , everybody is doing the same , either openly , like the FAA, or covertly.

WillowRun 6-3

31st Dec 2022, 16:19

About FAA... If the previous "dual mandate" was formally rescinded or discontinued, it fooled me. Even a cursory browse through the FAA Authorization legislation reveals a large volume of projects Congress statutorily authorizes the agency to conduct, and which have a lot more to do with building up, or advancing, the overall NAS (National Airspace System) than with either certification of aircraft or other subjects essentially concerned with safety. The ICAO working paper is a spot-on illustration.

Privatizing the ATC function has been controversial, despite success of this move in other countries. Probably a big reason it hasn't happened in the U.S. is the need for Congressional appropriators to deliver, or at least to be seen as delivering, to their backers and donors. Call me cynical....

One other thing to be noted, IMHO. Faulting "politics" is a blind alley. Policy, and politics, and law, all go together to form the context. Sorry if it seems pedantic, but the existence and workings of civil aviation sectors, and nearly everything else, occur within a context built from all three of those central factors.

Big Pistons Forever

31st Dec 2022, 17:42

Privatizing the ATC function has been controversial, despite success of this move in other countries. Probably a big reason it hasn't happened in the U.S. is the need for Congressional appropriators to deliver, or at least to be seen as delivering, to their backers and donors. Call me cynical....
.

A fully functioning ATC system is critical infrastructure for any developed nation. Don't believe all the privatization cool-aid, losing control of ATC is never going to end well.

A perfect example of this is NavCanada the privatized ANS provider in Canada. When COVID hit the fee for service model stopped getting paid for services that were no longer needed because no one was flying. As a result all the trainees in the system were laid off as well as a substantial number of qualified IFR and VFR controllers. Now that traffic has come back the system is melting down due to lack of staff. My home airport is an international airport with 8 airlines serving it, plus lots of GA movements and is usually ranked around 7 or 8th busiest in Canada. It now sometimes will have only one controller working clearance, ground, inner tower and outer tower during the day. They used to have all positions manned by individual controllers.

The UK NATS is another example of what happens when governments get out of running national infrastructure. Yes a government run ANS won't be as "efficient" as a privately operated ANS system but it will have the entire resources of the government behind it and ultimately be responsive to the people not a faceless board of directors.

Sorry for the thread drift, although I would argue that the de facto privatization of aircraft certification was the root cause of the MAX fiasco.

MechEngr

31st Dec 2022, 17:59

100% no one at the FAA would have spotted the original MCAS problem and they certainly didn't see the potential for an immediate crash following Lion Air; neither did anyone else, per what I have seen posted. Dekker had the chance in Jan 2019 - somehow still didn't see the problem until long after the second crash.

The original problem remained - the SMYD concept was defective going back to the start of the NG and the FAA did nothing about it. The "runaway" concept was a lie as well - clearly that predates the NG and still it isn't a top concern for pilot training. Both fall under the FAA and predate self-certification.

Bergerie1

31st Dec 2022, 18:07

Those who flew the 707 will know well the runaway stabilser drill. In the early years, there were a number of 'near misses' and, while it may have been adequate for the 1960s, it is most certainly not adequate for today's environment. Perhaps it was wrong, today, to rely on the pilots knowing how to deal with it, and it was even more wrong for airlines to downplay its importance.

WideScreen

1st Jan 2023, 06:40

A fully functioning ATC system is critical infrastructure for any developed nation. Don't believe all the privatization cool-aid, losing control of ATC is never going to end well.
......
Wait !

The simple fact US ATC as a service should be separated from the organization, responsible for its rule-setting, does not imply, the ATC needs to be privatized !

It's far better to have these public serving tasks under the direct government responsibility, than having a commercial organization run a monopoly on something that in base belongs to the state (or its people, depending on how far you want to trace down ownership). Government run public services might be financially less efficient from its nature, though they don't go on strike, don't capitalize on the monopoly position and can be hold accountable through political responsibility (and at least replace the head of the bureau). For consumers/customers, there are no options to "vote with your feet", when an ATC is abusing its monopoly position.

ATC Watcher

1st Jan 2023, 11:42

Government run public services might be financially less efficient from its nature, though they don't go on strike, don't capitalize on the monopoly position and can be hold accountable through political responsibility (and at least replace the head of the bureau). For consumers/customers, there are no options to "vote with your feet", when an ATC is abusing its monopoly position.

Good points to mention this. which is partially true. Partially because we have experience with both systems and can draw some conclsuions . Neither system is without flaws. First because most of the so called " privatised " ANSPs are in fact owned 100% by the State , And where its is not the case ( like UK NATS for instance) the State still has control and will cover the losses to keep the system going . Canada is another exception . Interestingly it was the success boy everybody was using to justify "privatisation" also by the FAA a few years ago. . Covid reminded everybody that it was not the panacea as it was reported here by Big pistons. Keeping the profits for yourself anfd your saheholders when everyting goes well ( especailly when you have a private monopoly ) but having to the State cover your debts when traffic goes down because the State cannot let you fail, is not really fair to the taxpayer but it is one of the lessons we saw with Covid ( same as with the banks in 2008, so nothing new) .

Big advantage of a "privatised " ANSP" is being able to raise money rapidly and buy best stuff there is on the market immediately , and doing so free of political interference, raise salaries of staff according to te marked as opposed to the public service fixed scales , recruit and promote the best elements faster, etc,, and the cherry on the cake : separate the regulator from the service provider. , so improving safety in the process. A totally different story in the US/FAA.

Last remark ; when you mention public servants do not go on strike. No. Again experience shows that ATC strilkes are happening in both systems , but with a huge tendency to be harder and last must longer when ATC is a public service. There has been very few strikes in privatised ANSPs since 1990 ( when it started ) ) and they did not last very long. Different story in countries where they are still public servants ( take France as an example ) or ,back to the US/FAA , between 1975 and 1981, PATCO did call for stikes despite not being allowed to. It ended very badly, and its effects on the ATC sytem in the US lasted decades..

Until recently NATCA was in bed with he FAA , and supporting "privatisation" NavCanada style. Covid has thrown some ice on the bed sheets , but I am curious to see what will happen when the sheets will be dry , meaning traffic going fast back up with a mounting ATC staff shortage ..

WillowRun 6-3

1st Jan 2023, 12:09

Mea culpa.... post I wrote about "privatizing" ATC was too hasty and not well-informed - the recent problems in Canada for example were news to me. I should be sorry for drifting the thread, although posts that followed are interesting, so anyway, a maximally happy new year!

WillowRun 6-3

19th Jan 2023, 23:52

Federal District Court Judge in Texas, in the criminal case against the company, has ruled that the families of the crash victims will be allowed to present their views on the settlement agreement previously reached between the Department of Justice and the company. This follows a ruling some months ago in which the court stated that the families met the legal (statutory) definition of crime victims, and thus should have had opportunities to present their views on the settlement agreement of the criminal charges prior to its conclusion.

So, the company now will have to be arraigned on the charges and, presumably, enter a plea, insofar as the arraignment phase of the proceeding is when crime victims or their representatives (here, the families) present their views.

According to the WSJ news article, the DOJ had some discussions with the families as recently as November, inasmuch as the settlement was a product of the Department under the prior presidential administration's direction.

The court did not rule on aspects of the families' motion seeking to change certain terms of the settlement (technically, iirc, a Deferred Prosecution Agreement).

SLF/attorney guest on this forum will read court's order and see if anything further seems reasonably possibly interesting to the aviators and other real people. Things could get interesting: next court date, January 26.

(I was perhaps outspoken on this forum in decrying the prosecution of Forkner; there's some saying about what payback is, and maybe this is yet to be visited upon the Defendant in this matter.)

tdracer

25th Jan 2023, 01:42

NTSB formally disputes Ethiopian report on the MAX crash:
Ethiopian Max Crash Report Made False Claims on 737, US Says (msn.com) (https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/companies/ethiopian-max-crash-report-made-false-claims-on-737-us-says/ar-AA16Hcj1?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=ce3d549ad89140f6a4044ad672af9bdc)The US National Transportation Safety Board accused the Ethiopian Accident Investigation Bureau of making claims “unsupported by evidence” in conclusions belatedly published late last year.

“The final report does not provide any details to support the EAIB’s statements about the existence of an electrical problem,” the NTSB wrote on Tuesday.

US investigators said they agreed generally with Ethiopia’s findings that a flawed design in the 737 Max pushed the nose down automatically and was at least part of the cause of the March 10, 2019 crash that killed 157 people.

But the Ethiopians ignored numerous other factors, the NTSB said. In particular, the Ethiopian Airlines Group crew had been told how to counteract a failure of the flawed software known as Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, after a crash off the coast of Indonesia about four months earlier. But they failed to follow the procedure, the NTSB said.

“This is unprecedented in our view,” NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy said in an interview. “They were not operating in good faith with ICAO rules and we feel that we have to be very public where we think there were inaccuracies in the report and where we think it could be more comprehensive.”

MechEngr

25th Jan 2023, 02:49

What payback does a lawyer want in this case? Seems like billions in settlements and crashing their sales and stock prices aren't enough. Meanwhile those in charge of the airline, knowing the plane was flawed, knowing their pilots weren't trained, and still sold tickets, walk away with a huge cash windfall and a discount on new planes from a source they put all the blame on. No justice in that.

Loose rivets

25th Jan 2023, 02:56

During the intensive period of posting on PPRuNe, I mentioned the possible adverse effects of knowing a little about the previous crash but being nowhere near to having a clear picture of MCAS. As unlikely as it sounds, during those chaotic minutes, having some fuzzy recollection of technical memos might just have been worse than not having been briefed at all.

MechEngr

25th Jan 2023, 05:41

Since the ET302 crew failure started before MCAS was involved, it's not a simply a problem of failing to have a clear picture of a technical memo.

WillowRun 6-3

25th Jan 2023, 09:50

Loose rivets

25th Jan 2023, 12:20

Since the ET302 crew failure started before MCAS was involved, it's not a simply a problem of failing to have a clear picture of a technical memo.

Fair comment, though there was plenty of time after MCAS played a role, for the mental chaos to become all-consuming.
I've long wondered if the power was left high because of being in a bewildered state, or if they imagined pulling the power back would exacerbate the pitch problem.

Loose rivets

26th Jan 2023, 01:31

I've just been reading a 4 hour old BBC news item on the reintroduction of charges against Boeing. What kind of justice comes up with "deferred prosecution agreement". I was generally aware but hadn't realised it was so blatant.In January 2021, the US Department of Justice (DoJ) charged Boeing with fraud. But the company was able to avoid going on trial, by agreeing to pay $2.5bn in fines and compensation, and promising to tighten up its compliance procedures.

This settlement - known as a deferred prosecution agreement - provoked intense anger among a number of the relatives of those who died aboard ET302.

They claimed, and continue to claim, that the deal was a "sweetheart agreement" which was concluded without their knowledge, violated their rights, and allowed the company to avoid being held fully accountable.

The Department of Justice defended its decision, insisting that the settlement was appropriate, because it could not prove beyond reasonable doubt there was a direct connection between Boeing's alleged crimes and the two crashes.

Embedded in the post is a long sub thread which has wondrous graphics but it leaves the reader with the usual over-simplified ideas.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-64390546

Reading on, and on, and on, I have to say that it would be churlish to nit pick this news item. In one of the sub-sub sections, it really gives a good overview of the Boeing/FAA self regulation issues. The inner link is a long read.

MechEngr

26th Jan 2023, 02:49

Every part of the indictment you either stated or implied against the Ethiopian airline or the government of that country, or both, may be valid and true, MechEngr.

That having been said though, why shouldn't NTSB have taken issue with the accident report, or done so in such a formal manner? Or is your point not that NTSB should have merely shrugged it off, but rather are you trying to impress upon those readers here who might be a ton less cynical and world-wise, the more enlightened understanding of the true state of affairs?

The reply was to the situation in the cockpit regarding MCAS as the cause of the chaos. On that basis your response is nonsensical.

