Boeing 737 Max Recertification Testing - Finally.

[WideScreen]

.....
In hindsight it was a terrible idea to allow the AoA system to produce valid, but incorrect AoA data. In hindsight it was terrible the FAA approved that.
Sure, though that was 50+ years ago, such a concept was completely normal in those days and got inherited based with the original airframe, etc.

One of the many, many reasons, this whole B737 should never have reached the MAX version. This looks "hindsight", though a proper engineering company would understand the whole B737 design had become obsolete and should not be given another life-extension.

[WideScreen]

....
At the time of ET-302 it wasn't a latent defect. It was clearly exposed.

No, it wasn't.

The instructions only worked, when it was immediately recognized what the issue was. After that, the airplane was doomed.

The Boeing instructions not even considered the aspect of delayed recognition of the problem.

You know, there are reasons why the B737MAX was grounded for 18+ months (and in China 2+ years):

THERE ARE NO SUITABLE INSTRUCTIONS POSSIBLE to realistically overcome the AoA vane mishap.

IIRC later on, in a flight simulator, experienced pilots did have to react within 4 seconds after an AoA vane mishap, to be able to save the aircraft.

[fdr]

No, it wasn't.

The instructions only worked, when it was immediately recognized what the issue was. After that, the airplane was doomed.

The Boeing instructions not even considered the aspect of delayed recognition of the problem.

You know, there are reasons why the B737MAX was grounded for 18+ months (and in China 2+ years):

THERE ARE NO SUITABLE INSTRUCTIONS POSSIBLE to realistically overcome the AoA vane mishap.

IIRC later on, in a flight simulator, experienced pilots did have to react within 4 seconds after an AoA vane mishap, to be able to save the aircraft.


We may need to go back to the AOM and AD to confirm exactly what the exact wording was, however, the system logic, flawed as it was, would not be unrecoverable if the crews had been given enough information to counter a runaway trim in the first instance with a manual trim input to ensure that the trim returned to a normal range, before the STAB CUTOUT SW....... CUTOUT was selected. If the first action was to go to CUTOUT before putting the aircraft into an "in trim" condition, then, yes, it was possible that the speed, trim and residual elevator authority in conjunction with the minimal torque available by the manual trim wheel for a severe out of trim case, would result in a stabiliser that would overpower the manual trim system unless the elevators were unloaded, a technique which is pretty exciting for the passengers and pilots alike to see the world big in their windows. IIRC, the AD included comments related to being in trim, but did not at any time expand on the criticality of that action, and the industry awareness of the limitation of 60's accepted trim architecture that barely had a fully compliant backup in the absence of the knowledge related to being out of trim v manual trim torque constraints.... this was an ill considered document, and had potential to result in a bad outcome, blaming the ET302 pilot for merely being a pilot and not being Tex Watson is hardly the standard of excellence that the Old Boeing, pre contamination with MDD management, "The New Boeing" the one that sacked QA managers for doing their job, that managed systems that resulted in fasteners on the B787 being a different size on the east coast and west coast... (Coriolis?) who gave the MCAS, the KC46 debacles, VOL I and VOL II, and generally messed up a proud company... yeah.

The weasel words applied did not make it easy for a crew confronted with a change that was very recent and which had not been trained or explained in depth to the flight crew.

The evidence is that of the 3 events, the one the sector prior to Lion Airs splash, and the ET302 one, where 2 of those beat the driver, and one driver set had the new instructions, it would seem to have been quite reasonably, nay, necessary to go back and sort it out at fort fumble.

All Corporate management of TBC since 1995 bears responsibility for the damage imposed to the engineering reputation of that company, and should be held accountable, their actions damaged shareholder value and there was repeated evidence that they were heading into the weeds in their myopic management practices.

[WideScreen]

We may need to go back to the AOM and AD to confirm exactly what the exact wording was, however, the system logic, flawed as it was, would not be unrecoverable if the crews had been given enough information to counter a runaway trim in the first instance with a manual trim input to ensure that the trim returned to a normal range, before the STAB CUTOUT SW....... CUTOUT was selected. If the first action was to go to CUTOUT before putting the aircraft into an "in trim" condition, then, yes, it was possible that the speed, trim and residual elevator authority in conjunction with the minimal torque available by the manual trim wheel for a severe out of trim case, would result in a stabiliser that would overpower the manual trim system unless the elevators were unloaded, a technique which is pretty exciting for the passengers and pilots alike to see the world big in their windows. IIRC, the AD included comments related to being in trim, but did not at any time expand on the criticality of that action, and the industry awareness of the limitation of 60's accepted trim architecture that barely had a fully compliant backup in the absence of the knowledge related to being out of trim v manual trim torque constraints.... this was an ill considered document, and had potential to result in a bad outcome, blaming the ET302 pilot for merely being a pilot and not being Tex Watson is hardly the standard of excellence that the Old Boeing, pre contamination with MDD management, "The New Boeing" the one that sacked QA managers for doing their job, that managed systems that resulted in fasteners on the B787 being a different size on the east coast and west coast... (Coriolis?) who gave the MCAS, the KC46 debacles, VOL I and VOL II, and generally messed up a proud company... yeah.
Yep, it WAS recoverable, when diagnosed properly right away (IE, just upfront know what was going to happen, the yearly sim session). Diagnose fast and react fast, and the official Boeing procedure would work. Be not 100% prepared (and as such react slow), things get hairy. When the AP drops out, together with the cockpit cacophony, things get confusing right away, and it is pretty likely, an out of trim situation will not be the first priority (normally only a nuisance, though requiring attention to get a proper trim balance), to correct. And once you have 20 kg out of trim yoke force, it takes a lot of trim time to get neutral. Combine that with the picky situation, that the B737 nicely goes easily way out of trim in the other direction (Rostov-on-Don) and it is certainly understandable, that all but very experienced pilots are hesitating to keep trimming (The Lion air 2-nd attempt and maybe ET302 too).

We should not forget, a Parkinson alike trim usage would save the show, though that was left out of the Boeing documentation, maybe, because it was unknown, or just, because that would bring a significant change in the trim-computer to light and require the additional training ?

The weasel words applied did not make it easy for a crew confronted with a change that was very recent and which had not been trained or explained in depth to the flight crew.

The evidence is that of the 3 events, the one the sector prior to Lion Airs splash, and the ET302 one, where 2 of those beat the driver, and one driver set had the new instructions, it would seem to have been quite reasonably, nay, necessary to go back and sort it out at fort fumble. ?

All Corporate management of TBC since 1995 bears responsibility for the damage imposed to the engineering reputation of that company, and should be held accountable, their actions damaged shareholder value and there was repeated evidence that they were heading into the weeds in their myopic management practices.
Yep, how to make a company great again, get Trump style leadership !

[Loose rivets]

Being an old retired guy, I had the time to read in on every post in PPRuNe's threads (plural). It was a long haul and would take a month . . . or two, to summarise.

Just a few memories to ponder, in no particular order:-

I found what might be the only mention of MCAS in a South American pilot's handbook. Four or five shortened lines on a right hand page. It was found by chance. When I posted it on PPRuNe folk looked at my link, but as I recall, no one had found another reference to MCAS world-wide. (as of back then)

The Ethiopian captain might well have been more affected by the chaos having had minimal and vague explanations of a mysterious system. One thing that would be burning into his brain would have been that the other aircraft crashed. This is not just an idle response to an above post, but something I pursued at length back then. I still doubt that any instruction in that 5 months was equivalent to part of a type rating written.

"it's as though STS is working in reverse". An odd quote - more indicative of the pilot's state of mind than reasoned systems analysis.

That nine second MCAS pitch down run.

After some considerable time, Sully's quote. "That could have claimed me."

My own self-opinionated original thoughts . . . slowly weighed down by the vivid descriptions of chaotic sights and sounds. Memories of how distracting 20 mins of stick-shaker had been for me. Just the stick-shaker, everything else spot on normal. Later, I was astonished at how it had soaked into my brain.

World wide lack of awareness about the Toronto 707 hand cranking - and how close it had been to disaster. And now the 47' horizontal stabilizer has to be cranked by a wheel with a smaller radius. This is not a linear burden.

Not our members of course, but an almost world-wide lack of understanding about losing the Pickle Switch function after switching the two switches that all good pilots would have switched - and doing it in a microsecond.

For weeks on Quora I posted much what I'd learned on PPRuNe. I had to be careful, for some hours there was just me, thousands of hits world wide. Some Boeing skippers let us know how American pilots would have done it. Soon everyone and their uncle was a Boeing MAX instructor. The point of all this is the confusion. I'd take an hour to write a few lines, yet still manage to confuse someone. Good reporting certainly deserved that Pulitzer Prize.

[FullWings]

What struck me at the time was that there wasn’t an immediate trigger for action in the way the fault presented itself. The 737 trim is active all the time during flight; in fact it is unusual for the trim wheels to *not* be in motion for any length of time. STS, MCAS, config changes, CofG changes, etc.

The Boeing checklist trigger for trim runaway at the time was “continuous uncommanded trim motion”, which guards against an electromechanical runaway, but that wasn’t what happened - it was a software failure that only moved the trim under certain circumstances. How could you tell the difference between, say, STS doing its job and and an MCAS failure? The answer is, in the short term you couldn't, and abnormal operation appeared the same as normal operation unless you had a long diagnosis period, by which time it was too late.

[Loose rivets]

I wish I'd written that.

[MechEngr]

What struck me at the time was that there wasn’t an immediate trigger for action in the way the fault presented itself. The 737 trim is active all the time during flight; in fact it is unusual for the trim wheels to *not* be in motion for any length of time. STS, MCAS, config changes, CofG changes, etc.

The Boeing checklist trigger for trim runaway at the time was “continuous uncommanded trim motion”, which guards against an electromechanical runaway, but that wasn’t what happened - it was a software failure that only moved the trim under certain circumstances. How could you tell the difference between, say, STS doing its job and and an MCAS failure? The answer is, in the short term you couldn't, and abnormal operation appeared the same as normal operation unless you had a long diagnosis period, by which time it was too late.

STS tries to ensure that the trim load is zero. This is why the Lion Air crew reported of MCAS "STS is running backwards" because it was adding to the trim load and not making it go away. The fact that an unexpected 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 ,60 pounds of trim load was on the wheel is enough to tell there is a trim problem and using the wheel trim switch countered the trim load occurred to the first Lion Air crew and the captain of the second Lion Air crew, who apparently thought using it was obvious enough he didn't mention it to the First Officer.

How would the crew know there was an electromechanical failure? Do they rip the wiring apart looking for the short circuit before turning off the trim switches? How long is "continuous?" STS doesn't run at top speed for 30 solid seconds, which is more than enough to put 100 pounds on the wheel. Trim will stop at the upper or lower limits of travel, so by definition it cannot be "continuous." I had a recent electrical issue in my house - power would cut out and come back on - from a loose wire at the distribution transformer waving in the breeze and sometimes making a short circuit to ground. If a similar situation happened, intermittent, but interfering trim problem by wiring defect, say by chafing, or a loose bit of solder in a trim switch, would that also be a hands-up, cannot be solved situation?

[India Four Two]

The 737 trim is active all the time during flight; in fact it is unusual for the trim wheels to *not* be in motion for any length of time.

That was the one thing that surprised me many years ago when I had a jumpseat ride in a 200 - the almost continual noisy motion of the trim wheels.

[FullWings]

STS tries to ensure that the trim load is zero. This is why the Lion Air crew reported of MCAS "STS is running backwards" because it was adding to the trim load and not making it go away. The fact that an unexpected 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 ,60 pounds of trim load was on the wheel is enough to tell there is a trim problem and using the wheel trim switch countered the trim load occurred to the first Lion Air crew and the captain of the second Lion Air crew, who apparently thought using it was obvious enough he didn't mention it to the First Officer.

How would the crew know there was an electromechanical failure? Do they rip the wiring apart looking for the short circuit before turning off the trim switches? How long is "continuous?" STS doesn't run at top speed for 30 solid seconds, which is more than enough to put 100 pounds on the wheel. Trim will stop at the upper or lower limits of travel, so by definition it cannot be "continuous." I had a recent electrical issue in my house - power would cut out and come back on - from a loose wire at the distribution transformer waving in the breeze and sometimes making a short circuit to ground. If a similar situation happened, intermittent, but interfering trim problem by wiring defect, say by chafing, or a loose bit of solder in a trim switch, would that also be a hands-up, cannot be solved situation?
I am trying to point out that the initial symptoms of the MCAS failure were, for all intents and purposes, so similar to normal operation of the trim system that it wouldn’t immediately trigger a SOP disconnect of power to the stabiliser. It ran for a bit, then stopped, then did some more, and was able to be countered by use of the manual trim switches. None of that screams “runaway” until you look at it post-hoc with system knowledge that was not disseminated to line crews at the time.

A (plausible) electromechanical failure would be when nothing you can do with the normal flight deck controls can stop the trim running in a particular direction, so swift intervention is necessary before it goes to the stops. On my current type (777) you get a warning as soon as the monitoring picks this up. If you disconnect the trim every time it moves automatically, you’d do it shortly after takeoff on every flight. There is no indication to the pilots as to whether it’s MCAS, STS or even the other pilot doing the trimming, apart from the speed, and that doesn’t really help much; an intermittent fault would, again, look like normal operation until it really showed its hand.

In a critical, high workload phase of flight, near the ground, experiencing something novel that doesn’t easily categorise and requires cognition and an accurate mental systems model (not present, through no fault of the pilots) to diagnose would confuse even experienced operators. That’s why we use rule-based behaviour for Time Critical Events, such as RTO, GPWS, Windshear and Trim Runaway, but these are triggered by specific criteria which are learnt and practiced by rote because there is not time for pontification. Sadly, I think the accident crews never really got beyond the startle/react phase as there were too many audible, tactile and mental distractions to allow much in the way of a diagnostic loop to develop.

[Big Pistons Forever]

Sadly, I think the accident crews never really got beyond the startle/react phase as there were too many audible, tactile and mental distractions to allow much in the way of a diagnostic loop to develop.

I think this is a very important part of the issue that doesn't get enough attention. The pilot was not just dealing with a sudden change in pitch forces caused by MCAS, he was also dealing with stick shaker activation and multiple alarms. He had only seconds to correctly identify the cause, MCAS activation, before the airplane became unrecoverable. The truly tragic aspect of this is that due to Boeing butt covering they were not provided with the information they needed. I can almost see the Lion Air crash as a case where the engineering swiss cheese holes lined up without any one person being in a position to have enough information to say definitely "this needs to be fixed". However everything about the single point of failure = likely loss of control due to MCAS was known by the time of the Ethiopian accident, and yet Boeing minimized the problem because they did not want to admit any liability and pay for the cost of correcting the problem. It was only when another plane load of people died were they forced to act.

Since with Boeing it is all about the dollars, maybe they should have thought of the old adage "If you think paying for safety is expensive, try paying for the accident"

[WillowRun 6-3]

STS tries to ensure that the trim load is zero. This is why the Lion Air crew reported of MCAS "STS is running backwards" because it was adding to the trim load and not making it go away. The fact that an unexpected 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 ,60 pounds of trim load was on the wheel is enough to tell there is a trim problem and using the wheel trim switch countered the trim load occurred to the first Lion Air crew and the captain of the second Lion Air crew, who apparently thought using it was obvious enough he didn't mention it to the First Officer.


Or: "who for some reason didn't mention it to the F/O, possibly out of growing startle reaction, or because he thought it was obvious enough"?
Serious question, I'm not arguing that "it was obvious enough" was not the reason, rather asking whether it's a necessary inference?

[Loose rivets]

Handing over to the FO to free up a bit of brain-load and he doesn't do the one thing - use the Pickle Switches - that might well have given the clue how to save the aircraft.


