Kobe Bryant killed in S76 crash

[FH1100 Pilot]

The question to ask yourself.....are you prepared...capable...current...AND Proficient to fly your machine on basic flight instruments or are you just a button pusher?

If you are honest and know you come up short....what can you do to bring yourself up to that minimum standard?

As long as you are deficient....do not expose yourself to any chance of having to rely upon those skills YOU lack.
Oh, geez. Oh, Jesus H. Christ. Whenever I read crap like the above, the question I always have is, "Do you know any helicopter pilots? Have you ever actually *met* any real helicopter pilots?" Because if SASless had met, say, two of them, he would understand that every darn helicopter pilot privately (and often publicly) considers himself to be the best in the business. In 40 years in this business, I have NEVER met a commercial pilot who honestly thought that his skills were even slightly not up to par. The thought is preposterous. It's quite the opposite, in fact. Every helicopter believes down deep in his soul that he can handle anything...ANYTHING...that gets thrown at him with the coolness of Chuck Yeager. "Rotor falls off? Heck, I'll just call a Mayday, pop the floats and set the beotch down! What, you mean you couldn't??" Read some of the pompous, self-righteous, over-the-top comments over on the JH "bad" board and you'll get the idea.

SAS often has some good things to say - and he does say a LOT of things - but he's off the mark here. No commercial pilot worth his salt is gonna engage in a little navel-gazing and then say to himself, "Ya know, I'm really not as good as I think I am."

Tough as it is to admit, Kobe's pilot screwed-up, plain and simple. I'd bet that he had his head down, fiddling with either his iPad or something on the centre console (GPS? VHF?). And when he looked back up it was, "Oh, $&*#, we're in it!" Then he began his left-turn course-reversal, which might have worked at 70 knots, but not 130 because the turn radius was too large and it put him in the hills on the opposite of the valley. Wouldn't be the first pilot to make such a dumb mistake; won't be the last, sadly.

[Old Age Pilot]

I am concerned about the media (talk shows and late night comics) pushing the public towards demanding more in-flight safety devices like CVRs/FDRs/ and Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS). Based on this accident and high profile VIP.

Just what perspective in this accident investigation supports this among the public?

In my curent myopic vision (pls help me change) The pilot said he was going up above the clouds. Does that also entail a change in course that would have been imprudent and prevented by a TAWS system?

In what way would a CVR have pointed to a single pilot mis-application?

Can the wreckage recovery still proceed to a point where it can determine if a mechanical fault occurred without reliance on a DFDR ?

Can we still not come up with a probable cause to satisfy the basis of continued safety?

I believe that it is premature to start calling for equipment changes before an investigation is completed

I feel the same. The narrative of the NTSB is "we cannot answer any speculative questions, we can only deal with known facts - and we know nothing at this stage", yet there is this apparent snipe at the FAA for "failing to implement" their recommendations intended to avoid a specific cause of accident. They are indirectly suggesting the cause before they've even begun the investigation.

[GeorgeMandes]

There is a reason the airlines, and most corporate operators of turbine aircraft launch with two pilots. One pilot flying with another working communication, setting the nav equipment, and monitoring the pilot flying would have added much capability and been the least costly part of the operation.

[TIMTS]

As I read through these comments, there’s a possibility here that I haven’t seen mentioned, and I base this on personal experiences.

I was a captain on an IFR flight in a VIP 76B. Our high net worth pax had been briefed that this would be an ifr flight due to weather, and expressed no issues or concerns.

At pretty much the same time as I called glide slope alive my co pilot started having what looked like an epileptic fit next to me. Our pax was leaning through the little sliding glass window behind the left pilot seat, grabbing and shaking the shoulder harness.

My partner in crime delt with it swiftly, professionally and firmly. Although we landed successfully I can only imagine what would have happened if I had been single pilot, low level SVFR in the hills at 140+ kias, and someone from behind started pulling on my seatbelt.

could this have been a pilot in control of the situation suddenly dealing with a stressed out, possibly nervous, already delayed person in the back distracting him at a critical time?

just a thought

[Compton3fox]

Oh, geez. Oh, Jesus H. Christ. Whenever I read crap like the above, the question I always have is, "Do you know any helicopter pilots? Have you ever actually *met* any real helicopter pilots?" Because if SASless had met, say, two of them, he would understand that every darn helicopter pilot privately (and often publicly) considers himself to be the best in the business. In 40 years in this business, I have NEVER met a commercial pilot who honestly thought that his skills were even slightly not up to par. The thought is preposterous. It's quite the opposite, in fact. Every helicopter believes down deep in his soul that he can handle anything...ANYTHING...that gets thrown at him with the coolness of Chuck Yeager. "Rotor falls off? Heck, I'll just call a Mayday, pop the floats and set the beotch down! What, you mean you couldn't??" Read some of the pompous, self-righteous, over-the-top comments over on the JH "bad" board and you'll get the idea.

SAS often has some good things to say - and he does say a LOT of things - but he's off the mark here. No commercial pilot worth his salt is gonna engage in a little navel-gazing and then say to himself, "Ya know, I'm really not as good as I think I am."

Tough as it is to admit, Kobe's pilot screwed-up, plain and simple. I'd bet that he had his head down, fiddling with either his iPad or something on the centre console (GPS? VHF?). And when he looked back up it was, "Oh, $&*#, we're in it!" Then he began his left-turn course-reversal, which might have worked at 70 knots, but not 130 because the turn radius was too large and it put him in the hills on the opposite of the valley. Wouldn't be the first pilot to make such a dumb mistake; won't be the last, sadly.

I know plenty of pilots and most do know and will discuss their limitations.

[Helisweet]

Oh, geez. Oh, Jesus H. Christ. Whenever I read crap like the above, the question I always have is, "Do you know any helicopter pilots? Have you ever actually *met* any real helicopter pilots?" Because if SASless had met, say, two of them, he would understand that every darn helicopter pilot privately (and often publicly) considers himself to be the best in the business. In 40 years in this business, I have NEVER met a commercial pilot who honestly thought that his skills were even slightly not up to par. The thought is preposterous. It's quite the opposite, in fact. Every helicopter believes down deep in his soul that he can handle anything...ANYTHING...that gets thrown at him with the coolness of Chuck Yeager. "Rotor falls off? Heck, I'll just call a Mayday, pop the floats and set the beotch down! What, you mean you couldn't??" Read some of the pompous, self-righteous, over-the-top comments over on the JH "bad" board and you'll get the idea.

SAS often has some good things to say - and he does say a LOT of things - but he's off the mark here. No commercial pilot worth his salt is gonna engage in a little navel-gazing and then say to himself, "Ya know, I'm really not as good as I think I am."

Tough as it is to admit, Kobe's pilot screwed-up, plain and simple. I'd bet that he had his head down, fiddling with either his iPad or something on the centre console (GPS? VHF?). And when he looked back up it was, "Oh, $&*#, we're in it!" Then he began his left-turn course-reversal, which might have worked at 70 knots, but not 130 because the turn radius was too large and it put him in the hills on the opposite of the valley. Wouldn't be the first pilot to make such a dumb mistake; won't be the last, sadly.
Good theory, scud running must be done around 30/40 kts to avoid cloud

[chuks]

When I saw images of the wreckage trail I began to think that this was just another accident due, basically, to flying at low level in poor visibility: scud-running. That's something that has well-known risks, as pretty much anyone who has done that will agree. Most every holiday season in the foothills of the Appalachians saw the CAP van in our airport parking lot, since they were out looking for this or that family who had dinged in going visual in marginal VMC, into rising terrain.

The rest of this also goes with "just another accident involving someone famous."

"World's Greatest Pilot Who Would Never Screw It Up." Yes, well, anyone can screw it up!

"Lack of some bells and whistles on the accident aircraft." TAWS in that environment would have been a real distraction, unless the repetition of "TOO LOW! PULL UP!", the bleedin' obvious, is something you need to be told about, assuming that you do have the terrain in sight anyway. Lose sight of it and it's probably going to be "GAME OVER!" instead, but who needs to be told that?

"Helicopters are unsafe." Yes, and so are ladders! So? What, the guy should have walked to his destination? "Greatest basketball player ever mauled by mountain lion!"

Best one so far was "I also flew on that accident helicopter!" from one of the Kardashian clan.

[FH1100 Pilot]

Good theory, scud running must be done around 30/40 kts to avoid cloud
Like everything in life...it depends. If I'm scooting along at 600' agl under an overcast but the viz is pretty good, then a speed higher than 40 knots might be okay. Not far behind Kobe's pilot, Van Nuys Airport was calling their vis 2.5. So here's the judgment call. Maybe he felt that 130 knots was acceptable. Should he have slowed down? Apparently, while he was following "the 101" (as Californians like to call their roads), he came upon a little ridgeline that was cut (excavated) so the 101 could pass through. Or maybe the terrain features were such that there was a little narrow passageway between the hills and that's where they decided the road should go. Whatever. On the other (west) side of that ridgeline was a little valley. As he got into this valley is where we see the sudden left turn begin - where he departed from following the highway. My theory is that this is where he punched-in and decided to turn around instead of committing to an IFR flight.. Again, at 60 or 70 or even 80 knots...maybe no problem. But a turn at 130 knots? That takes up a LOT of real estate.

[aa777888]

Tough as it is to admit, Kobe's pilot screwed-up, plain and simple. I'd bet that he had his head down, fiddling with either his iPad or something on the centre console (GPS? VHF?). And when he looked back up it was, "Oh, $&*#, we're in it!" Then he began his left-turn course-reversal, which might have worked at 70 knots, but not 130 because the turn radius was too large and it put him in the hills on the opposite of the valley. Wouldn't be the first pilot to make such a dumb mistake; won't be the last, sadly.It probably is just that simple. And, he may have been lulled into a false sense of security, i.e. the ceilings may have been low but the vis not too bad for the mission up to that point, because I can't imagine why else he'd be hustling along at 130'ish under those conditions. Although he did have that hold to deal with which may have made their arrival late, adding additional pressure to fly fast.

P.S. I must be the exception to FH1100's helicopter pilot stereotype, because I always am measuring my own performance, rarely do I think "Well, damn, I really nailed that mission perfectly." There is always something that could have been done better.

[SASless]

It would appear some folks are lying to themselves.

We are all fallible....we all have perishable skills...but apparently the inability to admit to ourselves is the hardest thing for us to do....besides just saying the word "NO!" to our customer or employers.

For those that disagree with me....you will note I posted that as a request to take that step back and consider your own situation in the comfort of some place safe rather than discovering your shortcomings in a very dangerous if not fatal setting.

To win a War....you must know your enemy

I suggest they are us.

[Sir Korsky]

I remember Nick Lappos saying many years ago, if we spent the time at the SIM teaching people how not to fly into mountains instead of simulating tail rotor failures, we'd save many lives.

[Lonewolf_50]

@SLFMS: Thanks for that IIMC story. Let's say I (at least once) experienced "got behind the aircraft" when going V to I and yeah, must work hard to catch back up.

Oh, geez. Oh, Jesus H. Christ. Whenever I read crap like the above, the question I always have is, "Do you know any helicopter pilots? Have you ever actually *met* any real helicopter pilots?" Because if SASless had met, say, two of them, he would understand that every darn helicopter pilot privately (and often publicly) considers himself to be the best in the business.
Speak for yourself. ;)
In 40 years in this business, I have NEVER met a commercial pilot who honestly thought that his skills were even slightly not up to par. Ah, that's different, and I think this makes sense. If you don't think you are up to it, flying in a helicopter is no place for anyone. On that I suspect you and I would agree 100%.
FWIW: the Old Harry Reason's article from years ago about "helicopter pilots are different" still applies, don't you think?
"If something hasn't yet gone wrong, something may soon" mindset that among helo pilots is healthy may be deemed as strange among the general populace.
The thought is preposterous. It's quite the opposite, in fact. Every helicopter believes down deep in his soul that he can handle anything...ANYTHING...that gets thrown at him with the coolness of Chuck Yeager. "Rotor falls off? Heck, I'll just call a Mayday, pop the floats and set the beotch down! What, you mean you couldn't??" Read some of the pompous, self-righteous, over-the-top comments over on the JH "bad" board and you'll get the idea. Not sure what percentage of helo pilots that represents.
No commercial pilot worth his salt is gonna engage in a little navel-gazing and then say to himself, "Ya know, I'm really not as good as I think I am."
But do you think that a lot of commercial pilots think "I always like to get better at my craft" or something like that?
I know one for sure who does (HEMS guy up in Oregon who I flew with years ago when we were both in the Navy. It's just the way he is).
estimate of what happened Might have been that way.

Someone asked about Kobe's experience with aviation (https://www.pprune.org/showthread.php?p=10674275): as far as I understand it, his experience was as passenger, and at one time, owner of a helicopter.

[SASless]

Mr. Lappos was also very much a proponent of expanding the IFR Infrastructure to afford far more access and flexibility for Rotorcraft IFR operations.

Sikorsky did a lot of work in testing and proving Rotorcraft related procedures and technology.

Perhaps had the Industry and FAA embraced some of those ideas and concepts we might have an improved safety record these days.

[ShyTorque]

P.S. I must be the exception to FH1100's helicopter pilot stereotype, because I always am measuring my own performance, rarely do I think "Well, damn, I really nailed that mission perfectly." There is always something that could have been done better.

Me, too. But then, I've only been flying RW for my living for forty years, so I've still got an awful lot to learn.

[blackdog7]

At a recent session at Flight Safety, the instructor suggested if you encounter IMC conditions, you should climb until above the cloud layer.
If you fly in the flat lands around Dallas, perhaps that would work.
But if you’re in the mountains or in a valley, that will most likely be a fatal mistake.
SVFR or VFR means maintaining visual contact with the ground, not rocketing through the scud at 130knots and initiating a climb.
First thing that should be done as wx deteriorates is to slow down, maintain visual contact with the ground, and turn around if there is a wall of fog off the nose.
The older age one achieves, the easier it is to just say “no”.
This was CFIT or the pilot had a jammer.

[Indelible Spirit]

I don’t know what avionics this aircraft was equipped with, but even ForeFlight for $200 per year would provide moving terrain maps, which probably would have helped more than distractions of numerous radio frequencies, while getting caught “special VFR” in the soup, near terrain. Tragic.

“The helicopter did not have a terrain awareness and warning system -- a safety feature which provides the pilot with information about the terrain,” Homendy [of the NTSB] said. (CNN article 1/29/2020)

[kenish]

I was about to ask if this helicopter had a CVR/FDR (but figured I should go back a few pages to see if it was already answered).

Which sort of begs the question, why not? I would think any aircraft that is being operated "for hire" should be so equipped...


Neither directly prevents accidents. They assist with post-accident/incident investigation which sometimes results in corrective action for the future which indirectly prevents future accidents. For this accident, it's likely a FDR would have found aircraft systems were operating normally and flight controls reacting properly to control inputs right up to impact with terrain.

The FAA's two basic charters (Safety of Flight and promoting growth of aviation) require them to balance risk and benefit. Remember the NTSB recommendation to prohibit "lap infants" on airliners? FAA's holistic analysis determined it would be safer on an individual basis but would increase overall risk and fatalities, and was not adopted.

[PAXboy]

SASless Perhaps had the Industry and FAA embraced some of those ideas and concepts we might have an improved safety record these days.
From 1981 onwards the USA took a very different view of regulation under Reagan and many aspects of aviation were affected. The UK followed a very similar line of political practice. We are where we are and, under present USA and UK govt, the relaxation of regulations will continue.

But, as we know, prangs will continue to happen and this error (whatever it turns out to be) will be repeated.

[Hughes500]

I think most rotary wing pilots are actually highly self critical. Yes I m sure we all have done things that on reflection we sit down and say WTF was i dong. So I am with Shy and certainly all the pilots I know with a few exceptions don't think of themselves as heli God's

[Indelible Spirit]

flight path visualization. NTSB stated aircraft had climbed to 2300’ on a southerly heading before descending steeply to impact in a left bank at 1100’.

https://youtu.be/XSHpbGhy3Ko

Thank you. It would be informative to see this video on a simulator with <2.5 miles visibility 130+ kts, and +/- 1,200 ceilings. It must have been a nightmare. Not to mention holding for 15 minutes flying in circles. I think most passengers would have needed a bucket!

[JohnDixson]

To your point regarding IFR infrastructure, SAS, you raise a particularly relevant aspect of this tragic event. The aircraft technology to fly precise separate helicopter routes and approaches to a GPS/inertial hover at a preselected point already exists and is in production. ( this isn’t a proposal to enable/approve approaches to school parking lots by the way ). In the case at hand, if the infrastructure existed,an IFR route to Camarillo,for example would have removed the weather factors. Helicopter VFR routes exist in two large cities and work. The air vehicles, flight control technology, navigation technology, and precise/automated aircraft position technology are all positioned to fly helicopter IFR routes. The challenge is deciding to do it.

[[email protected]]

Perhaps there are two types of commercial pilot - the ones that SAS knows who do stay self-aware and acknowledge their human failings - and the ones that FH1100 knows who sound destined to own their own smoking hillside resting place.

[gums]

Salute!

@ Crab thank you from a surviving "light" pilot. I learned many survival skills from "close calls" because I had barely enuf skill to recover from, and come home. I thank my instructors and the old farts in the ready room and their war stories. I always questioned my reactions to unusual events after getting back home. You know, engine failure, structural damage, and those other minor problems we all faced at one time or another.

I am glad we are getting into the IIMC discussion, because until you see it for real, it's hard to make the other guy unnerstan how serious the situation is. And altho I am not a rotor head, I escorted helos on combat SAR missions in my previous life in two different planes and time frames, but same theater of ops. Depending upon the monsoon season we had lottsa scud and low clouds on one side of the mounts, and other times nil. SAS can testify, as he flew helos about same time as I and same places.

One post mentioned the pere-planned maneuver should you encounter a sudden fog front or cloud layer after cresting a ridge. So we survivors of such encounters can thank our "practice" imaginary missions that we envisioned while waiting in line for the haircut.

I have a bad feeling about the cause of this crash due to preliminary data indicating both a higher than normal speed and rapid descent and heading change. Doesn't sound like a standard CFIT. There has to be something else besides a turn the wrong way at a lower altitude to avoid the rocks and a transition to attitude, power and speed on the gauges.

As usual, I continue to give the pilot/crew a break. OTOH, I have lost about a half dozen friends due to CFIT or poor navigation/situation awareness or spatial disorientation in both commercial airlines and military planes.

Gums sends...

[Bell_ringer]

Perhaps there are two types of commercial pilot - the ones that SAS knows who do stay self-aware and acknowledge their human failings - and the ones that FH1100 knows who sound destined to own their own smoking hillside resting place.

Reading the commentary is insightful.
There are those that want to opine about how legal the flight was.
Others about how mundane the conditions were relative to their own experience.
It isn't surprising that these accidents keep happening, as long as there are people willing to pay, there are people willing to fly.
Ops normal.

[Musician]

I feel the same. The narrative of the NTSB is "we cannot answer any speculative questions, we can only deal with known facts - and we know nothing at this stage", yet there is this apparent snipe at the FAA for "failing to implement" their recommendations intended to avoid a specific cause of accident. They are indirectly suggesting the cause before they've even begun the investigation.
I am speculating that the NTSB is using the opportunity which this high-profile case provides to push their old TAWS and "FDR/CVR for light commercial aircraft" recommendations in the hopes that they may get political traction this time when they hadn't before. From their perspective, even if this wasnt a situation where TAWS would have helped, situations where it will are sure to arise again. And understanding more clearly how light aircraft accidents occur ought to help save lives in the long run, too, that is the NTSB's reason to exist. I don't believe this push on the old recommendations expresses any opinion on this particular accident.

P.S.: From the NtSB's "Most Wanted" list: "Part 135 operators must implement safety management systems that include a flight data monitoring program," while this doesn't require a FDR per se, but rather a device where the data can be more easily downloaded from, the collected data is commonly copied off theFDR interface. This means that adding a FDR to a cockpit that doesn't have one (yet) might be a crucial step towards introducing that kind of safety management system.

[jimtun]

Apparently the Heli was flying at 130kts just below cloud before the eventful left turn , and a lot of comment suggests 130kts is a bit fast in those met. conditions .

Im thinking the Pilot felt he was running out of time to get his VIP to destination ontime , and may have been going faster than desirable , and took a chance on getting through on the 101 highway route , because of the earlier substantial holding delay south of Burbank , and subsequent routing north of Van Nuys .
Could pilot have questioned Burbank ATC a bit more about his holding delay , or the unexpected routing north of Van Nuys , rather than just accept it ? , and then maybe bought himself some time for options later ?

Heli could also have continued West on 118 towards Camarillo in maybe marginal VFR ,or climbing above the layer and then IR approach to Camarillo , or had he already decided after passing over Van Nuys to then aim for a set down somewhere near Mamba destination Thousand Lakes to give the pax an on-time arrival ?

We may never know , but hope to learn !