My agenda is to focus on all elements regarding safety and not to ignore major ones, an oversight which the NTSB and other ICAO participants attempted to rightfully correct when the flawed Ethiopian report skipped their own actions. I didn't suggest or imply the NTSB should shrug off anything, though I would have liked to see the investigation include the SMYD giving a false report; I don't recall seeing that mentioned.

If the airline were instead operated by a hedge-fund backed venture capital firm that got it via leveraged buyout and saddled it with insurmountable debt, would that make an ethical difference when they continued to fly? Would they be held blameless for operating in the face of a known fatal hazard after taking no steps to mitigate it?

artee

26th Jan 2023, 07:52

I've just been reading a 4 hour old BBC news item on the reintroduction of charges against Boeing. What kind of justice comes up with "deferred prosecution agreement". I was generally aware but hadn't realised it was so blatant.

Harvard Law School (https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2022/05/25/nosedive-boeing-and-the-corruption-of-the-deferred-prosecution-agreement/) have an interesting article on how Boeing went about the negotiations.Boeing was in trouble, and it needed a gentle, quiet exit with little publicity. But the penalty also had to look sufficiently tough that it would not strike the public as a sellout. This was a difficult balance to strike, and it required a cooperative U.S. Attorney.

Watch now how Boeing solves this problem:

Step One: Forum Shop for the Best Jurisdiction
Step Two: Inflate the Penalty
Step Three: Finding a Scapegoat
Step Four: Ignoring the Victims
Step Five: A Final Footnote

Shortly after the Boeing DPA was signed on January 7, 2021 (the day after President Trump’s “rally” in Washington), the U.S. Attorney resigned (as is customary on a change of Administration), and months later, she joined a new firm as partner—Kirkland & Ellis. Well, it’s a small world

Kirkland Ellis had negotiated the agreement for Boeing.

WillowRun 6-3

26th Jan 2023, 13:06

The reply was to the situation in the cockpit regarding MCAS as the cause of the chaos. On that basis your response is nonsensical.

My agenda is to focus on all elements regarding safety and not to ignore major ones, an oversight which the NTSB and other ICAO participants attempted to rightfully correct when the flawed Ethiopian report skipped their own actions. I didn't suggest or imply the NTSB should shrug off anything, though I would have liked to see the investigation include the SMYD giving a false report; I don't recall seeing that mentioned.

If the airline were instead operated by a hedge-fund backed venture capital firm that got it via leveraged buyout and saddled it with insurmountable debt, would that make an ethical difference when they continued to fly? Would they be held blameless for operating in the face of a known fatal hazard after taking no steps to mitigate it?

Apologies, contextually it appeared your response related to the NTSB follow-up.

Rather than again misunderstanding a post, and especially because it's not entirely certain (to this SLF, anyway) what outcomes you're comparing in the question with which your post ends, I'll wait to have the outcome of today's hearing - and related proceedings, if any - in the DPA matter to take into account. That said, and with that caveat, I'd say yes.... outright greed and purposeful manipulation of vulnerable safety regulatory processes would make an ethical difference, at least insofar as a jury's consideration of punitive damages is concerned.

MechEngr

26th Jan 2023, 18:13

WHBM

26th Jan 2023, 19:43

The current outcome. The one that currently stands that greed and purposeful manipulation of a safety regulatory process captured by the owner/operator of an airline and the sole arbiter of its own safety analysis. The one that the NTSB complained about. That outcome.

Here's another ethics question: If an entity is entirely judgement proof and beyond all legal reach, is it ethical to ignore their contribution in assessment of blame?
Is this the airline which has long term lived on US (and European) foreign aid for new aircraft, as another aspect of "capture" has been of the various overseas aid programs by mainstream corporations from the donor country, scooping much of the aid for the poor populace for their own high ticket products, selling them to a country and a government otherwise desperately impoverished ?

I imagine the NTSB and whoever looks after aid handouts in Washington are now at daggers drawn.

WillowRun 6-3

26th Jan 2023, 21:15

Standardization is a myth.

Okay, that's just an attention-getting device. First of all, this SLF/attorney lacks meaningful knowledge about the subject air carrier other than facts one would have to assume are valid about more-or-less any unspecified airline in a given size class and the flag carrier of a country similarly in a given category or class.

But the realization that selling airplanes to air carriers 'round the world has long entailed embracing, and more so, utilizing, flaws or weakness in the airline or national regulatory scheme relative to fidelity to safety matters - that adds another layer of cynicism and mistrust to the legacy of the 737 MAX and the company. Maybe that isn't really the biggest jolt.

So much of the international commercial aviation sector professes to operate under standardization, established and looked after by that U.N. affiliate with the wings and globe in its insignia. (For a current instance, on another thread the existence of an ICAO program seeking to address upgrades - or redoing entirely - of the Notam system was asserted as a reason explaining Congressional inaction on the same subject.) But if an air carrier, the country flagship no less, and the national government deviate significantly from both the letter of the standards and the results intended to be produced by the total set of standards (and RPs) - maybe it's time for the largest and most significant countries in the sector (int'l commercial aviation) to drop the pretense about standardization. I realize that economic issues were cut out of the proceedings in Chicago in 1944; maybe that decision has borne a bitter - and tragic - legacy.

Of course, the U.S. won't do this under current policy leadership and administration in Washington, and even if it wanted to, it could not be done without a Permanent Rep to ICAO and Council with Amb. rank (as capable as the current head-of-mission obviously is).

soarbum

26th Jan 2023, 21:18

Fair comment, though there was plenty of time after MCAS played a role, for the mental chaos to become all-consuming.
I've long wondered if the power was left high because of being in a bewildered state, or if they imagined pulling the power back would exacerbate the pitch problem.

You have to remember that the auto-throttle was engaged and the crew had delegated the speed control to HAL. With the stick shaker going and a multitude of alarms distracting them, it was harder for them to notice in time that HAL wasn't doing his job.

From ET-302 Interim Investigation Report - p13
"At 05:39:42, the crew engaged Level Change mode and set MCP speed to 238kt"

Description taken from piece by Seattle Times, March 7th 2021

According to the interim investigation report released a year ago, the faulty Angle of Attack sensor on Flight ET302, even before it triggered MCAS to push the plane’s nose down, interfered with other sensor readings of altitude and airspeed. Registering the plane as still below 800 feet above the ground even after it passed that threshold, the jet’s computer had the autothrottle maintain full takeoff thrust for 16 seconds after it should have reduced the power for the climb phase. More significantly, seconds later the pilots set the jet’s speed target at 238 knots, but the autothrottle didn’t follow through. Again because of the faulty sensor on the left, the flight computer detected the discrepancy between the left and right airspeed values and flagged the data as invalid. Unable to validate the aircraft’s speed, the computer stopped sending thrust instructions to the autothrottle. As a result, the engines remained at maximum thrust for the rest of the fatal flight. The plane eventually exceeded the 737’s maximum design speed of 340 knots. This so increased the forces on the jet’s tail that the pilots couldn’t budge it manually.

Loose rivets

26th Jan 2023, 22:33

Pulitzer Prize winners - The Seattle Times (https://www.seattletimes.com/pulitzers/)https://www.seattletimes.com › pulitzers (https://www.seattletimes.com/pulitzers/)
Seattle Times staffers have won journalism's highest honor 11 times since 1950, and have been finalists on 14 other occasions since 1982.

Seattle Times wins Pulitzer Prize for Boeing 737 MAX coverage (https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiE9vyWsub8AhVRNsAKHaRJA1oQFnoECCEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.seattletimes.com%2Finside-the-times%2Fseattle-times-wins-pulitzer-prize-for-boeing-737-max-coverage%2F&usg=AOvVaw2VgUfnikUhuWGiYe4Wc9uU)https://www.seattletimes.com › inside-the-times › seattle-ti... (https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwiE9vyWsub8AhVRNsAKHaRJA1oQFnoECCEQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.seattletimes.com%2Finside-the-times%2Fseattle-times-wins-pulitzer-prize-for-boeing-737-max-coverage%2F&usg=AOvVaw2VgUfnikUhuWGiYe4Wc9uU)

4 May 2020 — The Seattle Times has been awarded a 2020 Pulitzer Prize for National Reporting for its yearlong coverage of the two deadly crashes of ...

Impressive stuff. I like to think there was a two way street between the Times and PPRuNe's multi-thousand posts.

WillowRun 6-3

26th Jan 2023, 22:49

Meanwhile, in federal court in Texas, Boeing entered a plea of Not Guilty.
Reporting by Courthouse News Service follows via link. Note, Article includes link to court filing by the crash victims' families.

https://www.courthousenews.com/boeing-pleads-not-guilty-to-misleading-feds-about-737-max-safety/

Added: the court filing is..... the recitation it sets forth of the facts overall, as well as its withering contempt for the way the DPA was reached and for Boeing's criminal acts and omissions, it's really kick-out-the-jams.....

WideScreen

29th Jan 2023, 05:51

Since the ET302 crew failure started before MCAS was involved, it's not a simply a problem of failing to have a clear picture of a technical memo.
Well, they may have made "mistakes" (though is it really a mistake to not know what to do when the instruments give conflicting information -including, but not only, over speed + stall- when the check-lists and training does not cover these items ?), though the aircraft only became unflyable, once the MCASS started acting.

Only when the not-documented secret button was pushed, the MCAS effects could be compensated for. In the pre-Indonesian crash, only the (experienced ?) engineer, monitoring the situation, managed to get to that stage.

So, yeah, for now, there are no reasons to assume, this crew would not have managed to get the MAX on the ground in one piece, with all participants in this MAX/MCAS experiment walking away unharmed, if the MCAS had been stayed at rest.

WideScreen

29th Jan 2023, 06:40

......
So much of the international commercial aviation sector professes to operate under standardization, established and looked after by that U.N. affiliate with the wings and globe in its insignia. .... But if an air carrier, the country flagship no less, and the national government deviate significantly from both the letter of the standards and the results intended to be produced by the total set of standards (and RPs) - maybe it's time for the largest and most significant countries in the sector (int'l commercial aviation) to drop the pretense about standardization.
Is this about standardization itself, or the implementation ?
I realize that economic issues were cut out of the proceedings in Chicago in 1944; maybe that decision has borne a bitter - and tragic - legacy.
I don't think the economics itself are the issue.

It's more that the ICAO assumed (wrongly), that developing countries (in those days third-world countries), would be able to realize/implement the ICAO standards to the same level as the democracy lead first-world. The same issues the UN is also plagued with.

Of course, the U.S. won't do this under current policy leadership and administration in Washington, and even if it wanted to, it could not be done without a Permanent Rep to ICAO and Council with Amb. rank (as capable as the current head-of-mission obviously is).
I doubt there will be any political direction willing to do this, given the negative "impression" it will give towards democratic countries, as well the "destroy your own survivability" for dictatorial regimes.

When a new power rises in a country in chaos, there are 2 options to stabilize and get all noses in the same direction: Discuss/negotiation among all parties or use force to do so. Western democracies obviously went the first road. Putin (and China as well), went the "force" road, and current history shows the result of regimes that use the force road: It needs more and more force and repression.

Looking how the world-wide money laundering is being handled (putting countries on a black/gray list, and softly punishing those countries violating the norms, by reducing their international monetary options), is something that might work too for ICAO violations. This issues with this is, though, that the number of incidents is that low, that results can only be "measured" using the validation of the implementation of laid out standards. Still a fishy judgement, though. There are so many countries violating the intended implementation. Think about the whole of the ME........

MechEngr

29th Jan 2023, 07:54

WideScreen,

They were, starting 1-10 seconds after take-off*, given a continuing stick shaker** - which AFAIK requires two memory item steps: Disable the Autopilot and Disable the Autothrottle. They did neither one. The reasons for the requirement is simple: either the automation has pushed the plane into a stall or the instrumentation the automation requires has failed; both make reliance on the automation a bad choice. The overspeed did not happen for a long time after that; there was no conflict at the time the stall warning memory items were to be done. Had they been done there would be no overspeed and therefore no additional warning for it.

They also had access to fresh knowledge of exactly how MCAS functioned and how to handle it. This is skipped over by the Final Report, leaving the industry without a firm base to analyze what steps are required to guarantee every pilot learns and understands the information that is available.