Originally Posted by MechEngr View Post (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/633660-boeing-737-max-recertification-testing-finally.html#post11409323)
STS tries to ensure that the trim load is zero. This is why the Lion Air crew reported of MCAS "STS is running backwards" because it was adding to the trim load and not making it go away.

An important point. Would the captain be referring to the load while hand flying, or just the spin direction of the manual trim wheel? My highlight.

PPRuNe 2nd Nov 2018 . . . The purpose of the STS is to return the airplane to a trimmed speed by commanding the stabilizer in a direction opposite the speed change . . .

The speed of course was a bit of electronic guesswork by then.

[megan]

FullWings, your post #1010 is the most succinct explanation of the state of affairs the crew faced that I've seen. :ok:

[MechEngr]

Loose rivets, OK - been reading a lot more.

The speed target for STS appears to be either a previously set speed or the speed the plane was going when a pilot last let off the trim switch - sounds like an action similar to cruise control in a car. Lock it in at a set speed, but if I trim that speed up or down, the cruise control uses that new speed. However, it's smarter in that one of the problems is needing to handle the undamped phugoid which it does by reacting more quickly than the natural oscillation of the plane.

From the 737 page Flight Controls (http://www.b737.org.uk/flightcontrols.htm#Stab_Trim) :

Speed trim is applied to the stabilizer automatically at low speed, low weight, aft C of G and high thrust. Sometimes you may notice that the speed trim is trimming in the opposite direction to you, this is because the speed trim is trying to trim the stabilizer in the direction calculated to provide the pilot with positive speed stability characteristics. The speed trim system adjusts stick force so the pilot must provide significant amount of pull force to reduce airspeed or a significant amount of push force to increase airspeed. Whereas, pilots are typically trying to trim the stick force to zero. Occasionally these may be in opposition.

Per https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/614997-b-737-speed-trim-system-3.html#post10312888
By the sounds of everything, the Cessna 172 behaves the same way: When you get off the trim speed, a stick force develops. The STS only increases this stick force because otherwise it's too weak to meet certification.

From that thread - it was to solve the problem that at aft CG and high thrust there isn't enough trim reaction force to meet the minimum gradient of 3 pounds per 1 Degree AoA change. If the CG was at the Center of Pressure no stick force is required for any AoA change - hence this moves the trim opposite to the pilot input as the CG approaches that (hopefully unreached) condition. That is, if the pilot pulls back to slow the plane the STS supplies nose down trim to encourage the pilot to speed it back up.

---
It appears the effect of STS should have been to push the nose up as the plane accelerated and MCAS was pushing the nose down; the opposite. While STS doesn't move to relieve trim loads, it moves to reset the speed to where the trim load is zero unless the pilot is pulling or pushing.

[WideScreen]

.....
Sadly, I think the accident crews never really got beyond the startle/react phase as there were too many audible, tactile and mental distractions to allow much in the way of a diagnostic loop to develop.
It's not only the overloading cockpit cacophony, but also the conflicting alarms in itself (IE over speed and stall warning at the same time, and probably some more), as well, the AP dropping out and the friendly "you have control" to the pilot(s). All at the same time. Go figure.

And with the stick-shaker shaking your teeth out, there is little muscle tension monitoring capacity left, to determine, whether the aircraft is out of trim, until the yoke forces get in the order of magnitude of the stick-shaker forces. This happens in seconds, so yeah, before you realize it, the yoke force gets immense and the whole beyond recovery.

[WideScreen]

.....
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It appears the effect of STS should have been to push the nose up as the plane accelerated and MCAS was pushing the nose down;
......

I have my serious doubts about that. MCAS overrules STS, otherwise the MCAS would never have the opportunity to do its intended work (MCAS as well as MCAS-2).

[MechEngr]

I didn't say it did. Perhaps I need more words. Let me clarify to unwind your concern.

The effect expected by the pilot from STS was to push the nose up and, instead, MCAS pushed the nose down, appearing to the pilot that it was operating opposite which would have been reason for reporting it that way to maintenance.

[Loose rivets]

I went back to the 2nd Nov 18 and read ManaAdaSystem (https://www.pprune.org/members/20211-manaadasystem) with more care. His paste is from an FCOM? Must be right, surely? Gasp! This is exactly the kind of answer chatCPT churns out when it runs out of specific knowledge. (chatCPT can become the wandering mind of infant artificial intelligence.)

The thread goes on with good blokes trying to make head or tail of it. I'll come back tonight when I've had a drink. :ugh:

https://www.pprune.org/tech-log/614997-b-737-speed-trim-system.html

[alf5071h]

"Systems are designed and constructed from components that are expected to fail.
As the complexity of a system increases, the accuracy of any single agent's (person's) own model of that system decreases rapidly."

A quote from a report on coping with complexity in IT malfunctions. Many similarities with operator and design issues as the Max, except for the timescales and number of people involved.

Other 'cherry picked' quotes; read the full report for context.

Each anomaly arose from unanticipated, unappreciated interactions between system components.
There was no 'root' cause. Instead, the anomalies arose from multiple latent factors that combined to generate a vulnerability.
The vulnerabilities themselves were present for weeks or months before they played a part in the evolution of an anomaly.
The events involved both external software/hardware
The vulnerabilities were activated by specific events, conditions, or situations.
The activators were minor events, near-nominal operating conditions, or only slightly off-normal situations.


Surprise
In all cases, the participants experienced surprise. … mainly discoveries of previously unappreciated dependencies that generated the anomaly or obstructed its resolution or both. The fact that experts can be surprised in this way is evidence of systemic complexity and also of operational variety.
A common experience was "I didn't know that it worked this way." People are surprised when they find out that their own mental model of The System doesn't match the behavior of the system.

More rarely a surprise produces astonishment, a sense that the world has changed or is unrecognizable in an important way. This is sometimes called fundamental surprise … four characteristics of fundamental surprise that make it different from situational surprise:

1. situational surprise is compatible with previous beliefs about ‘how things work’; fundamental surprise refutes basic beliefs;
2. it is possible to anticipate situational surprise; fundamental surprise cannot be anticipated;
3. situational surprise can be averted by tuning warning systems; fundamental surprise challenges models that produced success in the past;
4. learning from situational surprise closes quickly; learning from fundamental surprise requires model revision and changes that reverberate.

This adjustment of the understanding of what the system was and how it worked was important to both immediate anomaly management and how post-anomaly system repairs add to the ongoing processes of change.
Uncertainty and escalating consequences combine to turn the operational setting into a pressure cooker and workshop participants agreed that such situations are stressful in ways that can promote significant risk taking.

Reread the surprise section with alternative viewpoints; operators were surprised, manufacturer, regulator, self; which types of surprise.
Pprune - surprise; a forum for ill considered post-mortems.

Experts are typically much better at solving problems than at describing accurately how problems are solved. Eliciting expertise usually depends on tracing how experts solve problems. … experts demonstrated their ability to use their incomplete, fragmented models of the system as starting points for exploration and to quickly revise and expand their models during the anomaly response in order to understand the anomaly and develop and assess possible solutions.

… focused on hypothesis generation. [ not seeking to follow SOPs existent or not ] These efforts were sweeping looks across the environment looking for cues. This behavior is consistent with recognition primed decision making.

… organizations which design systems... are constrained to produce designs which are copies of the communication structures of these organizations.

The alerts draw attention but they are usually not in themselves, diagnostic. Instead, alerts trigger a complex process of exploration and investigation that allows the responders to build a provisional understanding of the source(s) of the anomalous behavior that generated the alert.

It is unanticipated problems that tend to be the most vexing and difficult to manage.… unappreciated, subtle interactions between tenuously connected, distant parts of the system.

Don't overlook the end sections; how much dark debt is the industry carrying. An ever increasing amount due to automation and operational complexity, yet constant limited human performance.

"dark debt"; vulnerability was not recognized or recognizable until the anomaly revealed it. … found in complex systems and the anomalies it generates are complex system failures

Dark debt is not recognizable at the time of creation. … it is a product of complexity, adding complexity is unavoidable as systems change.

Ref https://snafucatchers.github.io
,

[OttoRotate]

Boeing recently announced intentions to increase production of the MAX family in the near future, but a friend claiming a mysterious 'inside track' just told me "Boeing is suspending production of the MAX 8."

This guy is not in aviation and is only looking to score points, so it would give me pleasure to shoot him down. Can anyone provide insight or references as to why this would be extremely improbable/impossible? Does the MAX 7 constitute the lion's share of production numbers?

REF: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/boeing-targets-2025-return-pre-crisis-737-max-production-rates-sources-2023-04-10/

[MechEngr]

That would be odd - the 8 is in the sweet spot. However there are orders for the other models and it would make sense to shift to making a slot in production to run a batch of them. I see a block for Southwest of 234 -7s vs 150 -8s.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Boeing_737_MAX_orders_and_deliveries#Orders_and_deli veries_by_customer as a guess at it. Unless the airlines have shifted.

[OttoRotate]

"MAX 8 production is closed indefinitely" ... "insufficient margins in tail structure" ... "issues may be common to 9 and 10" ... "expected to break later today or as late as early next week"

Piss poor timing to be coincident with the annual shareholders meeting.

This is the rumors forum, right? /s

[tdracer]

The overwhelming majority of MAX sales have been the -8 and -9, the -7 is almost a niche market with Southwest getting the lion's share. The -10 holds some promise (very good seat mile costs), but might be a 'stretch too far' as it's badly compromised to get the extra length and seats.
So the probability of your friend knowing what he's talking about is near zero.

[Less Hair]

"MAX 8 production is closed indefinitely" ... "insufficient margins in tail structure" ... "issues may be common to 9 and 10" ... "expected to break later today or as late as early next week"
Piss poor timing to be coincident with the annual shareholders meeting.
This is the rumors forum, right? /s

This doesn't really fit to recent reports that they intend to bring up the MAX rate faster?
Is this how stocks get interfered with?

[oceancrosser]

This doesn't really fit to recent reports that they intend to bring up the MAX rate faster?
Is this how stocks get interfered with?

Well, it does seem legitimate so hold your horses: https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/13/boeing-warns-of-reduced-737-max-production-and-deliveries-due-to-parts-issue.html

[MechEngr]

Is it time for a 737 Hamsterwheel?

[tdracer]

Well, it does seem legitimate so hold your horses: https://www.cnbc.com/2023/04/13/boeing-warns-of-reduced-737-max-production-and-deliveries-due-to-parts-issue.html
From the linked article:
“We expect lower near-term 737 MAX deliveries while this required work is completed. We regret the impact that this issue will have on affected customers and are in contact with them concerning their delivery schedule,”
That's a far cry from
​​​​​​​a friend claiming a mysterious 'inside track' just told me "Boeing is suspending production of the MAX 8."
Also, it doesn't just affect the MAX 8 - it "also affects certain 737 Max 7, the 737 8200 and P-8 planes."
So still call BS on the original claim.

[oceancrosser]

It will be interesting to see if the regulators (FAA, EASA) accept that affected delivered airframes are not subject to whatever fix or inspection must be done on undelivered airframes.

[WideScreen]

Southwest said in a statement that it expects the issue to impact its delivery schedule of new Max planes and that it is discussing the details of that timeline for this year "and beyond."
Given the "this year 'and beyond'", this issue does not seem to be something minor and/or resolved easily, otherwise, it would be a "couple of months hick-up" and then, the delivery catch-up is completed.

[WideScreen]

It will be interesting to see if the regulators (FAA, EASA) accept that affected delivered airframes are not subject to whatever fix or inspection must be done on undelivered airframes.
FAA:
The FAA said Boeing notified it of the issue and also said there is no immediate safety issue.

EASA might produce its own point of view. Oh, and China ????

[WHBM]

Groundhog Day at Renton again, it seems.Boeing said its supplier informed the company a “non-standard” manufacturing process was used on two fittings in aft fuselages.

Boeing said the problem was not an “immediate safety of flight issue and the in-service fleet can continue operating safely.“

However, it strains credulity (at least, if I was the fleet manager of a carrier operating them) that delivery of new aircraft is impacted by the issue, but it is of no consequence to those already delivered. If there is to be an AD issued with timelines, it should surely have been part of the announcement. For, as ever, the announcement is more of a "Teflon shoulders" form, sticking it instantly on another company rather then Boeing, rather than describing things accurately.

[atakacs]

For, as ever, the announcement is more of a "Teflon shoulders" form, sticking it instantly on another company rather then Boeing, rather than describing things accurately.

Does anyone have actual details as of WHAT is the matter ?

[WillowRun 6-3]

Recently, a columnist in a major newspaper wondered what the late American novelist and creator of the "New Journalism", Tom Wolfe, would have to say - were he here today - about a certain indictment of a famous person by the Manhattan DA. (No one can say for sure, but my own view is that Mr. Wolfe would never, ever, limp along verbally by using the word "narrative".) But what if the notable author were here to comment on the once, and continuing, travails,of Boeing and its strectched-to-the-breaking point 737? It's tantalizing, is it not? - and if it weren't so serious, I for one would endorse Mech Engr's order for a wheel of hamsters.

Entirely coincidentally, next week an august and esteemed (well, mostly, anyway) group of aviation attorneys are convening for a "continuing legal education" and networking conference. Actually a great deal of useful insights, contexts, and just plain updated information from the litigation and regulatory worlds will be bandied about. And one of the very most eminent of the attorneys involved in the 737 MAX legal actions is slated to participate in one of the panel discussions. Perhaps - I'm just saying it's possible - this SLF/attorney will toss out a question about how the MAX debacles prove not the validity or verities of the U.S. legal system but rather its vanities. ...... with apologies to the late, great author of, inter alia, The Right Stuff.

Oh yeah, the conference is being held in a nice European city known for nice springtimes, therein.

[WHBM]

... an august and esteemed (well, mostly, anyway) group of aviation attorneys are convening for a "continuing legal education" and networking conference. Actually a great deal of useful insights, contexts, and just plain updated information from the litigation and regulatory worlds will be bandied about. And one of the very most eminent of the attorneys involved in the 737 MAX legal actions is slated to participate in one of the panel discussions. .
Wouldn't you be better having an aeronautical engineer along, to tell you how the things actually work ?

Yes, I know the Boeing engineer's contract probably has them riding in Coach, while the corporate lawyers are all entitled to First Class ...

[WillowRun 6-3]

WHBM -
Answer: Yes.

However, one of the cold, hard slaps-across-the-face that accompany being an SLF on this forum is that the actual aeronautical engineering discussions frequently leave me far behind in the not-comprehending dust. I won't cite any examples, but obviously neither sequences of flight control (or systems) inputs in a given flight situation, nor changes in aerodynamic loads resulting from particular inputs, are intuitively clear. At least, not to me.

I do resort to looking things up, as incomplete and unsatisfactory as such process may be. (However, I don't recommend just looking things up for persons who aren't attorneys who also find themselves lacking legal understanding.)

[Big Pistons Forever]

Boeing's business model hasn't changed. It is a system designed to enable richly rewarded senior management consequence free incompetency......

[WideScreen]

Boeing's business model hasn't changed. It is a system designed to enable richly rewarded senior management consequence free incompetency......
I don't think, these senior managers are incompetent.

They are highly competent, they managed to fool about everybody monitoring/guarding the design (and maybe the manufacturing) of the B737 MAX. Including the oversight organizations FAA, EASA and several "follow the light" others around the globe.

The difference is, these highly competent senior (and maybe also the less senior as expected) managers did have a goal in mind, significantly deviating from US/EU and other area's laws, how the design of an airplane needs to take place as well, the idea of technicians/engineers, how airplanes should be designed/build.

This MAX debacle wasn't an accident (apart from the crashes itself), it was carefully planned inside Boeing, how this development should be done, in a way, to prioritize the profit over decent quality. Unfortunately, Murphy came around the corner and the whole origami game imploded/crashed, with nearly 350 lives lost, over USD 20B damage to Boeing and its stakeholders as well as a ruined reputation for both Boeing and the FAA, with the probable extension to the shattered USA reputation as a whole (though Trump helped enormously with that too).