[BrogulT]

At a recent session at Flight Safety, the instructor suggested if you encounter IMC conditions, you should climb until above the cloud layer.
If you fly in the flat lands around Dallas, perhaps that would work.
But if you’re in the mountains or in a valley, that will most likely be a fatal mistake.
SVFR or VFR means maintaining visual contact with the ground, not rocketing through the scud at 130knots and initiating a climb.
First thing that should be done as wx deteriorates is to slow down, maintain visual contact with the ground, and turn around if there is a wall of fog off the nose.
The older age one achieves, the easier it is to just say “no”.
This was CFIT or the pilot had a jammer.

In an inadvertent IMC encounter, I don't see how a turn maneuver among valleys and peaks is any safer than a climb, I'd expect just the opposite. You know that above you somewhere is the MSA and hopefully VFR-on-top conditions, both hopefully not too far up. In this case he could have climbed to relative safety fairly quickly and requested assistance. I think the charted MSA is 5200, but his actual collision risk would drop off sharply at 2300 and be almost nil above 3000. More importantly, in an inadvertent IMC encounter simply staying straight and level while performing a max-angle climb is a lot easier than some box-canyon turn in unexpected IMC. Your solutions only work ahead of time, not after the IMC encounter. The trick here is to quickly realize that the situation has already gotten out of control and the risk of a spacial disorientation upset or hitting terrain at your level is much higher than randomly climbing into something. Nobody want to be climbing blind even for a minute, but in this case it would probably be the least bad option.

[SASless]

Rotor Heads over the Years has been filled with similar tragedies as this current one.

There was the 109 that cut down the Crane Mast in downtown London, the 139 that came to grief one night in a Cow Pasture during takeoff, there was the 139 that crashed shortly after takeoff from an Island in the Bahamas, and so many others.

We all either knew the pilots involved, knew of those pilots, (and others in so many accidents I have not bothered to list....but LOTS of pilots).

I have lost friends...some who were excellent pilots and some who were lucky (one guy survived a mid-air with a MIG Fighter.....another survived a mid-air in cloud with a friendly fighter).....so this phenomenon of good pilots coming to grief is nothing new or unusual.

It is the why it continues to happen that is the issue.

We all know about it....we are all exposed to it....and despite all the training, experience, education, safety programs.....we still seem to find a way to get our names in the newspaper headlines.

This latest Pilot is no different than the rest of us.....he fully intended to get home at the end of his work day but did not.

Folks....he is not going to be the last one we read about.

Sadly.....one of you riding this post might just be the next one we discuss.

Think about that for a minute......what do you want us to say about your demise?

You can rule me out....I am retired and have no intention of ever being in a situation again, particularly as a passenger...not even in an EMS Helicopter, that it might happen to me.

So....who is next?

[[email protected]]

Better late than never.

[Musician]

Apparently the Heli was flying at 130kts just below cloud before the eventful left turn , and a lot of comment suggests 130kts is a bit fast in those met. conditions .
[..]
Heli could also have continued West on 118 towards Camarillo in maybe marginal VFR ,or climbing above the layer and then IR approach to Camarillo , or had he already decided after passing over Van Nuys to then aim for a set down somewhere near Mamba destination Thousand Lakes to give the pax an on-time arrival ?

We may never know , but hope to learn !
We know some, because the pilot talked to ATC about it. Transcribing from the NTSB briefing on the 27th (7:00):
"The pilot requested flight following to continue to Camarillo, but Southern California TRACON advised the pilot that they were too low for flight following. Approximately four minutes later, the pilot advised that they were climbing to avoid a cloud layer. When ATC asked what the pilot planned to do, there was no reply."
This and the published ADS-B data strongly suggests to me that the aircraft was inside the cloud when the left turn and descent were initiated.
It also suggests to me that the pilot intended to reach Camarillo airport. The 118 climbs about 500 feet higher than the 101, which should have made it a worse choice with low clouds? I have seen no evidence at all that a landing near the Mamba Sports Academy was planned.

[eeeyow]

Have two questions and apologies if they have been covered. The NTSB has stated that the craft was in a 2000 fpm descent at the end.

At the very start of the descent, is the current speculation that he was IN or OUT of IMC? I've assumed IN.
And doesn't this descent rate somewhat conflict with CFIT - as in for what logical reason would a pilot intend this?

[pilotsun]

Destination was Camarillo, no helipads near Mamba Sports Academy in Newbury Park. Common flight for this pax, land in Camarillo and then car service back to Newbury Park.

[thcrozier]

I have seen no evidence at all that a landing near the Mamba Sports Academy was planned.

Nor have I.

[globaljetstar]

The investigation will determine where each passenger was seated. Is it possible, rhetorically, that someone else was manipulating the controls? TBD...

[Bravo Delta]

Have two questions and apologies if they have been covered. The NTSB has stated that the craft was in a 2000 fpm descent at the end.

At the very start of the descent, is the current speculation that he was IN or OUT of IMC? I've assumed IN.
And doesn't this descent rate somewhat conflict with CFIT - as in for what logical reason would a pilot intend this?

I would like to ask a further question

We all know the decision to fly in soup ain’t fun.
I believe that this pilot had been in very similar positions many times over the years but in this case may have got overcome by the extra thick fog.

My question for All helicopter pilots.

If you make an abrupt control input eg max rate turn - is there a possibility of control jam ?

[Rated De]

Was the aircraft in question EFIS equipped?

[megan]

If you make an abrupt control input eg max rate turn - is there a possibility of control jam Nick Lappos, the S-76 test pilot says no.

https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/190924-sikorsky-s-76-ask-nick-lappos-43.html#post2892311

Some reading here.

https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/254165-jackstall-what-any-experiences.html?highlight=s-76+jack+stall

[herman the crab]

https://lbpost.com/news/island-express-helicopters-suspends-flights-to-catalina-in-wake-of-kobe-bryant-crash

[Musician]

Was the aircraft in question EFIS equipped?
The equipment list for the 2015 auction where Island Express bought the helicopter (they changed the registration then) has a Honeywell EDZ-705 EFIS.
https://ibid.illinois.gov/item.php?id=123331

[industry insider]

Crab wrote:

Far more important than any hi-tech gadget is a simple rule of aviation - Plan the flight and Fly the plan. If you haven't got a plan B for bad weather then you didn't plan the flight properly.

Scud running with the chance of IIMC and relying on ipad/TAWS/EGPWS to save you when it goes wrong is pure folly.

If you are low level in poor weather below the level of the surrounding terrain - you must have an escape route.

Probably the most sensible post on this whole thread Crab.

Some of the theories here indicate vivid imaginations.

When running S-76 Charters in the UK we would check the forecast the night before.

Plan A - If all OK then no problem to fly to a VFR destination (private site)
Plan B - If marginal, call VIPs and let them know there is the possibility of a weather problem, suggest alternative plan, offer to fly IFR to the nearest airport (with an instrument approach) and arrange a vehicle transfer (limo) to final destination.
Plan C - Cancel now and reschedule or arrange a vehicle transfer.

[Rated De]

The equipment list for the 2015 auction where Island Express bought the helicopter (they changed the registration then) has a Honeywell EDZ-705 EFIS.
https://ibid.illinois.gov/item.php?id=123331


Thanks musician,

Just pondering whether an analogue display failed at the most inopportune time.

[fdr]

I am speculating that the NTSB is using the opportunity which this high-profile case provides to push their old TAWS and "FDR/CVR for light commercial aircraft" recommendations in the hopes that they may get political traction this time when they hadn't before. From their perspective, even if this wasnt a situation where TAWS would have helped, situations where it will are sure to arise again. And understanding more clearly how light aircraft accidents occur ought to help save lives in the long run, too, that is the NTSB's reason to exist. I don't believe this push on the old recommendations expresses any opinion on this particular accident.

P.S.: From the NtSB's "Most Wanted" list: "Part 135 operators must implement safety management systems that include a flight data monitoring program," while this doesn't require a FDR per se, but rather a device where the data can be more easily downloaded from, the collected data is commonly copied off theFDR interface. This means that adding a FDR to a cockpit that doesn't have one (yet) might be a crucial step towards introducing that kind of safety management system.

TAWS is great for fixed wing, slightly less so for VMC ops in helicopters. The Terrain display as I said earlier is great.

A QAR/FDM sounds like a great move, for airlines. For most helicopters, when you transition from fixed to rotary (lobotomy assists) the first thing you note is that stuff happens at a different pace.You can be happy one moment and sitting in debris the next, so being aware of what you are doing is highly desirable in RW ops. trend monitoring doesn't necessarily give any signal of trends towards badness. Monitoring necessary would be flight controls, performance, attitude, power, in order to meaningfully understand what is happening, and then after that effort, it would help to know why you have a kitset, but it would not give a great deal of suggestion as to what your actual risks are. Risks of CFIT etc can be established quite well using COTS software already, to replay the info captured on an ipad. We do that for all of our jet flights already. Helicopter events are operational, Environmental, crew process, or mechanical. The latter is found by investigation, and basically never comes up on a QAR. The former are identifiable by review of readily accessible information from the aircraft, off the ipad, or from video, and that would give more info than a QAR would ever do. Don't get me wrong, QAR is great for RPT operations, where the profile of the operation is formalised and standardised to a high level of repeatability. Helicopters, ain't that. Every flight is it's own little enterprise. Personally, I have established a number of RPT and large aircraft SMS and QAR programs, and separately had made my own data recording system for flight test on small helicopters, and I would say there is not much happiness to be gained by a helicopter QAR system. Go buy an ipad, Stratus or similar, Foreflight or Garmin Pilot, and replay with CloudAhoy or similar. Add a couple of Go Pros, as they are just neat anyway. Or don't.

A helicopter operation is unlike RPT jets, and to think that they are, is myopic.

Personally, I love flying helicopters, for all of the same reasons, they need care and attention and tell you immediately if you are doing things right and even faster when you do things wrong.

A friend of mine as a young pilot was handed the keys to a brand new H-269C. The owner admonished him to "take care, it's a brand new chopper, don't bend it". "Yes, Sir!". The owner walked back to the office on the side of the hanger as the new pilot cranked up the blender. The owner hadn't touched the door knob by the time it took for ground resonance to have completed kitset-ing the shiny new toy. What is the trend monitoring tell you about that? dynamic roll over? LTE? RBS? VRS? CFIT? These things are identifiable without QAR, and to an extent, QAR wold not identify them unless you had an expert system.

More than in fixed wing, helicopter operations are stochastic in nature, and trending is of less value in an SMS program. But, if SMS makes one feel warm and fuzzy, then by all means, go ahead. My opinion is it is akin to the "Emperor has no clothes"; use the time to review personally or peer review the cloudahoy data, or go pro, that is where the truth is hidden.

[Musician]

The equipment list for the 2015 auction where Island Express bought the helicopter (they changed the registration then) has a Honeywell EDZ-705 EFIS.
https://ibid.illinois.gov/item.php?id=123331
The same list has a Fairchild A100S CVR, but the NTSB reported they didn't find one. This suggests that there might have been changes to the equipment.

[Search&Rescue]

I would like to ask a further question

We all know the decision to fly in soup ain’t fun.
I believe that this pilot had been in very similar positions many times over the years but in this case may have got overcome by the extra thick fog.

My question for All helicopter pilots.

If you make an abrupt control input eg max rate turn - is there a possibility of control jam ?

Nick Lappos is the Man and Pro for sure concerning S76, but the investigation board made a finding 2005 that flight controls might partially jam with some coll/cyclic
combinations... and the pilot needs to use additional force to release the jam... (Now we are talking about ”extreme handling” in stead of normal flight.)
This finding was done when S76C+ ended in the Gulf of Finland 10/08/2005 and 14 people perished.

[Scattercat]

Rotor Heads over the Years has been filled with similar tragedies as this current one.

There was the 109 that cut down the Crane Mast in downtown London, the 139 that came to grief one night in a Cow Pasture during takeoff, there was the 139 that crashed shortly after takeoff from an Island in the Bahamas, and so many others.

We all either knew the pilots involved, knew of those pilots, (and others in so many accidents I have not bothered to list....but LOTS of pilots).

I have lost friends...some who were excellent pilots and some who were lucky (one guy survived a mid-air with a MIG Fighter.....another survived a mid-air in cloud with a friendly fighter).....so this phenomenon of good pilots coming to grief is nothing new or unusual.

It is the why it continues to happen that is the issue.

We all know about it....we are all exposed to it....and despite all the training, experience, education, safety programs.....we still seem to find a way to get our names in the newspaper headlines.

This latest Pilot is no different than the rest of us.....he fully intended to get home at the end of his work day but did not.

Folks....he is not going to be the last one we read about.

Sadly.....one of you riding this post might just be the next one we discuss.

Think about that for a minute......what do you want us to say about your demise?

You can rule me out....I am retired and have no intention of ever being in a situation again, particularly as a passenger...not even in an EMS Helicopter, that it might happen to me.

So....who is next?

I often find myself looking for the "Like" button .... this post from SAS is one of those occasions. My great fear is that after 35 years of flying, I may make a human error one day and end up in a smoking hole in the ground, much to the disappointment of those who will say "he was such a good, careful, professional pilot .... bla, bla, bla". I aim to be a perfect pilot, but I know I never will be. Whenever I hear / read about these (seemingly) avoidable tragedies, I file them away & those memories have helped me make good decisions that I may not have made otherwise. So, I reiterate SAS's comment to ... "Think about that for a minute......what do you want us to say about your demise?"

[n5296s]

"Think about that for a minute......what do you want us to say about your demise?"
Or as one of my instructors says, "Before you do that, ask yourself, how will this look in the NTSB report?"

[aa5bpilot]

Have two questions and apologies if they have been covered. The NTSB has stated that the craft was in a 2000 fpm descent at the end.

At the very start of the descent, is the current speculation that he was IN or OUT of IMC? I've assumed IN.
And doesn't this descent rate somewhat conflict with CFIT - as in for what logical reason would a pilot intend this?

Far upthread I posted some PIREPs from that morning. Tops were reported between 2200 and 2600'. My presumption is that they were still in the clouds at the top of the climb (reports and data I've seen had them topping out around 2200)

I likewise don't understand the decent rate from a CFIT perspective. I'd see it more resulting from spatial disorientation, or, however unlikely, some sort of mechanical issue. I can't see how you'd want to descend, much less dive, out of an inadvertent IMC encounter without knowing for absolute certainty you weren't going to run into something solid. Better to get on top, or if stuck in the soup (and assuming basic IFR proficiency), fly somewhere you know you can let down.

From my own navel-gazing, I agree with BrogulT that a straight ahead max-performance climb would appear to have been the best option. If the pilot was familiar with the area (as reportedly he was), a climb along the track of the 101 which he was already following would have meant the least likelihood of encountering terrain. Depending on the climb capability, given the typical marine layer pattern here, he'd be reasonably assured to be on top within 30-60 seconds.

[[email protected]]

The pilot is reported to have been close to Bryant and his family - perhaps that affected the sense of detachment required to make safety decisions completely removed from the wishes and aspirations of his pax.

In rapidly changing weather which required instant responses, a slight distraction from his primary task - fly the aircraft - could have been the difference between success and failure.

Subtly different from an aggressive pax demanding you get him there - more a self imposed pressure of not wanting to let a friend down.

[Georg1na]

SAS and Crab - two best posts so far by far. Much common sense - luck is such a huge factor and I should know......................

[Musician]

Do you have a link to that audio where he asks for the climb?
I don't think that has been released. LiveATC uses volunteer receivers to capture radio traffic, and N72EX being low between the mountains, they didn't capture the pilot's part of this conversation. I assume that the NTSB has access to a more complete recording made at SoCal TRACON, and that Ms Homendy was referring to that in the media briefing that I've transcribed and linked. Hopefully we'll find out more when the preliminary NTSB report comes out.

[Musician]

From an archived version of the currently inoperable Island Express website (emphasis mine):
How many guests can a helicopter accommodate?It is determined by total passenger weight. Below are the maximum number of guests for each of the styles of aircraft we fly:

Sikorsky S76 – 9 guests
A-Star – 6 guests
JetRanger – 4 guests

FAQ - IEX Helicopters (http://web.archive.org/web/20190424112411/http://iexhelicopters.com/faq/)

That should put that speculation to rest.

[EFHF]

Nick Lappos is the Man and Pro for sure concerning S76, but the investigation board made a finding 2005 that flight controls might partially jam with some coll/cyclic combinations... and the pilot needs to use additional force to release the jam... (Now we are talking about ”extreme handling” in stead of normal flight.)
This finding was done when S76C+ ended in the Gulf of Finland 10/08/2005 and 14 people perished.
This is incorrect. It was a design and tolerance fault of the actuator, not of the flight control system overall design. From the investigation report (section 3.2):
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Commission determined that the cause of the accident was the uncommanded extension of the main rotor forward actuator and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. Contributing to the uncommanded extension and the actuator was the separation of the plasma coating on one of two actuator pistons and the operator’s failure to detect the internal leakage of the main rotor forward actuator.
Further detail in section 3.1.2:
The design and tolerances of the piston head allowed excessive rework of the piston head; as a result of the excessive rework of the piston head, the plasma coating at the piston head had separated into chips; the chips and resulting contamination led to excessive piston ring wear, in ternal leakage and blocked return ports;

Also, the current pertinent AD for the servo actuators:
(a) For a servo actuator with 1,500 or less hours time since new (TSN) or time since overhaul (TSO), determine the leakage rate on or before reaching 1,500 hours TSN or TSO. This 1,500 hour TSN or TSO inspection revises the airworthiness limitations section of the applicable maintenance manual.

(b) For a servo actuator with 2,250 or less hours TSN or TSO, but more than 1,500 hours TSN or TSO, determine the leakage rate on or before reaching 2,250 hours TSN or TSO.

(c) If the leakage rate in any servo actuator exceeds 700 cc per minute when performing the leakage rate inspection specified in paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD, then:

(1) Replace that servo actuator piston, HR Textron or Woodward HRT P/N 41004321 or P/N RW41004321, with a servo actuator piston, P/N 41012001 or P/N 41012001-001, and re-identify the servo actuator on the servo actuator data plate as Sikorsky P/N “76650-09805-111” and Woodward HRT P/N “3006760-111” using a metal stamp method; or

(2) Replace the servo actuator with an airworthy servo actuator, Sikorsky P/N 76650-09805-111, Woodward HRT P/N 3006760-111.

(d) On or before 3,000 hours TSN or TSO, whichever occurs first, replace each servo actuator piston and re-identify the servo actuator as specified in paragraph (c)(1) of this AD or replace each servo actuator as specified in paragraph (c)(2) of this AD.

[[email protected]]

From my own navel-gazing, I agree with BrogulT that a straight ahead max-performance climb would appear to have been the best option. If the pilot was familiar with the area (as reportedly he was), a climb along the track of the 101 which he was already following would have meant the least likelihood of encountering terrain. Depending on the climb capability, given the typical marine layer pattern here, he'd be reasonably assured to be on top within 30-60 seconds.
And I think the majority here would agree with you.

I suspect that if the pilot in this case was reading about someone else's accident, his answer would have been the same - the question is why he didn't just climb out of it - without CVFDR information we will probably never know.

[helipixman]

SAS and Crab - two best posts so far by far. Much common sense - luck is such a huge factor and I should know......................
I agree two great posts. Who will be next ?

I was part of a crew of a Jetranger from Edinburgh - Boynie near Lossiemouth a positioning flight for pleasure flying. Not long after departure from Edinburgh we encountered foggy conditions near Kinross so turned around and headed back to Edinburgh. On the ground the captain phoned the boss and was told he HAD to get to the destination that day. No pressure there then. We had three choices, try the original route again and turn up at Boyndie in two wooden boxes with the helicopter on a salvage truck, find an alternative or get the sack !

We found a completely weather free route by going via Glasgow - Cumbernauld - Loch Lomond - Fort William - Inverness and then along the coast to Boyndie. One hell of a long way round for a short cut. It could have been us that day !

[SASless]

We sit here all comfy, coffee cup in hand for me, and consider what could have happened to cause the tragic end to this flight and the loss of nine people.

Without going too far out on a limb, and acknowledging I am not privy to all of the factors involved....one question keeps coming back to fore.

Putting myself in that pilot's seat....and assuming I had found myself between two layers...one being low lying fog and the other a layer above e me....and realizing they were merging ahead of me....I would have been confronted with doing something really quick.

My gut instinct based upon years of experience including flying S-76's and being familiar with that particular area.....considering the reported weather for the time in question.....I would have gone wings level, pitched up ten degrees, applied Climb Power, and gone for sunshine and VFR on Top.

It seems that would have been the quickest and safest path to clear air.

We do not know what the Pilot could see from the cockpit that might have influenced his decision to do what he did.

Over time there will be lots of discussion about how he found himself in the situation he did....and that is a valid discussion.

We can also debate why he reacted as he did and that is valid also.

But....we must accept we do not know the actual circumstances of the final few moments of the flight and probably never will.

The real lesson that will be re-learned from this tragedy is avoidance is the absolute best practice.