As evidenced by the Lion Air preliminary report, issued months ahead of ET302 one crew and a senior pilot found the plane completely flyable with MCAS nudging away; Lion Air crashed when a first officer did not continue the management the captain had been performing.

There is no "secret button." The trim runaway cutout switches are plainly visible and work as advertised; though earlier versions had separate channels to cutout separate inputs, the training was always (last 10-30 years AFAIK) to cut them both rather than spend time to diagnose the exact cause of the trim runaway.

Read the Final Report for both Lion Air and ET302, paying close attention to the events recorded by the FDR for all three flights.

I feel quite sad at the outcome as MCAS was not a system that failed in a way to guarantee a crash. There was a failure in human factors and it wasn't the amount or kind of alarms, but in failing to convey to the pilots what an MCAS event felt like and how they needed to always handle the stall warning immediately and never use Autopilot or Autothrottle with the stick shaker running. You might ask, why doesn't the automation shut itself off when the stick shaker is running? Because, if it's an automation failure the automation cannot be trusted to do anything correctly. At least the airplane computers cannot lock the pilots outside.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwCFY6pmaYY

*They don't report the time the weight-on-wheels ended, just the time of positive climb which was at 50 foot altitude. Roughly 4 seconds after the stick shaker started the Anti-Ice and Master Caution indicators lit, which the F/O then announced to the Captain. A few seconds later, with the stick shaker hammering away, the Captain called for the Autopilot to be engaged, the first of three times before cutting out the trim. They re-enbled the trim and tried to engage the Autopilot a 4th time, the actions that allowed the MCAS its final trim increment.

** At some point there was also a speed/alt difference warning, but the stall warning should have the highest priority. Again, this should be covered by training, but the final report has no information on the proficiency of the pilots in prioritizing the stick shaker stall warning. The overspeed warning was at 5:41:21; the takeoff at roughly 05:38:43.

WideScreen

29th Jan 2023, 08:18

WideScreen,

They were, starting 1-10 seconds after take-off*, given a continuing stick shaker** - which AFAIK requires two memory item steps: Disable the Autopilot and Disable the Autothrottle. They did neither one. The reasons for the requirement is simple: either the automation has pushed the plane into a stall or the instrumentation the automation requires has failed; both make reliance on the automation a bad choice. The overspeed did not happen for a long time after that; there was no conflict at the time the stall warning memory items were to be done. Had they been done there would be no overspeed and therefore no additional warning for it.
Yep, they didn't do these things, though it would not have made a difference on the final outcome. Not to say, when on full power, with the nose pointing up, close to the ground, there are good reasons to keep the automation running, so, you have brain cells to investigate what is going on.
My impression is, they would have found out (they had time, since the aircraft was perfectly flyable) and setup the return to the airport.

This issue is the conflicting indications together with the cacophony on alarms that got fired.

They also had access to fresh knowledge of exactly how MCAS functioned and how to handle it. This is skipped over by the Final Report, leaving the industry without a firm base to analyze what steps are required to guarantee every pilot learns and understands the information that is available.
AFAIK, they didn't. That info piece was not readily available for ET crews at that time. There were some "instructions", though (see below), these only work in a very limited circumstance. Really, turning off the electric trim in a B737-NG/MAX is not an option, the moment you get a little out of trim.

As evidenced by the Lion Air preliminary report, issued months ahead of ET302 one crew and a senior pilot found the plane completely flyable with MCAS nudging away; Lion Air crashed when a first officer did not continue the management the captain had been performing.
Yep, once you know how it works, it's easy. The FO didn't and there was that much of a cacophony, the captain didn't instruct the FO EXACTLY what to do, unfortunately. Though they only did have a couple of seconds to investigate, etc. Not enough time, before this became irrecoverable.

There is no "secret button." The trim runaway cutout switches are plainly visible and work as advertised; though earlier versions had separate channels to cutout separate inputs, the training was always (last 10-30 years AFAIK) to cut them both rather than spend time to diagnose the exact cause of the trim runaway.
As long as you don't know how it works, it's a "secret button". Also, to be able to trim a B737-NG/MAX, you need the electric trim, the moment the aircraft is only a little out of trim. So, keeping the electric trim active was mandatory. The fact, it did need a trim-blib every couple of seconds to avoid the MCAS would take-over was NOT known.

Read the Final Report for both Lion Air and ET302, paying close attention to the events recorded by the FDR for all three flights.

I feel quite sad at the outcome as MCAS was not a system that failed in a way to guarantee a crash. There was a failure in human factors and it wasn't the amount or kind of alarms, but in failing to convey to the pilots what an MCAS event felt like and how they needed to always handle the stall warning immediately and never use Autopilot or Autothrottle with the stick shaker running. You might ask, why doesn't the automation shut itself off when the stick shaker is running? Because, if it's an automation failure the automation cannot be trusted to do anything correctly. At least the airplane computers cannot lock the pilots outside.
Sorry to hear, you are on the Boeing trail, that it's a pilot fault....

That way of thinking was "current", 50+ years ago. It's no longer applicable in today's busy commercial flying business. There are simply too many other (higher level) important items, to expect pilots to have to deal with something like the MCAS intricacies.

......
[/QUOTE]

MechEngr

29th Jan 2023, 12:15

Perhaps you need to read the Ethiopian report that details the answers Boeing supplied to Ethiopian pilots.

I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.

Part of Boeing's response to questions from the Ethiopian pilots:

The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other Airplane systems.

They were not in a frame of mind to understand that the Lion Air crash was initiated by bringing the flaps-up during a stick shaker event, even though Boeing underlined "flaps up flight" in their response. Had they cut the autothrottle, used pitch and power, and not changed the flap configuration, the situation would have been an annoyance. We won't know why the Chief Pilot and CAA did not take measures to ensure they would be in the correct frame of mind.

The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.

WideScreen

29th Jan 2023, 13:23

Perhaps you need to read the Ethiopian report that details the answers Boeing supplied to Ethiopian pilots.
Thanks !

I don't fault the pilots specifically. The airline had the obligation to ensure they were properly trained and the Ethiopian CAA had the obligation to see the training was correct and correctly done. Given both pilots mishandled the stick shaker, it's clear their training was inadequate.
My understanding is, this Boeing info was supplied to the airline, but didn't make it (yet) to the pilots.

Part of Boeing's response to questions from the Ethiopian pilots:
The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other Airplane systems.
Ehhh, yes, but read carefully, and you understand, that this Boeing "advice" does not work. The moment the B737MAX is marginally out of trim, there is no way, the manual trim wheel can be used to regain a trimmed situation.

ALSO, what is missing, is that MCAS will repeatedly fire after 10 seconds of no-trim-input. Something highly relevant to both B737MAX crashes.

They were not in a frame of mind to understand that the Lion Air crash was initiated by bringing the flaps-up during a stick shaker event, even though Boeing underlined "flaps up flight" in their response. Had they cut the autothrottle, used pitch and power, and not changed the flap configuration, the situation would have been an annoyance. We won't know why the Chief Pilot and CAA did not take measures to ensure they would be in the correct frame of mind.
I think, it is seriously offending to write that the Lion Air pilots "initiated" the crash by bringing up the flaps. How COULD they know, this would be a "dangerous" item ? They didn't, nor did the airline .....

The key is that I agree it should not be up to pilots. It should be up to their management and their CAA to ensure that if there is a known defect in the airplane that either the plane is pulled from service or the pilots are well rehearsed in managing when the defect rears its ugly head. This already applies to a large number of "fly with a defect":items.
Assuming you refer to Lion Air, I don't think, this B737MAX MCAS issue was recognized as being something existing, let alone being dangerous. I don't think neither "Management" nor "pilots" do have a blame, when a dangerous, unknown, undocumented feature starts to play up under very specific circumstances. Only one party is to blame, and that is Boeing, to hide the MCAS existence to the FAA and setting up their internal procedures in such a way, that all those pesky technicians can be silenced in favor of management choices.

IF this MCAS issue had not hit 2 non-US airlines, it would have been only a matter of time, before a US airline would encounter this issue.

MechEngr

29th Jan 2023, 15:44

I didn't use the word "knowingly" did I? If there is insult you are the one who just created it.

Why would I refer to a known defect for an airline that did not know there was a defect? One airline had the full nature of the defect laid out before them and with a response directly to their pilots.

Strange game. The only winning move is to ignore you. Still I encourage anyone interested in what happened to read the full FDR charts.

soarbum

29th Jan 2023, 18:42

soarbum

29th Jan 2023, 22:11

MAX also has those cutout switches!

Yes, the MAX has those cutout switches but they are wired not to interfere with MCAS trimming nose down.

https://www.reuters.com/graphics/ETHIOPIA-AIRLINE-CONTROLS/0100916V1NZ/index.html

Also https://leehamnews.com/2018/11/14/boeings-automatic-trim-for-the-737-max-was-not-disclosed-to-the-pilots/

Loose rivets

29th Jan 2023, 22:46

The fact, it did need a trim-blib every couple of seconds to avoid the MCAS would take-over was NOT known.

Alarmingly true. It was almost certainly that technique that got the pre LionAir home. There was so much on that flight that in a perfect world should have been promulgated as high priority.

. . . . There are simply too many other (higher level) important items, to expect pilots to have to deal with something like the MCAS intricacies.

This is an important statement, partly because MCAS did what it was supposed to do - a mere extension of existing software, and if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?

BFSGrad

29th Jan 2023, 23:25

Yes, the MAX has those cutout switches but they are wired not to interfere with MCAS trimming nose down.
Such a design would seem to negate the procedure for a runaway stabilizer if due to MCAS fault. All the schematics I've seen for NG/MAX trim show that the cutout switches completely disable the electric trim system, which is the system used by MCAS, STS, and autopilot to move the stabilizer. In other words, with the switches in cutout, the only method to move the stabilizer is with the manual trim wheels. Is this not correct?

MechEngr

29th Jan 2023, 23:35

I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.

The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.

If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.

Because MCAS provides a correction opposite to the manual inputs from a pilot. If the plane is heading towards a stall because the pilot is hauling back on the wheel, then having MCAS cutout when the pilot hauls back on the wheel defeats the purpose of MCAS.

Even on the previous generation cutting both systems was recommended as trim runaway is so rapid in making the situation bad that pilots have no time to figure out if the automation has failed or there is a loose piece of wire short circuiting the trim switch.

ImbracableCrunk

29th Jan 2023, 23:51

Are you confusing the switches at the control column base for the cut out for the switches on the quadrant?

waito

30th Jan 2023, 05:45

Are you confusing the switches at the control column base for the cut out for the switches on the quadrant?
At least I did, so I deleted my reply to soarbum.

soarbum

30th Jan 2023, 09:16

Because MCAS provides a correction opposite to the manual inputs from a pilot. If the plane is heading towards a stall because the pilot is hauling back on the wheel, then having MCAS cutout when the pilot hauls back on the wheel defeats the purpose of MCAS.

The point is that in making this change, they went from a system where the pilot could overrule the automation to one where the automation could overrule the pilot.
This is fundamental and was certainly not explained to the FAA and operators when deciding on grandfathering approval and pilot training.

I still don't see why they decided to remove the AUTO trim cutout switch and replace it with a "B/U" which seems to do exactly the same as "PRI"
This leaves pilots with just the nuclear option of disabling all electric trim and reverting to the reduced size manual trim wheel.
The only explanation is that they felt that MCAS was so important that it should not be possible for the pilot to fly without it in which case why did they not classify MCAS as DAL-A.

MechEngr

30th Jan 2023, 16:17

soarbum

30th Jan 2023, 21:57

Boeing told the FAA that MCAS was just an extension of the speed trim system.

1) MCAS was much more that a STS extension as the they were fundamentally modifying the logic of the stabiliser trim to accomodate it.

From the excellent and detailed blog by Peter Lemme at https://www.satcom.guru/2019/08/connecting-dots-from-command-to-action.html

" 737 MAX Autopilot MCAS Trim Commands
MCAS ENGAGE is an FCC output discrete entirely unique to the MAX. It drives the COLUMN CUTOUT OVERRIDE relay in the column switch module. The relay serves two functions: to command high trim rate and to allow for AND command in the presence of AFT column cutout.