This newly found issue, just shows, it's considered a normalcy to ad-hoc deviate from approved specifications, across the board. I'd say, this is just criminal intend.

[WideScreen]

Wouldn't you be better having an aeronautical engineer along, to tell you how the things actually work ?
...
I don't think so. This Boeing issue is not a technical issue (for which you need engineers), but just the implementation of the legal requirements about how to design/build airplanes.

So, a stiff lawyer's word towards (senior) management will do more than any engineer can accomplish.

A change of law, to make (senior) management by definition personally responsible for intentional deviations from a proper implementation of legal requirements around the airplane design/manufacturing, would help tremendously to solve these issues, ehhh, greed above suitable quality / follow the rules.

[WideScreen]

Does anyone have actual details as of WHAT is the matter ?
Seems to be, part of the mountings in the body at the tail end of the -7 and -8 are manufactured, deviating from the approved specifications. In plain English, I'd call that "hand-made", to save on special manufacturing tools/mechanisms.

In the past, other Boeing suppliers interpreted the prescribed CNC method as to be done "by handcraft" (in the end, the CNC machine input is, somehow, handmade too, so, just skip the CNS machine itself, saves money). I forgot, which part/airplane this was for. It does increase the manufacture tolerances (considerably).

[Big Pistons Forever]

I don't think, these senior managers are incompetent.

They are highly competent, they managed to fool about everybody monitoring/guarding the design (and maybe the manufacturing) of the B737 MAX. Including the oversight organizations FAA, EASA and several "follow the light" others around the globe.

The difference is, these highly competent senior (and maybe also the less senior as expected) managers did have a goal in mind, significantly deviating from US/EU and other area's laws, how the design of an airplane needs to take place as well, the idea of technicians/engineers, how airplanes should be designed/build.

This MAX debacle wasn't an accident (apart from the crashes itself), it was carefully planned inside Boeing, how this development should be done, in a way, to prioritize the profit over decent quality. Unfortunately, Murphy came around the corner and the whole origami game imploded/crashed, with nearly 350 lives lost, over USD 20B damage to Boeing and its stakeholders as well as a ruined reputation for both Boeing and the FAA, with the probable extension to the shattered USA reputation as a whole (though Trump helped enormously with that too).

This newly found issue, just shows, it's considered a normalcy to ad-hoc deviate from approved specifications, across the board. I'd say, this is just criminal intend.

The actions and inactions of Boeing senior executives has resulted in avoidable costs exceeding 25 Billion dollars. It has crippled the company, likely permanently, and yet the same old pathologies of cheap and nasty shortcuts to maximize short term profits at the expense of long term viability, still seem prevalent, thus my comment about consequence free incompetence.

[tdracer]

Seems to be, part of the mountings in the body at the tail end of the -7 and -8 are manufactured, deviating from the approved specifications. In plain English, I'd call that "hand-made", to save on special manufacturing tools/mechanisms.

In the past, other Boeing suppliers interpreted the prescribed CNC method as to be done "by handcraft" (in the end, the CNC machine input is, somehow, handmade too, so, just skip the CNS machine itself, saves money). I forgot, which part/airplane this was for. It does increase the manufacture tolerances (considerably).
I rather doubt that - CNC is typically far faster and less expensive than 'hand crafted' - once the machine is programmed it'll pump out dozens of parts with little if any human input (that's why automation is taking over so many formerly hands-on jobs - it's cheaper).
Educated guess is that they flubbed something in the 'finishing' process - possibly a heat treat or similar - or perhaps the part is made from the wrong alloy. The 'no immediate' safety of flight usually means the ultimate strength of the part is unaffected but the fatigue life is. So some straight forward analysis can provide a revised fatigue life - letting them know how long they have to repair/replace in-service parts. Ideally they can perform corrective action during a normal maintenance cycle with minimal disruption.
Delivery is a different issue - it's a real problem to deliver aircraft with a known defect - hence the impact on deliveries rather than in-service aircraft.

BTW, Spirit is an independent company - hasn't been part of Boeing for a couple decades. So blaming Boeing is a little unfair.

[atakacs]

Thanks for the educated guesses as of what the issue at hand is.
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…

[Big Pistons Forever]

I
BTW, Spirit is an independent company - hasn't been part of Boeing for a couple decades. So blaming Boeing is a little unfair.

Technically yes, practically they are captive to Boeing and the Boeing way of doing business...

Spirit manufactures aerostructures for every Boeing commercial aircraft currently in production, including the majority of the airframe content for the Boeing B737, the most popular major commercial aircraft in history.

[MechEngr]

From Spirit:

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https://www.spiritaero.com/programs/mro-services/

I expect Boeing to be a top customer, but Spirit doesn't appear interested in being captive - given the turmoil from COVID and from the 737 MAX stoppage, it would be insane not to diversify.

[Loose rivets]

Random Thoughts.

The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.

The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?

Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.

The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.

[tdracer]

Technically yes, practically they are captive to Boeing and the Boeing way of doing business...
Spirit is a major supplier to Airbus...

[megan]

Entirely coincidentally, next week an august and esteemed (well, mostly, anyway) group of aviation attorneys are convening for a "continuing legal education" and networking conferenceWillow, any idea if the content of the conference might become public? Their thoughts would be of interest.

[WideScreen]

The actions and inactions of Boeing senior executives has resulted in avoidable costs exceeding 25 Billion dollars. It has crippled the company, likely permanently, and yet the same old pathologies of cheap and nasty shortcuts to maximize short term profits at the expense of long term viability, still seem prevalent, thus my comment about consequence free incompetence.
Yep, that unfortunate event happened, because (senior) managers think, they can overrule the rules of physics (see how Trump "ruled", how Bojo "ruled", how Putin "rules", how Hitler did, etc). Some time in the future, they all find their graves, "this is enough". Even Putin will get evicted now or later (the sooner, the better). Some 40 years ago, I did have a discussion with such a business high-potential, being convinced the speed of light limitation would be "overcome" and traveling faster would become the normalcy. Boink.

For Boeing, these senior management actions still gave the profit to the shareholders in the form of share-buy-back over a long period of time. Oh, and the shareholders do think in the same framework, still do expect Boeing to emerge from its current engineering mess (or sold in parts for a profit). These people understand, they have a miss, every now and then, as long as the long term implementation of their goals works out OK, so be it. Unforeseen was, this MAX debacle has become such a big miss.......

[WideScreen]

I rather doubt that - CNC is typically far faster and less expensive than 'hand crafted' - once the machine is programmed it'll pump out dozens of parts with little if any human input (that's why automation is taking over so many formerly hands-on jobs - it's cheaper).
I agree with you, unless the CNC "part" becomes very big (or in an unreachable position). In which case the manual handling would be much easier. For example, a CNC'd mating surface all around the circumference of the body.

The example I referred to is what Loose rivets refers to in its first paragraph:
The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames. (https://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/633660-boeing-737-max-recertification-testing-finally-53.html#post11420032)
Educated guess is that they flubbed something in the 'finishing' process - possibly a heat treat or similar - or perhaps the part is made from the wrong alloy. The 'no immediate' safety of flight usually means the ultimate strength of the part is unaffected but the fatigue life is. So some straight forward analysis can provide a revised fatigue life - letting them know how long they have to repair/replace in-service parts. Ideally they can perform corrective action during a normal maintenance cycle with minimal disruption.
Maybe, we really don't know at the moment. It has to do with the whole frame as delivered by Spirit, not a small part. So probable something that gets mounted "fixed" (welded ???) and subsequently being machined/treated to spec.

Delivery is a different issue - it's a real problem to deliver aircraft with a known defect - hence the impact on deliveries rather than in-service aircraft.
Yep, in general, though, when the defect isn't serious, it could be a deferred repair (the Tesla approach, with their "Autopilot" vaporware). Currently, airlines are really chasing after their ordered airplanes, and might be willing to accept something "non-serious".

BTW, Spirit is an independent company - hasn't been part of Boeing for a couple decades. So blaming Boeing is a little unfair.
OK, let me elaborate:
- When the leader of a team is prepared to accept sloppy work, the team's delivered quality will gradually degrade.
- When a degraded team gets a new leader, that leader has a very difficult job to bring back suitable standards.
- When a supplier does deliver shoddy quality products and the "customer" does not take action, the supplier's standards will not improve.
- When the customer shows shoddy behavior, the suppliers will gradually start to deliver degraded quality to that customer, since, hey, nobody cares, so why should we ?
- When customer A accepts shady quality and customer B keeps up the standard, the supplier will gradually move its second grade staff to work for customer A projects and the better ones for customer B projects.

So, yeah, degrading standards also influence independent suppliers. So, when the customer (Boeing) lets slip on quality standards, the supplier will be very tempted to follow (over time), since quality is expensive, and it'll save a lot of money to follow the lower customer's quality standards. Oh, see YT for reports about this.

[WideScreen]

Thanks for the educated guesses as of what the issue at hand is.
I am probably way too naive but what is there to gain in obfuscating the matter to the degree the PR does ? Obviously you don’t want to jump to conclusions but given the overall MAX context I’d day frank and transparent communication would be a good start…
Well, Boeing clearly decided to rework its future along another pathway. Their choice usually flies well in boardrooms, among investors and the like. It is less appreciated by the general public, independent press, governments (when pressed to open up), etc.

Oh, of course, Boeing's secrecy pathway could very well be needed to avoid another (large?) batch of scandals........

[Commander Taco]

A change of law, to make (senior) management by definition personally responsible for intentional deviations from a proper implementation of legal requirements around the airplane design/manufacturing, would help tremendously to solve these issues, ehhh, greed above suitable quality / follow the rules.

In 1992, 26 coal miners in Nova Scotia died in a massive coal dust blast. During the resulting inquiry, it was discovered that the hazards of this particular mine were well known to all, including government inspectors, and that mine management had been informed of the dangers but had not acted. The positive fallout of this accident (can we even call it an accident when the dangerous situation is known to all and sundry?) was the Westray Bill (https://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/legisl/billc45.html) which established, amongst other things, that criminal liability can extend all the way to the C-Suite and BOD. In the wake of a tragedy, all it takes is the political will to make such a law happen.

I do wonder though, whether the passage of 30 years has dulled the institutional memory of the consequences of corporate negligence as regards safety. I suppose however, that’s the job of the corporate legal team to keep upper management aware of their legal duty of care.

[Winemaker]

When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
Well the hull certainly isn't going to fail in the middle of the wing box; it will fail fore and/or aft of the box.

[hans brinker]

The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.
.

Well the hull certainly isn't going to fail in the middle of the wing box; it will fail fore and/or aft of the box.

Would like some more statistics on this. It has been suggested that 737s are more prone to fuselage failure like that than the 320 in similar accidents, like runway overruns.

[hans brinker]

Random Thoughts.

The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit. The points of failure on more than one hull loss showed clearly that the fuselage often failed exactly on the frames.

The failure of two AoA sensors (let alone the surviving flight) in five months was an horrific coincidence, since they failed for quite disparate reasons. (In that early era the part was not deemed to be capable of causing a 'catastrophic' series of events.) I'm mindful of the vulnerability of a dual-sensor system. It's not beyond the bounds of possibility to have both units fail due to a common bombardment. Sully comes to mind. It seems almost certain the Ethiopian unit failed in such a manner. So, if two are lost, the new software can, or will be able to access a computed AoA, and the dangers will be radically muted anyway. Why is it that I still wish the system just wasn't there?

Real flying. I recall being a non-operating pilot on an almost new DC10 for my first visit to New York. At less than 1,000' at night, the bloke grabbed a handful of power and positioned for another runway. It was nifty flying, but I can imagine pulling a smidgen of g during such a manoeuvre and the thought of the elevators becoming a soft wet mush is all too real. Why should an aircraft exist that needs MCAS? I know the history, and have a certain sympathy if the cowling lift came as a compete surprise. With the benefit of hindsight, that would have been the moment to take the hit and call a meeting with investors.

The actions and inactions of people after the first crash is case-study material for university level psychology research. My own hobby-horse is the effect the meagre warning had on the Ethiopian flight crew. That is, knowing the end result had ended in a crash probably made the warning briefing counterproductive.

Could not agree more.

[WideScreen]

Would like some more statistics on this. It has been suggested that 737s are more prone to fuselage failure like that than the 320 in similar accidents, like runway overruns.
I think, the Internet is littered with examples of that.......

But, that's not due to the manufacture deviation, needing hammering to let the parts fit on assembly, though simply due to the ancient B737 design, grandfathered into the current MAX, so, the MAX will have the same fuselage breakups, when the time comes for those kinds of incidents.

[WHBM]

The Frames for an earlier type were supposed to be made by CNC machining to a tolerance of 3000th of an - inch perhaps? When the women swat team arrived there was a frame or frames on cloth covered tables being shaped effectively by hand.
When building the fuselage it seemed that, for one reason or another, they had to be "persuaded" to fit.
There was someone who wrote a short while ago, possibly on here, that they needed to visit the production lines at both Renton and Toulouse.

At Renton it was all activity - and noise. Production was in full swing. Long-service riveters getting stuck in putting it all together, laid in various uncomfortable positions to do so, blue jeans and workboots sticking out from various places. Not quite Betty and Margo assembling a B-17 in WW2, but it did make the observer recollect those old photos.

At Toulouse there were few staff around, just a handful in white coats looking at the CNC machine displays. The machines were just getting on with it.

I suppose others here, like me, have looked out on 737 wings and noticed the lines of riveting. Sort-of in a straight line, but somehow not perfectly evenly spaced. Now that maybe just what the designer intended, but some here will look and wonder ...

[WillowRun 6-3]

Willow, any idea if the content of the conference might become public? Their thoughts would be of interest.
Often legal conferences, are held to aid attorneys with defense counsel practices as well as the gun-slingers who haul alleged wrong-doesr into court, to "keep up" with both the sublime and ridiculous of current "stuff" going on. Sometimes informal (or very informal) papers, at least "the slides" used in the presentations are made available. This conference, though, is more informal yet, with panel discussions provoked or encouraged by moderators who, typically, brief panelists beforehand on topics to be prepared to address. It's often highly interesting and almost always useful to some degree. (And in many fields of law; my prior practice career in employment law, and in-house at a university, saw many such gab-fests - positively crucial for keeping up with new developments which, in those fields were frequent, and many.)

There are other types of lawyerly get-togethers where ""Chatham House" rules, which stipulate non-attribution, are adhered to. These are found predominantly in the academic world (especially "working groups" reviewing drafts of publications).

Perhaps someone at the conference, happily realizing its resumption after a long Covid-induced hiatus, will live-tweet impressions or summaries of panel discussions. I wouldn't hold my breath however awaiting this (but if it occurs, I can let it be known).

My own interest is particularly focused on the "trans-Atlantic" aspects of current affairs in international aviation liability, insurance and finance matters. Whereas U.S. once was said to hold and preserve a "gold standard", the devaluation which has occurred might in fact be continuing, and not yet arrested let alone reversed. And needless to elaborate, with the disruptions of normal commercial compliance with aircraft registration, leases, insurance and so on, and "bombs bursting in air" in fairly major warfare, problems ordinarily situated at nominal degrees of difficulty become closer to crisis, or intractable. (EUROCONTROL's October conference last year, anticipating the application of lessons learned from the difficulties of summer 2022 to expected traffic loads in 2023's summer season, is a good example.)

Not only across the Atlantic, but back home too. FAA reauthorization pends in the den-of-thieves, Washington, and the Congress of the United States. There is no Senate-confirmed Administrator; who knows what will become of the safety-conclave outputs produced recently? What I'm rambling on trying to say, it seems, is that this feels like a pretty crticial time in civil aviation especially insofar as a conference in Brussels or Paris or Montreal would see things. And skeptics could be surprised just how seriously the quite significant majority of lawyers who really work in this field take the very same considerations as pilots, particulalry professional ones, are concerned with.