To out this tragedy in perspective.....look back to the RAF Chinook crash at the Mull of Kintyre.

Some similarities arise between the two crashes.

[JohnDixson]

Megan,a further note re the possibility of “ jack stall” ,or servo stall/jam in the 76B.

At one point there was an effort to provide a gunship version of the 76,and in that pursuit it was decided to do a short test program including the maximum aerodynamic G pullouts as specified in the mil-specs. This program was, of course, well outside the FAA approved flight envelope. I got involved in flying that and we flew the B into severe blade stall in a number of maneuvers. The. Control loads (i.e.,servo loads ) went up dramatically, of course,as did the n/rev vibrations, but were still well within the servo load design criteria. Cyclic free to move.

[[email protected]]

The only thing that occurs to me is that he may have seen the ground and gone for a gap.

We know that low level stratus/hill fog is not consistent in its height or thickness but when you combine upslope stratus with slopes, a glimpse of the ground may give you a completely false horizon and the brain can easily be fooled into believing you are wings level rather than in a turn.

Visual cues are very difficult to overcome - as anyone who has had the leans from going in and out of cloud will tell you.

We used to show pilots a lake in Snowdonia which, in the right conditions, looked like it was sloping (it was referred to as the sloping lake) all it needed was a lowish cloudbase to obscure the tops of the hills and the steep sides of the narrow valley did the rest - illusion complete and difficult to fight unless you believe your instruments, something that is not easy to force yourself to do at low level.. That was a reason we always taught mountain flying as a visual/instrument balance.

[aterpster]

I feel the same. The narrative of the NTSB is "we cannot answer any speculative questions, we can only deal with known facts - and we know nothing at this stage", yet there is this apparent snipe at the FAA for "failing to implement" their recommendations intended to avoid a specific cause of accident. They are indirectly suggesting the cause before they've even begun the investigation.
I don't see it as suggesting the cause; rather the Board is upset with the FAA for failing to implement a previous formal recommendation. Having said that, I believe Ms. Homendy should not have brought it up during a media briefing.

[SASless]

What does it cost to buy and install a. CVR?

I have flown aircraft that had them and did not have any concerns about what could be heard on them to include the personal chit chat that occurs during normal operations.

Is it a cost concern or something else that the Helicopter Industry seems to use to excuse not installing such equipment.

I can see a cost issue for FDR installations but is it time to go that route as well for medium and large Rotorcraft as a certification requirement?

Just to obtain a detailed study of the issue is not cheap!


https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20191231005101/en/Global-Cockpit-Voice-Recorder-FDR-TPL-DRB

[Search&Rescue]

This is incorrect. It was a design and tolerance fault of the actuator, not of the flight control system overall design. From the investigation report (section 3.2):

Further detail in section 3.1.2:


Also, the current pertinent AD for the servo actuators:

I was not saying that a ”control jam” was the reason for that accident 2005... But Thanx EFHF for completing my post with these facts... ;)

[aterpster]

1:24,000 topo snippet of crash site area.

https://cimg4.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1481/topo_of_crash_site_e91b533505b0117b9e55a995c6c1ac70bc8744e1. jpg

[JimEli]

FWIW, unintended flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (UIMC) statistically ranks at the top of fatal helicopter accidents. DISCLAIMER: it is complete speculation that UIMC played any role in this accident:

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/798x304/helicoptersafety_nov17_figure_1_1_28962cc05844e626acb141889d bc87c2506c439f.jpg
IMHO, as a former sim instructor, MOST pilots exhibited difficulty at the onset of IMC, and many pilots had extreme difficulty. All of these pilots were instrument rated, but not necessarily performing IFR duties. ONLY a handful could successfully execute an immediate 180 degree turn without the assistance of an autopilot. This maneuver was typically one of the most challenging and problematic to complete successfully.

Previous wisdom highlighted the execution of a 180 turn. In fact, my former military background emphasized the maneuver as part of an IMC recovery. However, the time to make a 180 turn is prior to the UIMC encounter. Climb gradient performance of current helicopters typically allows the straight-ahead climb in all but the most restricted environments. According to the FAA Helicopter Flying Handbook, at the onset of IIMC:

“…pick a heading known to be free of obstacles and maintain it. This will likely be the heading you were already on, which was planned and briefed.”

…

“Try to avoid immediately turning 180°. Turning around is not always the safest route and executing a turn immediately after UIMC may lead to spatial disorientation. If a 180° turn is the safest option, first note the heading you are on then begin the turn to the reciprocal heading, but only after stable flight is achieved…”

[manamale]

It sounds to be like he went inadvertent IMC, initiated climb, started a left turn either intentionally or not, became spatially disorientated and was unable to recover. We are trained to recover from usual attitudes by rolling wings level but if we have put ourselves into that situation hard to say whether we would be able to fly ourselves out of it.

If this is the case we need to question why he did not couple up once he became disorientate or as soon as he was in the soup. Does the 76 have a go-around button? Are any of ye guys trained to couple up as a last resort for unusual attitude recovery?

[Lonewolf_50]

For Jim Eli: Amen. The transition from VFR scan to IFR scan, if not practiced, can create its own problems.
Try to avoid immediately turning 180°. Turning around is not always the safest route and executing a turn immediately after UIMC may lead to spatial disorientation.
If a 180° turn is the safest option, first note the heading you are on then begin the turn to the reciprocal heading, but only after stable flight is achieved…” That's how we taught it ... wait, how many years ago has it been? Yikes, gettin' old!

I am trying to piece together in my head a picture of what was going on during what looks to me like a climbing turn to the left.
If the pilot also slowed down while entering that climbing turn (trading airspeed for altitude, and also creating a tighter turning circle if he knew of rising terrain to his left) he may have -- speculation here -- created for himself an unusual attitude in IMC within a very short time after entering the goo, and, with a three axis change in flying parameters, induced a mild sense of vertigo. (--Guessing here-- and remembering a few of my own cases of The Leans that happened over the years)
Now the pilot is playing catch up. Finally getting instrument scan together, realizing (perhaps) that wings are not level, and begins to recover from unusual attitude/upset, is unable to arrest descent before running out of altitude.
Not sure all if the pieces fit, but that sequence seems to be a way that the end condition that the mountain bikers heard/saw could come about.

The ripple effect of a celebrity dying in a crash. (https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/more-sports/genesis-makes-last-minute-edit-to-super-bowl-ad-to-remove-helicopter-in-wake-of-crash-that-killed-kobe-bryant-eight-others/ar-BBZsJgN?ocid=spartandhp)
When celebritiy names are associated with something, all kinds of weird side effects happen. :ugh:

[Old Age Pilot]

I don't see it as suggesting the cause; rather the Board is upset with the FAA for failing to implement a previous formal recommendation. Having said that, I believe Ms. Homendy should not have brought it up during a media briefing.

Yes I can see it from that angle too. It just seemed off to mention during that particular briefing.

[Mozella]

From Forbes:
"The helicopter that crashed Sunday killing basketball star Kobe Bryant and eight others was owned by a charter company that only operated under visual flight rules, and its pilots were not permitted to fly solely based on their cockpit gauges if they encountered weather that limited visibility, a former pilot for the company told Forbes."

My experience is strictly limited to time as a Navy Fighter Pilot and later as a Commercial Airline Pilot but that was "back in the day". I know almost nothing about Part 135.

If the article in Forbes is true, it might explain why the pilot tried so hard to complete his mission using VFR/SVRF in such poor weather. Can someone with experience in Part 135 VFR-only operations comment on what would be the legal and professional ramifications if in this case Bryant's pilot had given up his "scud running', entered IMC, and presented himself as a pop-up IFR aircraft? I imagine plenty of people would be tight-jawed about doing this starting immediately with the controlling agency and no doubt it would not end there.

I don't know if the pilot was current for IFR or not and I suspect that although the helicopter may have been suitably equipped, I'm guessing that the maintenance required for IFR flight was not up to date. So it's certain that more than one person would have to do an unpleasant rug-dance and somebody would be paying fines and/or be forced to deal with licensing problems some place down the line. But almost anything is better than slamming into a hillside.

Comments from those closer to the action than I?

[SASless]

Lots of "what if'ing" there Mozella!

Do your remember your FAR's re Pilot Actions during an Emergency?

You do raise some good questions but some of your statements get ahead of the facts known at this time I suggest.

[roscoe1]

I suspect all on this forum would agree that filling out some paperwork, explaining truthfully how you got caught in IMC when it was not your intention or legal option to do so to your CP, FAA POI, company owner, customer, local sheriff, co-workers, local news hounds and friends at the bar is preferable to what is happening now. You might lose your job, which you lose by being in a fatal accident anyway, or get a suspension of your certificate but in perspective, sitting in an empty parking lot waiting for another company pilot and clearing weather is a pretty attractive alternative. Proper IIMC recovery procedures notwithstanding, they were going to a baketball game.....a basketball game is pretty low on the " gotta get there scale". Come to think of it, most everything is.

[kenish]

Heli could also have continued West on 118 towards Camarillo in maybe marginal VFR

The maximum elevation of Hwy 101 is approximately 800 MSL in the area of the crash and farther west at Conejo summit. The general terrain is rolling to moderate hills and the valley floor is at least 1/4 mile wide in most spots. There are a few narrow points along the route but no place is a "gorge" with big vertical road cuts as someone else claimed. The narrowest points in the valley are a mile to the west around Liberty Canyon, and at Conejo Summit. See post #311 for a good topo.

On the other hand Hwy 118 climbs to 1700 MSL through the Santa Susana Pass, and points on the route are much narrower and "V" shaped. Surrounding terrain along the route is steep, rugged, and rapidly rising in spots.

Possibly it was "tribal knowledge" that 101 was a better route than 118 in MVFR (seems like 118 was solid IFR anyway), and the pilot was more familiar with the 101 route.

[7p3i7lot]

OK does anyone actual know for sure that the company was not certified to fly IFR? Pilot was instrument qualified yes but current? Aircraft capable but maybe not maintained to IFR standards, record wise as that does cost money. If company wasn't qualified and had a no IFR policy then that would add another decision roadblock for the pilot to overcome as he would be reluctant to violate company policy.
So I ask again, was this company by certification or company policy not IFR capable?

[roscoe1]

The NTSB clearly stated that the company was 135 VFR only for helicopters. No idea if they had airplanes on their ops specs or not. You'll have to wait to see if the pilot was legally current, which we all know is an absolute minimum for IFR flying. Breaking company rules in the effort to be safe shouldn't even be a thing to worry about. Company rules and the regs. require weather be good at departure. For VFR flight, what happens after departure is the pilots judgement. If you can't stay VFR you may use SVFR if they grant it. It's pretty rare to be unable to stay SVFR but you must report that if it happens. Once back in class G, if you can't stay clear of clouds it is time to land tout suit or declare an emergency after you have secured the flying part. What ever happened to aviate, navigate, communicate in that order. And another thing, if this pilot was a long time LA basin guy, wouldn't or shouldn't he have known where the deck for VFR flight following was on common routes?

[Musician]

From Forbes:
"The helicopter that crashed Sunday killing basketball star Kobe Bryant and eight others was owned by a charter company that only operated under visual flight rules, and its pilots were not permitted to fly solely based on their cockpit gauges if they encountered weather that limited visibility, a former pilot for the company told Forbes."

My experience is strictly limited to time as a Navy Fighter Pilot and later as a Commercial Airline Pilot but that was "back in the day". I know almost nothing about Part 135.

If the article in Forbes is true, it might explain why the pilot tried so hard to complete his mission using VFR/SVRF in such poor weather. Can someone with experience in Part 135 VFR-only operations comment on what would be the legal and professional ramifications if in this case Bryant's pilot had given up his "scud running', entered IMC, and presented himself as a pop-up IFR aircraft? I imagine plenty of people would be tight-jawed about doing this starting immediately with the controlling agency and no doubt it would not end there.

I don't know if the pilot was current for IFR or not and I suspect that although the helicopter may have been suitably equipped, I'm guessing that the maintenance required for IFR flight was not up to date. So it's certain that more than one person would have to do an unpleasant rug-dance and somebody would be paying fines and/or be forced to deal with licensing problems some place down the line. But almost anything is better than slamming into a hillside.

Comments from those closer to the action than I?
The Forbes article you mention is https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2020/01/29/pilot-in-kobe-bryant-helicopter-crash-wasnt-allowed-to-fly-by-instruments/
I thought it made some interesting points, but I couldn't comment on them.

The NTSB has announced that they have the maintenance records, so I expect the state of the flight instruments is going to be documented in their preliminary report. The information I have seen has the pilot holding a current IFR rating, but all of that will also be in the report.

[Seaguard]

For Jim Eli: Amen. The transition from VFR scan to IFR scan, if not practiced, can create its own problems.
That's how we taught it ... wait, how many years ago has it been? Yikes, gettin' old!

I am trying to piece together in my head a picture of what was going on during what looks to me like a climbing turn to the left.
If the pilot also slowed down while entering that climbing turn (trading airspeed for altitude, and also creating a tighter turning circle if he knew of rising terrain to his left) he may have -- speculation here -- created for himself an unusual attitude in IMC within a very short time after entering the goo, and, with a three axis change in flying parameters, induced a mild sense of vertigo. (--Guessing here-- and remembering a few of my own cases of The Leans that happened over the years)
Now the pilot is playing catch up. Finally getting instrument scan together, realizing (perhaps) that wings are not level, and begins to recover from unusual attitude/upset, is unable to arrest descent before running out of altitude.
Not sure all if the pieces fit, but that sequence seems to be a way that the end condition that the mountain bikers heard/saw could come about.


I think you've got it about right, Lonewolf. Like many others here, I have also experienced the extreme difficulty of unexpectedly transitioning from visual flying to instrument scan. When you add in rapid attitude changes in multiple axes, it is VERY easy to get the leans and then it is a lot of hard work to overcome that.

[Mozella]

Lots of "what if'ing" there Mozella!

Do your remember your FAR's re Pilot Actions during an Emergency?

You do raise some good questions but some of your statements get ahead of the facts known at this time I suggest.


Yes, of course I know all about declaring emergencies. When I was flying in the Navy I was taught to declare an emergency when necessary and I did so a number of times with great success. Suddenly you stop asking and start telling. However, I personally know a number of civilian trained pilots who think that the last thing in the world they might do is declare an emergency and one or two of them are no longer with us because of it. In at least one instance, I lost a good friend for the very reason that he failed to use his instrument rating and the IFR instruments in his aircraft when push came to shove when he ran out of airspace suitable for his VFR flight plan. The accident being discussed in this thread has a lot of similarities; i.e. deteriorating weather conditions with a sad ending.

You can read about the downside of not declaring an emergency on this very forum in many other threads when things went from bad to worse because the pilot didn't want to be too much of a bother or perhaps because he/she didn't want to cope with all the paper work, rug dances, and so on. It happens and unfortunately it sometimes ends in tears.

There has been plenty of discussion in this thread about being overly focused on completing the mission with an "I can do it" attitude which was just a little too strong for the circumstances. "Get-home-ites is a variation on that theme. It's real and sometimes it's fatal. In hindsight we always say things like "a basketball game isn't all that important" and while that is certainly true, that thought is not always applied ahead of time when it might do the most good.

In my flying career, I flew almost exclusively in aircraft legal for IFR and I maintained my Instrument currency; therefore, I never felt that there was any pressure on me to avoid asking for an IFR clearance. That's why I was asking about those who may have actually been employed by an outfit which was NOT allowed to fly IFR and who operated aircraft which were NOT maintained to comply with FARs regarding IMC flying. Given those circumstances, I wonder if there is strong company pressure to NEVER get caught in a situation requiring IFR operations. Perhaps it's no big deal, but perhaps it is.

[GrayHorizonsHeli]

theres a close to the scene video of the crash site available as first responders arrived on theync.com.
I wont link it because the site has alot of questionable material.
not sure if anyone else has seen it or if its available anywhere else.
shows the weather conditions at the very least, not much else useful to speculate on

[jimtun]

Kenish , thanks for local terrain info .

[jess15]

Island Express Helicopters, the company that owns the helicopter that crashed Sunday, killing NBA legend Kobe Bryant (https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/29/us/helicopter-crash-kobe-bryant-wednesday/index.html) and eight others, is "suspending all flight service for operational reasons," two company representatives told CNN on Thursday.

The representatives declined to provide any other details about the suspension.
In addition to charter flights, Island Express provides regular helicopter service to and from Catalina Island.

https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/30/us/helicopter-crash-kobe-bryant-thursday/index.html

[gulliBell]

...I agree with BrogulT that a straight ahead max-performance climb would appear to have been the best option..

And it's easy to do in the S76. Having missed the opportunity to turn around, and now in IIMC, pull up the CDI knob to center the heading bug, push the HDG button on the flight director, haul in the power. It takes about 2 or 3 seconds to do that. Confirm climbing wings level, adjust pitch trim in the direction of 75 kts and make the radio call. You'd be rocketing skywards now doing at least 2000 fpm.

[capngrog]

.

Interesting to note impact scene from the NTSB video posted by Airbubba ..... the main rotor blades appear to be at the initial impact site and the remainder of the fuselage bounced and landed a bit farther away ...... could that indicate inverted flight at impact ??

.
https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1072x540/kobe_bryant_blades_at_impact_e4f764be7e8dd470105bc290e9221ee 63513a61a.jpg


.

I agree. There is an almost circular pattern evident (to me anyway) at the site of the initial impact point. If looking at the NTSB B-Roll of the site (Post #206), the tail fin is out of the above photo, just below the bottom edge of the photograph. It appears that the bulk of the wreckage (fuselage etc.) traveled (possibly rolling) from right-to-left in the above photo, with the fuselage winding up on its left side. This could indicate that the helicopter was in a side slip as well as being inverted. In my opinion, this was not a CFIT.

While having flown quite a bit in helicopters, I'm not a helicopter pilot - just a relatively low time fixed wing; consequently, this is just a bunch of relatively ignorant speculation on my part. In my defense, I do have more a little experience in aircraft crash investigation.

Cheers,
Grog

[TachyonID]

For what it's worth, I'm based at SBA and had a trip into LA, by car, that morning driving through only about 40 minutes before the incident. As such I drove past KCMA, through Camarillo and up the hill to T/O and past Las Virgenes on the way into the Valley on the trip to Glendale.

The weather is being described by the media as "very bad" but it's not necessarily atypical for mornings coming from the Oxnard-Camarillo plain, where marine layer is common in summer but not that unusual year around. Oxnard was still foggy at 0845 that morning... and there'd been a bad crash, in similar conditions, on the Oxnard side of the river on the previous morning.
As is common, the fog cleared on the Camarillo side and KCMA was reporting "1.5 miles, with low ceiling" at that time of day.

What WAS unusual about the trip this time is that generally, when you have foggy conditions along the SBA-Ventura coast and the low-lying river mouth of the Ventura River area was this: USUALLY you drive OUT of the fog going up the hill. Generally it clears by the CHP Weigh Station at the top of Conejo Pass. This Sunday, however, it was different... coming over the top of the pass and down toward Wendy drive into Conejo Valley I got into pea soup fog, off-and-on, which didn't really clear until I was pretty much into the Valley at Topanga.

The net is that I simply don't see how this flight could have completed in VFR or SVFR operating rules, since there WERE MULTIPLE cloud/fog layers under a low overcast. He would have had to do more than Scud-running to get to a safe arrival at KCMA. I understand that he "did this trip all the time", but fog around the pass isn't that unusual-- it was just complicated Sunday by layers that he''d have had to transit for a safe arrival. Conejo pass up to 2500' was fogged in. Those conditions had persisted for hours, so I'm completely unclear as to how he'd have filed a flight plan to do this trip given the poor VFR conditions enroute. I'm mystified by this so perhaps the helicopter pilots here can fill in the details. Because it looks like he either would have had to scrub or transit some ugly IMC to get there. It's baffling.

Curt

[krypton_john]

Stupid question probably... but could this flight have been made up the coast instead?

[TachyonID]

It's tricky. The Departure corridors for 25 and 24 at LAX go right over that bit of ocean. They probably had an easier time sequencing him to DTLA, Glendale where he held, then across BUR and VNY controlled airspace

[krypton_john]

It's tricky. The Departure corridors for 25 and 24 at LAX go right over that bit of ocean. They probably had an easier time sequencing him to DTLA, Glendale where he held, then across BUR and VNY controlled airspace

Ah. I was thinking you could just fly under them.

[bryancobb]

And it's easy to do in the S76. Having missed the opportunity to turn around, and now in IIMC, pull up the CDI knob to center the heading bug, push the HDG button on the flight director, haul in the power. It takes about 2 or 3 seconds to do that. Confirm climbing wings level, adjust pitch trim in the direction of 75 kts and make the radio call. You'd be rocketing skywards now doing at least 2000 fpm.
OMGGGG! And you can do that at 150kts headed straight into a funnel where rising terrain converges up to the cloud bases and you know there's Earth in the cloud ahead that you are about to climb into???? All while unexpectedly having to quickly establish a crosscheck and swap from eyes outside to instruments. SMH

[aterpster]

And it's easy to do in the S76. Having missed the opportunity to turn around, and now in IIMC, pull up the CDI knob to center the heading bug, push the HDG button on the flight director, haul in the power. It takes about 2 or 3 seconds to do that. Confirm climbing wings level, adjust pitch trim in the direction of 75 kts and make the radio call. You'd be rocketing skywards now doing at least 2000 fpm.
Not even any hurry to make the radio call in that area. He could have probably faked it, when on top at 4,000, or so, then called and request IFR to OXR (ILS). But, then again, perhaps his IFR skills were rusty from lack of use, precluding the ILS to OXR.