The MCAS ENGAGE discrete is routed to the actuator instead of FLAPS DN discrete to force high trim rate.

The AND trim command bypasses the AFT column cutout switch."

2) In the original MAX certification submission, Boeing listed the changes to the stab cutout switches as “Stab Trim cutout switches panel nomenclature” It was not just nomeclature, they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active. Again, why they would want to do this when they were going out of their way to minimise other cockpit changes has never been fully explained.

It will be up to the court to decide if these and other obfuscations were part of a deliberate attempt by the company to mislead the FAA regarding the impact of MCAS on other aircraft systems.

Loose rivets

30th Jan 2023, 23:43

Let's be the Devil's advocate again. MCAS is starting to be described as a kind of intermittent electric Stick Pusher. The high rate gives this impression.
To use the existing STS system to motor the nose down to keep stick loads within certification boundaries, and do it gently, seems fairly logical. But just supposing that added algorithm hadn't been given the grand name of MCAS! It's no longer a thing, just more processing. It's possible no one would have ever known something new was involved, given the existing chaos.

However, Boeing did give the game away. In the midst of the crash threads, I spotted mention of MCAS in a South American airline's Pilot's Handbook. Just a few lines. It was possibly the only such mention in the World.

I think it's important to go back to focussing on the single AoA sensor that should have been listed in the "Catastrophic" catagory, and hopefully required duplication. The history of that refurbished or older part is pivotal in the Lion Air disaster . . . and perhaps, Boeing.

******
. . . they were removing the ability to isolate MCAS/STS/autopilot inputs but still leave the Elec trim active.

Was there a pre-MAX 737 that like the MAX, had only ONE three-phase motor in the tail? What I'm getting at is - did the change to the cutout switches' wiring, coincide with the introduction of the two clutches that selected mechanical power from the single electric motor for the jack screw? (AP and Pickle Switches?)

MechEngr

31st Jan 2023, 02:33

AFAIK the NG had a single motor, but separate inputs from the FCC and the pilot (Why are they called pickle switch? Looks it up. Seems like it was the name for the bomb release) wheel mounted trim switches, a separate path. Anyone with an NG FCOM see what it says to do with trim runaway?

Separate trim channels would not have helped Lion Air as the flight that was successful was fine with manual trim and it would not have helped the accident/crash as they didn't use the cut out switches at all. It might have helped ET302 but they had failed to use the wheel mounted trim switches properly even when they were effective.

Had the logic been to invalidate the AoA when the vane heater continuity failed then ET302 would not have crashed. For Lion Air invalidating both AoA sensors due to disagreement would have worked. In both cases, AFAIK, all systems depending on AoA would have seen the invalidation and ceased all automation and Lion Air would have also been fine.

The other change I would look at is adding a vane stop that is in a shorter range than the counterweight stop. If the vane is destroyed then the vane stop would have nothing to stop against allowing additional travel. Even a momentary excursion into that area would be used to invalidate the AoA sensor. It might also serve as a check on the electrical setting as only a few degrees of additional travel would be used - so a check of the electrical vs the mechanical would form a barrier to the Lion Air electrical mis-calibration and would make for a simple test on a replacement - if the AoA system goes invalid when moved against either (or both) vane-stop then the sensor is suspect. This would have also prevented the Lion Air crash as the miscalibrated sensor would either be caught at the factory or could have been easily caught by the maintainers. It would move the failure to setting the wrong requirements for the sensor - and that could be caught with marking on the fuselage for the sensor vane travel limits.

For all the "but they hid it" about MCAS, the FAA would not have seen the AoA subsystem flaws fixed. All the FAA would have done is to ask for more paperwork; there is no indication anyone felt that the trim runaway procedure would fail to be used. Certainly after the Lion Air crash I didn't see any news of 737 MAX pilots refusing to fly, maybe in private? I believe no CAA grounded the 737 MAX after the Lion Air crash, even after the preliminary report made clear the human factors problem. Grounding only happened after ET302, suggesting a general opinion that the failure mode was expected to be handled as a trivial or annoying matter, the way the first Lion Air crew did, and that inexperience and lack of familiarity was the main problem, one that was solved with the Emergency AD.

GlobalNav

31st Jan 2023, 15:20

Alarmingly true. It was almost certainly that technique that got the pre LionAir home. There was so much on that flight that in a perfect world should have been promulgated as high priority.

This is an important statement, partly because MCAS did what it was supposed to do - a mere extension of existing software, and if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?

Of course the MCAS software operated as coded.

It's not enough to operate effectively in normal conditions, the non-normal conditions (i.e., failure modes) must be safe as well.

I stand in solidarity with the grieving families.

Jobs and share prices "trump" aviation safety.

Loose rivets

31st Jan 2023, 18:52

Mmm . . . defence lawyers must be able to turn off their compassionate circuits.

It wasn't until the aftermath that the 'seriousness categories' became generally known. Of course, just what can escalate into the Catastrophic range is hard to assess, since the crisis can go into a Butterfly effect of chance happenings, and I'm fairly sure the designers will be somewhat resistant to any component being labelled thus.

waito

31st Jan 2023, 20:43

I hope that Boeing will be forced to give a reponse in this court case as to why they felt that MCAS system on the MAX needed to be given the authority to override the pilot.

The 737NG had column cutout* switches to ensure that it there could be no nose down trip from either the pickle switches or the automated systems if the pilot had the column pulled back.
Also on the 737NG, the pilots had options either to disable just trim inputs from the automation or all trip inputs but this was taken away on the MAX.

If either of these two safety mechanisms had been left in place, the outcomes of the two accidents may have been different.
If Boeing were so interested in minimizing changes (pilot training) between the NG and the MAX, what were the underlying engineering/aerodynamic drivers that made them feel that MCAS needed to have the power to overrule those safetys.

To avoid confusion of technical terms, I looked up in an Manual (non-Boeing) of 737NG

Stabilizer trim switches on each control wheel, those rocker switches for pilot elec trim control

Control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches stop operation of the main electric and autopilot trim when the control column movement opposes trim direction

On Aft Electronic Panel:

Stabilizer Trim Override Switch In Position OVERRIDE – Bypasses the control column actuated stabilizer trim cutout switches to restore power to the stabilizer trim switches.

On Control Stand:

Stabilizer Trim Main Electric (MAIN ELECT) Cutout Switch - CUTOUT – Deactivates stabilizer trim switch operation.
Stabilizer Trim AUTOPILOT Cutout Switch - NORMAL – Normal operating position. CUTOUT – · Deactivates autopilot stabilizer trim operation. · Autopilot disengages if engaged.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/600x676/schematics_552890f17fed05b16d8485c2b9ed0891bb05c56e.jpg

Matey

31st Jan 2023, 22:10

Your interpretation of the schematic is correct. Stab Trim cutout switches to cutout = manual trim only

WillowRun 6-3

1st Feb 2023, 10:35

Re: soarburn and court case(s) (## 924, 933)

The Deferred Prosecution Agreement in the criminal case against Boeing still is in place and the court has not ruled that it will be changed in any manner whatsoever. The crash victims' families are seeking to have the DPA re-opened but that still is a long way from happening.

A point at which misunderstanding of this particular court case may have begun is the fact that Boeing was required to be "arraigned" in the federal district court in Texas. Of course ordinarily the arraignment of a criminal defendant happens at the start of the courtroom proceedings, not two years into a three-year DPA (though federal criminal practice is not part of my legal portfolio and perhaps this procedural stance of the Boeing case is not actually highly unusual - but so far, it does appear to be just that, highly unusual). The reason the court - evidently - agreed to have the government and the victims' families toss the case back in time to the arraignment phase is because it is at the arraignment phase when crime victims ordinarily have an opportunity to present their views on what the terms of release will be for a criminal defendant. It gets a bit artificial, does it not? - Boeing, as "the defendant", had not quite exactly been arrested, had it? - nor was it being held in custody by any law enforcement agency. But inasmuch as the arraignment is the procedural phase at which the individuals who have become "crime victims" may exercise their statutory rights to address the court specifically on the terms of setting the defendant free pending further proceedings, and since that step was skipped in this case, the court - evidently - agreed to put time, procedurally speaking, back on the game clock.

Now having said all that.... the company entered a plea of Not Guilty? What? How can it have acknowledged what it did acknowledge in the DPA, and then go on to plead Not Guilty? Of course it was not going to plead guilty, I realize, but.... this could get interesting still. It's not at such a dramatic juncture yet, but the crash victims' families have shown some major tenacity, is it not so? And reading the court filing they entered in connection with the arraignment -- look, reams upon reams have been written and published decrying what Boeing did and failed to do. This particular court filing, in my estimation anyhow, is right up there at the top, impact-wise.

WideScreen

7th Feb 2023, 06:17

The pilots could over-rule MCAS at any time. Press the trim switch on the wheel and MCAS trim command stops. That's clearly seen in the FDR graphs. The pilots retained the ability to set whatever trim status they wanted at any time. The source of the problem is the SMYD with a side of ADIRU - their design to pass on false AoA and a false stall warning is the source of the problem. As I mentioned even the Autopilot was trying to force the nose down when the ET302 crew got it to engage. Forcing the nose down on a stall warning is the action pilots should take (though they should actually set pitch and power appropriate for the weight and altitude.)

They changed the switches because (AFIAK) the NG guidance was that for any trim runaway, both switches are to be used, so operationally it made no difference.

The first Lion Air crew flew just fine with the manual trim wheel. It went so fine, they re-enabled electric trim, MCAS gave another kick, and they turned it back off.

If you are looking for the regulatory smoking gun, that was fired a long time before MAX was a twinkle in anyone's eye when they allowed a false stall warning to be acceptable and did not seek a way to invalidate a failed AoA sensor, perhaps as detected by loss of continuity in the de-ice circuit which occurs when the external vane is stripped from the plane.
Not sure if your writing is to "defend" the Boeing statements that "just switching off the electrical trim" using the trim cut-out switches is suitable to control the aircraft, but just reading your "instructions" makes me wondering, how pilots should be able to find out the need to do so, within seconds the cacophony started and let alone decide which actions to perform.

Not to say, IF the instruction to apply manual trim every 10 seconds, during the remainder of the flight, in case of an AoA sensor failure, to avoid an imminent crash, would have made it to the memorized instruction list, the whole MCAS disaster would have been unfolded before the first 737MAX take-off and MCAS design returned to the drawing board.

WideScreen

7th Feb 2023, 06:27

...... if I were acting for Boeing, that would be my prime defence: There are many hundreds of small software processes going on at any one moment. At what level of complexity should Boeing be obliged to tell the customer/trainers just what is being processed?
Yep, leave out all those items that are not relevant and only report the ones that are relevant. MCAS' existence turned out to by highly relevant (and obviously needing redundancy in systems/sensors, blablabla), so should have been reported/documented, but was deliberately avoided in all communication with the FAA (and towards customers, except 1 stray mention of the mnemonic).

Less Hair

7th Feb 2023, 08:12

Didn't they try to avoid requiring sim training for MAX conversion because Southwest would get reimbursed one million per aircraft in case they'd need the sim?

WideScreen

7th Feb 2023, 15:23

Didn't they try to avoid requiring sim training for MAX conversion because Southwest would get reimbursed one million per aircraft in case they'd need the sim?
Yep, and even an extra warning bulb would turn the MAX conversion into a sim training. With the $1M WN penalty, per airplane ....

MechEngr

7th Feb 2023, 16:44

There's no evidence that it would have made any difference at all. The ET302 crew was too overwhelmed by a stall warning to cut the autothrottle and still worked hard, against the stall warning memory item checklist to enable the autopilot. An extra warning light on the dash when they weren't looking at the instruments to begin with would have been equally easily ignored.

Not sure if your writing is to "defend" the Boeing statements that "just switching off the electrical trim" using the trim cut-out switches is suitable to control the aircraft, but just reading your "instructions" makes me wondering, how pilots should be able to find out the need to do so, within seconds the cacophony started and let alone decide which actions to perform.

Not to say, IF the instruction to apply manual trim every 10 seconds, during the remainder of the flight, in case of an AoA sensor failure, to avoid an imminent crash, would have made it to the memorized instruction list, the whole MCAS disaster would have been unfolded before the first 737MAX take-off and MCAS design returned to the drawing board.

