Kobe Bryant killed in S76 crash [Archive] - Page 3

malabo

6th Feb 2020, 19:33

Whether inadvertent or on purpose flight into IMC is somewhat academic, as both suggest pilot culpability. With 8000+ hours experience in the same area dealing with heavy smog, especially at sunrise and sunset it beggars belief that he could not avoid going IMC. And surely deliberate entry to IFR from a low level belly crawl at the bottom of a valley, against the operator certificate limitations, seems unlikely, even given our unknown of his relevant experience or competence.

We’re at a loss for an explanation, witness the thread’s decline into rotor rpm and engine fire certification. How about misplaced (it’s always misplaced) hero worship. Bryant was a has-been in the sports entertainment world, but seemed to still wax large in the pilot’s world in “servitude”. Wealthy people dying in helicopter crashes give our industry a bad rep, hence the HAC posturing. I always appreciated being distanced from my passengers by a business manager that made it very clear I was selected because they thought I would say no if the conditions warranted, and not yes out of awe of the client. We turned around a few times.

Jimmy.

7th Feb 2020, 00:42

We’re at a loss for an explanation, witness the thread’s decline into rotor rpm and engine fire certification.

While it's great to read some wise posts about what probably happened, I and for sure some other PPRuNers appreciate and learn a lot in that posts, including a few offtopic, as the engine fire certification, definitions (IIMC x UIMC) and others.
Just my humble opinion.

Two's in

7th Feb 2020, 01:30

Judging from many of the posts on here, it seems that Occam's Razor is no longer part of the rotary syllabus.

Jimmy.

7th Feb 2020, 02:15

Judging from many of the posts on here, it seems that Occam's Razor is no longer part of the rotary syllabus.
Or we wouldn't be at more than 500 posts so far. Maybe PPRuNers prefer Hume's Razor...:E

megan

7th Feb 2020, 12:46

gulli, re fireproof the FAA merely defines it as,Fireproof—

(1) With respect to materials and parts used to confine fire in a designated fire zone, means the capacity to withstand at least as well as steel in dimensions appropriate for the purpose for which they are used, the heat produced when there is a severe fire of extended duration in that zone; and

(2) With respect to other materials and parts, means the capacity to withstand the heat associated with fire at least as well as steel in dimensions appropriate for the purpose for which they are used.The catch is,1.1 of the FAR provides general definitions for the terms "fireproof" and "fire resistant," these definitions do not specify heat intensity, temperature levels, duration (exposure time), or an appropriate wall thickness or other dimensional characteristics for the purpose intended. With the advent of surface coatings (i.e., ablative/ intumescent), composites, and metal honeycomb for acoustically treated ducting, cowling, and other components which may form a part of the nacelle firewall, applicant confusion sometimes exists as to how compliance can be shown, particularly with respect to the definition of "fireproof" and "fire resistant" as defined in 1.1The following 1990 document provides guidance, and defines fireproof as,The capability of a material or component to withstand, as well as or better than steel, a 2000°F flame (+15O'F) for 15 minutes minimum, while still fulfilling its design purpose. The term "fireproof," when applied to materials and parts used to confine fires within designated fire zones, means that the material or part will perform this function under conditions likely to occur in such zones and will withstand a 2000°F flame (2150°F) for 15 minutes minimum

https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC20-135.pdf

What firewall "fireproof" means in the S-76 would have to be answered by SK..

Capi_Cafre'

7th Feb 2020, 16:58

The Operator has some history with the Regulator. (https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/kobe-bryant-island-express-helicopters.html)

Airbubba

7th Feb 2020, 19:03

Airbubba

7th Feb 2020, 19:18

NTSB News Release:

NTSB Issues Investigative Update on Sikorsky Helicopter Crash2/7/2020 The National Transportation Safety Board (http://www.ntsb.gov/) issued an investigative update Friday for its ongoing investigation of the fatal, Jan. 26, 2020, helicopter crash near Calabasas, California.The Sikorsky S-76B helicopter collided with hilly terrain and was destroyed by impact forces and fire. The pilot and eight passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter operated by Island Express Helicopters Inc., was on an on-demand passenger visual flight rules flight from John Wayne-Orange County Airport, in Santa Ana, California, to Camarillo Airport, in Camarillo, California.

"Our investigators have already developed a substantial amount of evidence about the circumstances of this tragic crash," said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. "And we are confident that we will be able to determine its cause as well as any factors that contributed to it so we can make safety recommendations to prevent accidents like this from occurring again.”

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/PublishingImages/DCA20MA059-flightpath.jpg (This NTSB still image is from a drone video duplicating the flightpath of N72EX at position/altitude of last ADS-B target. NTSB image) [I don't think this caption is accurate, this is Google Earth, not a still from a drone video. - Airbubba - It has now been corrected, see below.]

According to the investigative update, all significant components of the helicopter were located within the wreckage area. Examination of the main and tail rotor assemblies found damage consistent with powered rotation at the time of impact. The initial point of impact consisted of highly fragmented cabin and cockpit debris.

The main wreckage was about 127 feet from the impact and consisted of the empennage/tailboom, both engines, avionics boxes, and portions of the cockpit instrument panel. The entire fuselage/cabin and both engines were subjected to a postcrash fire. The cockpit experienced extreme fragmentation. The instrument panel was destroyed, and most instruments were displaced from their panel mounts. Flight controls were fragmented and fire damaged.

The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit voice recorder nor was it required to be for the accident flight. The NTSB has been issuing recommendations to the Federal Aviation Administration to require recorders on helicopters since 1999. Currently, safety recommendations A-13-12 (https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-13-012) and A-13-13 (https://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-recs/_layouts/ntsb.recsearch/Recommendation.aspx?Rec=A-13-013) are the only open recommendations that address recorders in helicopters.

The helicopter operator, Island Express Helicopters, held an FAA Part 135 operating certificate ISHA094F, for on-demand VFR-only operations, since 1998 and conducted offshore oil industry support flights and charter flights. The company’s operations specifications document listed six helicopters including the accident aircraft: 1 SK-76A, 2 SK-76B, 2 AS-350-B2 and 1 AS-350-BA.

The investigative update includes a summary of the ATC and radar data, weather information as well as a summary of video and photos provided by witnesses depicting the weather at the time of the accident.

The information in the update is preliminary and subject to change as the NTSB’s investigation progresses. Analysis of the accident facts, along with conclusions and a determination of probable cause, will come at a later date when the final report on the investigation is completed. As such, no conclusions about how the incident happened should be drawn from the information contained within the investigative update.
The full investigative update is available at https://go.usa.gov/xd84a

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1384x926/ntsb_lax_helo_2_51a1b1e0ec73dce1a20716039a171951a236e71e.jpg

377 Pete

7th Feb 2020, 20:15

Figure 1a in the .PDF shows a possible swath cut in the vegetation ~100 feet before main impact site. Fox News guy just said rotor blade clipped a tree branch. There's NO TREES to be seen in the area. All tall grass and 4-5 foot high chaparral.

Musician

7th Feb 2020, 21:25

The NTSB has published what it calls a preliminary report. The document is labeled as an 'Aircraft Accident Investigative Update'.

https://ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA20MA059-Investigative-Update.pdf

Some quotes that struck me as pertinent (emphasis mine):
"The SCT controller then asked the pilot his intentions, to which he replied he was climbing to 4,000 feet. There were no further transmissions"

"The helicopter was equipped with a four-axis automatic flight control system, electronic flight instrument system, radio altimeter, and ADS-B transponder. It was also equipped with a flight management system (FMS)." ... "All inspections were up to date."

"According to FAA records, the pilot held an FAA commercial certificate with ratings for helicopter and instrument helicopter, as well as an FAA instructor certificate for flight, instrument, and ground instruction.His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on July 3, 2019, with a limitation stating, “must have glasses for near vision.” At the time of his last medical application, he reported 8,200 total hours of flight experience. The pilot logged about 1,250 total hours in the S76 helicopter. His most recent flight review, including proficiency training in inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC) and unusual attitude recovery, was conducted in a helicopter with EUROSAFETY International on May 8, 2019. The pilot received satisfactory grades for these maneuvers."

I don't know what this means for the pilot's IFR currency.

They are showing some evidence that there was an unbroken cloud layer above the Van Nuys area from 1900 to 2400ft MSL.

They also found a large rotor blade segment 50 feet from the hub, and the hub was 60 feet beyond the fuselage and engines. This suggests to me that the pile of blade segments we discussed consisted mainly of 3 blades; since each blade has two red stripes, that matches.

SASless

7th Feb 2020, 23:02

"Our investigators have already developed a substantial amount of evidence about the circumstances of this tragic crash," said NTSB Chairman Robert L. Sumwalt. "And we are confident that we will be able to determine its cause as well as any factors that contributed to it so we can make safety recommendations to prevent accidents like this from occurring again.”

(My bolding of the text)

I shall say it is my opinion Mr. Sumwalt is talking out his hind end.

They will come up with a "Probable Cause", they shall make some recomendations, and that will be the end of it.

They are not able to force any change that shall prevent this from happening again.....that is for sure because helicopter pilots have an astounding ability to repeat history and the FAA has a unique talent at ignoring NTSB Recommendations.

rogercopy

7th Feb 2020, 23:26

(This NTSB still image is from a drone video duplicating the flightpath of N72EX at position/altitude of last ADS-B target. NTSB image) [I don't think this caption is accurate, this is Google Earth, not a still from a drone video. - Airbubba]
The NTSB caption is correct. Figure 3 is not from Google Earth. It shows the wreckage and people standing around it.

Figure 1a in the .PDF shows a possible swath cut in the vegetation ~100 feet before main impact site. Fox News guy just said rotor blade clipped a tree branch. There's NO TREES to be seen in the area. All tall grass and 4-5 foot high chaparral.
The NTSB Investigative Update said (page 3): "One piece of 2-inch diameter tree branch was cut cleanly in 3 locations (similar to saw cuts) about 30 feet prior to the initial impact crater."

JimEli

8th Feb 2020, 00:17

"...proficiency training in inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC) and unusual attitude recovery, was conducted in a helicopter..."

Airbubba

8th Feb 2020, 01:21

The NTSB caption is correct. Figure 3 is not from Google Earth. It shows the wreckage and people standing around it.

It is now, the correct image has now been linked in the news release. :ok:

This is the image that was originally in the media release with the caption:

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1465x861/ge_image_a6449c4fbcc855c53aaa5f00cac1834253a64605.jpg

Airbubba

8th Feb 2020, 02:03

The NTSB has published what it calls a preliminary report. The document is labeled as an 'Aircraft Accident Investigative Update'.

The NTSB has now corrected its earlier tweet calling the investigative update a preliminary report:

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1369x442/ntsb_correction_408b08496e4352ab05185dc293f7abd48755ca36.jpg

Musician

8th Feb 2020, 10:12

This is the drone still rotated 20° left, i.e. what the terrain would look like if breaking out of cloud at a left bank.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/515x289/image_8bc10950edd9c25a4121e8c10d97a26d6c316568.jpeg
Drone still from NTSB update, rotated 20°

aterpster

8th Feb 2020, 13:15

Musician

8th Feb 2020, 14:06

"...proficiency training in inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC) and unusual attitude recovery, was conducted in a helicopter..."
That's a reference to the CFR 135.293 (c) VFR currency requirements, though the regulation calls for "competency".

I wonder which type of helicopter the training was on, though. Island Express had 3 S76 and 3 AS-350. Eurosafety's US training center is in Camarillo, and they offer "advanced recurrent" training for the AS-350 only (full list of types at https://www.eurosafety.us/recurrent-airframe-training ).

SASless

8th Feb 2020, 14:16

How long do you retain your proficiency following satisfactorily completing such training and Check Ride?

There is "currency" and there is "proficiency"....one is legal, theoretical, and technical...the other is real.

Autopilots do a very good job of flying if they are serviceable and set up for immediate use....and used.

JimEli

8th Feb 2020, 15:12

That's a reference to the CFR 135.293 (c) VFR currency requirements, though the regulation calls for "competency".

I wonder which type of helicopter the training was on, though. Island Express had 3 S76 and 3 AS-350. Eurosafety's US training center is in Camarillo, and they offer "advanced recurrent" training for the AS-350 only (full list of types at https://www.eurosafety.us/recurrent-airframe-training ).I believe the 293 check needs to be accomplished in aircraft class type (I could be wrong).

Musician

8th Feb 2020, 16:26

I believe the 293 check needs to be accomplished in aircraft class type (I could be wrong).

CFR 135.293: "(b) No certificate holder may use a pilot, nor may any person (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=24a80ca42ed148d527b7ddad982da95a&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293) serve as a pilot, in any aircraft (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=8e9caab04f792d93d0738c9d3290164e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293) unless, since the beginning of the 12th calendar month before that service, that pilot has passed a competency check given by the Administrator (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=0c265d2e5b0cc0d1944056607ecc5df4&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293) or an authorized check pilot in that class of aircraft (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=8e9caab04f792d93d0738c9d3290164e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293), if single-engine airplane (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=ee9803083700896cd85aff74cb4f95ea&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293) other than turbojet, or that type of aircraft (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=8e9caab04f792d93d0738c9d3290164e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293), if helicopter (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=7dc120721ef47a2c4dc17c9948799e0e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293), multiengine airplane (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=ee9803083700896cd85aff74cb4f95ea&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293), or turbojet airplane (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=ee9803083700896cd85aff74cb4f95ea&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293), to determine the pilot's competence in practical skills and techniques in that aircraft (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=8e9caab04f792d93d0738c9d3290164e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293) or class of aircraft (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=8e9caab04f792d93d0738c9d3290164e&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:G:Part:135:Subpart:G: 135.293)."

There are two possibilities I can think of:
1) The May 2019 training was on an Island Express S76,
2) The May 2019 training was on an AS-350, and the pilot also had a checkride on a S76 earlier that year.

The NTSB wording is ambiguous, and I don't know which is more likely.

vortex-generators

8th Feb 2020, 23:35

Possibility number one is correct.
Two pilots from Island express were trained and checked by Eurosafety in Island Exspress company Sikorsky S 76. Pictures online of a flight to Catalina island Two Harbors.

Musician

9th Feb 2020, 00:23

Musician

9th Feb 2020, 09:26

medod

9th Feb 2020, 11:18

Is it at all unusual for a passenger to sit in a pilot's seat on these kinds of flights?

Hot and Hi

9th Feb 2020, 11:31

Is it at all unusual for a passenger to sit in a pilot's seat on these kinds of flights?
No, it is not unusual.

Search&Rescue

9th Feb 2020, 16:38

Looking at their facebook feed, Eurosafety seem to regularly do S76 recurrent.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1001x997/image_4260c28b325c357fe3ce86f5cf841aad7061a505.jpeg
https://m.facebook.com/177379092306991/photos/a.2383881068323438/2388266127884932/?type=3&source=54

This picture is very interesting... even tough it is not from the accident flight...

Because I had my ”wake up call” with MauiJim sunglasses last summer when flying with R44 and looked at a Garmin display (combined ADI&HSI)... and noticed that from certain angles the display turned totally black! 😳 In other words the ADI was not readible at all! Very scary thoughts crossed my mind then... even if I was flying in VMC.😳🤔

And after that I realised for sure the general guidance: Polarized lenses are not recommended for use in the aviation environment. While useful for blocking reflected light from horizontal surfaces such as water or snow, polarization can reduce or eliminate the visibility of instruments that incorporate anti glare filters.

https://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/sunglasses.pdf

I hope that this was not a factor in this tragic accident!

Devil 49

9th Feb 2020, 17:42

This picture is very interesting... even tough it is not from the accident flight...

Because I had my ”wake up call” with MauiJim sunglasses last summer when flying with R44 and looked at a Garmin display (combined ADI&HSI)... and noticed that from certain angles the display turned totally black! In other words the ADI was not readible at all! Very scary thoughts was crossing my mind even if I was flying in VMC.😳

And after that I realised for sure the general guidance: Polarized lenses are not recommended for use in the aviation environment. While useful for blocking reflected light from horizontal surfaces such as water or snow, polarization can reduce or eliminate the visibility of instruments that incorporate anti- glare filters.

https://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/sunglasses.pdf

I hope that this was not a factor in this tragic accident!

I used polarized brown lenses for thirty-some odd years. Yes, they can be a problem with some displays, lcd types especially; and windshields, windows with heat elements laminated; and 'stress figures' where lexan, plexiglass are bent in installation. Never had an issue with led, oleds or more modern displays. Reflected glare is a huge issue in some environments, even where it's not obvious. Unless the windscreen in whatever I was flying that day presented huge issues (one aircraft in all those years) polarized brown every time.

My experience was that I got about an extra mile vis when operating in 2-3 mile visibility conditions, especially with precip. I'm gonna guess I've got 800, 1000 hours running in 2-3 mile vis and 3-500 foot ceilings over the decades. Not arguing anything in the FAA circular, in my mind the benefit outweighed the risk, especially in restricted vis where reflected flashes were less an issue and in a cockpit absent the other issues mentioned. All things considered, I would have been wearing mine up that canyon...

havick

9th Feb 2020, 21:15

What is the point of being a high net worth individual owning a multi million dollar twin turbine helicopter to then sign up with a VFR only operator?

Non aviation savvy people have no idea what they are and aren’t signing up for. All they see is a fancy looking helicopter and have no idea of the helicopter, company or pilot’s capability/approvals.

Most clients don’t know what they don’t know, and the expectation is that the industry should protect them but sadly that’s not always the case.

Most high nett worth clients/owners have no problems paying for higher/better capabilities and when they have it explained to them what they’re getting. But if they don’t know what questions to ask, then they just accept status quo or believe what the snake oil salesmen are selling them.