[Big Pistons Forever]

There is regulatory theatre and then there is regulatory action. The theatre happens at the political level and won’t measurably move the needle. The real change is enabled by the senior management at the working level.

In Industry the metric for measuring manager worth is money, in government it is people.
I don’t really see in the FAA any substantive organizational changes that will create the effective teams that are adequately resourced with the right people to provide the day to day oversight that has been lost due to regulatory capture in the last 20 years.

Lawyers provide reactive oversight. The bad thing happens and then they engage to right the wrong. The regulator is supposed to provide the proactive oversight so that the bad thing doesn’t happen in the first place. Sadly the expectation that industry will spontaneously do the right thing is made a mockery of by what happened at inter alia Enron, BP, Exxon and of course the poster child of C Suite malfeasance, Boeing.

Effective oversight in aviation is really hard. Too much and you stifle innovation, too little and people die. Sadly I think the polarization and politicization in most Western governments has made effective aviation regulation almost impossible.

[tdracer]

There was someone who wrote a short while ago, possibly on here, that they needed to visit the production lines at both Renton and Toulouse.

At Renton it was all activity - and noise. Production was in full swing. Long-service riveters getting stuck in putting it all together, laid in various uncomfortable positions to do so, blue jeans and workboots sticking out from various places. Not quite Betty and Margo assembling a B-17 in WW2, but it did make the observer recollect those old photos.

At Toulouse there were few staff around, just a handful in white coats looking at the CNC machine displays. The machines were just getting on with it.

I suppose others here, like me, have looked out on 737 wings and noticed the lines of riveting. Sort-of in a straight line, but somehow not perfectly evenly spaced. Now that maybe just what the designer intended, but some here will look and wonder ...
Sorry, but that entire story smells of BS. For starters, they don't build 737 fuselages in Renton - they are assembled at Spirit in Wichita and shipped by rail to Renton as a complete structure - structural work on the fuselage in Renton is minimal. About all that happens to the fuselage assembly in Renton is the various wiring and systems are added (and of course the wings and tail are bolted on.
As for the 737 wing - it's assembled on the same type of Gemco automated machinery that puts together the 767 and 777 wings (except of course for the 777X composite wing).

[WideScreen]

Sorry, but that entire story smells of BS. For starters, they don't build 737 fuselages in Renton - they are assembled at Spirit in Wichita and shipped by rail to Renton as a complete structure - structural work on the fuselage in Renton is minimal. About all that happens to the fuselage assembly in Renton is the various wiring and systems are added (and of course the wings and tail are bolted on.
As for the 737 wing - it's assembled on the same type of Gemco automated machinery that puts together the 767 and 777 wings (except of course for the 777X composite wing).
It may be a bit exaggerated, though, based on YT videos (never been to such a factory myself) I saw (both the sterile Airbus assembly as the craftsmanship style Boeing assembly lines), I recognize what WHBM writes. The wording/details might be a bit off, though the general impression: I'd say, spot on.

And let me add, that a craftsmanship style does not need to be "bad", though it has all ingredients build in, to be relaxed about applying the approved building guidelines, especially, when low-paid/low-educated workers are on the floor.

When the working environment is disorganized, keeping up a proper working habit is quite difficult. Not to say, when you want to change working habits, the first thing you do is creating a "clean" and visually "organized" working environment (easy to do) and work from there to change the working habits (the difficult part).

[ATC Watcher]

Sorry, but that entire story smells of BS. For starters, they don't build 737 fuselages in Renton .
I think I was the poster WHBM was refereing to.. Anyway I can confirm it was as described . When I was in Renton it was taking delivery of a 757 ,which were built by lots of people in overalls with quite some noise and lots of debris in the floor.At the same time in Toulouse Airbus was already in the laser aligned business using robots in a hall with an immaculatle white floor. But that 20 years ago..

[WHBM]

Sorry, but that entire story smells of BS. For starters, they don't build 737 fuselages in Renton - they are assembled at Spirit in Wichita and shipped by rail to Renton as a complete structure - structural work on the fuselage in Renton is minimal. About all that happens to the fuselage assembly in Renton is the various wiring and systems are added (and of course the wings and tail are bolted on.
Sorry, td, but I don't see the word 'fuselage' in any of the description that was written. There is of course a bit more to final assembly than that. And I'm well aware the green fuselages are railed from Kansas to Seattle, apart of course from any that fall down a canyon in Montana on the way. And apparently quite a few do need fuselage work on arrival, from bullet holes they have picked up from yahoos doing 'target practice' along the line ....

[SRMman]

From the Guardian - The setback will probably delay revenues while the company reinstalls the affected fittings, which are used to hold the vertical tail stabiliser in place. Boeing could also face costs to replace the parts on planes going back as far as 2019. Oh dear!

[safetypee]

Willow, re your trans Atlantic views; #1058

See the 'political' answers in https://aviationweek.com/air-transport/safety-ops-regulation/ky-faa-easa-are-closer-after-difficult-discussions

It might be of greater importance that these subjects are published publicly, opposed to having any hard answers.

"We trust the FAA to do the right thing to solve the issues, if there are any."

"Where are you in certifying the 777X? We had a lot of discussions with the FAA and Boeing. Some were more difficult than others, but what matters is that we are agreeing on a common way forward."

"And of course, after the 737 MAX [crisis], there were lessons learned on the internal processes, items to which we need to pay more attention, such as the change product rule. What we saw was that the bilaterals are worded in sufficiently high-level terms that we can use them on both sides to [ensure] that the level of safety is what we want to achieve.
Certification is a matter of people.
It’s a matter of expertise.
We were very clear with Boeing and the FAA that we needed to define measures, solutions [and] changes with which our technical experts would be comfortable."

"… So it is not a surprise that the approach to certification is different in the U.S. and Europe. I think it is better this way, to be frank. If we can achieve the same results with two different approaches, our systems are even more robust."

[WillowRun 6-3]

safetypee, many thanks for that. .... many, many thanks.

On the difference between craftsmen and riveting, and significantly more automated, methods of aircraft manufacturing:
Suppose one were on a commission, properly charged and authorized, asked to advise the receiver for Boeing company - which (hypothetically) has been put into receivership resulting from otherwise intractable problems stemming from the criminal matter in Texas, governance deficiencies overall, and others - about leveraging the existing company into one that is at least as automated in manufacturing as Toulouse (if not more so). At what point in time should Boeing have made the change to automated methods in the past? Is it even meaningful to conceive of such a transformation occuring at all in light of what's gone wrong to date?

Another question - after the Second World War, and the emergence of the Chicago Convention of 1944 and (soon after) ICAO, Boeing had no massive competitor in Toulouse, obviously. Boeing contributed quite significantly to the development, growth, and technological advance of the global civil aviation sector for decades -- not the only airframer to do so, of course, but the most dominant. The point isn't about eliciting sympathy for poor Boeing; no. The question is, doesn't Toulouse's achievement owe a great deal to Boeing's heavy lifting of aircraft manufacturing for several decades? Boeing did so much to create the industry which Airbus then arose to serve in some ways better than Boeing had served it and was serving it - correct? Does that not give some impetus, in other words some validity, to the idea that wrong-doers at Boeing deserve to be held accountable as completely as feasible, but the corporate entity is worth redeeming?

(I mean, this thread has opened up topically, but if the above is too, too pedantic, apologies here in advance.)

[SRMman]

"The question is, doesn't Toulouse's achievement owe a great deal to Boeing's heavy lifting of aircraft manufacturing for several decades? Boeing did so much to create the industry which Airbus then arose to serve in some ways better than Boeing had served it and was serving it - correct?"

No, I wouldn't say a great deal. Airbus's success was built on the existing, not insignificant, aircraft industry of many European counties, to name Britain in particular, but also France and Germany as other examples. Some British aircraft manufacturing companies pre-date Boeing by several years.

[DaveReidUK]

At what point in time should Boeing have made the change to automated methods in the past?

The degree of manufacturing automation that can be applied to an aircraft programme is, to a large extent, baked in at the design stage. In the case of the 737, that was 60-odd years ago.

I have no doubt that, had Boeing decided on a clean-sheet successor to the 737, it would have been manufactured in a completely different manner.

[Asturias56]

I guess the question is why didn't they replace the 737 25 years ago?

I guess it was easy money - why change a winning team etc etc etc

[WideScreen]

.....
On the difference between craftsmen and riveting, and significantly more automated, methods of aircraft manufacturing:
Suppose one were on a commission, properly charged and authorized, asked to advise the receiver for Boeing company - which (hypothetically) has been put into receivership resulting from otherwise intractable problems stemming from the criminal matter in Texas, governance deficiencies overall, and others - about leveraging the existing company into one that is at least as automated in manufacturing as Toulouse (if not more so). At what point in time should Boeing have made the change to automated methods in the past? Is it even meaningful to conceive of such a transformation occuring at all in light of what's gone wrong to date?
Transition: The moment you start with a new frame. Airbus did so, right from the beginning, with the A300 and developed this further. However, this does require a vision, beyond a short-term financial profit. Especially after the McD merger, this vision was completely out of reach. In those days, the financial highlight had decided, that "current technology" was suitable for the future and all "developments" should be just extensions of current technology. Note, that this vision was not only rising in the airline industry. Management at many engineering companies did follow the same seminars and courses and were on the same route. Boink.

The B777 could have been a starting point, a bit early, though the same applies for the A300.

Be aware, this is not only the manufacturing, though also the acceptance, that one needs highly skilled labor to manufacture airplanes. Boeing was on the opposite road, to squeeze on labor costs in production, with all the quality problems that stem from that.

Another question - after the Second World War, and the emergence of the Chicago Convention of 1944 and (soon after) ICAO, Boeing had no massive competitor in Toulouse, obviously. Boeing contributed quite significantly to the development, growth, and technological advance of the global civil aviation sector for decades -- not the only airframer to do so, of course, but the most dominant. The point isn't about eliciting sympathy for poor Boeing; no. The question is, doesn't Toulouse's achievement owe a great deal to Boeing's heavy lifting of aircraft manufacturing for several decades? Boeing did so much to create the industry which Airbus then arose to serve in some ways better than Boeing had served it and was serving it - correct? Does that not give some impetus, in other words some validity, to the idea that wrong-doers at Boeing deserve to be held accountable as completely as feasible, but the corporate entity is worth redeeming?
......
Actually, Airbus isn't "started" as "Airbus", though was an initially hesitating cooperation of several independent airplane/helo manufacturers in Europe, who realized that each of them individually did not have the scale to be able to properly compete with Boeing (and others) and "decided" (IE pushed by the EU), to cooperate more closely, finally becoming one company, etc.

[tdracer]

I think I was the poster WHBM was refereing to.. Anyway I can confirm it was as described . When I was in Renton it was taking delivery of a 757 ,which were built by lots of people in overalls with quite some noise and lots of debris in the floor.At the same time in Toulouse Airbus was already in the laser aligned business using robots in a hall with an immaculatle white floor. But that 20 years ago..
757 fuselages were built in Renton - 737s never were. Also, 757s were built at a relatively low production rate compared to the 737 (the 757 never exceeded 7/month - one every 3 days - and most of the production was much less than that). 737s have been above 42 a month (2/day) at times. Boeing did a lot of work on process improvement in the late '90s/early 2000s that dramatically improved the working environment.

BTW, Boeing spent a boatload of money on developing an automated system for assembling 777 fuselages for the 777X program.
After several years and many millions of dollars, they admitted defeat and canned the whole project - they simply could not get the required level of quality without spending more on 'rework' than it currently costs to built 777 fuselages.
Granted, the tooling that was developed for the 777 fuselage is pretty advanced - including a large gig that rotates 360 degrees so that assembly work can be done from a comfortable working position.
As I noted previously, the 737 fuselages are built by Spirit in Wichita - it's up to Spirit what sort of mechanization and tooling they use - as long as the meet the required level of quality.

[WHBM]

The degree of manufacturing automation that can be applied to an aircraft programme is, to a large extent, baked in at the design stage. In the case of the 737, that was 60-odd years ago.

I have no doubt that, had Boeing decided on a clean-sheet successor to the 737, it would have been manufactured in a completely different manner.
Indeed. Discussion with a longstanding production engineer was that, when a prototype/first unit of an item is produced, things have moved on from this being done by the development engineers themselves hand-building it off the line, because it's not so much seeing that the design actually goes together and works, that is the easier bit on something well designed, but working out HOW it is going to be produced in volume, using and proving the actual production tools and procedures.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Before there was Airbus, there was "Aerospatiale" iirc, with the first version of the Ariane space launch vehicle. (This stretches way back to late 1974 or start of 1975 when (a significantly younger version of) this SLF discovered the trade publication, Aviation Week & Space Technology, and from there..... well, anyway.)

I would have thought that for at least some years after the war, the manufacturers in war-damaged countries were focused on rebuilding production capacity. Especially in Germany, given Allied bombardment (no?). And of course there were the BAe-146 (U.S. introduction, 1983, Appleton, Wisconsin) and Franco-British Concorde (U.S. first visit 1974, Boston).

Okay I admit it, I traveled to both places on those occasions to ger a sight of those airplanes.

[WideScreen]

....
BTW, Boeing spent a boatload of money on developing an automated system for assembling 777 fuselages for the 777X program.
After several years and many millions of dollars, they admitted defeat and canned the whole project - they simply could not get the required level of quality without spending more on 'rework' than it currently costs to built 777 fuselages.
Granted, the tooling that was developed for the 777 fuselage is pretty advanced - including a large gig that rotates 360 degrees so that assembly work can be done from a comfortable working position.
This smells like, Boeing is trying to "automate" the production of a design concept, which can not be automated (sensible).

As I noted previously, the 737 fuselages are built by Spirit in Wichita - it's up to Spirit what sort of mechanization and tooling they use - as long as the meet the required level of quality.
Yep, though, where the design of the item to be produced is not suitable for automation, any attempt to automate this, will cost a fortune and fail, be it a Boeing or a supplier.

IF not started at the initial design with concepts suitable for automated production, production automation will just plain "sock". There is no way around this.

That does not imply, that from one moment in time, ALL design items need to be reconsidered, though a stepwise change, will gradually move the whole production from craftsmanship to automation.

Does it cost "low skilled jobs" ? Yep it does. Though, it does bring back higher skilled jobs. Will the "low skilled jobs" be lost, IF no change is initiated ? Yep, the whole company will gradually disappear, because it is slowly getting behind, etc. and the "low skilled jobs" will disappear, including the company.

[MechEngr]

The degree of manufacturing automation that can be applied to an aircraft programme is, to a large extent, baked in at the design stage. In the case of the 737, that was 60-odd years ago.

I have no doubt that, had Boeing decided on a clean-sheet successor to the 737, it would have been manufactured in a completely different manner.

This specific automation claim seems a bit suspect. I agree that including automation as part of the initial design process is a good idea and delivers the least expensive adoption. But there are many ways to automate an operation. The usual impediment to automation is wide ranging variability. If that was the case it would not require a design change to focus on lowering the variability. Manufacturing is always welcome, and should be encouraged, to decrease variation to make a more consistent product.

Likewise jigs, fixtures, and, to a lesser extent, order of operations, can also occur without a design change.

Most remaining problems flow from the lower level variability. It's possible to make a design that is more costly, but is also more tolerant of that variation. This adaptation is not is a specific impediment but if the variation is reduced the adaptation should also respond to automation. This adaptation is often things like peeled shims that are customized based on making measurements of the varied gaps. If the underlying parts are consistent the gaps will be consistent and it may be possible to eliminate the much or most of the need to peel shims.

Perhaps there is some specific process that requires human flesh to perform the fastening work?

If I were to place a bet where things are difficult to automate it would be routing wires/cables - but that would not involve the image of a dirty trashed factory.