It was literally what crew #1 and the captain of crew #2 did - applying manual trim when the trim loads became noticeable at a few pounds, prior to any prompting by the documentation that was delivered shortly after the FO of crew #2 didn't. Trim cutout switches have been in place for several decades. Were pilots required to diagnose a wiring fault or an STS software failure prior to using the cutout switches back then?

No one called for any heads to roll until the owner of the plane that crew #3 controlled claimed that crew #3 followed every step exactly as laid out in the emergency AD and demanded that following those instructions was not enough to avoid a crash. That claim turned out to be entirely untrue, but was only revealed a full year later with the preliminary report. It certainly seems to me that everyone operating the 737, and the MAX in particular, accepted the AD as sufficient until then. Was there any testimony to Congress to the contrary?

For decades, pilots weren't all rigorously trained to deal with unwanted trim system actuation, certainly not in conjunction with any other problem. For decades it was OK to issue false stall warnings and stick-shaker activation. MCAS merely exposed that there had been no safety net on those two fronts for a long time.

What I am pointing out is that there are and have been systemic issues that extended far beyond Boeing and that sole focus on Boeing and MCAS is an incomplete lesson to learn.

Imagegear

8th Feb 2023, 02:06

Perhaps like this today:

B737 Max FLE2615 Cancun - Toronto diverting to FLL on descent and approach with a chase plane - FEL2615

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/688x501/b737_max_1736639a645a29cf2a5d50da304f4ced6a73bd80.png
Something went pear shaped

IG

WideScreen

8th Feb 2023, 04:27

There's no evidence that it would have made any difference at all.
That's a sneaky way to reason. Of course, there is no evidence of that. How to accomplish that ?

The ET302 crew was too overwhelmed by a stall warning to cut the autothrottle and still worked hard, against the stall warning memory item checklist to enable the autopilot. An extra warning light on the dash when they weren't looking at the instruments to begin with would have been equally easily ignored.
Of course, the warning light would be overseen in the cacophony of alarms. The MCAS should simply have been working properly, instead of being a deathtrap. That would have bought the crew time to get their act together, diagnose and resolve without crashing.
It was literally what crew #1 and the captain of crew #2 did - applying manual trim when the trim loads became noticeable at a few pounds, prior to any prompting by the documentation that was delivered shortly after the FO of crew #2 didn't.
Yes, of course, though the simple fact that the FO of crew #2 didn't apply the <10s repeated trim input, does not imply, it is "normal" to assume, this is a crew failure. Such a repeated manual input, to avoid a catastrophe, is simply not something acceptable in the airline industry.
Trim cutout switches have been in place for several decades. Were pilots required to diagnose a wiring fault or an STS software failure prior to using the cutout switches back then?
Of course, the cut-out switches are there and were for a long time. Though, IF the failure diagnose does take more than a couple of seconds and the MCAS creates a runaway, the manual trim wheel no longer provides a trim solution and there is no other option, then to turn on the trim cut-out switches again. OF the crew(s) had known, they could only use the cut-out switches, until the aircraft was in trim and then turn-off again and use the manual trim wheel, they would have done, but this info was completely hidden by Boeing.
No one called for any heads to roll until the owner of the plane that crew #3 controlled claimed that crew #3 followed every step exactly as laid out in the emergency AD and demanded that following those instructions was not enough to avoid a crash. That claim turned out to be entirely untrue, but was only revealed a full year later with the preliminary report. It certainly seems to me that everyone operating the 737, and the MAX in particular, accepted the AD as sufficient until then.
Yeah, that was a wrong statement, though, it does not imply, the MCAS issues should have been acceptable.
Was there any testimony to Congress to the contrary?
I don't know, though it doesn't matter. The MCAS issues should not have been there to start with.
For decades, pilots weren't all rigorously trained to deal with unwanted trim system actuation, certainly not in conjunction with any other problem. For decades it was OK to issue false stall warnings and stick-shaker activation. MCAS merely exposed that there had been no safety net on those two fronts for a long time.
Yes, for decades it has been, wrongly, especially in the past 10 years, acceptable, that such a cacophony can raise, that the pilots lose the plot.

There are reasons, the 737MAX (and more or less the 737NG too) is considered a bridge too far, see the opinions on this board and the FAA/Congress attempts to limit the legally allowed, but practically unwanted inheritance of certified old-technology in "new generation" airplanes. That old (GUI) technology, which should have been abandoned long ago in "new" airplanes brought to the market. The result of this is, the deplorable state Boeing ended up in.

And, I wrote earlier about this, when you start/keep feeding/demanding new items to be learned by pilots, you need to accept, that things will be falling off the table, since it is becoming just "too much" to learn all these things (in the time available). Which in turn implies, the pilots need to get more current technology, taking care of more basic items, especially conflicting alarms, freeing up the pilots' brains for more high-level knowledge/capabilities. (Not saying, that basic flying skills should be sacrificed).

There are reasons, pilots try to engage the autopilot, when things go haywire: It relieves them from the low basic tasks to keep a desirable flight path.
What I am pointing out is that there are and have been systemic issues that extended far beyond Boeing and that sole focus on Boeing and MCAS is an incomplete lesson to learn.
Of course, though it is largely Boeing (and their $ oriented customers), who just ignore the need to move on to better technologies and "invest" in that, by accepting higher prices for the airplanes. And, a practical issue is, that certifying "new technology" is extremely difficult and expensive.

WideScreen

8th Feb 2023, 04:30

MechEngr

8th Feb 2023, 12:22

"Yes, of course, though the simple fact that the FO of crew #2 didn't apply the <10s repeated trim input"

He did. He just didn't correct the trim forces he could clearly feel. You need to read the FDR graphs to see what everyone did.

The "cacophony" was from the stall warning. If pilots are blacking out from a stall warning then something is seriously wrong with the training. In this case it was a false alarm. I'm not sure why that is a factor, issuing false alarms, crying wolf, demanding focus on something that isn't a problem, is pushed off as not of primary importance. It's exactly what brought down AF447, another plane that was fully controllable by the crew. As suggested before, there are plenty of ways to detect the AoA system is either incorrect or has failed completely without using best 2 out of 3 (which failed on at least one Airbus, which also shoved the nose down and required power to be pulled from 2 of 3 flight computers). Using that detection to invalidate that side SMYD and ADIRU would have meant that MCAS would not function. Stop the first domino rather than expect the last domino not to get knocked down after, by my count, 4 have already failed.

WillowRun 6-3

12th Feb 2023, 02:18

Meanwhile, in the criminal case against Boeing in federal district court in Texas, the judge has denied the motion by the crash victims' families to modify (or even suspend) the Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Boeing and the Dep't of Justice. Reportedly the basis of the ruling is that the court does not have legal authority, under the CVRA (Crime Victims' Rights Act) or otherwise, to change the DPA. The court did express some frustration about this lack of authority, along with statements indicative of some extent of agreement with the families' factual and legal contentions. An appeal is expected.

WillowRun 6-3

9th Mar 2023, 00:08

The appeal has been filed in the U.S.Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (23-10168).

I'm not going to try summarizing the legal argument or otherwise commenting on the likelihood of various possible outcomes . . . . . . . Not until I've read the brief in support, that is (and maybe not even then). Still, I can say, for anyone not following close enough along in the legal process to date, that the families of the crash victims are seeking reversal on appeal of the ruling by the trial court (Judge Reed O'Connor, U.S.D.C. Northern District of Texas) denying any reopening or other modification of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement. Recall, the District Court ruled that the families are within the scope and definition of "crime victims" for the applicability of the federal Crime Victims' Rights Act, and stated damning things about Boeing's crime - criminality which the company admits in the DPA, of course.

On the related thread that started with a focus on the criminal trial of a Boeing development or test pilot (M. Forkner), discussion has sprung up again about MCAS and the various wrong-doings by Boeing. There are a goodly number of "main points" in the sordid tale - which I'm pointing out because if the Court asked this SLF/attorney what I think it should rule - not a prediction, mind you, just my view- I'd say, "reverse the District Court, remand with instructions to stop-the-clock of the time period set forth in the DPA, and then...... Appoint a Special Master, and convene a big, encompassing, painful inquest into all the things done wrong by the company. Bring in all the reports, from Congress, the Inspector General, the specially-convened panels in the federal interagency, everything. There may no longer be a procedural posture for an actual criminal trial, but do the next best thing." Sure, the Federal Rules might not exactly provide for, might not contemplate, this sort of inquest conducted by a Special Master. But, consider, I think I read about some guy, a former federal bureaucrat I guess, who had a bunch of federal government papers, maybe classified ones included?, stored with his golf gear or something, in Florida I think, and the District Court judge involved there appointed a Special Master. Aren't the CVRA rights of 346 crime victims' families entitled to vindication even if by some creativity with the Federal Rules?

I'll show myself out, but not without hoping that justice, justice will be done.

MechEngr

9th Mar 2023, 05:39

Justice won't be done. Sovereign immunity precludes it. This leaves only one cash-filled pinata, the real reason for the action. Maybe via settlement, maybe shorting the stock.

If a crime was committed then who will go to prison for it?

WillowRun 6-3

9th Mar 2023, 12:24

No, sovereign immunity has nothing to do with the question whether the DPA, entered into by the Justice Department and Boeing, can be re-opened and, if so, whether it should be modified

The corporation admitted criminal responsibility in the DPA, as you (presumably) know. So it is accurate to say that the district court action resulted in, among other things, the determination that a crime was committed. The district court's language on this particular point is quite stark, is it not?

Whether it still is a possibility that anyone formerly or currently employed by the company and/or responsible for the company's acts and omissions leading up to the crashes will be held criminally liable remains to be seen - though my own cynicism is a mere slice of the massive cynicism you seem to hold. But cynic or not, no individual is being adjudicated criminally responsible, in my view, without a very expansive proceeding that would delve into reams upon reams of information about how and why the crashes occurred - including all the dense reams about design, aircraft systems, certification matters, and flight operations. You'll recall the government presented a narrow effort to convict Mr Forkner, who defended under the burden of ill-advised communications that made him look bad, if not "guilty of something." And he was acquitted. Incidentally, MechEngr, you don't hold the view that Forkner should have been found guilty, do you?

Organfreak

9th Mar 2023, 15:03

Obviously I am not the person you are addressing; I am only a well-informed SLF in the peanut gallery who has followed this whole dismal situation closely, and *I*, a jury of one, do not agree that Forkner is not guilty. (I grew up in Seattle and remember the good ole days of Boeing being heroes to us kids.) But it has been clearly shown that lately Boeing has a criminally negligent corporate culture and a way to hold them responsible needs to be conceived and acted-upon. Maybe some ppl feel that they will pay at the cash register.. I dunno if that is enough!

MechEngr

9th Mar 2023, 21:46

So Ethiopia, the owner of the aircraft, the employer of the pilots, the supplier of training to those pilots, the ones responsible for their training, the supplier of their chief pilot, and the ones who sold the tickets, is no longer a sovereign nation?

Every level was provided with ample notice. At every level that notice was ignored and the orders given to proceed.

They failed to follow the memory items for the stall warning - 30+ years in existence. Both pilots failed at that, MCAS not involved at all. Were their trainers investigated about that failure? Will their chief pilot go to prison for not recognizing that inability? MCAS didn't do anything to the throttle, which was the pilot's responsibility, but that unattended throttle left the plane uncontrollable at the end. Perhaps counter with "MCAS", but the emphasized part of stall warning procedure is to never engage the autopilot or autothrottle - set pitch and set power. They re-enabled the trim so they could re-enable the autopilot because the control forces from the over-speed due to the unattended throttle were too high. The emphasized part of the AD and the FCOM was "never re-enable the trim" if it is disabled for any reason.

There will be no justice for ET302.

WillowRun 6-3

10th Mar 2023, 00:05

MechEngr
It's always so tempting, when some specific legal issue is in the public arena, and someone deliberately muddies the discussion, to wish upon that person the best counsel they can find if and when they find themselves in court. But this being a community, instead, I'll say I hope you never even need legal counsel at all.