[Musician]

OMGGGG! And you can do that at 150kts headed straight into a funnel where rising terrain converges up to the cloud bases and you know there's Earth in the cloud ahead that you are about to climb into???? All while unexpectedly having to quickly establish a crosscheck and swap from eyes outside to instruments. SMH
We have some facts from the ADS-B data, published at https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/kobe-bryant-believed-dead-in-helicopter-crash/

https://cimg1.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1408x958/image_0fa3029d31a77a3dca5103864ce2116c62b85ba8.jpeg
This is the final minute of flight, and before the descent begins, the aircraft is traveling at below 120 kts and above 2000 ft. A look at the topographical map confirms that there is no hilltop exceeding 2000 feet for miles in a westerly direction, and even the range it crashed into doesn't come up that high, see https://en-gb.topographic-map.com/maps/j3qe/Malibu/ (scroll a bit north) . If the helicopter had kept up the climb rate and heading, it'd have been safe and sound with respect to terrain. The left turn and descent caused the crash (mostly the descent, obviously). And at this point, we can only guess what caused that.

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1903x1045/image_bb6f1b365760be71574ba63c31e9a96564864428.jpeg

[spinwing]

Mmmmm ....

I have to admit to not knowing a lot about the S76B ... But is the Helipilot not similar to the Sperry SPZ 7600 as in the 412EP ... and if so we (?) used to train that in the event of a disorientation or emergency under IMC conditions we could just hit the 'GA' mode button (assumes the a/c is in ATT mode) and the heli will just drop all other AP modes pitch to the 75kt rotors level climb attitude, straight ahead and then command the collective pitch cue appropriately ... one would assume a current pilot flying into dodgy Wx in this quality of machine would have this 'bug out' strategy in mind !!

Perhaps some with first hand knowledge could confirm ??

Thanks ..

[megan]

You're correct SW, from my memory of flying both the 412 and 76. Trouble is if you're not full bottle and practiced at using the various functions available it can be all a bit overwhelming, particularly when you have the stress of being up to your neck in crocodiles.

[xcitation]

Am I correct in reading the ADS-B flight data that it took 15 seconds from level flight (Vert Speed 0 fpm) to rapid descent and losing contact.
Going half the speed would have bought some more valuable seconds unless it was a LOC incident.

[cncpc]

It sounds to be like he went inadvertent IMC, initiated climb, started a left turn either intentionally or not, became spatially disorientated and was unable to recover. We are trained to recover from usual attitudes by rolling wings level but if we have put ourselves into that situation hard to say whether we would be able to fly ourselves out of it.

If this is the case we need to question why he did not couple up once he became disorientate or as soon as he was in the soup. Does the 76 have a go-around button? Are any of ye guys trained to couple up as a last resort for unusual attitude recovery?
Shouldn't that be the first resort in those conditions if you're in IFR conditions? You certainly can't hand bomb it single IFR in a commercial operation. Even if they had the cert ops spec tor whatever, they had to have a functioning autopilot.

[RatherBeFlying]

They Heard Kobe Bryant’s Helicopter Go Down. Then They Prayed. (https://nyti.ms/2S1FCQ9)
Soon she saw a black SUV pull in. The driver got out, wearing a dress shirt with dark pants and dark jacket, she said. Visibly upset, he walked across the street, spoke with the authorities, and came back to the church lot. He had been at Camarillo Airport, Howland Forrest said the man told her, waiting for a helicopter from Orange County. He planned to drive Bryant, his daughter and seven others to Mamba Sports Academy in Thousand Oaks.

[pilotsun]

It seems the plan was to drive from Camarillo
Yes, this was the standard practice. Fly to KCMA, car service up the grade to Mamba Sports Academy in Newbury Park. Several times per month.

[Bravo Delta]

I agree. There is an almost circular pattern evident (to me anyway) at the site of the initial impact point. If looking at the NTSB B-Roll of the site (Post #206), the tail fin is out of the above photo, just below the bottom edge of the photograph. It appears that the bulk of the wreckage (fuselage etc.) traveled (possibly rolling) from right-to-left in the above photo, with the fuselage winding up on its left side. This could indicate that the helicopter was in a side slip as well as being inverted. In my opinion, this was not a CFIT.

While having flown quite a bit in helicopters, I'm not a helicopter pilot - just a relatively low time fixed wing; consequently, this is just a bunch of relatively ignorant speculation on my part. In my defense, I do have more a little experience in aircraft crash investigation.

Cheers,
Grog

I am leaning towards you’re analysis Grog, I have some theories but, I would like to support the pilot and I believe equipment failure. That needs to be eliminated 1st

[[email protected]]

Just because it didn't impact with wings level doesn't make it non-CFIT.

[Bell_ringer]

If he didn't intend for the wings not to be level, then it's still LOC.

[helimutt]

It’s all very well trying to exonerate the pilot. It’s all very well for pilots to hope that it was an equipment failure rather than a fellow pilots shortcomings, which in turn could mean they could also mess up in the same manner. But, and remember no-one knows what happened yet, the flight was perfectly normal until it wasn’t. By that I mean we have a vfr flight. Single pilot. Held and routed due to weather. Everything is pretty much fine until they reach the point where many witnesses state that the weather was foggy. The aircraft was most likely IMC in a hilly area. Now it would have to be such a massive and unlikely coincidence if this turns out to be a mechanical failure, where it also happens that all of the aircraft arrives at one crash site. Nothing apparently departed the aircraft in flight. It was heard flying and sounding normal right up to the part where there is an increase in blade noise due to probable abrupt manouvering. Then a thud. So is it likely that something failed just as they happened to be in fog/low cloud, in a rising ground situation, or is it more likely that the pilot just got it wrong and was disorientated? I know where my gut feeling is leaning. But we don’t know, and will probably never know exactly what happened but im
certain the NTSB will do their best and provide best investigated answers.

the autopilot on an s76 does have the ability to ‘go-around’ at the press of a button

watch out for reports of a large passenger aircraft very nearly doing the same very very recently in the UK. IIMC is not good in any sense.

[cncpc]

You will notice that this aircraft all arrives at the crash site. Must have been pilot error.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kXUZQYFu18

[helimutt]

You will notice that this aircraft all arrives at the crash site. Must have been pilot error.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kXUZQYFu18
I’m sorry but that is not the accident aircraft or anything like it.

I can’t see the fog and high ground? Or am I missing something? But I guess there’s always one. If you read my post correctly you’ll see I also stated that we don’t know the cause. We all have opinions.

i also notice cncpc, that you often comment on many accident posts and basically look to argue the toss, and you’ve had so many aviation adventures, flown so many types and commented on so many other accident threads, you’re pretty much an expert on Cessnas to the 737 max and also helicopters of various types. Your cv must be very impressive.

[[email protected]]

If he didn't intend for the wings not to be level, then it's still LOC. If he is flying the aircraft and it is perfectly serviceable - he hasn't lost control if he is simply disorientated - it is still CFIT because the correct recovery action would have worked - ergo not LOC.

It is semantics anyway, they all died for no apparent reason and without a definite technical failure or any CVFDR data, we won't know for sure.

[Weheka]

Very well said Mozella.

[[email protected]]

cpnc - you win the prize for the most pointless post on this thread so far.

[Deltasierra010]

Recovery action probably would have saved them IF they had enough clearance to carry it out, it’s obvious they didn’t.
Inadvertant IMC is a killer close to terrain you don’t get time to react

[Musician]

What we need to consider is that our perception of the cause of the accident depends on the dangers we have identified, and that depends on the information we have, and our background.

Discussion is focused on the weather conditions, or rather speculation about them; the NTSB have asked for and apparently received photographs from the public, so we'll likely learn facts as the preliminary report comes out. For the record, KVNY is at 800ft and reported an overcast cloud deck at 1300 ft AGL at 9:51, which would make the ceiling ~2100 ft MSL; from 9:45:11 to 9:45:21, N72EX was at 2100-2115 ft altitude as per its ADS-B transmissions as the highest level of its flight path. SoCal TRACON also heard the pilot announce that he was climbing to avoid a cloud layer, and we know that people on the ground reported foggy conditions. So the dangers we think likely are that the pilot might have been in clear air, but lost sight of the fogged-in ground and hills, and thus lost visual reference to a horizon; or that he broke into the cloud deck above inadvertantly. I haven't looked at satellite imagery, so I don't know if there were any holes in that cloud deck that he could have wanted to climb through, but it feels improbable.

But helicopters can crash in any weather. In 1999, Island Express Helicopters crashed N3593S because a loose pneumatic fitting caused the engine to go to flight idle power at a low altitude, which resulted in a forced landing in hilly terrain. The pilot autorotated successfully, and everyone survived. In 2008, Island Express crashed N67GE when its turbine failed unexpectedly (it was properly maintained); the helicopter was low and had to travel to avoid powerlines and buildings, and half of its occupants did not survive the subsequent hard landing. In this case, too, even the cracked fan blades that caused the accident made it to the crash site, because they remained attached. Knowing this, we see the danger that something essential in the 30-year-old helicopter broke, even if it was well maintained.

Or the pilot could've had a medical event, but we have no information on that at all, so it seems very far-fetched simply for that reason.

So it could've been "pilot error", and it makes sense to discuss this scenario because that is what we have the most information on, and also what most affects "lessons learned". But I feel that it's premature to outright dismiss the other scenarios as "too much of a coincidence" when we don't have enough information to judge the odds.

P.S.: Van Nuys also reported 2.5 sm visibility, so a helicopter traveling at 120 kts would be able to look ahead more than a minute of flight time. We don't yet have information on what the visibility was in the hills, at altitude. Looking down through a thin fog layer is easier than being in it, so ground witnesses may not tell the whole story.

[Indelible Spirit]

Yes, of course I know all about declaring emergencies. When I was flying in the Navy I was taught to declare an emergency when necessary and I did so a number of times with great success. Suddenly you stop asking and start telling. However, I personally know a number of civilian trained pilots who think that the last thing in the world they might do is declare an emergency and one or two of them are no longer with us because of it. In at least one instance, I lost a good friend for the very reason that he failed to use his instrument rating and the IFR instruments in his aircraft when push came to shove when he ran out of airspace suitable for his VFR flight plan. The accident being discussed in this thread has a lot of similarities; i.e. deteriorating weather conditions with a sad ending.

THIS!! Declare an emergency. Tell ATC what you are going to do. Blow out of there. Live to handle the paperwork tomorrow.
(Then explain to your charter passengers the “Emergency” was a procedure to stay safe.)
Hopefully, you’re running ADS-B IN/OUT and clear your own traffic.

[aterpster]

Stupid question probably... but could this flight have been made up the coast instead?
He could have gone up V25, which avoids the LAX Class B. Two problems with that, though. If he didn't have RNAV he would be below reception height for the Victor Airway. Second, as he neared Pt. Mugu, he would encounter restricted airspace. This is not the way helicopters go around Los Angeles.

[capngrog]

I am leaning towards you’re analysis Grog, I have some theories but, I would like to support the pilot and I believe equipment failure. That needs to be eliminated 1st

Absolutely! It is way too early in the process to rule anything out. As to whether or not the crash was a CFIT event, it really doesn't matter. Loss of control could have been caused by pilot error or equipment failure, as could have CFIT, in my opinion.

Regards,
Grog

[MurphyWasRight]

From Forbes:
"The helicopter that crashed Sunday killing basketball star Kobe Bryant and eight others was owned by a charter company that only operated under visual flight rules, and its pilots were not permitted to fly solely based on their cockpit gauges if they encountered weather that limited visibility, a former pilot for the company told Forbes."
...
...
I don't know if the pilot was current for IFR or not and I suspect that although the helicopter may have been suitably equipped, I'm guessing that the maintenance required for IFR flight was not up to date. So it's certain that more than one person would have to do an unpleasant rug-dance and somebody would be paying fines and/or be forced to deal with licensing problems some place down the line. But almost anything is better than slamming into a hillside.

Would be interesting to hear knowledgeable opinions on whether lack of "maintenance required for IFR flight" is a possible factor or is it that more of a paperwork exercise unlikely to find anything?
A misleading indicator at the wrong time 'could' partly explain the final seconds of the flight. I suspect the answer is no but I have no knowledge of this so thought I would ask.

Another thought was triggered by Gums comment about passengers needing a bucket after the circling hold, is it possible that a passenger did something very distracting all over the pilot or instruments at just the wrong time. (Trying to avoid graphic image here but not possible I guess.)

[Outwest]

Post #336 is very interesting. I'm trying to understand what power setting, what pitch and roll attitude would have you maintaining a fairly constant AS, a slight climb but have a huge ROD that starts around 45:11 and last until about 45:21 where the AS does start to increase.

[Bell_ringer]

..is it possible..

Grasping for possibilities doesn’t add anything constructive to a professional discussion.
it is possible they were distracted by a UFO, it is however very unlikely.

There is rarely anything out of the ordinary that causes these accidents. Not impossible, just statistically improbable.

[Devil 49]

Almost all my civilian career was spent in VFR only Part 135 (charter) operations. I'm retired now.

The last 20 of those 48 years, even the VFR single engine aircraft had basic IFR gauges.

I worked single-engine VFR HEMS day/night for the last 16 years. The ops manual insisted that an IIMC event would be handled by a straight ahead climb to a safe altitude. It's completely contrary to one's strong initial impulse to crank around in a 180 or descend to visual. But the policy works, if you think rationally, get your instrument scan going and accept the situation. I think the mnemonic was recognize, admit and accept, climb, confess and comply. Or something like that.

In the 48 years, I flew about half my Vietnam tour year flying nights, providing illumination with aerial flares. You want a vivid spatial orientation demonstration? Fly over an aerial flare at night, in and out of the clouds- the Sun is underneath you. Trusting the gauges was empahtically reinforced early in my career.

But I digress, I flew "light twins", AS355s in the Gulf of Mexico on contracts with minimums of 300' ceiling and 2 miles. 130 knots in those conditions is idiotic, at best you have a minute to visually acquire, recognize and divert around an obstruction. The 355 I flew cruised at 120 or so, and a key cue that the conditions were dropping below minimums was the urge to slow down. Even a 120 in perfectly flat terrain is pretty fast.

I never had to complete any of the IIMC flights under IFR, offshore or HEMS. The climb and a short IFR flight to VFR conditions every time. I did land en route for weather, precautionary weather landings, including the occasional overnight dozens of times. The property owners, neighbors might be surprised, local law enforcement might show up to offer assistance, but I was never ever officially questioned, investigated.

I am curious about the last few minutes of the accident flight in which no, or very little communication between the pilot and ATC were reported. Was that to low for radio or was the pilot task saturated? If so, with what challenge? An iPad running Foreflight is a great tool, but it's also a distraction, diversion of attention at what I suspect was the critical point of the flight. Had he engaged the autopilot while he "Foreflighted"? Was there a discussion as to continuing, the passengers had a schedule, were expecting the service they hired? Were there other aircraft issues? If the pilot did not fully understand the autopilot's operation, was he trying to get that under control so he could have that assistance? Was the final climb and the descent the point at which an autopilot operational issue used up the last of the flight's time? Or, did whatever other issue running the last 4, 5 minutes finally cause a loss of control?

[[email protected]]

Outwest - it could just be that the data isn't as accurate or reliable in those last few moments.

[Outwest]

Outwest - it could just be that the data isn't as accurate or reliable in those last few moments.
Yes, it must be as it sure doesn't look like thats possible. The last few seconds sure do look bad with the huge changes in ROD and AS......

[pattern_is_full]

Post #336 is very interesting. I'm trying to understand what power setting, what pitch and roll attitude would have you maintaining a fairly constant AS, a slight climb but have a huge ROD that starts around 45:11 and last until about 45:21 where the AS does start to increase.

1) with the caveat that FR24 ADS-B tracking is as trustworthy as a rattlesnake, especially regarding rates.....
2) From 45:08 to 45:18, there is not a "a huge ROD." There is a reduction in rate of climb, from 1800 fpm to zero (read from the scale on the left). Which is consistent with the aircraft leveling off at ~2100 MSL, as the altitude track indicates.
3) this is a rotorcraft, and within limits, it is easy to hold a constant airspeed (even zero) while creating a high ROD/ROC. It is called "raising or lowering the collective" (angle of attack of all the rotor blades). Lower the collective a bit (with perhaps a slight cyclic adjustment to hold pitch) and one can come down, or level off, with no change in AS.

The ability to disconnect ROC/D from airspeed is one of the key useful features of rotorcraft - they can go up or down with no airspeed change (or no airspeed at all).

4) now, after 45:18, things seem to go out of control (huge increase in descent rate, with corresponding increase in AS) - but I bow to the opinions of the pros as to what occurred then.

[gums]

Salute!

Thanks, Devil.

I flew under those flares in 1968 over the Trail hitting supply trucks( Blindbat dropped them) and down in III Corps and IV Corps for CAS missions when Spooky dropped them. Very much a disorienting experience and a constant reference to the gauges was the key to survival.

Secondly, the straight ahead climb "plan B" is a good one. If you have super situation awareness and are very familiar with the terrain, you may want a turn, but in a split second IIMC, the straight ahead climb will work 90% or more of the time versus much less of a % that you will hit the rocks.

As others here have made clear, the transition from scud running or simply going over a ridge and entering WOXOFF requires some plan B you have burned into your bag of tricks while sitting in the line for your haircut.

Gums sends...

[Outwest]

I suppose my choice of words should have been " a huge change in ROD" I have never in 42 years been able to see a helicopter increase altitude while simultaneously having a ROD at a constant AS......but then I'm constantly still learning.

[ShyTorque]

For what it’s worth, FR24 certainly can’t be treated as gospel. I was being curious and tracking a helicopter on FR24 only a day ago, the same type that I fly. I watched it flew past here on a constant heading at about 120 knots. FR24 showed a ground speed of 307 knots (!) then zero and showed it carrying out a couple of tight 360 degree turns, which it certainly never did.

[Outwest]

As crab said, probably not reliable or at least a lag

[Michael Gee]

This from Daily Mail Newspaper posts

I suspect that a lot of helicopter customers are going to be asking LOTS more questions about safety equipment and certifications from now on. They'll probably be telling their pilots to put the helicopter on the ground ANYWHERE so they can get out if they get into very foggy conditions. Who cares if it might hurt the pilot's EGO.

This is the point - the helicopter should have not flown in the conditions observers say existed.
If Heli is in good flying condition it should have gone for safety on the ground and waited - even a few minuets waiting for a weather change is what many pilots would do.

Going back a bit, Military flying in Canada as Duty pilot towards 2300 hrs radio burst into life asking that the Picnic Hamper could be flown out to the Ex ends location- weather grotty - decided to say NO - radios with now the Brigadier demanding I flew was given a further reply NO - a career change coming I feared - Captain stayed put until weather improved !

[Bell_ringer]

As crab said, probably not reliable or at least a lag

Most fr24 readings are done via mlat which requires you to be in range of multiple ground receivers, not to mention delays in sending disparate readings back to the cloud mothership.
At low level this can be tricky so the readings can’t be taken as gospel.

[Stu666]

For what it’s worth, FR24 certainly can’t be treated as gospel. I was being curious and tracking a helicopter on FR24 only a day ago, the same type that I fly. I watched it flew past here on a constant heading at about 120 knots. FR24 showed a ground speed of 307 knots (!) then zero and showed it carrying out a couple of tight 360 degree turns, which it certainly never did.

That's a very good point.

If the terrain is not conducive for reliable radio transmissions, the FR24 receivers will likely have a hard time plotting it too. Particularly if they were MLAT-ing it.

[Socalbug Smasher]

I live 10 min from the crash site and work 5 min from there. If my office faced the other way I could see the site. As a local GA flyer in this area I know the terrain well and as a hiker in those hills I am very familiar with the location.
I just happened to be in my office Sunday morning about 30 min after the crash ( didn't know it at the time of course) and I can tell you that the hills that are across the 101fwy from me were blanketed in fog ( or june gloom as we call it) and they are less than 1000msl. looking out my window, I thought to myself no way to be flying in this soup this morning.
I am very curious about this pilots decision making, I suspect ( but don't know for sure) that had he continued to track along the 118 fwy on the north end of the valley, gone over the Santa Susana pass (2500 gets you over that and keeps you out of the Burbank class C shelf ), he would have been in the clear over Simi Valley and could have gone the long way round to KCMA. Coming out of VNY in low cloud days that is typically what I do , once over Simi, you are usually in clear skies and can go on your way.
People asked if he could have followed the coast, but id suspect it would have been socked in also, He chose the right route, but just took it too far.
I've driven past the crash site, and the fightradar24 location and the actual location seem a little off on the pictures I've seen. Reports that he just missed the top of the hill are a little misleading, he may have missed the top of that particular hill buy 30 ft but 100 yards beyond that hill is another one 1000ft higher. he basically plowed it in to the middle of the range.
Had he hit the top of the next one he would of wiped out some multi millon $$ homes, ( back side of "the Oaks" community)
Even being familiar with the area, and if the helicopter wasn't equipped for IFR, surely a simple iPad for foreflight would have kept him clear of the terrain
Pretty sure this is going to get blamed on the pilot, on multiple levels.
Very sad for all involved.