One big difference is that Airbus is a multinational company that also serves as a show-piece, supported by multiple governments. Showpieces can have money spent on cosmetic dressings.

I saw this in a facility that assembled medical equipment: while there was no need for sterile conditions and no one was wearing hair coverings, the workers were all issued lab coats. Perhaps it was for esprit de corp, but under the veneer it was a rather unproductive and relaxed operation. My favorite was a case of simple magnets to hold a cabinet door closed. Two different versions of the same model had arranged them differently. So I went to the floor and asked the assemblers. Two were working the station and when I pointed the differing requirements, they each claimed each version was right, and then looked at each other because they had been doing all the assemblies different ways, inches from each other, and never noticed the difference. Now - one might say - it doesn't matter, and I suspect that is right. But there had been an engineering drawing change to make them different. So, what problem in two otherwise identical cabinets, caused engineering to find one assembly unacceptable? Turned out - engineering didn't know. But they had lab coats too.

The main factor isn't to make some operation more easily automated, but to eliminate the function entirely. Doing that does require design change and, with it, some form of re-qualification. One company I worked for made fighter planes and at some time they discovered it was less expensive to buy a 500 pound slab of aluminum and mill off 470 pounds of it (or so) rather than assemble the part from 30 or so pounds of aluminum in the form of 50 little bits of sheet metal and a few hundred rivets. Of course if one of those brackets got damaged, one could grind off the rivets and replace the bracket for a few dollars. In the one-piece version a completely custom one-off part would have to be made, the remains of the stub removed, and the repair part riveted into place. Maybe pay now, maybe pay later.

Obviously, changing the length of the fuselage from series to series and model to model must have required re-qualification, so redesign would have been far easier to add in. Not sure if Boeing put that effort in or skipped it. It would be interesting to know if they did. They have made other, more significant structural changes and such changes would have saved a significant amount of money..

[DaveReidUK]

This specific automation claim seems a bit suspect. I agree that including automation as part of the initial design process is a good idea and delivers the least expensive adoption. But there are many ways to automate an operation. The usual impediment to automation is wide ranging variability. If that was the case it would not require a design change to focus on lowering the variability. Manufacturing is always welcome, and should be encouraged, to decrease variation to make a more consistent product.

Likewise jigs, fixtures, and, to a lesser extent, order of operations, can also occur without a design change.

Most remaining problems flow from the lower level variability. It's possible to make a design that is more costly, but is also more tolerant of that variation. This adaptation is not is a specific impediment but if the variation is reduced the adaptation should also respond to automation. This adaptation is often things like peeled shims that are customized based on making measurements of the varied gaps. If the underlying parts are consistent the gaps will be consistent and it may be possible to eliminate the much or most of the need to peel shims.

Perhaps there is some specific process that requires human flesh to perform the fastening work?

If I were to place a bet where things are difficult to automate it would be routing wires/cables - but that would not involve the image of a dirty trashed factory.

One big difference is that Airbus is a multinational company that also serves as a show-piece, supported by multiple governments. Showpieces can have money spent on cosmetic dressings.

I saw this in a facility that assembled medical equipment: while there was no need for sterile conditions and no one was wearing hair coverings, the workers were all issued lab coats. Perhaps it was for esprit de corp, but under the veneer it was a rather unproductive and relaxed operation. My favorite was a case of simple magnets to hold a cabinet door closed. Two different versions of the same model had arranged them differently. So I went to the floor and asked the assemblers. Two were working the station and when I pointed the differing requirements, they each claimed each version was right, and then looked at each other because they had been doing all the assemblies different ways, inches from each other, and never noticed the difference. Now - one might say - it doesn't matter, and I suspect that is right. But there had been an engineering drawing change to make them different. So, what problem in two otherwise identical cabinets, caused engineering to find one assembly unacceptable? Turned out - engineering didn't know. But they had lab coats too.

The main factor isn't to make some operation more easily automated, but to eliminate the function entirely. Doing that does require design change and, with it, some form of re-qualification. One company I worked for made fighter planes and at some time they discovered it was less expensive to buy a 500 pound slab of aluminum and mill off 470 pounds of it (or so) rather than assemble the part from 30 or so pounds of aluminum in the form of 50 little bits of sheet metal and a few hundred rivets. Of course if one of those brackets got damaged, one could grind off the rivets and replace the bracket for a few dollars. In the one-piece version a completely custom one-off part would have to be made, the remains of the stub removed, and the repair part riveted into place. Maybe pay now, maybe pay later.

Obviously, changing the length of the fuselage from series to series and model to model must have required re-qualification, so redesign would have been far easier to add in. Not sure if Boeing put that effort in or skipped it. It would be interesting to know if they did. They have made other, more significant structural changes and such changes would have saved a significant amount of money..

While much of the above is true, it's hard to see much relevance to the 737.

Round about the same time the 737NG was on the drawing board, I was involved in the initial development of a regional jet (we got as far as making presentations to a whole bunch of airlines before the project was cancelled). One thing that sticks in my mind is just how much of the design work was centred on manufacturability - the processes, techniques and automation that would go into the building of the aircraft.

I stand by my view that trying to retrofit all those manufacturing innovations to a 30-year-old programme would have been a non-starter, and clearly Boeing decided likewise.

[WideScreen]

It's (largely) a change of thinking: "When I want to automate the production of this object, what reduction in number of components / assembly complexity can be done".

The one-piece milling is a typical example. Using CNC, you can create a complete wing-spar, with whatever additional items already attached, etc. Creating such a piece in manufacturing is a matter of "let the machine run", and no longer individual craftsmanship on a lot of individual components, requiring another site of skilled craftsmanship to assemble.

Think about a 3D printer, which easily creates 1000+ versions of the same, once the model is created. Compare that with a lot of individual injection molding parts, which need to be assembled later on, each with its tolerances, etc, to get the final object.
Noted, that 3D printing does still have its challenges regarding long-term durability, etc.

[Imagegear]

Just a comment from someone who has nothing to contribute from a technical or political perspective however,

I personally have never travelled on a "Max 8", and never will. There was just so much subterfuge from Boeing and the FAA about the issues, not to mention airlines and politicians, that I could not even begin to unravel it all. Even on the PPrune, contributors were and still are putting alternative perspectives and very different ideas about what the problems really were.

In the Max 8 situation, I saw additional crew training, disabling of functionality, etc., as workarounds, but again no proper fix. The politics and technical aspects are still being discussed here and elsewhere. No one appears to be in full agreement as to whether the aircraft is really safe to fly or not. This led me to think that the problem had been dumped on pilots, introducing another level of "what do we have do now"

As with the B787 battery fires, putting them in a box was never a solution but a workaround to get aircraft delivered and flying. Normally a workaround gets fixed. To date, the workaround remains, but no fix. How did these issues get past the FAA.

I am fully aware that there is an acceptable level of failure given survivability, catastrophic failure vs revenue and known punter acceptance of risk. A vast majority of punters are quite prepared to ignore any risks and go for price and convenience. Should they be thinking this way in regard to this, and other aircraft issues?

I look forward to an unequivocal statement that these issues are definitely fixed.

IG

[MechEngr]

While much of the above is true, it's hard to see much relevance to the 737.

Round about the same time the 737NG was on the drawing board, I was involved in the initial development of a regional jet (we got as far as making presentations to a whole bunch of airlines before the project was cancelled). One thing that sticks in my mind is just how much of the design work was centred on manufacturability - the processes, techniques and automation that would go into the building of the aircraft.

I stand by my view that trying to retrofit all those manufacturing innovations to a 30-year-old programme would have been a non-starter, and clearly Boeing decided likewise.
My point was - there are a lot of automation advances that could be used that would not be seen by looking at the parts. More automation in part forming and part machining, more automation in hole drilling, More automation in in-line inspection. Manufacturing tools that provide data collection and process feedback. Instead of Bob or Alice having a feel for a properly bucked rivet, the tools detect the acceleration spike that matches when the rivet is properly set and tracks deviations to adjust the process if the rivets are a few PSI higher or lower in yield strength. Even sticky labels with bar codes could be used to track inventory and tools to ensure parts get to the correct locations on time and tools are inspected according to usage rather than calendar date.

All of these cut costs on rework, cut costs on inspection, cut time on the factory floor - most of all, they decrease uncertainty.

No one has redesigned chickens or cows, but farm automation is a huge industry, from the moment they are conceived to the moment they are being shrink-wrapped.

[tdracer]

Just a comment from someone who has nothing to contribute from a technical or political perspective however,

As with the B787 battery fires, putting them in a box was never a solution but a workaround to get aircraft delivered and flying. Normally a workaround gets fixed. To date, the workaround remains, but no fix. How did these issues get past the FAA.

IG

This is one of those times of 'knowing just enough to be dangerous'. With the 787 battery fires, Boeing and the battery vendor redesigned the battery with better cell-to-cell isolation, they redesigned the charging system, they redesigned the way the battery and charging system where monitored. And then, because the fire damage made it impossible to positively determine the root cause of the problem, they did a 'belt and suspender' approach and put the whole thing in a stainless-steel box that would contain a total battery meltdown. Ten years later (with over a thousand 787s in service), there have been a handful of single cell battery failures, but no total battery meltdowns.
Yet the myth persists that all Boeing did was put the battery in a box and called it a day, :ugh:

The FAA, EASA, and others went over the MAX certification with the proverbial fine-tooth comb - I seriously doubt you could do a similar review of any commercial aircraft certification and not find some concerns or oversights - and implemented corrective action for anything they found before re-certification and return to flight. If you have concerns over the FAA, why would EASA do Boeing any favors and approve the MAX if they still had any concerns?

[Loose rivets]

More thoughts, but this time having Zoomed to a group of youngsters, most of which helped me around the skies on simplistic types. One mentioned today how he felt going back to the 737 for a while after Airbus luxury. Until the crashes, I'd assumed the massive cable run up and down the length of the aircraft was a kind of payment for having that high mass human link to the horizontal stabilizer. Now it seems even the earlier 73's have been burdening the Real Pilot's aeroplane with some weighty cabling that doesn't promise . . . really, promise, to deliver the goods when most needed.

A stray thought. Didn't we give the Americans the flying tailplane to save lives while testing supersonic flight? That was one heck of a free lunch.

Another mental ramble sees me in a factory where we are making frames, this time for 737's. It's me that's got to get it right. Well, contrary to an above post, I think it matters very much what method we use when we've agreed, as in this case, to use state of the art technology while making this part. CNC it has to be, but why?
Like doing a pass on a lathe, the work has to be back to reference temperature after each pass. CNC takes all that into account. When they say 1/3,000", that's what it's got to be at reference temperature. What else? We know they take a bit of pushing in, but this requires not chiselling metal off the receiving surface with sharp edges. The minimised CNC'd CORNER edges will allow the metal to fold around them without cutting their way in over time. You'd be able to run your palms down my edges.

I frankly don't know if a surfeit of frames would be of help to the fabricators. In my world they would. To make, there would be minimal loss of materials and time on all but the outer edges which is in software anyway. When the Real McCoys' have done their work, they can be cut out along the dotted line - sacrificed at minimal cost. CNC makes that cheep 'framing' totally disposable.

The Pattern jigs for aircraft have been historically horribly expensive. A great BTW. Boss sold our Viscount nose pressure bulkhead jigs to Cambridge for 20k ??? Then the Ministry of Planes ordered him to fit radar - which needed a non pressurised nose-cone. It cost about that for each aircraft - which the nice men at Cambridge could do, 'cos they'd got our jigs.

[WideScreen]

Just a comment from someone who has nothing to contribute from a technical or political perspective however,

I personally have never travelled on a "Max 8", and never will. There was just so much subterfuge from Boeing and the FAA about the issues, not to mention airlines and politicians, that I could not even begin to unravel it all. Even on the PPrune, contributors were and still are putting alternative perspectives and very different ideas about what the problems really were.

In the Max 8 situation, I saw additional crew training, disabling of functionality, etc., as workarounds, but again no proper fix. The politics and technical aspects are still being discussed here and elsewhere. No one appears to be in full agreement as to whether the aircraft is really safe to fly or not. This led me to think that the problem had been dumped on pilots, introducing another level of "what do we have do now"

As with the B787 battery fires, putting them in a box was never a solution but a workaround to get aircraft delivered and flying. Normally a workaround gets fixed. To date, the workaround remains, but no fix. How did these issues get past the FAA.

I am fully aware that there is an acceptable level of failure given survivability, catastrophic failure vs revenue and known punter acceptance of risk. A vast majority of punters are quite prepared to ignore any risks and go for price and convenience. Should they be thinking this way in regard to this, and other aircraft issues?

I look forward to an unequivocal statement that these issues are definitely fixed.

IG
I have bad news for you.

The whole airplane, not alone the B737-MAX, is full of these "fixes". Create something to make use of physical properties and you will find secondary effects, which need to be handled, etc. Nothing strange.

The important aspect is, that all the resolutions for all these "things to be handled" need to comply with the regulations put in place. In general, engineers take care of this happens, and it's their job. It's the manufacturer's task to take care of, and the engineers do have the opportunity to do so.

This is where things did go haywire around the B737 MAX development. Boeing created such a development environment, the engineers were not in a position to do their job properly. And Boeing did this intentionally, just to save development money (and time) and take care, the final product did not deviate from what was commercially wanted.

As such, the "new" MCAS feature did get insufficient development attention from the engineers to a level that Boeing did all that it could to just shield the existence of the MCAS from the FAA (and the customers). Just to avoid critical questions, which could trigger additional engineering attention, and potentially (better: probably) change the final product towards a worse commercial proposition. This costed >300 lives and Boeing > USD 20B.

So, yeah, as tdracer mentions, the B737 MAX did get a MAX scrutiny for regulatory compliance.

A secondary effect, though, is due to the regulations allowing grandfathering of old-though-historically-regulatory-compliant inheritance style, effectively, the B737 MAX does have the regulatory quality of 50+ years ago. So the B737 MAX does have a significantly lower technical quality than (for example) an Airbus A220 series airplane.

So, all in all, a B737 MAX is from the regulatory perspective not worse than a B737NG (not better either, due to the Jurassic inheritance).

Having flown the B737 MAX a couple of times as a passenger (SQ Business), the passenger experience is a little more comfortable than the B737 NG, though it doesn't reach the passenger experience, an Airbus A321neo reaches.

[WideScreen]

More thoughts, but this time having Zoomed to a group of youngsters, most of which helped me around the skies on simplistic types. One mentioned today how he felt going back to the 737 for a while after Airbus luxury. Until the crashes, I'd assumed the massive cable run up and down the length of the aircraft was a kind of payment for having that high mass human link to the horizontal stabilizer. Now it seems even the earlier 73's have been burdening the Real Pilot's aeroplane with some weighty cabling that doesn't promise . . . really, promise, to deliver the goods when most needed.

A stray thought. Didn't we give the Americans the flying tailplane to save lives while testing supersonic flight? That was one heck of a free lunch.

Another mental ramble sees me in a factory where we are making frames, this time for 737's. It's me that's got to get it right. Well, contrary to an above post, I think it matters very much what method we use when we've agreed, as in this case, to use state of the art technology while making this part. CNC it has to be, but why?
Like doing a pass on a lathe, the work has to be back to reference temperature after each pass. CNC takes all that into account. When they say 1/3,000", that's what it's got to be at reference temperature. What else? We know they take a bit of pushing in, but this requires not chiselling metal off the receiving surface with sharp edges. The minimised CNC'd CORNER edges will allow the metal to fold around them without cutting their way in over time. You'd be able to run your palms down my edges.

I frankly don't know if a surfeit of frames would be of help to the fabricators. In my world they would. To make, there would be minimal loss of materials and time on all but the outer edges which is in software anyway. When the Real McCoys' have done their work, they can be cut out along the dotted line - sacrificed at minimal cost. CNC makes that cheep 'framing' totally disposable.