The subject is the DPA. If there's a problem in the international legal framework which precludes justice - as someone may define it - with respect to the country, Ethiopia, that isn't an argument that will help in the DPA matter. It may arrive as a surprise, but legal counsel representing the families have an obligation to represent them as fully and far as the law allows. What can or cannot be achieved under current law in holding Ethiopia, the country, accountable, just isn't a factor. (If it turns out that the 5th Circuit case, the appeal of the DPA status, does involve the Ethiopian government issue you've asserted, I'll come back here and acknowledge it.)

I won't even guess at how the domestic law of Ethiopia would handle a lawsuit against the government. Maybe that's a subject you're well-versed in - but I'm not and won't guess as to how the U.S. doctrine of sovereign immunity might find a parallel in the other country.

As to the flight operation itself of ET302 - strictly off-limits for this SLF/attorney, so I'll leave it alone, other than to say your comment certainly seems to blame the pilots, though unclear how that blame compares in your view to others at fault... like Boeing. But as a non-aviator, I'm not commenting in substance on all that.

MechEngr

10th Mar 2023, 01:05

Yes, I can see that ignoring the facts regarding the incident are going to be off limits in seeking justice, even though they are core to understanding the main topic, recertification. Ignoring the facts makes sense if you have predetermined a desired outcome.

When you enter a courtroom have you looked at sufficient legal precedents to understand how the case might go or do you just wing it? Would a loss for your client be your fault if you just winged it or would you say that LexisNexis let you down and deserve all the blame? Or would your Bar association that skipped questions of law share some blame? Possibly if your school didn't even cover law before giving you a degree. Surely it's someone else's fault, someone with cash.

However far up the chain responsibility for pilot mismanagement of that flight goes needs to be investigated. But they won't be.

There will be no justice.

MechEngr

10th Mar 2023, 01:13

For further clarity - entering court with a case that is essentially identical to one that had two recent examples where one was won and the other lost, making huge international news, and with a large amount of legal analysis by expert lawyers. As you enter the court your client asks about those cases and you reply, "Not sure what you are talking about" and then you throw a hot coffee at the judge.

WillowRun 6-3

10th Mar 2023, 01:43

Actually, I'm now taking somewhat of a step back here.

The legal system - the processes within the system - in this country do not provide an omnibus (overall) forum for addressing all the issues in a given situation in one setting. I recognize that you're intensely indignant over what you perceive as getting-away-with-murder by the State of Ethiopia, or parts of it. But to the extent that your view is that this specific injustice must be pounded upon endlessly, to the exclusion of achieving some positive results in a given case in which that State is not directly present, I'll just agree to disagree.

I'm not going to engage in any dialogue which involves any attorney, least of all a rhetorical version of myself, engaging in courtroom misconduct. I'm a guest here, you surely realize -- and lawyers in general already have a bad enough name here. No, thank you. But I will say: if the families win before the Fifth Circuit, and the DPA is re-opened, and some further recourse or redress is obtained for the families, I'll view that as a more just outcome, even if other unjust aspects of the unnecessary deaths of 346 people remain unredressed.

artee

10th Mar 2023, 23:03

^^
I've always appreciated your posts. thoughtful, well reasoned, and able to explain legal things in a way that makes it easier for non-legal beagles to understand.
Please keep up the good work.

Big Pistons Forever

11th Mar 2023, 00:45

WillowRun 6-3

11th Mar 2023, 01:16

Many thanks -
WR 6-3

WHBM

11th Mar 2023, 08:39

The legal system - the processes within the system - in this country do not provide an omnibus (overall) forum for addressing all the issues in a given situation in one setting. I recognize that you're intensely indignant over what you perceive as getting-away-with-murder by the State of Ethiopia, or parts of it. But to the extent that your view is that this specific injustice must be pounded upon endlessly, to the exclusion of achieving some positive results in a given case in which that State is not directly present, I'll just agree to disagree.

Well, you just have to accept that the carrier brings the legal aspects of the country that it is from. If you want Western standards of law and state oversight, choose a Western carrier.

Now a significant number of the passengers were on journeys which could have been done wholly on such carriers, indeed, nonstop in many cases. France, UK - why not fly nonstop on your own carrier ? The single largest overseas group (in fact, double the number of Ethiopians on board) were Canadians, who have a range of such carriers connecting directly in Europe. What does Ethiopia have to do with a trip from Montreal to Nairobi ? One answer of course, it's cheaper. OK, on you go. Don't get upset if the carrier's national traditions are not your traditions.

EDLB

18th Mar 2023, 17:15

Munro gives some insight on his time with McDonald Douglas. Has probably more to do with the 737-MAX mess than anyone dares to know.
if you have some time:

https://youtu.be/Q0U9llcuaXA

Jet Jockey A4

19th Mar 2023, 00:03

Thanks for sharing that video EDLB... Amazing how top management can really destroy a company.

WideScreen

19th Mar 2023, 02:11

Thanks for sharing that video EDLB... Amazing how top management can really destroy a company.
Are banks different ?

Jet Jockey A4

19th Mar 2023, 11:10

Are banks different ?

No... Unfortunately that is the dark side of predatory capitalism when the bottom line is to make sure that the investors in such companies get more than their fare share of the money, damned the rest.

ATC Watcher

19th Mar 2023, 11:20

@ EDLB, thanks for that video, sad to watch in fact but revealing of a "profit -above -everything" culture that could also bring down Boeing civil airctaft in ethe same manner unfortunately as it looks the same kind of management is at the top.
.
@ Jet Jockey A4 : Amazing how top management can really destroy a company.
Oh yes, look at Twitter right now , Elon Musk is on his way to do the same , not for money, but for power..and in a very short time too..

20driver

19th Mar 2023, 16:21

Oh yes, look at Twitter right now , Elon Musk is on his way to do the same , not for money, but for power..and in a very short time too..

Twitter aside what Musk has done with Tesla and SpaceX is nothing short of astounding. When he started both ventures the know all would have given him zero chance. No one had broken into the car industry in many decades. As for private launchers and contract hauling to space, you would have been sent to the rubber room.
I for one very confidentially predicted tesla would be bust in 2019 and GM or VW would buy the carcass.
As for Twitter - really who cares? It's an internet thing and they come inevitably go. It will be replaced.
SpaceX and Tesla represent amazing engineering and hard tangible goods.
I stand by me prediction the boring company will be a bust but I will give the guy credit where credit is due.

India Four Two

19th Mar 2023, 16:57

^^
I've always appreciated your posts. thoughtful, well reasoned, and able to explain legal things in a way that makes it easier for non-legal beagles to understand.
Please keep up the good work.

WR,

I’ve been traveling a lot for the past month and haven’t kept up with this thread.

artee has expressed my opinion of your posts much better than I could. Keep up the good work.

WillowRun 6-3

19th Mar 2023, 21:31

This SLF/attorney greatly appreciates the kind words of encouragement and approval - thank you very much.

Big Pistons Forever

20th Mar 2023, 03:07

Sigh……

Acknowledging the terror of the passengers who were pretty sure they were about to die due to a design failure that Boeing is totally responsible for would cost money. Instead we see another example of the Boeing executives failure of vision and the top down driven Boeing culture which incentivizes senior management who understand the cost of everything and the value of nothing.Boeing Claims MAX Victims Didn’t Suffer Any PainBy
Russ Niles (https://www.avweb.com/author/rniles/)
-
Published: March 18, 2023Updated: March 19, 2023
1 (https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/boeing-claims-max-victims-didnt-suffer-any-pain/#comments)
https://s30121.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/10Ethiopia5-promo-videoSixteenByNine1050-v11-696x392.jpg.optimal.jpg (https://s30121.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/10Ethiopia5-promo-videoSixteenByNine1050-v11.jpg.optimal.jpg)Boeing lawyers say the company shouldn’t have to pay for the pain suffered by victims of two 737 MAX crashes because they couldn’t possibly have felt any pain. The Wall Street Journal is reporting (https://www.wsj.com/articles/boeing-families-argue-over-pay-for-737-max-victims-suffering-d38127d5?reflink=share_mobilewebshare) Boeing’s legal team says the law in Illinois, where this case is being heard, doesn’t allow their families to be paid for pain and suffering to be compensated because there essentially was none. Boeing consulted experts who determined there wasn’t enough time in the 700-MPH impact for the human brain to process pain signals.

Boeing has already admitted fault for the crash and an earlier one in Indonesia which together killed 346 occupants of the two brand-new aircraft. These filings are an attempt to have the court limit what evidence a jury could consider when awarding damages. The families want the jury to be able to consider the effect of the six minutes of climbs and dives that preceded the crash. The WSJ says the Boeing claims allowing that evidence would “prejudice and confuse” jurors, potentially leading them to award amounts “tantamount to punitive damages.”

“Jurors would inevitably sympathize with testimony about the passengers’ alleged fear of impending death and imagine themselves in the passengers’ shoes,” the WSJ quoted Boeing attorneys as writing in one filing. Eliminating pain and suffering from the compensation calculation leaves only grief and loss by the plaintiffs to be considered by the jury. The difference could amount to millions of dollars per victim. The plaintiffs’ lawyers said the 157 passengers and crew “undeniably suffered horrific emotional distress, pain and suffering, and physical impact/injury while they endured extreme G-forces, braced for impact, knew the airplane was malfunctioning, and ultimately plummeted nose-down to the ground at terrifying speed.”

MechEngr

20th Mar 2023, 04:33

"Acknowledging the terror of the passengers who were pretty sure they were about to die due to a design failure"

And just how would they know that? Did the flight loads differ in any significant way from many clear air turbulence events? The majority of the flight bounced around 1G; it was only the last 5 seconds that were below 0G. They certainly didn't know the plane was malfunctioning. The word "brace" doesn't appear in the final report indicating the pilots did not call for it.

Is pain and suffering for the injuries sustained? I've estimated the entire duration of the collision was less than 0.1 second, front to back; each row got roughly 1/266th of a second and more than 5000Gs. They didn't endure those forces, they did not experience those forces; there would be in that brief interval no time for sensation to arrive to experience or remember.

This comes across as a cash grab by lawyers who would otherwise get nothing from the settlement Boeing had previously promised. They want observers to imagine this was a 30 mph car crash and to extrapolate it as if the greater violence produced greater suffering. It is horrific to imagine, but the reality is that it was a slight flicker at the end of their conscious existence. It is sad for those left behind to have lost those they loved and cared about, but it is an especial cruelty of the lawyers to imply they suffered during the crash.

---

ET-302 MAX 8, 130 feet long, remove 30 feet for tail and nose ~100 feet passenger compartment. 700 mph => 1000 ft/sec so passenger compartment was involved for 0.1 second. Passengers evenly spaced 6 across = roughly 27 rows, so 0.1 sec/27 rows = 0.0037 seconds per row, going from 1000 ft/sec to 0 ft/sec. Since that 1000ft/sec happens in 0.0037 seconds that is just over 8,000 Gs. Nerve impulses travel at about 40 m/sec or 130 ft.sec, so the overall noticing from the first collision at the knees with the seat ahead advances at 14% the oncoming collision and never reaches the brain. At most the person at the back of the plane would not know about the collision for more than 1/10th of a second, about 3 frames in a typical movie projection.

Apparently the known highest G survivor:
The current record holder for surviving the most G’s in a crash is Kenny Bräck, who hit 214Gs for a few thousandths of a second in an Indy car crash in 2003
Kenny Bräck - Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenny_Br%C3%A4ck#Return_to_IRL)
He broke his sternum, back, a femur, crushed both ankles so badly that the track doctor was collecting pieces of bone and put them in plastic bags labeled Left and Right to send to the hospital, and was in general so bashed up that they didn’t discover several broken ribs until several weeks later.
https://www.quora.com/What-would-happen-to-human-body-at-100-G-force-and-how-much-can-be-reached

The ET-302 collision had 40 times higher accelerations than severly damaged Brack, followed in the next 0.0037 seconds by another similar load from the passenger behind them, all the way back, and less that 0.1 seconds later by the rear pressure wall of the 737 MAX and the equipment behind that. That force for a 200 pound person is 1.6 Million pounds.

DaveReidUK

20th Mar 2023, 08:12

The majority of the flight bounced around 1G; it was only the last 5 seconds that were below 0G.