[Hot and Hi]

Just because it didn't impact with wings level doesn't make it non-CFIT.
We had this debate not too long ago, and I believe we settled on Bell Ringer‘s naming convention.

[Hot and Hi]

cpnc - you win the prize for the most pointless post on this thread so far.
Not at all! Cpnc‘ post is a well considered response to the argument brought forward that in case of mechanical failure we would most likely see a different debris field.

The point made here, and substantiated with supporting evidence, is that not all mechanical failures lead to in-flight breakup.

[377 Pete]

N72EX was sending full ADS-B data, MLAT was not in the equation. playback shows five different ground station FR24 radar callsigns:

F-KLGB3
T-KWHP7
F-KMSO2
T-KNSA63
F-KWJF1

If mlat were being used, the data frames would have shown 'MLAT-1' or 'MLAT-2'.

[rogercopy]

Discussion is focused on the weather conditions, or rather speculation about them; the NTSB have asked for and apparently received photographs from the public, so we'll likely learn facts as the preliminary report comes out. For the record, KVNY is at 800ft and reported an overcast cloud deck at 1300 ft AGL at 9:51, which would make the ceiling ~2100 ft MSL; from 9:45:11 to 9:45:21, N72EX was at 2100-2115 ft altitude as per its ADS-B transmissions as the highest level of its flight path. NYT article quoted witnesses near crash scene saying clouds were 300 ft above ground.

"The clouds sat about 300 feet off the ground, witnesses near the crash scene said." (http://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/us/kobe-bryant-crash-flight-certification.html)
N72EX was at 2100-2115 ft altitude as per its ADS-B transmissions as the highest level of its flight path.
ADS-B altitude is Pressure Altitude. You need to add about 220 to adjust for local pressure, making it 2320 ft max altitude. That matches what NTSB said "2300 ft".

[Bell_ringer]

We had this debate not too long ago, and I believe we settled on Bell Ringer‘s naming convention.

It may seem like semantics, but if the aircraft is going in a different direction to which you intended, then it’s LOC, no matter how firmly you are attached to the levers.

[henra]

Am I correct in reading the ADS-B flight data that it took 15 seconds from level flight (Vert Speed 0 fpm) to rapid descent and losing contact.
Going half the speed would have bought some more valuable seconds unless it was a LOC incident.
Honest question: Do you see any indication in this pattern (from level flight to -5000fpm at 150kts+ in 15s) which would indicate anything else other than LOC (in the extended sense that it was not so much a mechanical loss of control but a loss of spatial orientation, aka incipient 'Graveyard Spiral')?

[Hot and Hi]

NBC News: FAA overruled safety system that 'could have helped' in Kobe Bryant helicopter crash (https://www.nbcnews.com/news/amp/ncna1125226)

The NTSB has previously recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require helicopters like the one that crashed Sunday to incorporate the technology, but the agency declined, she said. Aviation safety experts have said TAWS systems have saved countless lives."Certainly, TAWS could have helped," Homendy said, but she said she couldn't conclude that its use could have prevented the crash.

It seems that the NTSB have an axe to grind with the FAA about their numerous rejected recommendations!

It is regrettable that the NTSB uses this high profile accident to attack the FAA regarding the NTSB’s TAWS recommendation.

TAWS helps an IFR flight to stay away from terrain. Here we deal with an VFR flight that went into IMC (“conditions”) but never adopted IFR (“rules”). The pilot was acutely aware of the proximity of terrain (so no further benefit of a TAWS telling him) and used his limited or otherwise abilities to get away from it.

Even more shocking I find that the NTSB, of all good people, by making this statement implies - at this early stage of the investigation - that the accident was caused by pilot error. Because the only possible way a TAWS would help is by supplying information to the unaware pilot in a presumed good aircraft, which he can then use fly a different course. If the a/c goes technical, or the pilot as a medical problem, TAWS would of course not make a difference.

Edit: fixed TAWS-related spelling error.

[rogercopy]

It is regrettable that the NTSB uses this high profile accident to attack the FAA regarding the NTSB’s TWAS recommendation.
Yeah, that was very inappropriate for Homendy to use this incident to blast the FAA for not requiring TAWS. Especially because that implies that CFIT was a cause.

Now, Homendy also called out FAA for not requiring FDR (and CVR), which I think was more appropriate, because that certainly would have helped the NTSB investigation, which would lead to better safety in the future.

[roscoe1]

Terrain awareness/avoidance/ alert warning system or TAWS. Not TWAS. Although everyone will know what you mean. With all the confusion over TCAD versus TCAS and their many derivitives, which actually are different, as defined by most, it can help to use standardized acronyms. Call me picky or worse, no issue there.

Most on this forum probably agree that TAWS would not have saved these people unless the pilot were moving much much slower, in which case if ( the assumed) loss of control due to vertigo was the cause, it might have been avoided anyway. Even with that, we all know the irritation of flying low level all day and having to mute the system if possible. Same with TCAS when approaching airports, when they are busy. Acceptance and favor of these systems is also personal. Some like them, some don't. I do think that all HEMS operators should have TAWS. I also think that any 135 IFR helicopter operation should also have both systems; if for no other reason than the safety of the clueless passengers in the rarest of rare occasions that it works with a positive outcome. The latter leads me to my point. I wonder how many instances of TAWS alerts have actually snapped someone to attention so they could make successful corrective action and live to fly again? Any there I was stories are appreciated. Deus ex machina.

[MLH]

TWAS helps an IFR flight to stay away from terrain. Here we deal with an VFR flight that went into IMC (“conditions”) but never adopted IFR (“rules”). The pilot was acutely aware of the proximity of terrain (so no further benefit of a TWAS telling him) and used his limited or otherwise abilities to get away from it.



And what good is TWAS barking PULL UP, PULL UP with the display turning colors if a pilot is no longer aware of which way is up.

[xcitation]

Honest question: Do you see any indication in this pattern (from level flight to -5000fpm at 150kts+ in 15s) which would indicate anything else other than LOC (in the extended sense that it was not so much a mechanical loss of control but a loss of spatial orientation, aka incipient 'Graveyard Spiral')?
Yeah LOC is most likely IMHO. I am not as convinced as some on the CFIT narrative. Flying instruments is not that tricky given wx was anticipated, entry was at stable cruise and he had a good attentive scan to gain IMC rating. Didn't we all fly IMC in the pea soup as a teenager using steam gauges. Caveat is I am a fixed winger, is it a world of difference in a rotary?
The CFIT case is hard to imagine, choosing a descent into worse fog and mountains being the preferred option over a climb into relative safety and staying ahead of the a/c. In extremis the PF is at one with their equipment, game face is on and social factors are not even on the radar.

[ShyTorque]

The point about having TAWS is that having to deal with constant warnings from it might have persuaded the pilot to turn back somewhat earlier. Obviously, if you have lost control of the aircraft it would be just one extra distraction to deal with.

The aircraft I fly has it but it really is only of use in the cruise, as a cross check of my adequate terrain clearance planning. It sometimes becomes a nuisance when landing at off airport sites. There is no “pull up” audio warning on it, btw.

[gulliBell]

OMGGGG! And you can do that at 150kts headed straight into a funnel where rising terrain converges up to the cloud bases and you know there's Earth in the cloud ahead that you are about to climb into???? All while unexpectedly having to quickly establish a crosscheck and swap from eyes outside to instruments. SMH
Even better at 150 kts, a zoom climb would have you rocketing up well over 3500 fpm. This was an emergency situation because there was no other option. Reports now that one of the pilot's former colleagues has stated the accident pilot had an IR but he'd never flown in cloud before. Which is possible in FAA land.

[IflyIFR]

Any helo drivers care to advise why it would be- barring major airport airspace complications- not common practice to file an IFR flight plan and cruise at say, 5000’ or so, well clear of terrain? Then cancel the IFR and land visually at the destination? I never understood running scuds if it weren’t entirely, positively necessary.
Expediency would be the main factor. Flying IFR would have delayed departure and required additional routing. JMHO

[Sir Korsky]

The point about having TAWS is that having to deal with constant warnings from it might have persuaded the pilot to turn back somewhat earlier. Obviously, if you have lost control of the aircraft it would be just one extra distraction to deal with.

The aircraft I fly has it but it really is only of use in the cruise, as a cross check of my adequate terrain clearance planning. It sometimes becomes a nuisance when landing at off airport sites. There is no “pull up” audio warning on it, btw.

and here's the problem. The TAWS would have been screaming at every turn on that trip and the pilot would have likely disabled the distracting audio, thus making it pretty much useless right up until impact. The TAWS doesn't know if you can't see where you're going.

[rogercopy]

Expediency would be the main factor. Flying IFR would have delayed departure and required additional routing. JMHO
Yes. And also, there were articles that interviewed several pilots at various helicopter charters in LA. They said none of the charters in the area are certified for IFR, because they don't need it. Usually the weather is good, and certification costs more. In the rare case the weather is bad, they just don't fly.

[gums]

Salute!

Two things.....

Murphy made a comment that I cannot find/recall associated with a post I made...... but I can stand to be corrected, and I fully unnerstan some folks with a small bladder and associated biological needs. Maybe someone else mentioned the "bucket" need, but I don't think it was me!
Another thought was triggered by Gums comment about passengers needing a bucket after the circling hold, is it possible that a passenger did something very distracting

I return to the CFIT and IIMC aspects of this tragedy, and my personal plan B was to fly st ahead and climb unless very familiar with the terrain nearby.

Gums sends...

[ST Dog]

Murphy made a comment that I cannot find/recall associated with a post I made...... but I can stand to be corrected, and I fully unnerstan some folks with a small bladder and associated biological needs. Maybe someone else mentioned the "bucket" need, but I don't think it was me!

It was Indelible Spirit.

Not to mention holding for 15 minutes flying in circles. I think most passengers would have needed a bucket!

[ShyTorque]

and here's the problem. The TAWS would have been screaming at every turn on that trip and the pilot would have likely disabled the distracting audio, thus making it pretty much useless right up until impact. The TAWS doesn't know if you can't see where you're going.

If the aircraft was equipped with a TAWS with a “screaming audio”; as I wrote, not all do so. The system on the type I fly freezes the nav display until cancelled, which is a bit of a hint that it might be time to go to plan B.

[runner1021]

One can assume the pilot checked departure and arrival station wx and forecasts, and possibly KBUR and KVNY. However, in this type of operation, there is no accurate method of checking conditions along your entire route. Unlike IFR operations, enroute wx and hazards don't appear to get much attention. Had he been aware of the enroute wx, should he have even attempted the flight? Or, should he have pressed on as far as he could, which he apparently did, resulting in being forced to make some hasty last minute decisions? I've always felt VFR operations provide the operator with an abundance of ways to get into trouble.

In light of this tragedy, I would hope that clients of this type of operation attempt to educate themselves as to the potential hazards associated with marginal VFR operations.

[Gordy]

Please continue the "healthy" discussion and continue to be respectful, lest we forget, there is a human side to this.

Please don't ask----I cannot comment for obvious reasons. And maybe lighten up a bit on SASless for some of his "moderation" earlier...

RIP Ara, my best friend:

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/2000x1504/20170622_171446_e0d3c1641ff27323f32415d18171cdaaa214fec7.jpg

[Tailspin Turtle]

Yeah LOC is most likely IMHO. I am not as convinced as some on the CFIT narrative. Flying instruments is not that tricky given wx was anticipated, entry was at stable cruise and he had a good attentive scan to gain IMC rating. Didn't we all fly IMC in the pea soup as a teenager using steam gauges. Caveat is I am a fixed winger, is it a world of difference in a rotary?.

It depends on the helicopter and how some of the cockpit switches are set if control augmentation is available. An airplane in general, if in trim and you use the rudder pedals to keep the wings level, keeps going where you intended it to go. Worst-case helicopters, those with no helpers like SAS or autopilot functions engaged, require full time attention in yaw, pitch, and roll. If everything is working and appropriately set, the S-76 is a best-case helicopter.

[akaSylvia]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51332546


Island Express Helicopters was restricted to flying under what are known as visual flight rules, meaning pilots must be able to see clearly outside the aircraft in daylight, Keith Holloway, a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) spokesman, told the Reuters news agency.


I'm not sure I understand what they mean by this. Do commercial operators in the US require a specific license (or training?) for their instrument-rated pilots to fly in IFR conditions?

[Musician]

It may seem like semantics, but if the aircraft is going in a different direction to which you intended, then it’s LOC, no matter how firmly you are attached to the levers.
The ICAO usage is exactly that (www.icao.int pdf (https://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/AIG/Documents/ADREP%20Taxonomy/ECCAIRS%20Aviation%201.3.0.12%20(VL%20for%20AttrID%20%20430% 20-%20Occurrence%20category).pdf)):
Loss of aircraft control while or deviation from intended flightpath inflight . (LOC-I: Loss of control - inflight)
Loss of control inflight is an extreme manifestation of a deviation from intended flightpath.
The usage notes explicitly include pilot-induced oscillations and practice autorotation.
CFIT is more of an "wasn't aware there was terrain in the way" kind of thing.

I found this interesting:
Unintended flight in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) (UIMC: Unintended flight in IMC)

Usage Notes:
• May be used as a precursor to CFIT, LOC-I or LALT.
• Applicable if the pilot was flying according to Visual Flight Rules (VFR), as defined in Annex 2 – Rules of the Air – to the Convention on International Civil Aviation and by any reason found oneself inadvertently in IMC
• Only to be used when loss of visual references is encountered,
• Only to be used if pilot not qualified to fly in IMC and/or aircraft not equipped to fly in IMC
Ms Homendy mentioned that the NTSB would be looking into whether the IFR equipment in the helicopter was servicable. If it was, and since the pilot was IFR-rated, this would technically fail to qualify as an UIMC occurence.

[Search&Rescue]

Honest question: Do you see any indication in this pattern (from level flight to -5000fpm at 150kts+ in 15s) which would indicate anything else other than LOC (in the extended sense that it was not so much a mechanical loss of control but a loss of spatial orientation, aka incipient 'Graveyard Spiral')?

I can share your thoughts... the interesting question is why? But there will be lot of factors: flight planning, commercial pressure, IFR certification for the operator, pilot’s recency for IFR flight with that type etc. E.g. Most of the pilots have done a minor mistake that HDG bug is not straight forward, when they select HDG mode... and even notify that kind of thing after entering Adhoc IMC and correct it with that speed/altitude combination during SP Ops... It might be very challenging... and cause confusion...

[4468]

VFR flight entering into IMC when unintended, unexpected and undesired, is one of the most challenging situations any pilot can face. Perhaps particularly in a helicopter? Preceding that with extensive manoeuvring and speed changes means the inner ear will likely give you a very bad case of the leans.

Having at some previous point held a ticket to prepare and then fly on instruments ‘under the hood’ (possibly on a totally different helicopter?) is of limited value I’m afraid.

There is absolutely no substitute for continuous regular IFR training in the actual aircraft. But if the operator thinks flight on instruments is not required for their operation, who will pay for the pilot’s training. Even if the pilot understands the requirement?

IF this proves to be unsuccessful unplanned entry into IMC whilst attempting to maintain visual contact with the ground, it will merely be the most recent in a long, long, long list of similar accidents.

It’s an insidious, and utterly unnecessary chain of events.

How tragically sad for all involved. I am so very sorry.

[SASless]

Folks.....don't get ahead of the facts in your comments.

Do not take for gospel. what you are reading in the media and for sure not here at Rotor Heads when you address this particular tragedy.

As in everyone of these events....it takes a long time for the actual facts and data to be ascertained and published.

If you are going to pontificate at least take the time to carefully consider separating the wheat from the chaff in that regard.

Until you know without any doubt whatsoever the accuracy of the information you are basing your opinion upon....remember you are just speculating, supposing, surmising, or just plain flat assed guessing as to what happened.

Discussing this is fine but be reasonable in how you go about it....some of you seem to skip off into fantasy land without giving scant consideration to the known "facts" which are pretty thin at this time.

All of the information so far comes from sources outside the cockpit.....think about that for a bit.

No matter how much we learn....it will not be from inside the cockpit....we will never know what the Pilot could see, what he was experiencing, what he was thinking, and probably never know with certainty what he did during the final moments of that flight.

We can combine all of the known data and other evidence to begin to get a good idea but probably we will never really know.

Let's start with the latest road some of you are traveling.

What do you know for a fact about the Pilot's Instrument flying qualifications, training, experience, currency, and proficiency at the time of crash?

Lay it out and quote your source(s) for that information.

If You want to describe him as being incompetent.....PROVE IT!

Back up what you are saying.....do so with proven and ascertainable fact.....or amend your posts to note your opinion is pure speculation.

[harrogate]

Witness on Liveleak (https://www.liveleak.com/view?t=sRBr3_1580137926)

https://youtu.be/28QYy8lrww8

As described by Expecting2fly

The description of the micro climate and the wx situation comes at the end of the video.

This doorbel video cam audio eerily checks out with the witness description of the final moments and abrupt end. Tough listen.

https://youtu.be/guGQyqki6ik

[JimEli]

...
Only to be used if pilot not qualified to fly in IMC and/or aircraft not equipped to fly in IMC

Ms Homendy mentioned that the NTSB would be looking into whether the IFR equipment in the helicopter was servicable. If it was, and since the pilot was IFR-rated, this would technically fail to qualify as an UIMC occurence.

I think not meeting currency requirements would fall into the not qualified category.

[Sir Korsky]

The most common cause of red screen that I witnessed at 76 SIM was that little red force trim button and an over eager thumb. The aircraft's attitude retention mode is very stable and hands off the controls uncoupled, it pretty much just stays where you left it. First thing you should do is probably nothing once you've gone inadvertent IMC. Once you've gone for that force trim option, you'd better be strong on your instrument skills as the 76 has quite a sensitive control input. If you had to make an abrupt pitch change to instigate an immediate climb, Set 10 degrees up with the force trim, then hands off the damn thing then pull the collective to the max and then start engaging some modes once you're high enough and out of trouble. Then call ATC and consider 7700 in the box.

[SASless]

In the early days, Air Log ordered S-76's with no SAS system as they sent all theirs down to Texas for installation of the Sperry Helipilot systems.

The Aircraft were delivered in West Palm Beach and were either flown to Texas for the Sperry install or put to work until that could be arranged.

Air Log, true to GOM standards, operated the "Bare Hares" VFR until they could obtain a slot at the Dealer for installation of the Sperry System.

The 76 with no SAS system is a hand full but is quite flyable.

With a Sperry System installed and operated in ATT Mode....with Force Trim ON.....using the Cyclic Trim Switch or Force Trim to reset your Datum works fine.

Sir is right in what he states.

[Gomrath]

A wrong turn down Las Virgenes Road instead of maintianing the 101 is a possibility. In that low weather very plausible, IMO. Probably not.. The 101 is a wide 4 lane freeway East to West. Las Virgenes Rd crosses the freeway and is a 2 lane road with central reservation running North to South with gas stations and stores.
There's a credible ear witness account that would support your theory I saw on Live Leak earlier. The witness mentions the area's "micro climate" and previous history of cloud settling in the bowl of the crash site.

If you go to LL and search "Witness Describes What He Heard Before Kobe Bryant Helicopter Crash". I can't post the link because I'm a noob. We get marine layer all the time along that stretch of the 101. That morning it was heavy fog and had been that way since dawn. The weather did not deteriorate prior to the crash. It had been IMC for hours. Both VNY and BUR bank were IMC. A Climb into cloud and a 180 degree turn is not the norm for an IR rated pilot, no.
as for lift vectors ? Nope

your questions?
1. He was svfr and most likely caught out by going imc low level and the turn was probably his last attempt at getting back visual. Not just a case of jumping straight on instruments in that situation at that height.
2. nope
3. nope. Siggy Hoffman was a different issue not lift vector issue if I remember correctly. More a cyclic limit factor known about in the 105.
best not to speculate and wait for the report He was not SVFR. SVFR was only to get him through VNY airspace. After that he was on his own nav and to maintain VFR. He asked for Flight Following as 99% of pilots do there regardless of weather. That’s an amazing ability to have..... Amazing! With the surrounding hills and the traffic noise from the nearby 101 freeway....