Alex Permit

9th Feb 2020, 23:26

vortex-generators

10th Feb 2020, 00:07

Is it at all unusual for a passenger to sit in a pilot's seat on these kinds of flights?
I didn't read that anywhere, was there a passenger in the left seat on this flight?

[email protected]

10th Feb 2020, 05:56

Bravo Delta

10th Feb 2020, 06:54

Just another Buddy Holly accident that happened 61 years ago.
All young and old pilots, this is a modern day version of an old accident. Wisdom from an old bold pilot.

Glacier pilot

10th Feb 2020, 07:12

RE: The FAA, You are probably 100% correct. What I find interesting is that the pilot (except for the last few seconds of flight) seemed to have every intention, with apparent confidence, of completing the flight to a landing spot (otherwise why request and inititate a climb to 4000' - plenty of opportunities to abort the mission). Looking at the NTSB photos, my guess, the manuever attempted was a deliberate one to climb through a 'hole' (legal- who knows). The key questions are; 1) why the decision in the first place and 2) what caused the pilot to abrubtly 'deviate' from his objective just, seemingly, a few feet & seconds from the ridge top and from on top conditions and to initiate a sequence of events that resulted in loss of aircraft control. IMO, a major distraction occured, e.g. 1) an inflight emergency; 2) an unwanted input from the co-pilot/passenger, or 3) the sudden & unexpected awareness of the proximity of terrain. Every new generation of pilots seems needs to learn the difference betwen 'thinking I can do it' as opposed to 'knowing that I can do it'.
(My bolding of the text)

I shall say it is my opinion Mr. Sumwalt is talking out his hind end.

They will come up with a "Probable Cause", they shall make some recomendations, and that will be the end of it.

They are not able to force any change that shall prevent this from happening again.....that is for sure because helicopter pilots have an astounding ability to repeat history and the FAA has a unique talent at ignoring NTSB Recommendations.

ApolloHeli

10th Feb 2020, 07:17

Bravo Delta

10th Feb 2020, 07:19

RE: The FAA, You are probably 100% correct. What I find interesting is that the pilot (except for the last few seconds of flight) seemed to have every intention, with apparent confidence, of completing the flight to a landing spot (otherwise why request and inititate a climb to 4000' - plenty of opportunities to abort the mission). Looking at the NTSB photos, my guess, the manuever attempted was a deliberate one to climb through a 'hole' (legal- who knows). The key questions are; 1) why the decision in the first place and 2) what caused the pilot to abrubtly 'deviate' from his objective just, seemingly, a few feet & seconds from the ridge top and from on top conditions and to initiate a sequence of events that resulted in loss of aircraft control. IMO, a major distraction occured, e.g. 1) an inflight emergency; 2) an unwanted input from the co-pilot/passenger, or 3) the sudden & unexpected awareness of the proximity of terrain. Every new generation of pilots seems needs to learn the difference betwen 'thinking I can do it' as opposed to 'knowing that I can do it'.

I like your passion, and I agree that so much may have happened BUT the decision was made before the aircraft left the ground.

rogercopy

10th Feb 2020, 09:56

I didn't read that anywhere, was there a passenger in the left seat on this flight?
There's no evidence that there was a passenger in a pilot seat. The helicopter's passenger compartment was able to carry 8 passengers (two benches that could fit 4 each). So most likely, all 8 passengers were in the back.

Sir Korsky

10th Feb 2020, 10:09

Devil 49 - the AW139 RFM specifically prohibits the use of polarised sunglasses in the cockpit because of the blanking effect they have on the MFDs/PFDs so it is clearly aircraft and display specific. I don't know what the S76 displays are like or if there are similar limitations.

Polarized sunglasses that worked just fine with the 76 IIDS and EFIS are totally useless with the 139 display. I quit wearing sunglasses in the 139 as I find the mesh screens and sun blind quite effective anyway.

airsound

10th Feb 2020, 10:22

Airbubba, you pointed out that the NTSB document was labeled as an 'Aircraft Accident Investigative Update'.
and indeed it is so titled. I seem to have seen various versions of it, with minor differences, such as having page numbers or not. That sort of thing is minor, but it makes you wonder whether you're looking at the same document.

But the thing that puzzles me about it is that it has no date on it, no reference number to identify it, and no signature or other indication of who wrote it. It's been described as a 'preliminary report' - but it doesn't seem to be the kind of formal preliminary report that accident investigation bodies usually publish within a month or so. Which is presumably why NTSB describes it as an investigative update.

Does this matter? I don't know - but I do know that I'd rather like my official documents to have some indication on them of when they were written and some way of identifying them.

airsound

SASless

10th Feb 2020, 12:38

Ah....we are back to the "What If'ing" againl

Now we are being told the climb to 4,000 feet was intended to complete the flight to the destination.

Then there is supposition about a "Hole".

Folks....you do not know what the Pilot's thinking was or what his intentions were.....beyond he reported making a climb to 4,000 feet to ATC.

A fair assumption is he was going to get to VFR On Top conditions.

After that.....you are just guessing what he had in mind upon getting back to VFR conditions.

JimEli

10th Feb 2020, 13:54

Hello. I'm a new time poster with no flight experience, so please be gentle. I'm here to ask a question of the experts. Are there any disciplinarily actions a pilot faces for inadvertent VFR flight into IMC? If so, do such potentially "punitive" actions disincentivize some pilots from taking actions such as declaring an emergency or "confessing" their predicament to ATC?A pilot always has the option to use the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) (https://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/index.html) which collects, analyzes, and responds to voluntarily submitted aviation safety incident reports in order to lessen the likelihood of aviation accidents.

FAR 91.25 Prohibitis the use of ASRS reports for enforcement purposes: The Administrator of the FAA will not use reports submitted to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration under the Aviation Safety Reporting Program (or information derived therefrom) in any enforcement action except information concerning accidents or criminal offenses which are wholly excluded from the Program.

ASRS Enforcement Restrictions. The FAA considers the filing of a report with NASA concerning an incident or occurrence involving a violation of 14 CFR to be indicative of a constructive attitude. Such an attitude will tend to prevent future violations. Accordingly, although a finding of violation may be made, neither a civil penalty nor certificate suspension will be imposed if:

1. The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate;

2. The violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or action under 49 U.S.C. § 44709, which discloses a lack of qualification or competency, which is wholly excluded from this policy;

3. The person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action to have committed a violation of 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, or any regulation promulgated there for a period of 5 years prior to the date of occurrence; and

4. The person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, or date when the person became aware or should have been aware of the violation, he or she completed and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident or occurrence to NASA.

Musician

10th Feb 2020, 15:07

There's no evidence that there was a passenger in a pilot seat. The helicopter's passenger compartment was able to carry 8 passengers (two benches that could fit 4 each). So most likely, all 8 passengers were in the back.
So if we're doing a what-if, let's do it properly.

I posted earlier (#301) that iexhelicopters advertised this type of helicopter for 9 passengers on their website. That makes me conclude that having a passenger up front was not unusual for their operations. I can imagine the pilot asking, "which one of you wants to ride up front today?" But there were 8 seats in the back, so possibly nobody was in the front besides the pilot.
The NTSB will have found evidence: a seat that was empty post-crash with its harness intact may have been unoccupied, if the post-crash fire allows that determination to be made. It is possible that the "the passenger did it" scenario can be ruled out based on that.

If a passenger was in a front seat, then they'd have control if they touched the stick, since this is not a fly-by-wire aircraft, right? All of the passengers are old enough to know not to do that, so the person would have to have been panicking. But the flight path does not look how I'd expect a panicked person to fly (but then I don't know how they would).

Ever since SASless posted that sensibly, the pilot would have activated the autopilot for the climb, I had been wondering if it is possible on the S76B to disengage the autopilot accidentally. The famous predecessor accident for this is Eastern Air Lines Flight 401: the crew had put their passenger jet on "altitude hold" at 2000 feet while they tried to figure out why the gear down indicator wouldn't come on, and then someone jostled the yoke and the autopilot changed over to "attitude hold" and slowly descended into the Everglades. The common factor besides the low altitude is that looking out of the window didn't help, as it was dark; and here, they probably were in cloud.

It seems unlikely to me that the pilot would have accidentally disabled the autopilot and not noticed, even if he was distracted talking to the passengers or plotting a course, but could a passenger have done it? What would it take on that helicopter with these avionics, is it even possible to do accidentally?

To be very clear, I am assuming:
- a passenger was up front
- autopilot was active
- the passenger used a control
There is no evidence that any of these happened, and there are plenty of alternate explanations.

Jimmy.

10th Feb 2020, 15:25

377 Pete

10th Feb 2020, 17:18

Been reading through this:

Somatogravic and Somatogyral Illusions"Somatogravic and Somatogyral illusions are the two most common forms of vestibular or 'false sensation illusion' which may be encountered when no clear horizon is present and flying wholly or partly by visual external reference is attempted."

skybraryDOTaero/index.php/Somatogravic_and_Somatogyral_Illusions (replace 'DOT' with '.')

I have experienced this while driving at night through light to moderate snowfall. Any visual reference to a fixed point is masked by weather, your brain tells you that YOU are the fixed point which creates the odd, unnerving sensation that you are standing still. You look at your tach and speedo, all is normal. I would imagine that as a pilot, with a third axis to deal with, the sensation is several times worse...

HissingSyd

10th Feb 2020, 17:50

Somatogravic and Somatogyral Illusions
I have experienced this while driving at night through light to moderate snowfall. Any visual reference to a fixed point is masked by weather, your brain tells you that YOU are the fixed point which creates the odd, unnerving sensation that you are standing still. You look at your tach and speedo, all is normal. I would imagine that as a pilot, with a third axis to deal with, the sensation is several times worse... i do not think that is a vestibular (inner ear) illusion, but a visual illusion called 'vection'. It is nevertheless unnnerving.

[email protected]

10th Feb 2020, 19:34

I would imagine that as a pilot, with a third axis to deal with, the sensation is several times worse... and that is the reason we learn to trust our instruments when visual cues are absent or confusing.

That lack of movement cue that we normally get from our peripheral vision is the reason pilots on NVG are taught to scan to the side - your peripheral vision is removed when looking down the tubes, along with your stereoscopic depth of field.

The vection feeling is best seen on a train if you are stationary and looking out of the window at another train which then sets off - this will give you the sensation of movement because your only external visual cue is moving even though you have no proprioceptive feedback to confirm that your train has moved.

[email protected]

10th Feb 2020, 19:37

Musician posted a photo of the crash site rotated by 20 degrees which shows how the brain can be fooled by a powerful illusion - suddenly catching a glimpse of terrain in between layers of cloud could easily cause disorientation unless you cross check with your instruments (not easy to make yourself do at low level).

Musician

11th Feb 2020, 09:35

In the picture of the aircraft's cockpit is possible to see both Flight Directors' Mode Select Panels (I don't remember the nomenclature on the 76) and AL 300 displays on the front panel, instead of in the center console. So, I don't think a passenger could have decoupled without pilot notice, considering the other way to do so is pressing a button on the cyclic.
Well, the obvious way to decouple is via the autopilot ("helipilot") control panel on the center console, just ahead of the seats. (I haven't found where the decouple button is on the cyclic control, except "at the bottom". I don't know how easily that can happen.) I believe that would've put the FD in SBY (?), so it'd have been somewhat noticeable, but there wouldn't be a chime or a caution light. But it still feels very unlikely for a passenger to do that when it requires a conscious action (and we don't even know if there was a passenger up front).

The big question is, how do you miss a rapid descent of over 1000 feet in 20 seconds?
Possible answers:
-- pilot looking outside (for traffic? terrain?)
-- pilot working with iPad (thought FD was coupled when it wasn't?)
-- pilot incapacitated
-- ...?

Where is the point when you say to yourself, "no use looking outside any more, time to go on instruments"? And not having flight following means you need to look out for traffic, right?

Jimmy.

11th Feb 2020, 10:23

Does anybody know if the helicopter was equipped with SPZ 7000 or 7600?

industry insider

11th Feb 2020, 11:51

Musician wrote

It seems unlikely to me that the pilot would have accidentally disabled the autopilot and not noticed, even if he was distracted talking to the passengers or plotting a course, but could a passenger have done it? What would it take on that helicopter with these avionics, is it even possible to do accidentally?

To be very clear, I am assuming:
- a passenger was up front
- autopilot was active
- the passenger used a control
There is no evidence that any of these happened, and there are plenty of alternate explanations.

With each passing day, the speculation and theories become ever wilder.

Lonewolf_50

11th Feb 2020, 12:37

Where is the point when you say to yourself, "no use looking outside any more, time to go on instruments"? And not having flight following means you need to look out for traffic, right? As soon as you are no longer in VMC, or as the FAA puts it, "at the onset of IMC."
There have been a number of posts in this thread where pilots have shared their experiences with Inadvertent IMC/Unintentional IMC.
Even if you get on the gages immediately, it is easy to be/get behind the aircraft and be catching up if you enter IMC before you expect to.
Jim Eli a few pages back cited some FAA material on that topic (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10675418).
According to the FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook, at the onset of IIMC:
“…pick a heading known to be free of obstacles and maintain it. This will likely be the heading you were already on, which was planned and briefed.”
“Try to avoid immediately turning 180°. Turning around is not always the safest route and executing a turn immediately after UIMC may lead to spatial disorientation.
If a 180° turn is the safest option, first note the heading you are on then begin the turn to the reciprocal heading, but only after stable flight is achieved…”
As to
And not having flight following means you need to look out for traffic, right?
If you just flew into the goo, just how much traffic do you expect to see, Musician?

SASless

11th Feb 2020, 12:50

The Gospel extant is to use the Autopilot to the maximum extent possible if installed and serviceable.

Lonewolf_50

11th Feb 2020, 13:05

@SASless: yeah, that too.
Maybe I need to rephrase that point for Musician's benefit: one needs to be on the gages Now (even with autopilot engaged) not Later.
Given Musician's posted location - Bremen - and me remembering German folk lore (https://germanstories.vcu.edu/grimm/bremereng.html), - I cannot help but have this mental picture (https://bostonconservatory.berklee.edu/sites/bostonconservatory.edu/files/styles/boco_image_width_460/public/event/image/P_O_2019-04_BremenTown_WEB_460x660.jpg?itok=CImSYr7c).

Musician

11th Feb 2020, 13:30

Does anybody know if the helicopter was equipped with SPZ 7000 or 7600?
It had a SPZ 7000 when it was sold to Island Express in 2015, see the equipment list at https://ibid.illinois.gov/item.php?id=123331 .

If you just flew into the goo, just how much traffic do you expect to see, Musician?
Good point.
I still had that mental image of them being between the low cloud/fog layer in the valley and the higher cloud layer in the area, which means no horizon outside, but some horizontal visibility. Except that's not where they were any more.

(Yep, those are the original town musicians from Bremen! :))

[email protected]

11th Feb 2020, 14:42

The 180 turn can be a problem, even in a fixed wing - My SAR crew and I were called out one day to look for a a missing Cessna with 3 on board which had departed Swansea and was heading through the Welsh hills to Halfpenny Green ISTR.
We tracked a 121.5 beacon up the Neath valley underneath the cloudbase and realised the signal was in or above the cloud so we followed it upslope in the gloop (hovertaxiing) and got a sufficient increase in visibility at the top to see a wood with 3 guys at the edge of it.
After landing on to let the winch op question them, it turned out they were the ones we were looking for and their Cessna was parked 45 degrees nose down in the middle of the wood.
If the pilot had executed a good 180, they would have smashed into the hillside - instead he pulled back on the stick, washed off the speed but gained enough altitude that when the aircraft stalled, they were about 20' from the top of the wood and it plopped in - no injuries.
Apologies as I have recounted this tale before but it seems pertinent here.

ShyTorque

11th Feb 2020, 14:49

With each passing day, the speculation and theories become ever wilder.

Well said and I agree.

Lonewolf_50

11th Feb 2020, 15:39

The 180 turn can be a problem, ... their Cessna was parked 45 degrees nose down in the middle of the wood.
If the pilot had executed a good 180, they would have smashed into the hillside - instead he pulled back on the stick, washed off the speed but gained enough altitude that when the aircraft stalled, they were about 20' from the top of the wood and it plopped in - no injuries.
Apologies as I have recounted this tale before but it seems pertinent here. Looks like a case of "better lucky than good" but perhaps he had a sense in his head of what was to his left and right before going IMC?
.

FH1100 Pilot

11th Feb 2020, 17:36

There are two other things to speculate on that haven't been discussed much here.

We do not and cannot know what was going through the mind of Kobe's pilot. But there are some clues. In a Facebook thread on this accident, long-time and well-respected former Chief Pilot of PHI, Mike Hurst opines about a certain psychological phenomenon that happens to pilots as they get closer to their destination. It's slightly different from "Get-there-itis" although it falls under that category, I suppose. Mike had a fancy name for it, which I forget at the moment. It's not so much an urge or pressure get where you're going, but a subtle belief as you get closer and closer that you can make it. And Mike certainly knows a thing or two about helicopter pilots.

The other thing nobody is really talking about is fuel. You all know that we helicopter pilots are always battling fuel vs. payload. I suspect that Kobe's pilot took off with "just enough" fuel to get to his destination with the required reserves and not much more. But then Burbank Tower held him out, circling for over 12 minutes. And then, instead of letting him go direct, they told him to go northbound, circumnavigating east of both Burbank and Van Nuys to circle around north of both fields before coming back down south to pick up the 101. I'll bet you that all this circling and rerouting ate into his reserves...which gave him the impetus to pull the power in and keep the speed up when really, in perfect hindsight, we know that he should've slowed that beatch down. And he was a short guy, and his S-76 has a *BIG* glareshield, and slowing an S-76 down brings the nose up, decreasing outward visibility even more... And in the L.A. area you can't just plop an S-76 down in someone's parking lot like you can a 206...