The first negative g excursion was around 17 seconds before impact.

If I'd been a believer, I think I'd have started looking for my rosary at that point.

MechEngr

20th Mar 2023, 09:40

The first negative g excursion was around 17 seconds before impact.

If I'd been a believer, I think I'd have started looking for my rosary at that point.

It lasted for 5 seconds at ~-.4G and then returned to 1G before the final tip-over. Compare to the flight recently that shoved people hard enough into the overhead bins many popped open. Surprised? I'm sure, but unless that same surprise is action for millions of dollars in individual damages for clear air turbulence, it's not something that will be significant compared to thousands of prior turbulence events.

Compensation for emotional suffering by the families? Absolutely. Compensation for loss of companionship, loss of income? Without doubt.

But telling people their loved ones died in agony is cruel and untrue.

Were I in a similar situation I would likely just be saying "Sh*t, Sh*t, Sh*t, ..." all the way to the ground. Not panic - disappointment that I would not be going where I bought the ticket to go to. Having once narrowly avoided being decapitated in a traffic accident, I don't recall any more than some surprise at the sudden appearance of an obstacle at face height that, at the last second, swerved out of the way and was replaced by grass and several fence posts.

DaveReidUK

20th Mar 2023, 10:05

But telling people their loved ones died in agony is cruel and untrue.

Well yes and no.

Were I in a similar situation I would likely just be saying "Sh*t, Sh*t, Sh*t, ..." all the way to the ground. Not panic - disappointment that I would not be going where I bought the ticket to go to.

While I don't see anyone arguing that death was other than instantaneous upon impact, suggesting that exasperation accompanied by a few mild expletives was the strongest emotion felt by those on board in the seconds before they died seems rather unlikely.

megan

21st Mar 2023, 05:53

suggesting that exasperation accompanied by a few mild expletives was the strongest emotion felt by those on board in the seconds before they died seems rather unlikely.Absolutely Dave, I think the majority of pax these days are experienced enough with air travel to be aware that things are not proceeding normally, not gone back to the report, but sitting there for some minutes on a roller coaster ride with pitch and airspeed excursions is going to raise stress levels.

My dictionary defines “pain” as,

Noun – highly unpleasant physical sensation caused by illness or injury
Verb – cause mental or physical pain to

Knowing you’re about to die a violent death is going to bring about mental pain I would suggest, to the point of losing some bodily functions – heart attack, bowels, urinary, brought about by stress, in fact you don't even need the knowledge of pending death to bring about those results, sufficient stress is enough.

Willow :ok: for your contributions, thank you.

EDLB

21st Mar 2023, 06:47

So the next development will be that the AP will spear the plane in as soon as he detects that things go south, to save some bucks for the airplane manufacturer?

WHBM

21st Mar 2023, 08:01

"... and ultimately plummeted nose-down to the ground at terrifying speed.”
Nothing like a good "plummeted" in the lawyers' descriptions, as much loved by redtop journalists as well, when your percentage of the settlement is under threat ...

WillowRun 6-3

21st Mar 2023, 19:48

Resistance to commenting on this - to my mind anyway - surprising wrinkle in the lawsuit has crumbled. I may say something here that will be controversial, or even worse.

Not having worked many personal injury or wrongful death lawsuits in Illinois, I'll ignore the legal technicalities which appear to have been "in the conference room" when the manufacturer's defense attorneys decided to litigate this issue. My gut reaction to the story was.... disgust. Quickly followed by realizing some further cynicism would be in order here. I mean, after everything that's emerged about how and why the 737 MAX debacles happened, there is no objectivity, and there is no limit to the disgust.

As for the legal counsel representing the families, I think it's fair to say that the very successful (as in very, very) lead counsel does not have a reputation for making way-out arguments just to add to his net worth. He's successful way beyond that level. Which, however, doesn't answer the issue of what damages should be allowed....

Here's what bothers me the most. You're the PF or PM, and the event as documented by the flight recorders and as explained in the report (flawed as it may be) is unfolding, and as your "life flashes before your eyes" - that isn't pain? Or take another well-known air crash disaster: as American 191 indeed plummeted into Elk Grove Village, Illinois, just a short distance from the O'Hare runway where the engine on its left wing had separated, those aviators, stunned at what the airframe was doing, were not experiencing pain of impending, untimely death?

And let's not forget that airline pilots have come to be known as "drivers." I get in the driver's seat of my motor vehicle, buckle my safety belt, and at most I have 2 or 3 other people in the car. Aviators driving have hundreds in their flight vehicle. The drivers love to fly, and - not "but" - and it is an awesome responsibility. Seeing the ground rushing up, or the ocean, that isn't a "pain event" in the specific context of airline avaiatorship? Perhaps I'm romanticizing the commitment felt by drivers, but I will not accept the argument that it isn't excruciating when such an accident unfolds (even if it fails in a Chicago courtroom).

I hope it's not out-of-line improper to speak of the deceased pilots, in either crash. (The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" - its stall speed fatally altered unbeknownst to its drivers - haunts me... as a reason to keep trying to bump my career over into aviation law and policy, especially safety.)

Of course, what passengers experience is a different set of facts to a large extent. But not completely different. I hope the judge hearing this case has some very dedicated law clerks to explore the legal issues to assist the court in making a ruling. "Hard cases make bad law", so the saying goes, but it's up to the law clerks to move the court's thinking to a higher plane.

India Four Two

21st Mar 2023, 20:40

My gut reaction to the story was.... disgust.

Me too!

MechEngr

21st Mar 2023, 21:25

Some measure success by money. If it's pro-bono, then sure, but even then, is this case one in which the plaintiffs will be made whole or does this prolong their suffering so a lawyer can prove he can win? This isn't an additional action by the defense to claw back previous concessions. Consider this - Boeing is a company. It has no feelings. At best the disgust is for fellow lawyers hired to stop another cash settlement increase gained by furthering the pain of the plaintiffs. Did the plaintiffs' legal team tell them they would be made whole? Did they simply suggest that nebulous "We'll make Boeing pay!"

The pain the ET-302 pilots felt was due entirely to mishandling. The event had previously proven to be easily controllable; it was far from inevitable, as losing an engine, half the hydraulics, and an asymmetric portion of the lift enhancement system was.

The pilots of American 191 had not been handed a playbook 5 months ahead of the crash. If they had they would have refused to even operate the plane. Clearly no aircraft would be operated with an engine missing and half the hydraulics eliminated. I doubt the pilots of that flight were stunned - that they in fact were working to solve a problem and not mentally incapacitated.

"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?

Because Ethiopia benefited from the crash we will never know how it came to be that those two pilots mishandled the stall warning (before, and not part of MCAS) and then the MCAS reaction, both required memory item lists. What is interesting is the composition of the ET-302 crew was very similar to the Lion Air accident crew - long time NG pilot paired with a low-hour first officer. Why was that combination assigned a plane that had a world-wide known adverse reaction to a sensor defect; a reaction that can be easily seen by the trim wheel continuing to turn long after it would normally stop and felt by the increased trim forces that were easily countered with a thumb switch, when neither of them had demonstrated an ability to do so?

Whatever the motive, this action cannot cause Boeing to hurt and cannot give anyone their loved ones back. The only winners will be lawyers on both sides and Ethiopia.

WillowRun 6-3

21st Mar 2023, 23:18

I didn't say mentally incapacitated. I said they experienced pain of awareness of imminent, untimely death. And all the more so, based on the dedication and commitment to safe flight operations which they assuredly held as they attained their positions.
As to the airframe, I quoted an aviator who had posted that information (on an unrelated thread) and in fact has posted on this one. Of course, "flyable" - if they knew what had gone wrong with the airplane. That should be obvious.

If you want to believe that the difficulties of corruption or heaven knows what else claimed to be wrong in Ethiopia means that those two pilots did not experience pain of imminent, untimely death - feel free. And also obviously, the point was, and is, that awareness of imminent, untimely death does cause pain, perhaps not like a root canal, but not unknown in the law.

And not least, lead counsel is quite accomplished in lawyering stuff. I'm not sure that your knowledge of same is any better than my own essentially non-existent knowledge of Mechanical Engineering.

Big Pistons Forever

22nd Mar 2023, 16:58

Nothing can bring back the dead passengers but a monetary settlement is a way to in measurable and well understood terms, to acknowledge and atone for wrong doing. I do not see how anybody could argue that there was NOT a significant period of time, perhaps 17 seconds, where the passengers must have known they were likely to die. That mental anguish has to qualify as pain and suffering in my opinion.

My point, however is that this is a chance for Boeing to reset their sadly battered image. Yes it will cost them money but acknowledging the pain and suffering shows there is some humanity in corporate America. Digging in to fight this to the bitter end just looks bad and shrieks of the kind of short term thinking that permeates Boeing and is responsible for breaking the greatest civil aviation manufacturer that ever existed.

And yes I get that there is undoubtedly some unseemly lawyer money grubbing going on, but the lawyers negligence didn't kill all those people, Boeing's negligence did.

WillowRun 6-3

22nd Mar 2023, 17:54

What Big Pistons said, yes.

Only point I see as necessary to add is that plaintiffs' attorneys, if they are to stand even a slight chance against the Big-Law machines that represent corporate defendants particularly in litigation with massive reach like this case, need resources to carry the fight. The plaintiffs have the burden of proof. Fulfilling it, and doing so against Big-Law (and its connectedness sometimes), requires resources. I won't drift the thread (more) relating about "litigation reform" and "loser pays lawyer fees" initiatives - the resources to fight the depths of Boeing's pockets had to be on hand at the start and had to come from someplace along the attorneys' prior engagements.

MechEngr

22nd Mar 2023, 21:51

WillowRun 6-3

22nd Mar 2023, 23:14

On money damages and human life: actually there is rational process. In exchange for waiving rights to litigate their claims arising from the 9/11 terrorist hijackings and crashes, the victims' families presented their claims to a unique type of neutral arbiter under a "special claims process" (the exact nomenclature might be slightly different). This also was the process for claims resulting from the oil-drilling rig disaster, Deepwater Horizon.

The process isn't presented as exact. But in these mass torts - highly notorious instances of liabilities - the work of the designated claims adjudicator has been - unless I've missed some big news - widely accepted. The work done by Ken Feinberg in both matters (and others) didn't purport either to be precise or to bleed corporate defendants into oblivion.

So I'll disagree that the claims at issue in the case in Chicago are mere exercises in excess, or whatever other derision sought to be given to them.

But as to the culpability of the national government in that country, rather than Boeing, perhaps the company should have retained a person with both the insight and knowledge you advocate, in its p.r., lobbying, expert witness cadre, or even at counsel table. Candidly I'm not sure you could find any international civil aviation litigation attorneys who - outside of advocating for a client or for their own practices - would agree that a corrupt government, as you assert, replaces as the legally responsible party the grossly negligent manufacturer. Perhaps at some upcoming professional conference someplace, some worthy on the big-ticket air crash litigation circuit will advocate your corrupt Ethiopian government theory of the case, .... or even mention this thread in the "hallway networking."

As to AA 191, see please the NTSB report (1979), pp. 22-25, describing results of simulator tests.

tdracer

22nd Mar 2023, 23:30

As to AA 191, see please the NTSB report (1979), pp. 22-25, describing results of simulator tests.

Apples and Oranges.
Ethiopian was flyable using the processes and techniques that Boeing had recommended (as one of the Indonesian crews had demonstrated) - something that the pilots failed to do for whatever reason.
The AA 191 DC-10 was NOT flyable using the processes and techniques that were recommended at that time. Yes, it was flyable - but not with the processes and techniques that the manufacturer recommended, and the crew had been trained with. The crew followed their training to the letter - training that did not account for the type of failure they experienced which had dramatically altered the stall characteristics of the aircraft.