[Gomrath]

“The helicopter did not have a terrain awareness and warning system -- a safety feature which provides the pilot with information about the terrain,” Homendy [of the NTSB] said. (CNN article 1/29/2020)
Not required. Apparently the Heli was flying at 130kts just below cloud before the eventful left turn , and a lot of comment suggests 130kts is a bit fast in those met. conditions .

Im thinking the Pilot felt he was running out of time to get his VIP to destination ontime , and may have been going faster than desirable , and took a chance on getting through on the 101 highway route , because of the earlier substantial holding delay south of Burbank , and subsequent routing north of Van Nuys .
Could pilot have questioned Burbank ATC a bit more about his holding delay , or the unexpected routing north of Van Nuys , rather than just accept it ? , and then maybe bought himself some time for options later ?

Heli could also have continued West on 118 towards Camarillo in maybe marginal VFR ,or climbing above the layer and then IR approach to Camarillo , or had he already decided after passing over Van Nuys to then aim for a set down somewhere near Mamba destination Thousand Lakes to give the pax an on-time arrival ?

We may never know , but hope to learn !
The 118 is at a higher elevation and most likely the Cloud base would have been lower. The maximum elevation of Hwy 101 is approximately 800 MSL in the area of the crash and farther west at Conejo summit. The general terrain is rolling to moderate hills and the valley floor is at least 1/4 mile wide in most spots. There are a few narrow points along the route but no place is a "gorge" with big vertical road cuts as someone else claimed. The narrowest points in the valley are a mile to the west around Liberty Canyon, and at Conejo Summit. See post #311 for a good topo.

On the other hand Hwy 118 climbs to 1700 MSL through the Santa Susana Pass, and points on the route are much narrower and "V" shaped. Surrounding terrain along the route is steep, rugged, and rapidly rising in spots.

Possibly it was "tribal knowledge" that 101 was a better route than 118 in MVFR (seems like 118 was solid IFR anyway), and the pilot was more familiar with the 101 route. The Conejo grade is very much a gorge. It then drops steeply into the Camarillo plain. There are major electrical power lines on concrete pylons that cross the Conejo grade about 200-300 feet above the gorge. For what it's worth, I'm based at SBA and had a trip into LA, by car, that morning driving through only about 40 minutes before the incident. As such I drove past KCMA, through Camarillo and up the hill to T/O and past Las Virgenes on the way into the Valley on the trip to Glendale.

The weather is being described by the media as "very bad" but it's not necessarily atypical for mornings coming from the Oxnard-Camarillo plain, where marine layer is common in summer but not that unusual year around. Oxnard was still foggy at 0845 that morning... and there'd been a bad crash, in similar conditions, on the Oxnard side of the river on the previous morning.
As is common, the fog cleared on the Camarillo side and KCMA was reporting "1.5 miles, with low ceiling" at that time of day.

What WAS unusual about the trip this time is that generally, when you have foggy conditions along the SBA-Ventura coast and the low-lying river mouth of the Ventura River area was this: USUALLY you drive OUT of the fog going up the hill. Generally it clears by the CHP Weigh Station at the top of Conejo Pass. This Sunday, however, it was different... coming over the top of the pass and down toward Wendy drive into Conejo Valley I got into pea soup fog, off-and-on, which didn't really clear until I was pretty much into the Valley at Topanga.

The net is that I simply don't see how this flight could have completed in VFR or SVFR operating rules, since there WERE MULTIPLE cloud/fog layers under a low overcast. He would have had to do more than Scud-running to get to a safe arrival at KCMA. I understand that he "did this trip all the time", but fog around the pass isn't that unusual-- it was just complicated Sunday by layers that he''d have had to transit for a safe arrival. Conejo pass up to 2500' was fogged in. Those conditions had persisted for hours, so I'm completely unclear as to how he'd have filed a flight plan to do this trip given the poor VFR conditions enroute. I'm mystified by this so perhaps the helicopter pilots here can fill in the details. Because it looks like he either would have had to scrub or transit some ugly IMC to get there. It's baffling.
Curt I live 1 mile from the location and drove by some 0 minutes before the accident. The weather was grim. Certainly not the more usual marine layer that rarely comes down to ground level. This morning it was a wet fog that shrouded the hills. Not wet through rain but wet from the thick fog. You could not see the crash site from half a mile away on the 101.
Point is, it had been foggy since dawn. VNY and BUR were both IMC.
The Part 135 operating license was VFR only.
Senseless.

[MurphyWasRight]

It was Indelible Spirit.

Originally Posted by gums View Post (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/629197-kobe-bryant-killed-s76-crash-20.html#post10676684)
Murphy made a comment that I cannot find/recall associated with a post I made...... but I can stand to be corrected, and I fully unnerstan some folks with a small bladder and associated biological needs. Maybe someone else mentioned the "bucket" need, but I don't think it was me!

.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Indelible Spirit View Post (https://www.pprune.org/rotorheads/629197-kobe-bryant-killed-s76-crash-post10674829.html#post10674829)
Not to mention holding for 15 minutes flying in circles. I think most passengers would have needed a bucket!
.

Thanks ST, apologies to Gums.
That is what happens when relying a bit too much on memory.

[377 Pete]

Gomrath said "Probably not.. The 101 is a wide 4 lane freeway East to West. Las Virgenes Rd crosses the freeway and is a 2 lane road with central reservation running North to South with gas stations and stores."

The Las Virgenes 101 overpass is 4 lanes Plus a center divider. I think it's plausible he mistook overpass traffic for 101 traffic in those mucky conditions. I've driven it countless times

I need 10 posts to upload an image, so 2 down 8 to go...

[Hot and Hi]

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51332546



I'm not sure I understand what they mean by this. Do commercial operators in the US require a specific license (or training?) for their instrument-rated pilots to fly in IFR conditions?
Yes, like also in most (if not all) other countries having IF capable aircraft and IF-rated pilots is not sufficient. To commercially operate under IF rules, the operator needs to be licensed for this too.

And yes, that comes with extra training requirements and additional, specific approved operating procedures per type of aerial work to be done under IFR.

[SASless]

Here is a good starting point....then do some research about Operations Specifications (OpsSpecs) and see what role they play in how an Air Taxi Operator can carry out its operations.


https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/part-135

http://fsims.faa.gov/WDocs/8400.10%20Air%20Transp%20Ops%20Insp%20Handbk/Volume%203.%20AIR%20OPERATOR%20TECHNICAL%20ADMINISTRATION/Vol%203-Chap%201-Sec%206.htm (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/part-135)

[pilotsun]

Gomrath said "Probably not.. The 101 is a wide 4 lane freeway East to West. Las Virgenes Rd crosses the freeway and is a 2 lane road with central reservation running North to South with gas stations and stores."

The Las Virgenes 101 overpass is 4 lanes Plus a center divider. I think it's plausible he mistook overpass traffic for 101 traffic in those mucky conditions. I've driven it countless times

I need 10 posts to upload an image, so 2 down 8 to go...

With Gomrath on this, not likely. FR has altitude over 2000 at that point and the ceiling at that time was between 1000-1300 depending on who you listen to. That would be well into the soup.

[Musician]

I think not meeting currency requirements would fall into the not qualified category.
Legally, about all he'd have to do would have been to take the company helicopter out to log six IFR approaches twice a year, right? Or am I missing something?

[Musician]

This doorbel video cam audio eerily checks out with the witness description of the final moments and abrupt end. Tough listen.

https://youtu.be/guGQyqki6ik
Could anyone who is familiar with this type say whether the engine noise sounds normal? Or is that not possible to judge from that clip?

[JimEli]

Legally, about all he'd have to do would have been to take the company helicopter out to log six IFR approaches twice a year, right? Or am I missing something?
Not for part 135. And basic Part 61.57(c) currency stipulates more items.

[Musician]

Not for part 135. And basic Part 61.57(c) currency stipulates more items.
Well, yes, the full list is
i) Six instrument (https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/index.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=7fe5a7765bc41dd93adc4e9d5f03ea31&term_occur=999&term_src=Title:14:Chapter:I:Subchapter:D:Part:61:Subpart:A:6 1.57) approaches.

(ii) Holding procedures and tasks.

(iii) Intercepting and tracking courses through the use of navigational electronic systems. https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/61.57

If you choose an instrument approach that requires you to track a course, and then ask ATC to put you on hold for one of the approaches, you're done? If you do it at night, or under the hood?

And since every commercial pilot needs their IFR rating, it's in the interest of the company to keep it up. In fact, my information is that the accident pilot was both the company's chief pilot and a cfii, aka an instrument instructor, who could've done the hood flights with the other company pilots?

So there is incentive for the pilot to be legally IFR-rated, which was my point.
It's clear that tells us nothing about how many flight hours he had actually logged in IMC and clouds.

[Sir Korsky]

Only around 5% of the hours flown for most multi IFR guys are logged as actual. This is typical for pilots who have a cold winter season to deal with. So if you fly 500 hours a year, realistically on average you can expect 25 hours of instrument time. The cost and complexity of operating a dual pilot modern twin helo don't really make much sense when you consider the capabilities of the aircraft that you're just not utilizing most of the time. So skills can get rusty, both cognitive and dexterous.

[JimEli]

Well, yes, the full list is
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/61.57

If you choose an instrument approach that requires you to track a course, and then ask ATC to put you on hold for one of the approaches, you're done? If you do it at night, or under the hood?

And since every commercial pilot needs their IFR rating, it's in the interest of the company to keep it up. In fact, my information is that the accident pilot was both the company's chief pilot and a cfii, aka an instrument instructor, who could've done the hood flights with the other company pilots?

So there is incentive for the pilot to be legally IFR-rated, which was my point.
It's clear that tells us nothing about how many flight hours he had actually logged in IMC and clouds.

Under part 135 it's different. Basically an IPC (135.297 check and AP check for SP ops) is required every 6 months.

[gulliBell]

Could anyone who is familiar with this type say whether the engine noise sounds normal? Or is that not possible to judge from that clip?
Sounds normal to me...right up until the impact noise. In any event, most of the sound signature is main and tail rotor noise.

[gulliBell]

..If You want to describe him as being incompetent.....PROVE IT!


Competency should be easy to elucidate. Does anybody know if the operator sends their S76 pilots to Flight Safety for annual recurrent training in the sim?

[Squawk7700]

Sounds normal to me...right up until the impact noise. In any event, most of the sound signature is main and tail rotor noise.

The sound of it flying over is not consistent in terms of a normal fly-by as such. Sounds like it’s stooging around at slower than normal speed and ignoring the fact that you can’t hear any blade slap of it slowing down, it sounds like it’s slowing up and or turning slightly for around 10 seconds before the impact. Certainly doesn’t sound like a helicopter on it’s side in a 5,000ft descent rate.

[n5296s]

Certainly doesn’t sound like a helicopter on it’s side in a 5,000ft descent rate
Out of curiosity, where do I go to find out what that DOES sound like? Somehow it has been absent from my life experience so far. Why would a helicopter sound different if it is descending or banking? I do agree that the sound is pretty consistent up to the last moment.


For what it's worth (thanks Google Street View) I'm pretty sure the doorbell cam is at 4304 Oak Glen St. That puts it about 400 feet off the flight path, according to the ADS-B data ( https://caltopo.com/m/P69T ). The timing is just right. If the ADS-B data is to be fully believed, they were already in a 2000+ ft/min descent and 45 degree or so bank at that point.

https://www.google.com/maps/@34.1381022,-118.7019403,3a,75y,64.71h,88t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sFefn_cxXtRkayrRErSmvhw!2e0!7i16384!8i819 2

https://www.google.com/maps/place/4304+Oak+Glen+St,+Calabasas,+CA+91302/@34.1380443,-118.702228,323m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x80e820c18d3a6bef:0x9ef9917ec88 e4ed8!8m2!3d34.1380432!4d-118.7016795

[SLFMS]

Could anyone who is familiar with this type say whether the engine noise sounds normal? Or is that not possible to judge from that clip?


It doesn't sound unusual to me. The distortion sounds like it's from a poor quality microphone rather than the aircraft.
You can hear the normal main and tail rotor noise embedded in the clip.
I'm certainly not a sound expert but have flown the 76 nothing stands out as obviously weird about the sound.
​​​​​
​​

[Gordy]

And since every commercial pilot needs their IFR rating,

Nope, not for helicopter pilots---

[377 Pete]

For what it's worth (thanks Google Street View) I'm pretty sure the doorbell cam is at 4304 Oak Glen St. That puts it about 400 feet off the flight path, according to the ADS-B data . The timing is just right. If the ADS-B data is to be fully believed, they were already in a 2000+ ft/min descent and 45 degree or so bank at that point.



Got my hands on the FULL ADS-B file which is 2 data frames per second as opposed to the one frame every five seconds that's been going around. Working on a .KML file for google earth. Looks to be a controlled left turn right over that address, until the last few data frames. Here's a link to an image host since I don't have 10 posts-

imgurDOTcom/a/KNsDRPu (replace 'DOT' with . )

[Bravo Delta]

This doorbel video cam audio eerily checks out with the witness description of the final moments and abrupt end. Tough listen.

https://youtu.be/guGQyqki6ik


Tough listen for sure, From my analytical mind the audio indicates an operational vehicle up until impact.
Painted into a corner RIP.

[rogercopy]

FR has altitude over 2000 at that point and the ceiling at that time was between 1000-1300 depending on who you listen to. That would be well into the soup.
If you're saying 2000 is much greater than 1300, it's not that straightforward.

FR/ADS-B altitude is Pressure Altitude (29.92 inHg). Need to add about 220 ft to correct for local pressure (VNY altimeter 30.16).

Ceiling is AGL. Elevation at 101 & Las Virgenes is ~800 ft.

But the ceiling in the mountains could be very different than the ceiling quoted by VNY ATC.

NY Times quoted witnesses saying the clouds were 300 ft AGL at the time of the crash.


For what it's worth (thanks Google Street View) I'm pretty sure the doorbell cam is at 4304 Oak Glen St. That puts it about 400 feet off the flight path, according to the ADS-B data. The timing is just right. If the ADS-B data is to be fully believed, they were already in a 2000+ ft/min descent and 45 degree or so bank at that point.
There may have been multiple doorbell cam videos, but the one I saw started at 9:45:01 am PST, which was +1280 fpm ascent at that time.

[Squawk7700]

Out of curiosity, where do I go to find out what that DOES sound like? Somehow it has been absent from my life experience so far. Why would a helicopter sound different if it is descending or banking? I do agree that the sound is pretty consistent up to the last moment.


For what it's worth (thanks Google Street View) I'm pretty sure the doorbell cam is at 4304 Oak Glen St. That puts it about 400 feet off the flight path, according to the ADS-B data ( https://caltopo.com/m/P69T ). The timing is just right. If the ADS-B data is to be fully believed, they were already in a 2000+ ft/min descent and 45 degree or so bank at that point.

https://www.google.com/maps/@34.1381022,-118.7019403,3a,75y,64.71h,88t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1sFefn_cxXtRkayrRErSmvhw!2e0!7i16384!8i819 2

https://www.google.com/maps/place/4304+Oak+Glen+St,+Calabasas,+CA+91302/@34.1380443,-118.702228,323m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x80e820c18d3a6bef:0x9ef9917ec88 e4ed8!8m2!3d34.1380432!4d-118.7016795

5,000ft per minute in a 90 degree bank, I assure you you’d know about if you heard it !

[industry insider]

Sounds like a normally functioning S-76B to me, right up until impact.

[[email protected]]

It has already been acknowledged that the ADSB data may well be unreliable and the doorbell audio sounds like industry insider says- just a helicopter passing overhead in the cruise.

All the talk of rates of descent and angles of bank is pure conjecture and not really helpful to anyone.

It seems to me that we are far more likely to be talking CFIT than LOC - but we still don't know why.

[aterpster]

It has already been acknowledged that the ADSB data may well be unreliable and the doorbell audio sounds like industry insider says- just a helicopter passing overhead in the cruise.

All the talk of rates of descent and angles of bank is pure conjecture and not really helpful to anyone.

It seems to me that we are far more likely to be talking CFIT than LOC - but we still don't know why.
And, we may never know.

[helimutt]

Could anyone who is familiar with this type say whether the engine noise sounds normal? Or is that not possible to judge from that clip?

ive listened to the clip a fair few times now and there does seem to be a barely perceptible rise and fall in sound from the tail rotor, but is it just the recording effect, or something else? It sounds like a normal s76 in all other respects, and I’ve heard and flown enough of them to be fairly certain.but, it definitely sounds as if flying slower than normal cruise speed and possibly turning.

[SASless]

Insider,

What is the difference in sounds made by the various models of the 76?

Does a B Model sound any different than an A model or C model?

Not picking on you....but as I read this thread I am amazed at the analytical abilities of some of the other posters based upon scant information and far too often no experience or professional qualifications at all.

I know what you meant by your post....the sound track did not seem to demonstrate "unusual" sounds being emitted by the passing helicopter....but yours is a simple example.

On the other side....some of the efforts to calciulate sounds, ROD's, and other situations by using some Data is interesting but yet in the end serves no real purpose other than to advance the discussion a bit.

At least those folks are trying to make a legitimate contribution as compared to those who are just plain guessing at something with no basis whatsoever.

[rogercopy]

Got my hands on the FULL ADS-B file which is 2 data frames per second as opposed to the one frame every five seconds that's been going around. Working on a .KML file for google earth. Looks to be a controlled left turn right over that address, until the last few data frames.
Remember to correct the altitude. ADS-B is Pressure Altitude. Otherwise, your KML will look like the helicopter was only skimming over Hwy 101 as low as under 100 ft at some places, which is misleading.

[gulliBell]

Does a B Model sound any different than an A model or C model?.

They all sound the same to me. And not only that, I wouldn't be able to pick a difference in sound between single or twin engine operation, assuming the main rotor speed was the same AEO or OEI.

[IamNew]

Not required.
The 118 is at a higher elevation and most likely the Cloud base would have been lower. The Conejo grade is very much a gorge. It then drops steeply into the Camarillo plain. There are major electrical power lines on concrete pylons that cross the Conejo grade about 200-300 feet above the gorge. I live 1 mile from the location and drove by some 0 minutes before the accident. The weather was grim. Certainly not the more usual marine layer that rarely comes down to ground level. This morning it was a wet fog that shrouded the hills. Not wet through rain but wet from the thick fog. You could not see the crash site from half a mile away on the 101.
Point is, it had been foggy since dawn. VNY and BUR were both IMC.
The Part 135 operating license was VFR only.
Senseless.

This is probably a silly question, but I don't understand this portion of the transcript with ATC (bold is by me):

Helicopter: Van Nuys. Helicopter 2EchoX, we are currently with you for the special VFR transition. We are currently at 1,400 [feet].

Van Nuys airport tower: Helicopter 2EchoX, Van Nuys tower. Wind calm, visibility 2½. Ceiling 1,100 overcast. Van Nuys altimeter’s 30.16. Cleared into Van Nuys Class Delta, northeast of Van Nuys along the 118 Freeway westbound. Advise when you’re in VFR conditions or when you’re clear of the Van Nuys Class Delta. Transition when you’re at or below 2,500 [feet].

Helicopter: 2EchoX-ray. Advise in VFR condition, and then we stay on the 118. We’re currently at 1,400 [feet], and we have 0235.

Van Nuys tower: Helicoper 2EchoX, thank you. And once you’re clear of Van Nuys Delta, did you want to talk to SoCal?

Helicopter: Affirmative. 2EchoX.

Helicopter: Tower for 2EchoX-ray, can we start go ahead and turn toward the southwest for the 101?

Van Nuys tower: Helicopter 2EchoX-ray, approved, and are you transitioning in VFR conditions?

Helicopter: VFR conditions, 1,500 [feet]. 2EchoX.



How were they in SVFR at 1400 if the Van Nuys ceiling is 1100? Weren't they already in then clouds then? And then she asks if they are transitioning in VFR conditions and he says yes they are but at 1500? Seems conflicting to me yet ATC doesn't seem concerned.

[Gomrath]

It's slightly to the right of 101, which makes a perfect visual ILS (if you see what I mean).

It's at 692 feet (according to caltopo), so IF the ceilings being given were correct, it would have worked. But your suggestion of hitting a fog bank seems highly probable, so the ceiling info would be wrong in that case.
As for taking a car from KCMA - it's only 3 miles or so but if they were already hitting a deadline... we all know that "just taking a car" easily adds half an hour to the journey time.
There is no pad in Newbury Park. They were heading to CMA. Then a car back.

[EPHD75]

In a small charter company like this is there typically any oversight or review of a pilot's plan for a mission? I understand from reading above that the pilot was the unofficial (or official) "chief pilot" for the company. It seems to me that had there been a review of the available Wx before departure, and a discussion of "what ifs" and responses with the pilot by a supervisor/manager, at a minimum the pilot may have been better prepared to execute one of the various maneuvers suggested above when he lost VFR. Also, and I think this is really important, the pilot would then have "air cover" by management with the client, with whom there was a relationship apparently, so to speak if he was forced to abort, recover VFR, find a landing location, and arrange a car. Furthermore, one would expect that the pilot had briefed the VIP before departure on the weather driven possibilities. The whole thing just seems so sad and so senseless.