There sure are a lot of pieces to this puzzle! Talk about a guy stuck between a rock and a hard place. Granted, he probably put himself into that jam, but still...

Torquetalk

11th Feb 2020, 18:20

Wasn’t this a S76B FH1100? Iirc correctly MAUW 11700 pounds, so he should have been able to upload at least 2 hours of fuel.

FH1100 Pilot

11th Feb 2020, 18:34

It's called "speculation," Torque ;-)

Joejosh999

11th Feb 2020, 18:59

If we know he was attempting to climb (likely into IFR/goop) to 4000, how much are we doubting that the left turn at around 2300 was intentional?

SASless

11th Feb 2020, 19:36

The turn is. meaningless compared to the descent In terms of outcome!

What say you sleuths work that one out for us first...then figure out the turn.

gulliBell

11th Feb 2020, 20:00

...But there are some clueAnd he was a short guy, and his S-76 has a *BIG* glareshield, and slowing an S-76 down brings the nose up, decreasing outward visibility even more...
.

Not really. The nose attitude in an S76 remains mostly level throughout flight with changes in airspeed. It's not until you really slow it down (to a speed well below minimum IFR speed) that the nose starts to pitch up. If you are in cloud you don't want to slow it down to a point where the nose starts to pitch up.

SASless

11th Feb 2020, 21:15

FH100.....exactly where do you come up with the idea the Pilot was short in stature?

What is your source for that information....or did you just make that up out thin air somehow?

I assume you do not know the guy.

Would you be surprised to learn he was over Six Feet Tall?

While discussing this tragedy with another Old Git friend who has about four thousand hours in the 76....all of it in the Gulf of Mexico....we both had similar questions about IIMC procedures and the use of the Auto Pilot system.

He also raised concerns about folks being overly quick to criticize those who are no longer able to defend themselves.

The following arrived by email and I think it needs to be shared.

"The readiness to blame a dead pilot for an accident is nauseating, but it has been the tendency ever since I can remember.
What pilot has not been in positions where he was in danger and where perfect judgment would have advised against going?
But when a man is caught in such a position he is judged only by his error and seldom given credit for the times he has extricated himself from worse situations.
Worst of all, blame is heaped upon him by other pilots, all of whom have been in parallel situations themselves, but without being caught in them.
If one took no chances, one would not fly at all.
Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes."

In the words of Charles Lindbergh, Journal entry, 26 August 1938
There was a Celebration of Life for the Pilot....attended by about 300 people with helicopters flying in to participate.

A formation flight of Helicopters flew overhead in his honor.

Folks....he was one of us....remember that when you post.....he was well liked and respected and some of his friends attend this Forum.

FH1100 Pilot

12th Feb 2020, 01:55

SAS, check out this picture of our boy. Regardless of how tall he was, in the aircraft his eyes are apparently just above the tall glareshield. I'd imagine that it wouldn't take much nose-up attitude at all to make outward visibility pretty bad. Now, before you go running your mouth (again), I do understand how parallax and camera angle can make things look worse. But don't even try to tell me that the S-76 is a good platform for slugging along VFR, down low and slow in scuzzy viz.

And cut the crap with all the jibber-jabber from Lindbergh about not blaming dead pilots. We get it; we're all pilots...human pilots. And we all make mistakes, sometimes fatal ones. I don't think you need to be an expert NTSB accident investigator to see what happened here. Why? BECAUSE WE'VE ALL BEEN THERE! The only difference is that *we* are all still around to talk about our dumb mistakes. Lindbergh's last line is quite succinct: "Safety lies in the judgment of the chances one takes." EXACTAMUNDO, Chuckie! Again, I'm not NTSB guy, but I think that any of us commercial/professional pilots would question the judgment of someone bombing along that fast, pressing on into decreasing weather and rising terrain. He didn't appear to have much of a Plan B. Speaking of which...

gulliBell, never mind "minimum-IFR speed." I don't think IFR was on his mind at all. Otherwise he might have been prepared to do it. So tell me, what pitch attitude would an S-76 be at if you slow to 60-70 knots? Five degrees? Maybe some of the other S-76 whiz kids can answer that. It's a helicopter. You know why you never heard about IIMC accidents with Bell 47's and Hiller 12's? Because they only flew at 60 knots. And if that was too fast, you slowed to 45. I'm thinking that for Kobe's flight, even 90-100 knots would have been too fast for those conditions. (Obviously, 120-130 was too fast.)

We don't know exactly when he went IIMC, but he undeniably did. I'm guessing that it happened where the 101 goes through that "cut-through" or "pass" at that little ridgeline where it meets Las Virgenes. He'd been following the 101 pretty well up to there, and that's where it all started to come apart. So it was in that general area. So maybe the better question is: what speed would have been appropriate that would have allowed him to SEE the cloud/fog-bank he was about to penetrate and make a 180 before doing so?

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/979x777/ara_acdb5151d1048b543b791ced99726ae1f67117e2.jpg

Ascend Charlie

12th Feb 2020, 02:16

Don't judge the horizon by the angle of his sunglasses. Look at the waterline in the background, then tilt your head right till it's level. Now he has plenty of vis over the glareshield.

SASless

12th Feb 2020, 02:27

FH,

Ever making with the attitude and wild assed guesses you are.

You called him "SHORT".....he was over Six Feet Tall!

What else have you got wrong due to having bum information upon which you build your theories?

Have you ever even flown the 76 in your career or were you trapped at the small ship table down there in the GOM?

Evidently you do not get it....as you are well across the line where discussing possible causes of this tragedy in which nine people died has become just another opportunity for you to spout off in a very ugly way about a Man (not a Boy as you called him) who was the Pilot of the aircraft who cannot defend himself.

You are exactly the kind of Pilot Mr. Lindbergh was talking about as demonstrated by you crass comments.

nonsense

12th Feb 2020, 02:30

Don't judge the horizon by the angle of his sunglasses. Look at the waterline in the background, then tilt your head right till it's level. Now he has plenty of vis over the glareshield.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1149x1006/rotated_7bec39042180bf8137bcd78cfc57157f9aca00d3.jpg

John Eacott

12th Feb 2020, 03:00

nonsense just beat me to it, but my effort to straighten up the image attached: note the lower window frame is horizontal.

With about a thousand hours on S76s I would agree with Ascend Charlie that sighting over the coaming isn’t at issue here except by some without practical experience. I’d be more interested in the cross cockpit visibility when in a left turn, but the Polaroid glasses issue has also got my attention and some actual feedback from an S76 driver would be appreciated.

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/796x602/3f8987cd_30b2_4f29_9fb1_dd3c38cf6e88_6553260f44462538ca49a86 0438d142e800b0c41.jpeg

megan

12th Feb 2020, 03:36

But don't even try to tell me that the S-76 is a good platform for slugging along VFR, down low and slow in scuzzy vizThe 76 is no better or worse than any other helo I've flown, 12K in the aircraft and plenty of that was scud running, I stand 5'7", a short arse.

John, we had glass screens rather than the much lighter weight acrylic, think the Polaroids did give funny colours from comments by other chaps, I had Raybans.

John Eacott

12th Feb 2020, 04:27

megan thanks: I’ve been reliably informed that the sunnies were only worn in bright sunlight, otherwise ‘parked’ on the top of his head. So that’s a non issue. (I’m also a RayBan wearer from the early 70s, bit of a running joke in the family!)

At 6’ 2” tall he is most likely have found the coaming slightly obscuring the top of the instrument panel, rather than having it obscure his outside view. I know with the seat adjusted for my 5’11” I could lose part of the top attention getters.

Again, theories thrown in by some here without knowledge and experience on type can appear ‘right’ but not actually be so. A very deep coaming may appear in photos to be a hindrance to external vision in the S76, but is neatly designed to actually give very good forward vis whilst acting as a glare shield for the panel.

Ascend Charlie

12th Feb 2020, 06:07

I wore polarising prescription sunglasses for 1300 hrs in an S-76B, and found no problems with the glass panel instruments, though there were some light brown wavy (transparent) lines in the front windscreen from the laminations, and the side windows had a slight rainbow tinge. Don't bother with the LGBPDGW comments, but the windows were slightly bent.

At night I had to lean forward and cover the shield with my arms to see out into the very dark bits of the Barrington Tops - despite being a BIG glare shield it only seemed to be anti-sun for daylight rather than anti-internal reflection for night.

Search&Rescue

12th Feb 2020, 06:16

John Eacott,

nobody knows for sure, if ”the sunnies were only worn in bright sunlight, otherwise ‘parked’ on the top of his head.” Sometimes pilots like to wear sunnies because of the contrast
(terrain vs. clouds) even if the sun is not the primary issue... but they might have been ”parked” on the top of his head as well...

Bell_ringer

12th Feb 2020, 06:45

This accident didn't happen because of sunnies, the outcome was set when they left the pad.
It may have made one of the holes slightly larger than it should have been, but it isn't a case of death by Rayban.
This really is digging too far into the detail, trying to make sense of something that happens far too often, with or without sunglasses, in an assortment of aircraft.

Search&Rescue

12th Feb 2020, 10:47

Totally agree with you Bell ringer, that there have been several factors affecting this sad accident... starting on the pad as you mentioned...

SASless

12th Feb 2020, 11:49

My experience on 76 was a very pleasant change from Bell Products and I found the cockpit layout quite comfortable.

As noted the Glare Shield was quite large but was very well designed and allowed for excellent visibility outside and more than adequate inside.

After flying Bell products....the 76 was a real treat...fast, slick, smooth....and NEW!

Having a FD. AP, and Area Nav made the machine fun to fly too.

By FH1100's standard I too am a short are...being only 5'9" tall.

Sir Korsky

12th Feb 2020, 13:13

Pretty sure I remember somewhere it states eyes should be level with the glare shield in 76 publications. 76 always had good viz and was easy to reference in all stages of flight. Super aircraft.

went to the basement to dig this up...

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/546x549/seat_10848a6599240d9d34990f8191d5546d9f401242.png
whose nose?

helimutt

12th Feb 2020, 15:46

This talk of a passenger decoupling the autopilot can be pretty much discounted. They’d have to either press two buttons on the centre console and disengage both channels or reach across and press the flight director buttons on the pilot side or reach across and press the decouple button on the pilot cyclic. All highly unlikely (bordering on ridiculous)
The mention of someone being a front seat passenger and overriding the controls is plausible if they have a cyclic in front of them, as they can interfere with flight controls and grabbing a cyclic in a stressful situation could cause all sorts of problems for the pilot. Its unlikely they could press down on the collective (unlikely because you need to press a trigger under the collective handgrip to move collective. )

Some polarising sunglasses definitely prevent you from viewing the screens in a C++ from certain angles, but I’m not sure about a B model.

All of this talk is supposition. We will likely never know the real cause of this accident, but if nothing else it should make the helicopter pilot community maybe stop and think a second longer when they next take that flight in deteriorating conditions. We can only live in hope.

Torquetalk

12th Feb 2020, 17:24

donut king

12th Feb 2020, 20:25

6000hrs on 76s, pilot here.

regarding the cockpit picture....two things screaming at me!

1) how low level the flight appears to be?
2) his HSI heading bug is not set. Whether I’m flying IMC or VMC....heading bug heading bug heading bug.....even on NAV.

Was beaten into me as a young cojo, heading control and altitude control will save you when wx goes woxoff! Not criticizing, but my OCD is smacking me with those two items!

SASless

12th Feb 2020, 23:05

You don't reckon that photo was taken as the aircraft was setting on a waterside pad out at Catalina do you?

donut king

12th Feb 2020, 23:22

You don't reckon that photo was taken as the aircraft was setting on a waterside pad out at Catalina do you?
yeah, I thought of that possibility....check the airspeed gauge...I don’t see the analog needle at zero. I could be wrong....old age and all.

SASless

12th Feb 2020, 23:58

A bit of googling came up with this video.......

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cInB1Zrh4Ew

Lonewolf_50

13th Feb 2020, 03:29

SASless, that video brought back a few memories of a time and a place that's half a lifetime ago. Thanks. If Ara got to fly that route with some frequency, then he was a lucky man. lucky man.

Nubian

13th Feb 2020, 21:58

You don't reckon that photo was taken as the aircraft was setting on a waterside pad out at Catalina do you?

If you look careful at the picture, you can see enough of the ASI needle to make out that the 76 is at great speed.

SASless

13th Feb 2020, 22:12

Your eyes are better than mine....but these days there is nothing surprising about that.

I shall go with the majority of the young eagle eyed amongst us.

industry insider

14th Feb 2020, 06:01

Nubian wrote

If you look careful at the picture, you can see enough of the ASI needle to make out that the 76 is at great speed.

I disagree a bit. If you look at the Torque gauge, its at around 60% (S-76B) so its not that fast and even though we can't see, at that altitude, there wouldn't have been enough ROD to bump the speed up to "great speed" levels.

Musician

14th Feb 2020, 11:30

a) This is not the accident aircraft, these aren't accident conditions.
b) I originally put the source in the image comment, it showed up in preview, but not in the post. It's on facebook. m.facebook.com/177379092306991/photos/a.2383881068323438/2388266127884932/?type=3&source=54
c) It's a panoramic picture. These can be taken by carefully rotating your smartphone while it automatically takes pictures, and then software stitches them together. (This means the left and the right edge can be a few seconds apart.)
d) The left side of the panoramic picture that has Ara sitting on the right side looks like this:

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/998x1135/image_5e23858c6bded48eca1e34e8fe0295ee0e76659b.jpeg

industry insider

14th Feb 2020, 13:10

145, normal cruise for an S-76 then.

Glacier pilot

14th Feb 2020, 18:28

You seem familiar with this autopilot system. Would you know (hypothetically) if the autopilot was engaged, is there an 'alert' system to indicate to the pilot that a trim (pitch) situation to a maxium position has occured. (full aft or full forward trim) (due to a fuel burn, CG, airspeed/altitude change, etc) Obviously, he pilot should 'know' or be paying attention, but how is the trim positon 'scanned' (with autopilot engaged) in normal operations? Thanks.

Sir Korsky

14th Feb 2020, 19:29

One thing I never liked about the 76 was the lack of audio annunciation when/if the modes decoupled. Some later 76 models would alert you with a " decouple " audio warning - but not all of them and even then it seemed to be sporadic at best. So if you got distracted, you may not have noticed that George wasn't driving anymore. The 139 gives you a big old bell chime whenever a mode is uncoupled or decoupled and you get used to hearing it after selecting a function and then you confirm that selection with a color change on the PFD. So in the 76, you had to be real careful that the aircraft was coupled and remember who had charge of the FD panel/APs. The 139 only has one center console mounted FD panel so takes care of that problem.

The 76 has needle monitors which correlate/mirror the moving AP actuators but not the trim.

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 19:36

You seem familiar with this autopilot system. Would you know (hypothetically) if the autopilot was engaged, is there an 'alert' system to indicate to the pilot that a trim (pitch) situation to a maxium position has occured. (full aft or full forward trim) .

The S76 autopilot trim can't get to a maximum trim position like a jack screw on an aeroplane trim system might get to a maximum position. The S76 uses two linear actuators in series per channel, each with 5% control authority (fast/fine movements), with a rotary trim actuator that re-positions (coarse movement) as required to make sure the linear actuators always operate about their central position (so they can never get saturated). This operation is syncronized automatically and the pilot is not aware of it doing its thing. A separate autopilot computer controls each linear actuator. The linear actuators have a position indicator in the cockpit. If one actuator has failed "hard over" the other actuator goes "hard over" in the other direction to compensate. Or if one actuator simply stops playing the other actuator just moves double, to compensate. There is also an AP1/2 warning light, and another indicator that will display a diagnostic fault code. The fault code will be proceeded by a 1 or 2 to tell you what channel has the fault. Just follow what the manual says in response to the particular fault code. If all else fails just turn off the affected autopilot. 5% authority on the remaining series actuator is enough for the system to do what it needs to do, although with an AP off you can't couple the flight director for push button flying.

donut king

14th Feb 2020, 19:38

You seem familiar with this autopilot system. Would you know (hypothetically) if the autopilot was engaged, is there an 'alert' system to indicate to the pilot that a trim (pitch) situation to a maxium position has occured. (full aft or full forward trim) (due to a fuel burn, CG, airspeed/altitude change, etc) Obviously, he pilot should 'know' or be paying attention, but how is the trim positon 'scanned' (with autopilot engaged) in normal operations? Thanks.

there are small windows showing trim actuator position with an analog needle. Should one of them hardover, the respective AP should kick off and an indication of 1(2) AP appears in the narrow window(in the pic)....the one with hashed digits. In the pic, flight director (hdg, nav, alt, etc...)is not engaged and he is flying the aircraft manually. Also, his heading bug and track bar is not being used/ set according to aircraft flighpath.

Again, this is not the accident flight but someone earlier said it was a checkride flight.

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 19:43

...So if you got distracted, you may not have noticed that George wasn't driving anymore..

Well yeah. There is an amber DCPL warning light and "decouple" audio, and if the aircraft isn't following the command bars, then you'd need to be pretty much asleep at the wheel not to notice any of those.

Sir Korsky

14th Feb 2020, 19:50

Well yeah. There is an amber DCPL warning light and "decouple" audio, and if the aircraft isn't following the command bars, then you'd need to be pretty much asleep at the wheel not to notice any of those.

That was it, decouple audio. Was a while ago. I am only reporting what I saw in flying with maybe 30 guys in 2000 hours on A's through C's. On multiple occasions nobody had noticed that George wasn't driving - and don't get me started on the blow throughs where George wouldn't capture the ALT and keep on climbing or descending. Must have flown 20 airframes too. Just a statement of facts and no intention of being better than anyone else is intended here. If I won the lottery I'd let you fly.

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 19:56

...Should one of them hardover, the respective AP should kick off ...