The Pattern jigs for aircraft have been historically horribly expensive. A great BTW. Boss sold our Viscount nose pressure bulkhead jigs to Cambridge for 20k ??? Then the Ministry of Planes ordered him to fit radar - which needed a non pressurised nose-cone. It cost about that for each aircraft - which the nice men at Cambridge could do, 'cos they'd got our jigs.
Let me help: Due to the availability of CNC machines, for example, the wing design itself can move away from all those individual little mechanical pieces, into far fewer bigger components. Components, which are easier to handle, created more precisely, with better predictable characteristics, that the whole wing construction from its individual components will move away from large-scale craftsmanship of many not-fitting-so-well pieces to assemble a few big properly fitting components.

This "wastes" a huge amount of material in the CNC machine, though this can all be recycled relatively cheaply (in contrast to the craftsmanship labor to assemble all the individual small pieces, which is gone, forever).

All in all, it does require a change in design mindset, so in general only suitable for "new" designed from scratch parts.

[megan]

Didn't we give the Americans the flying tailplane to save lives while testing supersonic flightI'm afraid that nonsense was something propagated by Eric Brown and is one of the enduring aviation myths. His story is that the US pinched the idea from the M.52 project and used it on the XS-1, nothing is further from the truth, the XS-1 used the exact same set up as a B737, had the XS-1 used a slab it would have required powered controls because of control surface pitching moments, the only power on the XS-1 was batteries for the recorders and nitrogen for cockpit pressurisation, gyros, flaps, gear and stabiliser trim. The first jet to have an all flying tailplane was the F-86E, it wasn't a slab though, the "stabiliser" portion had a range of 6° up and 10° down and the "elevator" portion had a range of 3° down and 10° up, the elevator portion being geared in movement to the stabiliser, sort of a compound slab. A true slab was introduced on the F-86H. Slabs had been investigated on both sides of the Atlantic, they were a feature on the WWI Morane-Saulnier G, Fokker Eindecker and Halberstadt D.II aircraft, have to remember that the Wright brothers used a slab for pitch control. ;) Sorry to wear the anorak coat LR.

[Loose rivets]

What shall I dine out on now:uhoh:

I'll blame Winkle. I've got the raw BBC first cut of his interview in my garage somewhere ( I used to fix the editing recorders - the tape was jamming the machine). He certainly had a convincing way about him.

[megan]

He certainly had a convincing way about himIf you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it - attributed to J (https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/joseph-goebbels-table-of-contents)oseph Goebbels.

Unfortunately, as the UK's premier test pilot folk naturally believed he knew what he was talking about. I think he was disgruntled that the US won the "first" supersonic crown, snatching the fame from the UK. He had the presumption, because of his status, that he would have been the pilot for any UK attempt, presumption on his part because the committee had not selected a pilot. His book on the M.52 is a novel, as it contains very little fact, every page is a thinly disguised swipe at the US.

[Imagegear]

AVTalk Podcast737 MAX deliveries paused after fresh quality issueA sub-contractor of Spirit Aerosystems used a “non-standard manufacturing process” that has affected some of the attachment points for the fitting between the 737-7, 737-8, 737-10, and P-8 fuselage and vertical fin. Approximately 50 undelivered aircraft are affected and nearly all 737 MAX aircraft built since 2019 will need rework.

IG

[WillowRun 6-3]

Well, another re-acquaintance with the joys of FL 400 completed, and basing the post on suggestions of how discussions at a certain aviation subject matter conference this SLF/attorney attended could be both interesting and relevant, I'll share some content. (Referencing posts #1034 and megan response #1048; and #1058 re: Atlantic alliance perspective, and safetypee response #1065 [for those interested more in form than in substance].)

One participant, legal counsel with substantial importance in litigation matters on behalf of the accident victims and their families, was asked about what he envisioned or perhaps even anticipated would be done in the event the Deferred Prosecution Agreement were in fact re-opened. (The DPA's status is the subject of an appellate action at present.) The questioner had imprecisely suggested that the accidents had been investigated as fully as possible. The answer given by the legal counsel was that much has yet to be uncovered with regard to Boeing's actions and failures to act in the aftermath of the Lion Air accident.

Another participant, also an aviation attorney with substantial importance (and not necessarily limited to adversarial roles), railed vehemently against casting aspersions against the integrity of Boeing's officials, including at least one whose area of responsibility was referenced. To the contrary, the responding legal counsel stated, the Boeing officials were and are people of integrity.

The difference(s) of opinion were not resolved.

If the Court of Appeals remands (sends back to the Distrcit Court) the DPA with instructions to re-open it and further discovery is conducted.... there's no way for someone without relevant and material personal knowledge to say with certainty, but if the Dominion case against Fox sets any example, there is a lot, lot more yet to see the light of day.

Over on the other 737 MAX thread currently running, there's a compelling post by soarbum (#276) about information Boeing knew but failed to act upon; also a spirited rebuttal in post #279. As SLF/atty the particular information about operating the aircraft and how the various systems work together (or don't) would be way outside my airway. I mean, my lane. But, per Viper (the Sunday morning scene at Viper's seaside home), "A good pilot is compelled to always evaluate what's happened, so he can apply what he's learned."

[WillowRun 6-3]

Issued April 26, 2023, Report AV202325 - third DoT Inspector General report.

"FAA Has Completed 737 MAX Return to Service Efforts, but Opportunities Exist to Improve the Agency's Risk Assessments and Certification Processes."

https://www.oig.dot.gov/library-item/39461
Edit (https://www.pprune.org/editpost.php?do=editpost&p=11428734)

[Imagegear]

I may be misunderstanding what the big picture is here, but it seems to me that the FAA has a lot of "regulatory" and "codifying" work still to complete before they be able to properly determine the causes of accidents with aircraft and manufacturers, alike. In the meantime, aircraft are continuing to be designed, manufactured and flown without the necessary corrective actions being completed.

Comment?

IG

[WideScreen]

I may be misunderstanding what the big picture is here, but it seems to me that the FAA has a lot of "regulatory" and "codifying" work still to complete before they be able to properly determine the causes of accidents with aircraft and manufacturers, alike. In the meantime, aircraft are continuing to be designed, manufactured and flown without the necessary corrective actions being completed.

Comment?

IG
Comments: Yes, it's the FAA's task to do everything BEFORE accidents happen (prevention), the NTSB comes "after" the accident.

And more in general: When an organization lets (severely) slip on the standards, it's extremely difficult to raise the bar again, without a complete overhaul, including replacing people at a large scale.

[MechEngr]

The FAA has never done anything before accidents happen. The design and manufacture regulatory task of the FAA is to close the doors after the horse has left the barn ablaze, but only if the community wants those doors closed. They sat on their hands and failed to prevent:

1) an unauthorized change to engine replacement procedure that crashed the DC-10 in Chicago
2) that two nuts in series isn't a back-up system when the wear of one nut allows the back-up to wear - Alaska Airlines
3) the use of unauthorized tools and skipping the manufacturer inspection method allowed both nuts to completely wear away - Alaska Airlines
4) not ensuring pilots know to never try to fix the plane from the cockpit instead of landing as immediately as possible and avoiding changing configuration - Alaska Airlines
5) allowing unauthorized people into the cockpit of an in-flight aircraft for any reason - 4X 9/11
6) failing to require smoke and fire detectors in cargo holds - Valujet (also numerous other safety problems)
7) allowing a dual-use calibration system that miscalibrated an AoA sensor - LNI610 (Lion Air)
8) failing to require on-aircraft verification of AoA sensors following replacement - LNI610
9) continuing to fail to require ADS-B Out on ALL manned aircraft (No electrical? Too bad. Don't fly.) Too many mid-airs in G/A to count. But G/A says "Costs too much"

It's not the FAA that is primarily at fault - it is the operators and owners of aircraft who also know of these problems and press the FAA to not act. The FAA acts when industry needs the public to know that "such things won't be tolerated anymore" while the industry continues to do other such things. The balance is that it is usually in the operator's best interest to have operations go well. Marginal operations and invulnerable operators break that model.

[Imagegear]

So if I am understanding you correctly, the FAA is stating that as far as they concerned, they abrogate responsibility to the company or individual, to regulate themselves, and by the way when it all goes pear shaped, it cannot the FAA's responsibility?

IG

[WideScreen]

So if I am understanding you correctly, the FAA is stating that as far as they concerned, they abrogate responsibility to the company or individual, to regulate themselves, and by the way when it all goes pear shaped, it cannot the FAA's responsibility?

IG
Partially, though the main goal, is to "make clear", that the manufacturer of the items does not carry any blame about their mishaps........

Boeing is completely innocent, Boeing does not attempt to blackmail the FAA and/or their customers, it's all the fault of the FAA and the customers, never Boeing fault. How much they do intentionally mislead all other parties.

[WillowRun 6-3]

No, the assessment of the FAA as stated in several recent posts is not correct. Recall the Federal Aviation Administration is part of a presidential Cabinet-level Department in the Executive Branch of the United States Federal Government (Transportation, obviously); recall further that the Executive Branch is what in the U.S. system of government is a "political branch." This means that accountability is held to be exercised by the voters. There is neither abdication by FAA of its role nor a complete lack of recourse (again, through the electoral process).

Obviously FAA's fidelity to the high standards by which its functions are to be performed has been badly lacking in particular recent matters. Nevertheless, what I would pay to watch a dialgoue between those who claim FAA completely abdicated its role (and has no accountability), and a professional like Billy Nolen, who I'll venture to assert would stridently dispute those claims.

There are, of course, exceptions, in that legal claims can be brought against agencies of the Executive branch in statutorily specified situations.

[ATC Watcher]

Comments: Yes, it's the FAA's task to do everything BEFORE accidents happen (prevention), the NTSB comes "after" the accident.
.
On prevention : The FAA is a complex and atypical organisation . I cannot speak about aircraft certification but practiced them a lot them on the ATC side over decades. . Atypical is that they are both regulator and service provider when dealing with ATC . They suprevise themselves. On safety they are always reactive, basically waiting for accidents to occur , and reacting on the reports recommendations to change things. They never were procative in Safety , and this is historical. And then , unlike most of they counterparts in other countries, they are also subject to political pressure and very sensitive to lobbies.

[WideScreen]

On prevention : The FAA is a complex and atypical organisation . I cannot speak about aircraft certification but practiced them a lot them on the ATC side over decades. . Atypical is that they are both regulator and service provider when dealing with ATC . They suprevise themselves. On safety they are always reactive, basically waiting for accidents to occur , and reacting on the reports recommendations to change things. They never were procative in Safety , and this is historical. And then , unlike most of they counterparts in other countries, they are also subject to political pressure and very sensitive to lobbies.
Yep, let me add some more about prevention: I consider laying out a whole scheme of certifications, etc, validation of these schemes, etc, to be all part of the "prevention".

And, yes, the FAA is a typical US organization, where politics want to have a big influence in what is happening, as well a mix-up of safety and commercial/operational. Historically. Other (EU) countries have a better implementation of these things, usually through independent governmental organizations. Still not perfect, though, I think, better than the wish-wash the FAA has on its plate. And recent Boeing history shows, these mixes of responsibilities don't work that well.

[fdr]

Yep, let me add some more about prevention: I consider laying out a whole scheme of certifications, etc, validation of these schemes, etc, to be all part of the "prevention".

And, yes, the FAA is a typical US organization, where politics want to have a big influence in what is happening, as well a mix-up of safety and commercial/operational. Historically. Other (EU) countries have a better implementation of these things, usually through independent governmental organizations. Still not perfect, though, I think, better than the wish-wash the FAA has on its plate. And recent Boeing history shows, these mixes of responsibilities don't work that well.

I'm conflicted; would like to say the FAA is not doing a good job, but then, compared to the rest of the world, that would be nonsense. The FAA still remains a gold standard in working out a system that functions. I don't agree with all of the direction it takes, and the X numbers of FAA's that exist due to the regional balkanising of the regulator is frustrating.

I do think that there is a time for an epiphany in many areas, we cling to outdated standards and processes that add nothing to the operational effectiveness, and in fact constrain the implementation of far better, more reliable modern technology that would not add any adverse burden to risk, it would reduce risk.

The FAA is, neither bad nor perfect, it does a job that is thankless. On Alaska 261 and the Boeing QA issues it did itself no favours, it knew better and was constrained in response.

[WideScreen]

I'm conflicted; would like to say the FAA is not doing a good job, but then, compared to the rest of the world, that would be nonsense. The FAA still remains a gold standard in working out a system that functions. I don't agree with all of the direction it takes, and the X numbers of FAA's that exist due to the regional balkanising of the regulator is frustrating.

I do think that there is a time for an epiphany in many areas, we cling to outdated standards and processes that add nothing to the operational effectiveness, and in fact constrain the implementation of far better, more reliable modern technology that would not add any adverse burden to risk, it would reduce risk.

The FAA is, neither bad nor perfect, it does a job that is thankless. On Alaska 261 and the Boeing QA issues it did itself no favours, it knew better and was constrained in response.
Apologies to offend you, this is not my intention. Let me elaborate.

When an organization does have to fulfill conflicting targets/roles, it will be difficult to do so. This is something the FAA is confronted with, simply due to the law environment it has to operate in. This does not imply, the individuals, each and all, at the FAA don't do "a good job". Though the diverging law based targets make that each and every individual at the FAA will have a different interpretation, where the focus should be and what aspects will get priority.

Not to say, the diverging targets make it much easier for individuals to deviate from a not-so-clear route (muddy). This is what we saw happening with the Boeing MAX disaster. Individuals at the FAA, who did have to decide for their own, how much leeway Boeing got (too much).

As such, it would be better, from a reduction-of-conflict-of-interest point of view, to have the conflicting targets being served by independent government related (but at a distance) organizations. This is a framework that is created (more or less) in Europe.

Oh, in IT, this is called: Garbage-in, Garbage-out. Whatever you do your best, the result will be disputed. The impossible task.

So, the issue is not so much with the FAA itself, though with the conflicting tasks it has to fulfill, the butcher that does quality control on its own meat.

[Loose rivets]

WideScreen's quote pales in the real world . . . it's extremely difficult to raise the bar again, without a complete overhaul, including replacing people at a large scale.

I think we should go back to the vast pair of threads that followed the accidents. The impression I was left with was that the FAA's workload for Boeing was so great that Self Certification became an unspoken norm. Unspoken? Huh, 'They filled in the paperwork and I just signed it', is still ringing loud in my ears. The workload of redoing what Boeing had already done took them to the realms of new buildings - which would need filling with a good proportion of totally new staff - so great was the symbiosis by then.


A building full of D W Davies' standing full square against the world would be nice. (stick pushers) Yeh, dream on. That kind of determination is very rare.

[MechEngr]

The problems in the FAA start with the US Congress and end with the US Congress. They underfund the FAA and saddle them with responsibilities and then wash their own hands of responsibility and cave to lobbyists if the FAA isn't keeping up with corporate support**. Unfortunately the Pollyanna concept that voters have any influence over such operational details was swept completely away by Citizens United.

Airlines (most of them) and manufacturers have huge incentives to not cause a crash. In the design and operation there are literally on the order of a billion decisions. To review those requires a staff/skill level that is even larger. That oversight is expected to review to see if the decisions made are correct, but also to discover the decisions that weren't made at all.

If the decision tree for MCAS had added "Crew won't trim and won't reduce thrust," particularly after LNI610, then the workable solution wasn't to remind crews about how to manage trim runaway but to simply disable electric trim for all flights. However no one noticed that branch was missing, so no one made a decision based on it.

Missing decisions are the most difficult problems to find.

As to work-load. This could be reduced if the FAA required industry to include them on automated tools that track approval status. At the time MCAS was being prepared the software would have been in a software controlled vault that required multiple approvals to advance through the process. Such systems can send e-mails to a list of participants and can include the differences between versions to make understanding the changes simpler. None of the recommendations in Report AV2023025 suggest any such automated manner to ensure all parties get unfiltered information. This is an enhancement to lengthy status reports that might miss or minimize details.