[JimEli]

Well, yes, the full list is
https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/61.57

If you choose an instrument approach that requires you to track a course, and then ask ATC to put you on hold for one of the approaches, you're done? If you do it at night, or under the hood?

And since every commercial pilot needs their IFR rating, it's in the interest of the company to keep it up. In fact, my information is that the accident pilot was both the company's chief pilot and a cfii, aka an instrument instructor, who could've done the hood flights with the other company pilots?

So there is incentive for the pilot to be legally IFR-rated, which was my point.
It's clear that tells us nothing about how many flight hours he had actually logged in IMC and clouds.
An interesting perspective: simply fly 6 approaches under the hood on one flight, count that as the tracking/intercepting, and execute 1 circuit of a holding pattern. With that suggestion, is there any doubt there are accidents like this?

[grizzled]

This is probably a silly question, but I don't understand this portion of the transcript with ATC (bold is by me):

Helicopter: Van Nuys. Helicopter 2EchoX, we are currently with you for the special VFR transition. We are currently at 1,400 [feet].

Van Nuys airport tower: Helicopter 2EchoX, Van Nuys tower. Wind calm, visibility 2½. Ceiling 1,100 overcast. Van Nuys altimeter’s 30.16. Cleared into Van Nuys Class Delta, northeast of Van Nuys along the 118 Freeway westbound. Advise when you’re in VFR conditions or when you’re clear of the Van Nuys Class Delta. Transition when you’re at or below 2,500 [feet].

Helicopter: 2EchoX-ray. Advise in VFR condition, and then we stay on the 118. We’re currently at 1,400 [feet], and we have 0235.

Van Nuys tower: Helicoper 2EchoX, thank you. And once you’re clear of Van Nuys Delta, did you want to talk to SoCal?

Helicopter: Affirmative. 2EchoX.

Helicopter: Tower for 2EchoX-ray, can we start go ahead and turn toward the southwest for the 101?

Van Nuys tower: Helicopter 2EchoX-ray, approved, and are you transitioning in VFR conditions?

Helicopter: VFR conditions, 1,500 [feet]. 2EchoX.

How were they in SVFR at 1400 if the Van Nuys ceiling is 1100? Weren't they already in then clouds then? And then she asks if they are transitioning in VFR conditions and he says yes they are but at 1500? Seems conflicting to me yet ATC doesn't seem concerned. Hi IamNew,

The simple answer is that the official current weather for Van Nuys (ceiling, visibility, temp, etc) is observed and/or measured at a specific location on the airport. The visibility and cloud height(s) in other areas of the Van Nuys Class D airspace may be -- and often are -- quite different than the officially recorded weather. For the controller, if the pilot says he is "VFR" then the controller will, in most cases*, accept the pilot's statement, as that aircraft certainly could be in VFR conditions at 1400' or 1500', even if the official ceiling (where that observation or measurement was taken) is 1100'. Which is also why she sounds "unconcerned"; it's not an unusual situation in itself. ( *Subject to certain conditions under which the controller may not issue clearance but we don't need to get into that in this example)

grizz

[RatherBeFlying]

The NTSB CVR folks have capability for sound signature analysis and may be able to extract useful data from the various doorbell cam audio files. Tail and rotor RPM shouldn't be too hard. A control malfunction may have a sound signature. Possibly rotor aspect can be determined from doorbell location and ADS-B position data. Raw ADS-B transmissions are good data, especially given the hoops that have to be jumped through to certify an installation.

Result being that a subset of data normally available from FDR and CVR exists, but has to be collected from disparate sources.

[TriStar_drvr]

This is probably a silly question, but I don't understand this portion of the transcript with ATC (bold is by me):

Helicopter: Van Nuys. Helicopter 2EchoX, we are currently with you for the special VFR transition. We are currently at 1,400 [feet].

Van Nuys airport tower: Helicopter 2EchoX, Van Nuys tower. Wind calm, visibility 2½. Ceiling 1,100 overcast. Van Nuys altimeter’s 30.16. Cleared into Van Nuys Class Delta, northeast of Van Nuys along the 118 Freeway westbound. Advise when you’re in VFR conditions or when you’re clear of the Van Nuys Class Delta. Transition when you’re at or below 2,500 [feet].

Helicopter: 2EchoX-ray. Advise in VFR condition, and then we stay on the 118. We’re currently at 1,400 [feet], and we have 0235.

Van Nuys tower: Helicoper 2EchoX, thank you. And once you’re clear of Van Nuys Delta, did you want to talk to SoCal?

Helicopter: Affirmative. 2EchoX.

Helicopter: Tower for 2EchoX-ray, can we start go ahead and turn toward the southwest for the 101?

Van Nuys tower: Helicopter 2EchoX-ray, approved, and are you transitioning in VFR conditions?

Helicopter: VFR conditions, 1,500 [feet]. 2EchoX.



How were they in SVFR at 1400 if the Van Nuys ceiling is 1100? Weren't they already in then clouds then? And then she asks if they are transitioning in VFR conditions and he says yes they are but at 1500? Seems conflicting to me yet ATC doesn't seem concerned.

the ceiling is height above ground. Pilots give their altitude at height above mean seal level. Van Nuys field elevation is around 700 feet above seal level. Therefore a ceiling of 1100 feet would put the cloud bases at 1800 feet MSL. The pilot reported his altitude as indicated by his altimeter as 1400 feet MSL. Therefore at the time about 400 feet below the cloud bases.

[IamNew]

the ceiling is height above ground. Pilots give their altitude at height above mean seal level. Van Nuys field elevation is around 700 feet above seal level. Therefore a ceiling of 1100 feet would put the cloud bases at 1800 feet MSL. The pilot reported his altitude as indicated by his altimeter as 1400 feet MSL. Therefore at the time about 400 feet below the cloud bases.

thanks, makes sense.

[Musician]

An interesting perspective: simply fly 6 approaches under the hood on one flight, count that as the tracking/intercepting, and execute 1 circuit of a holding pattern. With that suggestion, is there any doubt there are accidents like this?
You did point out to me earlier (thank you!) that for part 135 pilots, more requirements apply to remain IFR-certified, as stated in 135.297 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/135.297). My idea that a commercial pilot could simply take the company helicopter out for a short flight to remain legally IFR-current was wrong, and we both agree that it wouldn't produce the necessary level of experience to fly safely in (or into) IMC.

I was happy to learn that 135.293 (https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/135.293) (c) requires VFR-only helicopter pilots to demonstrate each year that they can safely return to VMC from inadvertant IMC.

[Musician]

Got my hands on the FULL ADS-B file which is 2 data frames per second as opposed to the one frame every five seconds that's been going around. Working on a .KML file for google earth. Looks to be a controlled left turn right over that address, until the last few data frames. Here's a link to an image host since I don't have 10 posts-

imgurDOTcom/a/KNsDRPu (replace 'DOT' with . )
Here's your image:

https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1456x788/wtuoh6mr_416a577d5191ec2704f3ba3182569a5182068510.png
created by 377 Pete

This does look like the turn is too early for following the overpass by mistake.
I couldn't tell by the picture if this was a controlled turn or a graveyard spiral, but the very quick descent from 2300ft altitude is unlikely to be intentional.

Is the KML file at the bottom of the FR24 blog page (https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/kobe-bryant-believed-dead-in-helicopter-crash/) not based on the "granular" ADS-B data?

[spacetracer]

Folks...we can't trust to any ADS-B data from FR24.
​​​​​​For instance it shows around 80 kt everytime we are on the ground after landing.
Our today's flight: two landings: 10.42 and 11.00, the first landing is displayed with zero ALT and AS 79kt, the second- 1500 ft with 80 kt while on the ground. I should say the elevation of the helipads is almost the same(400 ft).
I could see no any accurate data on the FR24 and even location is wrong.
So it's better to keep that in mind when concluding the the last seconds of the flight discussed.
I don't believe in CFIT as well as the Pilot flew up to 130 kt between cloud layers with low visibility in mountain area.
The AP wasn't coupled for sure and he made left 180 by hand on final phase.
Looks like loss of airspeed control while climbing through the clouds.
Zero speed... POB 09... Heavy aircraft...VRS...SWP...
Only God knows. RIP.

[industry insider]

Insider,

What is the difference in sounds made by the various models of the 76? Does a B Model sound any different than an A model or C model?

No, they sound the same when in flight SAS, which is my whole point right?

It doesn't sound different enough to be able to make a reasoned judgement from someone's door bell cam recording but there is no way it is at 160 knots and 90 degrees of bank or spinning.

Many people seem to be dissecting this accident too forensically and putting forward wild theories. Statistically, while there maybe subtle nuances, the underlying cause has sadly been seen before.

[n5296s]

there is no way it is at 160 knots and 90 degrees of bank or spinning
Just looking at the last few ADS-B data points, they covered about .54 miles in 11 seconds, and changed heading by about 60 degrees (just eyeballing it) in that time. That makes for 153 knots ground speed and an average 38 degrees of bank, over the last 11 second of flight. That assumes you don't disregard the ADS-B data altogether of course. But even if a few data points are off (and some certainly are, if you look at the CSV file), they don't affect the overall result.

[Musician]

Folks...we can't trust to any ADS-B data from FR24.
​​​​​​For instance it shows around 80 kt everytime we are on the ground after landing.
Our today's flight: two landings: 10.42 and 11.00, the first landing is displayed with zero ALT and AS 79kt, the second- 1500 ft with 80 kt while on the ground. I should say the elevation of the helipads is almost the same(400 ft).
I could see no any accurate data on the FR24 and even location is wrong.
So it's better to keep that in mind when concluding the the last seconds of the flight discussed.
ADS-B data is sent from your aircraft, it is as accurate as your sensors. For example, if you're low to the ground and don't have good GPS reception, your position could be inaccurate.

To be logged by FR24, an ADS-B transmission has to be received by one of its receivers, and their coverage is not complete (and it also appears that messages drop out more in high-traffic areas). So if the last transmision FR24 receives from you is during your approach at 1500ft and 80 kts before your craft gets too low and loses radio contact, that is what it will display, because that is all it has. For the FR24 realtime tracking, there may also be programming that guesses where aircraft are when reception drops out intermittently; I expect that observed "impossible" flight maneouvres result from "bad guesses" during dropouts. And aircraft themselves are supposed to "guess" their positions between GPS updates when sending out ADS-B data.

In this case, we are looking at a completed flight, and (presumably) the exact ADS-B data as it was received from the aircraft; and here also, we know that we don't have complete coverage because the final few hundred feet down to impact altitude are missing from the data.

(I have also seen a study that suggests some ADS-B systems have hardware or software issues that could cause small errors in the data. It's always a good idea to cross-check if the data make sense.)

[spacetracer]

To be logged by FR24, an ADS-B transmission has to be received by one of its receivers, and their coverage is not complete (and it also appears that messages drop out more in high-traffic areas). So if the last transmision FR24 receives from you is during your approach at 1500ft and 80 kts before your craft gets too low and loses radio contact, that is what it will display, because that is all it has. For the FR24 realtime tracking, there may also be programming that guesses where aircraft are when reception drops out intermittently;
Unfortunately I'm not allowed to post URLs to share recorded by FR24 data of our flight but believe me it's totally inaccurate for the whole flight from take off until landing. It's displayed ZERO altitude while we're flying 1500 for 12 minutes.

[Droop Snoot]

https://www.pprune.org/australia-new-zealand-pacific/629086-c130-down-ne-cooma-6.html#post10670047

Interesting explanation of online ADS-B data and how it can be accurately analyzed. I cannot vouch for the veracity of this explanation.

[n5296s]

it's totally inaccurate for the whole flight from take off until landing
I think you need an avionics shop. FR24 is spot on accurate when I fly, and for anything else where I've looked too. You often get occasional spurious data points, but the majority of the points are correct.

[wiedehopf]

Some ADS-B data points:
https://tar1090.adsbexchange.com/?icao=a9a1ad&showTrace=2020-01-26&zoom=15

Press K for labels. The labels show ground speed, uncorrected barometric altitude and a timestamp.
Add 225 ft to get the approximate altitude above mean sea level. (250 ft might be more accurate but that's more theoretical)

Attached a KML file with the altitudes corrected by 225 ft and converted to meter as per KML standard.
You'll have to remove the .doc ending, the forum didn't want a KML file.
The KML file can be viewed for example on http://earth.google.com/

The screenshot from the FR24 data a couple of posts before has more points, still thought i'd post a different data source for those curious.

[SASless]

If one guy is saying his aircraft data is inaccurate and others are saying the system is accurate but relies upon the aircraft system being accurate.....how do we know the particular aircraft is sending accurate data?

How do you check your own aircraft to confirm it is operating correctly?

Has that been done?

[n5296s]

How do you check your own aircraft to confirm it is operating correctly?
Retrieve the CSV file from FR24 just after your flight? You may need a "silver" FR24 subscription for that, which costs about $20/year.

Also when you install ADS-B, at least in the US, you are required to conduct a test flight to confirm correct operation.

For VFR flight, FR24 relies on ADS-B. Now that means everything flying, round here anyway, but until recently it generally didn't show small planes.

[Bell_ringer]

If one guy is saying his aircraft data is inaccurate and others are saying the system is accurate but relies upon the aircraft system being accurate.....how do we know the particular aircraft is sending accurate data?

How do you check your own aircraft to confirm it is operating correctly?

Has that been done?

Don't rely on a crowd-driven, cloud system for accurate position information.
Just because your phone says it was so, does not make it so.
If ATC can't get accurate data with SSR or ground stations, then it's not worthy as a basis for a fictional opinion.

[SASless]

So....I take all this jibber jabber about location, speed, etc....is just that.

Until we know if all those checks, flight tests, equipment installs were done and passed all the requirements....all this is just so much talk and arm waving amounts to some interesting entertainment but has no probative value.


Or....do I miss something?

[JimEli]

If one guy is saying his aircraft data is inaccurate and others are saying the system is accurate but relies upon the aircraft system being accurate.....how do we know the particular aircraft is sending accurate data?

How do you check your own aircraft to confirm it is operating correctly?

Has that been done?Experience with FAA compliance monitoring of ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft to date has revealed that a large percentage of equipped aircraft have deficiencies with ADS-B Out system performance following initial installations. Many of these deficiencies have been attributed to improper installation and incorrect system configuration.

The FAA provides a free, web-based service called the Public ADS-B Performance Report (PAPR) at https://adsbperformance.faa.gov/PAPRRequest.aspx. Additional information on the PAPR service can be found at https://www.faa.gov/nextgen/equipadsb/. The FAA recommends that owner/operators of ADS-B Out-equipped aircraft verify equipment performance through periodic use of the PAPR request service.

Per § 91.227 Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment performance requirements, ADS-B Out Performance Requirements for Navigation Accuracy Category for Position (NACP) specifies the accuracy of a reported aircraft's position, as defined in TSO-C166b and TSO-C154c:

(1) For aircraft broadcasting ADS-B Out as required under 91.225 (a) and (b) -

(i) The aircraft’s NACP must be less than 0.05 nautical miles;

(ii) The aircraft’s NACV must be less than 10 meters per second;

Source: AC No: 90-114B Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast Operations (12/30/2019)

[9Aplus]

If one guy is saying his aircraft data is inaccurate and others are saying the system is accurate but relies upon the aircraft system being accurate.....how do we know the particular aircraft is sending accurate data?

How do you check your own aircraft to confirm it is operating correctly?

Has that been done?
Do not know for others... but when we was doing one glass cockpit + ADSB upgrade on GA fixwing.
The first thing in use was separate SDR receiver and software monitoring.
Started static on apron, later during mag sensor calibration on ground taxi and finally flying within airport circle.
On apron we find out that navigator from producer A is not feeding transponder from producer B with Alt data, position data was in in order - even much better than expected EGNOS level 7,5m on all three axis.
Therefore we was forced to provide extra serial RS232 source with Alt data.
After that we included "new" object on FR24 network.
Just remember that you need attenuator if front, because most of SDR-s are not able to receive correct data
in case of over-driven input.

[n5296s]

interesting entertainment but has no probative value
I must have missed something... this is Pprune :-) Probative value isn't really what it's about, or so I thought.

But as far as the ADS-B / FR24 data is concerned, some common sense applies. The data is mostly self consistent and consistent with other known facts. There are a few apparent anomalies especially with heading and altitude, but they are obvious (and in the case of heading, could have been caused by the way it was flying in the last few seconds). It's extremely improbable that the smooth curve shown on the most recent plot would happen by chance.

Also, the aircraft was equipped for flight in the LAX Class B veil (and was within it until a minute or so before the crash), i.e. it was required to have a certified ADS-B installation. So yes, "all those checks, flight tests, equipment installs were done and passed all the requirements" were required to have been done. It COULD have been done by a rogue avionics shop, and not have been flight tested, but it doesn't seem very likely.

[wiedehopf]

In regards to data accuracy: The GPS isn't off, otherwise the track wouldn't be following the US101 so nicely.
And it is indeed not fact or probative value, but it's by a long shot the best data available.
I'd see it as more reliable than an eye witness.
The data also fits exceptionally well with the crash location, so there aren't any red flags in regards to the data that would make them unbelievable.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1366x768/screenshot_from_2020_02_03_21_18_01_bce79be022aa9da86c71b609 f087c366ec3eea02.png

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1366x768/screenshot_from_2020_02_03_21_27_10_3d35c131875509a0bec67edb 7293105082149bef.jpg
https://cimg8.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1366x768/screenshot_from_2020_02_03_21_26_37_f14e0db574c421a100363b8a d3ee36f48f9dca88.jpg

[Lonewolf_50]

For wiedehopf (https://www.pprune.org/members/433642-wiedehopf)
While that's a nice reconstruction, it isn't the same as a trace from FDR data.
Which I suspect is a point that SASless is hinting at.

What was going on in the last 10-15 seconds inside the cockpit isn't told in that reconstruction. That - what was happening inside the cockpit - is the key to learning anything of value from this loss of lives and loss of a helicopter.

All that the reconstruction does is show the route to the scene of the crash site.

[wiedehopf]

I'm perfectly aware and i don't think i drew any conclusions.
There is no CVR or FDR for that particular helicopter if i'm not mistaken.

Edit:
Removed unnecessary speculation.

[Lonewolf_50]

I'm perfectly aware and i don't think i drew any conclusions.
My apologies if my post led you to believe that I felt that you had; was not the intended message. (As much for the general reading public as anything else).
There is no CVR or FDR for that particular helicopter if i'm not mistaken.
Such was reported early on.
I'm also well aware that this could turn out to be a mechanical malfunction or some other issue. Maybe even the NTSB will have a hard time reporting with certainty what caused this crash.
They certainly have their work cut out for them, given the lack of FDR data to point to those crucial details as the left turn commenced, and then what followed up to the point of impact. By crucial details I refer to "what going on with the machine" (if anything was amiss) and "what's going on in the cockpit?" . .

[Senior Pilot]

There has been a lot of speculation based upon individuals interpretations of FR24, ADS-B, door-bell videos and expert ear analysts such that moderators have had their work cut out sorting the wheat from the chaff.

A number of experienced helicopter pilots have hinted that this is best left to the NTSB. Since this thread is trawled by the media and others looking for, and getting, any misdirection available there will be a slash and burn policy on any more posts of this nature.

Stick to what you actually know, not what you think you know.

[377 Pete]

There has been a lot of speculation based upon individuals interpretations of FR24, ADS-B, door-bell videos and expert ear analysts such that moderators have had their work cut out sorting the wheat from the chaff.

A number of experienced helicopter pilots have hinted that this is best left to the NTSB. Since this thread is trawled by the media and others looking for, and getting, any misdirection available there will be a slash and burn policy on any more posts of this nature.

Stick to what you actually know, not what you think you know.

Is this why my replies aren't showing up? I try not to engage in empty speculation. I've been a Feeder for 6 years ( using FR24 sponsored hardware) and do know something about ADS-B. I'm familiar with its weak points and strong points. Its understandable that the Rotor Pilots who have been here for years resent the onslaught of non-rotor pilots over the last week. Some of us non-pilots try to post info that has value. But it is what it is. Ifyou don't want me posting here, let me know. I'll quit typing replies and comments that end up in the round file. Thanks in advance for your consideration...

[tigerfish]

Totally support the mods on this one. Whilst I agree that PPrune is a rumour network, there simply has to be an element of experienced professional helicopter pilot input. Recent posts have not followed that discipline.


TF

[jess15]

Totally support the mods on this one. Whilst I agree that PPrune is a rumour network, there simply has to be an element of experienced professional helicopter pilot input. Recent posts have not followed that discipline.


TF
Speaking of experienced professional helicopter pilot input, this guy makes some very relevant comments. scroll to around 20 minute mark

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ymcG-YKOCM

[Senior Pilot]

Is this why my replies aren't showing up? I try not to engage in empty speculation. I've been a Feeder for 6 years ( using FR24 sponsored hardware) and do know something about ADS-B. I'm familiar with its weak points and strong points. Its understandable that the Rotor Pilots who have been here for years resent the onslaught of non-rotor pilots over the last week. Some of us non-pilots try to post info that has value. But it is what it is. Ifyou don't want me posting here, let me know. I'll quit typing replies and comments that end up in the round file. Thanks in advance for your consideration...