Not really, the AP won't kick off, it continues to drive the other 2 axes in the normal way. But the flying will feel "sloppy" in the channel that has gone "hard over" because both series actuators will be out of the equation (with the good actuator still playing but driven all the way opposite to the failed channel).

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 20:02

....and don't get me started on the blow throughs where George wouldn't capture the ALT and keep on climbing or descending...

That's interesting. My experience is the opposite. I don't remember George not doing what its supposed to do. Not ever (although there might have been, once or twice). I guess all our George's must have been the ones not built on a Friday.

Sir Korsky

14th Feb 2020, 20:06

That's interesting. My experience is the opposite. I don't remember George not doing what its supposed to do. Not ever (although there might have been, once or twice). I guess all our George's must have been the ones not built on a Friday.

Glad to hear that you got a better MX package than we did. So glad I'm in a modern new build aircraft now. Schlepping 35 year old **** boxes around doesn't inspire me much anymore. The OT days were the worst for bad Georges I heard once.

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 20:17

..Schlepping 35 year old **** boxes around doesn't inspire me much anymore. ...

Don't tell me you wouldn't take a 212 for a drive, if you had the chance, and go and have some real George-free fun for an hour?

gulliBell

14th Feb 2020, 20:27

145, normal cruise for an S-76 then.
Yeah, but something strikes me as being a bit "odd" about that photo. Apart from the obvious.

Sir Korsky

14th Feb 2020, 20:29

Don't tell me you wouldn't take a 212 for a drive, if you had the chance, and go and have some real George-free fun for an hour?

No thanks - just cruising to the last medical. Have a great weekend my Kiwi buddy.

SASless

15th Feb 2020, 00:46

A certain small Helicopter Operator used to have some Sfena Autopilots on some of its 212's.....now that was a joke!

But then by the time those aircraft got to the end of the line....it was a good day when the cockpit doors would stay shut and the blades not come apart.

No corner cutting there.....uh uh no.

donut king

15th Feb 2020, 01:15

Not really, the AP won't kick off, it continues to drive the other 2 axes in the normal way. But the flying will feel "sloppy" in the channel that has gone "hard over" because both series actuators will be out of the equation (with the good actuator still playing but driven all the way opposite to the failed channel).
have had many ap kick off due to handover...one of our machines was notorious for it! The old phase 2’s would hard over and stay on until pilot physically shuts off the appropriate axis.

Sir Korsky

15th Feb 2020, 01:44

the aforementioned indicator....

https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x613/unnamed_e28f0a94cf8aac2d5ba703ad30a812a7b7f41c5d.jpg

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 09:23

have had many ap kick off due to handover...one of our machines was notorious for it! The old phase 2’s would hard over and stay on until pilot physically shuts off the appropriate axis.
Oh, fair enough. I've never seen it happen in a C, C+ or C++, what the older rides did I can't remember.

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 09:36

the aforementioned indicator....

That's right. And for those not familiar with the indicator. The pointer represents the displacement of the actuator from the central position. One indicator for each linear actuator. The selector knob selects the axis you wish to monitor. So the indicator can monitor all six linear actuators (i.e. three pairs). Normal presentation is the pointer for each actuator darting about the central position, with each pointer more-or-less moving in the same direction at the same time. Abnormal indication is one pointer stopped whilst the other pointer is moving twice as far as normal, or pointers moving in opposite directions to each other, or "hard-over" one full left whilst the other full right.

ShyTorque

15th Feb 2020, 10:29

I used to fly an S-76B that developed a strange fault. The heading bug would, at random times, kick round to a heading of 060 degrees. If coupled up, the aircraft would snap into a turn onto that heading. A bit disconcerting, especially in solid IMC under radar control.

helimutt

15th Feb 2020, 12:32

ASI normal for a 76 in the cruise when you compare it to this pic:-

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/504x647/109e5c21_8efd_4120_9600_fd9f12d9900c_ad7fc79661b76a9e6174125 e4039f3eacf738dfa.jpeg
ASI pretty normal for 76 in the cruise. This isn’t a B model but ASI in same place as the picture posted earlier.

helimutt

15th Feb 2020, 12:36

Blaze619

15th Feb 2020, 12:40

Why would the engine torque not be matching?

Sir Korsky

15th Feb 2020, 13:00

I have seen the 76 flight director fail to acquire ALT in the climb on more occasions than I can remember. I’ve also seen the whole flight director just decouple and lights go out with zero warning. No bells or whistles. Apart from that the AP/FD on the 76’s is very good in my experience.

Guess you had the haunted option too installed ! 76 was a great, dependable, solid and brilliantly executed product. Try throwing a plastic 139 around like you could a 76. Despite its flaws which were pretty much predictable and easy to live with, you could ascertain 100% faith in a well maintained ride. The king of its time.

Sir Korsky

15th Feb 2020, 14:19

Why would the engine torque not be matching?

might need some memory assistance on this one, but caption states not a B model. I can't remember a straight C or C+ that had steam and EFIS. There were even some late B's that had the full EFIS and IIDS suite. So, if it is a B, then the PT6 had the torque/temp match selector, and in this image, it may have been selected to temp match. It was pretty much useless for sea level drivers and didn't offer any gain under normal ops. Always left it Torque match.

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 14:34

..I can't remember a straight C or C+ that had steam and EFIS...

They are out there. All but one of the SkyShuttle C+'s had the hybrid steam/EFIS.

212man

15th Feb 2020, 14:54

They are out there. All but one of the SkyShuttle C+'s had the hybrid steam/EFIS.
the first Norsk machines as well.

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 14:57

..This isn’t a B model but ASI in same place as the picture posted earlier.

I'm curious what S76 variant that engine torque indicator is from.

mnttech

15th Feb 2020, 16:10

First report is now out
report gen (https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20200126X41436&AKey=1&RType=Prelim&IType=MA)
just 2 pages
On January 26, 2020, about 0945 PST, a Sikorsky S76B helicopter, N72EX, crashed into hilly terrain near Calabasas, California. A post impact fire ensued and resulted in a brush fire. The eight passengers and one pilot onboard were fatally injured and the helicopter was destroyed. The helicopter was operated by Island Express Helicopters. Weather at Van Nuys airport, about 14 miles northeast of the site was reported as 1,100 feet overcast with 2 ½ miles visibility. The flight was operated under the provisions of 14 CFR Part 135 under visual flight rules from John Wayne Airport (KSNA), Santa Ana, California, to Camarillo Airport (KCMA), Camarillo, California. An Investigative Webpage is located at https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Pages/DCA20MA059.aspx.

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 19:17

...It was an A with the later gearbox, 2S1 engines....

Really? 2S1 engines have DECU's, I wouldn't have thought you could have any trim control of the engines normally (in automatic mode).

gulliBell

15th Feb 2020, 20:06

OK. But with N1's matched that #1 engine looks a bit tired. With NAV coupled to FMS I'm curious why the active leg isn't shown in green on the EHSI. Quite a bit of drift angle there too.

Nubian

15th Feb 2020, 20:11

Nubian wrote

I disagree a bit. If you look at the Torque gauge, its at around 60% (S-76B) so its not that fast and even though we can't see, at that altitude, there wouldn't have been enough ROD to bump the speed up to "great speed" levels.

Well, I'd say normal cruise is pretty great compared to SAS comment in the same post about a possible landing situation to explain the level attitude of the aircraft in the picture.... That's all.

Sir Korsky

15th Feb 2020, 21:03

picture tells a thousand words - thanks Mutt

Senior Pilot

16th Feb 2020, 00:23

We’re rapidly into Hamsterwheel territory; fascinating as the S76 lessons are they are becoming irrelevant to the thread. I’d rather not come and moderate posts but if you want a discussion on S76 variances and flying then maybe take them to a dedicated thread, please?

The same goes for FR24 and ADS-B rinse and repeats

Meanwhile let’s get back on topic :ok:

simon001

17th Feb 2020, 19:05

This crash is a mystery and may remain so. There are a few things that don't add up.

Based upon the information that the NTSB has published so far, I suspect they will come out with a probable cause of "Loss of control due to spatial disorientation due to continued VFR flight into IMC" or some variant thereof. It's looking that way at the moment.

There is no indication thus far of any mechanical malfunction. Of course, that doesn't mean that there wasn't a malfunction. One thing is for sure: Having a malfunction IMC in a helicopter in close proximity to terrain would be a serious situation.

My view is that the pilot never should have taken off in the first place. But having flown traffic watch in the wee hours around the San Francisco Bay Area, the word "marginal" gets interpreted pretty loosely if you want the broadcaster to be able to get their reports in. When the sun comes over the horizon and the ceiling drops, you start hearing a lot of special VFR requests. I think chopper pilots take a few liberties with that one due to the capability of their aircraft over the limitations of fixed wing.

But IMC is IMC for all. Therein lies the question: How did the pilot figure he was going to get all the way from John Wayne to Camarillo via 101 VFR in those conditions? Hope? We all know that in flying, hope is not a strategy. And I am really surprised that such an experienced pilot hoped for that. Maybe he knew something we didn't about the weather over there that morning.

The METAR on departure was 1000 feet overcast. Marginal right there. Burbank was IFR. Van Nuys 1000 overcast and then he was heading for the mountains. My daughter goes to college in Thousand Oaks, which is just to the East of Camarillo, which I fly into to visit coming down from the Bay Area. You drive up over a mountain pass between CMA and Thousand Oaks. Definitely over 1000'. It's mountains everywhere. Sure he might have been able to skirt around LA following the freeways (Which he did), but once West of Van Nuys, he had to climb. And climb he did.

The NTSB photo taken from a mountain top in the update report show cloud tops at approx. 2400 at the time and location of the accident. He flew past VNY at 1500, right at the cloud level the tower reported. When he was with SoCal he said he was going to climb through layers to 4000. Right at that point, if you look at the photo, you know he's deliberately gone VFR into IMC. So that was the big rules violation.

But as to why he crashed, well, it is still a mystery. He followed 101, climbed to 2300, then for an unknown reason, began a left turn. Then he started descending and by the time the turn had gone through 180 degrees, he was descending at 160 knots and 4000fpm into the mountain.

Why did he turn?

a) Maybe he figured that the VFR into IMC was a bad idea, that he would later get busted for it decided to come back, pretend he never went IMC and just land back at VNY and have the passengers driven the rest of the way.
b) Maybe he became spatially disorientated and lost control.
c) Maybe he had a mechanical problem, or an instrument problem during the climb and decided to turn back and try and get back down to VMC ASAP.
d) Maybe he experienced a serious medical problem.

We may never know the answer. As I said, I suspect the NTSB will probably go for (b). But I really do wonder about this. He was an experienced pilot, an IFR instructor. The year before he completed VFR into IMC and upset training in the helicopter satisfactorily. 8000 hours total time. 1000 in that make and model. 10 years with the company. And the helicopter had a four axis autopilot. He was following 101, he had a plan to go VFR into IMC (Against the rules, yes, but it was still a plan), he climbed and came oh so close to VFR on top at 2400, but only made it to 2300 before starting that left hand turn. He was probably only IMC for a minute or two. Plenty long enough for an inexperienced non-instrument pilot (let alone helicopter pilot) to lose control, but for a pilot with his qualifications and experience? I would be surprised if that was the cause.

But again, it's a mystery. All four reasons are quite plausible. The tragic part is that the pilot and aircraft were both qualified for flight in IMC conditions, but the operator was not. So he did not have the option of filing. And the passengers were not to know that of course.

Like many have said, the biggest mistake was the decision to take off in the first place. I suspect that would have crossed his mind as he was circling outside Burbank for 15 minutes, again when he flew past Van Nuys, and almost certainly as he began the climb towards the mountains.

Very sad. A lesson for all.

JimEli

17th Feb 2020, 20:16

...
The year before he completed VFR into IMC and upset training in the helicopter satisfactorily.
...

Having experience instructing this maneuver with Part 135 operators, that statement easily leads to a wrong conclusion.

Also, consideration needs to be given to any items on the MEL that could have affected LOC/UIMC. Additionally, I haven’t seen any discussion here about VFR/SVFR in terms of the allowable limits per the Company’s Operation Manual. I can't imagine a Part 135 VFR-only operator using FAR minimums. I could be wrong.

SASless

17th Feb 2020, 20:40

gulliBell

17th Feb 2020, 21:17

...I would be surprised if that was the cause.

I wouldn't. I see experienced instrument rated pilots crash ALL THE TIME within 20 seconds of entering cloud on their annual recurrent checks in the Level D S76 simulator. These are pilots who rarely see a cloud in their operational flying, except for their sim checks.

simon001

17th Feb 2020, 21:30

JimEli

17th Feb 2020, 21:49

...
The FARs do not differentiate between intentional or otherwise. The FARs specify that a pilot must fly under VFR until cleared by ATC to fly under IFR. The only intention the pilot declared was to climb to 4000. He was asked multiple times whether he was VFR. He confirmed VFR. VFR into IMC, intentionally or otherwise, is bad. And yes, it is a violation. If ATC asks you and you admit it, they will declare an emergency on your behalf immediately. If you live, you get to copy down a number when you land. I know because I've been there. And in the pilot's case, he could not have received a pop up clearance from ATC because he was below the MDA shelf for that area. The pilot, with his experience, would have known that.
...
From FAA Order JO 7110.65Y - ATC:

d. When VFR aircraft operating below the minimum altitude for IFR operations requests an IFR clearance and the pilot informs you, or you are aware, that they are unable to climb in VFR conditions to the minimum IFR altitude:

1. Before issuing a clearance, ask if the pilot is able to maintain terrain and obstruction clearance during a climb to the minimum IFR altitude.

2. If the pilot is able to maintain their own terrain and obstruction clearance, issue the appropriate IFR clearance as prescribed in Para 4-2-1, Clearance Items, and Para 4-5-6, Minimum En Route Altitudes.

gulliBell

17th Feb 2020, 21:58

What really messes people up is the transition from poor visibility but still in sight of the ground, to not insight of the ground any more. Typically practiced in the sim as a low visibility runway departure. As soon as they start the climb phase, lose sight of the runway, they do a descending left turn and crash in an unusual attitude in the grass off the runway before they've even crossed the upwind threshold. I've seen some pilots do this three times in a row! Crash. Reset. Try again. Crash. Reset. Try again. Crash. Move on to something else. These are not newly minted IFR pilots. They are guys with thousands of hours experience who only see a cloud once per year (and that is in the sim, luckily).

simon001

17th Feb 2020, 22:16

Interesting. Especially the three times in a row part.

As soon as they start the climb phase, lose sight of the runway, they do a descending left turn and crash in an unusual attitude

Hmmm.

gulliBell

17th Feb 2020, 22:27

Joejosh999

17th Feb 2020, 22:37

Is there a reason it’s always left?....

gulliBell

17th Feb 2020, 22:56

Don't know. What I do know, I don't recall seeing crashing into the dirt on the right side of the runway, doesn't matter whether the pilot is flying from the left or right seat.

fdr

17th Feb 2020, 23:31

Trust me. It's what happens. Exactly as I said. 40 degrees left bank. 20 degrees pitch nose down. Splatter. Having more than three goes to get it right becomes a waste of simulator time, especially when in their real world flying they never encounter those conditions. The time is better spent on other things, like working out which engine is on fire and not shutting down the wrong engine. Trust me on that one too. It happens.

gB, that is an interesting observation, really interesting.

To clarify your setup, you are presenting a loss of visual reference while at low altitude and during acceleration phase, is that correct? it seems to be logical that is your condition that is being looked at.

If so, then the roll being to the left is understandable as a matter of control derivatives. The pitch down is itself not consistent with a control derivative, it is however consistent with a pilot input akin to the consequences of exiting a thick overcast. Your comment about observing this outcome from either seat removes visual illusion of flow over a windscreen which does occur in the real world, but not too many sims will replicate water droplet streaming over the screen.

That would be an interesting little project for the guys at Moffet to look at I would think, if it is prevalent.

For non chopper people, the dynamic effects on the rotor disk in going from a hover through transition and on to a cruise speed results in very non-linear lateral trim requirements, and a nearly linear pitch input requirement. Essentially the cyclic control input traces an S curve (that would be a russian or Euro chopper, For USA it is a mirror "S"...) to maintain level flight with increasing IAS. For reasons why that is so, read Wayne Johnson's Helicopter Theory (read Ch15), or Ray Prouty's Helicopter Aerodynamics ( 2 volumes...) or Helicopter Performance, Stability and Control, or J. Gordon Leishman's Principles of Helicopter Aerodynamics. Seddon's Basic Helo Aero us a good read too.

fdr

17th Feb 2020, 23:32

Is there a reason it’s always left?....

there is a good reason why the left would be predominant with a stick fixed or stick free condition if the event is during acceleration. Have a quick look at my prior post.

MarcK

18th Feb 2020, 00:00

Simon,

Some questions for you.

As you look at the route flown....what Class Airspace was it along the route....plainly it changed several time?

In each Class Airspace...what was the "VFR" minima for the operation considering both FAR's and the Operator OpSpecs?

If the Weather in Controlled Airspace is 1000/3sm....that is VFR...right?

Marginal.....depends upon your definition but in general I agree with you....depending upon that the forecast is and what the actual weather is in the surrounding area along the route of flight.

If the weather plummets to 900 feet ceiling down to 2.5sm vis.....and becomes IFR in controlled airspace....and the flight is continued via SVFR.....is that not still VMC flight under IFR?

What are the weather minima for Helicopters flying in SVFR within Controlled Airspace?

As to flying from VMC into IMC....if not done intentionally....is not a rule violation.