I expect that with full disclosure the FAA would not have identified the potential interaction between a valid, but incorrect AoA sensor and MCAS. By avoiding a paper trail the FAA avoids responsibility.

**This is why the FAA has worked on eliminating R/C hobby fliers in the US and ignoring that as many people die in GA accidents in the USA each year as died on the two 737 MAX aircraft, including several avoidable mid-air collisions every year.

[WillowRun 6-3]

MechEngr, aren't the two problems in your asterisk-note issues or questions of policy? And therefore subjects about which, if there was sufficient consensus, Congress could exert significant influence if not control (especially in reauthorization)? By consensus, the reference is to the level of importance to assign to GA safety deficiencies and R/C hobbyists, and not the merits of the reforms you imply should be made (as to which I'll assume you're entirely correct).

The political accountability for any Executive Branch agency doesn't exist in isolation and - quite obviously - not an the "operational" level. A voter who may have been disgusted with, let's say, a DoT secretary grandstanding for publicity while adding nothing of value in the aftermath of, let's say, a serious railroad accident still sees that issue as just one of several that will motivate a vote one way or the other (or not voting). The Citizens United decision did not alter that calculus.

And since labor organizations are relatively unconstrained to make political donations, why shouldn't corporations have the same First Amendment right?

[WHBM]

If the decision tree for MCAS had added "Crew won't trim and won't reduce thrust," particularly after LNI610, then the workable solution wasn't to remind crews about how to manage trim runaway but to simply disable electric trim for all flights. However no one noticed that branch was missing, so no one made a decision based on it.
I know that "Decision Trees" are the taught academic way to devise the logic for such items, but in my experience they principally facilitate those who don't actually have a detailed background to document the issues. What is needed in addition is someone, separate, to go through things specifically looking for Single Points Of Failure, and someone again who looks at the resulting logic, and from their long understanding says "do you know what, that is going to be tough".

[Loose rivets]

For 'tough', read catastrophic. Sorry, "Catastrophic".

I don't think any logic tree would have had a branch leading to, 'won't reduce thrust.' I've tried again and again to put myself in that skipper's mindset and only come up with the fear of the nose pitching down with reduced power. I haven't searched for the graphs yet, but I don't think there was a break in that high power setting. Hard to plan for such an event.

[WillowRun 6-3]

United States District Court Judge Alonso has ruled in favor of the plaintiffs with regard to an issue of damages that has been noted and discussed on this forum. As framed by the Court, "whether plaintiffs can recover for emotional distress that their decedents suffered during the flight prior to suffering any physical injury." For those perhaps interested in reading the ruling as such, the case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois is 19 C 2170 (Consolidated), "In Re: Ethiopian AIrlines, Flight ET 302 Crash." (This SLF/attorney guesses that posting a pdf of a court decision won't be popular here.)

A few observations holding some relevance. The ruling delves incisively into the pertinent questions of Illinois tort law (including both Survival actions and Wrongful Death actions). What I think is significant - beyond the win for the plaintiffs of course - is that the Court had to "read around the law" - that is, evidently it realized that the issue to be decided was not resolved yet by good precedent and it had to conduct a process of law-finding, if you will, of its own. Not making law, rather interpreting it. lndeed, as the Court stated, following a methodical and quite careful review of caselaw precedents proffered by both sides, "where that leaves the Court is with little to go on in determining how to apply Illinois law to this case."

Notice, with the large number of international conventions and documents of official standing by which international civil aviation operates, nonetheless, a serious question of availability of damages turns on an interpretation of State law (here, Illinois, simply because that is where Boeing moved its corporate office). The law of the United States as a country figures into the legal reasoning insofar as the District Court must follow certain principles, in deciding what a particular State's law is, or would be if the State Supreme Court were presented with the issue. I'm not saying this just to talk lawyer-talk. It strikes me that there are legal processes for individuals to become lawyers in each of the 50 states, but not a United States-wide license to practice law. Would it be useful for such a licensure to exist for the practice of international civil aviation law as issues grow in complexity, technological change accelerates or advances at least, and as geopolitical conflicts impact airspace, aircaraft leasing and insurance, .... I could go on,.... but back to Chicago.

Here is a good summary of what the ruling decided: "A jury could reasonably infer from the evidence that will be presented at trial that the passengers on ET 302 perceived that they were going to crash, horrifically, to their certain deaths."

Part of the set of prior decisions the court considered was the litigation arising from the May 25 1979 crash of Flight 191 near Chicago O'Hare. In earlier posts I advocated that there is precedent, of a sort, to be found in that accident, as the aviators who so tragically perished in that crash certainly were aware, "horrifically, [of] their certain death." Disclaimer: I do not know whether the litigation that took place over Flight 191 included any development of the issue, in specific context of the pilots. But I'll track it down, because this ruling isn't gong to be the last time such an issue arises.

Finally, from the ruling:
To the extent Boeing’s argument is that the beneficiaries may not testify that their grief was increased by their contemplation of the emotional distress their loved ones must have suffered
in their final moments, the Court rejects it. Boeing does not appear to dispute that what happened during these final moments is part of the “process or manner of death.” And, as the Court explained
above, there will be evidence describing the “history of the flight” and “the aircraft’s movements” during those final few moments, the substance of which will not be new to the beneficiaries. Based
on this evidence, contemplation of what the passengers must have experienced as the airplane crashed is hardly mere speculation. There is sufficient evidence to support a reasonable inference
that these passengers experienced pre-impact fright and terror, and that experience is part of the “process or manner of death.” Therefore, the Court is not inclined to bar evidence of how
contemplation of that emotional distress affects the plaintiffs’ grief.

[DaveReidUK]

This SLF/attorney guesses that posting a pdf of a court decision won't be popular here

I can't see anyone objecting to you posting a link.

[WillowRun 6-3]

I haven't found the decision anywhere yet except the Pacer.gov website, which is a pay -walled user-id site. Maybe there's a way but it eludes me so far.

[MechEngr]

American justice, for sale to the high bidder** and best lobbyists. Thank God Pacer stands between the public record and the public.

I do wonder as to the effect of dynamiting this particular worm can. It's similar to how US courts made police invulnerable to the majority of the most heinous acts and how courts said it was OK for police to take anything from a person if they said the magic words "Civil Asset Forfeiture" and how the requirement for a "well regulated militia" vanished to allow the US to lead the world in children gunned down in classrooms.

Now, if only Boeing can be made insolvent. That is the goal, right? It cannot be the cynical belief that money will ease the pain they suffered on behalf of others. They can't realistically be putting a price on lives.

**Just to add - Sacklers.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Just a small correction - Pacer doesn't charge anything if the user doesn't exceed 30 bucks in charges per calendar quarter. At a dime per page, that's a lot of use. So not standing actually between the public and, etc.

[MechEngr]

Paywall is paywall even if they let the riff-raff have a price-off peek. Government should be posting this free as a public record I already paid taxes to have stored and indexed. Doesn't the court also collect filing fees? I don't care if Pacer allows poverty on the "dime per page" (costs them 0.000000001 cents to host) charity.

But then I recall some recent hoopla about some court had been redirecting fees to decorating and remodeling when it was supposed to be for document management. Ah - it is PACER https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/03/20/pacer-court-records-225821/

And it appears to be more poorly managed than the FAA NOTAM system.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Perhaps some insight on Pacer other than a polemic from four years ago?

[MechEngr]

I'm sure the Federal Courts have completely reformed since then. Not sure where more info would come from. Anyone appearing before the court would be a fool to mention how screwed up they are, and only those in direct contact with the Court would be able to pierce the veil (robe?) which was mentioned as a huge problem in that article.

They still say 10 cents per page returned as a search result, so if a search returns 250 documents of 10 pages each that language, however vague, seems like it's billable as $250 - with giving the user a copy of any document an additional 10 cents per page, up to $3 limit per some documents. They emphasize the way to keep the search price down is to give the exact document number. Which, for the general public, will not be known. Thus a search, billed directly to the credit card attached to the account, to find that document number might get very expensive.

Perhaps I am misunderstanding why they are so keen on making sure the user is informed of just how expensive using this service can be by using the phrase "no limit" to the cost of a search.

Nevertheless, back to the can of worms that will be blown to bits if PTSD from imagining the suffering of others can be a cause of action - can't see that turning out well, except for the lawyers. Perhaps the late night psychics can be sworn as expert witnesses to vouch for the experiences relayed by the deceased.

Perhaps the reason for the electronic window shades in new Boeing aircraft is a version of the Peril Sensitive Sunglasses** - they go black to avoid the wearer seeing what's about to happen and shield the wearer from worrying about it.

Are you just giddy at the idea of Boeing insolvency? Seems like giddy as this lawsuit hasn't anything to do with recertification testing.

**a plot device in Hitchhikers Guide to the Galaxy by Douglas Adams

[WillowRun 6-3]

Thank you, MechEngr, for de facto inviting further writing here (after a day of CLE programming I could use something fun). I'll address your points above in reverse order (without implication thereby on their merits).

Boeing insolvency is not something I would cheer, encourage, welcome or otherwise be associated with positively. If you've read even one of ten posts I've written on this forum taking the OEM to task for its various and sundry failures, that would be clear. I haven't ever urged the company to bite the dust (while a good number of very knowledgeable posters have wished for that result here). About the most strident post I've written decrying the state of corporate affairs was one which wished for a return of William "Wimpy" Winpisinger, described (iirc) as aggressive, blunt, radical, flamboyant, and outspoken (according to some biography). I'll say something I couldn't support factually - I never had the honor of meeting the great union leader - but I believe anyway: Winpisinger would want to see the company get back to engineering excellence and the basics of building quality airplanes - paying the price for its misdeeds but not insolvency. (Okay, it's a lawyer thing - don't even think about putting words in my mouth.)

And the tort cases in Chicago aren't aimed at insolvency, won't result in insolvency, and couldn't in any rational calculus lead to insolvency. (I'll save for another day a subpoint about what you might say to the plaintiffs in the case about their losses, how you might give the back of the hand to their claims. Perhaps I've misread your approach.)

As it happens, the recertification thread was simply the most recently active. Did I say the case has a bearing on recertification? - of course not. The other most active thread recently, iirc, involved the criminal case againist Boeing in Texas, and (again iirc) was topically pointed at the case against Forkner. These seem less ongoing, with the exception of the DPA matter pending in federal appellate court, which is even more legalistic and thus not germane to pro pilots even insofar as such aviators do take note of legal matters and affairs. Maybe the tort case in Chicago, which may proceed to trial as soon as June 20, will impact ongoing certification matters, but if so, I don't know that.

Second, perhaps you do know the difference between wrongful death actions, and Survival Act actions. It matters here because you've conflated two different types of claims, both at issue in the case in Chicago and both changed by this recent ruling. The wrongful death claim is one brought by the decedent's surviving spouse, children, other beneficiaries. The ruling says that these claims can include damages for the suffering these individuals experienced as a result of the pre-death suffering their decedents experienced. On the other hand, a Survival Act claim is for the legal wrongs and resulting damages suffered by the decedent himself or herself, which claims survive after the death and thus can be brought by the personal representative of the decedent. These involve the pre-death suffering of the doomed passengers, and not anything suffered by the surviving family and beneficiaries. So neat little references to psychics are not at all relevant. And besides, the court ruled that no speculative evidence could be admitted - and that the basic facts of the descent and other manuevers or gyrations of the aircraft in its fatal plunge would be sufficient to state facts for a jury to consider. And not least, this is not an outlier ruling; there are other courts in other states which have reached similar results.

Third, I think one of us misunderstands how to use Pacer, or how others use it. All you need is enough info about the case, whether names of parties or something other, and the specific court where it is pending, and you can run a docket report listing all the court file contents. Each has a number and is described briefly. The docket report is only a handful of pages. They don't download or print automatically - you pick what you want to review. True, an individual unschooled in court processes especially federal civil procedure (or criminal procedure, but that's a world in which I have not practiced law, so . .. .) might not know which document to download. But the picture you have painted about Pacer usage leading to escalating and unreasonable, even unbelievable or astronomical monetary charges, is just entirely contrary to actual experience.

(I'd gladly email the ruling by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to a moderator, if there really are forum people who want to read it for themselves. It appears that access to Pacer documents includes personally identifiable information, and, you understand, anonymous callsign and all that....)

[Loose rivets]

I have, a couple of times, mentioned the affect Boeing's strangled description of MCAS might have had on the Ethiopian captain. In the previous chapter, the captain had died. The character playing this scene takes on fixed stare and paralysed throttle arm.

[MechEngr]

I invited creating a separate thread, at least that was the intended implication.

As far as I can tell from the really bad interface and help screens, PACER charges for the page count of items returned on that list. It also charges separately if items from that list are downloaded.

If a low-time user goes to PACER and asks for cases involving Boeing, the way that one might with Google, expecting to whittle it down with more sophisticated searches, then PACER might easily turn up thousands of dollars worth of charges.

Which brings to mind - how did you know to search PACER for this particular recent information?

You protest about not wanting insolvency - but never express the damages you feel will 100% end all litigation. Previously it's been that Boeing has not been punished enough. $20 Billion has crippled the ability of Boeing to compete. Insolvency is the next step. If the participants want to let others know of their suffering there are likely 100 or so ghost writers in the US who can put together a tell-all book. The only reason to go to the courts for this is to try to extract financial revenge sufficient to salve all their wounds and that is the extraction of all the financial value of Boeing to put an end to the company. Or it's just a callous attempt at a money grab. Perhaps I'm just cynical.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Okay. Pacer is soon-to-be classed as a dead horse, as far as I'm concerned. I'll just reiterate that the docket report on even long-running cases is just a few pages. Nothing gets downloaded off that report unless it is selected for download. I have not studied the Pacer system; I've used it pretty easily, and I don't have reason to believe its primary purpose was to make all federal court filings available online for free. In any event, no one with even rudimentary knowledge of federal courts in the U.S. would search Pacer for cases in general involving Boeing - and anyone who did have basic knowledge would know that there is a cost associated with treating it like it's Google or some other free-to-search platform.

As to this ruling, I first saw news reports of it in the online edition of a major newspaper. (Since the relevance of your inquiry eludes me, I'll add that looking for the case name or number, I read several more news outlet reports the same morning, all with mostly the same content and a few brief slightyly different items.)

As for damages. I'm going to agree to disagree. I'll mostly leave aside the assertion that some as yet unspecified damages award, after all appeals have been exhausted, would add such a burden that the company would become insolvent. I don't think that is valid but I'm not a securities analyst or a financial analyst and so I'm not arguing that point in substance here, other than to say I don't think your asserting it makes it true. More broadly, and not only because I'm an attorney, I believe in the U.S. civil justice system, even with its many, and serious, flaws. And in that system, it is for the jury to determine damages, subject to court and appellate review. Thus, I don't have a number to propose - that's for plaintiffs and their counsel to propose and advocate.

Not least, as for your most general point, that the plaintiffs in this lawsuit do not deserve financial compensation based on a variety of contentions you assert, well, your opinion is your opinion. I'm imagining something like a joint "struggle session" - U.S. style and not exactly like the Red Guards - in which you berate the plaintiffs for their wrongheadedness of pursuing financial damages in tort, and I (or others posting here) berate Boeing management and directors for their deceit, malfeasance, and failure to uphold what should have been a sacred trust of engineering excellence and high fidelity to aviation safety. In other words, just as my views are completely unconvincing (or worse) to you, you have not convinced me that the doors to the courthouse in ordinary civil litigation should be closed to these plaintiffs, not for any of the various reasons you've argued, or some of those reasons, or all of those reasons.

[MechEngr]

Did you demand that the Boeing management be held to task after the Lion Air crash. If not, what was it about the Ethiopian crash reporting changed your mind?