WillowRun 6-3

22nd Mar 2023, 23:38

megan

23rd Mar 2023, 01:00

Willow, had a work colleague on the Chicago DC-10.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1200x958/psa_flight_182_crash_1_ad2b67daf0fb598f0283816780db5caccaff0 282.jpg

PSA Flight 182 CVR unknown voice - Ma, I love ya

MechEngr

23rd Mar 2023, 09:42

Quite.
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"

The ET-302 pilots responsible for failing to follow ANY of the recommendations? Are you asking if I care what they felt? I cannot care what a driver feels just before blasting into the side of a church school bus, causing it to burst into flames, killing all involved when earlier that same driver was told their brakes were faulty and to either drive at a reduced speed or not at all. I bet the pilots of PIA 8303 had similar feelings as they cruised into a residential area.

Damages for the pilots and cabin crew of ET-302 are an employer problem.

The pilots of AA-191 lost key controls available to normal flight. ET-302 did not. The pilots of AA-191 had no warning of what could happen and what could be done. ET-302 crew had every bit of information required. The pilots of AA-191 did not take actions that demonstrably made the situation worse. On ET-302 almost every step was witer a half-measure or made it worse.

Yeah - I know about the simulator testing - where they worked out that if the AA-191 pilots knew the exact configuration of the plane that they might have recovered, but the pilots in the crash did not have that preparation. But that report includes the following:

"Under these circumstances, none of the pilots believed it was reasonable to expect the flightcrew of Flight 191 to react in the same manner as did the simulator pilots who were aware of Flight 191's profile and were able to recover from the stall."

In other words, having been told about the condition the subsequent pilots expected to survive. Told, just like ET-302 pilots were told, or should have been told by their employer. If there was concern for their passengers, they (the pilots and the company and the CAA) had roughly 5 months to work out how to follow the memory list items for the stall warning and then the MCAS increments. If they didn't care about the passengers before that, it also doesn't matter to me what they thought during.

In fact, isn't it a tremendous moral hazard to shield people from responsibility? Boeing has already admitted fault but ...

Boeing took the hit as the alternative was to tell Ethiopia they would never be sold another plane, particularly after Ethiopia immediately misrepresented the event to the public, a case you refuse to acknowledge by deflecting. Ethiopia absolved Boeing of all blame by purchasing more 737 MAX aircraft, though no doubt benefiting Ethiopia from discounts due to the adverse publicity from the misrepresentation.

The plaintiff lawyer might know this, but there is the saying "A man will not admit knowing when his job depends on him not knowing" so I expect no acknowledgement either way.

But this is America, where even now the US Supreme Court, with hundreds or thousands of cases submitted, chose to spend their day hearing about a disagreement between a maker of a dog chew toy and a maker of a toxic drink. I wonder, what will Justice Kavanaugh have to say? We know he likes beer. 16 years ago, Louis Vuitton lost a similar suit against another dog chew-toy company at the Federal level.

fdr

23rd Mar 2023, 13:18

Ok then - as soon as this latest action was brought, Boeing should have offered $1 Billion per passenger and $1 Billion per extended family member. Wipe the company clean, all the retirement funds, every supplier, every employee bankrupted, and pull Boeing as manufacturer of record for every plane they have built. This will wipe out American and Southwest and maybe even Ethiopian. Revenge will only be complete when Boeing no longer exists.

But is $1 Billion each enough? Maybe it should be more.

Because pain is immeasurable and cannot be offset with cash, the families will still hurt - and they will always hurt. And this latest legal action will not extinguish that pain - it will enhance it. Both sides representing this are cynical and cruel. Neither side will admit a dollar value to place on human life. They each have a number, but they know that making that evaluation is morally corrupt. If the defense makes an offer, the plaintiffs will reject it as "too little." So they intend to compel a jury to make that decision for them, a jury forced to take the immoral task of picking a monetary value for human life and human suffering.

I see no mention of that monetary value here either. Why not?

I agree - it "looks bad" because that is the goal of the plaintiffs lawyers. They made an infinite demand without evidence. What would the typical reaction be?

I don't question lead counsel's ability. His is an appealing, if lacking in concrete evidence, argument, the sort lawyers are rewarded for making. And it is helped that it is fueled by outrage from a false story - of brave pilots doing everything correctly and per the procedures and still the plane's control was wrested from them as certainly as if the wings had been cut off. Based on that falsehood there could be only one source of the event.

The claims for Ethiopia are heavily weighed by their acceptance and operation of a plane with a known defect by pilots never trained to manage the documented defect, nor for management of long recognized, unrelated problems. We could know exactly the names of the people who made that sequence of decisions, perhaps discover the reasons they had. But there's no money to be had from them.

"(The fact that the DC-10 was a "perfectly flyable airframe" ... " It was not - why this gross misrepresentation?

Apples and Oranges.
Ethiopian was flyable using the processes and techniques that Boeing had recommended (as one of the Indonesian crews had demonstrated) - something that the pilots failed to do for whatever reason.
The AA 191 DC-10 was NOT flyable using the processes and techniques that were recommended at that time. Yes, it was flyable - but not with the processes and techniques that the manufacturer recommended, and the crew had been trained with. The crew followed their training to the letter - training that did not account for the type of failure they experienced which had dramatically altered the stall characteristics of the aircraft.

Quite.
I only referred to 191 for the point that awareness of imminent and untimely death is a form of damage that could be compensated at law. The detailed discussions of what the ET302 passengers experienced led me to think, "wonder what the state of mind was of those aviators in Chicago as the final moments flashed before them - would they not have experienced something quite similar to the type of pain at issue in this case?"

If I may,

WR 6-3 is making a comment on 191 and in a perfect world, with better information to the crew, the aircraft was indeed able to fly, but the crew were not in possession of that information, and they followed accurately their training, and that failure in SA that had nothing to do with the crew put a flyable aircraft into an impossible position.

ME & TD, your objections are valid, but WR's indication of the importance of information to the crew to permit them to effect a viable response is indicative of the complex nature of aviation.

In 191's case, the lack of cues to the condition of the left slat, and the abruptness of the subsequent stall on one wing only was not the crews fault, all 3 of you believe that, it is the NTSBs findings and it happens to have the weight of truth. The 191 case is germane in the same way as 302 and co are to the question of crew comprehension, and that leads to the emotional trauma inflicted on the crew as well as all others on board. I personally think the emotional harm in those seconds to. a crew that have an absolute comprehension that the aircraft they are responsible for along with the welfare of all on board, is about to be destroyed, they know with certainty what is about to occur and would know that their endeavours for reasons they usually do not fully comprehend, is going to fail. There is extreme mental pain in that, mercifully only for a short period of time.

As for Boeing, it is time to eject their corporate management that has destroyed the fabric of a once proud and capable engineering company while chasing short term values to boost their own pocket change. The takeover of Boeing by MDD management, those that had led MDD from being a pioneer to a corruption plagued company, who then oversaw the corruption of Boeing from 95 onwards, they need to be sacked wholesale, and held accountable for the damage. The debacle has cost Boeing billions, and yet they cannot find the moral fortitude to give generously to the victims of their negligence, which stems from the greed and short sighted policies of the company. That there would be a disaster such as this was forewarned by the disgusting action that Boeing took against the QA staff that identified the falsification of production on the B737NG back in the early 2000's, where the ring frames were disclosed to Boeing management as being falsely produced by hand instead of complying with the CNC production, a method that Boeing demanded and got an extended fatigue life for the B737 for. The corruption of that included the mute accessory to the falsification by the FAA, and the courts, the pillars of jurisprudence, dismissing the suits by the QA staff who were sacked by Boeing for doing their job.

alf5071h

23rd Mar 2023, 18:45

The 'pain' of impending death appears to be unique to US law.

Many years ago, shortly after the law was introduced, as an expert witness to illustrate what might have been perceived and when - seen, felt, heard, etc, based on the flight path relative to geographic location, interpreted from the FDR; … CFIT
The likelihood of perception (human aspects) was to be judged by the court re timing, context, and individual personal aspects.

There appeared to be a wide range in perception; flight crew quickly, attempted recovery action and voice.
A flight attendant less so; a jump seat view vs cabin, but greater than passengers, but all ranging across individual effects of expectation from previous flight experiences, or even novice fear of flying.
Thus whilst the time period in which the fear of impending death was not clearly identifiable, it was concluded more likely to be in the range of consciousness for everyone.

The aviation content of this discussion is related to situation awareness as outlined by Endsley in 'Design for Situation Awareness' - Theoretical Underpinnings.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mica-Endsley/publication/238653506_Designing_for_situation_awareness_in_complex_syste m/links/542b1ada0cf29bbc126a7f35/Designing-for-situation-awareness-in-complex-system.pdf?origin=publication_detail

And for those who may have to judge, or choose to do so with hindsight - previous posts; see 'Human and organizational biases affecting the management of safety' - 2. Beliefs about the nature of human behavior.
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Carl-Rollenhagen/publication/236597701_Human_and_organizational_biases_affecting_the_mana gement_of_safety/links/5a05a9e2458515eddb894e95/Human-and-organizational-biases-affecting-the-management-of-safety.pdf?origin=publication_detail
,

DaveReidUK

24th Mar 2023, 07:39

The 'pain' of impending death appears to be unique to US law.,

No, it isn't.

MechEngr

24th Mar 2023, 13:44

fdr

24th Mar 2023, 21:51

As to situational awareness, from that link to Endsley:

"In actual practice, however, long term memory structures can be used to circumvent the limitations of working memory. "

"Where scripts, set sequences of actions, have been developed for given situation conditions, much of the load on working memory for generating alternate behaviors and selecting among them is also diminished."

"Of prime importance is that this process can be almost instantaneous due to the superior abilities of human pattern matching mechanisms."

Where does the responsibility to commit sequences of actions and the underlying patterns to long term memory lie?
What if those materials were labeled as "Memory Items"? Should the users be expected to memorize them in proximity to a disaster that occurred recently?
What if the airline, recognizing they had taken no relevant training action or confirmation action, had parked the plane until Boeing produced the updated software or the pilots demonstrated what Endsley said was the appropriate action for them to have taken?

In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.

Am a fan of Mica's work, and the rest of the gang that have been dealing with ADM, NDM and SA for many years, enough to have had direct dialogue. If operational safety is to improve, it will likely come from better SA awareness & training in SA loss recognition and recovery, and analysis in events.

The decision making heuristics that give timely responses are great, when we are responding in a correct manner to the condition that exists, when we have failed to detect the problem, or incorrectly assumed consequence to that problem, then the training needs to have a pretty fast OODA like cycle embedded in it, that if doing what we think is the solution is not working, check again what the problem is, and then apply a response. In time critical situations, there is limited time to get a determination that what we are doing ain't working, so what we though was the case may not be so, or the intervention we apply was not as good as we expected it to be. If the review (we apply "confirmations", and for a rather high number of cases, "the verbal confirmation done ain't worth the paper it's not printed on....") is flawed, the response is likely to be flawed. The response can independently be incorrect, or not the sole option the pilot has. 90% of the time in the simulator covers "stuff" that is pure box ticking, covering day to day operations. The sim time applied to improving the decision making and SA awareness of the pilot is still underrepresented. Such training can be done effectively by PTT, or FBT, and is not a box tick, it is experiential expansion of the skills of the crew member.

A320LGW

25th Mar 2023, 01:20

What is interesting is the composition of the ET-302 crew was very similar to the Lion Air accident crew - long time NG pilot paired with a low-hour first officer. Why was that combination assigned a plane that had a world-wide known adverse reaction to a sensor defect; a reaction that can be easily seen by the trim wheel continuing to turn long after it would normally stop and felt by the increased trim forces that were easily countered with a thumb switch, when neither of them had demonstrated an ability to do so?

Both pilots demonstrated an ability to do so in their sim training, hence why they occupied those seats. What you mean to say is why did startle factor get the better of them in the moment. We can all sit here in our comfy armchairs and point fingers, but until you've had all the bells and whistles go off, you have no idea how you would react.

It is my understanding that the ET crew did actually do what was required of them to recover initially, what killed them was re-engaging the stab trim switches .. a fatal move indeed.

As for crew composition, I think that's irrelevant, and if anything, the finger should be pointed at Boeing even more. On a worldwide scale (with the exception of the US), the 737 is typically flown by relatively young captains with new first officers, for many of whom it's their first rating. Boeing knew this and it's nothing unique to ET or Lion. It makes unleashing a system with such deadly latent threats/faults look to be even more criminal.