Perhaps he realized the best option was to declare his intentions and climb to VFR on Top.....why would the FAA see that as a violation?
§ 91.155 Basic VFR weather minimums
(b) Class G Airspace. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this section, the following operations may be conducted in Class G airspace below 1,200 feet above the surface:
(1) Helicopter. A helicopter may be operated clear of clouds if operated at a speed that allows the pilot adequate opportunity to see any air traffic or obstruction in time to avoid a collision.
§ 91.157 Special VFR weather minimums.
(b) Special VFR operations may only be conducted—
(1) With an ATC clearance;
(2) Clear of clouds;

dbcooper8

18th Feb 2020, 00:36

Having experience instructing this maneuver with Part 135 operators Do any 135 VFR operators, with aircraft that have FD's, include the use of some FD modes, such as HDG, in their written procedure, training and competency check for IIMC?

I find it perplexing that there is no apparent use of the FD during any part of this flight. The FD, when used correctly, can help to prevent SD and LOC.

Sir Korsky

18th Feb 2020, 00:56

Helicopters need 1/2 mile day and 1 mile night now - the FARs were revised a few years ago. Class G stopped at 700 feel AGL.

(b) Class G Airspace. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.155#a) of this section, the following operations may be conducted in Class G airspace below 1,200 feet above the surface:

(1) Helicopter. A helicopter (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.155) may be operated clear of clouds in an airport (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.155) traffic pattern (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.155) within 1/2 mile of the runway or helipad of intended landing if the flight visibility (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.155) is not less than 1/2 statute mile.

Glacier pilot

18th Feb 2020, 04:10

Following your logic: Until the the pilot decided to climb ("over a layer"), he had two options at that time: 1) find a place and , in the vicinity, land or 2) or revert course and find a place to land. Climbing his options would have increased (as would the work load): 1) Flight to destination , VFR on top a layers, and hope for a hole; 2) or IFR approach to an airport; 3) or Precautionary landing on some ridge top, 3) or Declaration of an emergency. Note: More information is required to determine if fuel would have been an issue and 4) "pop up' check things out and make a determination from there (and continue flight or go back down and make a new decision). As you pointed out, what doesn't make sense is the climb to 2300' and then a sudden turn (especially since that it seems the ROC to get there was about 900 FPM) (10 seconds and then in the 'clear') Presumably, that climb was with poor forward visibility and use of instruments (autopilot?) must have been in use. If there were no other, casues, then, the post about the left turn crashes after VFR takeoff into IMC in the sim make sense, if there was a decision to go back down and in those moments there was a loss of spatial orientation (since the flight path obviously doesn't indicate a controlled descent). As you noted, the weather conditions and options) would have been recognized (presumably) by a seasoned pilot and the best decision would have been not to go in the first place.

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 04:21

To clarify your setup, you are presenting a loss of visual reference while at low altitude and during acceleration phase, is that correct? it seems to be logical that is your condition that is being looked at..

Correct. We do low visibility runway takeoff training at night. Pilot usually flying from the right seat. I suspect as they are accelerating and rotate to climb attitude, as the runway starts to disappear below them there is an inclination to fly left to maintain visual contact with the runway for as long as possible. When they lose sight of the runway they are already in a left bank, and probably with the somatogravic illusion they instinctively pitch forward. Before you know it they are in a nose down left wing low attitude with 2000 fpm sink rate and punch a hole in the grass next to the runway.

What might have happened in the Bryant accident is similar to what I see in the simulator. The pilot was in sight of the 101 freeway in very marginal weather and he's flown left to maintain the best view of the ground reference (the freeway) from out the pilot side window. He's lost visual contact with the ground, commenced an immediate climb as per IIMC procedure, had an oopsie moment and pitched it forward (incorrectly) sensing the climb attitude was too steep. Sensory overload, nothing computes any more, and the rest is history. The instrument scan and IFR flying skills were not to the required standard for flying in real cloud for the first time. I'm guessing the pilot had never done an IFR recurrent check in the Level D S76 sim. The place to practice is in the sim, punch a few holes in the pretend ground, reset, and try again. Unfortunately in real life the ground is much harder, and there is no reset button.

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 04:43

..Why did he turn?.

I can virtually guarantee he turned left in order to maintain visual contact with the 101 out his pilot door window, and he was hand flying at the time. He just kept turning left when he lost sight of the ground. Nothing wrong with the instrumentation at all. His intention was to press on to destination. If he intended to discontinue to destination he would have done a right turn, maintaining visual reference with the 101 out the right side pilot door window as he did the 180 turn. Bet my house on it.

simon001

18th Feb 2020, 04:49

This is consistent with what I have read from the couple of experienced rotor instructors who have chimed in. Thanks for the insight and the perspective. I initially thought someone with that many hours and time in type would have gotten onto the gauges quick smart. But anything is possible on the day. I made that mistake myself many years ago but had the benefit of a lot of feet below me.

That would be an interesting little project for the guys at Moffet to look at I would think, if it is prevalent.
I spent several sessions in the Vertical Motion sim out at Moffet doing upset training and they definitely have done some very interesting studies there. The AF447 simulation was a beaut. And the comparison of vertical vs. non vertical motion in upset recovery was an eye opener.

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 04:59

..I find it perplexing that there is no apparent use of the FD during any part of this flight..
Me too. He didn't think to use it because he'd never been in a situation before where he had to use it. All he needed to do was push one button and haul in the power.

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 05:11

Following your logic: Until the the pilot decided to climb ("over a layer"), he had two options at that time: 1) find a place and , in the vicinity, land or 2) or revert course and find a place to land...

No. Looking for a place to land in those circumstances is looking for the scene of the accident. Once he lost the opportunity to turn around, the smart money option is to climb straight wings level with George doing the flying, make the radio call, ask for radar vectors to the nearest airport with VMC, and then do what they tell you to do after that. Hands and feet off the controls, let George do all the hard work. All you need to tell George is the heading the radar controller told you to fly.

fdr

18th Feb 2020, 06:03

JimEli, you make a valid point. Based upon his qualifications, training and experience, I felt that spatial disorientation was unlikely. But I really don't know of course and the final moments of flight do point to a loss of control.

SASless, I'm going to pass on responding to your questions about airspace. I was not suggesting that the pilot was out of compliance with the FARs, if that's where you were going. Let's assume that he was in compliance, all the way up to where he left Van Nuys' airspace. Which is where I disagree with you:

The FARs do not differentiate between intentional or otherwise. The FARs specify that a pilot must fly under VFR until cleared by ATC to fly under IFR. The only intention the pilot declared was to climb to 4000. He was asked multiple times whether he was VFR. He confirmed VFR. VFR into IMC, intentionally or otherwise, is bad. And yes, it is a violation. If ATC asks you and you admit it, they will declare an emergency on your behalf immediately. If you live, you get to copy down a number when you land. I know because I've been there. And in the pilot's case, he could not have received a pop up clearance from ATC because he was below the MDA shelf for that area. The pilot, with his experience, would have known that.

I suspect he decided to climb through the marine layer to get on top. He almost made it. Almost.

My main point here is that a VFR flight from SNA to CMA that day was going to be marginal AT BEST and the pilot would have known that before departure.

gulliBell, I am fixed wing only so your comment about 76 pilots crashing within 20 seconds of going IMC on the sim was an eye opener.

Simon#1; the CFR treat helicopters quite differently to fixed wing in a couple of ways. Have a good read of 14 CFR Part 91.119 and 91.155.

In simple terms, VFR in a chopper permits flight in a visibility that is similar to minima on a lot of instrument approaches. 1/2 mile is not VFR in a 777, it is acceptable for a helo. In class G airspace, that is the basic limit for the helo, in control airspace, SVFR would apply.

For flight altitude, the chopper can be operated at essentially any altitude if the operation does not endanger 3rd party persons or property. If the pilot can argue he did not pose a risk to life or limb outside of their own copter, then they are compliant. Your friendly FSDO FOI may beg to differ, but it is pretty much a statement of the law, beauty being in the eye of the beholder. If you break anyone or anything outside, then you would probably run into non compliance with this rule.

Choppers are quite different to fixed wing, and the FAA in particular has rules that permit helicopters to be operated with acknowledgement of the unique requirements.

Weheka

18th Feb 2020, 08:14

Correct. We do low visibility runway takeoff training at night. Pilot usually flying from the right seat. I suspect as they are accelerating and rotate to climb attitude, as the runway starts to disappear below them there is an inclination to fly left to maintain visual contact with the runway for as long as possible. When they lose sight of the runway they are already in a left bank, and probably with the somatogravic illusion they instinctively pitch forward. Before you know it they are in a nose down left wing low attitude with 2000 fpm sink rate and punch a hole in the grass next to the runway.

What might have happened in the Bryant accident is similar to what I see in the simulator. The pilot was in sight of the 101 freeway in very marginal weather and he's flown left to maintain the best view of the ground reference (the freeway) from out the pilot side window. He's lost visual contact with the ground, commenced an immediate climb as per IIMC procedure, had an oopsie moment and pitched it forward (incorrectly) sensing the climb attitude was too steep. Sensory overload, nothing computes any more, and the rest is history. The instrument scan and IFR flying skills were not to the required standard for flying in real cloud for the first time. I'm guessing the pilot had never done an IFR recurrent check in the Level D S76 sim. The place to practice is in the sim, punch a few holes in the pretend ground, reset, and try again. Unfortunately in real life the ground is much harder, and there is no reset button.

I would agree with you GB as to what may have happened. Even after starting a right hand climbing turn into the soup at tree top height, flat country, (fixed wing). I still finished up in a left hand descending turn and should have hit the ground at around 20 seconds as you say. I managed to recover and popped out the top after just 42 seconds. A.H. inop and not covered, (vacuum pump busted) and only electric turn and bank. Have 296 GPS printout of incident.

rogercopy

18th Feb 2020, 09:15

Van Nuys 1000 overcast and then he was heading for the mountains. You drive up over a mountain pass between CMA and Thousand Oaks. Definitely over 1000'. It's mountains everywhere.

Van Nuys was 1100 ft overcast AGL (per ATC). VNY elevation is 800 ft. So that means ceiling was 1900 ft MSL at VNY. The highest elevation on Hwy 101 between VNY and Camarillo is about 1150 ft MSL (about 1 mi east of Las Virgenes Rd). So *IF* the ceiling was 1900 ft MSL in the mountains, they would have had at least 750 ft of clearance above Hwy 101.

Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the ceiling was much lower than 1900 ft MSL in the mountains. The fog was around 1150 ft MSL, which local residents said it was the lowest they had ever seen.

But it could explain why the pilot was hopeful that it would be clear enough for VFR in the mountains.

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 09:48

...But it could explain why the pilot was hopeful that it would be clear enough for VFR in the mountains.
Being hopeful in the planning of it is one thing. In the execution of the plan, when you see it and it isn't as hoped, you come up with a different plan.

SASless

18th Feb 2020, 12:40

JimEli

18th Feb 2020, 16:03

Do any 135 VFR operators, with aircraft that have FD's, include the use of some FD modes, such as HDG, in their written procedure, training and competency check for IIMC?

I find it perplexing that there is no apparent use of the FD during any part of this flight. The FD, when used correctly, can help to prevent SD and LOC.
My experience sim instructing has shown that upon UIMC entry, there is a short pause of disbelief/confusion. Followed by a tendency to fixate (usually on the attitude indicator), cross scan instruments far too slowly and initiate a climb way too soon. All of this typically results in a decay of airspeed, and if the collective was increased to initiate a climb too soon, heading trim was lost shortly followed by LOC. All occurring in just a matter of seconds.

If the operator lacked an establish procedure, I would suggest, that verbally stating the mantra “attitude, torque, trim” during the initial UIMC event helped me prevent the sudden onset of LOC. “Attitude, torque, trim,” was used to cue the actions of leveling the wings, applying cruise torque, and centering the ball. Repeating until calm enough before making the next move. In many cases, not moving the controls is initially beneficial. Airspeed upon entry is a key factor, because if high, it tends to improve the stability of the aircraft and provide a greater margin if the pilot started slowing. It was a rare occurrence to see a pilot survive UIMC if he attempted to slow to climb speed. In my experience, worse advice was never given.

IF the aircraft had an autopilot/flight director, immediate engagement would be a life saver. However, dependent upon type of AP/FD, it may need some setup prior to the UIMC entry, or it could simply be a hinderance. Use of a FD alone doesn’t always work due to the aforementioned pause, fixation and slow scan issues. Regardless, the pilot needs to have memorized and recently practiced procedures to survive. Most don’t. In my mind, an AP would be the single biggest rotorcraft enhancement to prevent single pilot LOC/UIMC accidents.

Furthermore IMHO, the fact that one is a highly experienced VFR pilot and CFII adds very little to the successful execution of a UIMC transition.

SASless

18th Feb 2020, 16:13

We must constantly remember "Currency", especially if it is only the "legal" definition of currency, is not to be confused in anyway as being "proficiency".

My experience teaching in Sim's was far too many Pilots release the AP and try to fly manually when things got all pear shaped.

Last time I checked....AutoPilots are fearless, do not have emotions, ignore psychological pressures, ignores stress....and do a fine job of flying helicopters and do what they are told.

If the stated goal was a straight ahead cruise climb from about 1100 feet to 4000 feet.....how hard should it be if done manually....and even easier if it was done using the AP?

A 76 with all the kit working should be one of the easiest helicopters to fly as exist.

All that being said.....we are back to guessing what. might have happened and why that is not what was done.

Sir Korsky

18th Feb 2020, 16:15

all new stabilized helicopters should incorporate a wings level button similar to that installed on the AW169. Hit it once wings level, hit it twice GA.

Weheka

18th Feb 2020, 17:47

Weheka.......very glad to have you with us still!

You raise some good points in that one short post!

Inop Attitude Indicator....not covered.....now there is an interesting situation.

You are very lucky it was not a Helicopter you were flying at the time....the end result would probably have not allowed you to post about it.

SASless, I most certainly wouldn't be writing this post had I been in a helicopter. I think the main reason I survived and what sticks in my mind is I experienced some sort of phenomenon where the 42 seconds were the longest 3 or 4 minutes of my life. You are very calm and able to think clearly, I seemed to have so much time? But yes, little chance in a helicopter, especially with rising terrain as in this case. I wonder if Kobe's pilot or anyone else here has experienced something similar.

SASless

18th Feb 2020, 18:56

What happens if you hit three times?

Resets to "Manual"?

Glacier pilot

18th Feb 2020, 19:13

I agree with you a 100%, once the option to turn around or to land was gone; then straight ahead climb with autopilot. (There would have been headlines, but different ones.) Somewhere in the climb, probably splitting time between trying to maintain a ground visual and fly on instruments & other distractions, my guess something along the lines of what you have described in the simulator occured. All it takes is unconcious pressure on a control.

Sir Korsky

18th Feb 2020, 22:33

What happens if you hit three times?

Resets to "Manual"?

No Manuel, he's the Spanish George :)

No idea - phase 7 139 reverts to phase 5 heading mode if you hit GA twice

gulliBell

18th Feb 2020, 23:37

...All it takes is unconcious pressure on a control.

The key to flying the S76 in IMC is not to touch the flight controls. Fly it in ATT mode using the trim switch for attitude changes, or just let George fly. Some pilots feel bravado is required as soon as they punch a hole in a cloud and they hands fly, failing to make use of George. It takes demonstration and training to get out of that mindset. And you can only do that training in the S76. Fair chance the IIMC and UA recovery training the pilot did in his May 2019 check was not on the S76. As soon as pilots touch the force trim release on the cyclic (or worse, fly in SAS mode), and it's their instinctive reaction to do that, things can go pear shaped very quickly. Which is why S76 pilots should do their IIMC and UA recovery training in the S76.

Sir Korsky

19th Feb 2020, 00:32

The key to flying the S76 in IMC is not to touch the flight controls. Fly it in ATT mode using the trim switch for attitude changes, or just let George fly. Some pilots feel bravado is required as soon as they punch a hole in a cloud and they hands fly, failing to make use of George. It takes demonstration and training to get out of that mindset. And you can only do that training in the S76. Fair chance the IIMC and UA recovery training the pilot did in his May 2019 check was not on the S76. As soon as pilots touch the force trim release on the cyclic (or worse, fly in SAS mode), and it's their instinctive reaction to do that, things can go pear shaped very quickly. Which is why S76 pilots should do their IIMC and UA recovery training in the S76.

I had a pitch hard over on an ILS once. Happened so quickly and I estimated we lost 400 feet before I managed to recover and climb back onto the slope. Was the shock of a lifetime. ATC asked us what the hell we were doing. We were lucky that it happened early after capture and we had plenty of airspace to cushion us. If it was low IFR and it happened near mins it could have been a different story. Learned many lessons that day and will always shadow the controls when coupled descending IFR. Servo went to the garbage.

SASless

19th Feb 2020, 02:01

Gulli is spot on with his advice to fly in the Attitude Mode (ATT).

We were taught as Nubbins to set an "attitude" to achieve the desired effect from the helicopter beginning in our very first days learning to hover.

Carry that thought forward.....if you. have an autopilot system that will do that for you....why not use it?

Release the Force Trim....move the Cyclic to adjust to the attitude you want....release the Force Trim button....and George attempts to hold that attitude for you. You can make very fine temporary adjustments with light pressure on the Cyclic or by use of the Trim Switch.

That is at a Hover.....and in forward flight use the same procedure until established in the cruise....then use the Trim Switch as the primary.

Engage the "Holds" as desired and let the AP do all of the work.

Make use of all the features you can.....and spend more time attending to other duties while monitoring the AP's flying of the aircraft.

One Pilot (of the human version) must fly the machine at all times.....keep it straight which one is doing that and never leave George unattended.

JohnDixson

19th Feb 2020, 02:08

SAS posted:

”We must constantly remember "Currency", especially if it is only the "legal" definition of currency, is not to be confused in anyway as being "proficiency".

Has anyone access or knowledge of the pilot’s flight records for the past few years, specifically actual and simulator instrument time?

gulliBell

19th Feb 2020, 05:03

Has anyone access or knowledge of the pilot’s flight records for the past few years, specifically actual and simulator instrument time?