I believe your mind was convinced by the misstatements of the Ethiopian government that the pilots followed, without failure or any deviation, the instructions given them by Boeing and the FAA and you set that as your stake to which all other outrage is anchored because those instructions "didn't work."

All that needs to happen is for Boeing to get behind the investment curve and they can follow Douglas and Lockheed into the dust. I didn't ask for a number - I asked for an outcome. How badly hurt do you want Boeing to be? I suspect it is bankruptcy. Nothing short of the death penalty for the corporation. Because of that stake you planted.

What Boeing expected to happen with MCAS did happen. The day before the Lion Air crash. Nearly textbook execution of trim problem handling, almost exactly the way the failure mode team expected. Same initial flight deviations, but no one died, nor did any appear to express they felt they might. The pilots wrote it up as annoying.

How did the exact same plane with the exact same problem go from controllable to uncontrolled in less than 24 hours? Training and attitude.

That no one called for grounding the fleet after Lion Air is enough to tell me that no one thought MCAS was a problem.

Sure - this is the US, home to civil suits over the amount or kind of grass on a lawn. Everyone should be welcome to air any grievance they have the money to pay to pursue as long as a lot of money goes to lawyers. I don't care about that for this instance - I care about the intended result - what do the plaintiffs expect from this?

One claim "The attorneys want to call experts who would testify that the passengers likely suffered physical injuries and emotional trauma before the crash."

If they prevail on that then every bumpy flight is filled with passengers suffering emotional trauma. Where will experts come from? Are there people who have been killed in crashes who come back to testify that before the crash they were overcome by fear of dying and that this thought, not held long enough to make it to long term memory, haunted them for the rest of their lives? I guess it did. Like someone falling from a cliff has the rest of their life to avoid crashing on the rocks below.

Is it too much to ask if you think they can be made whole? Or is this revenge? Or a cash grab? Is there any amount large enough that no company will ever think of this failure to imagine a crew doing all the wrong steps in the wrong order and create a system that operates correctly in spite of 100% human failure? Or it doesn't matter because you personally are aggrieved at the actions of Boeing and are looking for standing on the coattails of this decision?

No point in asking for a legal opinion - you cannot make any because hypothetical, speculation, not being paid a retainer by me - about the likely effect this interpretation of a loophole in the current law will have elsewhere. This same type of loophole interpretation is what allows police to steal money and property under the pretext of Civil Asset Forfeiture and allows police to commit heinous actions and be protected by qualified immunity.

---

I'll reiterate - the PACER terms of use appear to be charge for just making the inquiry in proportion to the size of the returned result. Charged for making the search. No need to deflect about downloading. You appear to agree that it is designed to seriously harm those without legal training - the ultimate paywall. What does a law degree cost? PACER is required to collect only enough to pay for its operation - instead it looks to be a piggy bank, charging far in excess of its operating costs and preventing non-legal trained people from learning about the legal system.

[WillowRun 6-3]

Did you demand that the Boeing management be held to task after the Lion Air crash. If not, what was it about the Ethiopian crash reporting changed your mind?
WR - Sure, a lone SLF/attorney writing on an internet forum would have position to "demand" something of Boeing.
And it wasn't the second accident as such - it was the rather substantial volume of reports and analyses pointing out and documenting Boeing's many misdeeds. Of course your knowledge of the flight dynamics and systems performance and connections is far superior to anything I even could try to fake. But your views on where the blame should be placed are the only views I have seen or read about which absolve Boeing. That doesn't make you incorrect, just because you appear to hold unique views absolving Boeing - but it does make it unseemly that you would try to attribute thinking to me that I never have subscribed to or even implied.

I believe your mind was convinced by the misstatements of the Ethiopian government that the pilots followed, without failure or any deviation, the instructions given them by Boeing and the FAA and you set that as your stake to which all other outrage is anchored because those instructions "didn't work."
WR - No, and yet I almost admire the audacity of trying to read things into my mind. But you're incorrect.

All that needs to happen is for Boeing to get behind the investment curve and they can follow Douglas and Lockheed into the dust. I didn't ask for a number - I asked for an outcome. How badly hurt do you want Boeing to be? I suspect it is bankruptcy. Nothing short of the death penalty for the corporation. Because of that stake you planted.
WR - Stake, what stake? Frankly your query makes little or no sense to me. Hurting Boeing was taken off the table when punitive damages were stipulated as not part of the case. The outcome I believe should result is the verdict to be rendered by a jury In a court of competent jurisdiction and subject to trial court and appellate review.
Further.... I'm not going back to dig out posts from some years ago but I do accurately recall other posters who stridently attacked Boeing insofar as it continuing as a company was concerned. I wasn't in their camp (and though not as colorfully as you, they disdained differing views too). You're incorrect; I still don't wish for bk. Again, your audacity in attributing views or opinions to somebody else is almost admirable.

What Boeing expected to happen with MCAS did happen. The day before the Lion Air crash. Nearly textbook execution of trim problem handling, almost exactly the way the failure mode team expected. Same initial flight deviations, but no one died, nor did any appear to express they felt they might. The pilots wrote it up as annoying.
WR - as far as I am aware (and as noted above), even if these facts could be taken at face value as you assert them, you are definitely in a small minority in concluding that Boeing is therefore absolved of liability.

How did the exact same plane with the exact same problem go from controllable to uncontrolled in less than 24 hours? Training and attitude.
WR - Simplistic reduction to this binary description just disregards all the investigative and analytic reports.

That no one called for grounding the fleet after Lion Air is enough to tell me that no one thought MCAS was a problem.
WR - I think the plaintiffs in the Chicago case have something to say about this.

Sure - this is the US, home to civil suits over the amount or kind of grass on a lawn. Everyone should be welcome to air any grievance they have the money to pay to pursue as long as a lot of money goes to lawyers. I don't care about that for this instance - I care about the intended result - what do the plaintiffs expect from this?
WR - That's just the point. They expect their day in court. I've already stated support for the court system in general. Hot McD coffee spill cases don't justify closing courtroom doors to plane crash victims' families. Surely you're aware of review of damages awards at both the trial court and appellate levels?

One claim "The attorneys want to call experts who would testify that the passengers likely suffered physical injuries and emotional trauma before the crash."

If they prevail on that then every bumpy flight is filled with passengers suffering emotional trauma. Where will experts come from? Are there people who have been killed in crashes who come back to testify that before the crash they were overcome by fear of dying and that this thought, not held long enough to make it to long term memory, haunted them for the rest of their lives? I guess it did. Like someone falling from a cliff has the rest of their life to avoid crashing on the rocks below.
WR - Again, I'd pay hard-earned foreign currency to observe you present these views to the actual plaintiffs, or in court on behalf of the company.

Is it too much to ask if you think they can be made whole? Or is this revenge? Or a cash grab? Is there any amount large enough that no company will ever think of this failure to imagine a crew doing all the wrong steps in the wrong order and create a system that operates correctly in spite of 100% human failure? Or it doesn't matter because you personally are aggrieved at the actions of Boeing and are looking for standing on the coattails of this decision?
WR - What are you talking about? The premise of tort law is to provide some compensation, not necessarily precise, and not to satisfy any revenge motives. And "make whole relief" as a concept of compensatory damages works where there are tangible or concrete remedies, obviously not the case in some aspects of personal injury lawsuits. As to holding a personal grievance against Boeing - yikes, no way. (Maybe naively, I'm proceeding on the basis that you're not starting an ad hominem here.) Standing, coattails?--I have idea what you're driving at, but to be safe, "no."

No point in asking for a legal opinion - you cannot make any because hypothetical, speculation, not being paid a retainer by me - about the likely effect this interpretation of a loophole in the current law will have elsewhere. This same type of loophole interpretation is what allows police to steal money and property under the pretext of Civil Asset Forfeiture and allows police to commit heinous actions and be protected by qualified immunity.
WR -There is no connection between the damages analysis and the issues extant with regard to qualified immunity and forfeiture. And the ruling by Judge Alonso isn't about a so-called "loophole."

---

I'll reiterate - the PACER terms of use appear to be charge for just making the inquiry in proportion to the size of the returned result. Charged for making the search. No need to deflect about downloading. You appear to agree that it is designed to seriously harm those without legal training - the ultimate paywall. What does a law degree cost? PACER is required to collect only enough to pay for its operation - instead it looks to be a piggy bank, charging far in excess of its operating costs and preventing non-legal trained people from learning about the legal system.
WR- No, I don't agree it's designed for that. It's easy to use without incurring large costs. Court files were far less accessible prior to Pacer, and iirc they weren't available online at all. If there is over-charging occurring, it hasn't been factor in my own usage, and again, it's easy to use without running up the cost. It wasn't intended as a general search engine, but your criticisms appear to give it that role.

[Loose rivets]

MechEngr

What Boeing expected to happen with MCAS did happen.

I don't think Boeing expected the full sequence of events - which is what brought down the aircraft. If it had, the AoA sensor would have carried a "catastrophic" label, which originally it did not.

At this point, who knew about MCAS? Some people in Boeing and the South American airline that had less than half a dozen lines about it in its pilot's handbook. I found this entry quite by chance and introduced it into the gargantuan PPRuNe pair of threads. Basically, the world did not know about MCAS until some time after the first crash. It might be said that Boeing was backwards in coming forwards with that vital information.

The day before the Lion Air crash. Nearly textbook execution of trim problem handling, almost exactly the way the failure mode team expected. Same initial flight deviations, but no one died, nor did any appear to express they felt they might. The pilots wrote it up as annoying.

With respect, that must be an all-time simplification. There may have been a very different outcome if the other skipper hadn't been there. Just the psychological lightening of load by having him input his observations and thoughts - indeed, to the point of going for his own company's notes. All this must have been of considerable benefit. Yes, they were, in some manner, controlling the aircraft before settling into what must be one of the most illegal flights of the century. Then the write up. Annoying? I know what was annoying - the deaths that might have been avoided if the first captain had not been covering his own hind quarters while minimising a serious disruption of major symptoms. 'How can I write this up to justify carrying on? I know, we'll call the totally uncalled for movement of 47 feet of major flying control as . . . Annoying."

How did the exact same plane with the exact same problem go from controllable to uncontrolled in less than 24 hours? Training and attitude.

When was that almost new AoA sensor changed for an older refurbished unit from Florida? The first crash had a Sensor with the vane wildly misaligned with its shaft.
The level of chaos on that flight-deck can be compared with the previous day's flight, but I suggest the second flight, the first fatal, was a scenario that had Sully saying, 'That could have claimed me'.

That no one called for grounding the fleet after Lion Air is enough to tell me that no one thought MCAS was a problem.

As I say, Boeing was backwards in coming forward. How long was it before most of the operators in the world even knew what MCAS was? By my count, we're up to two separate instances of silence being deadly.

[MechEngr]

When was that almost new AoA sensor changed for an older refurbished unit from Florida?

It was the same sensor on both notable Lion Air flights. The original sensor had developed an intermittent open that vexed the maintainers due to a slightly larger glob of epoxy than intended, opening with some relation to sensor heat being on or off or transitioning. The maintainers replaced it and the first flight with the new sensor is the one that flew safely under fully manual trim control.

The second flight crashed because the Captain transferred control to the First Officer. Until that point the Captain had maintained pitch trim. The First Officer, for reasons unknown, allowed nearly 90 pounds of pitch trim force to build up.

Had he been all alone the Captain on the second Lion Air flight would not have crashed. As soon as he set up for landing and deployed the flaps, MCAS would have stopped. He managed to disengage/did not engage the autopilot and the autothrottle, according to the airspeed disagree and the stall warning. He managed to keep the plane in trim. and he felt comfortable enough to hand over the controls while he looked at the manual.

After analyzing what the First Officer did, it seemed clear the main human failure was not remembering the trim system had an off switch and that the plane should be trimmed for neutral force in level flight before using it.

Did Sully make that claim before or after ET-302? Recall that Capt. Sullenberger's own testimony a few years earlier essentially put the blame on Ethiopian for not having 1500+ hours in both seats, which he stated was a minimum requirement that made his own safe emergency landing possible. If it was his testimony after ET-302, recall that Ethiopian misrepresented what happened and claimed the pilots followed every step exactly in the correct order. The truth that they failed to respond correctly, even before MCAS was enabled, was hidden in the FDR trace released a year later. I expect his statements were from believing what Ethiopian claimed was true.

The question was - why was any airline unaware of the problem after Lion Air? The preliminary report was 100% sufficient to determine cause, mitigation in flight, and identifying sequence and symptoms. ET-302 wasn't because anyone was silent. Their own report indicates they were well aware of MCAS before the crash.

Knowing the name is irrelevant. Knowing the symptoms is sufficient to identify the needed procedures. There is evidence Ethiopian knew the name. There is no evidence they ever knew the symptoms or the procedures as delivered to them.

[DaveReidUK]

The inquest into the deaths of the 3 British passengers on board ET302 starts today, with lawyers for the families seeking an "unlawful killing" verdict.

[WHBM]

The inquest into the deaths of the 3 British passengers on board ET302 starts today, with lawyers for the families seeking an "unlawful killing" verdict.
Does that get more compensation than an Accidental Death verdict ?

[MechEngr]

"British victims of an airline crash in Ethiopia where all 157 passengers and crew on board died were “unlawfully killed”, a coroner has concluded."
https://uk.news.yahoo.com/british-victims-boeing-737-max-182239580.html

[Compton3fox]

Issues found in the rear pressure bulkheads of airframes manufactured by Spirit... I am left wondering what other issues are yet undiscovered?

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/new-boeing-737-max-supplier-defect-delay-aircraft-deliveries-2023-08-23/

[GlobalNav]

Issues found in the rear pressure bulkheads of airframes manufactured by Spirit... I am left wondering what other issues are yet undiscovered?

https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/new-boeing-737-max-supplier-defect-delay-aircraft-deliveries-2023-08-23/

The good news is that this was discovered and being dealt with, instead of being ignored and covered up.

[WillowRun 6-3]

The good news is that this was discovered and being dealt with, instead of being ignored and covered up.
The quoted post states a highly condensed summation of many hundreds (or more) posts about the MAX debacles - plural, debacles - of Boeing: that conformance to sound engineering and quality assurance standards (not to mention regulatory requirements) could be referred to as "news."

[MechEngr]

Labor negotiations and problems on the spotlight airplane and production line problems leaked to the press? Say it isn't so.

Somehow the problem is all better now that the contract is agreed to.

I still dream of the day there is a labor strike over manufacturing quality issues.

[WillowRun 6-3]

MechEngr, I would gladly abandon my other "profesisonal development initiatives" and audition before the union's leadership to get the role of lead legal counsel for the labor organization in such an industrial action.

Okay, so maybe I've been influenced by the relative greater frequency of strikes in Europe, even - especially - in ATC.

Or maybe influenced by imagining the scene when Joe Patroni flies to New York, and barges into an airline executive office's with words like, to the effect, if you want to lose airplanes in flight, you can throw me out of your office, otherwise, you need to listen to what's wrong with [component part]. The scene definitely is in the book, maybe not in the movie . . . . though of course George Kennedy's portrayal of Joe Patroni is one of the Hollywood motion pictures industry's greatest portrayals.

[ATC Watcher]

maybe influenced by imagining the scene when Joe Patroni flies to New York, and barges into an airline executive office's with words like, to the effect, if you want to lose airplanes in flight, you can throw me out of your office, otherwise, you need to listen to what's wrong with [component part]. The scene definitely is in the book, maybe not in the movie . . . . though of course George Kennedy's portrayal of Joe Patroni is one of the Hollywood motion pictures industry's greatest portrayals.
Indeed it was. Great book . But that was 50 years ago.
For a good understanding of how corporate America reacts to "knowledgeable" people marching in an office with bad news may I suggest the excellent documentary " Painkiller" on Netflix on OxyContin . I am prepared to bet the reaction of Purdue executives is very similar to what Boeing board room is planning right now.