We have had no way of knowing your expertise, or lack of, until this response of yours.

A recent poster from the USA contributing in the C-130 Australian crash thread was adamant that he is/was an ADS-B expert and derailed the thread comprehensively with his ‘proof’ that the wings folded whilst at a significant altitude, despite advice to the contrary. That sort of problem cannot help but influence our moderation of new signups who appear within these high profile threads.

FWIW he also claimed your sort of experience; but please continue to contribute on the understanding that not everything will make it onto the thread.

And to those having issues against this moderation, you are welcome to your opinions. Just don’t expect them to remain on view in this thread.

[Musician]

I'd like to thank everyone who answered my questions about the engine noise on the doorbell video. My takeaway of the answers is that there is no clear sign of a malfunction, and while some people had different ideas of various symptoms that might be audible, there was never any other pilot who would back that up, which to me feels that it isn't indicated clearly enough in the recording to be relied upon.

I have to admit that I haven't paid any attention to the news media, and what any witnesses they found reported on what the machine sounds like, mostly because the average person doesn't even know what it's supposed to sound like. But here, we had an opportunity to have a group of people listen to that sound who do know, and I now feel fairly certain that there isn't anything in there that could be heard (and especially not by any witness who would have only heard it once, and who would not have had the prescience to know a crash was imminent). If there was, several pilots would have noticed it.

To be extra clear, there still could have been some sort of failure aboard the aircraft; all I'm saying is that we can't decide that from the audio. The NTSB is investigating.

(An analysis I thought I could do is to quantify the Doppler effect, i.e. the reduction in pitch of the audible noise (not of the aircraft! this is about sound frequencies, not attitude) as the helicopter passes the recording location that result from the change of the helicopter moving towards the microphone and then away from it; since n5296s found out where the camera is, this could corroborate the speed and flight path of the helicopter with a little applied geometry and physics. But it seems like a lot of effort for very little gain; I'm certain the NTSB has access to experts who have experience with this, and who can throw more advanced methods at this data, so at this point I'm just going to wait for their preliminary report.)

[[email protected]]

Speaking of experienced professional helicopter pilot input, this guy makes some very relevant comments. scroll to around 20 minute mark he does make some very valid points, especially about instrument ratings but at about 17 minutes he states that getting IMC with low speed, (below 20 to 30 kts) is a situation nobody could get out of - that is demonstrably untrue, you just have to train to do it.

[Search&Rescue]

It has already been acknowledged that the ADSB data may well be unreliable and the doorbell audio sounds like industry insider says- just a helicopter passing overhead in the cruise.

All the talk of rates of descent and angles of bank is pure conjecture and not really helpful to anyone.

It seems to me that we are far more likely to be talking CFIT than LOC - but we still don't know why.

It is always a pleasure to read your posts and professional comments Crab... the difference between CFIT and LOC might sometimes be marginal... but if the helicopter was inverted during impact, I would rather consider this sad accident as a LOC.

[XV666]

It is always a pleasure to read your posts and professional comments Crab... the difference between CFIT and LOC might sometimes be marginal,,, but if the helicopter was inverted during impact, I would rather consider this sad accident as a LOC.

Where do you get the idea that it was inverted?

[Bravo Delta]

I'd like to thank everyone who answered my questions about the engine noise on the doorbell video. My takeaway of the answers is that there is no clear sign of a malfunction, and while some people had different ideas of various symptoms that might be audible, there was never any other pilot who would back that up, which to me feels that it isn't indicated clearly enough in the recording to be relied upon.

I have to admit that I haven't paid any attention to the news media, and what any witnesses they found reported on what the machine sounds like, mostly because the average person doesn't even know what it's supposed to sound like. But here, we had an opportunity to have a group of people listen to that sound who do know, and I now feel fairly certain that there isn't anything in there that could be heard (and especially not by any witness who would have only heard it once, and who would not have had the prescience to know a crash was imminent). If there was, several pilots would have noticed it.

To be extra clear, there still could have been some sort of failure aboard the aircraft; all I'm saying is that we can't decide that from the audio. The NTSB is investigating.

(An analysis I thought I could do is to quantify the Doppler effect, i.e. the reduction in pitch of the audible noise (not of the aircraft! this is about sound frequencies, not attitude) as the helicopter passes the recording location that result from the change of the helicopter moving towards the microphone and then away from it; since n5296s found out where the camera is, this could corroborate the speed and flight path of the helicopter with a little applied geometry and physics. But it seems like a lot of effort for very little gain; I'm certain the NTSB has access to experts who have experience with this, and who can throw more advanced methods at this data, so at this point I'm just going to wait for their preliminary report.)

Agreed but my comment will be that the audio does indicate relatively advanced forward speed under the supposed reduced visibility..????

[Search&Rescue]

Where do you get the idea that it was inverted?

Hi there! Of course I am not 100% sure... but look at the post #329...

[helimutt]

Agreed but my comment will be that the audio does indicate relatively advanced forward speed under the supposed reduced visibility..????

I’d actually say from the door cam sound recording that the S76 in question wasn’t moving that quickly. So, you have two differing opinions. Different people hear different things.

[gulliBell]

I'd like to thank everyone who answered my questions about the engine noise on the doorbell video...

Just to be clear, even if there was an engine problem, it doesn't require an immediate landing or cause a loss of control. There is another engine with plenty of power available to keep you humming along just fine. Even if you have an engine on fire, just let it burn until you are safely transitioned to single engine flight. There is no hurry to rush anything. When you are safely flying and assured of terrain clearance, you have two fire bottles that discharge into the engine bay. If those two bottles of fire retardant don't put out the fire, the engine bay is fire rated for 15 minutes. Gives you plenty of time to get it on the ground safely. So these reports of engine spluttering or whatever. Total bollocks. Engine problems are a total furphy in explaining an apparent loss of control.

[SASless]

The video with the two guys yakking about the crash needs some qualifying in my opinion.

It begins with neither one of them were first hand witnesses.

The "Helicopter Pilot" flys EMS in Northern California where there have been several fatal crashes due to IIMC/CFIT/LOC tragedies.

This crash occurred in the day light, and at this point the NTSB is just getting started with their investigation and have not reported ANY causes or indications of what actually occurred during the last few moments of the flight.

We do have some collateral data that is of some use but does not rise to actual fact or evidence at this time.

So ya'll just keep on with your speculation.

Just be careful about hanging yer hat on some of the information being presented as fact.

Thus far, Crab remains the adult in the room in my view by his injecting some very wise observations. (Yes....Crab....I have paid you a compliment!).

[[email protected]]

Crieky SAS - I'll go and have a lie down :):ok: - I think we do tend to agree on most of the important stuff most of the time :ok:

I trust you are up and running on the new hip now?

[SASless]

Walking .... Running is no longer an option or any other high impact activity......but improving overall.

If pain makes one strong....I am about ready to start tugging on Superman's Cape.

[sandiego89]

Hi there! Of course I am not 100% sure... but look at the post #329...

Post 329 if fraught with problems, and purely speculation on the attitude, I would not put much credence into it. The 329 poster says the main rotor blades can be seen at the start of the impact site, but they seem to be clearly in the middle at least to me (red and white painted rotor elements). A high speed impact, during a turn in hilly terrain is going to be an extremely violent, tumbling, incident.

[ShyTorque]

I suspect that the EMS pilot in the video above muddled the theory behind VRS and that of RBS with regard to the effect on angle of attack in VRS. He got it right but then changed his mind.

[HissingSyd]

I have lurked for quite a while here, but I might have something pertinent to offer.
It seems that the pilot was in a climbing turn and that he started it in VMC before entering cloud. At that point he is likely to have looked down towards his instruments. This could well have triggered the Coriolis Illusion. This is not just disorientation and it is not the leans, but a full-blown sensation of spinning about all three axes.
This once happened to me. I was taking off from a frigate in a Wasp at night, The cloud base was forecast at 300 feet, but it was actually no more than 100. As I was turning and climbing away from the ship visually I entered cloud and immediately looked down to the instruments. I was experienced and current and I knew straight away what was happening, but it required an immense effort of will to ignore what my senses were telling me and not put in any control inputs. It probably lasted less than ten seconds, but felt like a lifetime. It really could have been a killer.

[Arnie Madsen]

Post 329 if fraught with problems, and purely speculation on the attitude, I would not put much credence into it. The 329 poster says the main rotor blades can be seen at the start of the impact site, but they seem to be clearly in the middle at least to me (red and white painted rotor elements). A high speed impact, during a turn in hilly terrain is going to be an extremely violent, tumbling, incident.

Fair enough sandiego89 .... I agree that I should have said the blades are JUST PAST the impact zone (in my original post I said AT the impact zone) .

But I still speculate the machine must have been mostly inverted (blades hit the dirt first) because they all broke off (rather cleanly) and at the same time (at impact crater) ...... then they would have bounced a bit to where they are in middle of the picture .... and the main fuselege traveled a bit farther because of the larger mass .

In any other scenario , such as a steep turn , the blade tips would hit first and sections of blade would fly off in all directions away from the main site.

I cannot think of any other way the blades could all be completely severed and remain in one spot. Hope that makes sense. Thanks.

.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1189x720/bryant_blade_debris_07567616608d94788d98d362d61461ca01efde77 .jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1072x540/kobe_bryant_blades_at_impact_49bc8e49dc84992c7473fd1291513a5 2a8c56335.jpg

[JimEli]

Just to be clear, even if there was an engine problem, it doesn't require an immediate landing or cause a loss of control. There is another engine with plenty of power available to keep you humming along just fine. Even if you have an engine on fire, just let it burn until you are safely transitioned to single engine flight. There is no hurry to rush anything. When you are safely flying and assured of terrain clearance, you have two fire bottles that discharge into the engine bay. If those two bottles of fire retardant don't put out the fire, the engine bay is fire rated for 15 minutes. Gives you plenty of time to get it on the ground safely. So these reports of engine spluttering or whatever. Total bollocks. Engine problems are a total furphy in explaining an apparent loss of control.To my knowledge, certification standards (Part 29 in this case) have never stipulated a 15-minute time period. Has the manufacturer stated that time period?

[[email protected]]

It may be but the Coriolis illusion is normally the result of abrupt head movement after being in a steady state turn for some while - not sure it fits the picture here but it is a possibility.

[MechEngr]

Fair enough sandiego89 .... I agree that I should have said the blades are JUST PAST the impact zone (in my original post I said AT the impact zone) .

But I still speculate the machine must have been mostly inverted (blades hit the dirt first) because they all broke off (rather cleanly) and at the same time (at impact crater) ...... then they would have bounced a bit to where they are in middle of the picture .... and the main fuselege traveled a bit farther because of the larger mass .

In any other scenario , such as a steep turn , the blade tips would hit first and sections of blade would fly off in all directions away from the main site.

I cannot think of any other way the blades could all be completely severed and remain in one spot. Hope that makes sense. Thanks.

.

https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1189x720/bryant_blade_debris_07567616608d94788d98d362d61461ca01efde77 .jpg
https://cimg9.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune.org-vbulletin/1072x540/kobe_bryant_blades_at_impact_49bc8e49dc84992c7473fd1291513a5 2a8c56335.jpg

I've seen an estimate that the rotor turns at around 350 RPM; if that is wrong then the rest of this will be too, by whatever the proportion of error is in that number. That means that the rotor is turning at nearly 6 rotations per second, (350/60), so 1/6th of a second for a full rotation. If the copter was going say, 150 mph, that's 220 feet per second, so one rotation would be amount to 44 feet of travel. As each of the 4 blades strike the ground, the next blade would hit at 1/4 of that, or about 11 feet. The blades are 22 feet intact, so the over lap could be 50%.

The blades would have some forward momentum, but they would all have the same momentum, and should end up roughly the same distance from their individual initial impact sites. The large imbalance in the rotor head could have quickly dispatched that connection to the drive; it is different than most blade shedding that I've seen videos of where the pilot would be involved in shutting off power and the rotor head remains with the helicopter fuselage even as blades are flung from the accident. In those cases the imbalance causes each blade impact to be in a different location as the fuselage pivots on the ground. In this case, there is the distinct possibility that nearly 1300 shaft horse power was being dumped into the rotor at the same time the unbalance was increasing and with the last blade left, broke that connection, allowing the momentum of the stubs to carry the rotor head separately. If the blades were striking on the retreat side their velocity relative to the ground would be largely reduced, not nearly to zero by any means, but a lot.

tl;dr I would discount the helicopter being inverted at the crash site; It looks more like the main fuselage crumpled at an initial impact, allowing the rotor blades into substantially level contact with the tips hitting the hillside, and the engine and drivetrain, tailcone, and rotor head separating and continuing on, carried by momentum to their various end points. It just appears unusual because it's a rare type of crash. An open field accident, chopper stationary on the ground, usually flings blades randomly, but this only shares that a helicopter was involved.

[roscoe1]

" This is not just disorientation and it is not the leans, but a full-blown sensation of spinning about all three axes."

This sounds like what it can be like if you have ever been in a Barany chair which is a vertigo inducer training device. The chair spins smoothly while you wear a blindfold. Youn re told to put your head in various positions and asked to determine direction of spin etc. By far the most dramatic and frightening demo was where they had you lower your chin by your chest for a while as the instructor spins, stops spins in the other direction and eventually tells you to raise your head. The sensation is best described as feeling like you've been pitched from your pilot seat, out of the helicopter in a hover at altitude. It made me make noises I've never made before and grip the chair, although that made no difference. The instructor then pulled off my blindfold to allow the rest of the class to see my eyes, which were uncontrollably darting around for several long seconds before I almost fell out of the chair. It was so unnerving as to instantly change my perspective ( no pun intended) on spatial disorientation. You sort of think you know how to deal with it but after this demo I'm not sure I want to find out.

[Search&Rescue]

To my knowledge, certification standards (Part 29 in this case) have never stipulated a 15-minute time period. Has the manufacturer stated that time period?

§29.861 Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts.
Each part of the structure, controls, and the rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to controlled landing and (for category A) flight that would be affected by powerplant fires must be isolated under § 29.1191, or must be—
(a) For category A rotorcraft, fire- proof; and
(b) For Category B rotorcraft, fire- proof or protected so that they can per- form their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.
[Doc. No. 5084, 29 FR 16150, Dec. 3, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 27–26, 55 FR 8005, Mar. 6, 1990]

(And ”Fire proof” should be associated with a test flame temperature of 2000 degrees F for at least 15-minute duration...)

[Squawk7700]

It has been a very long time since a pilot has discovered a new way to crash an aircraft. There is nothing new here. The pilot lost control of the situation in low visibility conditions, for whatever reasons. It happened twice two weeks ago in our country and five good people died, and it will continue to happen whilst pilots push their personal limits.

[Weheka]

Squawk, well said.

[Weheka]

HissingSid, you experienced what some call "the matrix effect".

[gulliBell]

To my knowledge, certification standards (Part 29 in this case) have never stipulated a 15-minute time period. Has the manufacturer stated that time period?
Via our training pipeline custodian of all S76 knowledge, 2000 degrees and 15 minutes. We've been teaching that in our ground school courses for years.

[gulliBell]

...But I still speculate the machine must have been mostly inverted (blades hit the dirt first) because they all broke off (rather cleanly) and at the same time (at impact crater) ...... then they would have bounced a bit to where they are in middle of the picture .... and the main fuselege traveled a bit farther because of the larger mass .

They were my initial thoughts exactly as soon as I saw the drone overhead debris dispersion. And the reasonably circular 44 ft wide brush cutting effort.

[megan]

Via our training pipeline custodian of all S76 knowledge, 2000 degrees and 15 minutes. We've been teaching that in our ground school courses for yearsAuthoritative reference please, not all that's taught is legit.

[HissingSyd]

By far the most dramatic and frightening demo was where they had you lower your chin by your chest for a while as the instructor spins, stops spins in the other direction and eventually tells you to raise your head. The sensation is best described as feeling like you've been pitched from your pilot seat, out of the helicopter in a hover at altitude.
Indeed. We were subjected to this in initial training, which meant that I had a chance of recognising it. Does everyone have this experience today?

It may be but the Coriolis illusion is normally the result of abrupt head movement after being in a steady state turn for some while.
That is the demonstration as described by Roscoe, but I do not think the physics requires the steady state to cause the illusion.
Before posting I looked at a lot of sites about the Coriolis Illusion and there seem to be two distinct descriptions, copied almost word-for-word from site-to-site. The first is like yours and the second like mine. Wikipedia, for instance, is like mine.

It has been a very long time since a pilot has discovered a new way to crash an aircraft. There is nothing new here.
Whatever the cause it is unlikely to be new, but how prepared are helicopter pilots these days, to cope with the somatogyral illusions?

[JimEli]

§29.861 Fire protection of structure, controls, and other parts.
Each part of the structure, controls, and the rotor mechanism, and other parts essential to controlled landing and (for category A) flight that would be affected by powerplant fires must be isolated under § 29.1191, or must be—
(a) For category A rotorcraft, fire- proof; and
(b) For Category B rotorcraft, fire- proof or protected so that they can per- form their essential functions for at least 5 minutes under any foreseeable powerplant fire conditions.
[Doc. No. 5084, 29 FR 16150, Dec. 3, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 27–26, 55 FR 8005, Mar. 6, 1990]

(And ”Fire proof” should be associated with a test flame temperature of 2000 degrees F for at least 15-minute duration...)Very good. FWIW, those are the current regulation/guidance. At the time of the S-76 certification, (category B occurred in 1978, and category A followed in 1979), there was no quantified definition of “fireproof.” In 1993, the FAA published AC33-2B, which stated:

The FAR Part 1 definitions of “fire-resistant” and “fire proof” are very broad and are not quantified in terms of flame temperature and time of immersion. For purposes of engine certification, fire resistant should be associated with a test flame temperature of 2000 degrees F, for at least a 5-minute duration; fireproof should be associated with a test flame temperature of 2000 degrees F, for at least a 15-minute duration.

[dukesahazard]

FWIW, the rotor blades are not all in one spot. The rotor head itself is 100' or so on the far side of the fuselage. There's a large piece of rotor blade a couple hundred feet beyond that. You can see both on the news copter footage shot right after the crash.

[JimEli]

Just to be clear, even if there was an engine problem, it doesn't require an immediate landing or cause a loss of control. There is another engine with plenty of power available to keep you humming along just fine. Even if you have an engine on fire, just let it burn until you are safely transitioned to single engine flight. There is no hurry to rush anything. When you are safely flying and assured of terrain clearance, you have two fire bottles that discharge into the engine bay. If those two bottles of fire retardant don't put out the fire, the engine bay is fire rated for 15 minutes. Gives you plenty of time to get it on the ground safely. So these reports of engine spluttering or whatever. Total bollocks. Engine problems are a total furphy in explaining an apparent loss of control.

And one last thing...I hear advice similar to this espoused everywhere. And I agree that response could be too hurried, inducing error. But hesitation can easily be taken too far, or employed with an attitude too cavalierly. In a jet aircraft with podded engines, the advice seems more practicable, however, consider the location and distance between engines in your helicopter, with the likelihood of subsidiary complications. Most engine fire emergency procedures dictate the immediate establishment of OEI flight and extinguishing without delay.

FWIW, this S-76 accident (https://app.ntsb.gov/pdfgenerator/ReportGeneratorFile.ashx?EventID=20051128X01894&AKey=1&RType=Summary&IType=MA) somewhat highlights this, wherein the NTSB determined the probable cause(s) to be the pilots' delayed response to an engine fire warning…

[[email protected]]

That is the demonstration as described by Roscoe, but I do not think the physics requires the steady state to cause the illusion. Syd, as I understand it the steady state is required because the semi-circular canals stop sensing movement because there is no acceleration in any plane to create the sense of movement - when the head is suddenly moved there is acceleration and hence the confusing sensations in the balance organs.

Whatever the cause it is unlikely to be new, but how prepared are helicopter pilots these days, to cope with the somatogyral illusions? British Army pilots are required to undergo disorientation training in the air on an annual basis.

Brit Mil pilots all go through similar training at RAF Henlow.

[gulliBell]

Authoritative reference please, not all that's taught is legit.
I'll defer to post #486. But it wouldn't have been put in our course without an authoritative source.

[megan]

gulli, there's authoritative, and then there's authoritative, FSI disseminated some duff gen once upon a time, as does our wonderful CASA still. You'll no doubt remember the -92 run dry capability sprouted by SK in its advertising.

[gulliBell]

gulli, there's authoritative, and then there's authoritative, FSI disseminated some duff gen once upon a time, as does our wonderful CASA still. You'll no doubt remember the -92 run dry capability sprouted by SK in its advertising.
Yes, grant you that. Given our FSI links, and their Sikorsky factory links, it's quite possible most roads lead to Stratford CT.