The accident pilot's colleagues are reported to have said he had never flown in cloud before. I've got a hunch also that he'd never been checked out in a S76 simulator.

[email protected]

19th Feb 2020, 07:09

The accident pilot's colleagues are reported to have said he had never flown in cloud before. I've got a hunch also that he'd never been checked out in a S76 simulator.
If that is the case then simple disorientation following IIMC seems the most likely cause.

I don't think anyone should hold an IR if they haven't been in cloud.

I have lost count of the number of students who are really good under the hood but go to pieces when you actually get into the fluffy stuff.

megan

19th Feb 2020, 11:27

I have lost count of the number of students who are really good under the hood but go to pieces when you actually get into the fluffy stuffTrouble is crab you don't have to have flown in white fluffy stuff to get an instrument rating.

gulliBell

19th Feb 2020, 11:38

Trouble is crab you don't have to have flown in white fluffy stuff to get an instrument rating.
Exactly. I've seen freshly minted IR pilots come through the cloud-free IR training pipeline and the first time they enter cloud they lose it within a minute. That is the point where the proper IR training begins. With passengers, on line operations.

SASless

19th Feb 2020, 12:22

I found I flew better in-cloud than by using a Hood as my instrument scan and other tasks got much easier due to the ability to use my peripheral vision.

I fully agree that the best learning is done doing it for real.....with a proper Simulato being the second best option.

The Simulator is where the best learning takes place but for straight forward flying ability and confidence boosting....flying in real weather is the best course.

One observation about pilots and instrument flying.....are they flying "instruments" or flying the Attitude Indicator?

My Army Instrument Instructor , regardless of policy, insisted the AI was a secondary instrument that was used to set a new attitude to cause some effect that was determined by what all of the other Instruments were indicating.

The way I used to check for this in the Sim or the aircraft was to begin the age old "Unusual Attitude" drill...with the Student putting his head down and closing his eyes....while I moved the aircraft about all three axis.....but at the start of it while straight and level I would adjust his attitude indicator 5-10 degrees wing low.

Then...when in an all but wings level attitude (5-10 degrees of bank) showing on his attitude indicator....off we went for the roller coaster ride.

Remember....there were three Attitude Indicators in the aircraft that he could look at any time he wished.

Most would take three evolutions of going wings level...then correcting a turn...then correcting a turn...then correcting a turn.....before realizing something was wrong with his Attitude Indicator.

Sadly....some would never figure it out and thus never be in full control of the aircraft either physically or mentally.

That Instructor is the one that required me to fly a Huey...no SAS, with no Gyro's, fixed card heading indicator, and mag compass then complete an NDB Hold and NDB approach....before he would sign me off.

Are we seeing that level of training these days?

Mind you those skills are highly perishable

We should also remember another Aviation Law... "Never let bad judgement put you into a situation where you need your best skills!".

megan

19th Feb 2020, 12:38

My instrument training was military and done beneath a bag in fixed wing, so absolutely no cheating. Sim instructor once gave a failed a primary fattitude indicator in the -76, an approach plate was quickly stuck over the offending instrument.

SAS, Superior pilots use their superior judgment to avoid situations that would require the use of their superior skills. Not too sure I ever measured up.

JohnDixson

19th Feb 2020, 12:38

There is another question that comes to mind, and apologies for not remembering this,but, some FADEC’s may have memory chips and although not crash protected,if they survive,may offer evidence of what the collective/engine situation was up to the crash point. Does anyone know if the B model PT-6 FADEC’s have such a chip?
(I might have mentioned that on the initial design of the UH-60,and in spite of the Army saying they didn’t need it,Rich Murphy, who ran the Avionics/Electronic Flight Controls Group at the time, had such a chip designed and installed into the AFCS computer with exactly this sort of use intended. Never got any credit for doing something most of us thought very admirable ).

gulliBell

19th Feb 2020, 12:59

Given the engine gearboxes melted in the ensuing fire, chances are any memory chips are also kaput. In any event, at this point not even the wildest theory is even remotely suggesting any engine problem was involved here.

SASless

19th Feb 2020, 13:28

What are the ROD/Airspeed combinations for the 76B and how do those correlate with the airspeed/ROD data that has been presented?

Sir Korsky

19th Feb 2020, 13:35

The PT6's in the B had the EEC and was pretty basic stuff.

JohnDixson

19th Feb 2020, 15:31

GB, I wasn't thinking about the engines being involved at all: my thought was that the FADEC data could lead to learning at least what the collective was doing. .
Should have added that I’m certain that SA is assisting the NTSB,and they will certainly be chasing down any possibilities re data that might be obtained from either the engine Fadec or the Honeywell AP box. The crash photos makes that hope a bit optimistic but its a box you have to check-literally.

[email protected]

19th Feb 2020, 18:50

Sas - the selective radial scan has always been the UK mil tecbnique - starts with the AI to select an attitude then goes to and from each instrument to check the effect of that attitude but always back to the AI.

It's easier on a PFD/ MFD since all the information is on one screen:) but the premise is the same.

Lonewolf_50

19th Feb 2020, 19:08

Hands and feet off the controls, let George do all the hard work. For an experienced pilot/sim instructor to be teaching pilots to "get their hands off of the controls" makes my skin crawl. Even if George is doing it, you guard the controls, and you monitor what George is doing.
1. SIr Korsky's example is one point to remember.
2. Overdendence on automation erodes pilto skills and kills people.
3. Use the kit per SASless' and your general points, but do not become a passenger if you are the pilot.

n5296s

19th Feb 2020, 19:32

I don't think anyone should hold an IR if they haven't been in cloud.
I agree 100% with the principle, but the problem is that most civilian heli training is done in R22/R44, including IR, and while the R44 (at least) can be fully equipped for IFR, it can't legally be flown in IMC. An IMC-legal heli is way more expensive to operate and most schools don't have them. So the only way to do this would be to do the IMC part in FW, which would pose a whole bunch of problems of its own. Flying a heli under the hood is a bit of a joke, imho - even with the Steampunk Francis Hood, you still have to work at it not to see outside.

Personally I rather like flying in IMC (FW), and much prefer it to the hood. But I 100% agree that it's a totally different experience. Also even for the most experienced pilot, it takes a few seconds to really change gear and get into full-on IMC mode, even when you're expecting it. (I'm not by any means "the most experienced pilot" but I've confirmed this in discussions with people who have reasonable claim to it).

simon001

19th Feb 2020, 20:54

The accident pilot's colleagues are reported to have said he had never flown in cloud before.
From the NTSB Update:
According to FAA records, the pilot held an FAA commercial certificate with ratings for helicopter and instrument helicopter, as well as an FAA instructor certificate for flight, instrument, and ground instruction...His most recent flight review, including proficiency training in inadvertent entry into instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC) and unusual attitude recovery, was conducted in a helicopter with EUROSAFETY International on May 8, 2019. The pilot received satisfactory grades for these maneuvers.
At face value, that looks reasonable, but as a few people rightly pointed out, clouds and a hood are different. The stress that this is "real", the disorientation as the ground appears then disappears, the tendancy to turn with no visual cue etc. And of course temperature, mountains and MEAs. As I am reading, this sounds doubly hard in a helicopter.

I did all of my fixed wing instrument training in an aircraft rather than a sim and was lucky enough to find an instructor who was willing to do most of it at night and also some night IMC (I think him not having kids helped). I feel that it helped me tremendously. My most memorable learning moment was during the winter when ATC wouldn't give us our desired departure route at the 5000' MEA over Livermore due to the Oakland arrivals, instead routing us towards Panoche which was a 7000' MEA. The freezing level was 6000'. We knew that wasn't going to work. But the instructor turned it into a brief but effective learning exercise while we were still over an area with a low MDA. As we continued climbing, he got out his flashlight, pointed it at the strut, said "Here, I got it. Look out the window. You don't ever want to see that." We asked for and were quickly granted a 180.

gulliBell

19th Feb 2020, 22:24

For an experienced pilot/sim instructor to be teaching pilots to "get their hands off of the controls" makes my skin crawl..

In the S76 that is what you do. Feet on the floor. Hands off the controls. Control inputs come via pushing buttons or trim switches or turning knobs. Or, as SAS correctly pointed out, you can bump the cyclic flight control against the force trim spring pressure to make small adjustments on a precision approach. There is nothing that can go so wrong with the system or the aircraft where you need to be guarding the controls. Hands are sufficiently within reach to respond to any system disturbance that would require hands to go back on the controls. That is how you do it.

SASless

19th Feb 2020, 22:25

Flying in "Icing Conditions".....in a helicopter can be very educational.

Done at night over the North Sea way oop north can be very educational.

I promised myself several times I would never do that again.

Flying Airplanes in the Pacific Northwest could get rather interesting with all of the very high chunks of rocks out that way.

But...if you keep your wits about you....have a couple of planned options for the eventualities.....you can manage.

Just like kissing Rattlesnakes.....a lot of prevention pays off....don't scrimp.....it isn't worth it.

Sir Korsky

19th Feb 2020, 22:27

Nobody is going to let a newly minted doctor perform heart transplant surgery straight out of medical school are they? The key is in the primacy techniques adopted when training. If students are taught the right way from the start, it would program the mindset to adopt quality ADM when needed. Would you throw the keys to your IMC flown S76 to a newly minted guy? No, you'd send him out with an experienced guy until he gains the experience needed to become competent and comfortable within the IFR environment. Real world IMC flying is on the job training and the learning never ceases. The administrator understands this and licenses are issued as a foundation for development and progress.

gulliBell

19th Feb 2020, 23:01

So true. The problem is, when the pilot who did all his IR training avoiding clouds, who was probably taught by a CFII who had done all of his training and instructing also avoiding clouds, one day finds himself in a cloud by himself only to discover the experience is now a much higher level of seriousness than expected. If it turns out the accident pilot found himself in a cloud for the first time, and he was by himself, not-with-standing his thousands of hours of experience, he was under a lot of pressure in an unfamiliar environment backed into a corner with no other way out.

Glacier pilot

19th Feb 2020, 23:25

From personal inflight 'learning'' experiences in airplanes: 1) A 180 degree turn can involve actually going IFR into the turn. It doesn't result in 'course reversal and it takes time to come back out of the cloud and then fly back into good conditions. If this is done in the vicinity of terrain (not recommended), then it takes a lot of concentration not to be distracted by the ground that can come into view below (even while on the guages) & 2) As a 'green' co-pilot, while gliding through the clouds (a longer story), I witnessed the captain looking outside for a 'hole' while he was allowing the airplane bank to steepen (to the left!). (I remember my knee bumping the yoke to prevent going more than 45 degrees. The point being, it's either VFR or IFR and avoid situations of trying to do both. First rule is to fly the aircraft!

Lonewolf_50

20th Feb 2020, 02:29

In the S76 that is what you do. Feet on the floor. Hands off the controls. Control inputs come via pushing buttons or trim switches or turning knobs. Or, as SAS correctly pointed out, you can bump the cyclic flight control against the force trim spring pressure to make small adjustments on a precision approach. There is nothing that can go so wrong with the system or the aircraft where you need to be guarding the controls. Hands are sufficiently within reach to respond to any system disturbance that would require hands to go back on the controls. That is how you do it.
Listen close, boy.
When you are a single pilot, 'George' is not your co-pilot.
George is a part of the machine that is trying to kill you.
You guard the controls when you select AP, or, you choose to be a passenger, which means that you are no longer The Pilot, you are just one more poor bastard along for the ride.
If you can't teach that to your students, then you are part of the problem.
The crash in question had One Pilot.
When you have a co-pilot, the context changes.
But at least one of you needs to behave like a friggin' pilot.
This message was brought to you by a helicopter pilot who was taught that the pilot flies the machine, and is a master of the machine's systems ... or is ******* dead along with every other poor bastard along for the ride.

SASless

20th Feb 2020, 02:54

Lone.....when the other human pilot is flying the aircraft do you "guard" the controls in case he does something dangerous?

Climb down off that lofty steed you seem to be sat astride for a moment and consider what GB was really saying....not what you appear to have perceived.

He is not saying you lean back, and drag out a Kool, kick yer dancing pumps off, and prop yer hole filled sock on the center console and tune up your fav raggae music channel......he is talking about letting the Auto Pilot do exactly what it was designed to do....under the direct supervision of a human pilot

That for damn sure is what I am describing....which is not at all what you are describing.

You can attend to other duties in the cockpit while keeping a weather eye on George's performance.

You do understand we do this stuff single pilot in many of these machines don't you?

At some point you have to take your hands off the controls and divert your attention for short intervals out of necessity.

Think not....drop something. you need....and try to hold onto the controls while you fetch it off the cockpit floor....or look up a new. approach plate....or any number of tasks....like figure out a new routing ATC gives you that requires you to look at a paper chart.

Autopilots are pretty reliable these days....as long as you punch the right button or twist the right knob.

megan

20th Feb 2020, 03:07

For an experienced pilot/sim instructor to be teaching pilots to "get their hands off of the controls" makes my skin crawl......do not become a passenger if you are the pilotUsed to be a pet peeve of mine, our 412 and -76 co-pilots mostly were low experience and in their first multi with all the gizmos job, gulli was one of them. It was a very laid back job and standards applying were those set by the PIC, which varied as you can imagine. Pilot as passenger was one, Vne exceedance was paid little attention to by many for example. One crew had an engine failure in the cruise and they reported the 76 assumed an unusual attitude, how does that happen? Someone asleep at the wheel?

SAS, just saw your post, we did in fact fly single pilot prior to having co-pilots employed, and it complicated the job by having to make work, which brought about its own pitfalls. Had it been an IFR operation two crew would have been ideal, but it was VFR (tongue in cheek). To fly at night or IMC we had to crew with two captains, how fraught was that, two people who both thought they were in command, even though one had been designated.

Lonewolf_50

20th Feb 2020, 03:52

Lone.....when the other human pilot is flying the aircraft do you "guard" the controls in case he does something dangerous?
I pay attention to what the other pilot is doing. I don't take a mental vacation. You? "Hey, Bubba!" became an informal wake up call 40 years ago For A Reason.
Climb down off that lofty steed you seem to be sat astride for a moment and consider what GB was really saying....not what you appear to have perceived. I speak English very well, thanks. he is talking about letting the Auto Pilot do exactly what it was designed to do....under the direct supervision of a human pilot That's what you say, and it's not what I read. That for damn sure is what I am describing....And I took no issue with your points. You can attend to other duties in the cockpit while keeping a weather eye on George's performance. The day I trust George is the day I trust HAL. Which is about the day after I stop breathing. Some imperfect human designed him, ya know? Ever heard of MCAS? Ever heard of AF 447?
You do understand we do this stuff single pilot in many of these machines don't you? Yes, and all that means is that we (when single pilot) have to be ever vigilant. The machine is trying to kill you. It's a helicopter. It can't help itself. At some point you have to take your hands off the controls and divert your attention for short intervals out of necessity. That isn't what I was talking about, and you know it. You Brain Must At All Times Be Engaged. Autopilots are pretty reliable these days....as long as you punch the right button or twist the right knob. And if you use it frequently, rather than once in every two or three hundred sorties.
SASless, how about we bring our attention back to the case in point, OK?

We must teach our children (the pilots that we train) well:
We are the pilot, not a passenger.

SASless

20th Feb 2020, 04:20

Megan,

You are describing the helicopter industry....where standards are flexible as one allows them to be.

I spent most of my time in the more backward locals known to Man....and the Industry.

The thing I noticed was professional standards followed the decline of personal standards.

That was as true of the customer as it was the operator and the staff of both.

Just as the only person who can cause you to lose your integrity is you yourself........so it is with your professional standards.

When you accept a lowered standard....that becomes the new standard....and in time follow that path and there are no standards.

I am still searching to see where this perception that anyone has said an Autopilot was a Co-Pilot that could be left alone to take care of business all by its lonesome.

No where have I seen a comment that described an Autopilot as being autonomous and is anything but a system that is to be used by a Pilot to ease the workload of mechanical tasks assigned to it by the Pilot.

As to redundant humans in the cockpit....that is not relevant to the tragedy under discussion.

Nor is the issue of confusion between humans as to who is actually in command.

As far as we know....perhaps even use or abuse of the Autopilot system may not apply.

Hartford

20th Feb 2020, 04:28

I notice in the airplane world they have been talking about the issue of automation being so ubiquitous pilots lose their hand flying abilities. The first time I had an auto-pilot it took some getting used to. Eventually I learned to trust it, and in my opinion it made operations safer.

I think it will always come with some skill erosion but it’s probably less than airplane pilot’s experience. Much of my flight time required hands on the sticks, but I suppose that’s job dependent.

When the visibility was low or the weather was looking questionable it was pretty comforting to know I had it. And I fully intended to engage it if I lost the horizon. Then I monitored to make sure me and it agreed on which way is up. But I certainly saw some people who were reluctant to use it and saw it as something like a crutch for less skilled pilots. I know of two accidents that could have been avoided simply by engaging it. I suspect when this investigation is through that will be the case as well.

As far as the building skill vs losing it through automation stuff. I know that despite the skill erosion in many airplane pilots, they don’t seem to smack themselves into the ground as much when they hit clouds.

helimutt

20th Feb 2020, 08:09

Listen close, boy.
When you are a single pilot, 'George' is not your co-pilot.
George is a part of the machine that is trying to kill you.
You guard the controls when you select AP, or, you choose to be a passenger, which means that you are no longer The Pilot, you are just one more poor bastard along for the ride.
If you can't teach that to your students, then you are part of the problem.
The crash in question had One Pilot.
When you have a co-pilot, the context changes.
But at least one of you needs to behave like a friggin' pilot.
This message was brought to you by a helicopter pilot who was taught that the pilot flies the machine, and is a master of the machine's systems ... or is ******* dead along with every other poor bastard along for the ride.

Ive read some garbage on this thread and some very interesting useful stuff. Unfortunately with your comments, I have to agree with SASless. The AP is there to make the machine easier to fly. Switch the AP’s off and the ride becomes hard work in an S76. Not impossible by any stretch, but once the AP’s are engaged, the 76 is very stable with no FD modes engaged.
If you now engage the FD modes for say ALT and HDG, you then monitor what it does and can intervene easily if you don’t agree with the inputs. Any machine or system can fail, but from every single instructor or examiner that I’ve flown with in the S76 for 15 years, all over the world, they all say if the sh*t starts to hit the fan, engage the FD modes to help you out and reduce workload a little if you can. Not one of them has ever said ‘oh just disengage the autopilot because its trying to kill you’
Now you come along and spout crap about George is trying to kill you? I have to say I disagree very strongly with your statements. I wouldn’t be surprised if the press pick up your comments and use them for Sensationalist Headlines. “Autopilots, The Killers In The Aircraft!”

Senior Pilot

20th Feb 2020, 08:29

BrogulT

23rd Feb 2020, 00:19

This is a question for those that fly the LAX-area helicopter routes. Various news outlets are reporting that Ari Zobayan had incurred a violation in 2015 and part of the circumstances were that he had requested to transit LAX Class B airspace using SVFR. I don't have a helicopter route chart, but the terminal area chart (and, I believe, the sectional) show that the LAX Class B is "NO SVFR". As a non-commercial fixed wing pilot it would never even occur to me to try to ask for something like that--the message seems clear! So two questions--was this marking in place on the charts back in 2015? And, is this a hard and fast rule or is it something you can still request and have granted if circumstances permit?

KKoran

23rd Feb 2020, 06:54

The notation on the chart isn't clear as the no SVFR restriction comes from Part 91, Appendix D, Section 3 which says "Locations at which fixed-wing Special VFR operations are prohibited."

gulliBell

23rd Feb 2020, 09:38

I think the issue of the violation was he requested SVFR, the request was denied, then he reported VFR when it wasn't.

SASless

23rd Feb 2020, 11:20

helonorth

23rd Feb 2020, 12:35

I think the issue of the violation was he requested SVFR, the request was denied, then he reported VFR when it wasn't.
That's not how SVFR works here. It doesn't matter what you "report". The airspace is VFR or it isn't, decided by official weather reporting, not the pilot.

SASless

23rd Feb 2020, 13:19

Gulli also overlooks the fact that the weather could be clear, blue, and 22 where the pilot is....and IFR where the Tower or weather measurement equipment is located.

Despite the runways being visible for a full half of their length....due to the way fog formed/dissipated.....several places I have worked out of had that as a common occurrence.

The Official weather controls of course....but blanket statements fail to consider reality sometimes.

In Olympia Washington the Tower Cab used to be in the sunshine looking out to Mt. Rainier but the airfield was IFR due to ground fog.

Even if they could see half the runway....they were still IFR.

Torquetalk

23rd Feb 2020, 13:55

it’s easy to get fixated on rules vs met definitions. All below are lawful possibilities:

VFR in VMC
VFR in IMC (uncontrolled airspace)
SVFR in IMC (controlled airspace)
IFR in VMC
IFR in IMC

Depends on the airspace. What is suitable and safe depends on a whole load of things.

What is not lawful is flying VFR in cloud.

SandBlaster214

23rd Feb 2020, 17:00

I happened to stumble across this short clip a few days ago. I tried to page back to see if I was posting a redundant link and couldn't locate it, so here goes. Personally, I thought it was rather well spoken and, although it doesn't bring any real "new" discussion points to the thread, it does bring out a few new talking points regarding current industry standards vs. type of operation and a few thought provoking analogies and other comparisons that point toward this accident. Like several others here, I've been flying these things for a while (45+ years), and I've worked both sides; "line" pilot and "Kool-Aid" drinking "manager" pilot and from my seat, find this thread has quite a bit of excellent commentary on the accident, speculation/ supposition of cause and effect, as well as educational commentaries aimed at future risk mitigation and avoidance.

I hope we can keep the thread alive for those safety/ educational considerations it has and hopefully will continue to generate. Look, I'm just an old West Texas ****-kicker and probably not smart enough to enter into the actual foray, as compared to a lot of folks here, but if this ongoing discussion causes one pilot to take note and re-analyze his current or planned situation so to avoid such an outcome, that's our end goal. I glad to see it's been re-opened and I say; "let's keep 'er going". Y'all please, be safe.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpGl2_fVr2Y

BrogulT

23rd Feb 2020, 19:04

FOX had an article on this.

The FAA said it was a one time event, did not indicate a continuing problem, took no action beyond a counseling session, the Operator conducted Remedial Training, and that was the end of it.

Had there been a serious violation the FAA would have taken Certificate Action.....they did not.

Since that event the Pilot had no violation record of any kind.

Shawn Coyle, well known around these parts, says pretty much what I just have.

Shawn notes that it is not uncommon for a Pilot to have violated a Rule sometime in their career.....I agree and plead guilty.

I once found myself inside a control zone under IFR, confessed my Sin, received a SVFR Clearance "OUT of...." the Control Zone.

Upon landing...called the Tower....apologized....and received forgiveness.

Move on folks.....old news of no importance.

I agree that an airspace violation isn't necessarily a big thing. I haven't done it myself, but I've heard/seen others do it and just get vectored out without even a demand to call the tower later. The fact the the FAA even went as far as to issue a notice of violation seems to indicate that this was a little more severe than the average airspace incursion and I can give you some possible reasons why they might have taken it more seriously.

First, this happened on the south side of LAX right where the boundary where Class B airspace goes directly from 100/50 to 100/SFC. To allow operations at Hawthorne and various helipads, including the LA Sheriff's Dept, they've pushed this 100/SFC boundary very close to LAX. At one point this boundary is only a few hundred feet away from the runway of one of the busiest airports in the world. This boundary matches a clearly visible highway and everyone that flies this area knows never to cross over it. I'm sure the local ATC takes incursions across this wall very seriously.

Second, there is the SVFR request itself and the subsequent statement that he was in VFR. Given the specifics of the area, I'd be shocked if they did allow SVFR transits given the other traffic and the potential consequences of popping up. I don't know the pilots destination on that day, but unless there's a landing spot right inside the boundary, I just can't see it being allowed. I found a helicopter chart and it also lists the area as 'NO SVFR'. I'd post a picture if I could, but I'd really like to know from a local if that 'NO SVFR' is actually a hard and fast rule that applies to helicopters. If it is, then perhaps it reflects poorly on the pilot that he even asked for it.

SASless

23rd Feb 2020, 19:07

I have heard the event happened like the following.......

The transition he requested was north on the 110 freeway which was clear and blue. The field was IFR with marine layer extending to the 405 freeway. He was VFR 10 miles east of that. Hawthorn cleared him. He orbited over the 105/110 freeway while waiting for LAX to clear him. Which is 1/10th of a mile north of the Hawthorn center-line and on the edge of the bravo. The LAX controller thought his orbit put him north of the intersection and called him out on the radio. He was not violated but counseled instead. He was not scud running.

How does that compare to what you are describing?

BrogulT

23rd Feb 2020, 19:31

I don't know whose version that is, but it sounds a bit like how I would describe it if I was his lawyer. :rolleyes:

The 110 Harbor Freeway is about 5 miles off the east end of the runways, not 10. The weather could have been as described, but if it was 'clear and blue' I don't know why he would have asked for SVFR. As far as ATC 'thinking his orbit put him north', I'd assume they'll have an exact track--it won't be a matter of opinion. And that boundary is clearly visible on the ground as the Imperial Highway, so there's really no excuse for crossing it if the weather is 'clear and blue'. As for the rest of it, I just couldn't tell you.

Torquetalk

23rd Feb 2020, 20:51

BrogulT

23rd Feb 2020, 21:51

You can’t be “in VFR”. The met conditions are either VMC or IMC. If LAX was IMC and he wanted a clearance to transit controlled airspace, then VFR would not be an option. It’s IFR or SVFR or fly around.

Yes, operating under VFR in VMC, requesting to continue on a VFR clearance. However, I'm not sure about your other statement and I've heard differing opinions on whether ATC can allow you to transit one area of their airspace under VFR, assuming that your entire transit route will be VMC, whilst the airport itself is reporting IMC. It doesn't really matter here because the issue is that he entered without a clearance at all, but I'm just wondering if this is clearly defined somewhere. I found a discussion of this on a controllers forum and even they were not in agreement.

Gordy

24th Feb 2020, 00:21

However, I'm not sure about your other statement and I've heard differing opinions on whether ATC can allow you to transit one area of their airspace under VFR, assuming that your entire transit route will be VMC, whilst the airport itself is reporting IMC.

Commenting in general here, I do it all the time.

The weather requirements for flying VFR in various classes of airspace are codified in 14 CFR 91.155, which states in part:"§ 91.155 Basic VFR weather minimums.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and § 91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under VFR when the flight visibility is less, or at a distance from clouds that is less, than that prescribed for the corresponding altitude and class of airspace in the following table: ..."
Notice the reg says "...flight visibility is ..." and "distance from clouds that is..." In the context of a pilot, "is" has only one meaning: that flight visibility experienced by the pilot at the time of observation. Likewise, in promulgating Amendment 91-262 to Part 91 in 2000, the FAA said:

"Flight visibility is also defined in 14 CFR section 1.1 and must be determined by a pilot from the cockpit while an aircraft is airborne." (65FR16113: Part 91 Amdt; No. 91-262, March 24, 2000)

In order for ATC to not require a SVFR, they need to know that you can maintain VFR (and thereby lessening their load and providing most of your own separation). Therefore, when you call for your transition, you need to advise them that you are, and can maintain VFR throughout your transition.

I do this on certain routes flying power lines in Northern California, and the first time I tried, I had to call the tower and explain this. If you know Barry Lloyd, he has a presentation on this very subject.

[email protected]

24th Feb 2020, 08:36

[email protected]

24th Feb 2020, 08:52

If you, as a pilot, believe you won't become a statistic because of your experience, skill or knowledge the you are very likely to be be closer to becoming one.

aterpster

24th Feb 2020, 12:25

You can’t be “in VFR”. The met conditions are either VMC or IMC. If LAX was IMC and he wanted a clearance to transit controlled airspace, then VFR would not be an option. It’s IFR or SVFR or fly around.
And a Class B surface area to boot, where air carrier aircraft are in landing configuration, and most vulnerable to unauthorized aircraft infringing on their approach path. That is what Class B is all about: positive separation at low altitude.

EESDL

24th Feb 2020, 14:36

Extract from LA Times article - a sick or witty pun?
”That’s not how it works. It shows that perhaps his understanding of special VFR as opposed to VFR was cloudy.”
LA Times article (https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-02-21/kobe-bryants-pilot-was-previously-counseled-by-the-faa-on-reviewing-weather-before-flying?utm_source=vertical-daily-news-news-from-the-web&utm_campaign=vertical-daily-news&utm_medium=email&utm_term=news-from-the-web&utm_content=V1)

MikeNYC

24th Feb 2020, 15:01

Commenting in general here, I do it all the time.

The weather requirements for flying VFR in various classes of airspace are codified in 14 CFR 91.155, which states in part:"§ 91.155 Basic VFR weather minimums.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section and § 91.157, no person may operate an aircraft under VFR when the flight visibility is less, or at a distance from clouds that is less, than that prescribed for the corresponding altitude and class of airspace in the following table: ..."
Notice the reg says "...flight visibility is ..." and "distance from clouds that is..." In the context of a pilot, "is" has only one meaning: that flight visibility experienced by the pilot at the time of observation. Likewise, in promulgating Amendment 91-262 to Part 91 in 2000, the FAA said:

"Flight visibility is also defined in 14 CFR section 1.1 and must be determined by a pilot from the cockpit while an aircraft is airborne." (65FR16113: Part 91 Amdt; No. 91-262, March 24, 2000)

In order for ATC to not require a SVFR, they need to know that you can maintain VFR (and thereby lessening their load and providing most of your own separation). Therefore, when you call for your transition, you need to advise them that you are, and can maintain VFR throughout your transition.

I do this on certain routes flying power lines in Northern California, and the first time I tried, I had to call the tower and explain this. If you know Barry Lloyd, he has a presentation on this very subject.

Gordy,

The more relevant FAR is:

§ 135.205 VFR: Visibility requirements.
(b) No person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface or within the lateral boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace designated for an airport unless the visibility is at least -
(1) During the day - 1/2 mile; or
(2) At night - 1 mile.

Gordy

24th Feb 2020, 15:48

Gordy,
The more relevant FAR is:
§ 135.205 VFR: Visibility requirements.
(b) No person may operate a helicopter under VFR in Class G airspace at an altitude of 1,200 feet or less above the surface or within the lateral boundaries of the surface areas of Class B, Class C, Class D, or Class E airspace designated for an airport unless the visibility is at least -
(1) During the day - 1/2 mile; or
(2) At night - 1 mile.

Not really. We are not talking about going that low in the example I am referring to. Commenting in general here:

I fly power lines all the time, and can fly in airports that are reporting conditions less than VFR, yet if I can maintain VFR, I can fly through it. A good example is Napa County airport, (KAPC), where a marine layer will sit on the Southern side of their airspace, where the lower one third of the class delta is 2nm visibilty. I fly a line on the North side where the "flight visibility" is 10nm. I can legally fly East to West through that airspace without requesting a SVFR. Obviously I would not fly below 1/2 mile vis. What am I missing?

Lonewolf_50

24th Feb 2020, 17:29

In related news: a wrongful death suit has been filed. (https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/nba/vanessa-bryant-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-helicopter-company-and-pilot-involved-in-kobe-bryants-accident/ar-BB10kL25?ocid=spartandhp)
(Predictable outcome of an accident with fatalities)
While that does not have anything to do with how to fly the S-76, and what is or isn't SVFR ...
... it does pertain to the overall environment in which professional pilots operate.

@gulibell:
apologies for the tone I took there.
I could have said what I had to say better than I did.

Bell_ringer

24th Feb 2020, 17:31

In related news: a wrongful death suit has been filed. (https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/nba/vanessa-bryant-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-helicopter-company-and-pilot-involved-in-kobe-bryants-accident/ar-BB10kL25?ocid=spartandhp)
(Predictable outcome of an accident with fatalities)
While that does not have anything to do with how to fly the S-76, and what is or isnt' SVFR ...
... it does pertain to the overall environment in which professional pilots operate.

I half expected the operator to close their doors and take the money and run. It was always going this route and they are unlikely to survive the process and outcome.

crunchingnumbers

24th Feb 2020, 19:09

If you, as a pilot, believe you won't become a statistic because of your experience, skill or knowledge the you are very likely to be be closer to becoming one.

Good point - after many years flying I would often remark to non-aviation friends that regardless of experience, the more flights I performed, simply meant that I was just that little bit closer to possibly becoming a statistic :eek:. There have always been lots of truly competent and naturally good pilots with all the skill and experience in the world - only problem is, some of the are no longer with us.

SASless

24th Feb 2020, 19:37

I always thought that if you go to the Well often enough you are going to hit mud at some point.

An old helicopter pilot I once knew reminded me on more than one occasion....."Just because you jump into a Well the Good Lord is not bound to fetch you out!".

I tried to follow that old Pelican's advice.

377 Pete

24th Feb 2020, 19:49

Don't know if this has been uncovered yet-
https://i.imgur.com/DHUs4eF.png
$20K is a pretty hefty fine. No doubt the victim attorneys already have this. I don't think any IEX pilots tested positive. Probably some kind of drug testing compliance problem.

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/enforcement/reports/media/q3-18.pdf

havick

24th Feb 2020, 22:02

Don't know if this has been uncovered yet-

https://i.imgur.com/DHUs4eF.png

$20K is a pretty hefty fine. No doubt the victim attorneys already have this. I don't think any IEX pilots tested positive. Probably some kind of drug testing compliance problem.

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/practice_areas/enforcement/reports/media/q3-18.pdf

That says a lot more about the company than you would think.

SASless

24th Feb 2020, 22:53

Is that the final result or what was assessed before any kind of arbitration or negotiation?

377 Pete

24th Feb 2020, 23:48

Is that the final result or what was assessed before any kind of arbitration or negotiation?
Twenty years ago I was fined $1K for 'missing/incomplete' records. Nothing was missing or incomplete, I tried to appeal, the FMCSA basically said 'pay the fine or have your operating authority suspended'. No arbitration, no negotiation. (This was a trucking company not an air carrier, btw).

Hot and Hi

25th Feb 2020, 06:20

Yes, this is the way it works in the ‘free‘ world. Makes you wonder how it works the other parts of the world.

SASless

25th Feb 2020, 13:13

The Law Suits begin.....one suit against the Operator and the Pilot has been filed.

As I have said many times in the past.....it is a tragedy when something like this happens.

The loss of life in the crash, the loss of an aircraft, the harm to the Operator....and then the family of the dead Pilot find themselves in Civil Court facing financial ruin as well.

Young folks....remember one day you. might survive a crash and find yourself in court explaining your actions to a Jury that will be quite happy to give away everything you have gained over your life and leave you burdened with a huge debt.

Store that away in the back of your Mind and always act in such a. manner that even a Jury will see you did your best, followed the Rules, exercised unquestionable professional judgement, and did the "right" thing.

That way you might avoid an accident and not even face the need to hire a lawyer.....much less pay damages to the Plaintiffs.

The other thing to remember....the Operator' Lawyer represents the Operator...not the Pilot.

Not only is it your Life and License...but also you fortune which is at risk.

https://www.breitbart.com/sports/2020/02/24/kobe-bryants-wife-files-wrongful-death-lawsuit-against-helicopter-company-pilot/

212man

25th Feb 2020, 14:24

The other thing to remember....the Operator' Lawyer represents the Operator...not the Pilot.

Yes - I used to fly with a pilot who had stuck an aircraft into the North Sea sadly with one pax fatality (actually single pilot loss of control trying to turn away from deteriorating conditions). He recounted the story of how at the opening of the Fatal Accident Inquiry the Sheriff (Scotland) asked him where his lawyer was and he pointed to his employer's lawyer, only to be told "no, I'm representing *******" !

[email protected]

25th Feb 2020, 15:17

No matter how good or lucky you think you are, always allow a margin for error - otherwise the error takes you to to the edge of (or beyond) your skill/luck envelope and such cliff-edges are often fatal.

Helicopter pilots are, by nature and necessity, managers of risk due to the environments we work in and the conditions we work under - I'm sure there's not one here who hasn't pushed their luck to get the job done and then sat and thought about it later pondering the what-ifs.

Doubtless Ara would have done the same if he had got through and delivered his pax and maybe learned a lesson from it - close calls are what make you stop and take stock. Not to be in this case sadly.

ST Dog

25th Feb 2020, 17:46

In related news: a wrongful death suit has been filed.
(Predictable outcome of an accident with fatalities)

Typical kitchen sink approach.

The suit also alleges the craft was unsafe, though it does not provide specifics relating to that matter.

So will SAC have to defend the AC design too?

SASless

25th Feb 2020, 19:01

Who has the deepest pockets...Sikorsky, the Operator, the Pilot.....?

Which one would you hope the Jury to find liable?

BrogulT

25th Feb 2020, 20:00

Who has the deepest pockets...Sikorsky, the Operator, the Pilot.....?

Which one would you hope the Jury to find liable?

The operator is generally going to be liable for anything the pilot did anyway. Suing both would be quite standard, but I would hope that the pilot's estate would not be tapped. In this case, however, the liability may exceed the pockets of the operator and their insurance policy. I would hope, ideally, that the operator would be paying.

Sikorsky by far will have the deepest pockets and unfortunately for them, today is their day to be wearing milk-bone underwear. They're going to be looking to settle out as quickly as possible, even if their liability is doubtful.

EPHD75

25th Feb 2020, 20:38

SASless

25th Feb 2020, 23:28

What was his earning potential over the years until his youngest child reaches Legal Age?

gulliBell

26th Feb 2020, 00:57

I don't think the legal action would be much about money. It would be about recognition of accountability.

SASless

26th Feb 2020, 01:00

Gulli....wake the heck up!

An NBA Superstar....lots of earning potential from endorsements....Los Angeles....and the Celebrity Lawyers looking for a very big fat paycheck......you can bet your breeches it will be about money based upon pinning the tail on some donkey!

malabo

26th Feb 2020, 03:05

I don't think the legal action would be much about money. It would be about recognition of accountability.

I guess we’d all burn in hell then. I’ve never seen any court case that captured the intricacies of helicopter flying and the second to second decision making involved.

I’m guilty of flying through a cloud, without an IFR clearance, on my way to or from a rig. Maybe a thousand times. Questioned by the copilot I said it was “Canadian VFR”. Truthfully, in Canada, or elsewhere with my company, popping up through a cloud layer was not considered IFR. Even descending back down through it. S76 (the old phase II without an FD that would wear a permanent indentation into your thumb from the coolie hat), AW139, 212/412, even did some IMC 180’s in 407/206 when I’d got too low enough over water that I’d climb 500’ then wait 10 minutes or so after the 180 before letting back down. I even recall some pilots asking for a ceiling check before they’d auto back down through a layer. Seemed normal at the time, and all the other pilots I flew with were comfortably competent doing the same.

Way more culpable than what Ara did. It does give pause to consider the personal financial disaster I was exposing my family to.

gulliBell

26th Feb 2020, 09:58

Bell_ringer

26th Feb 2020, 10:23

Well, of course the celebrity lawyers want their legal fees. But for the family, I suspect, given their existing wealth, wouldn't be needing to be any more wealthy. Not to the limited extent of what any insurance payout might be (operators carry about $20M liability insurance, right?). Surely the family would be more concerned with attributing responsibility?

There's no way that between the pilot's estate and the operator's assets and insurance that any judgement would make a financial difference to the family.
This will be about accountability and encouraging others to avoid such accidents in the future.
Litigators will no doubt have a field day painting a grim picture of operator culture and pilot history to a layman jury which will come to an inevitable conclusion.

If there ever was an incentative to be risk averse, it would be to avoid having to defend yourself (or your family defending your estate) from litigation.
If you are fortunate enough to exit the experience successfully, the costs can ruin you, something that has been shown to happen time and again.

377 Pete

26th Feb 2020, 13:06

(operators carry about $20M liability insurance, right?).

According to my math ($300,000 X 6 pax seats) IEX needed only $1.8M to meet the legal minimum. Which seems paltry.

https://i.imgur.com/ymmnoij.png

https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/afx/afs/afs200/afs260/exemptions/media/FillableForm6410.pdf

simon001

27th Feb 2020, 06:09

While the NTSB will be out for a long time determining the probable cause of this unfortunate crash, factors, IMHO, do point to continued VFR into IMC.

I say this with respect to the victim's families, including the pilot's family.

More information will be forthcoming of course. But a number of rotorcraft instructors in this forum have been very informative about VFR into IMC in a training scenario, which is something, as a fixed wing pilot, I was unaware of. Especially given the experience of the pilot. Inadvertent VFR into IMC is not good. But even more challenging for the rotorcraft pilot.

For anyone who's ever wondered about continued VFR into IMC accidents under Part 135, read the Capstone Project. A 17 year study of every air taxi accident in Alaska. The FAA chose Alaskan Part 135 operations for good reason. There was a lot of data. Alaskan Part 135 operations altered the national average.

https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/programs/adsb/Archival/media/Final_VFR_into_IMC_Study_15APR04.pdf

Some excerpts:

"controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) crashes, as they have termed those events, account for 50 percent of the total commercial accidents and are responsible for 79 percent of the commercial fatalities."

"the majority of VFR into IMC crashes occurred within 25 miles of the departure airport during the first leg of flight, during daylight hours on flat, snow-covered terrain. The majority of the pilots in these events had weather reporting capabilities and instrument approach facilities available. More startling is that the majority of these pilots were aware of the weather conditions at the time of departure. The report shows that a large number of these pilots were operating aircraft that were equipped for instrument flight but not certified."

"only 5 percent of the pilots involved in crashes for the active certificates were not certificated to operate in instrument meteorological conditions"

[email protected]

27th Feb 2020, 06:35

Simon, I wonder if some of the 'IFR avoidance' was due to lack of icing clearance on most helicopters. Also judging height and terrain over snow covered ground can be very tricky without a radalt and even then rising ground may not be obvious.

simon001

27th Feb 2020, 06:53

I am entirely unqualified to comment on rotorcraft and icing or snow.

Your point on judging height and terrain over snow covered ground does remind me of the 1979 Air New Zealand DC-10 Mount Erebus crash. The pilots were in VMC but still flew straight into the snow covered mountain. All souls on lost on the tourist flight. It was a really big deal for Air New Zealand. A national carrier. All charter flights to Antarctica ceased and did not resume again for another 34 years.

"Passenger photographs taken seconds before the collision removed all doubt of a "flying in cloud" theory, showing perfectly clear visibility well beneath the cloud base, with landmarks 13 miles (21 km) to the left and 10 miles (16 km) to the right of the aircraft visible" - Royal Commission Report, para 28

keeprighton1974

27th Feb 2020, 08:56

Getting back to the crash scene, if I may. Does anyone have footage of any other helicopter crash where the smoke is white and not black? I cannot find any.

gulliBell

27th Feb 2020, 09:49

Magnesium alloy burning.

Hot and Hi

27th Feb 2020, 16:54

Open source on the web indicates that Mr. Bryant at the time of his death had a net worth of $600 million. I wonder what the net worth of the pilot and the operator total, including insurance? Plaintiffs' lawyers may have a difficult challenge in making the argument that Mr. Bryant's family have suffered a terrible loss and need compensation. Terrible loss yes, compensation....hmmmm,
The size of the damages claim is not informed by the neediness of the dependents. But by the benefits that the dependents would have received had their breadwinner not been taken away. The dependents here include all surviving minor children (up to the age or 21) and possibly also the spouse.

Like when you dent somebody's Ferrari: The damage claim is high because of the high cost to repair a Ferrari. Not low because arguably, a person who can afford a Ferrari can also afford to get it fixed.

Hot and Hi

27th Feb 2020, 18:22

Great video Sandblaster:ok:

Back to Kobe Bryant's crash and ISTR the only reason the aircraft went North and was offered SVFR was because of the volume of traffic departing South from the airport - this seems to have been the controller trying to be helpful because the alternative was a long hold before crossing South under the departure lane.

Faced with a ,long hold and the inevitable desire to get his pax to their destination on time, I'm sure most pilots would have taken this option.

Trouble is, once clear of the controlled airspace, he can't be SVFR and must declare he is in VFR weather limits to legally continue flight. This seems to have coincided with the weather actually being worse - and now he has painted himself into a bit of a corner and convinces himself the best option is to carry on since the weather MUST get better as he gets down towards the highway.

So when it doesn't, he is royally screwed - then leaves one of his options too late (turn round or climb) and then as he hits the marine layer, tries to do both at once - the rest is sadly history.

If you go back to an earlier time in the flight, there were plenty of opportunities to take a safer (if more time consuming) option (hold, land, return to base etc) but once committed to the North routing, SVFR into VFR, worsening weather and tricky terrain, the holes in the swiss cheese really started to line up.

Until he entered cloud, he always had the option of slowdown, go down turn round or land and this is the message that still fails to be understood by pilots.
I am sure Crab didn't mean it, but I am afraid that some will misunderstand his post of saying that the actual conditions when given a Special VFR clearance are neccessarily worse than the VFR limits for helicopters operating outside of a control zone (CTR). Or to rephrase, that once exited the control zone in which you were operating under SVFR, in order to continue under VFR the visibility needs to have improved, else you can't proceed.

I believe that wouldn't be true. At least not universally.

In South Africa for example

In a control zone (CTR) a helicopter cannot operate under VFR if the viz is < 2,500m or the ceiling is < 600ft.
If granted SVFR clearance, a helicopter can continue to operate down to a viz > 800m (and no ceiling requirements, just clear of clouds and ground in sight).

Once "CTR out" the min viz requirements for helicopters is 1,500m, and no restriction on ceiling.

If we now look at a scenario [viz=2,000m;ceiling=500ft], while in a CTR you'd need SVFR clearance. Come "CTR out", the same conditions put you well above VFR minima applicable outside controlled airspace. Actually, you are good down to viz 1,500m, with reduced ceiling as long as clear of clouds and ground in sight.

The layman (read "press") might think that SVFR allows you to fly in the worst possible conditions, as ATC 'is vectoring you through". And once outside CTR, that is once you are on your own, you'd need better visibility to fly :ooh: .

The opposite is true: Because of the presence of IFR flights within a control zone, and the priority that is given to those IFR flights, ATC keeps an eye on you the moment the ceiling drops below 600 ft. Once outside the CTR, with no potential conflict with IFR flights, the helicopter pilot can subject him or herself to much lower minima.

[email protected]

27th Feb 2020, 21:39

I am sure Crab didn't mean it, but I am afraid that some will misunderstand his post of saying that the actual conditions when given a Special VFR clearance are neccessarily worse than the VFR limits for helicopters operating outside of a control zone (CTR). Or to rephrase, that once exited the control zone in which you were operating under SVFR, in order to continue under VFR the visibility needs to have improved, else you can't proceed. No, the SVFR clearance is an ATC permission, in this case to cross class B airspace when VFR isn't available (in some US airports I believe) or the weather precludes VFR (again I don't fly in the US but I believe when the ceiling is below 1000'agl). Helicopters can fly SVFR in class B with visibility less than the Class G VFR limit of 1 statute mile. Therefore on exiting Class B SVFR into Class G VFR you could be going from worse visibility limits to higher ones.
So, while he was in Class B - IF the visibility was poor, he would have to have an improvement in vis to 1SM as he crossed B to G in order to claim VFR.
It could well be that he had more than 1 SM all the way through B and out into G but he seemed hesitant to confirm VFR when asked which could have been visibility related or cloud related.
We are pretty sure that soon afterwards he entered cloud (definitely not VFR) where it all went wrong.

SASless

27th Feb 2020, 23:59

8driver

28th Feb 2020, 03:20

Y'all sure do like to pick the flysh** out of the pepper. The airspace doesn't matter. The regs don't matter, not a bit. The man made a choice to continue VFR into IMC and it appears he lost control. Now it may well be that a mechanical failure caused the loss of control. Perhaps there was a sudden incapacitation. But barring those things, it's pretty clear he continued VFR into IMC and screwed the pooch. No changing of the regs would prevent this accident, not even a requirement for GPWS because it appears control was lost. It comes down to judgement and experience and you cannot legislate those. The weather conditions on that day were apparently pretty unusual as far as the maritime layer was concerned. But if you are instrument rated you should be able to climb out of it.

Hot and Hi

28th Feb 2020, 03:42

So it seems the rules for helicopter minima outside CTR are basically the same across the world (with 1 statute mile roughly being 1,500 metres).

Other than that we must not confuse actual flying conditions with minimum permitted conditions. We fly in actual visibility, not in "minima". Actual conditions can be said to get worse if (for example) viz drops from 2,000m to 1,500m.

you could be going from worse visibility limits to higher ones. But what are "worse limits"? If, say, the ceiling limit in a control zone is 600ft, and then outside that control zone the limit is "clear of clouds", are we saying the limit got "worse", or are we saying the limit got "better"? That's ambiguous.

In reality, when flying from a zone with higher (= stricter) limits, into a zone with lower (= more lenient) limits, our options (degree of freedom) improve.

At the same (= unchanged) actual conditions, the only way the pilot - on existing SFVR - should be hesitant to confirm to be within VFR limits applicable to helicopters would be if he had been using the maximum extend of the SVFR clearance down to viz 800m. Then yes, upon exiting the CTR he would have to continue under IFR, as now the min required viz is 1,500m.

But that was not necessarily the case: Inside the CTR he could have had viz 2,000m (which in Class C and D airspace still would have required him to obtain SVFR clearance). Now upon exiting that CTR, with the same viz of 2,000m, he would have been well above helicopter VFR limits.

It would be wrong to assume (for the proverbial layman) that by definition the actual conditions would need to have improved to legally continue from SVFR (inside a CTR) into uncontrolled airspace. What could be though is that - due to approaching marine layer and/or rising terrain - the actual conditions (here: ceiling) got worse as he proceeded.

JimEli

28th Feb 2020, 13:15

Unless I am mistaken the aircraft did not get into Class B airspace..
Burbank is class C, Van Nuys is D, and from there the track would have taken him into Class G airspace.
SVFR in both the C and D is legal with an ATC Clearance which he had for each Control Zone.
Once in Class G airspace, 91.155(a) visibility minima is one half statute mile and clear of cloud.

Additionally, I believe Class G in this vicinity has a 700' ceiling. If he entered Class E, his visibility requirements would have been 3SM with cloud clearances of 500’ below, and 2000’ laterally. FAR 135.205 should have governed his minimum visibility requirement for the entirety at 1/2 mile, however his operation’s GOM could have imposed stricter limits. The airspace doesn't matter. The regs don't matter, not a bit. Except, given your supposition that, “the man made a choice to continue VFR into IMC,” if he had honored the airspace regs, chances are he wouldn’t have crashed.

vortex-generators

29th Feb 2020, 00:46

Ladies and gentlemen there’s has been a lot of discussion on the VFR minimums, /Special VFR Visibility and cloud separation legally required for this flight in various air spaces under Far 135 and 91. However, this been a great review, it doesn’t indicate what the pilots flight visibility was from the cockpit.

One of the many pieces of information the investigation are using to determine flight visibility is the security camera footage of the aircraft above Moreau Road and Highway 101. Without knowing the focal strength of this camera, it would be a guess, but I would say he was in legal flight visibility.

Figure 6 in the updated briefing is labeled still frame security video showing N72EX flying into clouds. The remainder of the video may show the aircraft fading into the background. But with the camera angle from the ground it would be difficult to tell whether he was climbing above the marine layer or flying into it.

megan

29th Feb 2020, 02:30

Sad part is, having climbed to 2300' safety was only 100' away, but he was not to know that, higher overcast layer obliterating the sun.

https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/886x589/00kobe_crash_02_jumbo_7cd710fadf2d8203281215916910e9125bf0fb e8.jpg

reader8

29th Feb 2020, 02:30

Without knowing the focal strength of this camera, it would be a guess, but I would say he was in legal flight visibility.

Refer to 8driver's point. If you're not competent or capable of flying on instruments then what matters is the visual cues available to you to allow you to determine your attitude and the rate of change so that your brain gets to complete that pesky hand-eye feedback loop. In flight visibility rules are only a regulatory tool to try to ensure visual references can be maintained, and generally at the pre-flight planning stage. It's a means, not an end. Try to accurately estimate visibility in flight.

Lose the ability to comprehend your attitude and take appropriate action then catastrophy occurs (see the recent Coulson C130 accident).

In control but not thinking about the terrain? Loss of situational awareness leading to CFIT.

Lose control because you can't maintain attitude? Loss of control in flight leading to UFIT.

Personally, I think that the balance of probably lies with CFIT. The only LOC indication is 'powered rotation'. Maybe he red-lined the torque when he saw terrain and ran out of tail rotor, maybe he tried to turn-away at last minute and used a bootfull of pedal. It draws a fine line between CFIT and UFIT but doesn't change the cause, which was his being there in the first place. What-If's about technical failures by lawyers might make this another Mull of Kintyre, which I doubt it is.